Hamas is a total mess.

With the overthrow of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, and the accompanying crisis for Islamists across the region, the organization’s regional strategy lies in tatters. A year ago they were convinced they were on the cusp of a “green wave” of Islamist victories.

The Muslim Brotherhood victory in Egypt, they reasoned, was a harbinger of the Arab political future. Hamas expected the new Egyptian government to end its isolation, help it dominate Palestinian national movement, and transform its strategic relationship with Israel.

But none of that happened. Egypt continued to put its own national interests first. It maintained and even enhanced security cooperation with Israel, kept tight control over border crossings, and launched a campaign against smuggling tunnels, flooding them with raw sewage.

Yet the hope remained that all this was temporary. Eventually the Brotherhood would assert control and deliver a foreign and security policy favorable to Hamas. Even at its high point, that was exceptionally wishful thinking.

Now, however, with Morsi gone and the whole Islamist movement regionally in varying stages of shock and disarray, Hamas finds itself suddenly more isolated, divided, and hapless that it may have ever been since its founding in the late 1980s.

The new Egyptian government, and much of the public, take a decidedly dim view of Hamas. They see it as conniving in the low-level, but extremely dangerous, insurgency in Sinai that greatly intensified after Morsi’s overthrow. Hamas, and the Palestinians living under its misrule, have paid a heavy price for the Egyptian military counteroffensive against Sinai extremists. Egyptian forces reportedly killed 35 Hamas fighters and destroyed 850 smuggling tunnels. Fuel and other shortages, and a financial crisis, have consequently intensified in Gaza.

Egyptian anger is also stoked by a sense that Hamas may have been interfering even more deeply in internal Egyptian affairs, beyond Sinai and the border region. For example, Hamas is being investigated for its alleged participation in a 2011 jailbreak that freed Morsi and several other key Islamist prisoners.

Hamas knows how dangerous these Egyptian, and broader regional, perceptions about its connections to other extremist movements are. They reacted furiously to Fatah’s reference to this interference, calling it nothing short of “incitement.”

Along with the post-euphoric crash following Morsi’s downfall, and the death of the dream of an “Islamic Awakening,” Hamas must also cope with nostalgia about the “good old days” of the now long-lost “axis of resistance.” For most of the last decade, Hamas pulled off the unique and highly implausible balancing act of being both a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood party and a member of the pro-Iranian alliance simultaneously.

The civil war in Syria closed down any room for such a split identity, especially since the Brotherhood in Syria is a key component of the Syrian uprising. Hamas had to essentially choose between abandoning its longstanding headquarters in Damascus and patrons in Tehran, and gamble on the rising tide of Sunni Islamism in post-dictatorship Arab societies.

After much dispute, Hamas’ Political Bureau decided to basically turn its back on Damascus and Tehran, and seek other patrons. Khaled Mishaal was dispatched to Doha and Ankara in search of funding, and his deputy Mousa Abu Marzouk to Cairo for political and logistical support. Against strong opposition from some members, Hamas’ political leadership effectively put all their chips on 32 red in the great Middle East strategic roulette wheel. But the ball just landed on 23 white.

With a predictable degree of schadenfreude, political leaders like Mahmoud Zahar – who lost his seat on the Politburo for his opposition to this gamble – and Hamas’ paramilitary leader Marwan Issa – who never fully broke with the Iranian Republican Guard, as the rocket exchange with Israel last year demonstrated – can now turn to their colleagues and smugly crow: “I told you so.”

Now Hamas cannot really now turn back towards Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah and remain a viable part of the Sunni Muslim Arab world. But they may have one or two more chips yet to play.

Qatar has reportedly scaled back, but not cut off, funding for the group. And the embattled and increasingly desperate Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may now need them as much as they need him. There is always the possibility regional Islamists might make a comeback, including in Egypt. And their rivals in Fatah are facing significant difficulties of their own, although their options seem broader and more viable.

