http://www.agsiw.org/what-to-expect-from-the-u-s-gcc-summit/

When President Barack Obama visits Saudi Arabia on April 20-21 and meets with Gulf Cooperation Council leaders, he will be tackling one of the most important, but deeply strained, U.S. international relationships. Although some Americans, including Obama, have questioned how strategically important the Middle East remains to the United States, both U.S. policy and interests continue to reflect a strong engagement in and commitment to the region in general, and the Gulf area in particular. Yet the trust of some Middle Eastern partners has been frayed, specifically among the Arab Gulf states. In these societies, anxieties are widespread that the United States may have abandoned these countries to their fate in a region they fear is being increasingly dominated by an ascendant Iran. These concerns form the immediate backdrop in which the U.S.-GCC dialogue and relationship will continue to develop, and the primary task for both sides is finding ways to offset them.

The Summit’s Context

While some important work was done at the Camp David summit in May 2015, when the GCC endorsed the Iran nuclear negotiations, and the Doha foreign ministerial meeting in August 2015, when the GCC endorsed the Iran nuclear deal, doubts about U.S. intentions have recently been exacerbated by some of the president’s remarks, particularly in a series of interviews summarized in The Atlantic by Jeffrey Goldberg. Obama once again expressed skepticism about some U.S. Arab allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, characterizing them as “free riders.” He also suggested they should “share” the Middle East with Iran, and reiterated his endorsement of a still aspirational “pivot to Asia.” Such rhetoric, combined with administration policies such as efforts to establish a new relationship with Iran including the nuclear agreement and the lack of a robust response to the conflict in Syria, prompts continued Arab doubts about the strength of the U.S. commitment to the partnership with the GCC states. For their part, many Americans share some of Obama’s concerns about being militarily and financially overburdened by European and Middle Eastern allies and about how political and social repression in some Arab societies may contribute to the rise of extremist organizations. So, doubts about aspects of the relationship, although they may be stronger on the Arab side, exist, in very different forms, on both sides.

The new summit comes at an important moment in the relationship. It will be the last major opportunity for Obama to repair the fraying of the partnership that has developed during his two terms in office. Moreover, whatever hopes may have been harbored that the nuclear agreement might lay the basis for a broader restructuring of the relationship with Iran, Tehran’s behavior thus far into the implementation phase suggests that traditional alliances with Arab countries will remain essential to securing U.S. interests in the region. Iran has not modified its aggressive regional policies, especially the use of proxies, destabilization, and even terrorism, to expand its influence in the Middle East.

The Continued Importance of the U.S.-GCC Relationship

Iran remains opposed to almost all long-term U.S. strategic goals in the region, and is still acting as a revanchist power, and as much as an international revolutionary movement as a state. This is particularly evident through its use of destabilizing proxy nonstate organizations such as Hizballah (a State Department-designated terrorist organization). Iran’s recent missile tests, which were in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions as well as international expectations, and the spirit, if not the letter, of the nuclear agreement, further underscore Tehran’s continued aggressive approach. Added to these deeds are the categorical statements by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other Iranian officials that there will be no further negotiations, and hence no more compromises, with the United States on any issues beyond the nuclear file. There is little reason to expect that Tehran will moderate its behavior over the next few years when it has not done so in the aftermath of the nuclear agreement. This would probably require a dramatic political transformation inside Iran, which is not anticipated.

Even though the United States is making significant progress toward energy independence, and relies much less for its own oil consumption on Gulf petroleum, as long as the United States wishes to remain a global power, the Middle East will continue to be strategically vital to its interests. Other major global economies – and key U.S. trading partners – particularly in South and East Asia, are still dependent on the oil reserves of the Gulf region and the petroleum shipped through Gulf waters. Other vital U.S. interests include counterterrorism and counterradicalization, a wide range of European strategic concerns, Israeli security, and a range of important issues arising from the fact that the Middle East is the geographic hub linking Africa, Asia, and Europe. With rare exceptions – Obama’s arguments among them – most foreign policy arguments that assert the emerging irrelevance of the Middle East to U.S. foreign policy prove to be neo-isolationist.

The restoration of trust between Washington and its Arab Gulf partners is therefore essential. The ongoing U.S. interest in this region is reflected in the high level of U.S. engagement, which refutes Gulf anxieties and some of Obama’s assertions. Although not as extensive as during times of war, the U.S. military presence in the Gulf region is historically very high, and certainly greater than pre-9/11 levels. U.S. investment and diplomatic and cultural engagement are also as robust as ever. This commitment is also reflected in key open-source U.S. policy documents, all of which reflect the strong U.S. interest in the region and commitment to its stability and security.

Moreover, despite talk of seeking alternative sources of international support and their efforts to develop more independent, proactive security policies (initiatives that are largely welcomed in Washington, which advocates greater “burden sharing” in the relationship), the Gulf states don’t have viable alternatives to U.S. support and leadership. Their military and intelligence equipment, training, and leadership structures are largely American. Additionally, while the Gulf states have pursued some diversification of arms suppliers, a wholesale switch to Russian, Chinese, or European alternatives, assuming they exist, would be prohibitively time consuming and costly. No other global power can begin to match the United States militarily or economically, and the U.S. presence in the region is uniquely robust. Moreover, while Iran and its allies form a fairly cohesive and coordinated bloc, the forces opposed to Tehran are disparate and often disunited. Only the United States is capable of providing a unifying orbit for the range of actors – including Arab states as well as Turkey and Israel – in the region that, often for very different reasons, seek to block the expansion of Iranian power.

The dissonance between the reality of strong U.S. engagement in, and commitment to, the Gulf region versus a perception of disengagement and disregard undermines the interests of both sides. It’s not difficult to track how these misunderstandings developed over recent years, and the questions on both sides are understandable and rational. But the upcoming summit is a vital opportunity to remind each other how important they remain to their respective interests.

What Can Be Accomplished at the Summit

Before his visit was announced, Obama was not widely expected to be planning another major trip to the Gulf region before the end of his second term. These meetings are therefore indications that his administration understands the depth and importance of the U.S.-GCC relationship. There is no specific reported agenda for Obama’s meeting with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman on Wednesday, but the U.S.-GCC summit on Thursday will be broken into three sections. The first will deal with the overall question of regional stability; the second will focus on the battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and counterterrorism more broadly; and the third will specifically address countering Iran’s destabilizing regional activities. This agenda reflects a balance between U.S. and Arab priorities, which further suggests that the parties are not as far apart as they, and others, sometimes suggest.

