https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/jihadists_reformed_or_reborn

One of the most extraordinary stories coming out of the unfolding Arab uprisings is that of Abdelhakim Belhaj, a key figure in the military forces supporting the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) and leader of the so-called Tripoli Military Council (TMC). Belhaj is reported to have led some 600 men—many of whom supposedly, like him, gained military experience during the Afghan war—in the crucial assault on Moammar al-Qaddafi’s Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli.

Belhaj reportedly accompanied NTC President Mustafa Abdel Jalil to key meetings in France and Qatar to help organize foreign support during the uprising. He also oversaw Abdel Jalil’s chaotic and rapturous entry into the Libyan capital as the leader of the de facto new Libyan government. Belhaj is therefore, in every way, a key figure in the NTC military alliance, if not its political leadership.

What is remarkable is that Belhaj’s history suggests that he has been not only an Islamist, but a Salafist-Jihadist with ties to the Afghan mujahideen, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and the notorious Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He was the leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), an extreme Muslim organization fighting to overthrow Qaddafi.

In 2004, when the West was cooperating with Qaddafi following the invasion of Iraq, Belhaj was arrested in Bangkok, Thailand, at the behest of Western intelligence services and subjected to “special rendition” to Libya followed by a lengthy incarceration and torture. He was released last year as part of a “de-radicalization” program overseen by Qaddafi’s son, Seif al-Islam. Belhaj is not the only member of the LIFG to have emerged as part of the NTC coalition. Others include Ismail al-Salabi, Abdelhakim al-Hasidi and Ali Salabi.

Qaddafi always claimed that the core of the uprising against him was “al Qaeda,” and although the LIFG was never a member of any formal al Qaeda coalition, it clearly was on the extreme Salafist-Jihadist, “takfiri” end of the Islamist spectrum. In the West, opponents of the limited military intervention, from both the left and the right, are claiming that al Qaeda now rules in Tripoli and that the West has been “conned” into supporting the worst kind of Muslim radicals.

Belhaj for his part claims to be a transformed man, a Libyan patriot and a loyal member of a large and diverse coalition. Thus far, most of what he and his fellow former LIFG colleagues have said and done seems to lend credence to those claims.

This raises a fascinating and novel narrative in the Arab uprisings: Former extremists and Salafist-Jihadists are maybe being transformed into religiously conservative but patriotic members of broad coalitions that are nationalistic and willing to engage in compromises and power-sharing arrangements. Indeed, so far they appear to be not only loyal members of the NTC, but have also generally subordinated themselves to its political leadership. Belhaj seems either to be accepting the authority of a broader political leadership or making his own decisions that seem to reflect a genuinely transformed worldview.

All is not sweetness and light, however. There are worrying reports that attempts to discipline Belhaj’s Tripoli Military Council by NTC chair Mahmoud Jibril were rejected by the TMC spokesman, Anees al-Sharif, who said, “We will not accept Jibril’s authority over us.” But one should not overestimate the impact of inevitable moments of friction within a diverse coalition in which lines of authority are still being drawn.

Whether or not Belhaj and his colleagues have really been transformed as they claim and seem to have been, or whether they are simply strategically positioning themselves and are still guided by their old ideology, remains to be determined. But if their metamorphosis is real, this may presage a new and important Arab political narrative whereby extreme Islamists can become part of diverse nationalist coalitions.

As Omar Ashour of the University of Exeter has pointed out, this renunciation of violence would echo that of Egypt’s Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya, reflecting a willingness of hitherto extremist groups to join political systems that are more pluralistic than such groups’ previous ideologies would have allowed. There is reason to hope that this development is part of a pattern whereby once violent jihadists are participating in national transformations by embracing political competition rather than a violent imposition of their worldview.

A decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Arab uprising—with their demands for democracy, elections and pluralistic systems—along with other factors, may at long last be dealing a death blow to al Qaeda-style violent Islamism. This offers former Jihadists a transformed ideology and perspective, and a new model for political engagement.

If the emerging narrative of the transformation of Abdelhakim Belhaj proves accurate, it will be among the more encouraging outcomes of this period of Arab uprisings, reflecting how these have contributed to tempering some of the most extreme forms of Muslim radicalism.

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/last-minute-deal-could-avert-a-collision-course-at-the-un?pageCount=0#full

The insistence by the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that he will
present a request for full UN membership for Palestine in its 1967
borders to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon at the General Assembly
meeting later this week – although telegraphed months in advance – has
sent shock waves through international relations, and Israeli and US
domestic politics as well.

Mr Abbas could have announced that he had already submitted this
letter and that it is a fait accompli. Instead, he gave world leaders
another week to act. So far Israel, the United States, the European
Union and the Middle East Quartet have provided him with virtually
nothing he can present to the Palestinian public as a plausible
alternative.

Renewed negotiations, a new framework for talks or a statement clearly
outlining the contours of a two-state solution might have sufficed.
None of these have been forthcoming, but the window of opportunity is
still open.

There are genuine reasons of state for this Palestinian move, no
matter how risky and even potentially disastrous it might prove.

Palestinians simply cannot live with a status quo involving continued
occupation and expanding settlement with virtually no prospects of a
serious resumption of bilateral talks with Israel. The negotiating
process brokered by the United States looks incapable of overcoming
the impasse between the two sides and the sense that something drastic
is required to communicate the level of Palestinian desperation is
widely shared.

There are also domestic political considerations. The secular,
nationalist Palestinian leadership in Ramallah knows that if this
deadlock continues indefinitely, at some point Palestinian society
will conclude their strategy of achieving Palestinian independence
through negotiations with Israel, diplomacy and institution-building
has permanently failed. They will then look for an alternative, and an
Islamist one is already ruling in Gaza.
But the potential damage to the Palestinian national interest and
project can hardly be overstated. The Republican-controlled US House
of Representatives has made its willingness to slash or even eliminate
US aid, the single biggest external source of PA revenue, crystal
clear.

Israel too has threatened unspecified “harsh measures” in response. If
the Palestinians are gambling that the US and Israel will ultimately
conclude they need the Palestinian Authority as much as it needs their
cooperation, they may be in for a nasty surprise.

As Mr Abbas himself has repeatedly acknowledged, a negotiated
agreement is the only choice for the creation of a Palestinian state.
And there is no alternative broker other than the United States. A
crisis in relations with the Americans by provoking a veto in the
Security Council is unlikely to enhance the prospects for genuine,
rather than virtual, Palestinian statehood.

If Palestinians are confident that Arab states will make up any
shortfall from a cut in western aid or Israel withholding Palestinian
tax revenues, they may face another serious disappointment. In The New
York Times, Saudi Arabia’s Prince Turki Al Faisal said that his
country had “earmarked $2.5 billion [Dh9.2 billion]” for the
Palestinians since 2009. That may be true, but no such figure has
actually been delivered. Palestinians can expect generous pledges from
Arab states, but must doubt the extent to which they will be
fulfilled. And aid, if it is provided, would certainly come with
significant political strings attached.