Lacking any obvious, immediate strategic alternatives, Hamas’ most likely response to this series of calamities is to once again hunker down and hold on to their dominance in Gaza purely on the basis of brute force and repression. And, once again, it will be the people of Gaza, and the Palestinian cause in general, that pay the price for their unending folly.

المعنى الحقيقي للإسلاموفوبيا ليس الهجوم على تعاليم وطقوس الدين الإسلامي. إنه الهجوم على المسلمين، بشراً ومجتمعات، خصوصاً منها تلك الجديدة، ولكن النامية، الموجودة في الغرب. وتهدف هذه الهجمات إلى تحديد قابلية هذه المجتمعات على لعب دور فعال في المجتمعات ذات التعددية، والمشاركة بشكل كامل في الثقافة والاقتصاد العالميين. اذا كان هذا هو تعريف الإسلاموفوبيا، إذن بالتأكيد نحن نحتاج إلى إجراء مراجعة لتعيين من هم أكثر المعادين للإسلام وأشدهم خطراً وتدميراً له.

لأول وهلة قد تعتقد أن الجواب عن هذا السؤال بديهي وبسيط. ولكنني أقول إنهم ليسوا من امتهنوا تشويه الإسلام والمسلمين مثل روبرت سبنسر الذي سخّر نفسه لهذا الهدف وكأنه أحد جنود الحروب الصليبية. وليسوا هم من اتخذوا هذا المجال هواية غبية مثل اليهودية الأميركية المتطرفة باميلا غيلار. وليسوا حتى أولئك العنصريين، ولو بصورة مخففة، من امثال الكوميدي الأميركي الليبرالي غير المتدين بل ماهر الذي يكره كل الأديان ولكنه يخصص نقده اللاذع للإسلام من دون الأديان الأخرى. وليس حتى السياسيين في الولايات المتحدة والدول الغربية الأخرى مثل بيتر كنغ او ميشيل باكمان الذين حاولوا أن يفوزوا بأصوات الناخبين من خلال طرح انفسهم الحماة ضد «الطابور الخامس المسلم.»

على الرغم من كل الأذى الذي يتسبب به المعادون التقليديون للإسلام فإن اكثرهم سوءاً – أو بالأحرى المعادين الحقيقيين للإسلام – لا بد أن يكونوا المتشددين الإسلاميين الدمويين الذين يغذّون مادة المعاداة للإسلام ويوفرون لها ذخيرتها الموضوعية في بعض الأحيان. مع ذلك فإنه من السخف أن يُساوى الإسلام مع الإرهاب وكأن الاثنين مترادفان، فهناك عدد لا يُحصى من الإرهابيين غير المسلمين ممن يمارسون العنف السياسي. ولا يجب أن ننسى أن المتشددين الإسلاميين الدمويين هم ليسوا فقط أقلية، بل أقلية داخل أقلية. إلا أن أفعالهم المدمرة تتسم بخصوصية لافتة في كونها تهدد، وأحياناً تنجح، في مفاقمة الخوف من المسلمين وزيادة الكراهية ضدهم في الغرب وحول العالم.

يبدو أن المفارقات ليس لها حدود في هذه النقطة، فمثلاً نقلت صحيفة «نيويورك تايمز» عن تامرلان تزارنييف، منفذ هجمات ماراثون بوسطن الإرهابية «إنه غاضب من تصوير العالم للإسلام بأنه دين عنف». لذلك قرر أن يثبت للعالم صحة رؤيته للإسلام بقتل ما يستطيع من المدنيين المنهمكين بممارسة الرياضة في ذلك اليوم.

وهنا تفوق تامرلان بضرره على الإسلام والمسلمين حتى على أولئك العنصريين الذين يصرخون بالويل والثبور ضد المسلمين وتجاوزت اساءته دعاية دعاة الكراهية ضد المسلمين أيضاً، فضرر هؤلاء يصغر أمام حجم الضرر الذي تسبب به تامرلان على القضية التي يدّعي الدفاع عنها، وهي سمعة الدين.

