https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/what_is_washingtons_end-game_in_yemen

News that Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been forced to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia will be very welcome in Washington. However, the United States still lacks an effective policy for ensuring long-term stability in that volatile, fractured country.

Since the turmoil in Yemen began, the US has been primarily relying on efforts by the Saudis and their Gulf Cooperation Council partners to secure Saleh’s departure from office as the beginning of a transition toward greater stability. For many weeks, the president refused to finally commit to a GCC proposal in which he would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. Now that he’s in Saudi Arabia, there is no doubt that the post-Saleh era in Yemen has begun.

But it’s not clear at all that this means an end to the bitter power struggle among Yemen’s elites that has divided the government and military, leading to his serious injuries. Saleh’s vice president is now nominally in charge, but his sons and nephews are still in place in their key military and intelligence positions. It’s not yet in the least evident what kind of reconciliation or agreement can be secured between the remaining regime forces and opposition groups such as the powerful Al-Ahmar clan and dissident generals.

For this, the United States is likely to continue to rely primarily on efforts by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to heal the rifts and restore a modicum of unity among the country’s elites and military. Washington was angered and alarmed by Saleh’s increasing use of American weaponry and US-trained counterterrorism forces in his internal power struggle with rivals within the elite, and will certainly expect that to stop given his removal.

American interests in Yemen are driven, above all, by concerns about the activities of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni affiliate of the loose-knit terrorist network. This organization has proven uniquely interested in and able to launch attacks directed against the American homeland. That includes the failed “Christmas bombing” over Detroit two years ago and an effort to send explosive packages onto American-bound international aircraft.

There has been increasing alarm in Washington in recent weeks that al-Qaeda and other terrorist forces have been exploiting the chaos in Yemen to gain space to operate – possibly even re-creating the kind of area of wide-ranging impunity that other groups used to enjoy in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Washington does not have any major stake in the outcome of power struggles within the Yemeni elite, but it has a strong interest in a stable and united Yemeni government committed to denying terrorists an operating base.

The US has also sought to avoid Yemen turning into a fully-blown failed state, a kind of Somalia on the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula and on the coasts of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Like the Saudis, Americans fear that such a failed state could prompt instability in much of the region, especially in Saudi Arabia itself. Therefore, Yemen has been one of the few cases in the “Arab Spring” in which Saudi and US interests have aligned almost entirely. This confluence of interests, along with the very limited options and influence the United States has on its own, has informed Washington’s reliance on Riyadh in trying to come to grips with this serious challenge.

That Saleh has now been forced to flee his country provides the two powers with a fortuitous and unexpected opportunity to move quickly to restore stability in Sanaa and move Yemen away from its seemingly inexorable drift toward failed-state status. It is precisely the kind of fortunate incident – removing a leader who is a clear impediment to progress – that has eluded NATO forces in Libya.

How the regime will fare in his absence and what the prospects for reconciliation among Yemeni elites are remains to be seen. So does the reaction of the thousands of peaceful street protesters seeking change. But it is strongly in the interests of everyone with a stake in Yemen’s future to move quickly to take advantage of the opportunity to reverse the drift toward anarchy and institute both reconciliation and reform measures.

From the beginning of the Arab Spring, it has been clear that, with Syria, Yemen has presented the greatest potential for regional disruption. Along with efforts by groups like al-Qaeda to promote and exploit chaos in the country, Houthi rebels and other insurgents, and a simmering North-South division that could again erupt into civil conflict, the anxiety-inducing factors in Yemen are uniquely alarming.

One can therefore expect Washington to give enthusiastic support to Saudi and GCC efforts to stabilize the situation and reverse the drift toward chaos. The chances of success for this exceptionally important but extremely difficult project are difficult to gauge, but the stakes could not be higher for Washington and Riyadh alike.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/is_yemen_about_to_disintegrate

Last Sunday I was involved in a panel discussion on the Al-Hurra satellite station regarding Yemen, one in which I was invited to discuss the policies of the United States. The other panelists were all Yemenis, including opposition and government figures. The conversation illustrated a great deal about how far down the road to chaos and confusion that country has drifted.