Obama is expected to stress several key points. First, he will certainly reiterate the U.S. commitment to Gulf security and stability. But this language is very familiar, and, at least in bilateral terms, is unlikely to go beyond the formulations in the joint statements after the crucial Camp David and Doha meetings in 2015. Second, he will undoubtedly address the need for social and political reforms in the Gulf states, an idea to which he is deeply attached, not least because he thinks it is a key to counterterrorism and counterradicalization. Third, Obama will join GCC leaders in reiterating opposition to Iran’s destabilizing regional policies and support for terrorism. In this case, the language may be noticeably stronger because of Iran’s intensified pursuit of these activities. However, the main opening for tougher language aimed at Iran comes from Tehran’s ongoing missile development and testing program, which is a source of mutual concern, especially for the Gulf states.

Both sides have an articulated stake in robust counterterrorism cooperation to combat threats including Iranian-sponsored extremists like Hizballah and Sunni militants like ISIL or al-Qaeda. But the United States is likely to focus on two regional conflicts as incubators of an increased terrorist threat. The Obama administration will probably press Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners engaged in Yemen to shift the conflict with the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and their allies loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to a political process and concentrate military efforts on countering Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While the coalition-Houthi war rages, AQAP has reportedly expanded its presence and capabilities in Yemen. This is deeply alarming to the United States and the rest of the West because AQAP is one of the few al-Qaeda affiliates operating that appears to have the capability of striking in the West, as demonstrated by several recent terrorist attacks in Europe.

A cease-fire in Yemen that went into effect April 10 is under stress but still holding. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates and increasingly Saudi Arabia appear to be interested in shifting the focus of combat to counterterrorism against AQAP. The United States is reportedly considering supporting a planned UAE offensive against AQAP in Yemen. Washington sees a political resolution of the Yemen conflict as essential for several reasons, particularly in order to reverse recent gains by AQAP. The coalition appears responsive to these concerns, but as long as the Houthis continue to hold large swaths of territory, fighting is likely to persist, particularly as the rebels seem intent on provoking the coalition and have a long history of breaking cease-fires.

Another regional conflict Obama is likely to raise is the anarchic situation in Libya, in which ISIL is beginning to thrive even as it is being degraded in Syria and Iraq. The new unity Libyan government, formed almost four months ago specifically to counter the rise of ISIL, appears stalled and mired in internal squabbles and divisions. It also does not appear to have received the level of international support it had anticipated. The United States is reportedly considering a range of military options in Libya, including bombing attacks and even limited forms of intervention on the ground. Washington will likely request GCC support for, and participation in, efforts to roll back the troubling expansion of ISIL in Libya.

Both sides can be expected to press each other on Syria policy, but a major breakthrough establishing a coordinated, comprehensive approach is unlikely given their contrasting stances on several issues. Even though both sides agree that President Bashar al-Assad should have no role in the long-term future of Syria, disagreements over how this goal should be pursued probably preclude any comprehensive coordination. Recent reports that the United States is preparing to work with its regional partners to increase the sophistication of weapons provided to moderate opposition groups if the current cease-fire in Syria collapses, as it seems to be, will be warmly welcomed by most Gulf states. But even that may not be sufficient to bring the two sides completely into agreement. Obama will also almost certainly raise the issue of Syrian refugees, urging the Gulf states to accept more of them (beyond those who qualify already as “guest workers”). In response, Gulf states almost certainly will point out that the United States, too, could do much more for the refugees. But these differences over Syria are not likely to be publicly aired.

It’s important that deliverables beyond rhetoric are secured at the summit. These could consist of further military technology transfers and weapons sales, including the confirmation of several outstanding fighter jet contracts for a number of Gulf states. Political opposition to some weapons sales, particularly to Saudi Arabia because of the war in Yemen, is emerging in the Senate, and may be an inhibiting factor. Beyond weapons purchases, several Gulf states, including the UAE, have in the past reportedly expressed a desire for some kind of strengthened formal alliance or treaty relationship with the United States. This has been effectively ruled out, because few Americans support embracing new binding military commitments in the Middle East. However, Secretary of State John Kerry recently suggested that a stronger formalized relationship between NATO and the GCC ought to be carefully considered. Further progress on this suggestion, even merely the establishment of a structure for investigating how such a relationship might work in practice, could be very helpful.

Following last year’s Camp David summit, one of the main takeaways for the Gulf states was the establishment of working groups, some of which were already in place, to coordinate cooperation on a range of issues, as well as a number of steps that gave the conversation with the United States greater chronological and thematic structure. It reassured them that the relationship with Washington would not be characterized by ad hoc communications but would rather be systematic. Something similar might be developed with NATO to begin to explore deeper cooperation, possibly leading to a more formal relationship.

But an actual NATO-GCC alliance will be difficult to establish. It may come with various conditions that will be difficult for the Gulf states to embrace, possibly involving compromises on sovereign prerogatives that they have thus far resisted. Washington has long championed the idea of an integrated ballistic missile defense shield for the Gulf states. This has proved implausible in practice because it would require the establishment of streamlined, integrated, and interoperable systems that involve the surrender of certain sovereign prerogatives to a joint command. (The time frame involving a response to incoming missiles being measured in seconds, and at most, minutes, requires such a structure). The Gulf states have not indicated a real willingness to make such compromises. The Obama administration apparently feels it may be making progress toward getting the Gulf states to begin making practical plans for developing such a system. The United States will press this issue at the summit.

Moreover, the Peninsula Shield force notwithstanding, the GCC is not a military alliance. It’s unclear, therefore, what the precise nature of the relationship with NATO, which is entirely a military alliance, would be. A similar issue arose when the United States authorized the sale of military equipment to the GCC as an organization. That may have been intended as a gesture of support to encourage greater military integration by the Gulf states, but it was, and remains, practically meaningless because the GCC does not function as an integrated military alliance or entity that purchases weapons. All sales, and related services and joint programs, therefore, have remained bilateral with individual Gulf states. Nonetheless, pursuing the idea of a more formal relationship between the GCC and NATO could serve as a significant rhetorical and political gesture. Since the fraying of trust has been largely perceptual, the management of “optics” could be central to repairing it.

