Can Saudi Arabia Afford Its Aid Cut to Lebanon?

http://www.agsiw.org/can-saudi-arabia-afford-its-aid-cut-to-lebanon/

Saudi Arabia’s decision to suspend a major military aid package to Lebanon – $3 billion earmarked for the purchase of French weapons – and to revoke another $1 billion pledged to support Lebanon’s internal security services, is an unexpected and dramatic change of policy toward a politically crucial Arab country. At the same time, the UAE has announced a drawdown of diplomatic staff at its embassy in Beirut. There are additionally concerns and rumors about the potential withdrawal of Saudi and United Arab Emirates deposits from the Lebanese Central Bank, which would also be deeply damaging to Riyadh’s Lebanese allies. Lebanese anxiety even extends to concern about the potential deportation of Lebanese workers from Gulf states and the loss of valuable remittances as well as social and economic links.

The proximate cause of this dramatic policy shift by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states is a drift of Lebanese policy strongly toward Iran in recent months. The turning point was Lebanon’s refusal to join a virtually unanimous Arab League condemnation of the recent attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. Even Iraq supported the condemnation of the attack, making the Hizballah-inspired Lebanese reticence on the issue all the more anomalous and, from the Gulf state perspective, unacceptable.

The major Lebanese factions have been embroiled in nearly two years of protracted wrangling leaving them unable to agree on a new president. Lebanese political groups are roughly divided into two general coalitions: on the one hand is “March 14,” which is essentially aligned with Saudi Arabia and the West, on the other is “March 8,” linked to Iran and its allies, particularly the Syrian dictatorship of President Bashar al-Assad. Hizballah, the pro-Iranian Shia militia and political party, in particular, has been withholding support for a long series of potential presidential candidates (in Lebanon an elected but heavily gerrymandered Parliament selects the president). Initially Hizballah was mainly seeking to secure its quasi-independent substate within Lebanon, complete with its own independent military, communications network, intelligence services, control over key areas such as the national airport, and a wide variety of other prerogatives. But, especially from the Gulf Arab perspective, Hizballah has recently been asserting greater control over Lebanon’s foreign policy in the interests of Iran, culminating in the refusal to condemn the embassy attack.

Another sign of this trend is an uptick in strongly-worded anti-Saudi rhetoric from Hizballah. Riyadh believes that Hizballah is riding a new wave of confidence, and even arrogance, following the Russian intervention in Syria. The Lebanese Shia militia is a core part of the pro-regime forces whose fortunes appear to have been reversed thanks to Moscow’s intervention in the conflict. From the Gulf perspective, it is precisely this reversal of fortunes in Syria that has allowed Hizballah to tighten its grip on the Lebanese state and foreign policy. The prominent Saudi columnist Abdulrahman al-Rashed went so far as to recently describe Lebanon as an “Iranian colony.”

The exasperation of Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as their Gulf allies is compounded by the sense that Iran’s aid to Lebanon, and more specifically its support for Hizballah, buys it tremendous influence and deference from Lebanese parties across the board and from what remains of the state. By contrast, Arab Gulf money seems to be taken for granted, accepted, but without concomitant consideration for the interests of these major donors. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies believe that Iran’s political investments in Lebanon have proved much more cost effective than their own because Tehran’s largesse has been tied to money and equipment for Hizballah’s militia.

Consequently, the Arab Gulf states feel that their financial contributions to the mainstream Lebanese state institutions such as the national military haven’t resulted in a commensurate consideration for their policy imperatives, whereas Iran has benefited enormously precisely by “playing dirty” and funding its own sub-state militia proxies. Following the suspension of the military aid program, according to Gulf sources, Lebanese political figures were perceived as not having moved quickly enough to try to repair the damage, which in turn led to the further measures involving the travel warnings, diplomatic downgrades, and hints of deposit withdrawals. The message is something along the lines of “Do we have your attention yet?”

At this point the answer is certainly yes, although whether the response will be deemed sufficient remains to be seen. Certainly the Saudi decision appears to have surprised, and even shocked, Riyadh’s Lebanese allies, several of whom have urged the kingdom not to “abandon” Lebanon. Prime Minister Tammam Salam announced plans to visit the Gulf Arab states to try to repair relations, and has already delivered a formal letter to Saudi King Salman asking for the decision to be reversed. Other commentators have described the Saudi move as “puzzling.” This dramatic expression of Gulf exasperation with unfolding trends in Lebanese political dynamics could well have far-reaching consequences for Lebanon’s regional role and domestic equilibrium.

From the Saudi point of view, cutting aid might feel like an act of the strong. Why, after all, Riyadh is asking, should we keep paying for Lebanese national agencies and institutions that are increasingly at the service of our Iranian rivals and are, at best, not responsive to our concerns and at worst seem to be hostile to our interests? Two possible obvious answers – that the Lebanese Armed Forces are one of the few nonsectarian social institutions in the country, and that they serve as a potential crucial counterweight to Hizballah – for some reason do not seem to have carried enough weight. Moreover, the Saudi government may be telling itself that cutting aid is what strong powers do to express their dissatisfaction with local clients and allies. Isn’t cutting or suspending aid the first thing Washington does when it wants to get serious with a misbehaving client?

However, there is a difference between the behavior and policy options of distant, global powers and the concerns and consequences facing local or regional ones such as Saudi Arabia. Washington has provided Lebanon with about $1 billion in military support over the past eight years, despite sharing many of Saudi Arabia’s concerns about Hizballah, which is on the State Department’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations, and refusing to deal with Hizballah officials within the Lebanese government.

The Lebanese allies of Saudi Arabia have begun to respond with uncharacteristic intensity. Pro-Saudi Lebanese factions are essentially the same as the pro-U.S. ones, but they never reacted with anything like this level of alarm and urgency when Washington has, several times in the past, cut or suspended aid. They sense, probably correctly, that the consequences of this cut in Saudi military and security support could have far-reaching consequences for the balance of power in Lebanon, and actually exacerbate rather than reverse the very trends toward Hizballah domination that have so annoyed Riyadh.

Indeed, while the Saudi move may seem an expression of strength from Riyadh’s perspective, from the point of view of many in Beirut it probably looks more like weakness, and possibly even a declaration of defeat. After all, this aid cut seems to leave Lebanon at the mercy of Hizballah and its allies, and other proxies and clients of Iran, since the clout and influence of pro-Saudi factions in Lebanon will be weakened by this loss of income and support. Saudi Arabia will be seen by many in Lebanon as tacitly admitting, through its actions, that it not only does not exercise sufficient influence in Lebanon, it no longer holds out any reasonable hope of doing so under the present circumstances. From the point of view of many Lebanese, that will not be seen as reflective of strength and authority.

This sense will be compounded by the strongly worded warnings issued by Saudi Arabia and several of its key allies, including the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, that their citizens should not travel to Lebanon and, if they are already there, should leave immediately. The move is an expression of concern about potential retaliation against their nationals by pro-Iranian Lebanese extremists. It further implies that Saudi Arabia and its allies are acknowledging that there is little they can do if their nationals are harmed or abducted in Lebanon.

