Across the Arab world, terrifying sectarian dynamics are starting to
emerge, essentially pitting Arab Sunnis versus all religious
minorities. The elements of this have been obvious for quite a while,
but the pattern has become so pronounced and almost pervasive that it
demands to be recognized no matter how frightening the prospects.

Throughout the region, political forces are lining up time and again
along this extremely dangerous binary divide. For instance, the
ecumenism of the Egyptian revolution has given way to the most
gruesome sectarian violence between the military and Islamist mobs on
the one hand and Coptic protesters on the other hand. This was
particularly evident over the weekend, with deadly clashes and
sectarian incitement raging throughout Cairo.

The Syrian regime has done its best to cast the uprising in that
country in a sectarian light, with a disturbing degree of success.
Regional support for Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite-minority rule is now
almost entirely restricted to non-Sunni Arabs (as well as Iran),
including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Shia-led Iraqi government, Shia
parliamentarians and activists in Kuwait and other Gulf States, and a
significant number of Christians in Lebanon and Syria.

By contrast, Assad’s alliance with Hamas, the Palestinian branch of
the Muslim Brotherhood, has collapsed largely along sectarian lines.
Support for Assad among Arab Sunnis has dropped to virtually zero,
including all Sunni-dominated governments. Support for his rule has
also further exacerbated the already deeply-damaged reputation of
Hezbollah among Arab Sunnis.

The Sunni Arab world, meanwhile, has been largely silent about the
campaign of relentless persecution and repression against the Shia
majority in Bahrain, implicitly backing the oppressive rule of the
Sunni-minority royal family.

Sectarian tensions simmer in Kuwait but are held at bay by the
country’s wealth and small population. In Saudi Arabia, however, they
have been bubbling away for months, particularly in the country’s
oil-rich eastern provinces. Last week they boiled over in Al-Awamiyah,
as Shia rioters were fired on by security forces. Saudi spokespersons
dismissed the incident as “nonsectarian” and merely criminal in
nature, but immediately undermined their arguments by blaming Iran for
the unrest.

The narrative of the last few years of the previous decade—the
“culture of resistance” (which supposedly included both Sunni and Shia
Islamists and some Arab nationalists) versus the “culture of
accommodation” (a term of abuse for all moderate or pro-Western forces
in the Arab world)—has been completely subsumed by this emerging
sectarian narrative.

It will be rightly objected that this scattershot analysis is
superficial, and that in each society there are many detailed and
specific forces at play, particularly in countries as diverse as
Lebanon or Iraq. It will further be observed that there are many
exceptions to this pattern, such as the role of imprisoned Sunni
social democrat Ibrahim Sharif in Bahrain or the presence of
Christians, Alawites and others in the Syrian opposition.

It is absolutely true that when you look at individual groves, there
are many details that do not correspond to this narrative or dynamic;
but it’s also plainly the new shape the broader forest is taking. I’ve
been watching this pattern emerge for a long time without being
willing to clearly identify it in writing, both because there are so
many details that complicate, and even contradict, such a reading, and
in hope that other dynamics would prevent a regional sectarian divide
from becoming definitive.

I now think it’s impossible to deny that the single most important
factor shaping the Arab regional dynamic is a sectarian divide, not
between Sunnis and Shia, but between Sunnis and everybody else. On the
sidelines are also significant divisions between Arabs and ethnic
minorities such as Kurds or Berbers, but it is the sectarian split
that is the real dividing line these days. This new sectarian
consciousness has greatly assisted the rise of Turkey as a regional
power, strongly aligned with Arab Sunnis, at least for the moment.

Iran is probably the biggest single loser in the regional realignment
so far, and the mainstay of many governments trying to blame unrest on
“foreign powers” (along with al Qaeda, Israel, the United States,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, depending on which government is
making excuses). However, an Arab world divided along sectarian lines
will continue to provide potential openings for Iran in Shia and other
non-Sunni areas, even where they have had little or no influence in
the past.

The emerging sectarian narrative threatens to rip apart many Arab
societies, and indeed the Arab world in general. More than military
dictatorships or violent organizations that may seek to exploit these
tensions, the illusions that Sunni Arabs across the region are seeking
to impose a new and repressive order on non-Sunni Arabs, or that
non-Sunni Arabs are subversive elements or disloyal agents of Iran or
other foreign powers, pose the gravest threat to a better future in
the Middle East.

These narratives are almost always implicit, but they are on the brink
of becoming hegemonic. Counter-narratives, based on deeds as well as
words, are more urgently needed than ever. If they wish to avoid it,
Arab political and religious leaders are going to have to move quickly
to prevent this stark sectarian divide from defining the regional
landscape into the future.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=318069&MID=0&PID=0

The elimination in a CIA drone strike of Anwar al-Awlaki, al Qaeda’s major English-language sock puppet and propagandist, has many problematic aspects. However, from an Arab- and Muslim-American perspective it can only be a very good thing.

Awlaki was not a “key leader” in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. His death will do virtually nothing to change the political situation in Yemen. Most Yemenis are unaware of his existence and do not care about his death. AQAP is only one of a myriad of Islamist and Salafist-Jihadist groups in Yemen, and is not a major factor in the power struggle between members of the Yemeni elite. This struggle will likely determine the outcome of the battle over that country’s future.