The main topic was about news reports that al-Qaeda had overrun the coastal city Zinjibar. Both government and opposition figures denied this, insisting that these were jihadist forces of a different variety led by a veteran named Khaled Abdel Nabbi. Al-Qaeda is unlikely to align itself with someone whose very name – Abdel Nabbi (“slave of the prophet”) – they would consider a serious blasphemy.

The self-contradictory and self-defeating exchange of accusations between the Yemenis on the panel was very striking. Predictably, the opposition figures said Abdel Nabbi was closely aligned with President Ali Abdullah Saleh and acting on his behest. The pro-government spokesman claimed that, on the contrary, “everybody knows” that Abdel Nabbi is in the service of rebel general Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, and has been for years.

Both the opposition figures and I noted that this accusation was effectively a self-indictment of the regime, since Ali Mohsen only recently defected. “If he was working with jihadists, why wasn’t he arrested?” asked one of the opposition figures. What nobody noticed is that flipping the question on the government is also, in effect, a self-indictment by the opposition since accepting the proposition that Abdel Nabbi works for Ali Mohsen means that the government was complicit with these jihadists in the past and the opposition is now.

The panel, much like the power struggle between Yemeni elites in general, was reminiscent of two boxers flailing away but landing at least as many blows to themselves as to each other. It’s true that Saleh benefits in a way by “playing the al-Qaeda card” as the opposition puts it, since this underlines the threat of chaos as the alternative to his rule. On the other hand, the opposition also benefits since Saleh looks increasingly weak and out of control of his own country.

Today news reports suggest that the Yemeni Air Force bombed Zinjibar in an effort to retake the town, while security forces are said to have killed at least 20 protesters in another southern town, Taiz. So rather than any of this being an example of a calculated plot by one side or the other, it’s more likely that Yemen is simply slipping into total chaos and toward failed-state status.

Under any controlled circumstances, Saleh would easily have been able to prevent 200 fanatics from overrunning a regional capital. It’s possible he didn’t want to, as some opposition figures claim; but it’s also undeniable that military forces on all sides are concentrated in Sanaa, the scene of a power struggle within the elite that has effectively split the military.

Rebel commanders over the weekend issued “Military Communiqué Number One,” which in the contemporary Arab world usually means initiating a coup or mutiny. In addition to this power struggle, Yemen has faced the Houthi insurrection, the presence of al-Qaeda and other jihadist forces, popular protests that are also probably not under anyone’s complete control, a Somali refugee crisis, and the existence of an undereducated, under-employed and heavily-armed population. There are also simmering North-South tensions that could re-erupt into another major national conflict.

So it’s quicker and simpler to list the forces keeping Yemen together than the dizzying array driving it apart. There is no question that the primary problem is that Saleh is refusing to step down, when even many of his supporters realize that it’s past time for him to go. Reportedly he privately claims the issue is about the next generation: He doesn’t want his sons and nephews to step aside for their counterparts in the rival Al-Ahmar clan. But most observers must have concluded at this point that Saleh is simply incapable of voluntarily stepping aside.

Thus far in the “Arab Spring,” no autocrat has voluntarily resigned. In Tunisia and Egypt, the leaders were removed by the army. In Libya (and now perhaps Yemen) the army split and civil war ensued. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has thus far managed to hold on to military loyalty, and thus to power. The efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council states to get Saleh to be the first to voluntarily and peacefully step aside have proven a humiliating failure.

But opposition forces, especially within the elite and the military, are also hardly paragons of virtue and responsibility. As the television panel I was on concluded, while Saleh is certainly the core of the problem, both sides in the Yemeni elite power struggle are perfectly capable of inflicting damage on themselves, and on their country.

At this stage, Yemen looks poised for an extended period of conflict and chaos. And with so many centrifugal forces at work, the country may possibly even be heading toward disintegration.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/what_was_netanyahu_so_enraged_about

President Barack Obama’s Middle East speech last Thursday did not break any particularly new ground on Israeli-Palestinian peace or Washington’s basic positions on negotiations. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and many of his supporters reacted furiously. Why? The reasons are deeply illuminating.

