http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/how-long-will-russia-be-given-a-free-hand-in-syria#full

As the Syrian regime totters and begins to show signs of cracking, it’s no surprise that its allies are intensifying their commitment to maintaining the dictatorship at all costs. As Russian and Iranian forces begin to play an increasingly direct role in the Syrian conflict, several straightforward truths about that war, and its international ramifications, are becoming painfully obvious.

The extent of the direct involvement of Russian forces is unclear. Some maintain that Russian advisers are merely in Syria to train Syrian government forces. But others suggest that, at the very least, Russia is preparing to defend key areas of strategic interest to itself, particularly related to its naval base at the Mediterranean port of Tartus.

It is the last remaining Russian base outside the former Soviet Union, and is the warm water port that was a valued Russian prize since the time of the tsars. There are also strong indications that Russia is preparing a military airbase south of the port city of Latakia, a major stronghold of Bashar Al Assad. Moreover, Russian troops may already have been involved in some of the fighting.

American intelligence believes that Russia is preparing to deploy Mikoyan MiG 31 and Sukhoi Su-25 fighter planes to the Latakia area.

Russia has said that it has Iranian permission for military overflights to Syria, after being denied such privileges by Bulgaria, which had come under American pressure to say no to Moscow.

Iran is also reportedly increasingly involved in the fighting on the ground in Syria, with Israeli and other sources saying that hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards have been deployed recently in support of Hizbollah fighters. These forces are key elements in the struggle for the area around Zabadani near the Lebanese border.

The regime now controls about a quarter of the territory of Syria. Mr Al Assad still holds most areas crucial to his regime: the Lebanese border, a corridor leading north to and through Damascus, and all the way to the Alawite coastal area.

But the stepped-up international intervention on behalf of Mr Al Assad clearly demonstrates the extent to which he is losing. For most of the past four years, American inaction has been predicated on not wishing to see the collapse of governance institutions in the country, as if they were somehow separable from the regime itself. But given that the regime has been reduced to operating in a small part of the country, this logic has long since broken down.

The Russian and Iranian interventions also demonstrate that the supporters of the Syrian dictatorship are much more committed to maintaining their ally and securing the necessary outcome than Mr Al Assad’s international opponents have been. We can safely assume this is just the beginning of their increased commitment.

Russia claims it is surprised by the international outcry, pointing out that it has made no secret of arming and supporting the dictatorship throughout the entire conflict. In a sense, that’s fair: Russia has indeed been blatant in its support for a government that has waged an unrelenting war on its own people for the sake of power, and has suffered no international consequences for doing so.

Iran, too, has made it clear from the outset that it was prepared to stop at nothing, including risking the political and military well-being of its key proxy group, Hizbollah in Lebanon, in a major intervention in the Syrian conflict that has been going on for several years. It was only a matter of time before Iran’s Revolutionary Guards themselves began fighting on the ground, and for Russian advisers, pilots and special forces to also act decisively in defence of their ally.

It is extraordinary that Russia has received a free pass in all of this, particularly in parts of the Arab world. The bitterness displayed towards American policy, which indeed has been misguided and counterproductive, is quite unmatched by anything similar directly towards Russia, which is infinitely more culpable. American “sins” in Syria are those of omission. Russia has been guilty of innumerable crimes of commission, and has been a direct partner in the Syrian calamity.

Russia is attempting to frame its intervention in terms of “counterterrorism” and the international campaign against ISIL. This is laughably hypocritical, because Mr Al Assad and ISIL enjoy a symbiotic relationship in which they need each other to thrive and survive. Yet there are disturbing signs that several European states, anxious about refugees and other spillover effects of the Syrian conflict, may be moving in the direction of seeing the dictatorship not as a cause of terrorism, which it is, but as a potential counterweight. That would be a tragic error.

The forces that have brought us the Syrian calamity, including the rise of ISIL, are intensifying their intervention and their determination to shape the future of that country. The question for everybody else is whether they will continue to have a relatively free hand. Or will they finally face concerted, coordinated opposition that, at the very least, forces them to accept a political compromise that involves the end of a brutal dictatorship that has been willing to crucify its own society in the name of raw power?

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/yemen-losses-will-bolster-regions-determination

The Arab intervention in Yemen has reached a critical point. The loss of 45 Emirati, 10 Saudi and five Bahraini soldiers in rebel attacks only underscores how high the stakes have become. It will surely redouble the commitment to restore stability and political legitimacy to Yemen. But it’s essential that the Arab states proceed with clarity and caution as well as determination.