It’s hard to exaggerate what is potentially at stake regionally if this Saudi move is not offset by other policy initiatives designed to draw Lebanon closer to its orbit or in some other way offset the intensification of Iranian influence and prevent the isolation of political forces in Lebanon that are resistant to Iranian domination. If direct military support to the Lebanese Armed Forces remains suspended, surely Saudi Arabia can, if it wants to, find other means of bolstering its political allies in Beirut and consolidating its presence within the Lebanese equation. It may employ a kind of probationary period sure to emphasize its point, but declining to fund the Lebanese military does not necessarily mean walking away from all Lebanese national and governmental institutions. Otherwise, the fears of Saudi Arabia’s Lebanese allies that they are essentially being abandoned to the tender mercies of Hizballah, Assad, and Iran may prove well founded. If this indeed eventually becomes, whatever Riyadh’s present intentions might be, a tacit Saudi admission of defeat or failure in Lebanon – or if it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy with the country falling deeper into the Iranian orbit – the precedent could be profoundly troubling for Riyadh in the long run.

Saudis might well scoff at any analogy between Syria and Lebanon, or the suggestion that if they walk away from one, they could walk away from the other. First of all, they would probably deny that this is what they are doing in Lebanon. And no doubt they would insist that Syria is an entirely different proposition from Lebanon, which has long been subject to the undue influence of Iran through Hizballah. However, if the scenario plays out as Riyadh’s Lebanese allies are warning it might, Saudi Arabia, in effect, could end up essentially acquiescing to, and practically consolidating, Iranian domination of Lebanon by withdrawing crucial aspects of its own leverage. That would surely suggest that there is a threshold wherein Saudi Arabia concludes a political battle has simply been lost and there is no longer any point in, literally, throwing good money after bad.

It’s possible that Saudi Arabia will avoid that dangerous pitfall by implementing other policies that offset the potential negative consequences of the aid cut and other recent measures. There are many different ways in which that important aim could be accomplished. But if the Gulf states don’t take such measures, and these recent moves backfire as Riyadh’s Lebanese allies are warning, the shift in policy toward Beirut could prove a very costly way of making a point.

Saudi Arabia may be serious about taking on ISIL inside Syria

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/saudi-is-serious-about-taking-on-isil-inside-syria

Is Saudi Arabia really preparing to send ground troops into Syria? When Brigadier General Ahmed Al Asiri said on February 4 that Riyadh was willing to contribute ground troops or special forces to any international initiative to combat ISIL in Syria, most observers dismissed the idea.

But this past week the logic of these statements has become clearer, and the prospect of their realisation, perhaps, slightly less far-fetched.

The Saudi comments were aimed squarely at Washington. The United States, the statements imply, has initiated a project against ISIL that, to succeed, will ultimately require the deployment of ground forces in Syria. Moreover, the Saudi proposal’s implications include the indirect but unmistakable suggestion that not only has not enough been done against ISIL, but also that Washington has been profoundly disappointing when it comes to the other supposedly shared goal of creating a future in Syria without president Bashar Al Assad.

The international interventions in Syria launched in 2015 have, after all, contained very little truth in advertising. The Turkish intervention, which supposedly targeted ISIL, has been mainly directed against Kurdish forces. The even more cynical Russian intervention was also marketed as a counterterrorism initiative aimed at ISIL, but focused on providing air support to regime troops and expeditionary ground forces from Iran, Hizbollah and several Iraqi Shiite groups.

So, when Saudi military officials speak about an intervention against ISIL, given this context it is very difficult not to imagine an intended impact on the broader conflict. Everyone cites ISIL as the supposed target because attacking them doesn’t violate international law.

But the same would not be true of an intervention against the Syrian regime, even though it is primarily responsible for a death toll rapidly approaching the half-million mark.

And unless Washington agrees to use a ground offensive against ISIL as the pretext for direct actions against the regime – just as Russia has done against the mainstream rebels – its impact on the broader conflict will have to be indirect.

But this is entirely plausible. ISIL has been a key to the regime’s survival. Not only has the Russian intervention been justified as an anti-ISIL campaign, but Mr Assad has successfully promoted the illusion of a choice between his continued rule and either the triumph of ISIL or complete anarchy.

This widespread delusion defaults powerfully to Mr Assad’s favour, including among many in Washington. It has become so deep-seated and far-reaching that the only sure-fire means of dispelling it may be to eliminate ISIL as a serious presence in Syria. Even severely reducing ISIL’s capabilities in the country would greatly help clarify the point that the conflict in Syria has never been about these terrorist fanatics, but rather the future of a particularly brutal dictatorship that will apparently stop at nothing to retain power.

Saudi Arabia has additional strong interests in curtailing the power of ISIL, which poses a significant threat to its national security.

ISIL’s presence in the kingdom is clearly growing, as steadily increasing ISIL-related arrests and terrorist incidents vividly illustrate. Saudi Arabia can either take the fight to ISIL in Syria and Iraq, or sit back and wait to fight the organisation largely inside its own country.

Saudi Arabia may view ISIL as a manageable threat compared with the crisis posed by Iranian hegemony, as most starkly demonstrated by Tehran’s grip on Damascus. But these two problems converge in Syria.

Iran depends on Mr Assad for its control over Syria, and he, in turn, relies on the spectre of ISIL to rationalise his continued rule to key audiences both locally and globally.

Therefore, even if the Saudi preference is a ground intervention aimed directly at the regime, just as the Russian intervention directly targeted rebels, Riyadh’s interests in Syria could still be powerfully if indirectly served by a concerted international assault against ISIL. This may account for the recent insistence that Saudi Arabia’s determination to contribute ground forces in Syria is “final” and “irreversible”.

This rhetoric is a direct challenge to Washington. Even if read only in terms of the ISIL threat, without considering the future of the dictatorship, the Saudi position suggests, quite correctly, that stated US policy goals ultimately cannot be realised by the present level of American commitment. It is unusual, and even embarrassing, to have coalition members with relatively modest military capabilities pushing a superpower towards greater engagement in pursuit of its own unambiguous policy goals.

The Pentagon was compelled to “welcome” the Saudi proposal, even though it clearly puts pressure on Washington, or otherwise look ridiculous.

This, ultimately, may be driving this new Saudi rhetoric about ground forces in Syria. But at some point, the United States will indeed have to either deploy capable ground forces, quite possibly in part American, or abandon the idea of “degrading and ultimately destroying” ISIL.

So, rhetoric notwithstanding and whatever their present intentions might be, American and Saudi forces might actually one day find themselves shoulder- to-shoulder in Syria.

Why Syria Peace Talks Collapsed Immediately

http://www.agsiw.org/why-syria-peace-talks-collapsed-immediately/

To no one’s surprise, and certainly not everyone’s disappointment, the latest round of peace talks on Syria this week in Geneva collapsed almost before it began. The Syrian warring factions, after all, never really agreed to discuss anything directly, or even sit together in the same room. Instead, international mediators led by U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura, on February 1 started going back and forth between Syrian government officials sitting at the U.N. headquarters in Geneva and opposition representatives gathered at their hotel. De Mistura announced a “pause” in this process on February 3, signaling that even this limited framework isn’t sustainable under the current circumstances. Demands by the opposition that the government lift its siege on various civilian areas in order to allow in humanitarian aid were completely ignored by the regime, contributing directly to the breakdown of the talks.

The global powers involved, particularly the United States, seem increasingly interested in developing a political process to end the conflict. But the armed Syrian factions, their regional backers, and especially the regime of President Bashar al-Assad don’t seem ready to engage meaningfully, appearing to see the value of continued conflict. The regime is seeking a military solution to its predicament, while the rebels are hoping to reverse a series of serious setbacks over recent months to regain the initiative of much of 2015, now lost to these reversals.

