Monthly Archives: October 2020

November 3 is a Referendum on US Political Extremism

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/will-democrats-follow-republicans-to-the-fringe-1.1099236

The Future of Both Parties, and Centrist Politics in General, Will be Strongly Shaped by the Coming Election.

There is barely a week left before November 3, when polls close in the most momentous American election in decades, if not a century or more. Fifty-six million ballots have already been cast by early and postal voting. If results are close, counting could go on for days and litigation for weeks. But a decisive outcome could be clear as early as election night.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden’s edge over incumbent Republican President Donald Trump has been amazingly consistent. Since early summer, he has held a strong, typically double-digit, lead in national polls, and smaller but significant ones in most swing states, with almost no deviation.

Democrats are haunted by Mr Trump’s unexpected victory over Hillary Clinton four years ago. Many Republicans appear convinced that he will somehow pull off another stunning upset.

But with the economy struggling and the coronavirus pandemic again surging, the underlying circumstances are radically different. Mrs Clinton was deeply unpopular, but there is no sign Mr Trump has provoked widespread dislike or mistrust of Mr Biden or demonstrated that he is senile or secretly radical.

Early voting data heavily favors the Democrats. Yet Mr Trump could still win, particularly if he inspires a large group of those among his core constituency of non-college-educated white Americans who typically don’t vote to go to the polls on election day. A marked surge of new Republican voter registrations in key states provides the main hope that he will prevail after all.

The all-important Senate, meanwhile, seems a real toss-up and is now the main focus of serious Republican efforts.

Four years ago, many Trump-backers cast the election in starkly existential terms. Now he is being even more lurid and aggressive, warning that a Biden victory would destroy the country, wreck its economy, prompt waves of non-white immigration, and hand power to radical socialists.

This time, however, Democrats and numerous prominent disaffected Republican commentators and operatives (though few serving elected officials) agree that the stakes are historically and nationally existential. Mrs Clinton, by contrast, never took Mr Trump seriously until he won, and no one knew how he would behave in office.

Mr Trump’s campaign proclaims that American culture, capitalism and, in effect, white ethnic power are at stake. Mr Biden’s allies insist that democratic institutions and the rule of law might not survive four more years of Mr Trump. The “soul of the country”, both sides say, is on the ballot.

The outcome will therefore force a far more dramatic reckoning within the losing party than any normal defeat would.

To counter Mr Trump’s narrow but deeply passionate base, the Democratic Party and its own base voters strategically chose to unite, tack strongly to the center and, through the staunchly moderate Mr Biden, build the broadest national coalition they could, including by courting receptive conservatives.

Democrats have bet everything on their center-left mainstream leadership, essentially the old guard from the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama eras. They are basically offering Americans a return to pre-Trump “normalcy” through a familiar, moderate standard-bearer backed by a historically unprecedented bevy of his Republican former opponents who agree that democratic processes and institutions are in mortal peril from the current president.

If Mr Biden wins, this gamble will be strongly vindicated and reinforced. As the clash between Mrs Clinton and Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont four years ago demonstrated, there is a bitter Democratic split between a typically younger and passionate left-wing camp, and the centrist, often literally old, guard still in charge.

That division will persist and perhaps grow. But a Biden victory will mean the new generation of leftists, now led by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, must be patient. They can still pursue control of the party, but will have to proceed cautiously, given the success of the centrist gambit, and, especially at first, the glow of victory.

But if Mr Trump wins, their ascendancy will be rapid. Amid bitter recriminations, the left would surely seize control of the party, shifting it radically in their direction.

Among Republicans, as Mr Trump’s presidency demonstrates, populist hardliners have already decisively defeated and marginalised the centre-right old guard, such as 2012 GOP presidential candidate Senator Mitt Romney of Utah.

If Mr Trump is re-elected, this radicalism will be strongly reinforced, and his personal control become so entrenched that one of his own children may inherit his party leadership.

If Mr Trump is narrowly defeated while loudly charging fraud, and especially if Republicans retain the Senate, the stage will be set for him to attempt a comeback in 2024, health permitting. Failing that, one of his core “America First” supporters – perhaps Senators Tom Cotton of Arkansas or Josh Hawley of Missouri, or the notorious white nationalist TV commentator Tucker Carlson – could take the helm of a doggedly extreme Republican Party.

Even if he is trounced and Democrats take the Senate, a rapid resurgence of the beleaguered Republican centre-right seems unlikely. The base is now so extreme that what is needed is another programmatic Republican de-radicalization campaign, even more extensive than efforts in the 1960s to marginalise the fanatical John Birch Society.