That said, Awlaki’s death was highly significant on two counts. First, he was a key figure in al Qaeda’s current strategy (as clearly articulated by its paramount leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri) of seeking to organize terrorist attacks in the West. Zawahiri’s recent statements have emphasized the need for extremely small groups and preferably lone individuals who have self-radicalized on the basis of the kind of propaganda relentlessly issued by Awlaki through the Internet.

Zawahiri has insisted that Western al Qaeda sympathizers should operate in the greatest secrecy, preferably alone, because communications invariably lead to discovery and the collapse of terrorist plots. Most would-be “jihadists” in the West are failing to heed such advice. They are also, typically, focusing on military targets that are difficult to attack, rather than “soft targets” such as civilian areas. This tactic is largely proving to be a failure because few Western Muslims are interested in violence. And in the rare cases that they are, they have generally disregarded Zawahiri’s admonitions and have been apprehended before launching successful attacks.

However, in at least one dreadful instance, Awlaki’s propaganda helped inspire and direct a major and successful act of terrorism on American soil: the Fort Hood massacre conducted by Major Nidal Hasan. Awlaki was apparently in e-mail contact with Hasan before he embarked on his murderous rampage, and Awlaki’s insidious propaganda plainly helped inspire that outrage. Awlaki has also been linked to a plot to ship explosives in printer cartridges on commercial airliners bound for the United States, as well as to the Nigerian “underwear bomber” who failed to bring down a commercial airliner over Detroit. Neither of those plots succeeded, but both almost did.

Second, Awlaki was an American born in New Mexico and a former senior cleric at a large and important mosque just outside Washington, DC. This has been exhibit A in the claims of professional Islamophobes and anti-Arab racists that the American-Muslim community poses a significant threat to the rest of American society. Awlaki’s activities, even if they are seen mainly as “speech acts,” posed a direct and very serious threat to the wellbeing of Arab- and Muslim- Americans generally because of his identity and virulent extremism.

American officials have said that the simultaneous death of another American al Qaeda extremist, Samir Khan, who was editor of the group’s English-language propaganda publication Inspire, was a bonus and that Awlaki was the main target. However, Khan’s loss may be an even bigger blow from a practical point of view to al Qaeda, which has lost someone key in radicalizing Western Muslims.

But Khan was little-known in the United States, while Awlaki was a malignant cancer on the reputation of Arab- and Muslim-Americans. He was also frequently cited by those who would stigmatize these communities as a potentially dangerous fifth column requiring discriminatory special treatment from the government.

The bottom line is that Awlaki preached that all Americans, of whatever origin, were fair game and should be killed at every possible opportunity. That, of course, includes Arab- and Muslim-Americans. So Awlaki not only threatened the reputation of these communities, but also potentially their members as well. This man wanted us all dead, so eliminating him was, quintessentially, an act of self-defense.

There are real and important constitutional issues and due process concerns about this assassination, and they will have to be debated in the coming months. However, due process arguments need to take into consideration the practical implausibility of the capture and trial of these individuals, what such an effort would have entailed, and the real options the US government faced in dealing with them.

These concerns notwithstanding, Arab- and Muslim-Americans should welcome the elimination of a man who posed a real and serious threat to their standing and, indeed, their very lives.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/palestinian_statehood_un_where_do_we_go?page=full

In a perfunctory meeting on Wednesday morning, Sept. 28, as expected, and per its usual procedure for dealing with would-be new United Nations members since the late 1960s, the Security Council referred the Palestinian application to one of its standing committees. The committee — which meets and votes in secret and requires unanimity to refer the matter back to the Security Council — is scheduled to begin considering the application on Friday morning. The membership process usually takes weeks, but can take only days (as with the most recent U.N. member, South Sudan) or years (as in the case of Kuwait). Neither the committee nor the Security Council is under any specific obligation to act on the request in a limited time frame, so the process theoretically could drag on indefinitely.

Because the required nine-vote Security Council majority is by no means yet ensured, and because the United States is publicly committed to vetoing a Security Council vote if one ever takes place anyway, full U.N. membership is effectively barred for the Palestinians under the present circumstances. Therefore, the application will have to serve as leverage to achieve something else if it is to produce anything meaningful. So what options does this leave the Palestinians? Let’s take a look at five, moving from the least to the most confrontational:

1) Declare moral and political victory and move on.

The Palestinians have made their moral and legal case for statehood in President Mahmoud Abbas’s speech and their formal application. And if the established international peace process should decisively fail, they do have other options, no matter how risky. The Security Council referral to the committee buys everyone time to look for compromises, particularly given that the Palestinian membership bid cannot succeed. If they choose not to press the issue in the Security Council, the Palestinians could seek advantages in other venues, as follows.

2) Work with the Quartet on more advantageous language for renewed negotiations. It is highly significant that the Middle East Quartet — the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the U.N. Secretariat — issued a statement in conjunction with Abbas’s address and the Palestinian application. The statement showed that the Quartet has not resolved the differences that emerged in its ranks this year, particularly over whether Palestinians should be required to recognize Israel as a “Jewish state.” But it reasserted the importance and viability of the established processes.