There were three elements to Obama’s speech that the Israelis did not like. First, Obama reiterated the well-established idea that negotiations will be based on the 1967 borders with mutually-agreed land-swaps. Even though this has been essentially understood since UN Security Council Resolution 242 and has been clear-cut United States policy since at least 2005, Obama stated the principle more clearly than usual. The Israelis regard this, essentially, as a concession to the Palestinians for which they will no longer be able to extract anything in return.

Second, Obama explicitly outlined what has been implicit US policy for most of his administration: That the parties should work on reaching understandings on borders and security first, and base progress on other permanent-status issues on those agreements.

Neither side seems particularly comfortable with this formula, which might defuse the settlement issue but also make reciprocal compromises on deeper, more existential problems like Jerusalem and refugees more complicated. To work, it will also mean instituting an informal understanding based on the Clinton parameters limiting Israeli settlement activity in occupied East Jerusalem to Jewish areas, something Netanyahu and his allies deeply oppose.

Third, Obama did not rule out dealing with, and possibly even providing aid to, a new Palestinian government arising from the Hamas-Fatah agreement. He said the agreement raised “profound and legitimate questions” for which the Palestinians would have to provide a “credible answer.” However, he didn’t adopt the Israeli line that no dealings with any such unity government would be acceptable.

There was a good deal to irk the Palestinians as well, especially Obama’s strong statement against any efforts next September to seek United Nations recognition for a Palestinian state. However, the plainly infuriated response by Netanyahu and his supporters seemed completely disproportionate to the substance of Obama’s remarks.

There are two factors informing this strong overreaction. First, and most important, is the Israeli sense that while Israel can deal with the Palestinians from a position of overwhelming strength and effectively impose any reality on them, at the international level the walls on Israel’s maximalist ambitions are closing in.

Obama’s speech is best read in contrast to Netanyahu’s speech the previous Monday before the Knesset. The Israeli prime minister ruled out negotiations on Jerusalem, spoke of annexing settlement blocs, and demanded a long-term Israeli military presence along the Jordan River. These positions are incompatible with not only international and American expectations about the nature of a two-state solution, but also American national interests and the vision of peace laid out in Obama’s subsequent speeches.

The American foreign policy, intelligence and military establishment has finally concluded that the creation of a Palestinian state and an end to the occupation that began in 1967 is essential for the United States to successfully pursue its other interests in the Arab world and, indeed, other parts of the Islamic world. This rethinking was mainly prompted by the problematic wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has only been reinforced by the “Arab Spring.”

In this context, Obama warned Israel that “there is an impatience with the peace process, or the absence of one not just in the Arab world” but “already manifesting itself in capitals around the world.”

The Israelis appeared more pleased with Obama’s address to the AIPAC convention this past weekend, in which he highlighted Washington’s support for Israel but also reiterated all his basic positions. However, last week’s events greatly strengthened Israel’s sense of being isolated not only internationally but also from the US with regard to its vision of the future. It might hope to impose unreasonable conditions on Palestinians, but cannot hope to do so on the world, especially on the Americans. This explains the hint of panic in the Israeli reaction to Obama’s unsurprising, reasonable, carefully-crafted remarks.

Netanyahu and his allies are fundamentally uncomfortable with Obama and would prefer to see a Republican in the White House after the 2012 US presidential election. The enraged Israeli reaction was an invitation to Republican hopefuls such as Tim Pawlenty and Mitt Romney to issue strong denunciations of the president’s remarks, which they immediately did. Even after the AIPAC speech, some of Netanyahu’s supporters are continuing to issue dark warnings to Jewish Americans that a second term for Obama would be disastrous for Israel.

So, while there was genuinely visceral anxiety among those like Netanyahu that Obama’s speech reinforced Israel’s international isolation on the future of the occupied territories, there was also a degree of politically-calculated histrionics aimed at helping Republicans in their effort to unseat the president in 2012.

What Netanyahu and his supporters are failing to understand, however, is that Obama’s remarks do not reflect his personal predilections. They are based on a strong American consensus regarding US national interests, especially the need for what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the “inevitable” Palestinian state.