The United States and Israel are plainly not going to provide the
Palestinians with any real alternative. The European Union, however-
which collectively gives more than twice what the US does to the PA
annually – finds itself uncomfortably divided among three camps: those
inclined to support, those which oppose and those that are ambivalent
about the Palestinian UN bid.

In its own interests, the EU has been working to find an alternative
formula in the General Assembly that it can unite behind and also
provide Palestinians with a significant upgrade in status. The major
stumbling block has been that upgrading Palestine to a non-member
observer state in the UN might give it access to the International
Criminal Court and other forums in which it could pursue charges
against Israel, which is unacceptable to some key European powers.

There has even been serious consideration of creating a new legal
status for Palestine that would make it a non-member state, or
something extremely close, but without access to these international
legal enforcement bodies. The Middle East Quartet has also been
working on a compromise to avoid a universally damaging confrontation.

It is still possible for Palestinians to make both their point and
advance their international status without a crisis in relations with
both the United States and much of Europe. Moreover a Palestinian bid
for full membership could be bogged down in the UN apparatus for
months or even indefinitely. A reasonable compromise is in everyone’s
interests.

Most important is the day-after scenario that will follow whatever
takes place at the UN this week. The worst thing that Israel, the US
Congress and others could do is cut funding to the PA, leaving
Palestinians on the ground tangibly worse off than they were before.

Frustration and despair could provoke an outburst of anger and even
violence, turning a difficult diplomatic mess into an unmanageable
political and security nightmare for Israel and the PA alike.

Any such move designed to “punish” the Palestinians is also likely to
backfire on Israel and the United States. Cooler heads should prevail
at the UN, but what is more important is to prevent an irrational
overreaction that takes a bad situation and makes it potentially
catastrophic.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=308686&MID=0&PID=0

The overthrow of Libyan leader Moammar al-Qaddafi has been widely regarded in the United States as a victory for President Barack Obama, as well as a vindication of his policy of limited military engagement. However, the extent to which the Libya policy is regarded as a template for American engagement when it comes to other ongoing Arab uprisings is still being hotly debated. In particular, there is still a strong consensus in Washington against any form of military intervention in Syria.

However, some voices in the Syrian opposition have begun to point to the Libyan experience as a template of their own for how to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime: first, by launching an armed rebellion; second, by establishing a stronghold and rival government on some part of Syrian territory; third, by appealing for outside intervention from the air and other coercive measures to chip away at the infrastructure of the Syrian leadership; and fourth, by launching a major offensive with the aim of taking Damascus and securing the dictatorship’s overthrow.

Like most Arab commentators, a majority of Americans regards this scenario as a pipe dream. The differences between Libya and Syria are many, and there is great fear that an armed uprising might play into the hands of the regime and legitimize repression. There is also skepticism that a rebel army could successfully be formed or prove a match for elite Syrian security forces that have so far proven fiercely loyal to the regime. There is considerable concern as well that a civil conflict could become even more sectarian in nature and spill over into neighboring Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey.

However, following Qaddafi’s overthrow there was growing interest among some Syrian opposition figures in armed rebellion. As a consequence, some Americans are beginning to toy with the idea that if a rebel force were to begin operating, it might be wise or even necessary to take significant actions to support it.

Michael O’Hanlon, a military expert at the Brookings Institution, has been one of the first and most forthright American commentators to raise the prospect of military options for the West in Syria. Like everyone else, he rejects the notion of an Iraq-style American invasion; says it is too soon to impose no-fly or no-go areas, while adding that this is a future possibility; suggests that a naval and land blockade might be effective; and raises the prospect of a Kosovo-style air campaign against the Assad regime and its assets. O’Hanlon says he favors none of these options at the moment, but insists now is the time to begin considering them.

Such thinking not only reflects a sense of vindication of Obama’s measured and calculated use of force in Libya to encourage regime change, but also the lack of other options the United States has to encourage the end or transformation of the regime in Damascus.

For months, American policy was focused on creating a dialogue between elements of the opposition and those in the Syrian power structure interested in a “pacted transition” to forestall the drift toward civil conflict. Almost everyone has concluded that such efforts are not plausible given the regime’s intransigence and the difficulty the opposition has faced in forming a unified front.

Consequently, the Obama administration is now committed to regime change because it has finally accepted that Assad cannot reform. But it lacks powerful leverage, and is forced to rely on cooperation with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and European allies who have closer ties to Damascus, further limiting its options.

However, the model Obama laid out for Libya—balancing interests with values whenever possible—is readily applicable to a project of regime change in Syria, which would serve American interests and values. Anxiety about regional unrest from Syria’s destabilization remains acute in Washington, but there is a growing sense that it is the regime itself that is the greatest source of instability.

Indeed, there is a growing belief that Assad and his acolytes are deliberately promoting conflict and sectarian tension in order to compel Syrians to accept the regime’s version of stability, regardless of the repression and brutality entailing, over the dangers of an uncertain future following an armed rebellion.

Washington would almost certainly prefer not to see an armed rebellion or any kind of destabilizing civil conflict in Syria. However, many American observers believe that an armed rebellion or civil war in Syria is almost inevitable and that the Assad regime is doomed. If such a situation were to take shape, and if an eventual rebel force and organized opposition were to pose a serious challenge to the power of the regime, although it would certainly follow a different trajectory than the conflict in Libya, Western and American inaction would make little sense.

The United States knows it would have a major stake in the outcome of such a conflict. Like it or not, Washington would eventually have to take significant measures—if not take on a repetition of the limited military intervention in Libya—to ensure an acceptable post-Assad future in Syria.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/is-civil-war-in-syria-inevitable/244614/?single_page=true

The prospects for a full-blown and largely sectarian civil war in Syria are mounting by the day. Much of the Syrian opposition, dedicated to non-violence, appears extremely reluctant to even consider the prospect. But as President Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown worsens, as the options for any other means of achieving regime change seemed to dwindle, and with the Libya model presenting itself, however imprecisely, as an alternative stratagem, the drift towards conflict is starting to feel palpable.

The Syrian Powder Keg

In some senses, all of the required element are already in place for a civil war to erupt. In recent weeks some of the opposition has been slowly suggesting a greater willingness to accept the use of arms. There are hints that arms and financing for weapons are being delivered by outside forces. And increasing numbers of the rank-and-file Syrian military are defecting. Together, these factors could prepare the nucleus for an armed rebel group. The emergence of a significant and potentially effective armed rebel group in Syria is now readily imaginable.

The Christian Science Monitor reports that Lebanese arms merchants are noticing a huge spike in prices, which they attribute to vastly increased demand for black market weapons in Syria. Mohammed Rahhal, a leader of the Revolutionary Council of the Syrian Coordination Committees (one of many opposition groups), last week bluntly told the pan-Arab newspaper Ash Sharq al-Awsat, “We made the decision to arm the revolution, which will turn violent very soon, because what we are being subjected to today is a global conspiracy that can only be faced by an armed uprising.” According to David Ignatius, “a newly emboldened Saudi Arabia has been pumping money to Sunni fighters in Syria.”