These casualties come in the context of a series of victories that have confounded critics. Yemeni government and allied Arab forces have rid most of the south of Houthi control. They are now moving towards the capital, Sanaa, in a pincer-like formation. Other key areas have also either been recovered or may well be soon. The essential outlines of a viable endgame scenario are starting to emerge.

These successes fly in the face of received wisdom, particularly in the West. From the outset of the intervention until very recently, and even in some quarters to this day, the ability of the Gulf states to act militarily in their own defence has been dismissed. Within a few weeks, Yemen was already being labelled a “quagmire” with no potential endgame and no prospect of significant Arab gains.

The dangers attending the intervention, however, have also increased.

It’s not just a matter of painful and, for the UAE, unprecedented battlefield losses of fallen soldiers. The political implications of the fighting are also exceptionally complex.

One of the most important strategic aims of the coalition from the outset was surely to break the alliance between the Houthis and Yemeni forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. This is essential to politically isolate and militarily weaken the Houthis.

Such a rupture, more than anything else, would induce the Houthis to come to reasonable terms in an agreement. Without it, even despite their recent setbacks, the Houthis will probably continue to be able to operate successfully outside their base areas. As long as that alliance is intact, a stalemate remains plausible. So Mr Saleh must be given something. But that remains totally unresolved.

Yemeni government and Arab forces may be closing in on the capital, but actually taking Sanaa is a challenge of a very different magnitude.

Because of the alliance with Mr Saleh, and several other factors, the Houthis have significant support in and around Sanaa. The cost of a protracted urban conflict there is both militarily and politically prohibitive. The same applies to the prospect of a siege.

One of the greatest pitfalls of the conflict so far has been the suffering it has caused, or exacerbated, for the civilian population. Even though most observers concede that there are faults on all sides, nobody expects the Houthis to pay attention to humanitarian considerations.

These concerns intensify when it comes to how to liberate Sanaa. Unless there is a workable strategy for a quick victory, the future of Sanaa, much like Yemen itself, will ultimately require a political resolution.

As pressure builds on the Houthis and their pro-Saleh allies, and until that affiliation is finally broken, the potential for southern political autonomy, if not independence, is likely to increase. The Al Hirak forces may be an implausible mishmash, but they agree on the need for a separate future for the South.

Given the setbacks experienced by the Houthis in recent weeks, the ability of Al Hirak to argue that only southern secession can prevent pro-Iranian domination of all of Yemen has evaporated. But that doesn’t mean that the issue is resolved.

On the contrary, if the south is relatively stable and most of the fighting takes place in the north, particularly with no end in sight, the impulse to break away may actually become stronger than ever.

The degree to which the conflict has strengthened Al Qaeda in Yemen is exaggerated in some quarters. However, extremist groups have taken advantage of the chaos and sectarian tensions, and, over time, there is a distinct danger that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula could become emboldened.

So the pitfalls facing the Arab coalition in Yemen include empowered extremists and secessionists, prospects of a stalemate, increasing humanitarian concerns, and the considerable difficulties of crafting a political formula that is acceptable to all parties.

But the loss of troops in the field is likely to redouble the determination to summon the diplomatic finesse that will be required to complement military effectiveness.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-road-to-statehood-is-blocked-in-all-directions

The quest for Palestinian independence appears to be simultaneously at death’s doorstep and stronger than ever. At the granular level of on-the-ground realities and national policies, the very existence of the Palestinian national cause as a coherent and even extant political programme appears increasingly tenuous. Yet at the same time, the emerging state of Palestine is becoming increasingly recognised, and almost universally accepted, as a part of the international community, a participant in major multilateral organisations and an integrated fixture in the global diplomatic environment.

Israel’s government has dropped all pretences. The appointment of right-wing extremist Danny Danon to be Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations confirms that prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement during the last Israeli election categorically opposing the creation of a Palestinian state was an accurate representation of policy. Mr Danon is a strident opponent of peace who instead advocates the annexation of as much territory in the West Bank as possible with “the minimum number of Palestinians”.

Mr Netanyahu and his colleagues know exactly the message – so blatant that it is actually crude – that they are communicating by sending Mr Danon to represent Israel in the UN. To engage with the centre of international support for, and expectation of, peace based on two states, Israel is dispatching one of its most strident annexationists.

It is no longer possible to argue honestly that Israel’s government is open to, let alone supportive of, peace with the Palestinians. And there is no basis for hoping that this is a temporary aberration that will be corrected in future elections. Supporters of the status quo such as Mr Netanyahu are fighting off those, like Mr Danon, who want to annexe Palestinian land.

A majority of Jewish Israelis might still favour peace. But various shades of extremism have captured the policymaking process, and only a dramatic set of developments could significantly alter that.

