http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/08/facts_on_the_ground?page=full

With negotiations hopelessly stalled and the deadline for a potential confrontation at the United Nations in September rapidly approaching, the Israeli government apparently decided that now would be the appropriate time to announce a major expansion of one of its most provocative settlements. Interior Minister Eli Yishai said last week that final approval has been given for 900 new units in the Jerusalem “Har Homa” settlement, an area known to Palestinians as Jabal Abu Ghneim.

With breath-taking cynicism, Yishai claimed that the cost-of-living crisis and housing bubble, which has spurred escalating protests and sit-ins across Israel, caused Israel to go ahead with this particularly controversial project. In announcing the decision, he said that “the real estate crisis is serious and we shall not halt projects” and that the move is merely part of “an effort to enable all Israeli citizens to purchase an apartment.” But given that the economic crisis is about the prices of housing, student fees, and cottage cheese, and not about the number of houses as such — and given that there is plenty of space in Israel where the government could build houses — nobody is buying this argument, above all because there is no more sensitive or strategically significant area anywhere under Israeli control, except the Old City of Jerusalem itself.

The expansion in Har Homa is not only highly damaging to prospects for peace, but it also taps into the deepest Palestinian fears of relentless and carefully choreographed settlement activity designed to permanently foreclose the possibility of their meaningful independence. The bitterest experience for Palestinians in their dealings with Israel since negotiations began in 1993 was the doubling of the number of settlers in the occupied territories from 200,000 to 400,000 during the 1990s, when they believed they were negotiating an end to the occupation. Not only did the occupation not end and no Palestinian state get created, but the number of settlements and settlers greatly increased throughout the entire era of the “peace process.” Including East Jerusalem, they now number more than half a million.

Har Homa, which didn’t exist before 1993, as Jerusalem expert Daniel Seidemann correctly points out, “is viewed by the Palestinians as the quintessential post-Camp David unilateral act.” It will be difficult for any Israeli government to agree to cede control of it, but almost impossible for Palestinian leaders not to insist on that very point, especially because the area is crucial to connecting Jerusalem with the rest of the West Bank. It has been a sticking point whenever raised in border negotiations. For Palestinians, an economic crisis in Israel being used to justify the most damaging of land grabs only reinforces their sense of powerlessness and the urgent need to find some means of confronting an unacceptable status quo.

The Har Homa announcement is particularly ironic because Palestinians are being lectured ad nauseam by Israel and the United States about their supposedly “unilateral” initiatives at the United Nations in September involving some sort of acknowledgment of Palestinian statehood. Of course, Israel settlement activity is without question unilateral — as well as a violation of the Geneva Conventions, the Roadmap of the Quartet, and many other crucial obligations. Palestinian U.N. initiatives may be outside the context of negotiations, but are not in fact unilateral, because the United Nations is a multilateral body.

In an effort to stave off a damaging confrontation at the United Nations — and to fend off the threat of shifting the issue to a multilateral forum beyond its control — the United States has been trying to find a way to revive the bilateral negotiating process it has overseen since 1993. In May, U.S. President Barack Obama proposed a generalized vision for new talks, based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed land swaps and focusing on borders and security first. Palestinians cautiouslywelcomed the idea but asked for clear terms of reference. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, categorically, and even angrily, rejected the formula.

With September approaching, however, Palestinian leaders are making it clear that they intend to go forward with some U.N. initiative — though precisely what is not yet known — unless they are offered a clear reason not to do so. They have understandably said that though their first choice is to resume negotiations, they find the present impasse intolerable and are determined to find some path forward.

Everyone faces a substantial “day after” problem in September. Any U.N. initiative, whether or not it is regarded by the Palestinians as a diplomatic success, will not change realities on the ground. Whatever happens in New York, if life for Palestinians under occupation doesn’t change or — because of American or Israeli retaliation — actually gets worse, an outpouring of widespread public anger is a real possibility. Some Palestinian officials have been encouraging mass nonviolent demonstrations coordinated with a U.N. initiative. But Israeli troops facing large Palestinian crowds, even nonviolent ones, are likely to resort to the use of force. And there are numerous Palestinian groups committed to armed struggle that would undoubtedly quickly move to take advantage of a chaotic or confrontational environment.

Leaks from the Israeli prime minister’s office have suggested that Netanyahu may now be willing to agree to talks based on the 1967 borders as long as the Palestinians recognize Israel as a “Jewish state,” whatever that might mean. The Obama administration has not confirmed the existence of such an agreement, and nothing remotely resembling a framework for negotiations or terms of reference has been made public. The reported proposal is a non-starter, though, because Netanyahu would basically be asking the Palestinians to agree to a very significant concession on an issue that was never raised until 2007 in exchange for a reaffirmation of what has been understood by all parties as the basis of negotiations since 1993. It’s a perfect example of asking for something very substantial in return for nothing whatsoever.

Some formula may yet be found, however, because almost all Palestinian options at the United Nations would constitute symbolic victories at most, but incur substantial costs and risks. A U.S. veto in the Security Council — or even a General Assembly vote pitting a large bloc of developing states against most of the West and Japan (which Israel is likely to claim as a coalition of the “civilized world” in its camp) — would do little to advance the cause and could actually damage chances for achieving Palestinian independence.

A losing confrontation with the United States over the issue of statehood in the Security Council would be particularly dangerous to the Palestinian national interest. The U.S. veto in February of a resolution on settlement activity effectively left Israel with a free hand to build with barely any protests, at least until now.

The Har Homa announcement, however, may be a step too far. Every U.S. administration has been strongly opposed to settlement activity in this area because it prejudices the outcome of negotiations on Jerusalem and greatly damages the prospects for an agreement. In 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accurately described Har Homa as “a settlement the United States has opposed from the very beginning.” It is imperative that the Obama administration, no matter how allergic it may have become to the settlement issue, also takes a firm stance on this latest plan.

Expanding the settlement at Har Homa is unlikely to help the Israeli government mollify the huge cost-of-living protests. But it will certainly give the Palestinians yet another reason to regard the present situation as not only intolerable but desperate, and to press forward with a U.N. initiative in spite of the substantial risks. The United States and others wishing the Palestinians to refrain from any ambitious U.N. initiative in September need to provide their leaders with a politically plausible and diplomatically meaningful reason to do so. With its new announcement about Har Homa, the Israeli government could not have given Palestinians a greater incentive to despair about where both present realities and the moribund American-led peace process are taking them, and, in spite of the considerable costs at stake, go ahead and roll the dice at the U.N. casino in New York.

http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/294651

The United States has just entered its extended presidential and
congressional election season with the Republican battle over their
party’s nomination well underway and President Barack Obama having
formally launched his reelection campaign. This regular feature of the
American political system has important implications for US foreign
policy and vital lessons for the Arab world.