منذ ظهورهم في العصر الحديث، صنّف أصحاب العنف السياسي من السنّة والشيعة أنفسهم على أنهم حماة المستضعفين. وكان من بين أهم القضايا التي طرحوها هي غضبهم من الطريقة التي يصور بها الغرب والمجتمعات غير المسلمة الأخرى الدين الإسلامي والمسلمين.

بإعطائه مثالاً جديداً داعماً لأسوأ ما يوصف به المسلمون من أوصاف بذيئة ومبتذلة (على أنهم متطرفون دمويون)، قام تزارنييف باتباع تقليد يعود إلى السبعينات من القرن الماضي عندما سعى سلفيون جهاديون و»خمينيون» وبطريقة مستغربة إلى ما قالوا انه حماية لشرف الإسلام وسمعته من خلال اقتراف جرائم قتل جماعي بحق المدنيين الأبرياء.

عندما تُصور الرسوم الكاريكاتورية الدنماركية على أنها إهانة للنبي محمد (صلى الله عليه وسلم)، وتغتنم منظماتٌ متطرفة الفرصة لتنظيم احتجاجات دموية تؤدي إلى سقوط قتلى، فمن هي الجهة التي تسيء لسمعة الدين؟ بعض من هذه الرسوم كان عنصرياً، وبعضها الآخر سخيفاً. كان يمكن لهذه الرسوم أن تمر من دون أي أذى يذكر لو لم تُثر كل تلك الضجة والصخب حولها. إذا كانت نية أصحاب الرسوم إثارة الخوف والكراهية ضد المسلمين والإسلام فإن من قام بعملهم بدلاً منهم هي الجماعات المتطرفة واحتجاجاتها الشريرة والتهكمية. هذه هي الإسلاموفوبيا، وأكثر إساءة يمكن أن توجه للإسلام والمسلمين.

ربما أول سابقة لهذا النوع من الإسلاموفوبيا الغريبة والذاتية كانت فتوى الموت الإيرانية التي اصدرها آية الله الخميني ضد سلمان رشدي عام 1989. لم تكن روايته، «آيات شيطانية»، لها أية صلة بالإسلاموفوبيا أو كونها معادية للمسلمين، على الرغم من أنها احتوت ايحاءات كاريكاتورية للخميني نفسه والتي كانت ربما السبب الحقيقي وراء اصدار الفتوى، فضلاً عن اسباب اخرى سياسية انتهازية. ولكن الفهم الخاطئ للكتاب وما رافقه من ادانة وحرق في المجتمعات الإسلامية، خصوصاً في بريطانيا والهند، صدرت من ناس لم يكونوا قد قرأوا حرفاً واحداً من الكتاب، الا إنهم لهثوا وراء عصبية جاهلة وغير موضوعية قبلت طرحاً سياسياً يصنف الكتاب على انه «مسيء للإسلام» على الرغم من أنه لم يكن كذلك. مرة اخرى، الأذى الحقيقي الذي تلقاه الدين والمسلمون جاء بسبب رد الفعل المتعطش للدماء والهستيريا المتمثلة بتهديدات القتل والاحتجاجات وتظاهرات حرق الكتاب وكل اشكال الغضب المصطنع والمفبرك.

ربما احدث ما وقع من أفعال «اسلاموفوبية» كان جريمة قتل الجندي البريطاني البشعة على يد رجلين نيجيريين في ضاحية «وولويتش» في لندن. وفي خضم فعلتهما المستنكرة كانا يجتران مقولات وسواسية ومتخيلة تصور العالم الإسلامي رازحاً تحت حصار غربي مفترض. ولم يفتهما بالطبع أن يعلنا رفضهما لصفة «التطرف» والتي قررا ان ينفياها عن طريق تقطيع جسد الجندي في وسط الطريق وفي وضح النهار.