Syria remains a key proxy battlefield for rival coalitions led by Saudi Arabia and Iran. Since the recent upsurge in tension between Riyadh and Tehran following the execution of Saudi Shia dissident cleric Nimr al-Nimr and the subsequent sacking of the Saudi Embassy in Iran, the likelihood of progress between these rivals became more remote than ever. In the weeks leading up to the recent flare-up, the diplomatic sidelines of the Syria negotiations had emerged as an unlikely but invaluable venue for Saudi-Iranian dialogue. These talks were the one place where diplomats from the two countries would meet, regularly, predictably, and face-to-face, to discuss crucial issues. If Riyadh and Tehran were going to move beyond their icy relations, this was the most likely context in which such progress, however limited, might have emerged.

The diplomatic encounter continues, with both Saudi and Iranian representatives taking part in the temporarily stalled, talks. But the context for progress on any front, let alone the super-charged question of Syria and the future of Assad, seems to have moved from unlikely to unattainable, at least under the present circumstances. Rather than pressuring their Syrian clients and allies to move toward a political solution, these regional powers seem committed to looking for a comparative advantage from further military confrontation on the ground in Syria.

Indeed, the forces backing the Syrian dictatorship, including Iran and its regional allies, and, crucially, Russia, appear to be committed to seeking a military ”solution” for the regime. Even if the Syrian government cannot end the conflict completely by reestablishing uncontested rule over the whole country, it can at least control the areas most critical to its fundamental policies. This involves securing a thick corridor of about a quarter of Syria, running north from the Lebanese border area, through Damascus and Aleppo, and into the northwestern coastal areas around Latakia. The Assad regime and its allies seem increasingly confident this, at least, can be accomplished. Russia’s military intervention in late 2015 was cynically packaged as an international counterterrorism initiative against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). However, the overwhelming majority of Russian air power has been targeted against the mainstream rebel groupings supported by Saudi Arabia and its two key partners, Turkey and Qatar.

This intervention appears to have successfully shifted the momentum in the conflict in favor of the regime, particularly in the areas it is focused on controlling. During much of 2015, Syrian regime and pro-regime forces consistently lost ground to rebel groups supported by Middle Eastern regional powers, particularly the Riyadh-backed Jaish al-Islam coalition and Ahrar al-Sham, favored by Ankara and Doha. While the situation on the ground was typically fluid and complex, for much of 2015 these groups made steady progress in key and heavily contested areas of the country at the expense of the regime (and also, at times, at the expense of ISIL).

The Russian intervention first stopped and has now apparently reversed this trend. In recent weeks the military momentum appears to have shifted dramatically in favor of the regime and its allies, including ground forces from the Lebanese Shia militia Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, and Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The Independent clinically summarized the emerging situation, in a war of competing sieges aimed mainly at targeting innocent Syrian civilians, as follows:
“According to the UN, the Syrian government is besieging 187,000 people in rebel-held towns; the rebels by contrast are besieging only two towns, with 12,000 residents. That is [now] the scale of the [emerging] asymmetry between the sides.”

The situation in many besieged areas is reportedly dire, with opposition activists reporting starvation conditions in a number of localities. The international donor community has pledged billions of dollars for aid to starving and desperate Syrian civilians, but delivering this desperately needed support may be difficult if the warring factions, especially the government, continue to use siege and starvation as a key tactic of war.

The regime appears to have used the latest round of international negotiations as a platform to demonstrate its newfound, or newly-regained, military strength. It sought to demonstrate that it is only interested in a military “solution,” rather than a peace agreement, by launching a significant offensive in several key areas, especially near Aleppo, on February 1 as talks convened. By Wednesday the Syrian military reportedly broke the siege of two crucial government-held villages in an effort to cut supply lines between rebel-held areas of Aleppo and its environs and the Turkish border. Over 300 Russian airstrikes were reportedly part of this major offensive, which was characterized in one editorial as a shameless and overt act of diplomatic “sabotage.”

The regime position is that it does not negotiate with “terrorists,” and that “in Syria, everyone who holds a machinegun [not under the control of the government] is a terrorist.” Russia has identified Jaish al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham as “terrorist” organizations, although it agreed to the participation of their representatives in the peace talks on an “individual basis.” Moscow thereby agreed that these key opposition organizations could be part of the negotiations in practice (thus “having its cake”) while continuing to identify them as politically intolerable terrorist groups in theory (thereby “eating it too”).

These Islamist groups were brought into the official Syrian opposition negotiating structure at a Saudi-brokered meeting of rebel groups in Riyadh in early December 2015. Particularly at issue was the participation of Ahrar al-Sham, given its frequent insistence on a future political and social order in Syria based on the application of sharia law and, worse, its history of collaboration with the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. The United States wanted evidence that Ahrar al-Sham was renouncing any cooperation with al-Qaeda and was moving away from a dogmatic and implausible fixation on sharia, especially given the heterogeneity of Syrian society. Ahrar al-Sham did eventually sign off on the meeting’s “Final Statement,” which indicated a much broader and more tolerant vision for the future. Ahrar al-Sham thereby became part of the quasi-official High Negotiations Committee formed at the meeting to conduct diplomacy on behalf of a supposedly united Syrian political and paramilitary opposition. It is the HNC that gathered in the Geneva hotel for the recent round of negotiations.

Even before the extent of the regime’s new momentum on the ground became apparent, at least two major problems for the HNC were obvious. First, it is haunted by the challenge that it must confront ISIL and other terrorists as well as the regime, and that the United States prioritizes the battle against ISIL. This presents both theoretical and practical conundrums for the opposition, particularly given that Ahrar al-Sham has a history of sometimes collaborating with Jabhat al-Nusra. This is obviously unacceptable to the United States, and also of serious concern to Saudi Arabia, despite its support of the group. Breaking this pattern of cooperation, and indeed confronting ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, must be an imperative for the opposition if it is to be politically viable in the long run. Yet, at the same time, that process cannot be perceived as in any way playing into the hands of the regime. No one has thus far proposed a comprehensive approach to cutting this Gordian knot.

Second, because of Turkey’s objections, one of the most important, successful, and effective armed opposition groups in Syria, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), has been excluded from the opposition umbrella entirely. The group was not invited to the December opposition meeting in Riyadh, and has no representation in the HNC. Turkey is alarmed by the strong ties between the YPG and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which, for decades, has been fighting a bloody and bitter conflict with Ankara over the future of Kurdish-majority areas inside Turkey. Turkey’s direct air intervention in Syria earlier in 2015 was also marketed internationally as a counterterrorism campaign against ISIL, but like the Russian intervention that followed it, in reality pursued its own interests.

Saudi and Qatari accommodation of Turkish hostility toward the PKK, and by extension the YPG, has greatly damaged the Syrian opposition, particularly at the political level. On the ground, when the opportunity has presented itself, elements within the mainstream Arab Syrian opposition such as the nationalist Free Syrian Army have joined with YPG units taking on ISIL in northern Syria. Moreover, the Kurdish groups have been successful in establishing a de facto independent area that they call “Rojava” in much of the northern region of Syria, an enclave that is liberated from government control and free of the depredations of ISIL. Its main challenges come from the Turkish military and state, rather than the Damascus dictatorship or ISIL fighters.