The most important factor pushing Syria in the direction of civil conflict may be that the Assad regime has left the opposition few other options for anything resembling success. The largely nonviolent protests have brought nothing in the way of serious reform or to weaken the regime’s grip on power. The protest movement, as it is presently structured, does not seem capable of either. If anything, the regime seems to have consistently worsened its behavior. With the opposition basing its strategy primarily on embarrassing the regime and increasing international pressure, rhetoric, and sanctions, the nonviolent tactic has been almost all pain with very little gain. At some point, other options will have to be considered — or the fight against Assad abandoned.

The battle lines are already drawn in Syria, and they are largely sectarian

The Tunisian and Egyptian models are not being repeated in Syria. In both of those cases, elements within the power structures decided that regime decapitation (taking out the top-level leadership but retaining the overall structure), managed reform, and a transition led under implicit pact with the protesters were preferable to risking complete downfall. Neither the Syrian political elite nor the most well-armed and well-trained professional soldiers, most of which come from the minority religious Alawite sect of which Assad is the leader, have demonstrated any interest in such a process.

The ouster of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya would seem to present a second model for regime change in the Arab uprisings. In Syria, such an approach may or may not be applicable, wise, or even practicable. The Libyan model essentially reduces to a four-stage process:

1) Establish a viable, armed rebel fighting force, base of operations, and rival government and capital in some part of the country. (In Syria, one can imagine this emerging in Hama, Homs, or Deraa, to name three possibilities.)

2) Appeal for international support in weapons, training, financing, and possibly even air support or other arm’s-length military intervention;

3) Chip away at the power of the regime in a relentless war of attrition using these resources;

4) Overthrow the regime militarily in a full-fledged revolution.

The Assad regime, however, is not nearly as hollow, in terms of support and infrastructure, as Qaddafi’s. It has proven its resilience and that it commands a fiercely loyal sectarian and ideological following among a hyper-empowered minority. Since that minority seems to increasingly feel it is not only fighting to preserve its power but also even possibly to prevent its physical decimation should they lose, the regime is quite unlikely to collapse from within.

This idea — that an intransigent Arab dictatorship can in fact be overthrown by an armed rebellion in a genuine revolution through a process of civil war — is a relatively new one in the contemporary Arab world. Neighboring states such as Turkey, some Gulf countries, and Western powers would be extremely unlikely to stand idly by doing nothing if a full-blown civil war were to erupt in Syria. The stakes would simply be too high.

The battle lines are already drawn in Syria, and they are largely sectarian. The respected German publication Zeit Online recently reported that at least one major Syrian city, Homs, “now resembles Beirut in the 1980s, divided along ethnic and religious lines where it’s too dangerous for people to travel in a particular direction because they will be shot if they do so.” The report adds, “Alawites have secured the streets leading to their residential areas with checkpoints. Their street barricades aren’t manned by the military, but by Alawite civilians who now fear being massacred in a Syria without Assad.”

Several reports suggest that other non-Sunni minorities, including many Christians, are also concerned about reprisals and the rise of Islamist forces in a post-Assad Syria. The great exception seems to be the Sunni merchant classes of Damascus and Aleppo, which appear to be more afraid of the chaos and violence of a civil war than they are of the regime’s brutality. However, as the daily death toll mounts, this calculus seems to be changing. It could change further as Western sanctions intensify, possibly convincing these urban middle classes that they have more to gain with the removal of the regime than tolerating its abuses.

The Washington Post recently noted that the success of the Libyan rebels “is prompting calls within the Syrian opposition for armed rebellion and NATO intervention after nearly six months of overwhelmingly peaceful demonstrations that have failed to dislodge President Bashar al-Assad.” Reporting for the paper, Liz Sly reported banners calling for NATO or other foreign intervention force as well as the increasing use of firearms by formerly peaceful protesters in Homs and other cities. The New York Times reported increasing defections by rank-and-file soldiers and the creation of an ad hoc organization claiming to represent them called “The Free Officers of Syria.”

The regime itself appears to be preparing for precisely such a conflict. In mid-August, Iran concluded an agreement with Syria to construct a large military compound in the Latakia airport that would serve as a direct supply route for heavy weaponry and other military supplies from Tehran. Crucially, Latakia is the de facto capital of the Alawite-dominated areas of northern Syria, an important port city, and the site of some of the fiercest attacks on protesters and Palestinian refugees by regime forces. The creation of a new major military base and supply conduit in the Latakia airport suggests the regime wants a Plan B in the event of a civil conflict that might eventually go badly for the well-armed but potentially badly outnumbered Alawite forces.

A Changing Region

The sectarian dynamics of Syria’s conflict are no longer limited to Syria’s borders. Much of the greater Sunni majority in Turkey and most Arab countries see their fellow Sunnis being massacred by members of the Alawite minority, who are frequently not perceived as “real” Muslims but as “heretics.” In a recent edition of Ash Sharq al-Awsat, noted Saudi preacher Dr. Aaidh al-Qarnicondemned the Assad regime, calling it worse than the crusaders. “What can a Muslim think,” he wrote, “when watching a regime carrying out such torture and oppression to other sincere Muslims who have taken to the streets demanding dignity, freedom, justice, and equality?” The sectarian subtext is impossible to miss.

The possibility that regional states might feel a political or emotional impulse to intervene to stop this killing should not be underestimated. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states no longer appear to regard Assad as a source of regional stability, but as an asset of much-feared rival Iran. Materiel, intelligence, financial, and political support from the Gulf and other parts of the Arab world for any armed rebellion in Syria could be significant. And if the conflict intensifies, pressure on the West to become involved will mount for both moral and strategic reasons.

The risks of launching a full-scale civil war on behalf of the opposition, however, are enormous, and not just because of the probably heavy death toll. There are real doubts about the plausibility of unseating the Damascus regime by force. Unless large parts of the army defect along with their heavy weaponry, a Syrian civil war would pit opposition groups with small arms, explosive devices, and improvised weaponry — a guerrilla insurgency — against Assad’s formidable and highly mechanized military machine.

The rebels would also risk losing the moral legitimacy of nonviolence, finally providing the regime with a semblance of arguments that it is combating “terrorists” or “armed gangs,” as it has so far described the protesters. As with other underground opposition movements in the contemporary Arab uprisings, the Syrian opposition would no doubt include Salafist and even Salafist-Jihadist elements, further strengthening regime claims that it is combating Al Qaeda and similarly nefarious organizations.

There are also significant concerns that a civil war in Syria could turn into a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Writer and analyst Meir Javedanfar has suggested that Iran might reluctantly welcome such a conflict because “it would help Tehran undermine Israel’s security and Saudi Arabia’s interests.” This could seriously damage Iran’s already frayed relations with its erstwhile ally Hamas and could lead to major tensions with Turkey, but Tehran may feel it has no choice other than to push back against its regional rivals through Syria.