وهكذا فإن مجموعات ضئيلة غارقة في ذهنية جنونية وشوفينية قررت أن افضل طريقة لمجابهة العرض السلبي للإسلام هو باتباع نفس السلوك الذي يتخذه «الاسلاموفوبيون الغربيون» كأدلة على صحة الصورة التي يطرحونها ضد الإسلام والمسلمين بصورة عامة. وهم بذلك يثبتون وبإخلاص تام نبوءة «الإسلاموفوبيين الغربيين» من خلال تقمصهم لنفس الصورة التي يدعون كراهيتها. ومن دون هذا العون الذي يقدمونه، فإن «الاسلاموفوبيين الغربيين» وببساطة سيظهرون على حقيقتهم التي تتسم بالسخافة. ولكن المتطرفين الدمويين الإسلاميين يوفرون لهؤلاء تبريراً غير مستحق وغير واقعي لتسويق الخوف والكراهية ضد مجتمعات المسلمين التي يدعي هؤلاء المتطرفون الدفاع عنها. لا أحد يغذي الاسلاموفوبيا بهذا القدر من التدمير والشدة مثلما يفعل هؤلاء المتطرفون الإسلاميون. انهم بحق «الإسلاموفوبيون الحقيقيون.»

 

Between the unparalleled demonstrations that began on Sunday, and the breadth and depth of Egyptian consensus on that stage on Wednesday evening, there could be no question. The entirety of organized, politically and socially active Egyptian society—of course excluding the Muslim Brotherhood and its immediate allies—have united in supporting the Army removing the government. If this goes badly, the blame cannot fall on the Armed Forces alone, for they have not acted alone. They have responded to an extraordinary outpouring of mass and popular anti-Brotherhood sentiment, and marshaled a huge coalition in support of their decision to end the current presidency and impose a new transitional order.

By agreeing to the military’s “framework” for transition, most of the other major national forces, particularly the non-Islamist ones, have been essentially made parties to the “implementation of the will of the people,” or the “coup,” or whatever one might care to call it. For it is both of those things, and neither.

In some ways it resembles the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. But Morsi was elected under the law. On the other hand, the essence of the failure of the Morsi government—an utter unwillingness or inability to compromise, conciliate, cooperate or come to terms—was actually exemplified in the extraordinary national unity that surrounded the rejection of his continuation in office.

First we saw a petition that drew over 25 million signatures calling for new elections. The former president dismissed this out of hand. Then the untold millions (the real number will never be known), from all walks of life and all Egyptian descriptions, poured out onto the street since Sunday calling for his resignation.

Even then, Morsi might have saved the day for himself. The turning point was probably his angry, belligerent, aggressive and paranoid rant to the nation on June 26. For more than 2 and a half hours, he bellowed and cooed, barked and berated, scolded and cajoled. His message was simple: “We are the revolutionaries. I am their leader. No one dare challenge me. Obey my authority.”

Inevitably, it alienated the entire country. And it reminded them that he had no policy answers to the problems that plague daily life for most Egyptians. And yet even when al-Sisi issued his 48 hour ultimatum, Morsi still had a chance. True enough, the whole point of the 48 hours was to tell the demonstrators all they had to do was hang in there for two days. But had the President called in the opposition, created a national unity government, announced new elections, or offered anything really  substantive that smacked of change, he might
well have survived.

Instead, he reacted furiously. His speech on Tuesday was a veritable tirade against everyone who is not an immediate supporter. He blamed the demonstrations on counterrevolutionaries, traitors, agents of foreign powers, scofflaws and hooligans. It was an expression of the most profound contempt for the ordinary people of the country and showed how out of touch he was, and the extent to which his loss of legitimacy was irrevocable.

Meanwhile, al-Sisi did exactly what Morsi should have done, but either could or would not. If there was ever any question about who was the better politician as an individual, or a more savvy institution, it’s been completely resolved now. He and his military colleagues held a set of intensive and serious consultations with representatives of the mainstream opposition coalition, the NSF, representatives of religious and other important social forces, Islamist groups outside the Muslim Brotherhood, and, indeed, almost the whole spectrum of organized Egyptian social and political life.