Members of Congress and Republican candidates are free to say whatever they want, since foreign policy is not their direct responsibility. But whoever ends up in the White House will have to base his or her policies on American interests, not on political calculations. Netanyahu, like any other Israeli leader, will not be able to ignore, flout or oppose these interests in the long run.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/19/one_step_forward?page=full

President Obama’s Middle East speech couldn’t possibly have — and almost certainly didn’t — please all of its potential audiences. His comments, however, were refreshingly honest in acknowledging the limitations of American power and influence and even broke new ground on a number of important subjects.

Obama returned to the theme that characterized his last major Middle East policy speech, on the Libyan intervention: the intersection, and often tension, between American interests and values. He wisely chose not to proffer a facile panacea that would almost certainly have proven unworkable.

Obama was strikingly frank in acknowledging that many Arabs feel the United States has pursued its interests “at their expense.” And he bluntly stated that “there will be times when our short-term interests do not align perfectly with our long-term vision of the region,” recognizing that there is no clear and consistent formula for resolving the ongoing contradictions between U.S. values and the aspirations of Arab peoples with some of Washington’s interests and alliances that are still considered indispensable.

Perhaps the most important change in tone in this regard was on Bahrain, where Obama condemned the crackdown in much stronger terms than the United States has to date. He called for dialogue but noted “you can’t have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail.” Even more striking, he compared the persecution of Copts in Egypt with that of Shiites in Bahrain, a stronger statement than anyone had anticipated. His remarks implicitly recognized the limitations of American influence with its own allies.

This statement is unlikely to be welcomed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council members, whose perceptions have become increasingly at odds with new American approaches to the Arab world, particularly when the Obama administration urged the ouster of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak over vociferous Saudi objections. Nonetheless, as the Associated Press reported today, despite these disagreements, U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation is expanding, including the creation of a new “facilities security force” to protect petroleum and other key installations in the kingdom.

Obama’s promise of debt forgiveness to Egypt and expanded trade and development programs across the region will be broadly welcomed, as will his commitment to work with Arab reformers and civil-society groups seeking change. In most cases, including Syria, he stopped short of calling for regime change, but suggested that Bashar al-Assad has to either reform or “get out of the way,” again the strongest U.S. statement thus far.

On the most sensitive subject of all, Palestine, Obama reiterated familiar U.S. policies in support of a two-state solution and criticized Israeli settlement building. This is noteworthy since the Israeli government just announced major new settlement expansion projects in extremely sensitive areas around occupied East Jerusalem, the continuation of a pattern of such announcements timed to coincide with major meetings with American officials.

Obama bluntly stated that the continuation of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state cannot be fulfilled with permanent occupation.” At the same time, he warned Palestinians against efforts to delegitimize Israel and correctly pointed out that symbolic measures in the United Nations would not create a Palestinian state. Obama’s invocation of the 1967 borders recalls President George W. Bush’s 2005 statement that any changes to the 1949 Armistice lines would have to be agreed by both parties. Obama insisted that “Palestinians should know the territorial outlines of their state,” and suggested that the issues of borders and security should be dealt with first, and that such understandings would be the basis for progress on other permanent status issues. Neither side seems fully comfortable with such an approach.

Significantly, Obama did not close the door on working with a new Palestinian unity government, saying that the Fatah-Hamas agreement raised “profound and legitimate questions” for which Palestinians will have to provide “a credible answer.” This is a far cry from Israel’s blanket rejection of anything springing from the agreement, although it places the onus on the new Palestinian government to satisfy American and international expectations on its commitment to peace with Israel and the rejection of violence.

In essence, the vision of peace Obama reiterated was nothing particularly new for American policy, but it was considerably at odds with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent speech at the Knesset. Netanyahu demanded as a prerequisite that Palestinians recognize Israel as “the nation state of the Jewish people,” implying transhistorical and metaphysical national rights in this territory for all Jews around the world, whether or not they are Israelis. He virtually ruled out any compromise on Jerusalem, spoke of annexing settlement blocs and insisted on a “long-term IDF presence along the Jordan River,” ideas that are clearly at odds with Obama’s vision of a “sovereign and contiguous [Palestinian] state.”