As always, the election context has a direct influence on both the
conduct of, and the debate over, US foreign policy. For example, while
the Obama administration clearly regards progress on peace between
Israel and Palestinians as essential and not optional for US
interests, no major peace initiative can be expected during the
campaign season. These built-in restrictions are an integral part of
the cautious American approach to pushing Obama’s outline of renewed
talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon land swaps
and a focus on borders and security first. They also help explain why
so little progress has been made in translating them into clearly
defined negotiating terms of reference rather than generalized
principles.

The election season has also helped produce a hardening of attitudes
in Congress towards the Palestinians, with administration officials
having to defend continued aid to the Palestinian Authority against
vehement criticism. And it prompted grandstanding by Republican
lawmakers who threatened to defund the mission in Libya. It is
unthinkable that Republicans would have threatened to defund a
military effort by a Republican president, and they would have
questioned the patriotism of anyone who tried to do so.

Electioneering unquestionably distorts foreign policy, as it brings
politics into conflict with policy, which is always a problem, even
more than usual. But it helps clarify the mechanics through which US
foreign policy is determined and the US national interest is defined.

Many Arabs, and even Arab-Americans, tend to think of US policies as
predetermined or subject to the machinations of small and shadowy
groups of powerful players. To the contrary, as election seasons
demonstrate most dramatically, the levers through which Americans
define their interests and develop a policy consensus are, in fact,
largely open, transparent and played out in public.

The two main sources of leverage in American politics, including on
foreign policy, are votes and money. These, more than any other
factors, determine exactly who gets elected, and on what platforms.
Media coverage, publicity and policy advocacy, especially when
connected to broad national or influential elite sentiments, are also
an important factor.

These levers are available to all Americans, and there are no laws or
mechanisms restricting who can apply them if they have the means and
the will. History demonstrates that a sustained application of such
resources eventually has a powerful impact on shaping how the country
defines its national interests and what its policies will be.

Arabs and Arab-Americans seem remarkably resistant to either
understanding how the system works or, at least, deciding to
participate in it enthusiastically. We have generally opted out of the
process altogether, leaving an open playing field for others on many
of our most cherished issues.

Arab-Americans have failed to create strong, effective national
institutions. Every single national Arab or Muslim American
organization is smaller or in some way less effective than it was on
September 10, 2011, which is a shocking indictment of the lack of
interest of the community in defending itself or promoting its
concerns. I’m not aware of a single registered lobbyist working for an
Arab-American organization with Congress on Capitol Hill. The
consequences of such woeful inaction are evident across the board.

While direct political participation is reserved for American citizens
only, Arab societies and governments have also demonstrated a
bewildering disinclination to understand the importance of encouraging
and supporting the development of Arab-American organizations. What
Arab societies need in the United States are not clients but friends;
allies, not employees. There has to be room for significant
disagreement as well as agreement. But influential Arabs have shown a
consistent preference for working with non-Arab-American organizations
and companies that do not understand or really care about broader Arab
concerns, and wasted huge amounts of money on this dead end.

Both the Arabs and the Arab-Americans have the means, talent and
resources to have a significant impact on the American policy
conversation through the established political system, which is open
to them in different capacities as citizens or noncitizens. The
negative consequences of their persistent non-engagement or
wrongheaded engagement is always evident, but becomes even more clear
as elections approach.

If we want Americans to sympathize with our positions, for example by
adopting a more evenhanded policy towards Palestine, we must give them
a reason to do so. Serious, sustained and meaningful engagement with
the American political system, and creating and supporting relevant
institutions, is the only way to accomplish this. Not doing so
guarantees continued failure.

http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/294651

The United States has just entered its extended presidential and
congressional election season with the Republican battle over their
party’s nomination well underway and President Barack Obama having
formally launched his reelection campaign. This regular feature of the
American political system has important implications for US foreign
policy and vital lessons for the Arab world.

As always, the election context has a direct influence on both the
conduct of, and the debate over, US foreign policy. For example, while
the Obama administration clearly regards progress on peace between
Israel and Palestinians as essential and not optional for US
interests, no major peace initiative can be expected during the
campaign season. These built-in restrictions are an integral part of
the cautious American approach to pushing Obama’s outline of renewed
talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon land swaps
and a focus on borders and security first. They also help explain why
so little progress has been made in translating them into clearly
defined negotiating terms of reference rather than generalized
principles.

The election season has also helped produce a hardening of attitudes
in Congress towards the Palestinians, with administration officials
having to defend continued aid to the Palestinian Authority against
vehement criticism. And it prompted grandstanding by Republican
lawmakers who threatened to defund the mission in Libya. It is
unthinkable that Republicans would have threatened to defund a
military effort by a Republican president, and they would have
questioned the patriotism of anyone who tried to do so.

Electioneering unquestionably distorts foreign policy, as it brings
politics into conflict with policy, which is always a problem, even
more than usual. But it helps clarify the mechanics through which US
foreign policy is determined and the US national interest is defined.

Many Arabs, and even Arab-Americans, tend to think of US policies as
predetermined or subject to the machinations of small and shadowy
groups of powerful players. To the contrary, as election seasons
demonstrate most dramatically, the levers through which Americans
define their interests and develop a policy consensus are, in fact,
largely open, transparent and played out in public.

The two main sources of leverage in American politics, including on
foreign policy, are votes and money. These, more than any other
factors, determine exactly who gets elected, and on what platforms.
Media coverage, publicity and policy advocacy, especially when
connected to broad national or influential elite sentiments, are also
an important factor.

These levers are available to all Americans, and there are no laws or
mechanisms restricting who can apply them if they have the means and
the will. History demonstrates that a sustained application of such
resources eventually has a powerful impact on shaping how the country
defines its national interests and what its policies will be.

Arabs and Arab-Americans seem remarkably resistant to either
understanding how the system works or, at least, deciding to
participate in it enthusiastically. We have generally opted out of the
process altogether, leaving an open playing field for others on many
of our most cherished issues.

Arab-Americans have failed to create strong, effective national
institutions. Every single national Arab or Muslim American
organization is smaller or in some way less effective than it was on
September 10, 2011, which is a shocking indictment of the lack of
interest of the community in defending itself or promoting its
concerns. I’m not aware of a single registered lobbyist working for an
Arab-American organization with Congress on Capitol Hill. The
consequences of such woeful inaction are evident across the board.

While direct political participation is reserved for American citizens
only, Arab societies and governments have also demonstrated a
bewildering disinclination to understand the importance of encouraging
and supporting the development of Arab-American organizations. What
Arab societies need in the United States are not clients but friends;
allies, not employees. There has to be room for significant
disagreement as well as agreement. But influential Arabs have shown a
consistent preference for working with non-Arab-American organizations
and companies that do not understand or really care about broader Arab
concerns, and wasted huge amounts of money on this dead end.

Both the Arabs and the Arab-Americans have the means, talent and
resources to have a significant impact on the American policy
conversation through the established political system, which is open
to them in different capacities as citizens or noncitizens. The
negative consequences of their persistent non-engagement or
wrongheaded engagement is always evident, but becomes even more clear
as elections approach.