The consequence was, ultimately, the development of a consensus regarding the basic elements of what al-Sisi announced, and what was endorsed by the other key figures at the podium, Wednesday night. The Constitution is suspended temporarily, and a committee will be formed to amend key provisions in the new Constitution that are generally regarded as unacceptable. The Constitution was rammed through by Morsi and his Islamist allies after a red herring “constitutional declaration,” in which he assigned himself virtually monarchical powers. He rescinded the declaration only to mollify public anger about the terrible new Constitution that was immediately rammed through an Islamist-stacked committee. That mockery reiterates almost everything that was objectionable about the old constitutions, and adds a layer of potentially very oppressive “Islamic” legislation.

The issue of the Constitution is the most important one by far. Without serious revision, the Constitution that was forced through by the Muslim Brotherhood and their Salafist allies is a death sentence to any hope for a tolerant, pluralistic, democratic and open-minded Egyptian political system. On the contrary, it opens the door to an endless stream of abusive, pandering majoritarian oppression of unpopular individuals, disfavored or despised minorities, and subjugated women.

The functions of the presidency will now be assumed by the Chief Justice of the High Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour. He will be sworn in to this function on Thursday. New presidential elections will be held “at the earliest possible date,” followed by parliamentary elections. In the meantime, a government of “technocrats” will be formed, very possibly headed by ElBaradei. One of the less encouraging announcements was that of a “media code of ethics” to guarantee “professionalism,” which can hardly result in anything other than censorship. Hopefully the kind of suppression of free speech through quasi-legal means that was employed in such a reckless way under Morsi whose government brought more prosecutions for insulting the presidency in his one year in office than Mubarak’s did in his more than 30—will be prevented by the military’s coalition partners.

There will also be a commission for national reconciliation, whatever that means. But Egyptian society, political forces and leading personalities are going to have to try to learn the principle of national unity from their own public. The Egyptian people came together across many different lines of division to reject an arbitrary   government that had gone too far and was abusing its authority and dragging the nation into the abyss. But it is crucial to understand that the Muslim Brotherhood is not going away. It is not a spent force. It is not an irrelevancy. It is a major national institution with a huge constituency. Indeed, after the army, it is probably the single largest and most effective national organization in all of Egypt.

Therefore, any impulse to institutionalize the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood will be a catastrophe. The lessons from the Algerian experience must hang heavy in the air. The Brotherhood left no choice for the whole rest of society, united, to reject their governance. But, if they stay within the law and eschew major outpourings of violence, they should not be persecuted or prosecuted. If they turn to violence, as some of their rhetoric suggests they might, this will be a calamity. It will lead to civil war, at least of a kind. They will lose, but it will be a generalized catastrophe.

If, on the other hand, non-Islamist forces who have now seized power by popular acclimation seek to systematically exclude the Brothers even if they continue to try to play by the new rules, they will be courting disaster. They must allow the Brotherhood to run in upcoming elections, and hope that they will learn their lesson and behave in a more reasonable, normative and inclusive manner if elected. If not, they will be rejected again. Democracies, from the outset, have always had to incorporate and accommodate non-democratic and authoritarian-minded forces (which the Brotherhood most certainly is) in spite of their hostility to the pluralistic order in which they participate. It is one of the great hazards of a free, open and democratic system: to be true to itself, it must generously afford oppressive groups more liberty than such groups would allow anyone else.

Yet there is a serious danger that the Egyptian Islamists may turn to violence. They may kid themselves, as other Arab Islamists have in the past, that “we’ve tried democracy, and it doesn’t work.” Since we want power, we have to try the more direct route again: violence. Morsi himself has articulated precisely this kind of mentality in his recent speeches, particularly on the evening before he was overthrown. All of his repeated pledges to sacrifice his own blood and body in the cause of “legitimacy” were just so much red meat for anyone in the Brotherhood who wants to instigate violence. But many of the Brotherhood leaders have been placed on an indefinite travel ban. The point is not to stop them from enjoying the fine weather in Fiji at this time of year. The message is simple: if you or any of your supporters, or anyone linked to you, starts blowing things up or shooting people on the streets, you can and will be arrested and held responsible.