Bruce Riedel recently noted that for their part, “The Saudis sense a strategic opportunity has opened in Syria, a unique chance to deal a mortal blow to one of their enemies, the Shia terror group Hezbollah, and a serious blow to their regional adversary Iran.” Saudi Arabia and even Israel appear to believe that, while chaos and civil conflict in Syria is very dangerous to their interests, the fall of Assad would be a potentially calamitous blow to Iran. The West would have an obvious stake in helping to ensure that Iran’s allies do not prevail. Syrians on both sides of the divide might be able to find foreign patrons prepared to help, but risk turning a Syrian civil conflict into a proxy battle, a violent outlet for the ongoing Middle Eastern Cold War.

A Troubled Opposition

By using extreme measures against unarmed protesters, the Assad regime has made it quite clear how it would react to any genuine armed rebellion. Taking up arms would mean facing the unrestrained wrath of a large, disciplined, well armed, and, apparently, fiercely loyal elite military who already appear capable of almost unimaginable levels of cruelty. Syrians, perhaps more than any other Arabs, are intimately familiar with both the self-crucifixion of Lebanon and the sectarian carnage in Iraq.

The opposition has so far been unable to organize even politically. Could it really organize a coherent armed rebellion? Unlike in Libya, there is no clear political body for the international community to engage with, as Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton has pointed out.

Sectarian differences, tensions between secularists and Islamists, internal and external opposition groups, personal and ideological rivalries, and other divisive factors have thus far prevented the development of a single coherent opposition grouping. Most worryingly, Kurdish figures walked out of one of the latest of many opposition conferences, protesting that most of the participants wanted any post-Assad Syria to remain defined as an “Arab” country, as the current designation “the Syrian Arab Republic” has it.

Opposition hopes currently rest on long-time dissident Burhan Ghalioun, who agreed, apparently reluctantly, to lead the self-described “Syrian National Council,” the latest effort at an alternative national leadership. But his unenthused and apparently haphazard appointment is not encouraging. Traditional opposition leaders and young protesters still appear divided. These would-be political leaders could be simply brushed aside by an ad hoc leadership of armed men — especially one driven by the worst elements of banditry, Salafism, and even Salafist-Jihadism.

Prospects for Outside Action

The long-term success of an armed uprising in Syria would probably require not just Arab and Turkish but also Western assistance. However, the appetite in the West for getting involved a civil conflict in Syria is virtually nonexistent, due to reasonable anxieties about a spillover effect into neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon and Iraq. Therefore, overt encouragement at this stage, let alone materiel support or the remote contingency of a limited engagement along the lines of the Libya intervention, is hard to imagine at this stage. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, continuing his country’s aggressive stance as the leading European force supporting some key Arab uprisings such as that in Libya, recently ruled out any military intervention but insisted, “we need to accelerate regime change.”

However, if the Syrian opposition creates a unified front, builds a credible (if initially outmatched) rebel fighting force with Arab and possibly Turkish support lines, establishes some sort of rival government or authority, and enters into a protracted civil conflict with the Assad regime, how long could the West neutrally sit on the sidelines as if it had no stake in the outcome? Regional forces appear to be preparing for the possibility of such a conflict, as are elements of the Syrian opposition, and so does the Assad regime itself, which is leaving the opposition few viable alternatives. Under such circumstances, the United States and its Western allies had better think seriously about what it will do if and when a full-blown civil war erupts in Syria.

http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/302721

 
سيُعتبر السقوط الواضح للزعيم الليبي معمّر القذافي انتصاراً هائلاً في
السياسة الخارجية وتبرئة للرئيس الأميركي باراك أوباما.

لم تحظَ يوماً حملة اوباما القاضية بمشاركة عسكرية محدودة في العمليات في
ليبيا إلى جانب حلف شمال الأطلسي ودول مجلس التعاون الخليجي بتأييد شعبي.
فقد تعرّضت منذ إطلاقها لهجمات من كلّ حدب وصوب إما لأنها مضللة كثيراً
أو قليلاً ولأنه من غير المرجح أن تنجح. كما قيل إنّ هذا التدخّل سيؤدي
إلى المزيد من الخسائر البشرية في ليبيا بدلاً من إنقاذ الشعب وسيتسبّب
بضرر بدلاً من تعزيز مصالح الولايات المتحدة.

ويبدو أكيداً اليوم أنّ أوباما يملك تبريرات تخوّله القول إنه اتخذ
القرار الصحيح. فبوسعه إضافة رأس القذافي إلى رأس زعيم تنظيم «القاعدة»
أسامة بن لادن الذي تمّت تصفيته. وإن لم تغرق ليبيا في فوضى تامة خلال
الأشهر الإثني عشر المقبلة، فلن يكون ممكناً المساس بأوباما في كلّ ما
يرتبط بمسائل السياسة الخارجية خلال الحملة الانتخابية المقبلة على رغم
أنّ المسائل الاقتصادية قد تكون حاسمة على هذا الصعيد.

وتبدو المشاركة المحدودة في ليبيا دليلاً دامغاً على أنّ مقاربة أوباما
القائمة على التشديد على الائتلافات المتعدّدة الأطراف وعلى التصرّف بحذر
وموازنة المصالح بالقيم تؤتي نتائج أفضل من التفرد العنيف والعقائدي الذي
اعتمدته إدارة جورج بوش الابن.

تردّدت إدارة أوباما في اعتماد السياسة الخاصة بليبيا التي تولت المملكة
المتحدة وفرنسا إدارتها منذ البداية. وفي الأسابيع التي سبقت إعلانها،
عبّر مسؤول بريطاني رفيع المستوى خلال اتصال هاتفي أجراه معي عن يأسه من
التردّد الأميركي. لكن حين رأت الولايات المتحدة أن قوات القذافي تستعد
للتوجه إلى بنغازي من أجل سحق الثورة، انتهى هذا التردّد.

ويكمن هدف الإستراتيجية الأهم والمباشر في منع القذافي من تحقيق انتصار
حاسم، الأمر الذي تمّ بلوغه مباشرة. أما الهدف الثانوي فيقضي بمساعدة
الثوّار من خلال سحب الأسلحة الثقيلة وتقليص البنية التحتية العسكرية
التي كانت المصدر الأساس لسلطة النظام.

فيما تحوّل النزاع الليبي إلى حرب استنزاف طويلة، وجّه ما كان يبدو في
الواقع حائطاً مسدوداً ضربة تلو الأخرى لقوة القذافي العسكرية ولموقعه
الاستراتيجي. وساهم كلّ تطوّر في إضعاف الزعيم الليبي أكثر وفي تعزيز قوة
المعارضة المتمركزة في بنغازي. وخلال الأسابيع الأخيرة، بدا واضحاً أن
مصير نظام القذافي هو الانهيار.