If we want Americans to sympathize with our positions, for example by
adopting a more evenhanded policy towards Palestine, we must give them
a reason to do so. Serious, sustained and meaningful engagement with
the American political system, and creating and supporting relevant
institutions, is the only way to accomplish this. Not doing so
guarantees continued failure.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=296779

The massacre of over 100 protesters in the Syrian city of Hama on Sunday not only shocked the conscience of the world, it has created something of a crisis for American policy toward Syria.

In recent weeks, the Obama administration’s approach to Syria could be summed up in two words: managed transition. The preferred solution to the Syrian crisis was to try to reach out to members of both the opposition and the power structure simultaneously to try to begin a real dialogue about Syria’s future. That now looks increasingly unlikely, and the prospect of what Washington fears most—sectarian civil war—is increasingly possible.

For many months, Washington tossed lifelines to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, calling on him to lead the transition and begin the process of reform. Although most informed observers were convinced from the outset that the regime was, literally, incapable of reform for a myriad of unsavory reasons, the United States had profound and reasonable concerns about chaos and civil conflict in Syria.

In particular, the American concern has been that a raging, and especially sectarian, civil conflict in Syria could spill over into neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, and possibly even be the tipping point for a wider regional conflict. Israel’s and Turkey’s anxieties have also figured prominently in American thinking. A particular concern is Turkey’s apparent inclination, at a minimum, to militarily create a buffer zone in northern Syria, especially in Alawite and above all Kurdish areas, in the event of a civil war or sustained anarchy.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton came under particular criticism after a March 27 statement in which she declared that “[m]any of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe [Assad] is a reformer.” However, as the regime’s brutality escalated, Washington was unable to sustain this tone and imposed limited sanctions in April and May. The administration essentially abandoned the idea that Assad himself could institute reforms, with President Barack Obama bluntly stating that if he could not do so, he should “get out of the way.”

American efforts to try to avoid Syrian civil conflict have been led by the ambassador in Damascus, Robert Ford, whose credibility was greatly enhanced by his controversial July 8 “unauthorized” visit to Hama. Calls to pull the US diplomatic presence in Damascus were rejected on the implicit grounds that Ford was leading the quest for “managed transition” by keeping lines of communication open to figures in both the Syrian opposition and ruling elite.

That strategy, however, appears to have borne little if any fruit so far. Even before the Hama massacre, Ford was recalled to Washington for consultations. American concerns remain the same, but the approach to achieving regime change or transition in Damascus without all-out civil conflict plainly needs considerable and urgent revision.

Hama prompted the strongest words by far from Obama: “al-Assad is ensuring that he and his regime will be left in the past.” Yet American options remain limited, and a Libya-style military intervention is out of the question. Increased sanctions, particularly in the energy sector, are overdue. So is pressure through the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has referred the Syria file to the Security Council.

After last weekend’s massacre, the prospect of a referral of Syrian officials to the International Criminal Court or the creation of a special tribunal on Syria has received renewed attention. Syria is not a party to the Statute of Rome, meaning the Security Council would have to authorize an ICC investigation, as it did in Sudan. However, Russian and Chinese opposition to such a move may not be easily overcome at this stage.

Even though American options are limited, the Obama administration now has no choice but to significantly and publicly increase the pressure on the Assad regime. Concerns about stability are understandable, but it’s impossible not to recognize that the Assad regime itself is now the greatest source of instability. Indeed, it is undoubtedly dragging Syria toward civil war, quite possibly on a sectarian basis, and is most probably doing so deliberately.

This means that the calculation has to change immediately. The United States and its allies might not be able to prevent the Assad regime from forcing a brutal and probably sectarian conflict on its own country, but the best hope for avoiding this is moving away from a policy based on cautiously managed transition to one based on bolder actions aimed at regime change. Such steps can also help ensure that the pitched battle, if it must come, is quicker and more decisive, and that its destabilization of the region is better contained.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2011/Jul-29/The-ex-spy-who-stepped-into-the-cold.ashx#axzz1TP2YXQES

In 2007, an organization called Conflicts Forum, which at the time was being funded by the European Union, issued a report intended to promote a “positive assertion of Islamist values and thinking” in the West. It laid out a public relations campaign for rebranding “resistance movements” in the eyes of Westerners in terms of “social justice,” specifically promoting “Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s values, philosophy and wider political and social programmes.”

“We need to clarify and explain that Islamist movements are political and social movements working on social and political justice,” the report explained, “and are leading the resistance to the U.S./Western recolonisation project with its network of client states and so-called ‘moderates.’” The authors also asserted that “the progressive space of social movements [in the West] is empty” and asked “how the West can learn from the values and the notion of society that Hezbollah and Hamas have at the centre of their philosophy.”

Conflicts Forum, which received $708,000 from the EU between 2007 and 2009, is the brainchild of Alastair Crooke, a former long-serving British intelligence agent and adviser to the former EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana. In recent years Crooke has emerged as the leading Western champion of Arab and Muslim extremists and anti-Western regimes. Conflicts Forum, in other words, does not seek to resolve conflicts but rather exacerbates them.

Crooke’s most recent intervention was a commentary in Asia Times in which he argued that the Syrian uprising is almost entirely the work of extremist followers of the late Al-Qaeda terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Crooke also affirmed that a large majority of Syrians back the dictatorship of President Bashar Assad, who they believe shares their desire for radical reforms. In this way he merely parroted the demonstrably false propaganda of the Syrian regime.

In an earlier essay for Foreign Policy, Crooke insisted that Assad was uniquely immune to the “Arab Spring” because of his championing of “resistance” movements – news, no doubt, to the 10,000 detained Syrians and the families of the 1,400 dead, who Crooke now expects us to believe are all followers of Zarqawi.

Crooke is noted for arranging back-channel meetings between Western officials and members of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. But other than the grant from the EU, the rest of his funding remains mysterious, as do his core motivations, about which he is decidedly coy.

Crooke is a strong supporter of the Iranian ruling faction and its ideology, and has maintained “there’s absolutely no evidence the election [of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009] was stolen.” He apparently believes that the radical Shiite Islamism espoused by Iranian hard-liners is the key to the future of the Middle East, as opposed to any form of liberalism or democracy, or the conservative Sunni Islam championed by Gulf Arab monarchies. He cites Hamas as a Sunni group positively influenced by Iranian notions of revolution and resistance.

Most of the publications on the Conflicts Forum website reflect official Iranian ideology and foreign policy, including articles explaining “Iran’s commitment to the Palestinian cause,” attacking the Palestinian Authority, strongly supporting Hamas, celebrating the “principled foreign policy of Ayatollah Khamenei,” and casting the Arab Spring as an Iranian-style “Islamic awakening.”