Instead, former South Carolina governor Nikki Haley is poised to try to amalgamate populist Trumpians and traditional Reaganite conservatives. She has strong Reaganite credentials but served as Mr Trump’s UN ambassador without alienating him or his base.

Having painstakingly planted a foot in each camp, she has positioned herself to offer Republicans a viable future under a conservative, Christian woman of color in an increasingly diverse country – a plausible opponent to another Indian-American, Mr Biden’s running mate and possible successor, Senator Kamala Harris.

If Trumpism implodes in the coming days, a new Haley-led conservative fusionism could be the sequel. But there is no sign of any Republican leaders preparing to banish or subdue the increasingly empowered menagerie of fanatics, white nationalists, QAnon and other bizarre cultists in their ranks.

If Mr Biden loses, the US could find itself trapped between two extremist parties, with moderates sidelined in both. But if he wins, centrists and all Americans still committed to traditional institutions of democracy and the rule of law will retain a strong, even commanding, voice into the foreseeable future.

Arab States Should Avoid an Arms Race With Iran

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-22/saudi-arabia-uae-should-avoid-an-arms-race-with-iran?srnd=opinion&sref=tp95wk9l

They have an insurmountable lead in military hardware, but should worry about Tehran’s acquisition of technology.

Iran secured a significant diplomatic victory on Sunday when the United Nations arms embargo, imposed in 2007 over concerns about Tehran’s nuclear program, expired. Efforts by the Trump administration to extend it in the Security Council ended in an embarrassing American failure, as did the effort to invoke the grievance mechanism within the 2015 nuclear deal.

The Islamic Republic’s beleaguered President Hassan Rouhani cited the expiration of the embargo as a major accomplishment of the nuclear agreement. At least in theory, Iran is now back in the market to buy and sell conventional weapons. Russia and China are eager to supplyit with advanced jets, tanks and missiles.

This is alarming for its Gulf Arab neighbors, and especially for its primary adversaries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They will be tempted to enter an arms race with Iran, using their deeper pockets — and easy access to American weapons systems — to maintain their substantial technological edge over Tehran. It has been suggested that the UAE’s eagerness to acquire F-35 jets, for instance, anticipates the Iranian purchase of new planes to update its air force.

But the greatest threat to Iran’s neighbors will come, not from any big-ticket spending by Tehran, but from its acquisition of technologies that enhance its homemade weapons. State-of-the-art targeting and guidance systems for missiles and drones can help Iran inflict more damage than planes and tanks.

If the Russians and Chinese are willing to brave American sanctions — and give a cash-strapped Tehran very generous terms — it is conceivable that the Iranians will order jets and heavy armor. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps hasn’t been able to import advanced hardware in decades.

It may not be possible to prevent Iran from following Turkey in acquiring the Russian S-400 missile-defense system, which would be a significant upgrade from its existing S-300s. Moscow will likely argue that the S-400 is defensive, and therefore represents no threat to Iran’s neighbors. (The Russians are keen to sell it to Gulf Arab countries, as well.)

But defensive weapons such as missile-defense systems form a part of an overall integrated military structure, and as significant for offensive as defensive actions. Upgrading its capabilities in this area would greatly strengthen Iran’s strategic position. Even more alarming for the Arab states are prospects of Iran acquiring new offensive missiles and drones. Presumably, a great deal of American effort, whether diplomatic or punitive, will be directed at preventing this.

But in the medium-term, the greatest threat would come from relatively small purchases of precision-guidance technology, to greatly upgrade Iran’s domestic production. Many of Iran’s home-made missiles are based on models acquired from North Korea; these have been significantly altered and, in some cases, improved by Iranian engineers. Iran has also developed substantial drone-making capabilities.

Its enemies have already experienced the potency of these missiles and drones, whether executed by the IRGC or its proxy militias in the Middle East. The most dramatic demonstration came in the missile-and-drone swarm attackagainst Saudi oil installations last year. Now imagine how much more mayhem might be unleashed if those firing off the missiles and drones had better guidance and targeting technology.  

In all of this, the first line of defense for the Gulf Arab states will be the U.S. Treasury’s secondary sanctions on companies, and possibly even countries, engaging in major weapons deals with Tehran. But Iran’s neighbors will also want to be forearmed against the new threats.

While the question of F-35 sales to the UAE has made the headlines recently, the real game-changer in the current proposed package from Washington is the EA-18G Growler, which comes with the latest electronic-warfare technology, including jamming pods and communication countermeasures. This is the kind of weapon Arab states will hope to deploy against more sophisticated Iranian attacks.

But the best way for the Saudis and Emiratis to respond to an Iran armed with more potent conventional weapons to work with the U.S. to create an effective secondary sanctions regime: The Treasury Department will do the heavy lifting, but they can help by refusing to cooperate with entities and individuals that go too far in arming their enemy. They should press China, Russia and former Soviet republics against providing Tehran with greatly expanded conventional firepower.