As Israelis are turning away from any notion of accommodating the Palestinian national movement, Palestinian leaders themselves appear to be further burying, rather than rescuing, their own cause.

President Mahmoud Abbas has recently sprung into uncharacteristically vigorous action. But his energies have been focused inward, on consolidating his own authority and attempting to purge both real and perceived rivals. He is increasingly acting like the autocratic mayor of Ramallah rather than the responsible national leader of Palestine.

Appearances notwithstanding, Mr Abbas’s recent resignation from the Palestine Liberation Organisation executive committee, along with nine other members, is almost certainly a ploy to purge his critics and strengthen his control of the PLO. Worse, Mr Abbas has escalated his long-standing feud with former Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan into a vendetta against two of the most responsible and respectable Palestinians political figures.

Long-serving PLO secretary-general Yasser Abed Rabbo has been summarily dismissed from that post. His NGO, the Palestinian Peace Coalition, was raided and closed, drawing angry rebukes from its European funders. Former prime minister Salam Fayyad has also been a target, with repeated efforts to seize funds belonging to his organisation, Future for Palestine.

With Hamas lurching from crisis to crisis, and offering no plausible alternative to the Palestinian people whatsoever, Mr Abbas has squandered numerous opportunities to reintroduce the Palestinian Authority into Gaza in a number of realistic capacities.

But all of these subtle and complex opportunities would have required adroit and delicate diplomatic handling and involved considerable political risk. Sadly, Mr Abbas has preferred to chase shadows in Ramallah and issue empty threats about the International Criminal Court.

Palestine is increasingly accepted as a diplomatic reality at the highest theoretical levels. The chair is fluffed and the nameplate polished and waiting for the representatives of Palestine in countless multilateral forums the world over.

But the painful process of actually creating a Palestinian state – which perforce involves getting Israel, through a complex and difficult process, to reverse itself and accept and facilitate this outcome – has strikingly receded from the international, and even the Arab, agenda. This dire Palestinian national crisis requires a response from a strong and assertive national leadership.

However, Mr Abbas hasn’t been behaving like a national leader. And Hamas, which is infinitely worse in every respect, is currently making itself available to the highest regional bidder – although whether they prefer to be paid in cash or guns depends on which faction is bargaining.

Israel has dismissed Palestinian statehood, although without proposing an alternative. It’s possible that a sustained period of Israeli opposition to a two-state solution might even induce the United States itself to de-prioritise its own commitment to that outcome, rather than Washington pressuring Israel to accept the need for peace – especially since the Palestinians themselves lack a national leadership that is pursuing their own cause with any degree of seriousness.

The world clearly expects the creation of a Palestinian state. That expectation is meaningful and has significant long-term implications.

However, events on the ground, and the attitudes and conduct of both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, point to a very different and extremely dangerous future. Viewed from that perspective, the cause of Palestine appears to be a rapidly vanishing aspiration.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-gulfs-backing-of-the-iran-deal-is-smart-politics#full

The Gulf Cooperation Council’s public endorsement of the nuclear agreement with Iran is a smart move, but it’s neither a blank cheque for Washington nor the last word from the Gulf states on the international community’s relationship with Tehran. Indeed, behind the commitment of the Gulf states to give the agreement a chance lies an equally, if not more, evident determination to try to strengthen control over their own security arrangements.

The irony is that as the Gulf states’ position on the nuclear agreement moves closer to Washington’s, the experience has underscored their need to move beyond an excessive reliance on the United States.

Since the signing of the nuclear agreement, the Gulf states have all issued their own individual reactions. As one would expect from such a diverse group, their responses covered a wide spectrum. Oman unreservedly welcomed the accord, while Saudi Arabia emphasised the need for Iran to amend its aggressive and destabilising regional policies. Others sought to emphasise the potential benefits, while reminding Iran that it cannot continue to meddle as it has in the past.

US secretary of state John Kerry joined a meeting of GCC foreign ministers in Doha on August 3. The joint statement issued after the meeting finally brings the GCC position together, unanimously, in support of the nuclear agreement. It states “the Ministers agreed that, once fully implemented, the deal contributes to the region’s long-term security, including by preventing Iran from developing or acquiring a military nuclear capability”.

Whatever doubts some, or even all, of the GCC countries might have about the effectiveness of the agreement and its likely positive effect on regional security, issuing such a statement was a wise decision.

The GCC states had already secured some significant reassurances and commitments from the United States at Camp David, and presumably received more since then. Even if this well has run dry, and the United States has provided all the inducements it is willing and able to give to the Gulf states in connection with the Iran agreement, securing what has been achieved through such an endorsement is the correct policy.