The exclusion of these highly successful Kurdish forces from the opposition umbrella not only undermines the ability of the HNC to speak on behalf of the effective military and political opposition in Syria, it also reflects and promotes ethnic divisions that are a threat to Syria’s future no matter what defines its political order. Freezing the Kurdish groups out of the opposition coalition might have been viewed in Riyadh as unfortunate but unavoidable because of Turkey’s central role and the depth of its opposition to the YPG. But this perspective is short sighted. Although these divisions don’t strengthen the regime as such, it certainly badly weakens and divides the opposition. In effect, it means that rather than racing a unified front the regime is encountering a fragmented array of competing forces that, even within the HNC umbrella, is politically divided by ideologies, affiliations, and practical interests. These self-same divided but mainstream rebel groups must nonetheless confront the terrorist organizations that are a cancer on the uprising. Finally, the most politically significant and militarily effective Arab and Kurdish opposition groups in Syria are unable to fully cooperate, let alone unite, because of Turkey’s domestically driven objections.

As things now stand, the shared Saudi-Qatari-Turkish policy goal of regime change in Syria is in real trouble, if not profound crisis, as the Assad dictatorship’s contemptuous attitude toward the peace negotiations vividly illustrates. A year ago, the regime appeared to be approaching a state of exhaustion. But now, following a series of dramatic reversals mainly stemming from the Russian military intervention, the regime and its supporters appear to be once again not only confident of survival but sincerely hopeful of a possible military “solution” that secures their control of the key areas of the country for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the fragmented opposition is struggling politically and diplomatically, and even more ominously on the ground militarily. As long as that is the case, Damascus, Tehran, and even Moscow will have few compelling reasons to endure a political compromise that sacrifices the continued rule of Assad and his inner circle, which is a sine qua non of any political agreement from the opposition perspective.

Riyadh and its allies are going to have to oversee some significant rebel gains, both military and diplomatic, in order to alter this equation. If it is as committed to a peace agreement in Syria as it appears to be, then Washington, too, has a strong interest in changing the current balance of power on the ground. Only then are the regime and its supporters likely to seriously consider the need for a negotiated end to the conflict. Unless a real incentive for them to compromise emerges, the Assad regime and its local, regional, and global supporters will almost certainly persist in their current attitude that casts peace talks as little more than a diplomatically and politically useful farce.

If Saudi-Iranian tensions are to ease, proper dialogue is needed

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/if-tensions-are-to-ease-off-proper-dialogue-is-needed

For those hoping for greater stability in the Middle East, this has
been a discouraging week. The intensified standoff between Saudi
Arabia and Iran, backed by their regional allies, is one of the most
ominous developments in many months. This is not only a severe fault
line between two major regional powers. It also intensifies the
sectarianism that increasingly defines regional dynamics and
identities, and which threatens to divide the Muslims of the Middle
East into bitterly antagonistic rival camps into the foreseeable
future.

This current wave of intensification was kicked off by the Saudi
execution of a dissident Shia cleric, Nimr Al Nimr, who has repeatedly
called for the secession of the oil-rich Eastern Province and was
accused of promoting violence in that cause. Nimr was arrested in 2012
and sentenced to death in 2014, but was only executed last week.

The Saudi authorities must have known that this execution would
provoke a significant backlash from Iran and many Shia organisations
and constituencies in the Arab world.

Moreover, it seems to contradict a number of gestures towards
conciliation, including the restoration of full diplomatic relations
with Iraq, preparations to send a new ambassador to Iran and
substantive discussions with the Iranian officials on the fringes of
the Syrian peace talks.

It’s likely that the proximate cause for the execution of Nimr and
three other Shiite activists was the simultaneous mass execution of
more than 40 Sunni extremists associated with Al Qaeda.

Those executions also come in the context of the formation of a
Saudi-led antiterrorism alliance and other measures aimed primarily at
Sunni radicals such as ISIL and Al Qaeda. The inclusion of a small
number of radical Shias in the execution list may well have been an
effort to appear “even-handed”, particularly to domestic political
constituencies.

Although some claim that Saudi Arabia was acting in a “panicked”
manner because many of its policies seem to be going badly, and its
economy is in the doldrums, the real message appears to be one of
determination and defiance.

Riyadh appears to be telling both Sunni and Shia radicals that they
will find little space to operate within the kingdom. Iran and its
clients are being put on notice that Saudi Arabia and its allies are
not only ready to meet any challenge, but are even prepared to raise
the stakes. And the US is being reminded that, given the perceived
absence of American leadership, Saudi Arabia is prepared to define its
own security measures and pursue its national interests with a much
greater degree of independence from Washington.

Many observers, particularly in the West, have reacted angrily to the
Saudi move, decrying an apparent sectarian provocation that could only
have had the effect of exacerbating Sunni-Shiite tensions. And,
indeed, this is what has, predictably, occurred. But what’s missing
from this analysis is that Riyadh is merely playing catch-up to
Tehran.

Iran’s sectarian regional politics are so deeply entrenched that no
one notices them anymore. They appear to be “normal”. But, of course,
they are not. Iran worked for decades to unite Shia and quasi-Shia
communities across the Middle East in its orbit, drawing in the Syrian
regime, Hizbollah in Lebanon, many of the Shiite parties in Iraq, the
Houthis in Yemen and so forth.

Hamas was once the exception that proved the rule, being a Muslim
Brotherhood party that was also a part of the pro-Iranian alliance.

However, after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, Hamas was forced
by Damascus and Tehran to choose sides, and it could not remain
aligned with what was clearly a sectarian Shia coalition. It was, in
effect, expelled from the Iranian alliance because of its opposition
to the Bashar Al Assad regime once the Syrian uprising really caught
fire.

While it might be fair to decry the exploitation of sectarian
sensibilities by both countries, it’s preposterous to imply that Saudi
Arabia is exacerbating religious divisions without acknowledging that
this has been Iran’s modus operandi for decades, since at least the
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, if not from the very outset of the
Islamic Republic.

Yet the situation is alarming and dangerous, and there are faults on both sides.

While it is extremely unlikely that there will be a direct military
confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both countries are now
involved in directly combating each other’s clients.

In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and its allies are directly confronting the
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, while in Syria, Iranian forces have
joined with Syrian government, Russian, Hizbollah and even Iraqi
militia forces in combating Saudi-backed Syrian rebels.

With the breaking of diplomatic relations with Iran and the suspension
of even trade links by Saudi Arabia, following the outrageous attack
by government-backed Iranian mobs against the Saudi embassy in Tehran,
tensions have reached a new high.

It’s in everyone’s interests that the parties pull back and resume
efforts to create a constructive dialogue. But for that to happen,
enlightened self-interest and responsible behaviour are going to have
to replace the current atmosphere of mutual fear, suspicion and
loathing. Right now, that seems a tall order indeed.

What’s Behind the Saudi-Iranian Flare-up?

http://www.agsiw.org/whats-behind-the-saudi-iranian-flareup/

The January 2 execution by Saudi Arabia of 47 people on terrorism charges and the backlash it provoked have sent shockwaves through the diplomatic and political landscape of the Middle East. Forty-three of the condemned were Sunni extremists, mostly associated with al-Qaeda. However, four were Shia activists, including the prominent dissident cleric, Nimr al-Nimr, who had emerged over the past few years as a leader of the protest movement among Saudi Shias in the restive and oil-rich Eastern Province. Nimr’s execution has significantly inflamed the already volatile sectarian tensions throughout the region, and led to a diplomatic crisis between Saudi Arabia and Iran – each backed by their allies – that will almost certainly prove difficult to repair and possibly even contain.