The Gulf states would also be wise to find a way to end their quarrel with Qatar and present a more unified Gulf Arab front. If they’re willing to be more ambitious, they should create a collective Gulf Arab missile-defense system. And, of course, the whole point of a robust military stance is to facilitate effective diplomacy with adversaries.

All of this can be achieved without an indiscriminate, wasteful arms race.

Shutting the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad Would Be Counterproductive

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-20/shutting-the-u-s-embassy-in-baghdad-would-be-counterproductive?srnd=premium&sref=tp95wk9l

A smaller presence would better fit current American ambitions.

Since last fall, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad has been under constant attack by pro-Iranian militias. Now Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is threatening to shutter the vast complex if the Iraqi government can’t protect it. But cutting and running would be a huge mistake.

Every sensible person agrees the giant embassy is a burdensome anachronism: At 104 acres, it is the largest and most expensive American outpost in the world, an outsized relic of the George W. Bush administration. The scale reflects a vision in which the U.S. would be embedded throughout the Iraqi government.

American ambitions in Iraq have long since been downsized, so this giant footprint is an expensive and highly vulnerable target. Toward the end of last year, at the height of Iran’s “maximum resistance” campaign against the U.S., the embassy and other American installations in Iraq came under rocket attack almost weekly.

Eventually, American and British personnel were killed at a military base, leading to counterstrikes on the headquarters of the pro-Iranian militia group Kata’aib Hezbollah, killing at least 26 of its cadres. That group responded by besieging the embassy, which in turn provoked the Jan 3 drone strike that killed senior Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and Kata’aib chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, among others.

Tehran swore Soleimani’s killing would be avenged, and Kata’aib Hezbollah seemed intent on continuing to bombard U.S. positions, including the embassy. In recent days, there have been indications that Iran may rein in its militias, but the reprieve is at best temporary.

For years, U.S. officials have demanded that the Iraq government do more to prevent such attacks. That never happened, because taking on these militia groups, which are technically part of the Iraqi security forces, is politically and practically daunting.

It would appear that Pompeo is serious about the threat to close the embassy. That would be counterproductive, since it would deal a real political blow to the government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. 

The Kadhimi government is the most reasonable and forthcoming one the U.S. has dealt with in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. The prime minister, more than his predecessors, is making a real effort to weaken the pro-Iranian militias. His efforts are being undermined by the threat to close the embassy, which has been received as a victory by these militia groups and their Iranian patrons. The propaganda message is predictable: The U.S. is running away, leaving its Iraqi allies in the lurch.

No one doubts that Washington needs an embassy commensurate with the far more limited diplomatic role it intends to play in Iraq. But such a change must be executed carefully. A safe and secure transfer to a right-sized facility would require the outlay of hundreds of millions of dollars, which must be secured from Congress in advance of any such announcement. It’s also crucial that Washington doesn’t act in a manner that appears to reflect weakness, let alone defeat.

If the new embassy is successfully integrated into the local Baghdad infrastructure for supplies of electricity, water, telecommunications and so on – at least to some extent – that would also intensify the buy-in by Iraqis and broaden the local constituency for wanting the embassy to be where it is.

Douglas Silliman, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq — and, full disclosure, now a colleague at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington — observes that the way the U.S. pulled out of the consulate in Basra in September 2018, played into the hands of Iran and its allies. “A lot of people felt demoralized or abandoned by the U.S. and our allies, who left the field to our strategic competitors. A lot of Basrawis who dealt with us were harassed, kidnapped and killed.”

The lesson for the Baghdad embassy, he tells me, is to look for an option between keeping the presence as it is and shutting it down altogether, both of which would be big mistakes. “But,” Silliman notes, “the first thing is to decide what the main purpose of the presence is, and then suit the infrastructure to fit the mission.”

As with so much else about U.S. policy in the Middle East, the solution to this problem must start with Washington finally deciding what it wants to accomplish.

Barrett’s Coming Confirmation Foreshadows a Potential US Trainwreck over Courts

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/for-republicans-amy-coney-barrett-s-confirmation-will-reign-supreme-1.1095537

Although the hearings weren’t remotely interesting, the most consequential development in Washington these days is the confirmation process for Judge Amy Coney Barrett, nominated to replace the late liberal hero Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the US Supreme Court. As President Donald Trump inches closer to possible defeat in the November 3 election, the Republican party finds itself poised for a massive generational victory, finally securing a solid 6-3 conservative majority on the high court.