The most important message Obama communicated on Palestine is that he believes a peace agreement is “more urgent than ever,” suggesting that in spite of the growing complications and the looming presidential election of 2012, his administration will continue to look for opportunities for progress.

There was a great deal to both please and annoy almost all concerned parties, and Netanyahu has already signaled his displeasure with the 1967 lines. But it was not a bad step forward: Within the constraints of U.S. interests and the limitations of its power, Obama offered a number of important commitments that can, in fact, be fulfilled, and that help to place the United States more on the side of the aspirations of the Arab peoples than it ever has been in the past.

http://www.forward.com/articles/137976/

Many Jewish Israelis and their supporters have reacted with outrage to a New York Times Op-Ed on May 17 by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, particularly its invocation of the Palestinian historical narrative. Most troubling to them was Abbas’s description of how his family was “forced” to flee their home in what became Israel in 1948 — a word choice they feel implies that Abbas and his family were evicted by Jewish troops.

Abbas did not make any such claim, of course. Palestinians did, as the historical record suggests, quite reasonably feel “forced” to flee a war zone even when they were not physically compelled to do so. But the focus on that one verb was also a distraction from the main point of his narrative: the ongoing denial of the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. This denial, which is unquestionably true, lies at the heart of the Palestinian refugee grievance. It is also a historical fact — confirmed even by Israeli leaders who personally participated in these actions like the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin — that many Palestinians were subjected to forced expulsions, even if Abbas’s family was not among them.

What this disingenuous uproar points to is the continued refusal by both Palestinians and Israelis to recognize each other’s narratives as legitimate and to insist that their version of history alone is truthful.

Both sides fundamentally regard each other as interlopers. Modern Jews, particularly Jewish Israelis, see themselves as the sole heirs of the biblical Hebrews, and tend to view that ancient history as a metaphysical deed to the entirety of the land. They also tend to see Palestinian history as beginning with the Muslim conquest of Palestine, and sometimes dismiss most Palestinians as recent arrivals drawn to the area by the benefits of Jewish immigration in the 20th century. Palestinians typically consider themselves to be the descendants of all of the ancient peoples of the land, including the biblical Hebrews, and often question the lineal descent of modern Jews from the biblical Hebrews. They sometimes cast Jewish Israelis simply as colonialists and question key aspects of the Jewish historical narrative.

Israeli leaders have a long history of denying not only Palestinian history, but also Palestinian identity, such as Golda Meir’s infamous comment that there was no such thing as a Palestinian people. Palestinians, of course, have consistently returned the favor, frequently implying that Jews are a religious community but not a coherent national or ethnic group with the right of self-determination.

The truth elided by both parties is that the Palestinian and Israeli identities are 20th-century phenomena that emerged in parallel and in contradiction to each other. One hundred years ago, the words “Israeli” and “Palestinian” were meaningless. This is not to say that Arabs and Jews don’t have deep histories, but both political identities are recent constructs, forged in the context of the ongoing conflict.

Palestinian and Israeli national narratives both contain elements of the truth but they are tendentious and dismiss crucial and undeniable, but inconvenient, historical facts that are crucial to the other party’s identity. It is impossible, in the foreseeable future, for these narratives to be reconciled. Jewish Israelis will not become Palestinian nationalists, and Palestinians will not become Zionists.

One of the reasons that the two-state solution is the only way out of the conflict is that it would allow the two national projects and narratives to coexist in separate states. Rather than trying to base a resolution on arriving at one mutually accepted understanding of history, a two-state solution would also be a tacit acceptance that there are two mutually exclusive narratives, but this should not prevent each side from achieving some compromised version of its national aspirations.

Ultimately, it will be necessary for Palestinians to acknowledge the deep Jewish attachment to the land and for Israelis to acknowledge that the Palestinians are indeed its indigenous people, with not only civil and religious rights, but national ones as well.