Conflicts Forum strongly advocates the narrative that the contemporary Arab world is the site of a macro-historical struggle between a “culture of resistance” and a “culture of accommodation,” meaning all moderate, secular and pro-Western forces in the region. Crooke’s attachment to Assad appears to be a function of the Syrian regime’s self-professed role as a supporter of “resistance” and its strong ties to Iran and Hezbollah.

Conflicts Forum’s documents do not reflect Western efforts to understand Islamist movements; rather, they speak in a clearly and unabashedly Islamist voice. Its advisory board includes Azzam Tamimi, a prominent Hamas sympathizer in the United Kingdom who has defended suicide bombings. It also includes Moazzam Begg, who, as London’s The Daily Telegraph recently reported, confessed in a signed statement to the FBI that he learned how to shoot guns and operate explosives at an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan.

Crooke’s and Conflicts Forum’s activities are alarming from a Western point of view, but even more so from the perspective of those interested in the spread of democracy and liberal values in the Arab and Islamic worlds, above all Arabs and Muslims themselves. What such activities champion are in fact ultra-right wing, reactionary and fundamentally totalitarian ideologies hostile to human rights in general, and more specifically to the rights of individuals, women and minorities. Crooke is evidently a spy who gladly stepped into the cold.

This man, his odious views, and his nefarious organization have had a free pass for far too long. It is time to recognize Conflicts Forum for what it is: a champion not of “resistance and revolution” but of violence, intolerant religious fanaticism and totalitarian ideologies. That should be enough to make Crooke and his organization anathema to anyone even remotely interested in a decent future for Arabs and Muslims.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/defusing-palestinian-statehood-bid-at-the-un/242619/

Palestinian leaders need a reason not to ask the United Nations for recognition in September, which would be risky for everyone involved

Palestinian President Abbas wipes his brow after addressing the UN in September / Reuters

For most of 2011, Palestinian leaders have been privately and publicly speculating about potential statehood initiatives at the UN General Assembly meeting in September. The PLO may present some plan in effect asking the UN to recognize Palestine as an independent state, which wouldn’t make it so, but it would put Israel and the U.S. in a very awkward position. These ideas have been opposed by both Israel and the United States, which have described them as “unilateral,” and met with a mixed response among European states. To date no clear plan or strategy has been put forward but language of a draft resolution could be unveiled as early as Thursday.

In recent months, Palestinians have floated a number of ideas about what they might try to do at the UN meeting and what they hope to achieve. As President Mahmoud Abbas keeps insisting, it seems Palestinians would prefer to resume negotiations with clear terms of reference. With neither negotiations nor clear terms thus far forthcoming, however, and with time quickly running out, a UN initiative of some sort looks increasingly likely. The political and diplomatic results will depend on what, exactly, the Palestinians propose.

Despite persistent claims by both the Israeli right and the Palestinian left, the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah is not content with the status quo, in spite of the fact that its rule in “Area A” of the occupied West Bank is, for now, secure. The Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization leadership likely know that if their long-term strategy of securing Palestinian statehood, mainly through negotiations and diplomacy, is seen as a permanent failure, they will be finished in Palestinian politics. They need only look towards Gaza, where Hamas was elected, to see the alternative national leadership waiting in the wings. An Islamist take-over of the Palestinian national movement, they know, would have dire consequences for the cause of independence.

Many Israelis and Americans are frustrated at the impasse in peace talks. So too are the Palestinian people and leadership, for whom the special conditions of occupation and the ongoing Israeli settlement project make the status quo particularly alarming. Following the rapid breakdown of direct negotiations last year and the Obama administration’s failure to secure even a three-month extension of Israel’s partial and temporary settlement moratorium — even with an astoundingly generous package of inducements — the PLO concluded that they could not continue to rely primarily on a peace process that requires Israeli enthusiasm and American determination.

Palestinians had hoped that a convergence of bottom-up state-building and top-down diplomacy, led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, would be the key to independence. Left on its own, the state-building plan has been little more than a development project under occupation. This has given the leadership a sense of urgency that has impelled its turn towards possible statehood initiatives at the UN.

The most widely discussed option is for Palestinians to apply to the Secretary General for full UN membership, leading to a referral to the Security Council. If the Security Council approved the request, it would be forwarded to the General Assembly where it would require a two-thirds majority, which Palestinians would almost certainly get. But the United States has made it clear that it intends to veto any such resolution in the Security Council, making full UN membership for Palestine impossible at present.

Another option under discussion would be for Palestinians to seek a General Assembly resolution under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution 337 of 1950. This was an American-led initiative to overcome persistent USSR vetoes of Security Council resolutions regarding Korea. However, Uniting for Peace resolutions do not address UN membership, but rather are concerned with a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” They are a way to authorize use of force, sanctions, and other coercive measures by the UN General Assembly in spite of a Security Council veto. It is very difficult to see how such a resolution would advance the cause of Palestinian membership in the UN. Boycotts and sanctions have been in place in many contexts, including the Middle East, without such a resolution, and there is no indication that it would have any practical impact on either Palestinian UN membership or coercive measures aimed at Israel by other member states.

The most recently floated idea is that Palestinians could apply for non-member state observer status, as opposed to the PLO’s present observer status as a non-state mission. Theoretically, this would require a 50 percent-plus-one vote in the General Assembly, a tally Palestinians could likely easily achieve. However, such a change in status would make Palestine neither a member state of the UN nor a state with practical independence. Abbas and others have said the goal is to gain a more even footing with Israel diplomatically and to negotiate over the occupation not of undefined territory, but the territory of another state. Whether such a change of status in the UN would achieve this result is highly questionable.

But there are real reasons to pursue non-member state observer status. In the UN’s history, other than the Vatican,16 states have had held that status, and all 16 eventually became members. It could also provide Palestine with access to the International Criminal Court, possibly allowing it to accede to the Statute of Rome and become a member of the Assembly of State Parties. This is no doubt among the most important of Israel’s concerns about such a move, against which it has threatened unspecified unilateral retaliation.

Like many countries engaged in conflict, Israel is potentially liable for “war crimes” which includes unlawful use of force against civilians and property, most notably with regard to the last war in Gaza. But the Statute also defines a “war crime” as, “The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” which could easily be applied to Israel’s settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Despite Israel’s continuous insistence that these territories are “disputed” rather than occupied, the Security Council holds that the territories captured in 1967 are indeed occupied and Israel is the occupying power. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that such settlement of occupied territories is unlawful and a human rights abuse.

Another potential ICC vulnerability for Israel is “the crime of apartheid,” which the Statute defines as “inhumane acts … committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.”