This apparently unstoppable Senate confirmation realises a project that began in the 1970s. Outraged by 20 years of judicial hammer blows – beginning with Brown versus Board of Education, which effectively prohibited racial segregation in 1954, and culminating with Roe versus Wade’s guarantee of abortion and privacy rights in 1973 – conservatives sought a right-wing court majority.

The gold standard for conservatives was Ms Barrett’s mentor, the late justice Antonin Scalia, but she seems even more right-wing.

For example, Scalia, an ardent opponent of gun control, allowed that, perhaps, the government can bar convicted felons from owning weapons. Not so, says Ms Barrett. Gun ownership rights are so fundamental that the government must prove a significant, imminent public danger in every case. That puts her on the most extreme wing of an already extremely pro-gun constituency.

Both political parties are guilty of putting up nominees who refuse to discuss anything substantial on the ridiculous grounds that it might somehow compromise their independence. So, like all her recent predecessors, Ms Barrett declined any meaningful colloquy.

She refused to opine on whether the President could delay the election (he can’t), or whether it is unlawful to intimidate voters (it is). If asked whether the sky looks blue, she would have probably cited the need to hear arguments and research relevant litigation before commenting.

But the Senators were little better.

Timorous Democrats avoided any mention of Ms Barrett’s membership in a religious group that emphasises male supremacy, speaking in tongues, prophesying and other potentially relevant beliefs. Much as Mr Trump is counterfactually calling the moderate Mr Biden a “socialist”, Senate Republicans denounced Democrats for attacking her faith though they never mentioned it.

All Senators burbled tinned speeches, generally totally unconnected to constitutional law.

It’s a pity, because Ms Barrett is a champion of “Originalism”, a specious doctrine central to the programmatic conservative legal agenda. She said that it means: “I interpret the Constitution as a law, I understand it to have the meaning that it had at the time people ratified it.”

That’s plainly convenient for the political right. But it is absurd. It assumes there is a fixed or identifiable “public meaning” that is somehow defined during the ratification process (although by whom, precisely, and how, exactly, is undefined or contested) when obviously there almost never is.

Clearly, even when different people agree on the same language, they typically have radically different motivations and understandings of what they want it to mean.

Moreover, such legal “Originalists” usually ignore historians, as if only their own legal scholarship provides a genuine grasp of mindsets from the distant past. Common sense and bitter experience strongly suggest otherwise.

It’s also unlikely that the “original” constitutional understandings of 1787 survived the post-Civil War reconstruction and amendments from 1866-1877 that, as president Abraham Lincoln vowed, redefined the country, enshrined equality for all citizens and made the federal government – and not the states – the guarantor of that equality.

Democrats didn’t engage any of this, presumably because there aren’t many votes in methodology. But there are in health care, so Democrats insisted she is being rushed through for a case against the popular Obamacare health insurance law scheduled for arguments on November 10. But that case is so ridiculous that she and a majority will probably reject it.

Instead, Democrats should have emphasised what Mr Trump openly says he wants from Ms Barrett: support in rulings immediately after the election to affect the outcome. If Mr Trump tries to use courts as the primary means to stay in power despite the voters, Democrats may regret not having highlighted it and pressed her more strongly to recuse herself from any 2020 election issues, as would be ethical.

In the long run, all eyes will be on the Roe ruling, which she has strongly denounced, and a set of potential coming liberal reforms.

Washington may soon find itself reliving the 1930s, where a leftover, pre-Depression, ultra-conservative Supreme Court majority consistently blocked president Franklin Roosevelt’s economic restructuring until he threatened to expand its membership. Both sides ultimately backed down.

The potential for revisited “court packing” is the one campaign issue that Democratic nominee Joe Biden has severely mishandled. While “let’s see if she gets confirmed” would have sufficed, he has been repeating: “I’ll tell you my policy after the election” – a mystifyingly clumsy position.

Republicans are focused on controlling courts not only because they remember the liberal gains accrued between the 1950s through the 70s, but also because that’s the least democratic and accountable branch of government. That is bound to appeal to the party mainly of white, non-college-educated, and non-urban Americans, a constituency that is transitioning from being a solid majority to much greater potential vulnerability.

Democrats already see several of the Supreme Court’s conservative justices as illegitimate.

There is a much stronger case today against Clarence Thomas than in 1991, when a former subordinate named Anita Hill stood alone accusing him of improprieties during his confirmation hearing. Many believe Brett Kavanaugh similarly perjured himself. Neil Gorsuch is only on the bench because Republicans blocked Barack Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, claiming that it would be “improper” given a mere 10 months left in the president’s term.

Now Ms Barrett’s nomination is being rammed through while voting is already under way. And all of it is being done by a President and Senate majority elected without majority support.