Working with the Palestinians and the Israelis separately, the Quartet could issue a statement laying out the framework for new negotiations, timetables, and even clearer terms of reference that might provide the Palestinians with a significant diplomatic achievement — even if the renewal of direct talks with a reasonable prospect of success has to wait until political circumstances in the United States, in Israel, and among the Palestinians become more favorable.

3) Pursue a General Assembly resolution in cooperation with the EU.

The Palestinians are well positioned to win almost any of a number of possible resolutions they could bring before the General Assembly, but they can do this in either a cooperative or a confrontational manner with Western states. They could work with the European Union, which is badly and uncomfortably divided on the issue, to craft language that Europeans could unite behind and that would protect them from the most serious American and Israeli retaliation, as well as provide them significant diplomatic advances. Many important EU member states, particularly France and Spain, are supportive of Palestinian nonmember U.N. observer status, but others are concerned that this would provide Palestinians’ with access to the International Criminal Court and other law enforcement mechanisms to pursue charges against Israel. Some Europeans have been working on a new legal status for Palestine that would be an upgrade from the PLO observer mission but would protect Israel from potentially facing such charges.

4) Pursue a General Assembly resolution independently.

Palestinians could independently pursue nonmember observer-state status, and they would no doubt have a majority to secure that. But this could precipitate a crisis not only with the United States — which has threatened to cut funding to the Palestinian Authority (PA) — but probably with some important European countries as well, the two main reliable external donors to the PA’s annual budget. A crisis in relations with the Americans would also greatly complicate the resumption of negotiations, which Abbas and other Palestinian leaders acknowledge will be essential for the actual realization of an independent Palestine.

The least aggressive independent action the Palestinians could pursue in the General Assembly would be a resolution acknowledging their right to statehood, but not securing nonmember state status. The most aggressive would be a resolution under the “Uniting for Peace” formula laid down in General Assembly Resolution 377A (1950), which was designed to overcome differences among Security Council permanent members on urgent matters. This would have to be tabled following a U.S. veto in the Security Council and would authorize member states to take coercive measures “to maintain or restore international peace and security.” This might be interpreted as authorizing sanctions and other coercive measures against Israel. However, numerous countries have had sanctions and boycotts against Israel and, indeed, the Palestinians for decades without the authorization of Resolution 377. More importantly, a 377 resolution would not address or enhance the question of Palestinian statehood or U.N. membership, and in that sense is completely off topic.

5) Try to force a vote in the Security Council.

The Palestinians are trying to secure commitments for a nine-vote majority and could try to force a vote on their application in the Security Council, even though they know this will ultimately be vetoed by the United States. Palestinians believe they have recently won over Gabon and Nigeria, meaning that, in addition to Brazil, China, India, Lebanon, Russia, and South Africa, they have eight commitments to vote yes. The rest of the members are likely to vote no or abstain. The Palestinians are focusing their efforts on Colombia and Bosnia, both of which will be difficult to convince. Alone among South American countries, Columbia does not recognize Palestine, and it has an important security relationship with Israel. Bosnia, which is a confederation of three ethnic communities, is divided on the matter, with Muslim Bosniaks and Croats supporting Palestinian membership but Serbs opposing it because of a potential similar application by Kosovo.

If Palestinians cannot secure a nine-vote majority, then there is virtually no rationale for pressing their case in the Security Council. But if they can, some Palestinians and their allies argue that they could achieve a “moral victory” by forcing the United States to use its veto to block Palestinian membership. Such a moral victory, however, could come at a tremendous cost — loss of U.S. and other Western aid, a souring of relations with the United States, and unspecified harsh retaliationthreatened by numerous Israeli leaders, including potentially withholding Palestinian tax revenues that make up the bulk of the PA’s annual budget.

For the moment, the Security Council has bought everyone time by referring the matter to the committee and has averted but not foreclosed a universally damaging confrontation. The various compromise tracks are very much in the Palestinians’ interests, and there are promising signs they understand this. In defiance of all expectations, while the Israeli cabinet was unable to agree on any unified response to the Quartet’s statement, by contrast, following a meeting of its executive committee, PLO Secretary-General Yasser Abed Rabbo welcomed the statement, though he also reiterated the Palestinian demand for a settlement freeze.

If they play their cards right, Palestinian leaders will have made the moral case for their statehood, demonstrated that they do have options outside the established peace process, and secured new diplomatic leverage and political capital at home. But if they mishandle diplomacy in the coming weeks and months, they could face a very dangerous crisis in relations with the West, and especially with the United States, which they can ill afford.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/saliba-sarsar/the-palestinian-statehood_b_984890.html

President Barack Obama, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu all played mainly to their domestic political bases at the United Nations General Assembly meeting last week. Despite the drama, nothing in the basic discourse has changed, no party shifted its bottom-line positions, and none of it brought us any closer to peace or improved the situation on the ground.

Abbas gave a rousing speech articulating the Palestinian narrative and case for independence, but didn’t offer any outreach to the Israeli public. Netanyahu gave a defiant speech, including denouncing the UN as a “house of lies” aimed mainly at securing his leadership of the Israeli right. And Obama — who offered empathy to Israel and the Jewish narrative but none to the Palestinians — was essentially defending himself from a relentless attack from the Republican right on his Israel policies.