وتكمن الميزة الأكبر لهذه الإستراتيجية في أنها لم تؤدّ إلى تدخّل خارجي
في الشؤون الليبية فيما تفادت بلوغ نتيجة غير مقبولة وروّجت لنتيجة
مفضّلة. كما وُضعت نتيجة النزاع ومستقبل ليبيا بين أيدي الليبيين
تقريباً. وكان هذا أساسياً في نجاحها. من دون الاستعانة بأي جندي على
الأرض، رجّح تدخل القوات الائتلافية كفة الميزان لمصلحة الثوار إلا أن
هذا التدخل لم يسعَ إلى السيطرة عليهم أو إلى استغلالهم. وتمّ التأكد من
أنّه لم ينظر إلى هذا التدخل على أنه رهان استعماري جديد في العالم
العربي ولم يصف الثورة بأنها وسيلة للنفوذ الغربي كما خشي العديد من
الأشخاص.

إلا أنّ هذه الميزة الكبيرة تبدو شديدة الحساسية. ويعتمد أحد نجاحات
أوباما في السياسة الخارجية كما يبدو اليوم على قدرة الحكومة الليبية على
إعادة فرض النظام وبناء المصالحة وتفادي الثأر واحتواء الاختلافات
المتأججة في ليبيا. كما من المهم مصالحة قبائل القذاذفة وورفلة مع النظام
الجديد.

يعدّ التخوّف من التحذيرات بإمكان بروز سيناريوات قاتمة بعد انتهاء
الثوّار الليبيين من إحكام السيطرة على العاصمة، مبكراً وغير منصف. فقد
يجري عدد كبير من الأمور بصورة خاطئة لكن لغاية الآن، تجري معظم الأمور
على ما يرام كما كان متوقعاً. غير أنّ الحكومة الليبية الجديدة تواجه
تحديات كبرى.

بوسع حلف شمال الأطلسي إنهاء حملته الجوية إلا أنّ الدعوة إلى إرسال «قوة
فرض استقرار» غربية أو تابعة للأمم المتحدة في ظلّ الظروف الراهنة تعدّ
تضليلية. فلم يعبّر أحد في ليبيا أو الغرب عن رغبته في التدخل المباشر
على الأرض.

فضلاً عن ذلك، ما من سبب يدعو إلى التفكير بأنّ الحكومة الجديدة لن تكون
قادرة على إنشاء نظام مستقر وأحسن بعد الانتهاء من تغيير النظام بدعم
غربي.

بوسع الغرب القيام بالكثير على صعيد المساعدة والدعم ومن الواضح أنّ هناك
مصلحة في ضمان أنّ النجاح في التخلص من القذافي يترافق مع النجاح في بناء
ليبيا أكثر استقراراً وأفضل. وضعت المشاركة المحدودة الغرب على الجانب
الصحيح من التاريخ في هذه الحالة وساهمت في إلغاء الفكرة القائلة بأنّ
هذه القوى تعارض التغيير في العالم العربي.

وضع عدد كبير من الزعماء السياسيين أملهم بنجاح هذه المشاركة المحدودة.
ودافع عنها الرئيس الفرنسي نيكولا ساركوزي أكثر من أي شخص آخر. وخاطرت
الحكومة القطرية التي شاركت في الحرب الجوية وموّلت الثوّار ولقيت نتيجة
مرضية جداً.

لكن فيما يواجه أوباما معركة صعبة لإعادة انتخابه في تشرين الثاني
(نوفمبر) 2012، ما من زعيم آخر خارج ليبيا يراهن أكثر منه على النجاح في
قيام حكومة جديدة في طرابلس.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/no_one_owns_libya_or_owes_it

In the aftermath of the downfall of Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi, a preposterous debate has been raging in policy circles about the extent to which the West “owns” the future of Libya and what it “owes” the Libyan people.

The whole point of the limited military engagement was precisely to avoid this kind of responsibility, and that was both a Libyan and a Western desire. The Libyan rebels made it clear that they wanted military assistance from the air and in terms of weapons, intelligence and training, but not direct outside intervention on the ground. They wished to remain masters of their own fate, and so they are.

Similarly there was little appetite among Western publics and elite in favor of a ground intervention in Libya. Even the limited engagement lacked widespread support.

The current debate about who “owns” Libya is wrongheaded. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn” rule—namely “if you break it, you own it”—coined in the context of the buildup to the invasion of Iraq, does not apply here. The Iraq war was an unsolicited outside intervention for regime change almost entirely disconnected from events inside Iraq or any kind of Iraqi agency. In Libya, the rebellion and the civil war happened spontaneously, without much outside guidance or interference.

Certainly the United States and its NATO allies, along with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, played an important role in influencing what happened in Libya, but the outcome was ultimately determined by Libyans.

The intervention was not humanitarian, being shaped by obvious and rational interests. However, it served a laudable purpose of helping overthrow a foul dictator. No doubt the Libyan opposition is and should be grateful, but no one outside Libya “owns” the country or the long-term outcome of its revolution.

The interest in post-conflict stabilization in Libya is clear, but the powers that helped overthrow Qaddafi do not “owe” the Libyans anything further. It would be extremely unwise not to provide aid and support, particularly in terms of building political institutions and other key aspects of reconstruction.

However, this needs to be done according to the means available to donor countries and pursuant to specific requests from the new Libyan leadership. The impulse to rush to send huge numbers of aid workers and security consultants to Libya before the challenges have been properly assessed, and before a new government has determined its priorities, is a holdover from other conflicts and indeed other eras.

There’s a real element of hubris in the present debate. It might be true that without Western air power and Qatari money the Libyan rebels might not have triumphed, at least so quickly. But on the ground they were the ones who took the risks and accomplished the goal.

Libya is not a particularly poor, underdeveloped or war-ravaged country. It has a relatively small population with limited social divisions, and a ready source of income. The biggest challenge ahead is political, not development or reconstruction. Libya lacks political institutions and traditions, and will in short order require functioning new security forces. In these contexts in particular, outside help could be extremely useful.

Former CIA Director Michael Hayden, an unnamed British official cited byThe Economist and numerous others have claimed the West, in particular the United States, owns the future of Libya. By contrast, Joshua Foust hasasked a series of very pointed questions about how much aid and intervention would be forthcoming, and how it would be defined and even justified. A sensible approach, surely, strikes a middle ground. Because it helped the Libyan people overthrow their dictator, the West neither owns Libya nor the outcome of its revolution, nor does it owe its people a package of limitless assistance.

However, the countries that intervened have a stake in helping the Libyans develop a successful transition. That means carefully targeted support, in close coordination with the new authorities, but not the kind of nation-building program that was required in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The limited military engagement was designed to produce limited military results. It was a recognition of both the limitations of Western power and the need to allow the Libyans to largely determine their own fate.

Post-conflict stabilization assistance should follow the same model: limited efforts designed to produce limited results, leaving Libyans in charge of their own destiny. Skeptics like Foust will ask for a clearly defined and detailed post-conflict strategy for Libyan reconstruction and stabilization. Their desire for clarity is understandable but at this stage unrealistic.