Obama and his GCC interlocutors can be sure that every word arising from the summit will be carefully scrutinized. But that provides as many opportunities for progress as it does challenges. Last year the mood among Gulf leaders reportedly significantly improved after both the Camp David and Doha meetings, in spite of their doubts about the Iran nuclear negotiations and agreement. Under the current circumstances – particularly Tehran’s continued aggressive policies, which should bring the two sides closer together – opportunities for an even greater degree of mutual reassurance, based on both language and deliverables, seems likely.

There’s every reason to expect a generally positive, if not particularly dramatic, outcome to the summit and for that, in turn, to set the stage for a slow but steady recuperation of trust. The back-to-back summits are apparently intended to set a precedent, which is particularly welcome among the Gulf states, for an annual U.S.-GCC heads-of-state meeting. White House Middle East Coordinator Robert Malley recently told reporters these meetings “hopefully… will take place every year between the U.S. and the GCC at the leaders level.” That, alone, would go a long way toward solidifying the partnership into the foreseeable future. Nothing else, after all, makes sense for either side.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/us-gulf-ties-have-frayed-but-are-not-beyond-repair


My visit to the UAE last week strongly reinforced for me that negative misperceptions about Gulf relations with the United States, which in fact remain very strong, are deeply felt and widespread.

The sources and context of friction in the relationship are no mystery, especially persistent questions about the Obama administration’s intentions behind the nuclear agreement with Iran. More surprising was the extent to which these anxieties have become so entrenched they actually resist reassurances and evidence to the contrary.

Time and again my Gulf interlocutors, with few exceptions, pushed back strongly against efforts to point out that the fundamentals of the relationship remain very strong.

The American military presence in the region, while of course not as sizeable as during the Iraq war in 2003, or even the First Gulf War in 1991, is nonetheless historically very high and impressive by any standards. Diplomatic traffic is as robust as ever. Investments are also very strong, and in some sectors at historic highs.

These facts are not debated or denied. Yet the misgivings persist.

Pointing out the strength of these objective fundamental indicators of engagement and commitment proved, in most cases, insufficient to dispel the sense that Washington either has, or is preparing to, essentially abandon the Gulf states to their fate, particularly regarding an ascendant Iran.

It’s not about the core realities. It’s about perceptions.

Plainly, trust has been frayed. What’s required therefore, particularly in the run-up to Barack Obama’s upcoming trip to Saudi Arabia and meeting with the GCC leaderships, is serious attention to repairing that basic sense of confidence in each other.

Much of the concern is rooted in statements by the American president, not in speeches or policy statements given in his official capacity, but rather in a series of interviews reflecting his personal views with journalists such as David Remnick, Thomas Friedman and, most recently, notably and damaging, Jeffrey Goldberg.

In these interviews, Mr Obama has implied a sceptical attitude towards US Arab allies, especially Saudi Arabia, held Iran to a much laxer standard regarding human and women’s rights, suggested the Middle East is no longer as important to American interests as it once was, and strongly endorsed some kind of “pivot to Asia”.

Given these comments, and question marks that have arisen over the nuclear deal with Iran, the lack of a robust US response to the war in Syria, and other real and perceived policy issues, concern in the Gulf is understandable.

But not only are the fundamentals of the relationship still sound. Mr Obama’s personal views as expressed in these interviews don’t define and characterise US policy, because the American president is not a king or a dictator and policy is developed and transformed over many years with numerous inputs.

Words matter. But it’s important that words are weighed equally, and the words that are alarming are not given undue emphasis.

Much of what Mr Obama has said, for example regarding Iran’s misbehaviour and sponsorship of terrorism, should be reassuring but passes almost unnoticed.

Moreover, words have contexts that structure their relative significance. Campaign rhetoric, such as we have seen in the Democratic and Republican primary debates, is often not to be taken seriously, as when candidates promise to “tear up” the nuclear agreement with Iran, which will be over a year into implementation when the next president takes office.

Personal musings by political leaders are more serious than campaign rhetoric, but still need to be understood as individual thoughts. This is especially in contrast to formal policy speeches or official statements given as president, cabinet minister or such. There words acquire a much deeper significance than comments in personal interviews.

But by far the most important words are those in the official directives, national intelligence estimates and other core documents that instruct the apparatus of the US government and its officials precisely what policy is and how it should be implemented. These are the words that really define what the United States is doing or not.

There is nothing in these key documents other than a strong American commitment to Gulf security, clear intention to maintain a robust military, diplomatic and economic presence in the region, and a strong opposition to Iran’s aggressive regional policies. Any “pivot to Asia” remains entirely aspirational.

Questions in the Gulf about American policies are understandable.

But the reality on the ground reflects a robust relationship, characterised by American engagement across the board. And so do the primary relevant American policy documents.

Asking questions is reasonable. But one should be ready to take yes for an answer. In this case the answer is a fairly unequivocal yes.

Rebuilding trust is essential, but it’s going to require some fairly heavy lifting in both word and deed on both sides.

In his forthcoming visit to the region Mr Obama should, and no doubt will, emphasise that the United States remains committed to the security and interests of its Gulf allies. But he should have no illusions about the level of doubt he will face, both personally and as president of the United States.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/obama-and-gcc-leaders-have-a-lot-to-talk-about

The US-GCC summit meeting in Saudi Arabia next Thursday should prove an important milestone in the relationship, especially since it is intended to set the precedent of an annual head- of-state level summit into the foreseeable future.

Last May, US president Barack Obama invited GCC leaders to Camp David, although not all of them attended. The most important development from that summit for the Gulf states was the chronological and thematic structure established for conversations with Washington.

Various structures outlined what was going to be talked about, and when, dispelling the idea that US-GCC meetings would be ad hoc affairs designed to placate Arab concerns.

White House Middle East coordinator Rob Malley said on Friday that last year’s summit was designed not to “be a one-off event” or “a meeting for the sake of a meeting, but to launch a process in order to deepen the partnership”. He said that meetings will “be a hopefully regular process that will take place every year”.

