A deal, or at least a tacit understanding, on the outstanding issue of Israeli settlement activity is likely to be achieved in the coming days and weeks between the United States and Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu essentially dodged the issue in his major policy address on Sunday, affirming that there would be no "new" settlements, but sticking to his government’s position that "natural growth" would continue. On its face, this appears to be a position that is totally irreconcilable with the Obama administration’s firm stance that no new settlement activity, including "natural growth," is consistent with Israel’s Roadmap commitments or the requirements of the US administration. However, since a confrontation on this issue that could bring down the Israeli government over the question of settlements is in the interests of neither party, and would be a very costly diversion from the urgent need to move forward towards opening permanent status negotiations as outlined in the Annapolis agreement, some kind of accommodation has always been probable, as I explained in an earlier posting on Ibishblog.

The real question now is, will this American-Israeli understanding on what kind and degree of settlement activity is to be considered tolerable serve in effect as political cover for Netanyahu to essentially agree to American demands that settlement activity which changes the conditions of the occupation in meaningful ways is unacceptable, or will it be political cover for the Obama administration to essentially give way to Netanyahu’s attempts to secure a back door in the roadmap that will allow significant settlement activity to continue under the rubric of "natural growth?"

The problem is that "natural growth" is defined by many different people in many different ways, and has historically been used by both the settler movement and the relevant Israeli ministries in an extremely broad and expansive way that does not simply reflect internal demographic changes due to new births in the existing population of settlements, but has served as a means of significantly increasing the population and the size of the settlements. As with many other issues involving the occupation, when Israel speaks of "natural growth," it means one thing, when almost everyone else means something else. If there is to be an accommodation that allows for some measure of "natural growth" of existing Israeli settlements that is going to open rather than close diplomatic space, is going to have to severely restrict what constitutes "natural growth," and ensure that such activity does not expand the size of the settlements whatsoever territorially and simply accommodates minor demographic changes within the existing populations of the settlements.

Two days ago I was on a radio program (again) with the Israeli Consul General in Los Angeles Jacob Dayan, and he repeated the assertion that what was under dispute were essentially "babies" and "nursery schools." The truth is that neither the Obama administration nor the Palestinian Authority are concerned about babies and nursery schools in the existing Israeli settlements, but are extremely wary of the history of Israeli settlers and ministries using the rubric of "natural growth" to expand the territory and population of settlements in a significant way that threatens both the credibility and the viability of permanent status peace negotiations. However, accommodations for babies and nursery schools might actually be useful in providing the means for Netanyahu to argue that natural growth of settlements is carrying on, when in fact Israel actually undertakes what is, in effect, a real settlement freeze to all intents and purposes.

Signs of activity in securing an understanding are everywhere. Ha’aretz quotes the new Israeli ambassador to the U.S., Michael Oren, as saying that, “there has been some progress made on that front over the past few days. Both parties have expressed their determined will to put an end to this bone of contention, and some novel ideas have been proposed.” According to CNN, “Under discussion, this and another Israeli source said, was a proposal in which Israel would agree to no new settlements, no confiscation of new land and a limit on so-called ‘natural growth’ of existing settlements to allow access to vital services. One of the sources said a potential obstacle was Israel’s position that its laws and other administrative rules precluded it from blocking projects already approved and financed. But both sources voiced optimism some accommodation could be reached that created ‘no new facts on the ground.’"

Other potential aspects of a workable agreement on the issue might include limiting the very narrowly defined scope of allowable "natural growth" to areas within Israel’s unilaterally constructed separation barrier in the West Bank, or other limitations that narrow even further where extremely limited "natural growth" might be permitted. A timeframe limitation is also possible, as is the allowance of the completion of existing construction that is already underway or similar accommodations that would provide political cover to Netanyahu without significantly undermining the American position that settlement activity in effect must cease.

It is also possible that the United States might try to kick-start permanent status negotiations, especially to achieve an understanding on the eventual borders of a Palestinian state, in order to defuse the settlement issue in those areas which it is mutually agreed with the Palestinians that Israel will retain as part of a limited land swap. The Washington Post suggests that, “One option under consideration by the Obama administration would be to expedite Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over the borders of a future Palestinian state, the diplomat said. If a deal were to be reached on borders, construction could continue in those areas which would remain under Israeli control.”