However, because Palestine would not have the clearly defined borders necessary to join the ICC as a state, and since Israel is not a party to the Statute, Israelis could not be prosecuted by the ICC based on their nationality, or for their actions in areas that are not in the territory of a state that is party to the Statute. In January 2009, following the war in Gaza, the PA formally recognized the jurisdiction of the ICC, implicitly asking for it to exercise its authority in areas the PA considers under its authority, including Gaza. The ICC “accepted the declaration without prejudice” to its applicability, but made no clear determination, apparently because of the nebulous nature of Palestinian statehood. Non-UN-member state status may or may not improve the chances of a clear ICC acceptance of jurisdiction in any territories claimed as part of the Palestinian non-member state.

The Palestinian leadership appears divided on these three options, including the prospect of seeking non-UN-member state status. Those with deep reservations are said to include PLO Secretary-General Yasser Abed Rabbo and Fayyad, among others, who are concerned with the potential consequences of such a move, especially a cutoff of American aid, as Congress has threatened. The United States is the single largest donor to the PA, providing at least $400 million per year. A losing confrontation with the United States in the Security Council could be disastrous for for Palestinian prospects. The U.S. veto of last year’s resolution on settlement activity effectively killed the issue for the time being and left Israel with a free hand on settlement ever since. Would Palestinians really want to risk statehood in the same way?

There are other risks. Israeli retaliation could include annexation of parts of the West Bank, for example, or abrogation of the Oslo agreements. A failed UN initiative, or one that “succeeds” without improving the daily lives of Palestinians under occupation, could lead to an explosion of popular anger in the West Bank. Even if this were to begin as a nonviolent movement, because the occupation is a system of control and discipline, Israeli forces are likely to use force even against large crowds of unarmed people, and there are many Palestinian factions committed to violent resistance that would not fail to take advantage of chaos. The situation could rapidly spiral out of anyone’s control.

Israel’s proposed response to these options has been to form a block of about 30 states in the General Assembly opposed to a Palestinian initiative. It would be small but comprised of most of the large western powers and Japan. They would present this as not just a coalition of the major world powers but of the community of “civilized countries.” Even this could prove a de facto victory of sorts for Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, no matter what the rest of the General Assembly decides to do.

Many Palestinians therefore hope that renewed negotiations would make the UN initiative moot. But this prospect is receding quickly, especially since both the Middle East Quartet and the European Union are so internally divided on the issue. These dangers underscore the need to find an alternative compromise that would avert the negative consequences of an initiative at the UN, which would produce largely symbolic value and very harmful practical consequences. One such option would be to try to find a widely acceptable option to upgrade the status of the PLO mission at the UN with additional privileges but without non-member state status. This might be especially appealing if it were combined in some way with a restatement of President Barak Obama’s vision of talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed upon land swaps and an additional statement that the international community is committed to a two-state outcome and will accept no other resolution of the conflict.

All parties have a clear incentive to work quickly to find a way around a confrontation in September that would benefit no one and could lead to unmanageable consequences. Whatever the formula, the Palestinian leadership and people must be provided with a clear incentive not to pursue a UN initiative that is unacceptable to other key players. Otherwise, Palestinian leaders, lacking any other diplomatic steps forward, may feel that their hand is being forced. Simply climbing down from their proposed plans, without a credible explanation for their public, would be politically untenable, in spite of the obvious dangers ahead.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/debating_an_extremist_israeli_settler

Last week I had a fascinating debate with David Ha’ivri, an extremist Israeli settler—an event loosely connected to a conference of the pro-settler Christians United for Israel organization.

I call Ha’ivri an extremist settler for two reasons. First, many settlers are living in the occupied Palestinian territories not for ideological reasons but for practical ones. They have been induced to do so by generous Israeli government subsidies. Second, Ha’ivri’s worldview—that all the occupied territories belong exclusively to the Jewish people and that Palestinians there are not entitled to national or political rights—is by any standards extreme.

His vision involves permanent Jewish rule in all of Palestine, but no citizenship or votes for the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

In our exchange, Ha’ivri opened with a recitation of Jewish theological claims to all of the “land of Israel,” including the occupied territories, interspersed with a tendentious narrative about recent history. He and the audience, mainly of his supporters, probably expected me to counter with a tendentious Arab historical narrative or Muslim theological arguments.

I did neither. I pointed out that those arguments exist, and are as passionately held on the other side, but equally unhelpful. In his opening he never mentioned the word Palestinian, and neither described the problem nor suggested a solution.

I continuously emphasized that there are two peoples of approximately equal numbers in a small area who show no signs of being willing to share power or abandon their national agendas. Therefore, the only way to avoid continuing and intensifying conflict is a solution that involves creating two separate states.

My main point was that this was not so much a debate between an Arab and a Jew, as one between a modern mentality and a medieval one. Modern thinking, I explained, recognizes both the inherent rights of individuals as human beings and the rights of self-defined peoples to national self-determination. Medieval thinking, on the other hand, relies on holy texts and symbols, and conceives of people not as individuals and groups of individuals, but as fixed categories in a divinely ordained hierarchy. Though he was born in New York, Ha’ivri really believes that he possesses many rights in Palestine that Palestinians do not.

When the moderator, a friend of Ha’ivri, suggested there was deep significance in the fact that Jerusalem is frequently referred to in the Bible but not in the Koran, I dismissed this as irrelevant on two counts. First, historically this has not been, and it must not become, primarily a religious conflict that is by definition irresolvable. Second, ancient texts of whatever variety have nothing constructive to tell us about how to solve the real problems we face.

This modern, rational evaluation drew snickers from some of the audience. Most of them were clearly more comfortable with the religious absolutism Ha’ivri was offering, and deeply but erroneously and dangerously believe this is a religious struggle.

Many of them seemed more comfortable with the childish caricature he was offering of a morally pure Israel, relentlessly pursuing justice and friendship that is opposed only by degenerate Arab and Palestinian venality. The realistic evaluation I put forward, in which there were faults on all sides and no clean hands, has little appeal to absolutists. Nonetheless, I invited everyone present to join me in the modern world.

While I recognized the deep Jewish attachment to the land, neither Ha’ivri nor most others in the room showed any signs of acknowledging the deep Palestinian history, attachment and presence in it. His arguments, such as they were, boiled down to this: We have returned; we are not leaving; God is on our side. The organizers were distributing a pamphlet entitled “This Land is My Land,” which says it all.

Yes, I told him, you are there and you are a reality everyone must deal with rationally. But Palestinians are also there in equal and growing numbers, and they have the same rights you do, but you do not factor them into your thinking in any realistic manner. I noted neither he nor anyone in the audience would ever agree to be denied their basic rights, as he was suggesting Palestinians should, and that they would fight to restore them if they were taken away. To this, he offered no answer.

The whole conversation was, not surprisingly, deeply reminiscent of a debate I once had on Iranian TV with a leader in Gaza of Islamic Jihad. Nonetheless, some audience members plainly were listening to me and left with at least some challenging and unfamiliar ideas to grapple with.