What the Barrett hearings suggest is that a huge American train wreck over the Supreme Court, and other federal appellate courts, is likely if – as many suspect – Democrats consolidate elected executive and legislative authority in coming years.

If Ms Barrett enters the arena of power as Mr Trump exits it, perhaps even bringing down the Republican Senate majority down with him, she and her conservative colleagues on the Supreme Court may be the most politically powerful and relevant Republicans in Washington for many years.

Why Hariri’s Return Might Give Lebanon a Chance For Reform

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-14/why-hariri-s-return-might-give-lebanon-a-chance-for-reform?sref=tp95wk9l

He’ll find that the country’s political factions are less resistant to change.

After a tumultuous year, Lebanese politics seems firmly rooted in the proverbial square one . Last October, Prime Minister Saad Hariri was brought down by a series of widespread street protests against the entire ruling elite. Now Hariri looks likely to return, possibly as soon as this week.

At first glance, this might bode ill for the prospects of real reforms in Lebanon. But much has changed in the year since Hariri’s resignation. The worsening economy and the catastrophic August 4 explosion in Beirut have helped to soften political resistance to change. If Hariri plays his cards right, it is just conceivable that he could oversee a meaningful shift — however modest — in the Lebanese power structure.

That would require him to persuade Hezbollah, along with its local partners and Syrian and Iranian patrons,  to accept changes in the way the Lebanese state is governed and its resources managed. Some reports suggest the two sides have reached an informal understanding. Harder still, Hariri will have to win over the people who forced him from office a year ago.

Their desire for change is undiminished. Lebanese have made their disgust with the political system, with its sectarian quotas and networks of patronage, abundantly clear. They hold their leaders responsible for destroying their economy and currency, ruining their lives and livelihoods—and for the explosion that shattered their capital. All political factions are under enormous pressure to respond to the growing anger.

Pressure for change is also coming from abroad. Lebanon’s economy needs a multi-billion-dollar bailout from the International Monetary Fund; international investors would be loath to sink money into the country until it has a new IMF-approved framework. But a bailout would come with significant economic and political conditions.

For Lebanese with power and privilege, that means the terrifying prospect of opening the Pandora’s Box of reform. Any IMF-imposed moves toward transparency and accountability in economic management will inevitably impinge on the political elite’s ability to appropriate national resources.

But there are signs that the political class is beginning to accept that without reforms Lebanon would face total social collapse. Even Hezbollah has dropped its formerly adamant opposition to any deal with the IMF. It now seems willing to go along with French President Emmanuel Macron’s plan, which requires the formation of a government of technocrats, and committing to an agreement with the IMF. Other, less powerful leaders like Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt recognize they can’t block or veto such a deal and are maneuvering to join the new government.

Most of the political factions regard Hariri as a useful interlocutor with the IMF. This, taken together with regional and international support, will lend credibility to his claim to speak for the Lebanese power structure in making real concessions.

Even Hezbollah, long his opponents, will welcome Hariri’s return. His departure, and the political paralysis that it precipitated, left the pro-Iranian militia responsible for the Lebanese government, a very uncomfortable position, particularly in such hard times.

Hezbollah much prefers the old arrangement that allowed it to assert its primacy on the issues it considers vital, such as maintaining the  independence of its fighters and military infrastructure, while leaving the messy work of governing to others. Hariri’s return will allow it to once again wield power without responsibility. In exchange, he might be able to extract concessions on debt restructuring and public sector reforms that he can take to the IMF.

Hariri says he will follow Macron’s plan. An early signal of his seriousness would be the independence and credibility of key members of his cabinet—and especially the minister of finance, a position Hezbollah would be loath to fully relinquish. Announcing a truly independent, credible cabinet might win Hariri some leeway from ordinary Lebanese, who would otherwise regard his return with suspicion.

There is much that could go wrong. Hezbollah might yet balk at serious reform, and the protesters who brought Hariri down last October might not be inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt.

But these are desperate times, and what was once unthinkable is now possible. Consider the maritime border negotiations with Israel, which under almost any other circumstances would have provoked outrage among Lebanese. Now, not even Hezbollah can summon any serious opposition to haggling with the old enemy.

Lebanese desperation might — just might — help Saad Hariri to finally move his country beyond square one.

Trump’s kryptonite is thinking he’s Superman

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/trump-s-kryptonite-is-thinking-he-s-superman-1.1091782

The US president has failed to recast his fraught relationship with both the pandemic and the society it has devastated.

President Donald Trump had a remarkable vision for how to stage his return to the White House following his time in hospital with Covid-19, The New York Times reports. He planned to pretend to be exaggeratedly feeble, only to tear off his jacket and shirt to reveal a Superman costume. Apparently, he was dissuaded – but the very idea is troubling and revealing.