It’s hard to overstate the importance of an annual leaders ‘summit between the US and the GCC for ensuring that Gulf concerns are heard in Washington at the highest level and on a regular basis. It will be much harder under such circumstances to feel isolated, ignored or abandoned by the United States, particularly given the actual scope of the continuing American presence in the Gulf region.

At this week’s summit, the ­Arab side will press for a stronger American commitment to battle Iranian misconduct in the region. The scope for an intensification of language on Iran, beyond last year’s statements after the Camp David summit and the Doha foreign ministerial meeting in August, arises mainly from Tehran’s recent aggressive ballistic missile tests. Moreover, countering Iran is one of three specific topics to be addressed at the summit, the other two being regional security and counterterrorism.

Gulf states may also receive confirmation of contracts for fighter jets and other military technology, and further steps to expedite weapons sales (which is proving resistant to streamlining).

Mr Obama will undoubtedly raise the issue of domestic social and political reforms in Gulf societies, which he views as essential to regional stability and stemming the rise of extremist groups.

He will also press for a shift of focus in Yemen away from combating the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and their allies loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and concentrating instead on combating Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Washington is reportedly considering backing a planned offensive in Yemen against AQAP, an initiative which is only the most recent indication that the coalition is preparing precisely such a shift of military focus in Yemen towards counterterrorism.

Washington will also be seeking Gulf support for anti-ISIL efforts in Libya, where the extremist group has reportedly doubled its fighter strength in the past year as it has been degraded in Syria and Iraq.

The United States is reportedly considering a range of military options against ISIL in Libya and will be seeking GCC support for, and participation in, those efforts.

Several Gulf states have, in the past, pressed for a treaty-based relationship with the United States, a formalised alliance beyond mere partnership. This has been ruled out because most Americans oppose any further binding military commitments in the Middle East. However, secretary of state John Kerry recently suggested that Nato, rather than the United States, might enter into some kind of formal arrangement with the GCC.

This might be difficult to establish in practice, because, the Peninsula Shield force notwithstanding, the GCC is not a military alliance as such, while Nato is strictly a military alliance. The exact nature of what the two sides could offer each other isn’t clear.

Indeed, the most that can be anticipated at this stage is a statement of intention to study the problem more closely, and perhaps a ministerial framework or dialogue structure in order to pursue the question.

Nonetheless, because the frayed trust between the two sides has been largely a matter of perceptions, given that the actual fundamentals of the relationship remain very strong – the American military presence, investments, diplomatic traffic and civil society engagement in the Gulf region are all at historically high levels – even such a gesture that is largely symbolic could prove highly significant to restoring confidence.

And even though there are serious, practical matters to be addressed and resolved at such summit meetings, their main value is precisely at the all-important political and diplomatic optical register.

Mr Obama’s damaging comments about Arab allies being “free riders” who need to “share” the Middle East with Iran, and his continued endorsement of a thus-far nonexistent “pivot to Asia” have exacerbated Arab doubts about American intentions arising from the nuclear deal with Tehran and the lack of a strong US policy on Syria.

Mr Obama now has a golden opportunity to clarify the actual strength of Washington’s continued commitment to the security and interests of its Gulf allies, and he surely will. Expect a successful meeting, and a genuinely important precedent, but no dramatic breakthroughs.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/warhols-celebrity-culture-explains-rise-of-trump

The faux-naïve pop-art trickster Andy Warhol saw deeper into his own time, and ours, than any other public figure of the late 20th century. Though no intellectual, Warhol channeled most of the groundbreaking artistic, cultural and commercial trends around him like a human antenna. And in his banal blankness, he reflected them back at us, often blindingly, in an avalanche of artistic and cultural artifacts.

He also anticipated and helped shape a consumerist “celebrity” culture, which has culminated in, among other things, “reality television”. No surprise, then, that Warhol is an important touchstone in explaining the horrifying rise of Donald Trump in American politics.

Mr Trump is a Warholian figure par excellence, although the two could hardly be more different. Warhol specialized in posing as a baffling cipher. He deftly avoided questions, throwing them back at the interviewer and refusing to engage seriously. He understood the richness of ambiguity, and his surface-level, immediately identifiable pop art couldn’t survive verbal articulation, let alone pomposity.

By contrast, Mr Trump spews categorical pontifications at any opportunity, relishing his own contradictions and inanities. Yet, because he believes in nothing other than himself, he too can serve as a mirror for his audience. This explains why evangelical Christians are flocking to vote for him although he has proudly flouted many of their core principles, and why right-wing ideologues like Rush Limbaugh embrace him though he is the least “conservative” Republican presidential candidate in memory.

Curator Henry Geldzahler summarized Warhol’s public persona thus: “He’s a voyeur sadist, and he needs exhibitionist-masochists”, adding that obviously any given “exhibitionist-masochist is not going to last very long.” This twisted interpersonal dynamic was most famously enacted with the heiress Edie Sedgwick, as mercilessly lampooned and condemned in Bob Dylan’s classic song “Like a Rolling Stone”.

Mr. Trump is neither of these types. Instead he is a full-blown sadistic narcissist. But he doesn’t feed off of willing individual masochists like Warhol, recording their excruciating, prolonged meltdowns in ecstatic fascination. Mr Trump rather casts his net far and wide across entire groups with which he has nothing to do. Immigrants and Muslims have been his chief targets of late, but any “outsiders” would plainly do.

This is why Warhol, for all of his faults, is an infinitely more attractive figure. His nickname in the 60s — coined by the scintillating, haunted speed-freak and self-appointed “Pope of Greenwich Village”,  Bob Olivo, AKA “Ondine” — was “Drella”, a portmanteau brilliantly conflating “Cinderella” and “Dracula”. His entourage knew that, if they let him, Warhol was capable of sucking the life out of them.

Nobody has signed up in the same way, least of all consciously, for Mr Trump’s narcissistic sadism. Yet he targets millions of innocents with a vengeance, and in a vapid quest for personal power and glory. There is no “Cinderella” in him at all, and even “Dracula” seems too generous (certainly too glamorous). Instead this boorish charlatan simply embodies a petty, malevolent self-regard which feeds off of the promotion of fear and hatred.

Warhol famously encountered a very different full-blown narcissist when he undertook to paint the great boxer Mohammed Ali. As Warhol snapped his requisite Polaroids, the champ unleashed an extended diatribe of random and categorical pronouncements on a vast range of topics.