All three leaders emerged from the UN meeting politically strengthened, but the prospects for peace were not. Netanyahu marshaled Israel’s international assets to nip the Palestinian bid for full UN membership in the bud. The application will no doubt be referred to the 15-member Membership Committee, which meets and votes in secret and which requires unanimity to refer the application back to the Security Council for a possible vote. Past precedent shows this process can take years. Even if Palestinians decide to push for a vote in the Security Council, and can secure an at-present uncertain nine-vote majority, the Obama administration is publicly committed to vetoing their membership.

Caught between the rock of Israeli occupation and the hard place of (at least thus far) failed diplomacy, the Palestinian leadership sought recourse at the UN, knowing full well they were risking a damaging confrontation with the United States over a potential veto. By submitting a formal application for full UN membership, Abbas may appear to have taken a confrontational approach, but in fact the Palestinians have left an important opportunity for compromise open by not demanding any immediate vote or action.

That opportunity is best represented by the statement of the Middle East Quartet issued to coincide with the Abbas and Netanyahu speeches. It is clear that the Quartet has not resolved its differences which have emerged over the past year, particularly the question of Palestinian recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state,” but this body remains the most promising venue for creating a new framework, and even terms of reference, for future negotiations when political realities adjust to allow for their resumption with a reasonable prospect of success.

While the resumption of such negotiations will depend a great deal on improvements in internal Palestinian and Israeli political conditions, and especially on the resolution and outcome of the US presidential election, it is imperative that the prospects for a genuine two-state solution are preserved, and even enhanced. To achieve peace, Israelis and Palestinians must move beyond binary worldviews that cast each other simply as enemies in order to appreciate the complexity and interdependence of their relationship, not only now but into the future.

This means, first and foremost, preserving, protecting and enhancing the gains made on the ground in the occupied West Bank by the Palestinian institution-building program led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Many members of Congress from both parties and Republican presidential candidates have been irresponsibly calling for a cut in US funding to the Palestinian Authority and any international organizations that accord upgraded status to the Palestinians.

Nothing could be more shortsighted than threats by grandstanding members of Congress to cut US aid to the PA, the single biggest source of external funding for the Palestinians, which would undermine the legitimacy of the moderate, secular, nationalist leadership in Ramallah and ultimately threaten the viability of both negotiations and negotiators.

It would jeopardize the important cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces that has greatly reduced violence and restore law and order in some key areas of the West Bank. It could undermine, perhaps fatally, the credibility not just of individual political leaders but the whole Palestinian national strategy that seeks the establishment of an independent state living alongside Israel in peace, security and mutual dignity. And it would play directly into the hands of rejectionists forces like Hamas and the extreme settler movement that cling to a zero-sum mentality that seek a total victory of one party at the expense of the other.

It is evident that the status quo is untenable, the conflict has no military solution, and a negotiated agreement is the only alternative to continued conflict. The Israeli occupation must end and, in turn, Israel must become an accepted member of the community of nations in the Middle East. No Israeli, we hope, wants to occupy another people and no Palestinian, we believe, wants to be occupied. The few benefits the Israelis accrue from occupation (e.g., arable land, settlements, water resources) can be better secured through long-term arrangements with friendly neighboring countries, including a State of Palestine. Real “strategic depth” doesn’t come from belligerent occupation. It comes from an end of conflict.

Even though the presidential campaign is underway, Obama and his team should not shrink from urging Israeli and Palestinian leaders to do the right thing and resume negotiations within a specific time frame and with clear terms of reference, which becomes the basis of a just and lasting peace. The Quartet statement was a welcome indication that serious diplomacy continues and a reasonable framework for resumed negotiations can be developed in the coming weeks, even if the actual resumption of talks may have to wait for a more propitious political environment on all sides.

Abbas and Netanyahu have returned to their countries with stronger political positions and therefore more leverage and leeway to take bold moves that help lay the political groundwork for the resumption of talks aimed at a fair compromise.

Regardless of what transpires at the UN with respect to Palestine’s membership, it must become the impetus towards increased commitment on the part of the international community to finally fulfill the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and the yearning of Israelis for peace and security. The parties cannot accomplish this on their own.

Now is the time for leaders on all sides to rise above politics and use their strengthened positions to begin the difficult, and probably prolonged, process for creating a more positive political environment that can eventually produce successful negotiations. Above all, the gains that have been secured on the ground through the Palestinian institution-building program and Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation — which are real and not theoretical — must not be squandered, but protected and enhanced.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=315757

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ moving speech before the United Nations General Assembly on Friday was certainly the high point of his career. His address will be forever remembered because Abbas was able to do what no Palestinian leader has ever done in the past: make the moral case for Palestinian independence in a clear, coherent, reasonable manner at the highest international forum.

Most importantly, Abbas’ message was internationally receivable. Only the most recalcitrant supporters of the Israeli occupation could fail to have been moved by his words. Many in the room, including some jaded individuals, were left in tears.

This was the speech the late President Yasser Arafat never gave, missing two key opportunities to do so. In his first address to the General Assembly in 1974, Arafat appeared as a belligerent revolutionary speaking about holding a gun in one hand and an olive branch in the other. His comments were well-received among many Arabs and others in the Third World, but they played right into the hands of those who sought to depict him as a violent terrorist. Arafat’s speech at the Oslo Agreements signing ceremony at the White House in 1993 was rambling, semi-coherent and downright boring.