This is more than a crucial litmus test of the Obama administration’s ability and willingness to be firm with Israel on the question of a settlement freeze, and to succeed in shifting Netanyahu’s position while possibly providing him some political cover with regard to his ultra-right-wing coalition partners and the settlement movement and its supporters. It is, in fact, the sine qua non for progress in any meaningful sense on peace, since without a settlement freeze Palestinians will have neither the basis nor the confidence for going forward with this Israeli government. This is a hurdle that the Obama administration must overcome, and I have argued strongly in many venues over recent weeks that Palestinians and the Arab states should move quickly to support his position in order to facilitate his efforts to shift Israel on this issue.

The terms of the accommodation, if it is reached, will be quite obvious. It will become clear whether Netanyahu is formulating a face-saving way of accepting American requirements, or whether the Obama administration has in effect retreated from its insistence on a settlement freeze. The signs are very promising that the administration is going to insist that it is Netanyahu and the Israeli government that will have to accommodate the American position, rather than the other way around.

My article for Foreign Policy magazine’s website on Netanyahu’s speech: "How the Palestinians should respond to Netanyahu: Arabs should stop complaining about Israel’s aggravating prime minister and prove they’re the more reliable partner for peace."

I was never one of those who believed that President Obama?s ?open hand? policy and his masterful speech in Cairo would have an immediate effect on domestic politics in most Middle Eastern societies. I certainly don?t think it played a meaningful role in the recent Lebanese elections, heartening though they were. And, as I said on numerous radio and television programs in the run up to the Iranian election, I don?t think they were a factor in the Iranian vote either. However, as we witness extraordinary events unfolding on the streets of Iranian cities over the past couple of days, one has to wonder whether or not the new American approach to the Middle East is really as irrelevant as a sophisticated understanding of the domestic political dynamics in these countries suggested at first blush.

I would certainly agree that the American diplomatic stance was not a major factor in deciding who voted for or against Ahmadinejad, Mousavi or any of the other candidates. If it is true, as it certainly appears, that the results have been heavily doctored, it is very hard to imagine that there was a strong consideration of Obama?s policies in that decision either. However, in the general outpouring of dissent and outrage on the Iranian streets, it becomes increasingly harder to dismiss the idea that the presence on the global political scene and the iconography of Obama are completely irrelevant.

Obama, first and foremost, and whether one likes it or not, is at present the global symbol of political transformation. His election in the United States represented an extraordinary political step that most people not only around the world, but also here in our own country, scarcely believed possible. Second, the open hand approach embarrasses extremists and those like Ahmadinejad who nurture their own clenched fists like hothouse orchids and revel in the politics of confrontation. Third, Obama is not only a product of the universal aspiration for change, his election was also to a very large extent a function of the political mobilization of new media technology, which is also driving the push back against the extremely dubious (to say the least) official Iranian election returns. It is hard to gauge the effect that Obama?s policies or his status as a global icon of unexpected and positive political transformation is having on current developments in Iran, but I?m no longer prepared to say, as I have over the past few weeks, that it is obviously not a factor.

Mousavi is hardly the standardbearer of progressive politics in Iran, but he did confront Ahmadinejad on Holocaust denial as an affront to the Iranian national dignity and reputation and rather forthrightly accused his rival of dragging Iran further down the road towards dictatorship. He appears to have been more acute in this second observation that he may have suspected during the debates. Ahmadinejad?s lowest-common-denominator political style, rank demagoguery and now, apparently, willingness to rig the already highly restricted Iranian political system all smack of nothing more or less than fascism. Insofar as President Obama represents, at the present moment, a new spirit of openness and constructive change in the world that stands in marked contrast to what we are presently seeing from the Iranian regime and to the politics of its appalling figurehead, we may, in fact, be witnessing something of an Obama effect in Iran after all.

Reaction to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu?s major policy address yesterday is running the full gamut from rage and dismay to adulation and relief. The extremes aside, the question really is whether to see Netanyahu’s glass as half full or half empty.