Warhol was shocked. He asked, “How can he say that,” amazed at Ali’s self-righteousness. For Warhol, almost everything could be seen as beautiful, or at least interesting. Despite Warhol’s profoundly devout Byzantine Catholicism, he rejected most, at least conventional, moral judgments. Yet he remained captivated by Ali’s fame, if nothing else.

Warhol was in many ways a self-conscious, and arguably intentional, founder of our current celebrity culture, while Mr Trump is one of its main products. Warhol’s “Interview” magazine was the direct precursor to “People” magazine and its ilk, and his TV work, and parts of his life, clearly anticipated “reality” shows.

Mr Trump has lumbered out of a Warholian dream, or nightmare, in which fame, wealth and power are ends in themselves and, ultimately, self-validating.

Imagine the painting: hundreds of Trumps cascading across the canvas with gaudy eyes, rich lips, and Warhol’s other primary color emphases, fading in and out like a “Marilyn Diptych”. Or, if you dare, a single Trump, immovable and relentless, like Warhol’s celebrity portraits of the 70s and 80s.

Few public figures have “hair” as instantly identifying as Warhol’s bizarre, garish silver wigs. Mr. Trump’s elaborate do, though, comes close. But if we can’t believe the hair on his head, why would we take a word he says seriously? Warhol never asked us to, and playfully endorsed the harshest criticisms of his work as superficial and meaningless. Mr. Trump does.

An open letter from his former strategist Stephanie Cegielski reveals that, when he planned his campaign, Mr Trump was just on an ego trip with no intention of winning. But now, he can’t stop because “Trump is about Trump”.  He’s never wrong and he never fails.

Warhol famously imagined everyone being “world famous for at least 15 minutes”. The quixotic quest for narcissistic publicity is the essence of the celebrity, consumer culture simulacrum that is the Trump campaign. It’s flat as a Campbell’s Soup painting and empty as a plywood Brillo Box.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/power-politics-inform-russian-actions-in-syria

http://www.agsiw.org/how-russias-drawdown-will-affect-war-and-peace-in-syria/

The announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the “main part” of his country’s military forces that have intervened in Syria since late September 2015 will begin withdrawing soon may prove less dramatic in practice than many hope or suspect. The announcement and its overall context do not indicate a major Russian policy shift. Putin has insisted that Russian operations at military bases in Tartus and Latakia – the only significant manned Russian military installations outside the former Soviet Union – will continue as usual. This means that Russia will maintain significant airpower in Syria, although where it will conduct operations remains to be seen. The precise number of air forces is not yet available, and may never be fully public. However, Russia had a major military presence in Syria before the offensive, and there is every reason to believe that, even after the drawdown, Russia’s role there will still be significantly greater than it was before September. So the idea that Russia is leaving Syria, or even ending its military engagement, appears to be contradicted by Moscow’s own announcement.

Moreover, the official Russian statements show continued support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The readout of a telephone conversation between Putin and Assad on March 14 indicates that, while Russia may not have fully consulted its Syrian clients about this move, it is hardly abandoning them either. Why would Russia suddenly abandon a regime it has spent the past six months shoring up? Moscow has shown signs of irritation with Assad but remains fundamentally committed to regime maintenance, at least until a transition can be arranged that secures Russia’s interests. Until that can be accomplished, there does not appear to be any practical reason for Russia to suddenly turn its back on a regime it has worked so hard to shore up over the past six months.

However, the Russian drawdown may be partly designed to send a message to Assad, encouraging him to be more cooperative at the negotiations in Geneva. It comes in the context of a cease-fire largely secured by U.S. and Russian pressure that is linked to humanitarian relief efforts and the peace talks. Diplomacy is useful to both Moscow and Damascus, buying space and time for the regime to secure and consolidate its control over key areas and to perpetuate the status quo in Syria. But Russia appears to want more progress at the negotiating table than the Syrian regime. The timing of the Russian move strongly suggests a message to Assad encouraging cooperation, and a second message to the international community broadly casting Russia in a constructive role and avoiding any hint of being a “spoiler” to negotiations. Putin is also casting himself domestically as a decisive leader who can arrange successful military interventions while avoiding getting sucked in endless quagmires, and internationally as a judicious statesman who recognizes the limitations of the application of force and stays within reasonable constraints.

Putin is also casting Russia as a moderating force on the Syrian regime, although the reality is that without Moscow’s support the Assad dictatorship may not have survived until now. Moscow appeared annoyed by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem’s recent comments that any questioning of Assad’s future in the country is “a red line” that cannot be discussed at Geneva. Russia also expressed impatience with the regime’s statements that it wishes to keep fighting until it can extend its control over the entire country, an agenda Russia finds overly ambitious and needlessly provocative. So, while it remains generally supportive of Assad politically, Russia may be sending a message to him that he needs to be more flexible and responsive to Russia’s diplomatic and political concerns.

The Russian drawdown appears to be primarily a well-calculated response to the intervention’s mission having been largely successful, as the Kremlin is claiming. The purpose of the intervention, which was reportedly coordinated between Russia and Iran in the summer of 2015, was to reverse what, for them, had been an alarming series of setbacks for the regime at the hands of mainstream opposition groups, such as the Free Syrian Army factions, Ahrar al-Sham and Jund al-Islam, that are supported by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. Many reports indicate that Russia, Iran, Hizballah, and the other key allies of the Assad regime were increasingly concerned during the first half of 2015 that the Damascus dictatorship might lose so much ground that it would become unsalvageable. This is how the situation appeared to many outside observers as well.

The intervention – in which Russia served as the air cover and technical advisory vanguard for ground forces largely made up of the Syrian military and pro-regime elements backed up by expeditionary forces from Hizballah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a number of Iraqi Shia militias – was intended to reverse the momentum on the battlefield in Syria. Several key areas were targeted, including Aleppo, areas comprising the Alawite heartland near the northwestern coast that are also close to Russia’s military bases in Syria, and other strategic areas that had been threatened by rebel advances. Most reports indicate that with Russian support in the air and the intervention of its allies on the ground, the Syrian regime was able to make substantial progress in most, if not all, of the areas of the country it considers most important.