Abbas’ speech on Friday did for the Palestinian cause what Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver did for Zionism and Israeli statehood in a powerful UN speech in 1947. This was especially true of his closing remarks, in which Silver said that the Jewish people were “no less deserving” of statehood than others. Abbas’ speech also echoed the 1993 White House speech of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which he said the conflict must end, emphasizing the word “enough.”

The most important part of Abbas’ speech was his blunt question to the international community about the Israeli occupation, now more than 40 years old. “Is this acceptable?” Abbas asked. In another crucial passage, he observed that “in the absence of absolute justice, we decided to adopt the path of relative justice—justice that is possible and could correct part of the grave historical injustice committed against our people.” The only important element that could have strengthened Abbas’ speech was a concerted outreach to the Israeli public, but this was not his goal or mission at that moment.

Even most Israeli journalists noted the rapturous reception the speech received from the representatives of the international community and what this implied about the level of global support for Palestinian independence. By contrast, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address was insulting and offensive, describing the United Nations itself as a “house of lies.” Netanyahu said that he was committed to a two-state solution, but time and again made the case for continuing the occupation.

To many Israelis and Americans, the Palestinian move at the UN looks very confrontational. However, it actually leaves the window for a compromise wide open. The Palestinians have submitted their application for full UN membership to the Security Council, but they are not pressing for an immediate vote that could prompt a US veto.

In a move that was extremely significant, the Middle East Quartet issued a statement in conjunction with Abbas’ speech showing that it had not resolved its differences over the Palestinian issue. Nevertheless, it placed the Palestinian UN bid back in the context of the established peace process. What happens in the coming weeks will depend greatly on whether the Quartet can develop language that lays down the basis for future negotiations, when political circumstances allow for them to resume with a reasonable prospect of success.

Alternatively, the European Union, which is uncomfortably divided over the statehood issue, may develop language for a General Assembly resolution that it can unite behind. Such a measure could provide the Palestinians with significant diplomatic gains, without provoking a confrontation with Israel and the United States.

Now the most important task is to protect and enhance the successes developed by the institution-building program of the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli military confirms that security cooperation with the Palestinian security services remains “strong,” and international donors have reaffirmed that Palestinians are ready for independence.

Meanwhile, Republicans in the US Congress are chomping at the bit to cut or eliminate American aid to the Palestinian Authority, which represents the single biggest source of external funding for the Palestinians. Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz, in turn, is threatening to withhold Palestinian tax revenues that make up the bulk of the annual Palestinian Authority budget.

Everyone has been playing to their domestic constituencies, and both Abbas’ and Netanyahu’s political positions have been strengthened by their performances. Even US President Barack Obama’s address was more of a campaign speech than anything else, offering empathy to Israel but none to the Palestinians.

Now is the time to move beyond the theatrics at the UN and return to what is achievable. This means continuing to build the basis of a Palestinian state through international support and providing funding for institution-building. It also means serious work by all parties to lay the groundwork for successful negotiations, so that domestic political dynamics in the key societies involved can be aligned with their stated policies of seeking a genuine two-state solution.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=315757

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ moving speech before the United Nations General Assembly on Friday was certainly the high point of his career. His address will be forever remembered because Abbas was able to do what no Palestinian leader has ever done in the past: make the moral case for Palestinian independence in a clear, coherent, reasonable manner at the highest international forum.

Most importantly, Abbas’ message was internationally receivable. Only the most recalcitrant supporters of the Israeli occupation could fail to have been moved by his words. Many in the room, including some jaded individuals, were left in tears.

This was the speech the late President Yasser Arafat never gave, missing two key opportunities to do so. In his first address to the General Assembly in 1974, Arafat appeared as a belligerent revolutionary speaking about holding a gun in one hand and an olive branch in the other. His comments were well-received among many Arabs and others in the Third World, but they played right into the hands of those who sought to depict him as a violent terrorist. Arafat’s speech at the Oslo Agreements signing ceremony at the White House in 1993 was rambling, semi-coherent and downright boring.

Abbas’ speech on Friday did for the Palestinian cause what Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver did for Zionism and Israeli statehood in a powerful UN speech in 1947. This was especially true of his closing remarks, in which Silver said that the Jewish people were “no less deserving” of statehood than others. Abbas’ speech also echoed the 1993 White House speech of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which he said the conflict must end, emphasizing the word “enough.”

The most important part of Abbas’ speech was his blunt question to the international community about the Israeli occupation, now more than 40 years old. “Is this acceptable?” Abbas asked. In another crucial passage, he observed that “in the absence of absolute justice, we decided to adopt the path of relative justice—justice that is possible and could correct part of the grave historical injustice committed against our people.” The only important element that could have strengthened Abbas’ speech was a concerted outreach to the Israeli public, but this was not his goal or mission at that moment.

Even most Israeli journalists noted the rapturous reception the speech received from the representatives of the international community and what this implied about the level of global support for Palestinian independence. By contrast, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s address was insulting and offensive, describing the United Nations itself as a “house of lies.” Netanyahu said that he was committed to a two-state solution, but time and again made the case for continuing the occupation.