The Iranian response to Nimr’s execution was as predictable as it was irresponsible. The Saudi embassy in Tehran was sacked and burned by mobs clearly acting with the acquiescence, if not the approval, of the Iranian government. Targeting foreign embassies has been a favored way of expressing dismay by the Iranian regime since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, beginning with the targeting of the American embassy and its staff. Since then, there have been numerous instances in which Iran has expressed its objections to the actions or policies of other states by attacking their embassies in Tehran. So it’s not surprising that the Saudi embassy met the same fate over the weekend, although there are reports that Iran, which is seeking greater international acceptance, has apologized for the attack and promised the UN Security Council that diplomatic missions will not be targeted in the future.

The Saudi response – breaking diplomatic relations with Iran – raises the stakes even further. Long-time regional rivals, there had been recent signs of some thawing of tensions between Riyadh and Tehran. The two sides were beginning to talk to each other about a substantive issue of grave disagreement for the first time in years on the periphery of Syrian peace talks. Moreover, Saudi Arabia was preparing to send a new ambassador to Iran, and had just dispatched an ambassador to Iraq after some 25 years of prolonged estrangement.

All of that apparent progress has been overtaken by events of recent days. From the American perspective, a whole series of complications now arises, involving not only the search for peace in Syria, but also the campaign against ISIL, efforts to end the conflict in Yemen, and important diplomacy on issues in Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the region.

The timing of the executions isn’t easy to explain. But several crucial factors are clear. The most important is that Saudi Arabia almost certainly acted with an awareness of the potential implications the execution of Nimr was likely to have among Shias throughout the region. The messages Saudi Arabia appears to be trying to send to multiple audiences are therefore intelligible.

First, Iran and its allies have once again, and perhaps more starkly than ever, been put on notice that Saudi Arabia is not only prepared for region-wide standoff, but is even willing to raise the stakes. It is a defiant gesture by Riyadh, and in keeping with a policy initiative being pursued by King Salman since his ascendancy that emphasizes greater Saudi resistance towards Tehran and its regional ambitions. It is significant that Nimr was arrested in 2012 and sentenced to death in 2014 under the reign of Salman’s predecessor, King Abdullah, but was not executed. This is, therefore, another example of a change in policy driven by the new king, seemingly with the support of Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef and, one must assume, his son Mohammed bin Salman, the youthful but hawkish defense minister and deputy crown prince.

Second, Shia dissidents in the Gulf Arab states, including in Saudi Arabia itself, as well as Bahrain and elsewhere, are being clearly told that there are strict limits to how much dissent will be tolerated. Joseph Braude has explained the Saudi government’s attitude towards Nimr, and its perception of him as a dangerous and violent subversive, which helps explain why he was executed despite the predictably negative consequences. A different, and also useful, perspective on the rise of Nimr to prominence was recounted in the now-defunct “Riyadh bureau” website. Both perspectives are worth considering, along with others. Nimr aside, the status of Shias in Saudi Arabia must be addressed or it will remain a source of instability in the Kingdom for the foreseeable future.

Third, the vast majority of those executed were Sunni extremists associated with al-Qaeda. The message to Sunni extremists and self-described “jihadists” is a familiar one: their activities inside Saudi Arabia will be met with the harshest penalties. ISIL, too, is a target, since the execution of Shia activists, including Nimr, will have the effect, even if unintended, of undermining the group’s claims to be a Sunni “vanguard” against Shia assertiveness in the region. The blow to Sunni terrorists is therefore two-pronged: first is the fact of the executions themselves and all that they imply about the willingness of the Saudi authorities to crack down on extremists; second is a political attack on the sectarian claims of the terrorists.

One possible explanation for the decision to execute Nimr and other Shia activists at this time is that the Saudi government did not want to be perceived as simply targeting Sunni extremists by executing 43 al-Qaeda members. By executing Nimr and the other three Shia activists, Riyadh may have been attempting to appear “evenhanded.” This is especially plausible given the recent establishment of an Islamic antiterrorism alliance, and other Saudi-led initiatives targeting ISIL and al-Qaeda. But if so, the attempt at balance may have only succeeded in the narrowest possible domestic context, while regionally and internationally the execution of Nimr overshadows all other aspects of the event.

Fourth, the United States is once again being reminded that Saudi Arabia has concluded that American leadership is lacking and that it will pursue its internal security and regional interests in a more proactive and independent manner than it has in the past. Although there were many warnings in recent weeks that a wide-scale Saudi execution was in the works, most Western diplomats and multinational organizations did not expect Saudi Arabia to put Nimr to death. Washington is likely to move quickly to try to ascertain what Saudi Arabia is hoping to accomplish through this action and to begin to repair the perceived damage done to the key American foreign policy concerns cited above. No one should be surprised if Secretary of State John Kerry personally visits Riyadh in the very near future, since this is both his leadership style and would clearly be warranted by the gravity of the diplomatic and political crisis and its impact on the efforts to begin negotiations on Syria.

Saudi Arabia faces significant problems on multiple fronts, including new and serious domestic and foreign policy concerns. Its economy is suffering considerably from the low cost of petroleum, which, for complex reasons, Riyadh itself is helping to maintain. Current tensions with Iran don’t bode well for stability of oil pricing either. This economic pressure on the Saudi social and political system may help to explain the timing of the executions. The Saudi government faces a period of unprecedented belt-tightening, with unavoidable cuts in public services, amenities, subsidies, and other social benefits that the citizenry has come to expect over recent decades. Potential domestic discontent over this new period of quasi-austerity in Saudi Arabia cannot be allowed to spill over into challenges to the system. Therefore, the government may have been prompted to send a clear signal at this moment to Sunni extremists and Shia dissidents alike that any efforts to take advantage of the developing economic and social challenges will not be tolerated. Moreover, the Saudi-led Arab intervention in Yemen appears bogged down, even as reports surface that the Saudi-backed Jaysh al-Islam opposition group in Syria has suffered a series of recent setbacks since the killing of its leader, Zahran Alloush, apparently by a Russian airstrike in December.

Yet the Saudi attitude, as expressed in the executions and subsequent policy decisions, appears to be highly confident, if not brash. Other states have joined Saudi Arabia in breaking ties with Tehran, including Sudan and Bahrain. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, however, merely downgraded their ties to Iran – a move that is easily reversible – while fully maintaining trade links. And, as a useful reminder of the diversity within the Gulf Cooperation Council, Oman publicly criticized the Saudi move.

Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia may come to welcome American engagement (if it materializes) on these issues in the coming weeks, especially if Riyadh begins to feel that the consequences of its actions are less manageable than it had anticipated. The complete severing of diplomatic ties with Iran leaves Riyadh little wiggle room to resume high-level diplomacy without some kind of public explanation of what has changed. That could prove politically awkward even if it becomes desirable as policy. The internal blowback within Saudi Arabia is already problematic, with at least one Shia protester killed in Qatif in clashes with the authorities. The White House says it warned Saudi Arabia about the consequences of executing Nimr. Should Riyadh be persuaded that Washington is prepared to reengage in these issues with the Kingdom’s best interests in mind, this could reduce the current level of tension in U.S.-Saudi relations and perhaps repair whatever damage has been done to prospects for greater regional stability.