It is possible that the regime would prefer to continue the conflict at its recent escalated phase and try to secure control over additional parts of the country that have been lost to opposition groups in recent years. But the Russian announcement strongly suggests that Moscow’s commitment is limited to securing regime control over what is being called in Arab media “necessary” or “viable” Syria, as opposed to trying to regain much of the rest of the country. This “viable Syria” begins at the Lebanese border, continues north through Qalamoun and into Damascus, up into Homs and Hama and into the coastal areas mentioned. Ideally, from the regime’s point of view, it should also include all or most of Aleppo and its environs. Regime forces have apparently made significant progress in that area, and rebel forces seem to have been dealt crippling blows around Aleppo as a direct result of the Russian-led offensive.

Moscow’s mission has indeed been largely achieved if the point really was to secure “viable Syria” for the regime and its local allies. However, Russia claimed that its intervention was an international counterterrorism effort targeted at the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While regime forces have recently been attacking some ISIL positions, most of the intervention was aimed squarely at mainstream rebel groups and had little to do with ISIL. If the purpose was really to crush or greatly degrade ISIL, the notion that the mission has been accomplished by Russia and its allies makes no sense since it has done little to affect ISIL’s standing. But from the point of view of beating back the mainstream rebel groups in “viable Syria,” the claim of relative success is plausible and perhaps even accurate.

Russia and its clients in the Syrian regime will no doubt claim to be greatly enhancing negotiations and the prospects of peace by this redeployment. But, unfortunately, there is no indication that the parties on the ground, on any side, are ready to embrace a formal, or even informal, settlement that ends the conflict. On the contrary, it would appear that all the armed Syrian groups believe that they can strengthen their hands through additional combat, and their regional patrons seem to agree. So, even if global powers such as the United States and Russia would like to see a de jure or de facto understanding to end the conflict, the time may not be ripe yet for talks to proceed much beyond formalities and tenuous cease-fires.

The Assad regime will certainly feel greatly strengthened by the intervention of its allies, even if Russia is drawing the line at how far it is willing to go to impose its will in Syria. Russia, Iran, and Hizballah together have managed to largely reverse the momentum on the battlefield in favor of the dictatorship, and this isn’t likely to be quickly reversed. If it that eventually did happen, there is nothing preventing Russia from engaging in another “surge” to reverse such a reversal. So while the regime may be on notice that Russia will not be providing air cover for its broader ambitions to regain control of much wider areas, it will nonetheless likely feel that it can continue to build on the successes secured over the past six months. There is no indication that Iran, Hizballah, and the others have drawn the same line that Russia implicitly has, and Moscow remains a strong supporter of the regime, even if it intends to limit its direct military engagement. Therefore, it’s likely that the Assad regime believes that it can at least secure its gains through additional conflict, and probably even continue to make some limited progress in key areas.

The mainstream rebels will also likely conclude that they can benefit from more fighting. Russia’s “withdrawal” can only be a source of relief for them, and it suggests that they can bring the recent spate of setbacks they have suffered to an end. Looking back on the first half of 2015, they will remember that before the Russian-Iranian surge, they enjoyed a series of significant successes, which is what prompted the intervention in the first place. With Russia pulling back, and indicating that its commitment in Syria is limited as well as raising the prospect that it could be exhausted either now or in the future, the idea that opposition forces could at least return to the positions they held only a few months ago must be deeply tempting.

The opposition continues to receive substantial political, diplomatic, financial, and military support from regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Opposition forces remain in control of significant parts of the country. And, most importantly, the mainstream opposition strongly believes it represents the interests and wishes of the Sunni Arab majority in Syria. The opposition is convinced that because it is comprised of the Sunni majority, over the long run, its victory will be assured. As a consequence, the opposition will see Russia’s implicit admission of a limitation to its aims in Syria as confirmation of its own reading of the long-term trajectory in the country. Because these opposition groups remain convinced that a strong Sunni Arab majority in Syria and in the broader region will not accept control over Syria, certainly including its most important areas within “viable Syria,” by a minority Alawite dictatorship and its patrons in Iran, they believe time is on their side and that they will eventually prevail.

The forces on the ground in Syria also don’t appear to be under much pressure from regional patrons to seek an early end to the fighting. The Assad regime may be disappointed by the Russian drawdown. But it can console itself that Iran and Hizballah don’t seem to share Moscow’s interest in serious diplomacy (although Russia’s enthusiasm may be based on a sense that the United States appears to have gradually adopted a policy stance that accommodates all of their fundamental concerns, possibly including the survival of the Assad regime in the areas currently under its control). The main supporters of the armed opposition, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, also don’t seem to believe that a political solution is plausible, or even perhaps desirable under the present circumstances. On the contrary, the regional rivalry between these power blocs, which is playing out in Syria, would seem to be as aggressive as ever. In neighboring Lebanon, for instance, proxy confrontation between Iranian and Saudi allies is only intensifying. The war in Yemen also continues to rage.

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have threatened to intervene with ground forces in Syria, although ostensibly under the rubric of the anti-ISIL coalition that is led by the United States. Because Washington doesn’t seem open to such a dramatic military initiative, particularly one that also involves confronting the Assad dictatorship, direct intervention by Riyadh or Ankara doesn’t seem likely in the near term. However, there also does not seem to be any imperative for these regional powers, or their Iranian rivals, to urge their local clients in Syria to come to a political solution, particularly given that the armed Syrian groups are not disposed to do that anyway and would resist, if not reject, such pressure.

All of this means that the Russian announcement will probably be a great deal less dramatic in practice than it might initially seem. Nothing in Syria is likely to change in the short or medium terms given the balance of power on the ground, the ongoing Russian commitment to regime control of “viable Syria,” and the potential for an additional Russian-Iranian “surge” should there be some dramatic reversal of fortunes. Diplomacy in Geneva is shaped by realities in Syria. If the military balance of power remains essentially unchanged, the prospects for a political breakthrough – even if Moscow and Washington favor that – are limited. In the long run, Russia’s drawdown might be seen as significant because it defined the limitations of Moscow’s military commitment to the Assad regime. But in the short and medium terms its impact on the strategic equation in Syria, and hence the likelihood of an agreement or understanding to end the conflict, will probably be quite limited.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/obamas-flawed-foreign-policy-doctrine-laid-bare#full

Jeffrey Goldberg’s new article in The Atlantic comes close to realising the familiar cliché about journalism being a “first draft of history”. In this mammoth undertaking, titled “The Obama Doctrine” and running to 20,000 words, Goldberg details how America’s president views his foreign policy legacy.