Western countries and Qatar can and should play a helpful but limited role. The post-conflict stabilization process, like the revolution, should be driven by Libyans for their own country.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/qaddafis_fall_obamas_vindication

The apparent downfall of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi will be an enormous foreign policy victory and vindication for US President Barack Obama.

His campaign of a limited military engagement in Libya, along with NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, was never popular. From the outset it was attacked on all sides as either too much or too little, misguided and unlikely to succeed. It was even said that the intervention would cost more lives in Libya than it would save and harm rather than promote the interests of the United States.

Now it seems certain that Obama can justifiably claim to have made the right decision. He can add Qaddafi’s scalp to that of slain Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Unless Libya degenerates into total anarchy over the next 12 months, Obama will be virtually untouchable on foreign policy issues in the upcoming election campaign, though economic issues may prove decisive.

The limited engagement in Libya also looks like powerful prima facie evidence that Obama’s approach of emphasizing multilateral alliances, proceeding cautiously and balancing interests with values produces better results than the aggressive and ideological unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration.

The Libya policy was reluctantly adopted by the Obama administration, and was led from the outset by the United Kingdom and France. In the weeks leading up to its announcement, in a phone call with me, a senior British official expressed exasperation at American hesitation. But when it looked like Qaddafi’s forces had a clear path to Benghazi to crush the rebellion, that hesitation ended.

The most important and immediate goal of the strategy was to prevent a decisive Qaddafi victory, which was immediately accomplished. A secondary aim was to aid the rebels by chipping away at the heavy weaponry and military infrastructure that was the main source of power for the regime.

As the Libyan conflict settled into a protracted war of attrition, what sometimes appeared to be a stalemate in fact produced blow after blow to Qaddafi’s military strength and strategic position. Virtually every development left the Libyan leader weaker and the Benghazi-based opposition stronger. In recent weeks the writing was increasingly on the wall.

The greatest virtue of this strategy is that, as it averted an unacceptable outcome and promoted a preferable one, it did not amount to a decisive outside intervention in Libyan affairs. It left the result of the conflict and the future of Libya almost entirely in Libyan hands. This has been central to its success. With no boots on the ground, coalition intervention tipped the scales in favor of the rebels but did not seek to control or co-opt them. This helped ensure the intervention was not widely seen as a neocolonial bid in the Arab world, and it did not taint the rebellion as a tool of Western influence, as many had feared it would.

However, this great virtue is also a considerable vulnerability. One of Obama’s most important foreign policy successes—as it now seems—will be dependent on the ability of the new Libyan government to restore order, build consensus, avoid vengeance and contain simmering differences in Libya. It is especially important to reconcile the Qaddafa and Warfala tribes to the new order.

Handwringing by those warning of grim scenarios before the Libyan revolutionaries have even completed securing control of the capital is both premature and unfair. Lots of things could go wrong, but so far most things are going as well as can be expected. But it is true that the new Libyan government’s greatest challenges lie ahead.

NATO can now end its air campaign, and calls for a Western or United Nations “stabilization force” under current circumstances could not be more misguided. There has never been any appetite in Libya or the West for a direct intervention on the ground.

Moreover, there is no reason to think that having accomplished regime change with Western support, the new government won’t be able to create a stable, and indeed vastly improved, system.

There is much the West can do in terms of aid and support, and obviously there is a powerful interest in making sure that the success in getting rid of Qaddafi extends itself to success in building a stable and better Libya. The limited engagement placed the West clearly on the right side of history in this case, and goes a long way to dispelling the idea that these powers are opposed to change in the Arab world.

Many political leaders staked a great deal on the success of the limited engagement. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France became personally identified with it more than anyone else. The Qatari government, which participated in the air engagement and funded the rebels, took a huge risk that has paid off handsomely.

But with Obama facing a difficult reelection in November 2012, no other leader outside of Libya seems to have greater stakes in a successful development of a new government in Tripoli.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/fetishizing_nationalism

For those in the grip of its authority, a clearheaded understanding of how nationalist ideology actually operates seems extremely difficult.

All contemporary nationalisms are based on constructed and imagined narratives about history, geography, culture, ethnicity and religion.

Such narratives invariably involve a great deal of what can only be described as fiction. In particular, reading the past—whether real or imagined—as a justification for present-day political projects is, by definition, intellectually treacherous territory.

Last week I wrote about a new book tracing the history of Palestinian traditional dress in which I ruminated on the development of contemporary Palestinian national identity. Only a lingering degree of naïveté can account for my genuine surprise at the outpouring of outrage the column produced. I haven’t written anything this controversial in years, though all I did was assert that a new book helps demonstrate that Palestinian nationalism—while a contemporary, 20th-century phenomenon—is deeply rooted in broader Arab and ancient traditions and civilizations, and has its own distinctive cultural styles.

I had not taken into account the existential need some nationalists have to deny every aspect of a rival’s authenticity. The pro-Israel voices objecting to these virtually self-evident observations seem unconcerned with defending the Israeli national identity, but obsessed with attacking the invocation of any heritage or tradition on which Palestinian nationalism can draw.

The impulse to negate the other seems overwhelming. It appears much more powerful than any imperative to define, defend or interrogate one’s own nationalist identity, which is taken for granted.

These critics assume all aspects of Jewish and biblical Hebrew mythology, traditions and history automatically legitimize the Israeli national project. However, such claims were highly controversial among the Jews of the world for many decades, and are again being subjected to significant interrogation.

The traditional Zionist narrative holds that only the present-day Jews of the world are the genetic, religious and cultural heirs of the biblical Hebrews and ancient peoples of the “holy land.” Everyone else is a Johnny-come-lately at best, with the Palestinians usually ascribed no deeper origins than the arrival of Islam in the area (a mere 1,200 years ago)—and in many cases much less than that. The idea that they too, and perhaps even more than Jewish Europeans, might have genetic, ethnic and cultural ties to the ancient and biblical peoples of the land—including the ancient Hebrews—has been rarely considered.

In the decades immediately preceding 1948, the word “Israeli” was totally unknown and meant nothing, and the word “Palestinian” meant many things, but certainly not what it means today. Both of these national identities—the Jewish Israeli and the Arab Palestinian—are contemporary constructs born of recent history. They are largely grounded in their encounter with each other. They also embody deep cultural memories, traditions, myths, legends and tendentious narratives that at least to some extent retrofit the past to privilege their own national projects.

But all of this is entirely beside the point. Neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli national identity is more or less “authentic” or “legitimate” than the other because both are self-defined nationalisms adhered to by millions of people. The extent to which they are based on imaginary constructs—as all modern national ideologies ultimately prove largely to be—is meaningless in practice. Objecting to these mythologies is the political equivalent of complaining about the rain.

Systematized discrimination or exclusion is, of course, unacceptable for any decent society. But modernity dictates a healthy respect for both the human rights of individuals inherent to their status as human beings and the rights of self-defining national collectivities to self-determination. Contemporary political and national identities, including the Israeli and Palestinian, are invariably based on a confused mélange of myth, legend and history. But that is politically irrelevant. They are what they are, say what we will.