But Prime Minister Netanyahu’s demand that Palestinians recognize Israel as “the nation-state of the Jewish people” is implausible because it implies a permanent, metaphysical national right belonging to all Jews in the world, whether or not they are Israelis. However, language in which Palestinians recognize a Jewish right of self-determination in the State of Israel and Israelis recognize the Palestinian right of self-determination on what are now the occupied territories, is almost certainly a prerequisite for the conclusion of a viable peace agreement.

Such reciprocal recognition of self-determination in two states will probably have to come at the end of negotiations, rather than as a prerequisite for them. The core final status issues, like refugees and Jerusalem, cannot be bypassed or foreclosed first.

The ultimate goal of a two-state solution, however, must be not only two states for two peoples but also two states that will each embody an expression of their respective people’s national and historical narratives, two stories that will coexist without one needing to negate the other.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/sometimes_silence_says_it_best

On numerous occasions during the ongoing turmoil in the Arab World, I’ve been accused by friend and foe alike of engaging in “conspicuous silence.” Commentators, particularly in the age of the internet and cable television, are expected by news organizations and consumers to provide instant analysis on anything and everything. But sometimes the only honest and intelligent thing to say is very little, or even nothing.

The most recent instance was the accusation that I’ve been “conspicuously silent” about the unrest in Syria. As a matter of fact I haven’t been all that silent, particularly on social media and television, but I haven’t written an extended analysis of the Syrian situation either. This is because, like the early phases of the uprising in Egypt, the situation is extremely fluid, and even the identity of the key players in the uprising is not entirely clear.

There is a lot that can and has been usefully written about Syria, including backgrounders on key regime or opposition figures, and historical context. But the situation is so murky and fluid that a sustained or serious analysis is practically impossible. Not only have I not written one, I haven’t read one either.

What most people really want, of course, is an expression of moral indignation with the brutality and intransigence of the ghastly dictatorship in Damascus. That virtually goes without saying, and it’s largely what I’ve supplied on social media and television. But such an approach is no substitute for an evaluation. In fact, all analyses of the Syrian situation I have encountered are phony, ideological, aspirational or facile.

One could observe that we will probably witness a period of extended violence after which the Assad regime either survives, intact or in a modified form, or doesn’t. Or one could say the most crucial factor is the Syrian armed forces, and that if the regime can hold it together and keep it loyal, the Assads are likely to survive in power at least for the foreseeable future. Or one could warn about the dangers of sectarian strife, or the potential role of Islamist extremists.

But all of these statements are obvious and quite unenlightening, and none qualifies as worth reading or writing. As for predictions, under such circumstances–when the opposition is largely leaderless and without a clear ideology and the internal cohesion of the regime is unclear–they are the surest manifestation of a shameless charlatan.

Resisting the demand for instant analysis becomes all the more difficult when questions arise in one’s particular area of focus, and I’ve been dealing with that in the aftermath of the Fatah-Hamas national reconciliation agreement. The simple fact is that what has been agreed is obviously very vague and not precisely known, and how it will be implemented – indeed how much of the accord could possibly work – remains a complete mystery.

Virtually no specifics are clear, including the international and regional reaction, which party really has the upper hand, or what the impact will be on Palestinian national strategy in the long run. There is also no way of telling at this stage whether the agreement will be a political accommodation, bring about real national unity, or whether it is simply a temporary political gimmick. It seems clear that even the parties themselves are not quite sure, and they appear to have agreed to sign a document without knowing exactly what the outcome will look like. My conversations with people who ought to know strongly suggest that even they really don’t.

Because the specifics are entirely unknown, a serious evaluation is quite impossible at the moment. I’ve disappointed numerous editors and publications in recent days by refusing to proffer a facile rush to judgment, and on radio and television I have limited myself to saying why it’s too early analyze its nature or implications.

As a commentator, you’re not supposed to do that. You’re supposed to pretend to understand everything right away. You’re expected to produce instant analysis of whatever happens or whatever you’re asked about, even if the basic actors or ideologies in an uprising can’t be readily identified, or the essential outlines of an agreement are totally unclear.

I was once seated in front of a camera on a major American cable news network about to be interviewed about Islamophobia in Hollywood films when the US Federal Reserve cut the prime interest rate. I was asked if I would come back the next day for the scheduled interview, but also offered 5 minutes to comment on the new rate. I declined.