While his supporters will cheer, Barack Obama’s critics will find some of their grimmest concerns confirmed. Three key charges seem powerfully reinforced: a capacity for self-delusion; a double standard regarding Iran and the Arabs; and a pseudo-analytical aversion, in the name of “realism”, to intervention that can slip from amorality into immorality.

Mr Obama apparently believes the high point of his foreign policy performance – his “moment of liberation” from received wisdom – was his decision on August 30, 2013 to abandon his own “red line” on the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and not to respond militarily.

Mr Obama sees this choice as not only vindicated, but a courageous break with a “Washington playbook” that defaults to force. Leaving aside the effect of his astonishing about-face on American credibility (a criticism he dismisses), and of his broader refusal to seriously engage with Syria of which this is only the most dramatic example, what’s most striking is his insinuation that his inaction required courage.

The truth is precisely the opposite: the public overwhelmingly opposed air strikes against Syria.

At the time I met separately with four Democratic members of Congress, all staunch supporters of Mr Obama, who were desperately seeking arguments to explain a vote in favour of authorising force in Syria, against the deep-seated wishes of their constituents, because they thought that’s what the president wanted. When Mr Obama decided to reward Bashar Al Assad with a legitimising agreement on chemical weapons rather than any punishing military response, he was letting himself and his supporters in Congress off the hook.

The use of force would have been truly controversial and politically risky, and hence courageous. His decision was, in fact, extremely popular, although some analysts criticised it. Whether it was the correct determination or not, casting it in hindsight as a brave and triumphant moment of political “liberation” is simply preposterous.

It has been suggested that America’s Gulf Arab allies suspect that Mr Obama doesn’t particularly care for Arabs, while harbouring an equally irrational sympathy for Iran. It’s true that he often notes many Saudis were involved in the September 11 attacks while Iranians were not, as if that defines who historically has and hasn’t been responsible for terrorism.

Those ill-informed sentiments are, alas, on full display in Goldberg’s article. Mr Obama harshly criticises Arab states for being autocratic and patriarchal, apparently without recognising that Iran is at least as vulnerable as any other Middle Eastern society to criticism about domestic repression and misogynistic social policies.

Mr Obama’s worldview, as characterised by Mr Goldberg, not only reflects an enthusiasm to disengage from the Middle East and “pivot to Asia”, it also suggests an ultimately inexplicable double standard that seems to blame Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, for all the woes of the Middle East, and even the broader Islamic world, while giving Iran every possible benefit of the doubt.

There’s a clear need for a new, mutually-agreeable security arrangement in the Gulf. But Mr Obama’s suggestion that America’s Arab allies must simply “share” influence throughout the Middle East with Tehran calls into question both the benefits of partnering with Washington and the costs of confronting the US for decades, and to this day on most issues, as Iran indeed does. Is this a rational incentive structure, especially given that Riyadh shares most of Washington’s strategic goals while Tehran openly opposes them?

The reference to the Washington think tank community as “Arab-occupied territory” is especially galling since America’s Arab allies haven’t exactly been getting their way. The idea they wield undue influence over US policy might bolster fantasies about political “courage” and “independence” but it’s obviously nonsense.

Finally, the article strongly suggests Mr Obama would not have done anything to stop the genocide in Rwanda. He dispassionately shifts this mind-boggling, unimaginable tragedy into a disturbingly banal and almost abstract conversation about “how long it takes to crank up the machinery of the US government”.

These chilling passages demonstrate how such “realism” can easily slip into an amorality that, under certain conditions, further descends into outright immorality. This moral degradation can arguably be identified in the essentially nonchalant administration attitude towards the Syrian catastrophe. But regarding the Rwandan holocaust, it is unmistakable.

Given his stated views, could Mr Obama advocate intervention in Rwanda, assuming one accepts that there were no concrete American interests at stake? His comments strongly suggest he can’t.

The principled case for the American national imperative and interest in intervening in local conflagrations to prevent genocide is largely individual and intuitive. It either makes itself for one obviously, or not. For Mr Obama, it apparently doesn’t.

But what, then, does Washington’s power and global role ultimately signify? Is it simply a matter of commerce and narrow interests, unencumbered by broader principles?

This alarmingly dismissive attitude towards the genocide in Rwanda must surely be Exhibit A in the bill of particulars against the Obama “doctrine” and policy legacy. From it, all else follows.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/republicans-need-to-seize-control-of-their-party–heres-how-to-do-it

The Republican primaries recall the final scene of Frankenstein, in which enraged villagers besiege the castle, determined to do away with the aristocratic mad scientist and his monstrous creation. Unless they can somehow stop Donald Trump from winning either Florida or Ohio on March 15 (he leads in both), thereby practically securing their party’s nomination, the Republican leadership will have lost control of their own party to an open rebellion from the rank-and-file.

One would then expect Mr Trump and his faction to solidify their new-found control of the party apparatus. But he has no faction. He has no ideological movement, because he has no ideology. He has no broad political orientation, let alone specific policy positions.

So, because Trumpism doesn’t exist, it can’t inherit the Republican Party or inform its future. But Mr Trump does serve as a lightning rod for forces that are likely to reshape American politics.

It is possible Mr Trump is a flash in the pan. Some are comparing him to Wendell Wilkie, a former Democrat nominated in 1940 by the Republicans in a desperate effort to try to beat Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Republicans then returned to traditional candidates such as Thomas Dewey. Wilkie’s nomination was just a moment and didn’t signal any long-term transformation.

But this analogy ignores the deep structural forces that seem to be erupting through the Trump candidacy and that may preclude any return to business as usual, even if Mr Trump is somehow stopped or is crushed by Hillary Clinton in the general election.

One of the reasons Republican leaders are so alarmed at the prospect of a Trump presidential nomination is the categorical opposition to him in the electorally crucial Latino community. Mr Trump has deliberately appealed to a nativist, chauvinist and racist backlash against immigration. A significant section of the GOP base seems politically motivated by the demographic changes that are transforming white Americans from a majority into the largest minority in a diverse society. Mr Trump has tapped into similar anxieties regarding Muslims, African-Americans and others he paints as threatening.