Ha’ivri was amiable enough, but his mentality is extremely dangerous to Palestinians and Israelis alike. If mindsets like his guide Israeli policy, it would probably drag both Palestinians and Israelis, much of the region and possibly the world, into an apocalyptic cataclysm. This, sadly, is what some of Ha’ivri’s Evangelical friends, intoxicated with fantasies of a “second coming,” are gleefully anticipating.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/israels_anti-democratic_impulses_grow

A recently-passed anti-boycott law in Israel allows anyone advocating a boycott of the country or “areas under its control”—in other words the settlements—to be sued by private citizens and denied government benefits and contracts. This egregious attack on freedom of speech and conscience is a symptom of several deep-seated problems that are having a profoundly negative effect on Israel’s international standing and on prospects for peace with the Palestinians.

Most damaging, the law again conflates Israel as such with the occupied Palestinian territories. In that way it ignores the legal or political distinction between the areas required for a two-state solution, which the rest of the world finds crucial. While Israel is formally committed to such a solution, its policies have systematically undermined this outcome. Settlement construction is continuing apace, with new tenders offered almost weekly. And now the Israeli government is considering moving 10 percent of its renewable energy quota to the occupied territories, further entrenching its presence.

Some proponents of what is known as the BDS movement—for boycott, divestment and sanctions—would like to target Israel generally. However, almost all effective boycotts in the West have been centered on the occupation and illegitimate settlements. A new move in Holland to boycott Israel’s Egged bus company on the grounds that it supports the settlement policy reinforces this consistent pattern.

The anti-boycott law isn’t about protecting Israel from boycotts that target the country in general, because basically these don’t exist in reality. It’s about protecting the settlers from boycotts of settlement goods, a movement that is very real and growing, especially in Europe. But the anti-boycott law is only the tip of the iceberg in a profoundly anti-democratic shift in Israeli political attitudes. This is partly a consequence of a siege mentality, but it also has a great deal to do with demographic shifts among the Jewish population.

The large Russian immigrant community is better organized than ever, and the extreme religious community is growing at a much faster pace than the rest of Israeli society. Both constituencies are pushing Israel toward a new form of authoritarianism, within Jewish society.

Indeed, more antidemocratic laws are pending, including measures to investigate the activities and funding of liberal non-governmental organizations and human rights groups. Right-wing forces in Israel are seeking Knesset veto power over appointments to Israel’s Supreme Court to prevent it from remaining the primary barrier to antidemocratic legislation. Israelis convicted of espionage may now be stripped of their citizenship. State-funded organizations are no longer allowed to recognize the Nakba. Israeli towns are now allowed to screen potential residents for “social compatibility.” Knesset members who visit “enemy countries” without permission can be banned from politics and prosecuted. Palestinians marrying citizens of Israel alone may not become naturalized citizens or residents. And so forth.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he’s uncomfortable with some of this legislation, including the anti-NGO bill. Yet his coalition is based on appeasing forces far to his political right. And one can only admire his adroitness and cynicism over the anti-boycott law.

He was unaccountably absent for the debate and vote on the law, meaning he was careful not to vote for it. Then the next day he showed up at the Knesset and defended the bill strongly. But he was careful to invoke the authority of Israel’s Supreme Court and said that whatever the institution decided would be enforced (most observers believe the anti-boycott law will not survive legal challenge). Finally Netanyahu claimed the law began as a petition by members of the opposition Kadima party, implying the whole thing was really their fault.

Palestinians, both citizens of Israel and those living under occupation, have become used to antidemocratic restrictions since the founding of the state. But Jewish Israeli society has maintained its own credible version of democracy, at least until now. Many Israeli commentators have noted that Israel’s claim as being “the only democracy in the Middle East”—which was always shaky for various reasons, not least the persistence of the occupation—now rings more hollow than ever.

Crucially, almost all of the antidemocratic Israeli legislation centers around one principal goal: maintaining, deepening and protecting the occupation and the settlements project. Even though a majority of Israelis in poll after poll say they are in favor of a two-state solution, the most far-reaching policies of their government and dramatic legislation from their parliament are pushing headlong in the opposite direction.

This means one of two things. Either a minority of pro-settler fanatics has been able to seize control of the political momentum because of the structure of Israel’s government; or the Israeli public simply doesn’t understand the fundamental incompatibility between enlarging the settlements and deepening the occupation on the one hand and seeking a workable peace agreement with Palestinians on the other.

As long as Israelis treat the occupied territories as an integral part of their state, they invite others to do so as well, thereby delegitimizing their own country. It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that Israeli society is deliberately choosing a future of formalized, permanent apartheid and conflict over peace, which the rest of the world will not accept. Israelis have none but themselves to blame for the consequences.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/the-bahrain-stalemate/242086/

That Bahrain’s monarchy appears to be squandering the opportunity presented by its “national dialogue” between the government and the opposition should be the source of deep concern both regionally and in the United States. Bahrain’s strategic and political significance is totally disproportionate to its small geographical and demographic size, since it is the home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, a flashpoint in the Gulf region between Arab Sunnis and Shiites, and the subject of long-standing Iranian ambitions.

Since protests erupted on the island after similar movements toppled the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the diverse but largely Shiite opposition movement has struggled against the minority Sunni-dominated government and royal family. Following a violent crackdown against protesters and a military intervention by Saudi and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces, the government has cast all opposition, of whatever variety, as part of an Iranian-inspired conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy.

The government’s response to protests — numerous killings, widespread arrests, mass firings, and the jailing of dozens of opposition leaders who have virtually nothing in common other than their demand for reform — has effectively divided the society into two irreconcilable halves. But, in this contest, neither side can possibly hope to “win” over the other. Bahrainis in both camps face a simple choice: make a deal or face a deeply uncertain and probably very unpleasant future.

The Shiite majority cannot be indefinitely marginalized and excluded from power — as it historically has been — without tensions continuing to intensify and potentially spiraling out of control with ever increasing levels of violence. On the other side, it’s clear most Bahraini Shiites understand that their chances of successfully overthrowing the monarchy are extremely slim. In any event, they know they don’t have a viable future outside of the GCC framework. The prospects of leaving the Arab fold altogether to join forces with Iran are politically implausible and, to all appearances, unappealing to the vast majority of Bahrainis.

The crackdown produced a lull in protests, but also a political stalemate. The government asserted its practical authority, but its legitimacy has been left in tatters, and its relations with the restive and suppressed sectarian majority at an all-time low. Thus far, the government appears to have no strategy beyond repression, which is, of course, a recipe for disaster.

The national dialogue, which King Hamad al-Khalifa first called for on May 31, was the first opportunity since the uprising began for the parties to begin to find a way out of this dangerous impasse. Several prominent opposition parties agreed to take part, including the largest Shiite group al-Wefaq and the nonsectarian social democrats in al-Waad. Their inclusion presented a serious opportunity to begin to craft a new consensus in the country.