This seems to me a perfect example of the kind of all-purpose punditry that is both accepted and expected by news content producers and consumers alike. But honesty and seriousness demand that sometimes conspicuous silence, rather than empty posturing, is the only honorable, and indeed meaningful, commentary.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/dont_downplay_osamas_death

One of the oddest elements of US President Barack Obama’s announcement of the killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was a rush by many noted Middle East experts to downplay or dismiss the significance of this achievement. As rumors of the American accomplishment circulated in the hour before Obama’s speech, and immediately afterward, many commentators rushed to claim that bin Laden was essentially an irrelevant figure and that his death would change nothing significant in Middle East politics.

These claims are misguided. Even though it’s true that bin Laden’s politics have become increasingly unappealing to the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, and Al Qaeda has played no role at all in the “Arab Spring,” not even knowing how to react to it rhetorically, this analysis fails to recognize the importance of narratives.

For militant and extremist groups, defeat is disastrous, and this is an enormous defeat for Al Qaeda. The group’s political fortunes were moribund following the rapid overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and were revived only by the ill-considered invasion of Iraq, which gave it a new battleground, rationalization and lease on life for a number of years.

The loss of this vital symbolic figure, no matter how impotent he had become in reality, will undoubtedly be another significant blow to Salafist-Jihadist ideology. They may have gained a martyr, but they’ve lost the image of a defiant leader able to combat the Soviet Union and America alike with impunity. His deputy, the Egyptian fanatic Ayman Zawahiri, lacks the charismatic appeal bin Laden had among certain extremists, and he has no apparent successor.

By contrast, this is a colossal victory not just for the United States but for Obama himself. The president faces significant challenges to reelection next year, most particularly economic challenges, and above all continuing high rates of unemployment. However, it will now be impossible for Republicans to seriously harass him on national security grounds. A second Obama term seems increasingly likely. Even if there is a violent response by bin Laden’s followers, most Americans will chalk this up as the inevitable price of a much-cherished and long-overdue accomplishment.

Along with economic problems, the most serious threat to Obama’s possible reelection was always the possibility of another major terrorist attack against the United States. That issue is now effectively off the table, since he can claim to be responsible for what former President George W. Bush was unable to do in seven years: bring the chief architect of the 9/11 attacks to justice. A violent response would be more likely to unite Americans behind their president than undermine his national security credentials, as another major terrorist attack otherwise would have.

Those in the Arab world, most notably Hamas, who mourn the loss of bin Laden and praise him as a “holy warrior,” are damaging their credibility with both Westerners and Muslims alike. Similarly, Western apologists for Hamas who argue that the organization is, at heart, “moderate” and simply reacting to an ongoing Israeli occupation and siege have been exposed as foolish dupes of a genuinely extremist organization with repugnant views.

The rush to dismiss the importance of bin Laden’s death is born of three major impulses. First, there is a desire among some to try to demonstrate their sophistication by proffering faux-counterintuitive analysis to what is obviously an extremely important development to say the least. This is fake “insight” posing as special expertise.

Second, there’s an ongoing impulse by some to deny the importance of extremist elements in the Islamic world. Although they’re small and fringe, the Salafist-Jihadist movement, of which Al Qaeda has been the vanguard, have a disproportionate impact because of their willingness to kill and die without restraint. The fact that most people in the Arab and Muslim world can’t stand them doesn’t mean they don’t have a constituency or an impact. Denying this is pointless, but some analysts seem to have a real investment in it.

Finally, there’s an element of undisguised and unworthy disappointment in some circles. Some right-wing supporters of Bush are desperately trying to spin this as a belated Bush victory, and deprive Obama of the credit. Others, particularly on the extreme left, are simply allergic to any major American foreign policy success. And there are those who are, or at least should be, embarrassed by the reaction of Hamas and other extremist groups and therefore wish to dismiss the entire affair as largely irrelevant.