The August 3 joint statement contains strong and important language committing the United States to work with the Gulf countries to ensure their security from external threats and to combat “Iran’s support for terrorism and its destabilising activities in the region…particularly attempts to undermine the security of and interfere in the domestic affairs of GCC member states, most recently in Bahrain”.

The Gulf states must, and apparently do, understand that the agreement is for all intents and purposes a fait accompli. It’s true that Barack Obama and his administration are facing a much tougher battle in Congress than was initially anticipated. Most notably, the third highest-ranking Democrat in the Senate, Charles Schumer of New York, has announced his opposition to the agreement.

But he may well have done so after calculating that, because Congress will eventually not kill the deal, his party will forgive him for opposing the president in this case.

Mr Obama’s recent approach to the debate has not strengthened his hand. He has an impressive case to make, but his repeated suggestions, most recently at an address last week at American University, that opposition is simply opportunistically partisan, disingenuous, irrational or, ultimately, inexplicable greatly undermine his arguments.

It’s possible that Mr Obama sincerely cannot understand how or why anyone would disagree with his judgment regarding this agreement, which he compared to finding a cure for cancer. But when he strays from the zealous and powerful advocacy of his position into the territory of contemptuous dismissal of any serious disagreement, he begins to sound not so much arrogant as insecure and overly defensive.

Nonetheless, as both Mr Obama and Mr Schumer, and the leaderships of the GCC countries, understand, in the end it is virtually unthinkable that Congress will overrule the president on an issue of this magnitude. Few Democrats will want to emulate Mr Schumer, and the argument about the damage to American international credibility if Congress scuppers this agreement before it has really been born will eventually win the day.

So the Gulf countries were well advised to come together in support of an agreement that is going to be implemented no matter what they say.

Saudi Arabia, which is most sceptical of the agreement, had the choice of joining Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu – who is, at least in part, driven by domestic political calculations – as the only major international player to openly and vociferously oppose the accord. It’s an understatement to suggest that such an identification is not in Riyadh’s interests.

There is nothing to be gained for the Gulf states at this point by opposing the agreement, and a real value in striking this unified position that consolidates the partnership with the United States. Nothing else makes sense.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/israel-must-figure-out-the-true-cost-of-occupation#full

As expected, the Iran nuclear deal is reshaping the strategic landscape of the Middle East. Some of these new developments – such as Saudi Arabia’s reported outreach to Hamas and other Muslim Brotherhood organisations – are innovative but hardly unthinkable. But when it comes to Israel’s relationship with Gulf Arab states, shared concerns can only go so far.

Last week, Dore Gold, the director general of Israel’s foreign ministry, raised eyebrows across the political world when he remarked of Iran: “What we have is a regime on a roll that is trying to conquer the Middle East, and it’s not Israel talking, that is our Sunni Arab neighbours – and you know what? I’ll use another expression – that is our Sunni Arab allies talking.”

Mr Gold is hardly the exemplar of Israeli enthusiasm for the Arab world. Indeed, the author of the 2003 book Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism would have to be listed among those Israeli right-wing hardliners whose rhetoric can border on Islamophobic.

Mr Gold is not alone in thinking along these lines. Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned Arab states against “talking with Israel and even negotiating with it”. This may have “disastrous results”, he blustered.

Some might note that Mr Nasrallah – whose militia is squandering the better part of its manpower, treasury and Lebanese political capital in an all-out intervention designed to shore up the brutal regime of Bashar Al Assad in Syria – is in no position to lecture anyone about disastrous results or dire consequences. Or that his reckless adventure serves the interests of Iran, not Lebanon or any other part of the Arab world. But Mr Nasrallah’s outburst demonstrates how concerned Iran and its proxies have become about the potential for Israel and the Arab states to unite to thwart the rise of an Iranian-led axis.

They needn’t fret so much. Mr Gold’s comments may be based on a shared opinion about the rise of Iran between Israel and some Arab states. But, in fact, this is an instance of wishful thinking.

Israel is misreading the Arab world in several unfortunate respects. It does not recognise the diversity of strategic thinking and policies among the Gulf states, and treats them as if they had a single, homogeneous perspective and set of interests. And, even more importantly, it does not seem to understand that its conduct in the occupied Palestinian territories remains an insurmountable obstacle to close or open cooperation, even though that might otherwise make some strategic sense.

Since the overthrow of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Israelis have been deluding themselves that, because Arab societies face a series of profound immediate challenges, somehow the issue of Palestine has been forgotten or permanently relegated to the back burner. But the occupation remains absolutely unacceptable to the Arab world, and, while the Arab Peace Initiative commits the entire Arab League to a two-state solution involving the recognition and normalisation of relations with Israel, this depends on ending the occupation and allowing the creation of a state of Palestine.