In Israel, the extreme right was divided on its reaction to the speech. Those most concerned about maintaining the categorical opposition to any form of Palestinian statehood were generally dismayed by Netanyahu’s muted concession on this point, albeit in theory and with many unworkable caveats and restrictions. The settlers and their supporters, however, focused on his assertion that “natural growth,” which he did not define in any meaningful way, would continue. Supporters of the settlement movement have taken this as an endorsement of their plans to expand and extend the settlement project. Settlers were also heartened by his warm words about them being simply the “brothers and sisters” of the general Israeli public. The Israeli left and most of the center was generally dismayed by Netanyahu’s belligerence and his complete lack of recognition of any aspect of the Palestinian narrative or perspective, although some of these observers have emphasized that Netanyahu’s acceptance of Palestinian statehood in theory, however couched, represents a breakthrough for him and for Likud.

The range of Palestinian opinion runs the gamut from outrage to horror. The Palestinian Authority has called on the international community to isolate and shun Netanyahu’s government, with many harsh words from numerous Palestinian officials. While understandable, the Palestinian reaction is, predictably, strategically unwise. As I observed yesterday, Netanyahu’s recalcitrance opens significant diplomatic opportunities for Palestinians to exploit the continuing gap between the Obama administration’s firm position, especially on the settlement issue, and Netanyahu’s continued refusal to accommodate American requirements and existing Israeli commitments. A preferable stratagem would emphasize Palestinian alignment with Obama’s goals and methods, isolating Netanyahu, and drawing a contrast between his obduracy and their own willingness to take concrete, practical measures to advance the American approach to pursuing a peace agreement. The danger of digging in their own heels while Netanyahu digs in his is that this response encourages a perspective in the United States that regards progress on Middle East peace as essentially unattainable under the present circumstances, and instead urges the administration to focus on other foreign policy goals such as ongoing tensions with Iran and even the prospect of an Israeli-Syrian peace track at the expense of the Palestinian track.

Most observers acknowledged that Netanyahu’s primary audience was, in fact, President Obama himself. The White House naturally welcomed the Prime Minister?s movements on the question of Palestinian statehood, and accentuated the positive. However, there is little question that the administration must have been disappointed by Netanyahu’s continued refusal to cooperate on the question of settlements. Obviously, there is a proper appreciation of the political difficulties that Netanyahu faces from his right-wing coalition on any concession on settlements and a strong disinclination to push him too far too fast. However, over the coming weeks is likely that American insistence on a change in the Israeli position on settlements, especially “natural growth,” will resume. The inclination to devote more time, energy and political capital on shifting Netanyahu on this issue by Washington would be greatly enhanced if the Palestinians and the Arab states moved quickly to support Obama’s position rather than focusing on their justifiable unhappiness with the substance of Netanyahu’s remarks.

The “half-full” element of the speech — a tepid acceptance of the potential of Palestinian statehood and an acknowledgment that no new settlements would be created in the West Bank — was the easy part for Netanyahu, in spite of the fact that some on the Israeli right didn’t want him to make even these rather limited gestures. The “half empty” part is far more substantial, particularly Netanyahu?s ongoing refusal to accept that Israel’s commitments under the Roadmap requires a freeze to all settlement activity, including “natural growth,” as the Obama administration has repeatedly emphasized. In fact, the settlement issue, as things stand right now, is the crux of the entire matter. Without a meaningful settlement freeze, progress on other aspects essential to peace is virtually impossible. With it, enormous diplomatic and political spaces suddenly open up, and a return to the Annapolis principle that permanent status issue negotiations should be conducted simultaneously with the implementation of Roadmap Phase One commitments on settlements and security will be possible. In other words, a settlement freeze makes it possible to move quickly into substantive discussions about issues like borders, Jerusalem, refugees and security. It is the sine qua non of progress towards a peace agreement, and, as things stand, the veritable whole ball of wax.