A degree of violence now is virtually inevitable. Indeed, it’s been going on for quite some time. And it may intensify. But as long as it is contained, then the prospects for a productive, constructive transition remain viable. The danger is that some Brothers or others might feel that such a huge injustice has been done to “legitimacy,” and their simple majoritarianist misunderstanding of “democracy,” that only an armed response is sufficient. Some of Morsi’s supporters are openly speaking in terms of “civil war” and pledging to “sacrifice their lives in this situation.”

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has done enormous damage to itself already through its mismanagement of government and politics. If it wants to make matters worse, it can exploit these young people and destroy its reputation, at least in Egypt, forever. And the fate of the Brotherhood in Egypt will have tremendous implications for the fortunes of similar Islamists throughout the Arab world.

Whether in the United States or the rest of the West, or in the Arab or Islamic worlds, the idea that the Arabs and the Muslims are basically Islamists, or easily won over by anyone who grabs the Quran and clutches it to their chest while screaming “follow me to salvation,” must surely now be finally debunked. Most Arabs are faithful Muslims, but they are not Islamists. They do not welcome the Muslim Brothers’ authoritarianism, oppression and heavy handedness, and they will not put up with it. That’s a lesson not only for Islamists throughout the Middle East. It’s a lesson for policymakers in Washington, and around the world as well.

Any good spaghetti Western or Hong Kong action film culminates with a “Mexican standoff.” Classically, three protagonists stand, pistols drawn, all with each other in the crosshairs at close range. Theoretically, in this conundrum, the first to shoot is at a tactical disadvantage. More recently, Mexican standoffs have degenerated into a simpler formula in which two principals have each other at gunpoint, neither able to fire or stand down without unacceptable risk.

In the Arab world, Egyptians are renowned for their films and TV shows, especially their dramas and soap operas. The Egyptian “revolution” has, from the start, been a roller coaster alternating between epic heroic drama, mass tragedy, ludicrous farce, gangster-film intrigue and surrealism worthy of David Lynch. Now, with the dark inevitability of Greek tragedy, it has reached the “Mexican standoff” phase between the President and the army.

It wasn’t supposed to be like this.

The first anniversary for Egypt’s new President Mohammad Morsi saw not celebrations or commemorations of the first Egyptian elected civilian president in modern times, but instead gargantuan demonstrations throughout the country calling for his ouster, breathtaking in size and scope. Millions of Egyptians took to the streets throughout the country demanding his removal. These demonstrations were bigger, but there is an unquestioned sense of déjà vu in the oust-Morsi movement—called the Tamarod(rebellion) by its organizers—and the original uprising against Hosni Mubarak.

Indeed, the anti-Mubarak revolution began with an attack on his National Democratic Party’s headquarters, just as the most intense scenes yesterday were at the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters and that of its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). This morning,the Brotherhood’s headquarters lie ransacked and gutted—an appropriate metaphor for the political state of the President and his party, and possibly for the nation as a whole.

The anti-Brotherhood Tamarod marks another clear turning point in the serpentine process of an Egypt determined to leave its dictatorial past behind, but which knows not where it is going. But what’s happening in Egypt is going to be a major bellwether for the future of numerous Arab states and yet again demonstrates how much popular opposition there is to unfettered Islamist rule even in the more conservative Arab countries. If the Muslim Brotherhood cannot take and retain power, in its country of origin—Egypt—after winning elections and in the face of a fragmented and frequently ineffective political opposition, then the entire Arab Islamist project will be called into the gravest doubt. The clear implication will be it was simply never plausible for such religious fanatics to rule large, diverse and mainly non-Islamist Arab societies, particularly given their propensity for authoritarianism and incapacity for compromise and conciliation.