Mr Gold’s comments amply illustrate the extraordinary opportunity Israel has for creating a completely new relationship with much of the Arab world based on shared interests. Unfortunately, it is precisely the occupation and settlement policies that Mr Gold and his allies strongly support that will preclude Israel from taking advantage of this unprecedented strategic opening.

Israel cannot have diplomatic progress, let alone anything approaching an alliance, with the Arab world as long as millions of Palestinians remain non-citizens in their own land, with no realistic prospect for freedom. In particular, Israel cannot successfully engage with the Arab states while it is conducting an aggressive settlement project, gobbling up Palestinian land in violation of black-letter international law.

Jordan and Egypt made peace with Israel in their own interests, and those agreements are rock-solid. But Arab states in the Gulf region don’t share the same imperatives. Limited progress might be possible in specific areas. Israel might be able to cooperate with Qatar on reconstruction in Gaza, or with Saudi Arabia on Palestinian national reconciliation and relations between Hamas and Fatah. But despite the diversity in their policies none of the Gulf states will be prepared to enter into anything remotely resembling an alliance with Israel, despite the threat of Iranian hegemony, as long as the occupation continues with no end in sight.

Israelis often debate the cost of the occupation. The fact that it precludes them from building strong working relationships with Arab states with whom they share powerful strategic concerns needs to be factored in as a very high cost indeed.

Imagine a reality in which Mr Gold was completely accurate in referring to Israel’s “Sunni Arab allies”, and what that would mean for Israel’s regional interests and long-term security. And now return to today’s diplomatic reality, in which no matter how much Israel and many of the Arab states agree on the threat posed by Iran’s and the urgent need to counter it, there is a strict limit to how far they can coordinate, largely because of Israel’s own indefensible policies towards the Palestinians. The cost is clear, and prohibitive.

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/opinion/hussein-ibish-saudi-arabias-new-sunni-alliance.htm

WASHINGTON — If the Iran nuclear deal was an earthquake shaking the Middle East’s strategic landscape, one of the most dramatic aftershocks was the surprising arrival last month in Saudi Arabia of a high-level delegation from Hamas. The visit by the Islamist organization that rules Gaza is the latest sign of an about-face in Saudi policy, which is now seeking a rapprochement with the regional Muslim Brotherhood movement, to which Hamas belongs.

Saudi Arabia has long been mistrustful of the Brotherhood. Traditionally, the kingdom has regarded the Islamists as a political threat and a rival source of Islamic authority in the Middle East. This suspicion deteriorated into open hostility as Brotherhood parties threatened to take over key Arab states following the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in 2011.

The Saudis therefore welcomed the ouster of the Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, a Brotherhood leader, in 2013. That was the first of a series of major setbacks for the Brotherhood throughout the region. The low point came last year when the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a terrorist group. (Hamas is the only Brotherhood party that is openly armed and advocates the use of violence, specifically against Israel.)

The Saudi foreign minister, Adel Al-Jubeir, insisted that the recent Hamas visit was for religious, not political, reasons and that “the position of the kingdom with regards to Hamas has not changed.” But pilgrimages to Mecca don’t usually involve extensive meetings with the entire leadership, including King Salman bin Abdulaziz and his principal deputies, Crown Prince Muhammed bin Nayef and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman.

The Hamas delegation included its chief representatives in Egypt and Turkey, which means that its leading factions were all represented: This was not a power play by one element. As a courtesy, during the visit the Saudis released eight Hamas members jailed for illegal political activities in Saudi Arabia.

In another sign of a Saudi opening to Brotherhood groups, Saudi-backed forces in Yemen last month installed Nayef al-Bakri of the Brotherhood-oriented Al-Islah party (also designated a terrorist group by Riyadh) as governor of the key southern city of Aden, which Saudi-backed forces had just recaptured.

Three other leading Brotherhood figures — Rachid al-Ghannouchi of Tunisia’s Ennahda Party, Abdul Majeed al-Zindani of Al-Islah and Hammam Saeed of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood — have all visited Saudi Arabia in recent weeks. There was even a rumor, as yet neither confirmed nor denied, that the Brotherhood has been quietly removed from the kingdom’s terrorism list.

A critical mass of circumstances accounts for this shift in Saudi attitudes. King Salman is more sympathetic to religious conservatives than his predecessor was. The weakened Brotherhood is now perceived as less of a threat, while the extremists of the Islamic State are viewed as far more dangerous. Above all, the new Saudi approach is shaped by the regional confrontation with Tehran in the wake of the nuclear agreement.