Therefore, while it’s entirely reasonable to point out that Netanyahu?s speech leaves the glass both half-full, on Palestinian statehood, and half empty, on settlements, it is the half empty part that is far more significant. The most important thing to recognize this stage is that Netanyahu has moved from his original electoral and post-election positions in a way which he would have preferred to avoid. His speech yesterday, while entirely unsatisfactory, must not be his final word on these matters, and, if the other parties play their cards properly, it should not be. The likelihood is that the Obama administration will pocket the gains they have made thus far, and push for more. But they cannot get very far in this without significant Arab and Palestinian support to bolster the sense that at least one party in this situation other than President Obama is playing a sincere, constructive and politically courageous role.

It is absolutely essential that Arab reaction avoids the perception that all parties are simply reactive, defensive and uncooperative. The Palestinians and the Arabs will not strengthen their hands by focusing entirely on what’s wrong with Netanyahu’s positions. Instead, they must draw attention to what is useful and constructive about their own stances. This is the best way to isolate the Israeli Prime Minister and to make it clear that the fundamental barrier at the moment to progress towards peace are the positions he laid out in his speech. The glass they bring to the table needs to be full, and not also half-empty.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu today delivered a singularly unconstructive and even irresponsible speech, that offered little movement in the direction that President Obama and his administration have laid out. Netanyahu did acknowledge that there might one day be a Palestinian state, although with a plethora of caveats and preconditions that undermine any notion that he is serious about this prospect. In a piece of unintentional dark humor, Ha?aretz?s live ticker on its website misquoted him as saying that a ?Future Palestinian state must be ?dematerialized? if peace is to arrive? ? positively Freudian even if it was done by a spell-checking machine. The acceptance of a Palestinian state in theory while moving away from what is needed to create and sustain one seems a throwback to the era in which Netanyahu was first in the Prime Minister?s office in the 1990s. Apparently, he has not yet gotten the message that times have changed. His rhetoric about a Palestinian state, in this context, was therefore decidedly not reassuring.

The most significant aspect of the speech from the outset, as I noted yesterday, was not his theoretical acceptance of a Palestinian state, but his position on the settlements and the American insistence on a settlement freeze. Netanyahu largely ducked the issue, affirming that natural growth would continue, and that the settlers are not a threat to peace but are ?our brothers and sisters.? He did also not mention the Roadmap, which is the main Israeli commitment to freezing settlements. It would not be an overstatement to suggest that, on this and several other issues, Netanyahu has delivered an anti-Roadmap address. There is no doubt that the White House will be duly dismayed. A deal allowing for a version of ?natural growth? that is not a cover for expansion but rather the cover for an actual settlement freeze is still possible and desirable, but was not advanced by this speech.

By ducking so many crucial issues, especially the question of settlements, and by avoiding any consideration of the Roadmap, Netanyahu has opened a unique and extraordinary opportunity for the Palestinians and the other Arabs. If they move quickly to bolster rather than oppose Obama (as Netanyahu is implicitly doing), they will be able to draw a clear distinction between those who are ready, willing and able to assist the American President move towards peace and those who are not. If they take a sullen or otherwise noncooperative attitude at this stage, there is every danger that the President and his Administration will conclude that they are dealing with two recalcitrant and irresponsible parties that are impervious to reason, and walk away to focus on other matters. If, however, the Arab states in particular take urgent and practical measures to support Obama?s position, especially by committing to operationalize the Arab Peace Initiative short of diplomatic recognition in response to Israeli measures like a real settlement freeze, they will have positioned themselves as serious and committed partners to the American President and isolated Prime Minister Netanyahu, making either his position or his policies untenable. Netanyahu just opened the door. The Palestinians and other Arabs must walk though it without hesitation or delay.

Today on the talking head shows, reaction to the Iranian election was a great example of what is most wrong with TV coverage of foreign policy and international relations. A host of people with no knowledge, expertise or insight on Iran or the Middle East (most of whom do not seem to know so much as the name of Mirhossein Mousavi, referring to some unnamed “opposition candidate”) were invited to give their evaluation of the results as if their views on the matter merited consideration.

The worst of the lot was John King’s show on CNN, during which the insufferable “power couple” James Carville and Mary Matalin were asked what they thought about the results and their implications for US-Iranian relations. The answers were predictably tinned, and represented the maddening tendency on cable TV for all complex foreign policy issues to get reduced to a partisan political debate between GOP and Democratic party hacks aimed solely at spinning the issue for what are ultimate electoral purposes. It is, in the final analysis, interesting to see how the two parties and other domestic political factions are positioning to use these issues in their sub-ideological power struggles. But surely those questions must be a corollary to a proper and informed analysis of what is actually going on overseas and not a substitute for it, as it so often is in TVland.