Morsi’s June 26 obnoxious, defensive and endless rant to the nation on television merely underscored his political tin ear and intransigence, and, perhaps, sealed his fate. His unmistakable message was, “we are the revolutionaries,” and “everyone who opposes us are reactionary counterrevolutionaries, if not traitors.” It was bound to infuriate the nation, and so it did.

It also left absolutely no one with any confidence he has real policies, let alone solutions, to deal with the daily life crises ordinary Egyptians increasingly struggle with: growing poverty, inflation, mass unemployment, the nightmare of commuting, fuel and food shortages, and a rapidly crumbling national infrastructure. Additionally, there is a terrifying growth of crime, gang violence, rampant sexual harassment, and sectarian atrocities against Copts and Shiites. Egyptians do not feel safe, economically, socially or personally, and with good reason. In answer to all of these crises, the Brotherhood essentially merely offers “Islamic values.” Even many of the most devout Muslims fully understand Islam is a religion, not an ideology or political program, and offers no answers to these overwhelming national crises.

The Egyptian military put the number of anti-Islamist demonstrators at “14 million,” a figureReuters reasonably described as “implausibly high,” and which would make it by far the largest political demonstration in human history. But even if that number is wildly inflated, it’s clear these protests were vastly larger than the anti-Mubarak protests that brought down the old dictatorship more than two years ago. The typically restrained New York Times simply left the number at “millions.” At least 16 people were killed.

Egypt is now split along at least four major axes that interrelate in very complex and unstable ways. The Brotherhood and its Salafist allies clearly do have a significant constituency. The revolutionary groups on the ground, mostly young and without strong organizational capabilities and even clearly thought through ideologies, which were instrumental in bringing down Mubarak, once cooperated with the Brotherhood but now seem to have realized that they are at least as much, if not a bigger, threat to freedom than the old dictatorship. They have decided, it appears, that Morsi has to go, and with him the entire Islamist-rule project.

Lurking in the wings of course is the deep state, and in particular the military. Much of the police, the remaining security forces, and the judiciary are key elements in the opposition to the Brotherhood. For its part, the Army was glad to get out of the governing business, and is primarily concerned with protecting its key zones of influence: its control of defense and national security policy, its secret budget, its various extraordinary prerogatives (including the power of arresting and trying civilians in military tribunals), and its massive economic holdings (often estimated at a minimum of 20 percent of national GDP).

The Brotherhood, which overreached at almost every other stage, was wise only in seeking to accommodate the military, and to ram through a dreadful Constitution which even more deeply embeds a military authority and autonomy than the old one did, and also adds a layer of potential Islamist social authoritarianism. So the military remains a major power, but is likely to do its best to avoid directly intervening in domestic politics again. It wasn’t to their liking, and they don’t see any long-term benefits from such an arrangement.

What the Army needs is a stable, competent political partner to take care of the business of actually governing the country. Clearly that can’t be the Brotherhood. Since winning the first parliamentary election, and then the presidency, the Brotherhood has broken every promise it has made to friend and foe alike. It has not only alienated, it has infuriated, almost everyone outside of its core constituency or its direct partners. The degree of overreaching and political miscalculation has shocked even those of us who took the Muslim Brothers to be political cretins.

They rammed through a ridiculous, counter-revolutionary Constitution by terrifying the country with a red herring “constitutional declaration” that granted virtually monarchical powers to the President, far exceeding those of any of Egypt’s modern dictators. They’ve attempted to purge the judiciary. They are clearly trying to take over the Armed Forces by stacking its junior cadres with their own members. They’ve gone on a veritable bender applying blasphemy and libel laws at the drop of a hat against a breathtaking array of minority groups and political opponents, and even satirists.

More to the point, the Brotherhood has proven both absolutely incapable of cooperating with any forces outside of their immediate sphere of control or influence (except for the shameless Entente Cordiale with the military), and also of doing anything effective in government. Under their rule, the economy has continued to collapse. Social services are worse than ever. The state of social despair that led up to the downfall of Mubarak has been replaced by an atmosphere of social and economic panic.