Mr Trump may be returning to health, but his campaign continues to suffer from self-inflicted wounds with little time left to bounce back before the November 3 election.

For many months uninterrupted, former vice president Joe Biden has maintained a national lead of roughly 8 to 12 percentage points. It is becoming hard to imagine how Mr Trump can break that remarkably stable and large advantage.

The debates were an obvious opportunity, but his aggressive and often obnoxious performance at the first event on September 29 was of no help. Last week’s vice-presidential debate was more decorous, but did not yield a clear advantage to either Vice President Mike Pence or Mr Biden’s running mate, Senator Kamala Harris.

The star of the show was generally reckoned to be a large black fly that for some reason appeared strongly attracted to Mr Pence.

Americans don’t really vote for the vice president, so Mr Trump had a major opportunity in the second presidential debate scheduled for October 15. Yet he pulled out altogether when the organizers announced it would be held online rather than in person to prevent further infections. His advisors apparently convinced him that, trailing in the polls, he needed the opportunity more than his opponent, and he relented. But Mr Biden had already scheduled an alternative event and the organizing committee refused to add an additional date as Mr Trump then demanded. He may get one final chance to directly confront Mr Biden at a third debate on October 22, but no one would be surprised if that’s also cancelled.

Mr Trump’s abrupt swings on the debate reflected his greater-than-usual volatility since his release from hospital, which some doctors have suggested may be linked to his treatment with dexamethasone, a powerful steroid that can produce agitation, mood swings and hyper-aggressiveness.

That, perhaps, could help explain his prolonged and mystifying self-sabotage over failed negotiations on a new pandemic disaster relief/economic stimulus bill with both fellow Republicans, who want a much smaller amount than he does, and Democrats, who are insisting on an even larger intervention.

Although the president clearly needs a major relief initiative to aid his re-election, he suddenly and inexplicably called off negotiations with Democrats on Tuesday night. Two days later, however, he demanded that Congress “go big”, and insisted he wanted an even more generous initiative than the Democrats. Both sides appear to have given up on him, Congress has gone into recess, and anything passed now would probably come into effect too late to affect the election.

A personal bout with the coronavirus presented the president with a golden opportunity to recast his fraught relationship with both the pandemic and the families and society it has devastated. Instead, as I suggested that he might in these pages last week, he continues to dismiss its significance, essentially maintaining that it is not a big deal, although it is now the third leading cause of death in the US after cancer and heart disease, and has claimed well more than 200,000 American lives.

The president shocked many by suggesting families of fallen soldiers may have given him the disease.

He gave conflicting accounts of his Covid-19 experience, which he inexplicably called “a blessing from God”.

On one hand, he confided that “I was not in great shape” and “I might not have recovered at all”. On the other hand, he boasted: “I’m back because I’m a perfect physical specimen and I’m extremely young.” The president is 74.

In a video message aimed at older voters, Mr Trump implied this is a little-known secret, allowing that: “I’m a senior. I know you don’t know that. Nobody knows that.”

He unleashed unparalleled vitriol at his adversaries, demanding that Attorney General William Barr arrest and prosecute his election opponent, Mr Biden; his 2016 election opponent, Hillary Clinton; and his predecessor, Barack Obama. He suggested he might personally take such action if need be. In the same interview, he described Ms Harris as a “monster” twice and a “communist” four times.

Astoundingly, Mr Trump and his allies responded to the thwarting of a conspiracy by right-wing extremists to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer by condemning her for criticizing him in the past and appeared nonchalant about the terrorist plot itself.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, without much pushback, described the president as being in an “altered state”. But whether this outlandish behavior is attributable to steroids or the looming prospect of defeat, or both, is unknowable.

Still, Americans typically look to their leaders for reassurance and stability in times of crisis. In recent months Mr Biden has been cultivating such an image, while Mr Trump has not. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell pointedly added that he has avoided the White House since August 6 because of Mr Trump’s lax approach to preventing coronavirus infections.

Twenty-one confirmed cases are connected to the White House or the Trump campaign, which is resuming live mass events. Mr Pence held a large rally on Saturday at a Florida retirement centre with little social distancing and few masks. Mr Trump plans similar events soon.

So, many leading Republicans are now directing most available time and money to saving their Senate majority instead of Mr Trump’s dwindling re-election prospects. Party operatives are concentrating on restricting voting and preparing to contest ballots rather than winning him more votes.

Both campaigns are now fixated on Pennsylvania, because they agree Mr Trump will not win re-election if he loses there. But any candidate pinning all hopes on winning a single swing state without which national defeat is inevitable, and whose party operatives are reportedly focused on suppressing voting and contesting ballots, is plainly in deep trouble. And, of course, there is no Superman costume under his suit.