On NBC’s Meet The Press, which has still not recovered from the tragic early death of Tim Russert, Joe Scarborough fell into the trap of welcoming the re-election of Ahmadinejad as “good for the United States” in the long run. Perhaps he simply means that, from his GOP-centered perspective, this result will be bad for Obama, and hence good for the United States, but it seems more likely that he actually thinks that our country benefits from the public face of Iran remaining this malevolent clown with his apocalyptic rhetoric and no ability to conduct a constructive foreign policy for his own country. This only makes sense if one has concluded that war is inevitable and the challenge now is making the case for it to the American people and international public opinion. As I noted the other day, extremists tend to like other extremists and seem to feel threatened by even a hint at moderation. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz makes the same mistake from their own point of view. I would also note that the AP is now predicting, as I did yesterday, that Netanyahu will probably be making the most of Ahmadinejad’s reelection in his major foreign policy speech which is to be delivered later today.

I was once on a major financial news network to discuss stereotyping against Arabs and Muslims in the entertainment industry. I was fully made-up, IFBed and sitting in front of the camera, waiting for the interview to begin. Then word came through that the Fed had made a minor adjustment to the prime interest rate. For the next 45 minutes I was assured that we would be coming to segment soon, but that this story required immediate attention, which was perfectly reasonable. I was then informed, also perfectly reasonably, that the story on the prime required uninterrupted focus at that time, and that I would be invited back the following day to discuss stereotyping. Unless, it was added, I cared to comment on the adjustment of the prime myself. It was an interesting, but ultimately simple, ethical and practical choice: I could have commented on something I essentially know nothing about and thereby have acquired two, instead of one, valuable opportunities to promote the organization I worked for at the time, which was employing me precisely to do so; alternatively, I could have honestly declined and simply returned the following day to talk about something I actually know about. It was an easy choice to do the latter, as I did, but also oddly tempting for a fleeting moment and a representatively absurd situation. Ever since I have had an even greater appreciation for the sheer shamelessness of those who agree to pontificate on subjects about which they are utterly unqualified and the fecklessness of the producers and stations that give them the chance.

By contrast, C-Span, which is often a bastion of substance in this landscape of dross, featured an excellent interview with Karim Sadjapour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on its Washington Journal program. Sadjapour pointed to the extremely suspicious “fact” that Mousavi, an ethnic Azeri, was supposedly trounced in Iranian Azeri areas, which he compared to the idea that McCain would have sounded beaten Obama in African-American districts. He also deftly navigated a reasonable space between those callers who simply accepted the official account of the election results and blamed the US for all problems in US-Iranian relations and those who indulged in Islamophobic rhetoric, which he properly and frankly described as “asinine.” Not being a noted, all-purpose talking head, or a GOP or Democratic party apparatchik, Sadjapour (like most other real experts) was sadly missing from the more well-watched cable channels. As usual.

So, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has, by hook or by crook, been returned to a second term of office in the Iranian elections, albeit with a suspiciously large majority. This means that the public face of Iran will continue to be an apocalyptically minded fanatic with a fetish for Holocaust diminishment and denial. If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not make much of this in his major policy address tomorrow, and his allies in the United States do not make much of it in the American policy conversation, I will be very much surprised. Of course, power in Iran over foreign and military policy, among other things, as always rested squarely in the hands of the supreme leader, presently Ayatollah Khamenei. However, core diplomatic realities are exacerbated by the grotesque demagoguery to which Mr. Ahmadinejad appears in no common measure addicted. I don’t know about Iran, but in the United States and the Arab world, the war parties and clash-of-civilization types are certainly celebrating.