And this, more than anything, explains the size and vehemence of the protests. An overwhelming cross-section of Egyptian society can agree on one thing and one thing only: they have had enough of this ridiculous, incompetent, embarrassing, bellowing, threatening petty little thug. They realize that he is incapable of running a bath, let alone a country. And not only is he presiding over a social and political meltdown, his intentions are, if anything, now clearly more autocratic and repressive than the old Mubarak dictatorship. At least five cabinet ministers have reportedly resigned this morning in recognition of popular disgust.

Young revolutionaries who were once willing to make common cause with the Brothers are leading the battle, which has already turned violent. Brotherhood cadres have been ostentatiously preparing “paramilitary” units, but they are really just street gangs. The revolutionaries have a crack force: the “ultras,” the football hooligans who are the best street fighters in the country and who were crucial in the battle against Mubarak’s security forces. The most politicized of these have formed a loose-knit organization called the “black bloc,” but really it boils down to this: young soccer hooligans don’t like government and they don’t like authority. And they do like a good fight. And they’re good at it. So if street fighting becomes the order of the day in the unfolding protest movement, the “ultras” may again prove the most fearsome.

Post-dictatorship Egypt now finds itself at a four-way crossroads. The intersection is essentially between the Brotherhood, the military, the revolutionaries, and the heretofore silent majority. If the size of the demonstrations yesterday is anything to judge by, the extent of public anger and rejection of Morsi, the Brotherhood and their government is unmanageable. Unless they peter out quickly, which seems unlikely, Morsi and his allies are going to have to make an adjustment and a deal with some opposition groups very quickly to try to quell public outrage, or the situation could spiral entirely out of control. They simply have no legitimacy or moral or political authority left, beyond their immediate supporters.

The astonishing size, scope and breadth of the anti-Morsi protests that have erupted in Egypt clearly demonstrates what so many of us have been repeating ad nauseam since the Arab uprisings began in Tunisia: the majority of Arabs are not Islamists, and they do not wish to be ruled by Islamists, particularly not in an arbitrary and autocratic manner. The once-silent Egyptian majority is speaking, because hundreds of thousands if not millions of those who did not participate in the protests that ousted Mubarak were on the streets yesterday, and more may join them in the days to come.

The speed with which the Brotherhood came to power in the post-dictatorship era was no surprise whatsoever. They had long-standing structural, organizational, branding and competitive advantages that no one else could compete with. What has been amazing has been their absolute inability to shift from a strong, well-organized oppositional movement (or, indeed, politicized cult) to a political party, let alone a government. The vertiginous speed with which they have alienated everyone else, squandered all of their advantages, electoral legitimacy, potential for building any kind of coalition beyond the Islamist set, or to produce any positive results in terms of social or economic policies has been astounding. One measure of their political acumen was the FJP’s website description of yesterday’s “imaginary protests in downtown Cairo and the streets of Giza.” See, brothers and sisters? It was all just a bad dream.

The only thing the Muslim Brotherhood has left going for them, beyond their substantial but distinctly minority core base, is the fractured, disunited and confused opposition. When it comes to elections and normal politics, that’s a huge advantage. But when you’re facing millions of infuriated protesters demanding your downfall with a veritable encyclopedia of legitimate grievances and justifiable outrage—as Hosni Mubarak discovered—the quality of the opposition parties is no longer the issue. The only way to recover that advantage, potentially, is for Morsi to give in to opposition demands and call for new presidential elections. But it may be too late even for that, unless such an announcement can be in coordination with some key opposition groups. Right now, they have no apparent incentive to bail him out.

Ironically, capitulation to that risky demand may be the only way to salvage Brotherhood rule. But conciliation is constitutionally anathema to such fanatics. And, when they do compromise, they have an invariable tendency to break their word (in the greater glory of God, of course, so it doesn’t matter). Which is one of the largest reasons they find themselves facing millions of brave and infuriated Egyptian citizens who are once again demanding their freedom, this time from a new, and more ominous, brand of tyranny.