2015 was Quietly Decisive on Many Key Mideast Issues

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/as-obama-looked-for-an-exit-putin-seized-his-chance

Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, 2015 was a decisive year and even a turning point on several of the most pressing issues facing the Middle East. What looks like chaos and confusion has actually forced clarity on the key players.

It may well be remembered as the year in which the United States, perhaps irrevocably, abandoned its role as the guarantor of the Middle Eastern political order. It’s still true that the US remains the most powerful military force in the region. But the impression that Washington is very reluctant to use its power to try to shape Middle Eastern realities, except under the most extreme circumstances, has become almost universal.

In the magazine Foreign Affairs, Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson argue that the end of the “pax Americana” in the Middle East is both rational, given the supposedly dwindling importance of the region, and a restoration of the traditional policy that had been temporarily abandoned by the George W Bush administration. But current policies can hardly be simultaneously both a restoration of tradition and a response to new developments. In fact, they are an overcorrection whereby Washington is behaving as if it had much less power and influence than it actually does or it could have.

Russia’s intervention in Syria was a dramatic demonstration of how this is playing out. It may have appeared sudden, but Vladimir Putin has spent the past few years taking the measure of American determination, and testing the waters globally in Ukraine and elsewhere. He also carefully watched the growing role in Syria of Iran, Hizbollah and Iraqi Shia militias. From all this, he correctly concluded that he could intervene in Syria without any serious pushback from Washington.

American officials have been quoted recently as saying that they believe the Russian intervention has been quite successful. The official US response has amounted to little more than a shrug.

Russia’s actual military and economic power is dwarfed by that of the US. But Russia has the will to act and to try to shape outcomes to suit its purposes while, at least in Syria, the US does not. It’s going to be extremely difficult for any future American administration to reverse, let alone fully correct, the impression created recently, especially in 2015, that the US has lost, or voluntarily surrendered, much of its regional influence.

Last year was also decisive for the Arab confrontation with the transnational terrorist movement that has arisen on the fringes of its own societies. The rise and spread of ISIL over the past year has emerged as a such a clear-cut, unmistakable and universal threat that it’s now or never for the Arab world.

Many Arab states have mobilised with some success against extremists within their own societies. But what is required – and is now being attempted by initiatives such as the Saudi-led antiterrorism alliance – is a collective effort operating simultaneously on the military, law-enforcement, ideological and religious fronts. Piecemeal, individual efforts by dozens of Arab and Muslim states can only go so far.

Yet there is a long history of failed efforts to create functional Arab and Muslim security alliances, so scepticism is inevitable. If the present threat isn’t sufficient to produce such unprecedented cooperation, it’s hard to imagine what would be. So the real question is whether or not these societies are capable of coordinated security approaches that involve mutual trust and the surrender of some sovereign authority. This vital, and potentially existential, question has been posed over the past year, and will be answered in the coming ones.

Relations between the Arab states and Iran may also have reached a quietly decisive moment in 2015. The international nuclear agreement effectively means the diplomatic rehabilitation of Tehran, at least in the eyes of the West. The choice now is clearly one between open-ended confrontation for the foreseeable future or a gradual move towards accommodation.

The conflict in Syria looks like the template for endless discord, but at least Riyadh and Tehran are once again speaking to each other on the margins of the Vienna process on Syrian peace.

The outlines of an accommodation began to emerge clearly in 2015. Iran will play a greater role in the Arab world than most Arabs have traditionally been comfortable with, particularly in countries such as Iraq and Lebanon. But Iran’s role in Syria in particular, as well as Yemen and other Arab states, cannot continue as it is now. It basically means the Arab states agreeing to an Iranian sphere of influence that includes parts of the Arab world, but Iran accepting some pullback from the status quo.

Such an arrangement is theoretically workable, and the outlines of such an understanding have been defined with considerable specificity over the past 12 months. Whether it can be mutually acceptable and implemented will only be answered by future choices.

The past year provided a great deal of clarity about some of the most important decisions facing the main players in the Middle East. For a region that has often been opaque, such precision should be welcome and refreshing. But that requires the responsible parties to choose wisely.

Trump taps into the rage of anxious American men

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/trump-taps-into-the-rage-of-anxious-american-men#full

Christmas Day finds the US Republican Party more than ever in the grip of Donald Trump and all that he represents. A few weeks away from the Iowa caucus, and then the first primary in New Hampshire, his lead in the opinion polls is wider than ever. He leads the latest CNN poll with a whopping 39 per cent of Republican and Republican-leaning registered voters, more than double his nearest rival. The Trump phenomenon is no longer an aberration. It is now of historical significance.

A series of incredibly offensive comments, blatant falsehoods, cringe-inducing braggadocio, mind-boggling flip-flops, and juvenile outbursts have only strengthened his position. Moreover, the pushback against him by other Republicans has been timid and totally ineffective. It’s clear to everyone that he is tapping into something profound on the American political right.

But what would that be? The unstated, but unmistakable, unifying theme of his campaign is anger. Many of his supporters don’t consciously recognise this. They find his “Make America Great Again!” motif inspiring and even Reagan-esque. But unconsciously it inspires the question of what – and, more importantly, who – damaged the United States such that it needs repairing. The answer is almost always the wrong kind of people.

Immigrants – legal and illegal – are the main target for Mr Trump. He is playing on a raw, visceral nativism that laments the loss of a normative America defined by English-speaking, white and middle-class citizens. He is appealing to those who can no longer recognise the country they once knew, and who feel marginalised and excluded, as if immigrants, African Americans and other minorities have hijacked their USA.

Mr Trump especially appeals to those white American males who feel blamed, collectively, for all the ills of society, and that they, alone, can be vilified not only without restraint, but also usually with applause. This narrative insists that, in reality, it is actually these middle-class white American males who are being unfairly economically disadvantaged. Mr Trump, the billionaire, is cleverly exploiting the anger of those who feel, often with complete justification, that they are inexorably slipping from the middle class into the bulging ranks of the working poor.

Immigrants and other minorities could not have accomplished this grand theft without the connivance of traitorous “liberal elites”. Money-grubbing corporations, the mainstream media, academic snobs, arrogant intellectuals and the hated federal government bureaucracy are the core of the liberal cabal that betrayed “real Americans” for ideological or selfish reasons, and consciously and cynically degraded the country. This imaginary grand betrayal is at the centre of Trumpian rage.

The Republican Party establishment is seen as part of the problem. It is either too weak or compromised by corporate and other interests to effectively defend the country. Only – or even especially – someone unquestionably outside of the thoroughly corrupted system can possibly hope to rehabilitate it.

Narratives about radical, emergency measures needed to reverse national devastation caused by parasitical minorities empowered by back-stabbing elites must be immediately recognisable as the stuff of fascism. Yet it’s not clear what, if anything, Mr Trump actually believes. He hardly seems a would-be dictator. His campaign most often comes across as a gigantic ego trip, and sometimes even an incredibly elaborate practical joke.

But what explains the eagerness with which his lies, fabrications and reversals are championed by his supporters? It somehow doesn’t matter that his wild claims about blacks being responsible for most murders of whites, or thousands of Muslims in New Jersey celebrating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, or Barack Obama not having been born in the United States, are demonstrably and incontrovertibly false.