Since proposing the so-called dialogue, however, the government has handed leaders of both of those opposition parties, along with other opposition figures, indefensibly stiff prison sentences in a mass trial that lumped together political figures of all stripes. Al-Waad leader and moderate Sunni reformist Ebrahim Sharif, who had scrupulously avoided calling for anything resembling the overthrow of the monarchy, was given five years. His sentence demonstrated both the totality and indiscriminate nature of the crackdown. The presence of Sharif, a moderate Sunni reformist, in the protests severely undermined the “Shiite/Iranian plot” narrative the government has relied upon, and he paid a heavy price for confusing people by not fitting any stereotype.

The national dialogue is rapidly falling apart, just as it enters its second round. Almost all opposition participants have complained the discussions are too broad, vague, and generalized to be politically meaningful. Results will be forwarded to the King for possible royal decrees. Or not.

Moreover, bitter acrimony has erupted, and four Wefaq members last week threatened to pull out on the grounds that the pro-government Salafist Member of Parliament Jassim Al Saeedi referred to the organization as “rawfidh” (“refusers” of traditional Sunni narratives about Islamic history, effectively the equivalent of “heretics”), a term regarded as highly derogatory by Shiites. During the course of the unrest, Shiite derogatory terms for Sunni Bahrainis, including the royal family, have also become well-known, generally some form of “visitors,” “strangers,” or “immigrants,” suggesting their presence is alien and temporary and their rule illegitimate.

All of this is disturbingly reminiscent of sectarian tensions at the height of the civil conflict in Iraq, when Sunni and Shiite Iraqis referred to each other as Umayyads and Safavids, respectively. Of course, Bahrain has not seen anything close to Iraq’s orgy of bloodletting, but the pattern is hard to ignore. Such terms not only draw clear sectarian distinctions, but they invoke bitter historical memories and age-old grievances, linking them to contemporary conflicts in an exceptionally dangerous way.

Over the weekend the situation deteriorated significantly, as Wefaq organized tens of thousands of protesters under the slogan “one person, one vote,” which will yet again be perceived as a direct challenge to royal authority and an implicit claim to power by a thus-far marginalized sectarian majority. At least one female protester was reported killed by tear gas asphyxiation in the oil-production hub of Sitra. Between the insults, the frustration, and the unrest, Wefaq’s board said it intends to pull out of the talks and ask its ruling Shura council for approval. The absence of the country’s largest opposition party would probably be the final blow to any chances the dialogue could have of creating a new dynamic in Bahrain.

It’s not clear whether or not Waad and other opposition parties will follow suit, as the opposition is divided on many issues. The royal family also has obvious competing factions, although the power of Saudi influence can hardly be overestimated. As an unnamed senior U.S. official was recently quoted by the Financial Times, Bahrain “is a divided country and a divided ruling family”.

Virtually every piece of good news coming out of Bahrain these days is offset by the bad. For example, the government recently released a 20-year-old poet, Ayat al-Qurmezi, who had been sentenced in June to a year in prison for reciting an anti-royal poem at the now-demolished Pearl Roundabout, then the epicenter of protests. However, Qurmezi now says she was beaten, electrocuted, and threatened with rape during her incarceration. Human rights organizations have issued scathing reports about both the crackdown and ongoing abuses, mainly directed against the Shiite majority. For its part, the government continues to cast the blame squarely on Iranian meddling, although the evidence of this is scant at best.

But, at some point, the government and the opposition are simply going to have to make a deal. Neither has any better, feasible way out. And, given the monarchy’s closing off of almost all oppositional political space in the country, the onus to actually and seriously begin this process, for the moment at least, lies squarely with the government.

Neither the Shiite majority nor the ruling family and its Sunni supporters are going to go away or give up. Indeed, given Bahrain’s small size and population, as well as its economic and security dependence on its neighbors, in the long run, they need each other to survive. The real existential struggle in Bahrain is not an ongoing sectarian conflict, but rather to find a win-win mechanism for workable, sustainable coexistence. Otherwise, a disastrous lose-lose scenario will become more and more likely. It’s difficult to say what, exactly, will happen in Bahrain if it continues down this path, but it’s likely to be far worse for everyone involved than any negotiated settlement possibly could be.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hussein-ibish-phd/state-of-palestine_b_901442.html?view=print

With the independence of the new Republic of South Sudan, the world is again reminded that states are created on the basis of local, regional and international necessity. At least two decades of international action, as well as a long, bitter and bloody conflict produced the independence of the south, a state that has been already welcomed by the international community, the African Union, the United Nations, and has been invited to join the Arab League.

South Sudan is only the latest newly-created state in the international community. In recent decades numerous new countries have come into existence, arising out of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, the split between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, and so forth. Yet more than 60 years after its existence was envisaged by the UN partition plan for Palestine, more than 40 years after its creation was implied in the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and almost 20 years since the Oslo Accords led the whole world to expect that Palestine would, soon, enjoy independence, there is still no Palestinian state.

It’s hard to overestimate the strategic, political and cultural damage this failure to secure Palestinian independence is having on the Middle East as a region, and, indeed, throughout the globe. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the ongoing occupation that began in 1967 is completely disproportionate to its geographical and demographic size because of the profound emotional, ideological, religious and symbolic investment people throughout the world have made in it. Passions run high far beyond Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, and it’s no exaggeration to describe the conflict and the occupation as a cancer on the body politic of the global community.

The bottom line is this: in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea — what has been the de facto Israeli state since 1967 — there are approximately equal numbers, about 6 million of both, of Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Muslims and Christians. One group has a state, citizenship, self-determination and independence. A small group of Palestinians, about 1 million, are citizens of Israel but subject to significant forms of discrimination. But the large majority of Palestinians live in the occupied territories without citizenship or enfranchisement of any kind, self-determination or independence, and are subject to the arbitrary and typically abusive rule of a foreign military. Moreover, they have watched as their land is steadily colonized by Israeli settlements, which are both a violation of international law and a human rights abuse against those living under occupation according to the Fourth Geneva Convention. Nowhere in the world is there any comparable level of separate and unequal as there is under Israeli rule in the occupied Palestinian territories.

David Ben-Gurion, who was Israel’s prime minister twice, during 1948-1953 and 1955-1963, respectively, eloquently spoke in 1945 of the Jewish yearning for national validation and self-determination. He stated, “We are a people without a State and, therefore, a people without credentials, without recognition, without representation, without the privileges of a nation, without the means of self-defense, and without any say in our fate.” These might easily be the words of a Palestinian leader in 2011.

Two years later, on November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181, recommending the partition of Palestine into two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, with the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area to be placed under special international protection, administered by the United Nations. However, the UN Security Council failed to implement Resolution 181, and as soon as the British Mandate was terminated, Jewish leaders declared the establishment of Israel, leading to the intervention by five Arab armies in what was already a raging communal civil war in Palestine. This conflict left Israel in de facto possession of not the 55 percent of mandatory Palestine envisaged in the partition resolution, but 78 percent, which are now generally regarded as the internationally accepted borders of Israel.