To many Israelis and Americans, the Palestinian move at the UN looks very confrontational. However, it actually leaves the window for a compromise wide open. The Palestinians have submitted their application for full UN membership to the Security Council, but they are not pressing for an immediate vote that could prompt a US veto.

In a move that was extremely significant, the Middle East Quartet issued a statement in conjunction with Abbas’ speech showing that it had not resolved its differences over the Palestinian issue. Nevertheless, it placed the Palestinian UN bid back in the context of the established peace process. What happens in the coming weeks will depend greatly on whether the Quartet can develop language that lays down the basis for future negotiations, when political circumstances allow for them to resume with a reasonable prospect of success.

Alternatively, the European Union, which is uncomfortably divided over the statehood issue, may develop language for a General Assembly resolution that it can unite behind. Such a measure could provide the Palestinians with significant diplomatic gains, without provoking a confrontation with Israel and the United States.

Now the most important task is to protect and enhance the successes developed by the institution-building program of the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli military confirms that security cooperation with the Palestinian security services remains “strong,” and international donors have reaffirmed that Palestinians are ready for independence.

Meanwhile, Republicans in the US Congress are chomping at the bit to cut or eliminate American aid to the Palestinian Authority, which represents the single biggest source of external funding for the Palestinians. Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz, in turn, is threatening to withhold Palestinian tax revenues that make up the bulk of the annual Palestinian Authority budget.

Everyone has been playing to their domestic constituencies, and both Abbas’ and Netanyahu’s political positions have been strengthened by their performances. Even US President Barack Obama’s address was more of a campaign speech than anything else, offering empathy to Israel but none to the Palestinians.

Now is the time to move beyond the theatrics at the UN and return to what is achievable. This means continuing to build the basis of a Palestinian state through international support and providing funding for institution-building. It also means serious work by all parties to lay the groundwork for successful negotiations, so that domestic political dynamics in the key societies involved can be aligned with their stated policies of seeking a genuine two-state solution.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/obama-at-the-un-on-israel-palestine-good-politics-poor-diplomacy/245482/

If you’d wanted to gauge how strained relations between the Obama administration and the Palestinian leadership have become, all you’d need do is watch the shaking heads of the Palestinian representatives at the United Nations General Assembly during the U.S. President’s speech there on Wednesday.

Obama reiterated the American commitment to a two-state solution and the creation of an independent Palestine, both established U.S. policy. Rhetorically, however, his speech recognized most of the core elements of the Israeli narrative but virtually none of the Palestinian one.

Obama spoke about Israel being surrounded by enemies and powerful states that threaten its destruction. He expressed sympathy for Israelis being attacked by rockets and suicide bombers, and neighboring children being “taught to hate them.” He invoked the Jewish narrative of exile, oppression, and the Holocaust.

All of which is fine, of course. But what was missing was virtually any acknowledgment of the Palestinian narrative, except for the right to statehood. He made no mention of the occupation, the settlements, the 1967 borders, the refugees, Jerusalem, or any other aspect of the Palestinian narrative or concerns.

Unfortunately, that he made such a deeply unbalanced speech was little surprise. It comes
in the middle of a crisis in relations between the Obama administration and the Palestinian leadership, led by President Mahmoud Abbas, that is being intensified by the Palestinian insistence on seeking some form of recognition of Palestinian statehood at the UN.

American opposition to the statehood bid is driven in part by a desire to protect the U.S.-brokered, bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiating process, although it has effectively broken down in recent years. It’s also based on reasonable observations that such negotiations are ultimately the only way to fully resolve the conflict. No other party is seriously vying with the United States for the role of broker. Moreover, Israel would be deeply wary of any other way forward, given that it only really trusts the Americans.

The Obama administration isn’t on particularly warm terms with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu either. Many in the administration regarded his last visit to Washington as a series of affronts, perhaps the most serious of which was Netanyahu’s public lecturing of the U.S. president in a speech to Congress that seemed to make common cause with the same Republicans who are seeking to unseat the President in November. But the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel remains, essentially independent of political relations between the two governments, as Obama’s nods to Israel’s concerns in his speech reflect.

Indeed, Obama’s UN address was at least as much driven by domestic political considerations as by frustration with Palestinian leaders, Israeli leaders, or the stalled peace process. Republicans are ruthlessly harassing him from his right on this issue. Texas Governor Rick Perry, currently the highest-polling GOP candidate for the presidential nomination, recently accused him of “appeasement” of the Palestinians, despite his tough stance on their UN initiative. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Ileana Ros-Lehtinen wasted no time in denouncing the President’s UN speech for not threatening, as she has, to defund the Palestinian Authority, the relevant U.S. commitments to the UN, and international agencies that work with the Palestinians, should they persist with the UN bid.

Though Obama can claim credit for the elimination of Osama bin Laden and the ouster of former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, Republicans sense an opportunity to harass him from his right on Israel and to try to diminish his Jewish donor base, if not the reliably Democratic Jewish vote.

It’s not unusual in international relations that politics trumps policy. But this is happening, to an unusually and very dangerously high degree, among the Palestinians, the Israelis, and the Americans at the moment.