The facts aren’t relevant. All that’s important is the sentiment, even if expressed through evident lies. The emotional “truths” they articulate are much more meaningful than the claims themselves, and therefore their veracity is incidental. It’s true anyway, even if it’s false – truer than the truth, indeed all the more true for being a lie.

Mr Trump promotes a mentality that is bitterly hostile to inconvenient facts, which are dismissed as “political correctness”, and enthusiastically embraces comforting inversions of reality over painful truths. Yet Mr Trump – unquestionably the most brazen liar in modern American national political campaigns – is consistently lauded by his supporters for his courageous “honesty”. They insist that he, alone among politicians, tells the truth, while in fact he has set a new standard for shameless dishonesty. Some of his enthusiasts even assert that he is “humble”.

But the grim reality is that his preposterous fantasies are promoting fear and hatred of immigrants, of minorities, of “liberal elites” and of others who are supposedly destroying the country and who therefore, by unmistakable implication, must themselves be confronted and destroyed.

Mr Trump is playing with fire. It may be that doesn’t fully realise the potential destructive power of the rage his rhetoric is fuelling. Even if he does, he certainly doesn’t seem to care.

This Pied Piper of paranoia and chauvinism surely won’t end up as president, and maybe not even the Republican nominee. But his breathtakingly irresponsible demagoguery has already done profound damage to both his party and American political culture.

Peace remains a distant, elusive prospect in Syria

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/peace-remains-a-distant-elusive-prospect-in-syria

On Friday, the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution on Syria, calling for a ceasefire and negotiations between the government and the mainstream opposition groups. This resolution retroactively gives the highest level of international diplomatic endorsement and legal credibility to the Vienna process and its conclusions thus far. But, even as that process continues to develop and gain momentum, several things must happen before any serious progress on the ground becomes a realistic possibility.

Diplomacy on Syria has moved farther and faster than almost anyone anticipated. Between a series of meetings in October and November in Vienna, the newly-established International Syria Support Group has laid out a series of measures, now endorsed by the Security Council, to begin the political transition in Syria.

The group includes not only the key global players such as Russia and the United States, but also the leading regional players, including the most significant supporters of the opposition – Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar – as well as pro-regime stalwarts, Iran.

It seems the main global actors in Syria are keen on finding an agreement to de-escalate this incredibly destabilising conflict. However, some of the most important regional powers may not be quite as ready. And as for the local Syrian parties, thus far they show no sign of really being willing to seriously negotiate an end to their conflict.

Moscow and Washington still must come to an understanding regarding the future of Bashar Al Assad. This is not impossible. Russia could almost certainly secure its primary interests, especially its military assets in the country, and above all its priceless warm water port in Tartus, through a government not led by Mr Al Assad.

The US, after years of insisting that he has “lost all credibility” and “must go”, has recently taken the rather strange position that, although his departure remains essential, “it doesn’t have to be on day one or month one” but rather be negotiated.

Last week, secretary of state John Kerry went even further, saying that “the US and our partners are not seeking so-called regime change, as it is known, in Syria”, but that, “what we have said is that we don’t believe that Assad himself has the ability to lead the future Syria”.

Given that Russia can almost certainly do without Mr Al Assad personally, and the US appears to be losing interest in seeing the back of him right away, the two parties are not that far apart. Still, the Americans and Russians would have to find a formula on Mr Al Assad’s future that is sellable to the Syrian opposition if it wants an agreement to end the fighting.

The regional powers, however, remain very far apart. Hizbollah, and probably Iran too, cannot do without Mr Al Assad. They will undoubtedly fight tooth and nail to preserve his rule and his personal, physical presence in office. They just can’t trust anybody else to maintain the same level of commitment to their much more complex and detailed interests.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, on the other hand, remain absolutely committed to an outcome that not only doesn’t include Mr Al Assad, but that doesn’t subject the country to a “transition period” that he could use to manoeuvre his way out of any anticipated departure.

Moreover, neither the regional supporters nor the opponents of the regime are likely, at this stage, to voluntarily go along with any Russian-American compromise on Mr Al Assad. They either want him to stay or to go, end of story. It’s hard to imagine what would shift their thinking, given the stakes they believe are in play, both in Syria itself and because of the effect the outcome of the conflict will have on the regional balance of power.

Yet, on the sidelines of the Vienna process, Saudi Arabia and Iran are talking again. That might one day prove its biggest accomplishment.

The Syrian calculation is even starker when it comes to local forces. Mr Al Assad says he wants negotiations, but won’t talk to terrorists, and “anyone who has a machine-gun is a terrorist”. The opposition regards him as the ultimate terrorist, and morally and legally responsible for the hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of displacements caused by the conflict.

The regime and its supporters in Syria can’t imagine the country in any other hands, whereas the opposition can only imagine Mr Al Assad’s future as being in the dock at an international criminal tribunal.

The bottom line is this: because of developments in 2015, both the government and the opposition think they could strengthen their hands through further fighting. They may both be kidding themselves, but that’s clearly the hope. And under such circumstances, they are going to continue fighting no matter what their regional patrons, and still less their global supporters, have to say.

The development of an international framework for transition towards peace in Syria can only be a useful thing. But until the global players can find a formula for Mr Al Assad’s future that is acceptable to the key regional powers, and the local forces realise that ending the conflict is in their interests, the fighting in Syria is, alas, bound to continue.

What to Expect from Riyadh’s New Islamic Counterterrorism Alliance

http://www.agsiw.org/what-to-expect-from-riyadhs-new-islamic-counterterrorism-alliance/

The announcement in Paris on Tuesday that Saudi Arabia has taken the initiative to form a 34-member “Islamic military alliance” is, in theory at least, one of the most dramatic international counterterrorism moves in many years. The coming together of so many Muslim countries to combat terrorism — not only through military action, but also through “stopping the flow of funds” to violent radicals and “confronting the ideology of extremism” — ought to be enormously important.

Only time will tell whether this initiative has a real impact on stemming the rise of terrorist groups or proves, for one reason or another, to be essentially ineffective, or even counterproductive. It is, of course, high time that Muslim states band together to confront the radicals that threaten them all. But there are numerous pitfalls that could bedevil the formation and operation of such an alliance.

It seems clear from statements by Saudi officials such as Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman, who appears to have been the key figure in its formation, that the new alliance will operate essentially as was anticipated for a much-ballyhooed, but as yet unrealized, Arab League joint military command. The Arab League’s participating states in both alliances would have the prerogative of requesting various forms of assistance from the alliance in the case of a crisis.

In other words, the alliance wouldn’t act unless it was specifically asked to do so by the state in whose territory the terrorist activity is taking place. Many countries may be reluctant to ask for help. This core organizing structure ensures that if a government, for its own domestic political reasons or some other concerns, insists on pretending that there isn’t a problem or that it is contained, or that they do not need external aid. The alliance then would not intervene no matter how worrisome the situation becomes.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said that such assistance will be provided on a “case-by-case basis,” with each government making its own decisions regarding asking for, or providing, this kind of support, which could include “military training or equipment or… technical assistance in terms of messaging… to counter the ideology of violent extremism.” The available help includes, by implication, everything up to and including direct foreign military intervention.