As for Netanyahu’s speech, there are already signs of dissatisfaction among Obama administration officials with what has been advertised in advance. Ha’aretz reports that, "The proposals to be outlined in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech on Sunday will not be enough to satisfy the Obama administration, a senior U.S. official was quoted as saying.” The same report suggests that the outcome of the Iranian election can only intensify interest in moving towards an end-of-conflict agreement between Israel and Palestinians since, "U.S. President Barack Obama says containing Iran’s nuclear aspirations — which Israel considers a major threat — would be helped by progress toward a Palestine deal.” Indeed, US Special Envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, has continued to emphasize the seriousness of Washington’s new engagement, most recently by declaring that the US "supports the creation of a Palestinian state ‘as soon as possible.’” Meanwhile, signs are increasing that some members of Congress who have been increasingly critical of settlements and the occupation and supportive of President Obama’s peace initiative are beginning to feel the pressure from Jewish constituents in their districts. Movement by all deeply committed parties was always likely to be of the 3-steps-forward, 2-steps-backward variety, and entirely contingent upon momentum for progress.

Even though it’s very likely that Netanyahu’s speech will not fully satisfy the Obama administration, it’s also quite possible that they may cautiously welcome his remarks, in order to encourage further moves and out of an understanding that Netanyahu is constrained by his own coalition partners. It is essential that the administration not waver on the fundamentals of its position on a settlement freeze and a two state solution. However, as I noted recently, giving Netanyahu the time, space and political cover to adjust to the new American attitude is infinitely preferable to any sort of avoidable confrontation.

It is likely that Netanyahu is going to give way, at least in theory, to a Palestinian state, possibly with conditions. The conditions are not as important as they might first appear, as they represent the opening bargaining position from the present Israeli government, and not any fait accompli. The more crucial issue, and the thing to be listening for, is what language Netanyahu will be using to describe his policy on settlements. The Obama administration has been clear, consistent and extremely firm in ruling out all forms of settlement activity, although some kind of accommodation that allows for a degree of "natural growth" of structures but does not increase the size of any existing settlements in territorial terms is possible. However, it is unlikely that, over the long run, Netanyahu is going to be able to sell the administration on anything less than a real settlement freeze, no matter what kind of window dressing he can arrange for his right-wing allies.

The reason the administration is so firm on this issue is that Israeli compliance on Roadmap commitments, especially a settlement freeze, and Palestinian compliance with security commitments, sets the stage for revisiting the innovation to the Roadmap introduced in Annapolis, whereby phase 1 commitments such as settlements and security take place simultaneously as the beginning of negotiations on phase 4 permanent status issues. In other words, if a settlement freeze is achieved, and security measures are being taken by the Palestinians, it should be possible for the administration to begin to insist on convening permanent status talks and returning, at long last, to the fundamental issues. There are signs that the administration is very keen on beginning a serious negotiation on the question of borders, that being perhaps the most difficult and important of all permanent status issues.

The administration’s entire approach suggests a determination to actually achieve the outlines of an agreement, and perhaps even an agreement itself in the foreseeable future. If Netanyahu shows a willingness to go along with the essence of this by agreeing to a de facto settlement freeze with some obfuscations designed to mollify Israeli extremist sentiment, this will be a major step in the right direction, and certainly enough for the administration and the Palestinians to work with for the time being. At that point, it will be all the more important to bring the Arab states in to play a responsible role in building the conditions for peace. However, if Netanyahu falls radically short of the administration’s firm position on settlements, we will have moved one step closer to a confrontation between his government and the Obama administration, in which everyone could end up the loser. Except, perhaps, Ahmadinejad.

A reader asks, "I noticed that you’re affiliated with The American Task Force on Palestine. After googling them, I’ve come to the conclusion that they’re heavily criticized in certain Arab-American circles, but don’t understand why. Can you please explain?” Thanks for that question.

I’ll try to answer, although I agree the vehement anger directed against ATFP by some segments of the Arab-American community is difficult to explain given that most Arab-Americans agree with ATFP’s mission of advocating that an end-of-conflict agreement that allows for two states, Israel and Palestine, to live side-by-side in peace and security is in the American national interest. It should be noted at the outset that ATFP does also enjoy considerable support among the other segments of the Palestinian and Arab-American communities, has seen a steady increase in the support over its six years of existence, and has a large board of directors composed of noted and significant Palestinian-Americans. ATFP’s premier annual event, our October galas, have grown in size and stature with every succeeding year, and our website recently passed the milestone of 1 million hits in a single month. Obviously, while there are indeed vehement critics, there is also a strong bedrock of support.