Could it be game over for Donald Trump?

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/could-it-be-game-over-for-donald-trump-1.1087370

The President’s positive test strengthens the widespread understanding he has mishandled the Covid-19 pandemic and resulting economic crisis.

It is the ultimate “October non-surprise”. US President Donald Trump and his wife Melania have tested positive for Covid-19, meaning that he will have to suspend campaigning for at least a week.

He reportedly has “mild symptoms” and is being hospitalized as a precaution. But if he becomes badly ill, his ability to continue serving as President and even heading the Republican ticket will have to be re-examined.

Four weeks out, all indications suggest that former vice president Joe Biden, who has tested negative, is strongly on track to win. The President’s positive test could not have come at a worse time and strengthens the widespread understanding he has mishandled the pandemic and resulting economic crisis.

Early voting has already begun (full disclosure: I have voted by mail), and seems heavily weighted towards Democratic voters. Almost all polls seem discouraging for the President. He has been attempting to change the subject, but this election has inevitably focused on two themes: health care and jobs.

On both fronts, he is in big trouble.

Since January, with rare exceptions, Mr Trump has consistently dismissed and downplayed the severity and danger of the virus. In February and March, he insisted it was completely under control and going away. In April and May, he was promising that the return of warm weather would make the virus suddenly disappear “like a miracle”. And since June, he has consistently announced the imminent ending of the pandemic, denounced public health protocols, demanded the reopening of schools and promised a vaccine is almost ready.

In recent weeks, he has repeatedly flouted social distancing policies in several states by holding rallies of thousands of tightly packed people, usually unmasked, including indoors. And he has repeatedly mocked reporters and Mr Biden for wearing masks, including at the disgraceful “debate” fiasco on Tuesday night.

Despite the fact that he and everyone around him get tested constantly, Mr Trump’s infection was therefore probably a matter of time.

All decent people will wish the first couple a quick recovery. But a massive outpouring of national sympathy is unlikely given the President’s cavalier attitudes, including dismissing over 200,000 American dead from the coronavirus this year as “it is what it is”. Mr Biden’s best line at the debate was: “It is what it is, because you are who you are.”

It is not even clear this will finally end the debate about the danger of the virus. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is one of the few world leaders who has been even more dismissive of the virus than Mr Trump, and his own bout with the illness did nothing to change his mystifying view that it is just “a little flu”.

Indeed, it is possible that if the President has little personal difficulty bouncing back, he and his supporters will take it as proof that he has been right all along and that public health protocols are overblown and often unnecessary.

Yet the American majority will probably understand that the President’s own conduct greatly increased the chances he would get infected despite the extraordinary protections he is afforded, and it will thus underscore the extent to which he has misjudged – or rather, as Bob Woodward’s new book Ragedemonstrates, deliberately misrepresented – the dangers to the American public.

Since early summer, Mr Biden has maintained a national lead of around seven points, and smaller but significant leads in most swing states. Early mail voting indicates a huge Democratic advantage, although that could shift in time.

The President’s last obvious opportunity to change the election narrative, in particular by making it something other than a referendum on himself, came with the first debate this week but he failed to take it. By shouting, raging and constantly interrupting both Mr Biden and moderator Chris Wallace, Mr Trump ensured that all attention focused, yet again, on his own personality which is not the key to a winning coalition. His standing was further damaged when he appeared to endorse and embrace a violent white supremacist gang.

That came on top of numerous other major blows.

The New York Times revealed that he paid only $750 in personal income taxes in each of the past two years and paid none at all in 10 of the past 15 years. While some may find this admirable, many will regard it as reprehensible and borderline criminal.

Additionally, he apparently faces over $400 million in soon-due debts to unidentified parties, which could explain his unending obsequiousness to Russian President Valdimir Putin, and raises serious questions regarding national security and conflicts of interest.

The Atlantic, backed up by AP, Fox News, The Washington PostThe New York Times and others, reported that Mr Trump considers slain US troops to be “suckers” and “losers”. The latest jobs report was worse than expected. And a badly needed disaster relief bill to aid struggling families and companies is nowhere in sight.

The dire condition of Mr Trump’s campaign was arguably embodied by his former campaign manager, Brad Parscale, who was recently arrested outside his home drunk and threatening to commit suicide.

There is only one obvious piece of good news: Republicans in the Senate seem likely to confirm the ultra-conservative judge Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court, giving Mr Trump a strong sympathetic majority going into the election.

The President has repeatedly said that he expects the High Court to decide the election by ruling on the validity of ballots. That is only plausible if the results are very close.