Therefore, the activities of the new alliance, as they are presently conceptualized, are so broad, vague, and contingent on so many variables, that they might be difficult to implement in a meaningful way. It won’t be easy to translate this broad, aspirational language into kinetic action on the ground. Yet rapid and decisive action by this alliance will ultimately be the sine qua non of its worth as a counterterrorism initiative.

There are significant grounds to wonder whether or not this alliance can become a significant military and political force. Arab states have unsuccessfully pursued military alliances among themselves for many decades, and, as noted above, recent efforts to create a joint Arab League, and even just a joint Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) command, have yet to move beyond the planning phases. This new grouping is even larger, and, on that basis, as well as because of its broad, expansive mission, arguably more difficult to implement. Can this new plan work when simpler efforts along similar lines have failed so consistently in the past?

The costs of launching an initiative that proves practically ineffective could be steep. It could damage these countries’ credibility (particularly Saudi Arabia’s), strengthen the confidence of extremists, dismay moderates, and convince others in the international community, especially in the West, that this is “yet another” instance of Arab and Muslim states vowing to take action against terrorism but proving unable to do so in a truly effective way. The whole thing could be dismissed as an exercise in public diplomacy, or even “spin,” following the Paris and San Bernardino massacres.

Issues are also raised by what countries have been left, or opted, out of the new alliance. For instance, one noteworthy absence is Algeria, one of the Arab states that has been most experienced and successful in combating Islamist terrorism, with a large and very well-equipped military. Algeria has a long-established go-it-alone attitude, and therefore, might have been expected to at least take a wait-and-see approach to this new alliance. But its absence leaves an obvious gap in the group, to be sure.

There are also questions raised by the fact that the new alliance is almost entirely a Sunni affair. Missing from the group are Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Lebanon was initially listed among the participants but apparently Beirut will not be involved, presumably due to the heavy influence Hezbollah has in its national government. Bahrain, a Gulf Arab state with a Shia majority but Sunni ruling family, is a member, reflecting its government’s close ties to Riyadh. But it is very much the exception that proves the rule. Other Gulf Arab states such as Oman apparently declined to join the group, preferring, as is its general practice, to avoid broad alliances, especially on counterterrorism, and to maintain an independent foreign policy within the general context of the GCC.

There is an obvious argument in defense of the “Sunni character” of the new alliance: its primary targets must and will be radical Sunni Islamist terrorist groups. Therefore, the inclusion of Iran and any of its allies, or other clear-cut Shia powers, could render the organization ineffective and even counterproductive in gaining the support of the constituencies it is trying to address.

However, this “Sunni identity” of the new alliance means that it could end up reinforcing some of the most problematic fault-lines in the region, both within and between states. Shia powers and societies could feel excluded and even targeted. However, given that the terrorist groups that will be the primary targets of this new alliance are radical Sunni and are a mortal threat to Shias, should be a source of reassurance to Shia powers.

None of the pitfalls are necessarily fatal by any means. If the alliance can become a major force in combating terrorism, extremist financing, and radical rhetoric, it will be a very welcome addition and bring considerable international credit to the governments and societies that have taken the lead in putting it together. Even if this develops slowly, it could eventually prove a major benefit to fighting extremism, if not, indeed, a game changer.

Who Is a Muslim?

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/opinion/who-is-a-muslim.html?ref=opinion

WASHINGTON — Donald J. Trump’s scandalous proposal that the United States bar entry to all Muslims — though he later clarified his view that American citizens and a few others might be allowed in — raises two fundamental but largely unaddressed questions: Who and what is a “Muslim”?

Mr. Trump presupposes that the government could create an immigration policy that discriminates against Muslims. But implementing such a policy would be completely impossible under the current circumstances.

How would consular or immigration officials determine who is, and is not, a Muslim? This is the most obvious question, but almost no one is asking it. Instead, the debate churns on as if this problem does not exist.

Would the definition of a Muslim be based on family heritage, personal beliefs or both? How would that be codified in practice? On what basis could the government categorize people as Muslims? We have no legal definition or database of religious beliefs, and the First Amendment would almost certainly render any such enforced categorization unconstitutional.

My own case is instructive. I am a citizen of the United States but born in a Muslim-majority country (Lebanon), and, on my father’s side, into a clearly Muslim family. Moreover, my first name, Hussein, is one of a few in Arabic that is practically exclusive to Muslims (Arab Christians and Jews are not given this name).

While my father was a devout Sunni Muslim, my mother remains a devout Anglican Christian. So, despite my name and place of birth being clear indicators of a “Muslim origin,” the reality is more complex.

Moreover, I never embraced either religion, and had agnostic tendencies even as a child. Yet I identify with the Muslim-American community for social, cultural and political reasons. I am part of, and from, the Muslim community, but in terms of belief I am not and never have been a Muslim. So, how would I be categorized?

What if someone isn’t telling the truth about his beliefs? What about a sudden conversion? How would the government distinguish among Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and others from the myriad mixed societies around the world? Even a database of names wouldn’t help, since so many names are shared among different cultures and faiths. Therefore, Mr. Trump’s policy is totally impracticable, especially since would-be terrorists and criminals would be the first to embrace all forms of deception.

Beyond the complexities of determining “who is a Muslim,” an even deeper problem is the widely held delusions about “what is a Muslim.” An overwhelming majority of commentators on all sides, ranging from the most vicious Islamophobes to the most radical Islamists, wrongly assume that we all know, or can easily discover, what Muslims do and think that distinguishes them from other people.

The reality is that the range of peoples and societies that practice some form of Islam is so broad that it includes virtually any aspect of the human experience one can identify. Nearly one-quarter of the world’s population consider themselves Muslim, and Islam has been one of the largest religions in the world for over 1,000 years.

Seen in this light, the range of Muslim beliefs and behaviors is more or less indistinguishable from that of the rest of humanity. The word “Muslim,” without any further qualification, and the word “person,” are, for practical purposes, synonymous. One doesn’t actually tell you anything meaningful beyond what is already suggested by the other.

Both now and historically, one can find almost any recognizable human behavior being openly and systematically practiced among some Muslims, including those that are supposedly “prohibited by Islam”: alcohol drinking, homosexuality, lending at interest, occult practices and so forth. Muslim purists say these are cultural distortions, and not Islamic. But Muslims have no pope or global leader with the spiritual or political authority to compel or demand obedience to their doctrinal views.

Islamophobes describe bloodthirsty, violent and intolerant fanatics. Muslim activists depict devout, socially conservative people peacefully at prayer. Although the first group is minuscule compared with the second, Muslims of both descriptions can be readily identified. But so can a vast range of other ways of being Muslim the world over.

Anyone interested in exploring the intricacies and complexities of Islam as a religion, philosophical system and social text should study the new book “What Is Islam?” by the Harvard professor Shahab Ahmed. Professor Ahmed — who died at the age of 48 shortly before this book, his life’s work, was published a few months ago — carefully guides the reader through a detailed critique of the numerous received understandings of Islam. In their place, he proposes a subtle but accessible new framework for apprehending what Islam is and has really been, in all its multiplicity and endless complexity.

His book is a perfect antidote to our present discourse, which is trapped in false, dangerous binaries, about these two crucial questions: Who, and what, is a Muslim? Those like Mr. Trump and others who imply they know the answers are announcing with the utmost clarity that they actually have no idea what they’re talking about.