The deployment of myth, legend, history and tradition in the service of contemporary and modern national projects is, at least at a certain register, intellectually and philosophically invalid. Yet nationalist agendas can help people secure their individual and collective rights, achieve self-determination, overthrow colonial domination and serve other useful purposes.

Indeed, no sizable group of people can function successfully in the world of modernity without participating in some national structure.

Hence the urgent need to end the virtually unique statelessness of the Palestinians, who are not citizens of Israel or any other country.

The analytical challenge is to recognize that while not all nationalist claims are necessarily equally valid (they may speak on behalf of very few people, for example, and not really have the constituency they claim), in some important senses they are, however, all equally invalid. Championing one’s own nationalism as self-evidently “authentic” at the expense of a well-established, deeply-rooted and much-cherished rival identity is a particularly lowly form of self-delusion, chauvinism and fetishism.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68028/hussein-ibish/penniless-palestine?page=show

The financial crisis currently facing the Palestinian Authority is not
just economic; it is also a symptom of the deep political problems
facing the leadership in Ramallah. The PA has based its appeal to the
Palestinian public on a strategy that combines working with Gulf Arab
states, Israel, and the West to produce improvements in the quality of
life for Palestinians under occupation, while at the same time
pursuing independence through international diplomacy. Now a lack of
funding has limited the PA’s ability to meet its payroll, undermining
the credibility and authority of its approach and its leaders.

The situation became especially perilous in late July, when promised
donations failed to materialize, including $330 million that Gulf Arab
states had pledged to provide every six months. This shortfall was
caused by a combination of donor fatigue, impatience with the lack of
progress on Fatah-Hamas unity, and a long-standing tradition of Arab
states not meeting their pledges to the PA. Previously, in May, Israel
also temporarily failed to deliver the Palestinian tax revenues it
controls. As a result of the shortfall, the PA was forced to announce
that government salaries — on which more than a million Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza are dependent — would be cut in half for
August.

The PA’s financial woes undermine the achievements made by the state-
and institution-building program initiated by Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad in August 2009. Public anger at the proposed wage cuts was
palpable: civil servants, doctors, and teachers threatened a mass
strike. The government, meanwhile, mandated a reduction in the price
of bread, the staple food for most Palestinians — a further
reflection of the financial hardships that the crisis is causing to
ordinary people.

Undelivered pledges from Arab states are at the core of the immediate
crisis. (Fayyad has refused to publicly identify which states reneged,
but the group certainly includes Saudi Arabia.) This has been a
perennial problem for many years, since Arab states have often tied
the delivery of their donations to political demands and have at times
raised legitimate questions about the corruption that used to be
endemic in Palestinian financial management.

The uncertain status of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement has
further undermined donor confidence, because governments prefer to
know who precisely will be in charge of the money they are providing.
By signing a vague “national reconciliation agreement“ in Cairo in
April, the PLO and Hamas agreed, in effect, to agree. But since then,
they have not achieved a specific agreement on any issue. The tense
and frequently hostile relationship between the parties remains
unchanged, meaning that Palestinian society, polity, and leadership
remain not only divided but in a de facto cold war.

Both Fayyad’s reputation and that of the entire PA leadership have
suffered as a result of the financial crisis. Some leaders in Fatah
and Hamas have tried to make Fayyad the issue by claiming that
disagreement over whether he should remain in office was the primary
obstacle to reunification. But Fayyad is a convenient red herring. In
reality, there is near-total disagreement between the two sides.
Focusing attention on a manufactured dispute about Fayyad, who is a
member of neither party, has been a means to distract from Fatah and
Hamas’ inability to agree on any substantive issue.

Hamas is the primary beneficiary of the PA’s financial woes and their
political consequences. Indeed, although Hamas is suffering something
of a financial crisis of its own due to tensions with Egypt — and,
especially, Syria — it remains the recipient of significant cash
transfers from other patrons, primarily Iran. Still, the consequences
of Hamas’s financial crisis are greatly mitigated by the fact that its
rival, the PA, continues to pay most public employees in Gaza — even
though Hamas still rules there.

The real core of the PA’s long-term challenge is the ongoing Israeli
occupation, which prevents the Palestinians from having control over
key sectors of their economy and restricts almost every form of
economic development. In April, Mariam Sherman, the World Bank’s
country director for the West Bank and Gaza, said, “While we commend
the solid performance of Palestinian institutions, we are concerned
about the prospect for continued economic growth.” Israel’s ”closure
regime,“ she continued, represents ”the most substantial obstacle to
Palestinian economic viability.” A World Bank report issued at the
same time noted that strong private sector growth is unlikely “while
Israeli restrictions on access to natural resources and markets remain
in place, and as long as investors are deterred by the increased cost
of business associated with the closure regime.”

Such findings echo those of every major multilateral institution,
which emphasize that Israeli restrictions on access and mobility are
the gravest threat to long-term development and financial stability.
Genuine financial viability will ultimately require the creation of an
independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

However, even under occupation, the PA has achieved a great deal in
recent years. According to the World Bank, real economic growth in the
West Bank in 2010 exceeded 9 percent of GDP, which surpassed the PA’s
budget projection estimate of 8 percent. Moreover, under Fayyad, the
PA has overcome a legacy of corruption and patronage to establish a
transparent public finance system that has greatly reassured foreign
donors.

Nevertheless, corruption in other sectors remains an issue. The PA’s
improved image is threatened by an ongoing investigation into alleged
malfeasance by some officials, including four ministers, among them
Minister of the Economy Hassan Abu-Libdah. There are also charges and
countercharges of corruption between Fatah and an ousted former PLO
official, Mohammed Dahlan.

Other obstacles to economic well-being also remain. A June UN report
showed rising unemployment among Palestinians in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem — from 21.7 percent to 25 percent during the last
year. Moreover, what economic growth has occurred has been based on an
increase in construction and retail businesses, not manufacturing or
long-term, self-sustaining enterprises.

The PA’s state- and institution-building program has shown great
promise, but it requires sustained international financial and
political support to continue and expand. Crucially, if it is to
remain politically viable, it must also be seen by the Palestinian
public as part of a broader program to establish an independent state.
There is no Palestinian constituency for a program to create better
living conditions in small autonomous zones within a permanent or
semi-permanent Israeli occupation.

Although the PA’s potential plan to push for UN recognition of
Palestinian statehood is not directly related to the present crisis,
it does contribute to the overall uncertainty about the direction in
which Palestinian politics and national strategy are headed. A UN move
could create additional significant financial problems, including a
withdrawal or reduction in U.S. aid and possible withholding of
Palestinian tax revenues by Israel. At the same time, reported plans
for mass civil disobedience among Palestinians in coordination with a
UN initiative in September further contribute to uncertainty among
donors and investors, and raise additional tensions with the United
States and Israel.