Sixty-three years later, and following seven wars, the displacement of over a million Palestinian refugees during the 1948 and 1967 wars (who now number more than four million), two Palestinian intifadas, and countless dead and wounded, Israel remains a nation at war and in fear, and Palestinian national aspirations remain totally unfulfilled. Israeli settlements continue to be built at an alarming pace, with 200 already constructed, and the half-million Jewish Israeli colonists living in them are squeezing Palestinians into ever smaller areas of the West Bank and Jerusalem, and denying them access to water and other resources.

Peace efforts such as the Oslo accords (1993); Wye River accord (1998); Camp David meeting (2000); Taba negotiations between Palestinian and Israeli delegations (2001); George Mitchell’s proposal (2001); George Tenet’s plan (2001); United Nations Resolution 1397, which affirmed a vision of a region where Palestine and Israel would live side by side within secure and recognized borders (2002); the Arab Peace Initiative adopted unanimously twice by the Arab League (2002); and the “roadmap” for peace adopted by the Quartet (2003); have all been creditable efforts to develop peace, but none have succeeded and thus far the agony and tragedy have simply continued.

Years of conflict and insecurity, narratives of exclusion and pain, and incompatible visions of the future, let alone understandings of the past, have created a serious disconnect between Israelis and Palestinians. Each national community is caught up in its own tendentious and exclusive narratives: Israel using the past and the present to create the future; the Palestinians using the present to recreate the past in service of the future. Both are laboring under serious illusions.

Unfortunately, while US policy has emphasized that a two-state solution is imperative for American national interests, because of the “special relationship” between the two countries, in practice it remains steadfastly in Israel’s corner, vetoing 26 UN Security Council draft resolutions on Palestine since July 1973. Domestic political considerations and a powerful American popular and elite consensus in support of Israel make pressuring that country in the normal diplomatic manner very difficult for an American president. Palestinians have hoped to be able to use the “special relationship” to help mollify Israeli concerns and reassure them that because of American participation, they are not taking any inordinate risks in entering into a peace agreement with the Palestinians. So far, this strategy, while theoretically promising, has yet to demonstrate much efficacy.

According to almost all opinion polls, most Palestinians and Israelis are in favor of a negotiated two-state solution, based on the 1967 borders, with agreed upon land swaps. Unfortunately, similarly large majorities do not believe it will happen and do not trust the other side’s intentions. Unless President Barack Obama is able to persuade Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to negotiate on the aforementioned parameters, then the Palestinians will be facing many more checkpoints and a stonewall of delay while the Israelis continue to seize more Palestinian land in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Unfortunately, many Palestinians and Israelis believe that Netanyahu has no interest in pursuing a negotiated solution along the lines that Palestinians would deem acceptable. And, even more unfortunately, his unenthusiastic approach to the peace process and insistent emphasis on security above all, including peace, has proven extremely popular in Israel and he leads an unlikely but extraordinarily stable coalition government. In other words, his default position of saying “no” to everything is serving his political interests, leaving him with few incentives to be more forthcoming.

However, as numerous Israelis with impeccable national security credentials, including some very strongly rooted in the political right, have been publicly stating in recent months, it is essential to Israel’s national interest to help secure the creation of a viable, democratic and peaceful State of Palestine. While the Israeli occupation resulted from conditions of the 1960s or even earlier, the time for its ending has come. An independent, contiguous, and secure Palestine (democratic, pluralistic, non-militarized, and neutral) living in peace alongside Israel is, as an apparent consensus of Israeli national security experts appear to recognize, the only way to secure Israel’s long-term safety and stability. The occupation is untenable, dangerous and, ultimately, self-destructive.

The Arab states, as well as the United States and Israel, strongly require the creation of a Palestinian state for their fundamental national interests. For too long the Palestinian question has been a volatile, destabilizing variable in regional politics, the source of conflict and tension, and a powerful tool in the hands of extremists of many different varieties. This understanding was most importantly expressed through the Arab Peace Initiative, but has also been repeatedly emphasized by Arab leaders across the region. King Abdullah II of Jordan, in his memoir, Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril, expressed “a sense of urgency, a conviction that the window for peace between Israel and the Palestinians is closing.” We agree with him when he states, “Both sides have a moral responsibility to strive for peace… the alternative is more conflict and violence.”

Every moment that is lost only benefits the proponents of extremism on all sides. Albeit a minority, they will continue to monopolize the political narrative and dictate the facts on the ground in the absence of peace. The moderates will lose heart and fade away in the smoke of violence and hate and the fog of deception.

Enlightened leadership not only leads and serves but finds like-minded followers as well, leaders in their own right, who would be eager to sustain positive change for the common good of both Palestinians and Israelis. It not only responds to constituencies, it creates them. The need for allies for peace and statehood is equally important as the need for such a consensus locally, regionally, and internationally.

What Ben Gurion envisioned for his people in 1945, all Palestinians have sought for decades. It is high time that the United States and the rest of the international community stood by them, not just rhetorically or in terms of development aid, but with practical, effective diplomatic efforts that ensure that the occupation will end, and that a Palestinian state alongside Israel will be created, recognized by the major powers of the world, and welcomed as a member state of the United Nations. Without a doubt this will require Israeli acquiescence as well, which means that negotiations are unavoidable and indispensable.

But the international community has an important role to play in laying the groundwork for such an agreement, making it crystal clear that it will accept no other outcome, applying both negative and positive pressure on both sides to make it happen, and doing everything possible to avoid any other outcome. Simply leaving it up to the parties, which are defined by the most extreme degree of power asymmetry imaginable, is not a viable option. International engagement, led by but not exclusive to the United States, is more indispensable now than ever. Especially given the role the international community played in the creation of Israel, it has a right and a responsibility to play a similar role in the creation of Palestine.

This is a delicate process, and we are not proposing an implausible and impracticable “imposition” of a solution on the parties by an international community that is unwilling and probably unable to take such steps. Nor are we suggesting that the Palestinian demand for full UN membership in September is likely to prove successful. Clearly a failed confrontation with the United States at the UN Security Council over the issue of statehood is not in anybody’s interest, let alone the Palestinians. However, a greater role for the international community in resolving this exceptionally damaging and destabilizing ongoing conflict is essential. Palestinians can and should receive a major upgrade of their observer mission status from the General Assembly, and should be recognized on a bilateral basis by every state that is serious about Israeli-Palestinian peace.

There is much the international community can do to promote a two-state solution, particularly by clarifying its unshakable commitment to this outcome and its categorical refusal to accept any alternative. There is no longer any excuse for postponing or delaying such measures. They do not undermine Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; they support them insofar as they make the only reasonable, workable outcome far more likely and demonstrate that the world expects and will help the parties arrive at a two-state solution in the near future. The international community has made its commitment to Israel very clear since 1948. It must now move quickly to make its commitment to Palestine alongside Israel equally clear, especially to the Palestinians and the Israelis.