Abbas’ UN bid is, to a large extent, likely driven by considerations about his own legacy as well as by the ability of the secular, nationalist leadership in Ramallah to hold off political challenges from Hamas. A great deal of the Israeli intransigence is driven by an open competition between Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman for leadership of the Israeli right (this political stand-off may also be the single biggest factor explaining Israel’s bizarre refusal to apologize to Turkey over last year’s deadly flotilla incident). A politically empowered minority is driving Israel’s most self-defeating policies, above all the expansion of profoundly provocative settlements.

And then there are the Americans. The election season is inhibiting the administration from any bold new moves to restart talks, redefine the terms of negotiations, or pressure Israel to make the necessary steps towards a meaningful compromise.

Obama’s UN speech may well have been good politics, but it wasn’t especially good policy. It will almost certainly be widely misread in the convulsing Arab world as evidence that the U.S. remains part of the problem — rather than the key to the solution — of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The speech did nothing to help broker a compromise at the UN, which all parties badly need, including the United States, and would be in everybody’s best interests. It won’t help dissuade the Palestinians from pursuing an aggressive course at the UN, no matter how risky or unwise that might be. And it won’t do anything to help restart negotiations.

It’s understandable that the President is exasperated with both parties and deeply uncomfortable at the prospect of having to cast a veto in the Security Council against Palestinian statehood. Obama made those sentiments extremely clear today. It may have been an accurate reflection of the mood in the administration and in Congress, and it might even help Obama get reelected. But it didn’t do U.S. policy goals any favors.

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2011/09/could_a_un_upgrade_help_the_palestinians_prosecute_israeli_officials.html

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/palestine_between_fact_and_fiction

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ announcement that he intends to seek full United Nations membership from the Security Council raises a wide range of interesting, and in some ways alarming, scenarios for the coming weeks. However, the move is unlikely to ultimately bring Palestinians any closer to actual independence.

Abbas knows that if such a vote ever takes place at the Security Council, the United States is committed to vetoing it. There is even some question whether the Palestinians can achieve a nine-vote majority in favor of a state, with Israel’s UN ambassador citing Portugal as a key swing vote that might prevent such a majority.

Either way, Palestinians cannot win full UN membership at this stage, no matter how much they want or deserve it. Indeed, there are numerous procedural methods in which this request can get bogged down in the UN apparatus for weeks, months, even indefinitely.

If Palestinians want to pursue a UN-based strategy, this means they will ultimately have to turn to the General Assembly. The most they could secure from that body is an upgrade from observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization to that of a non-member observer state. That wouldn’t much change Palestinian rights and prerogatives in the General Assembly, but theoretically it could mean access to the International Criminal Court and other international legal enforcement mechanisms to seek charges against Israel.

As a practical matter, however, this may prove much more difficult than it sounds. Even if a non-member Palestinian “state” were able to accede to the Statute of Rome and join the Assembly of Parties at the ICC, the decision of a prosecutor to act on any Palestinian request to pursue charges against Israeli officials would essentially be a political matter, subject to intensive domestic and international pressures.

Frankly, it’s hard to imagine multilateral international law-enforcement agencies actually bringing charges against Israelis under present or foreseeable political and diplomatic circumstances.

What Palestinians are pursuing, then, is a kind of virtual “statehood.” However, on the ground the Israeli occupation will remain in place and could well intensify. Indeed, the daily lives of Palestinians may deteriorate due to various forms of Israeli and American retaliation.

Abbas himself has always recognized that actual Palestinian statehood will require an agreement with Israel. No international party is trying to replace the United States as the broker for such talks. A crisis in relations with Washington resulting from a Security Council veto or a non-member state vote at the General Assembly without prior understanding with the European Union or the Middle East Quartet is, therefore, unlikely to bring Palestinians closer to independence.

The international status of a Palestinian non-member state at the UN would be a mirror image of the de facto independent Republic of Kosovo. Kosovo is, in every meaningful way, a sovereign state that controls its own territory, makes its own decisions, is recognized by most of the great powers of the world, and participates in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. However, due to Russian and, to some extent, Chinese objections, it is not a member state of the United Nations and will not become one in the foreseeable future. It is also not recognized by its most important neighbor, Serbia, which considers Kosovo to be a UN-administered part of Serbian territory.

Kosovo, therefore, is for all practical purposes an independent state, but one that is severely restricted when it comes to recognition and participation at the multilateral and diplomatic register.

Abbas’ plan for Palestine will produce the inverse result. There will be a Palestinian state that enjoys significant recognition and the latitude to participate diplomatically at the UN, and quite possibly in other significant multilateral forums; however, it will, otherwise, enjoy little real sovereignty. Kosovo has de facto independence without many of the trappings of sovereignty. What Palestinians are demanding is, in effect, the box in which independence came, minus the content.

The Palestinians are not in a position to emulate the Kosovars, who secured de facto statehood in spite of failing to secure important recognitions, and braved the vociferous objections of Serbia and some permanent Security Council members. Even proponents of a Palestinian UN gambit must acknowledge that their statehood will, for now, be virtual at best.