In addition to these racial and cultural war cries, Mr Trump, despite being a billionaire, has given voice to a deep-seated and growing economic panic. The highly-touted economic recovery has been non-existent for much of the American middle class. Jobs, in particular, are either unavailable or cannot provide a traditionally normal middle-class standard of living. Manufacturing jobs, above all, continue to disappear.

Mr Trump shamelessly lies about transforming the employment market, while issuing absurd threats of trade wars with China and Mexico that he knows would wreck the American economy. His appeal is built on domestic policy attitudes reflecting cultural, racial and economic chauvinism, and a pseudo-macho foreign policy persona centred around bullying, bombing, torture and assassination. The persona he has created is that of a tough guy offering to “fight back”. Against just whom, precisely how, and to what end, are seen as irrelevant details.

The problem for all serious American conservatives is not merely that this witches’ brew of primal passions has upended their party. Nor even that Mr Trump’s ugly brand of politics almost certainly ensures defeat in any nationwide contest.

The deeper conundrum is actually that Mr Trump seems to be building a new coalition that incorporates large numbers of the very blue-collar Americans many Republican leaders believe hold a key to their past and future political success, and that, at the very least, they cannot do without. Moreover this coalition, which ranges from evangelicals to libertarians, hints at prospects of a potentially powerful new Republican bloc that moves beyond the reactionary strictures of the Tea Party and embraces social and economic flexibility. Beyond Mr Trump, counterintuitively, some Republicans think they can see the outlines of a new, pragmatic centre-right majority.

Yet carving out a viable future from this mess is going to require something the Republican establishment has recently seemed allergic to: leadership. And it’s got to begin with a clear-cut repudiation of Mr Trump and his odious politics as the only means of preserving their long-term credibility. The pledge all the candidates made at the end of the last debate to support whoever the nominee proves to be was typically spineless and unprincipled.

The only way Republicans can finally reclaim control of their party will be to show the tough leadership Mr Trump’s constituents clearly crave. And that has to begin with a categorical rejection of Mr Trump’s politics of hate and fear, whether or not he is the Republican nominee.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/caution-is-needed-but-hizbollah-cant-be-left-unchecked

One can readily understand why Saudi Arabia suspended a $3 billion (Dh11bn) aid package for the Lebanese Armed Forces to purchase French weapons, and cancelled outright an additional $1 billion in support for Lebanese internal security.

But if no alternative or additional means are found to bolster Riyadh’s allies in Lebanon, the move could prove problematic.

The essential background is the growing power of Hizbollah. The pro-Iranian Shiite group has long exercised major influence and operated an effective state within a state in large parts of the country. With strong Iranian support and direction, it built a powerful independent military and developed what amounts to an independent foreign policy, most dramatically illustrated by several protracted conflicts with Israel.

Hizbollah entered these major battles without consulting the other Lebanese, who found themselves paying heavy costs for decisions made, not by the national government but by a sectarian party and their patrons in far-off Tehran.

Hizbollah leads a pro-Iranian coalition called March 8, which has been at loggerheads with a pro-Gulf and pro-western Lebanese alliance (March14). The two sides have been fairly evenly balanced in terms of most functions of power in recent years, and typically have split the difference between them. Lebanon has, therefore, been characterised by an uneasy equilibrium of unstable forces. However, balance and, above all, avoiding any return to widespread civil conflict has been in everyone’s interests, so confrontations have been avoided and compromises have, ultimately, been made time and again.

Now, however, the balance of power in Lebanon has been shifting, especially from the Gulf perspective. Hizbollah’s leadership, beholden to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, dragged its militia and rank-and-file Shia constituency – not to mention the rest of Lebanon – into the Syrian conflict by intervening on behalf of the dictator Bashar Al Assad and their mutual patrons in Iran. The adventure threatened to become a quagmire for Hizbollah and was even beginning to erode support within its core base as ordinary Lebanese Shiites were wondering why their brothers and sons were fighting and dying for towns in Syria they had never even heard of.

Russia’s massive intervention which began in September last year changed everything in Syria, and is starting to have a concomitant effect in Lebanon. The momentum of the conflict on the ground has swung significantly in the favour of the regime and away from the mainstream rebel groups that had been gaining ground for most of the first half of 2015.

As the regime in Damascus has grown stronger, and looks like surviving within at least a rump state (now being called “viable” or “necessary” Syria) into the foreseeable future, Hizbollah and its leadership in Lebanon have been consolidating and expanding their own political and institutional authority.

For two years, Hizbollah has blocked the appointment of a new president. For much of that time, their demands were about preserving their established prerogatives.

Increasingly, however, these demands are reflective of a new level of control over Lebanese state institutions and policy.

Gulf Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, have become increasingly alarmed by this trend. The last straw for Saudi Arabia – which has traditionally supported Lebanon politically and economically – was the refusal of Lebanon to join the rest of the Arab League – even including the Iraqi government, which is normally very sympathetic to Iran – in condemning the mob ransacking of the Saudi embassy in Tehran in January. In the weeks that followed, the Gulf states saw nothing to offset their growing sense that increasingly, as one Saudi columnist put it, Lebanon is acting like “an Iranian colony”. Hostile comments by Hizbollah leaders rubbed salt into the wounds.

From its perspective, Riyadh is simply declining to fund a Lebanese security apparatus it believes is incapable of serving as a full counterweight against Hizbollah.

The other measures by other Gulf states to issue travel warnings and urge their citizens to leave Lebanon underscore their level of frustration with the trajectory of Lebanese politics.

It’s clear why Saudi Arabia and its allies are exasperated. But the challenge is not to strengthen the hold Hizbollah and Iran have been acquiring over Lebanon. Iranian officials are already competing among themselves to gloat about expanding their support for, and influence in, Lebanon.

The Lebanese military, for all of its imperfections, is one of the few genuinely national, non-sectarian institutions in the country. Removing all Arab support for it is likely to just play into the hands of Iran.

The Gulf states have ample reason for frustration, but they will have to move quickly to find new means of supporting their allies and exercising leverage in Beirut, or else their unhappiness about Lebanese political dynamics is only likely to increase.