The bottom line is that the PA’s financial crisis threatens the
achievements and potential of the state-building program, which has
been the basis of significant but limited economic growth in the West
Bank in recent years, as well as the credibility of the moderate
leaders who have created and led it. The success of the program in
terms of economic development must be linked to a viable political
path to national independence — not symbolic gestures at the UN that
have no effect on realities on the ground — or even its creators and
leaders will abandon it. Fayyad and other PA officials conceptualized
their project as a bottom-up supplement to top-down diplomacy, not as
an alternative to it.

The mainstream Palestinian leadership in Ramallah has staked its
entire political future on this policy of independence through a
combination of state-building efforts at home and diplomacy abroad. If
the Palestinian public sees this strategy as having permanently and
irrevocably failed, particularly if there are ongoing or regular
financial and economic crises, they will look to an alternative
leadership and program. The alternatives are either chaos or Hamas,
with inevitably dire consequences for the Palestinian national
movement and for U.S. and Israeli interests as well.

Those parties who do not want the Palestinians to go ahead with a UN
initiative — such as the United States, some European countries, and
Israel — should make every effort to ease the financial crisis. The
Palestinian leadership needs a clear and reasonable incentive to avoid
a confrontation at the UN in September, which would probably be very
damaging to Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. interests in the broader
Middle East. Otherwise, the Palestinians might feel they have no other
diplomatic options and an overwhelming domestic political necessity to
go forward with plans that carry significant risks.

Meanwhile, those parties, including some Arab states, who are
encouraging Palestinians to go forward with a UN initiative in spite
of the risks have an obligation to protect them from the political,
diplomatic, and financial consequences. But so far, the opposite has
occurred: the pattern of unmet pledges undermines the ability of
Palestinian leaders to make constructive decisions, places them at the
mercy of domestic political calculations and public anger, and weakens
their ability to lead. It is pushing them toward a confrontation with
the United States (and for that matter, much of the West) and with
Israel that they can ill afford, leaving them alone and exposed.

There is, however, the potential for compromise. Fears of a
Palestinian failure at the UN producing a backlash in the West Bank
are justifiably widespread. Yet a perceived success at the UN, met
with an initial wave of euphoria but followed by disenchantment as
living conditions remain unchanged or worsen because of Israeli or
U.S. retaliation, could produce an equal backlash. Instead, a
compromise strategy could produce a limited but real Palestinian
achievement in New York. Such a strategy would involve an upgrade of
the PLO observer mission at the UN, a reiteration of the Obama
principles (negotiations based on 1967 lines with agreed-upon land
swaps) , and a UN declaration clarifying that the international
community will not accept any outcome other than a two-state solution.

Massive international investment in state- and institution-building
could ensure a major upgrade in the quality of life for Palestinians
in the West Bank and could defuse the impact of any disappointment.
Whatever happens in New York in September, the day after needs to look
better, not worse, for Palestinians on the ground. Ultimately, the
Palestinian national aspiration for independence must be met. But
institution-building, investment, and financial support for a
leadership that is opposed to violence and committed to peace with
Israel can buy time and patience — probably for years, but certainly
not for decades.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=299083

 

What can a book about traditional folkloric costumes tell us about contemporary politics? Quite a lot as it happens.

Hanan Karaman Munayyer’s beautiful new volume, “Traditional Palestinian Costume: Origins and Evolution” (Interlink, 2011) combines superb photography of the renowned Munayyer collection of traditional Palestinian dress with an analysis of their origins, evolution and variations. Since the 1980s, Munayyer and her husband Farah have been assembling these costumes and other artifacts of Palestinian traditional life in their Palestinian Heritage Foundation.

Between the two of them and their foundation, they are among the most important documentarians and preservationists of this history and heritage, not just in the United States, but in the world. Their collection, which dates from the 1850s to the present, has been exhibited at the Kennedy Center in Washington and in museums and galleries across the globe.

Munayyer’s important new book demonstrates a number of very salient points with serious implications about the present and future for the Palestinian people. First, it shows that traditional and folkloric Palestinian costumes are distinctive from other Levantine ones. Within Palestinian society, in various areas and villages, the costumes have their own particular features, handed down largely from mother to daughter, over decades and indeed centuries. But there is still a distinctive Palestinian style, strongly connected to other Levantine traditional dress, with forms and patterns all their own.

Second, this rich history yet again demonstrates—and unfortunately this point continuously needs to be reaffirmed against pro-Israel propaganda that attacks the idea relentlessly—that an ancient and unbroken Palestinian history and culture really does exist. Like Walid Khalidi’s invaluable volumes “Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History Of The Palestinians 1876-1948” (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984) and “All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948” (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), Hanan Karaman Munayyer’s book stands as a stark refutation of the negation of Palestinian identity, history and culture.

The days are long gone when Golda Meir’s infamous remark about the Palestinians is still taken seriously in the West. The onetime Israeli prime minister stated that “[t]here is no such thing as a Palestinian people… It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their country. They didn’t exist.” Yet there remains a hard-core contingent among Israelis and pro-Israel Westerners who persist in denying Palestinians their identity, history and heritage.

Therefore, documenting that history and those traditions is not only a vital project of collective memory and an important academic task in itself, it is also a quintessentially political act. It is, above all, an act of passionate, dedicated and deeply meaningful resistance to the continued efforts at the negation of Palestinian identity and history.

This is Palestinian sumud, or steadfastness, at its finest. Beyond bluster, slogans and canned rhetoric, Munayyer’s volume has something deeply serious and meaningful to say about both the origins and the future of Palestinian national identity. That it is an important reference work in its own right and a stunning contribution to art history is an added bonus.

Beyond Palestinian particularism, the book also sheds important light on the relationship between different Arab cultures over the centuries and their relationship with ancient, pre-Arab traditions and civilizations. Perhaps even more importantly, it also examines the cross-pollination between Western and Middle Eastern cultures in the field of textile arts. Like so much of the rest of this fertile exchange, its most important moments were the confrontational interactions of civilizations during the Crusades and the colonial era.

Understanding the continuous interaction between the art and culture of the West and the Middle East undermines any notions of binary oppositional relationships between these societies and the dangerous concept of a “clash of civilizations.”

The West and the Arabs have been learning from each other for more than 1,000 years, and they continue to do so. Even a history as specific as that of traditional Palestinian costume demonstrates that contemporary cultures are rooted in an ancient past, an evolutionary process of cross-cultural exchange and influences, and, at its best, a healthy respect for each other’s contributions and traditions.

The book also helps to show that while Palestinian identity is distinctive and draws on particular cultural styles, it is also deeply rooted in the broader Arab Levantine tradition. This identity has been shaped more by its 20th century political encounter with Zionism and Israel than any pre-existing distinctive nationalist identity.

By focusing in great detail on a very narrow aspect of Palestinian life, Munayyer’s book has much to teach us not only about the past and future of the Palestinian people, but also about how culture in general functions in daily life and in shaping present-day political identities. Such flashes of insight help us understand the origins of our contemporary national identities, but also their broader ancient and regional roots, and their deep connection to a never-ending process of human cultural interaction across vast swaths of time and space.