Criticism of ATFP emerges mainly from the far-right and, especially, from the ultra-left of the Arab-American community. It primarily reflects the split between those who agree with ATFP’s peace-oriented mission and its dedication to the aim of ending the occupation on the one hand and those who believe that ending the occupation is either impossible or undesirable, or both. In other words, there is a constituency in the Arab-American community that simply does not accept the Palestinian national goal of seeking a negotiated agreement with Israel allowing for two states. These include one-state advocates who seek to replace Israel and Palestine with some other, as yet largely undefined, single state, by means as yet unarticulated. It also, more quietly, includes Islamists dedicated to the idea that all of historical Palestine must be dominated by Muslims. Obviously, those who adhere to these two alternative visions that abjure the only plausible means of achieving peace and an end to the occupation find ATFP’s position completely unacceptable. The feeling is mutual.

However, there is also some unease about ATFP’s methods even from some of those who agree with the goal of seeking an agreement with Israel to end the occupation. This is because ATFP has deliberately abandoned a deeply-rooted historical approach by the Arab-American community and other advocates of Palestinian rights in the United States that sees Palestinian-Israeli relations as a zero-sum equation in which everything good for one party is bad for the other, and vice versa. Since its inception, ATFP has been pioneering a new attitude that foregrounds the necessary role Palestinians and Israelis play for each other as indispensable partners in a potential peace agreement, and advocates not only dialogue with pro-Israel Jewish American organizations, but also a national coalition for Middle East peace with all pro-Israel organizations that agree with the aim of a genuine, reasonable two-state agreement. This has been difficult for many Arab Americans to accept because of the deep-seated suspicion the two communities have for each other, and a history of opposition, rivalry and bad blood.

The same attitude is readily to be found in some segments of the Jewish American community as well. It is an extraordinary element of the present discourse on US foreign policy towards the Middle East that Arab and Jewish American organizations that take the same positions in favor of peace are often well-regarded by the other community but viewed with suspicion within their own. This suggests that the ethnicity of any speaker is as important to the reception of what they have to say as their positions are, and that deviation from what is considered to be a normative community perspective is greeted with either approval or disdain based on the extent of this perceived deviation. This explains why some Arab Americans who are well disposed towards Jewish American groups such as Americans for Peace Now or the Israel Policy Forum are nonetheless uncomfortable with ATFP, whereas some Jewish Americans well disposed towards ATFP regard APN and IPF with suspicion. Asking people to move beyond deeply entrenched, familiar and comfortable attitudes, however dysfunctional and counterproductive they may be, is not always easy.

Another source of confusion and suspicion regarding ATFP’s methods, even among some who agree with its goals, has been the Task Force’s serious commitment to working within the political system of our country as it exists today and its determination to join the policy conversation in Washington. Many Arab Americans are used to a perspective of extreme skepticism about the potential of the community to seriously engage with the American political system and to empower itself through the normal processes of American civil society. There is an irrational and erroneous, but widespread, belief that the system is somehow closed to us and that nothing Arab Americans do will gain them greater political empowerment or a seat at the policy table on questions regarding Israel and the Palestinians. The truth, of course, is that this is a self-reinforcing and self-defeating attitude that must be overcome and defeated if Arab-American perspectives are to become more a part of the national conversation, especially on foreign policy.

Some Arab-American critics of ATFP’s methods object to its engagement with the government because they reject the American political system and believe that there is no benefit to seeking such an engagement but rather advocate what amounts to a revolutionary attitude seeking radical change that is extremely implausible. Others are simply uncomfortable with ATFP’s constructive approach to dealing with our national leadership, and our commitment to advancing the American national interest. Many Arab Americans are emotionally invested in a traditional approach to pro-Palestinian advocacy that emphasizes human rights, morality, and international law, and have yet to fully appreciate the necessity to articulate why ending the occupation is in the American national interest. To some, this smacks of instrumentalizing what, in their view, ought to be a purely moral and ethical argument that is entirely self-evident, and arguments that emphasize practical benefits to the United States of ending the occupation seem to debase what they would prefer to be a more "high-minded" approach. ATFP, on the other hand, strongly argues that it is no slight against our fellow Americans to recognize that they would, naturally, ask what the American national interest is in actively pursuing Israeli-Palestinian peace and an end to the occupation.