Right now, there is every indication they will not be. Mr Biden is leading and outspending Mr Trump, and every development other than the Supreme Court appears to be weighing heavily against the President. Even some of his closest allies, such as South Carolina Senator Lindsay Graham, who once seemed untouchable, now appear to be facing possible defeat as well.

And now that the coronavirus is having the last laugh and, at a minimum, has put him in quarantine and off the campaign trail in the coming crucial days, it is becoming increasingly difficult to see how Mr Trump is going to avoid defeat in November.

Why Palestinian Unity Is a Pipe Dream

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-01/why-palestinian-unity-between-hamas-and-fatah-is-a-pipe-dream?sref=tp95wk9l

This is not the first time Hamas and Fatah have promised national reconciliation and elections.

Still reeling from Israel’s normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, Palestinian leaders have fallen back on their hoariest, least convincing talking point: national reunification. Fatah and Hamas, the dominant parties in the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, say they have agreed to hold a general election, the first in 15 years. This, they say, will allow them to form a united front in opposition to Israel.

There is virtually no chance any of it will actually happen. This latest proposal will almost certainly fade away, just like all previous promises. There was talk of national unity in 2011, and a Fatah-Hamas pact in 2014 to form a combined government—and that’s to name just two failures. There haven’t been legislative elections since Hamas’ 2006 upset win, and Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas has ruled as president of the Palestinian Authority since his four-year term expired in 2009. 

Neither Fatah nor Hamas has demonstrated any real interest in healing the fractured Palestinian body politic. Over the past decade, each has become well-entrenched in their own fiefdom, where it rules and consumes resources without effective opposition.

In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority receives tens of millions of dollars in annual aid from the international community. (This, even after President Donald Trump ended American aid to Palestinians last year.) Although the PA stopped all dealings with Israel in protest against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plans for annexation of large swathes of the West Bank, it can still lay claim to the taxes Israel collects on Palestinian imports and exports. With annexation off the table at least through 2024, the PA will find a way to resume dialogue and once again get the tax revenues.

Meanwhile, at Israel’s behest, Qatar regularly delivers bundles of cash to Gaza to meet payrolls and keep the economy afloat there.

Both sets of leaders can live with the current arrangements, despite the hardships they impose on the Palestinian population. If the Palestinian parties keep talking up the idea of national reconciliation, it is because, no matter how cynical and unconvincing, these performances are useful. The Palestinian public and their supporters around the world want unity, and promises of unity relieves some of the pressure on both parties. They also help to satisfy donors and the international community. For Fatah and Hamas, these promises are a substitute for having no governing policy at all.

Obviously, national reconciliation is essential to Palestinian interests. But it’s not possible to fit the square peg of Fatah’s secular-nationalist goal of a two-state agreement with Israel into the round hole of Hamas’ Islamist rhetoric of armed struggle until complete victory. There is a long history of bad blood — and actual bloodshed — between them. Pretty much the only thing the two sides agree on is that they are all Palestinians.

There have been repeated efforts in recent years to secure a limited national reconciliation to address the humanitarian and political crisis in Gaza. These were pushed mainly by Egypt, which regards Gaza as a ticking bomb attached to its northeast and the source of considerable instability in Sinai. But even with lots of regional and international buy-in, it couldn’t be achieved.

Hamas agreed to relinquish control of the border crossings and government ministries to the PA, but would not discuss disarming its militia. Fatah leader and Palestinian President Abbas feared he was walking into a trap where he would have all the responsibility for the population, but none of the power and not enough money, leaving Hamas in a position akin to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon, with its own army, as well as foreign and defense policies. Abbas was also loath to let Hamas operate freely in the West Bank.

A bold national leader might have been willing to take these risks in order to extend his authority and reunify his people, but Abbas let the fractured status quo continue rather than try to outwit and outmaneuver his rivals.

And what of elections? After years of misrule, neither Fatah nor Hamas can be confident of a strong mandate. It is hard to imagine either will risk the embarrassment of a poor showing on its own turf, even allowing for the prospect of gaining some ground on the other side.

Conveniently, there is no shortage of others to blame when desultory efforts at national reconciliation falter and elections fail to materialize. The two sides can blame each other, of course. And both can and will finger Israel.

If a national vote is unlikely, it is just possible to imagine a limited election in the West Bank, conducted by the PA. Such an exercise would be useful, even if Hamas won’t reciprocate in Gaza and Israel won’t allow East Jerusalem to participate. It would at least show that Palestinian elections are possible and that one side, at least, is interested in gaining popular credibility, even in a limited area. It means risking the possibility of a Hamas win, but the Palestinian national crisis is so dire that there’s no rational substitute for letting the chips fall where they may.