More importantly, the risks in realizing an independent Palestinian state are enormous. Israeli retaliation aside, for Palestinians to provoke a crisis in relations with Washington and perhaps forego what a second-term American administration might do after the next election, if President Barack Obama wins, in exchange for a symbolic victory now, may mean paying a high cost for very limited gains.

It is still not too late for a compromise to be achieved. This would be in the interests of all parties, not least the Palestinians. As the example of Kosovo demonstrates, there is a huge gap between international recognition and genuine independence.

On September 19, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas formally told
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon that he would be
submitting an application for full UN membership for the state of
Palestine after his speech to the General Assembly on September 23.
This reiterates the plan outlined by Abbas in a speech to the
Palestinian people last week.

It is not absolutely certain that such a resolution would win the
required nine-vote majority in the Security Council, but even if it
did, the United States is publicly committed to vetoing it. So the
Palestinians cannot, at this stage, win full UN membership under any
circumstances.

This means that the Palestinians, if they are to pursue a UN-based
strategy to its logical conclusion, will have to turn to the General
Assembly for something less: UN nonmember observer-state status. The
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has been a nonmember
observer at the UN since 1974, with several upgrades in rights and
privileges since then.

Nonmember state status for Palestine, as opposed to the PLO’s
“political entity” observer mission, would not greatly alter the
procedural tools available to the Palestinians in that body.

But many Palestinians might regard it as an important symbolic
victory, an international recognition of their right to statehood and
another step towards eventual full UN membership and independence.

Invoking A Powerful Historical Precedent

There are two specific aspects to UN nonmember state status that
appeal to some Palestinians.

First, is the powerful historical precedent it invokes. There is
presently only one nonmember state at the UN, the Holy See, but the
Vatican has no interest in becoming a full UN member state for a
variety of reasons.

However, historically, there have been 16 UN nonmember states and,
accounting for the unification of Germany and Vietnam, all 16 are now
full UN members. This history alone helps to explain a large part of
the appeal such a status holds for Palestinian leaders.

Second, some Palestinians hope that a nonmember UN observer state of
Palestine would be able to access international law enforcement
agencies and mechanisms to pursue charges against Israel.

Specifically, some Palestinians are hoping their nonmember state could
become party to the International Criminal Court, potentially making
Israel and Israeli officials liable for war crimes under the Statute.
These not only include unlawful acts of violence against persons or
property, but also settlement activity and “the crime of apartheid.”

However, although theoretically it is possible for a non-UN-member
“state” of Palestine to accede to the Statute, actually pursuing
indictments and prosecutions against Israeli officials will be more of
a political and diplomatic process than a legal one.

It is difficult to imagine a multilateral, diplomatic international
law-enforcement body filing charges against Israel under the current
international climate.

The history of the Goldstone Report into the Gaza War found opposition
to acting under its findings coming not only from traditional
defenders of Israel such as the United States and France, but also
Russia and China, who were concerned about the potential precedent it
might set concerning the actions of large armies in heavily populated
insurgent areas.

Possible Backlash

There are two ways in which the Palestinians could seek such status in
the General Assembly.

The first would be to reach an understanding with the European Union
— uncomfortably split between members which are supportive, opposed
to, and ambivalent about such an upgrade for the Middle East Quartet.

The second would be to do it in a confrontational manner, which could
provoke a serious backlash from Israel, the United States and possibly
even some European states.

A confrontational approach could well result in the cutting off of aid
from the United States — the single biggest individual donor to the
Palestinian Authority (PA) annually — and a wide range of potential
Israeli retaliations, including the withholding of Palestinian tax
revenues which make up the bulk of the PA’s budget.

Moreover, a crisis in relations with the United States is extremely
unlikely to promote the realization of a genuinely independent,
sovereign state of Palestine.

That can only be achieved through negotiations with Israel and no
party is competing with the Americans to serve as the broker for such
talks.

Therefore, what the Palestinians would gain through a confrontational
General Assembly vote, which they could no doubt win, would be
largely, if not entirely, symbolic, but with very real, painful costs.

Indeed, the Palestinians might be setting themselves up as the mirror
image of the Republic of Kosovo, which has de facto independence but
no UN membership and limited international recognition, primarily due
to Russian and Serbian opposition.

Palestine could end up with enhanced status at the UN and widespread
international recognition, but no actual sovereignty and with de facto
independence at least as difficult to achieve as ever.

Potentially A Pyrrhic Victory

Palestinian leaders argue convincingly that they have little
confidence in the willingness of the present Israeli government of
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to enter into serious negotiations
leading to their independence, and that the bilateral negotiating
process brokered by the United States has essentially broken down, at
least for the time being. So it is understandable that they are
looking for an alternative.

But the practical consequences of a confrontational approach at the
UN, which alienates much of the West — especially the United States
— and provokes Israeli retaliation, could prove a Pyrrhic victory.

Worse still, if the United States, Israel and others overreact by
cutting off funds to the PA and leaving the Palestinians destitute and
in despair, this could provoke an outpouring of anger and even
violence that would turn into a security and political nightmare for
Israel and the PA alike.

In both of these instances, the “cure” would be worse than the
disease, and measures designed to make matters better or make an
important point could actually render the existing political situation
far more difficult.

Since the Palestinian leadership has taken no formal action yet, the
window for a compromise is not yet closed. It is strongly in the
interests of all parties to find one.