For a detailed response to many specific criticisms of, and calumnies against, ATFP from other Arab-Americans, please see my issue paper on the subject here.

A reader questions my assertion that ?moving quickly towards an agreement that will end the occupation by definition means moving towards a resolution of Israeli violence against Palestinians,” and notes that, ?You may have heard that the settlements in Gaza were removed some time ago and the thugs residing therein sent packing. I am not aware that these actions have relieved the citizens of Gaza of Israel’s kind attention.? The reader asks, ?Why do you suppose that a retreat from the West Bank would have a better outcome?? Thanks very much for this interesting question.

First of all, it should be noted that I am not advocating an Israeli “retreat” from the West Bank, but rather a negotiated agreement between Israel and the Palestinians which includes an end to the occupation. The unilateral redeployment of troops in Gaza and removal of settlers, in spite of frequent disingenuous claims to the contrary, was not connected to the quest for peace, but rather was a function of the continuation of the conflict. For more than a decade before it actually happened, most senior figures in the defense and military establishments in Israel had been strongly considering the move because of the serious burden attached to defending a small group of settlers in a very exposed situation and in an area generally not considered strategically, religiously or historically important to the Israeli national project. It was an action taken by the Israeli military on behalf of the Israeli military without consideration for the Palestinian people, their national aspirations or rights, or in anyway connected to peace gestures with or towards them.

The fact that the situation in Gaza degenerated to the point that it has following the redeployment is, to a very large extent, a predictable consequence of the fact that Israel’s withdrawal to the peripheries of Gaza was done unilaterally and was not pursuant to any kind of understanding with the Palestinian people. The reader doubts whether ending the occupation would really end Israeli violence against Palestinians, because of the experience of Gaza. However, this very same experience leads some Israelis to question whether ending the occupation would lead to an end to Palestinian violence towards Israel. What both of these arguments miss is that there was no agreement connected to the Gaza redeployment. It was not the function of a peace treaty, reflective of a mutual decision on the part of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to make a change that would benefit both peoples. It was a unilateral Israeli decision made exclusively by and for the Israeli government. And, of course, the fact is that Gaza remains under occupation until today, and under siege to boot.

I do think that ending the occupation is the key to ending both Palestinian violence against Israel, which is primarily motivated by a desire to end the occupation, and to ending Israeli violence against Palestinians, which is primarily motivated by the desire to enforce the occupation. The occupation is the context and proximate cause of most of the violence on both sides, although of course there are some extremists in both societies that conceptualize their violent acts in broader terms. Such extremists will have to be dealt with by the police of both Israel and the Palestinian state, but I do not believe they will be a major problem if there is an agreement that ends the occupation. Therefore, ending the occupation through a negotiated agreement that serves the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians would, in fact, end the cause and the context of violence, and therefore bring an end to most violence.

Philip Weiss reports that John Mearsheimer, although he is not optimistic about the prospects of Middle East peace, has urged Muslim Americans to form an alliance with Jewish Americans in pursuit of a two-state agreement in the Middle East. Mearsheimer notes that there is no prospect whatsoever of Israel agreeing to a single state in the foreseeable future, and that therefore a two-state agreement is the only possibility for peace and ending the occupation.

According to Weiss, Mearsheimer told his American Muslim audience in Detroit: “A two-state solution is the only good outcome for the Palestinians at this point in time. And it is also the only good outcome for Israel. Thus, I think it would make good sense for the Muslim community to rally behind the two-state solution and work hard to form alliances with those individuals and organizations in the American Jewish community who back the idea of creating a Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel. President Obama is going to need all the allies he can get to deal with Israel and the hardliners in the lobby. This is not a magic formula by any means, but it is the best hope we have of ending the Arab-Israeli conflict.”

I couldn’t have put it better myself.