The fact is, however, because narratives are important, given that politics is largely based on perceptions and symbols, the significance of this development can hardly be overstated. Barack Obama and his administration deserve unqualified praise, and that should come first and foremost from the hundreds of millions of Arabs and Muslims around the world who were the first and primary targets in Osama bin Laden’s vicious crosshairs.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/avoiding_a_fiasco

US President Barack Obama is being attacked from every possible direction over his policy of limited military engagement in Libya.

Because Muammar Qaddafi’s regime in Tripoli has not yet been overthrown and Libya appears to be stuck in a stalemated civil war, the cry of “fiasco” is unfairly ringing across the political spectrum.

Opponents of the no-fly zone say the policy has failed because it was a muted instance of imperial hubris: the US butting in where it isn’t needed or wanted. Many who supported it now say Qaddafi’s survival demonstrates that the policy was under, rather than over, ambitious.

Some want all action to stop. Others are nudging the West toward an ill-advised ground invasion.

These critics almost always ignore Obama’s stated goals for the intervention in Libya. He laid out a set of criteria for military engagement when American security isn’t directly threatened: a confluence of “values” with “interests.” Addressing a skeptical public, Obama stressed “values”: The prevention of a probable massacre in Benghazi and saving lives by attacking government heavy weaponry.

But he was also clear that the US had an “interest” in preventing Qaddafi from achieving a clear-cut victory by overrunning Benghazi and consolidating his power.

Critics of Obama’s limited engagement policy either suggest it was intended to lead to the rapid overthrow of Qaddafi, or that the US doesn’t know what it’s doing and essentially has no coherent policy.

Both are wrong.

Obama and his advisers are undoubtedly aware that air power alone has never resolved any conflict, and it is unlikely that they had any abiding faith in the ability of rebels to transform the air intervention into a rapid victory. Obama never spoke in those terms, and there’s no indication he was thinking in them either. The limited aim of the no-fly zone is not to produce, in short order or definitively, Qaddafi’s defeat and ouster, since air power obviously cannot do that. Its narrow goal is rather to prevent a Qaddafi victory.

As for saving lives, what might have happened in Benghazi without the no-fly zone intervention is speculation, but there’s every reason to think that many more people would have been killed in Libya without it, based on Qaddafi’s own words and deeds. Denying him a significant percentage of his heavy weaponry and eroding it further on a daily basis has undoubtedly blunted his ability to kill people, as he frankly boasted, “house by house.”

The no-fly zone hasn’t saved every life, and Obama never said it would.

But it’s hard to argue it hasn’t saved many. It might be possible to claim that by preventing a decisive Qaddafi victory a few weeks ago, the no-fly zone helped produce a stalemated civil war that could drag on, thereby leading to many otherwise avoidable deaths. That’s plausible, but anyone saying so would have to acknowledge up front that they are advocating allowing Qaddafi to fully retake control of his country, have his way with his rebellious cities and provinces, and reemerge as a menace to the region and possibly the world.

Those who argue for a ground intervention are basically advocating that Obama turn Libya into his own Iraq. They should remember Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn rule,” which invasion, but not a no-fly zone, engages: “If you break it, you own it.” Among other things, it would deprive Libyans of the ability to shape their own future independently and require the West to play a much larger role in developing it than anyone should be comfortable with. Every indication suggests large majorities of both Libyans and Americans do not want any such engagement. It is unnecessary and would be extremely unwise.

That said, supporters of Obama’s limited engagement policy in Libya must acknowledge that it might mean living with, or even enabling, a protracted civil war, a stalemate and possibly a temporary but prolonged de facto division of Libya.

At first glance, that seems a hard position to defend. But it can only be contrasted with the alternatives of having done nothing or an all-out invasion. For all its flaws, the limited policy avoids the likely disasters, or at least major problems, emerging from both of those approaches.

More should be done, and there are ongoing efforts to arm, train and otherwise assist the rebels, including $25 million in US “nonlethal aid” (in wartime, an illusory concept). Such steps are consistent with the logic of Obama’s limited engagement.

The policy avoids two obviously unacceptable scenarios – Qaddafi victory or Western invasion – in favor of one that isn’t pretty but is preferable to the really-existing alternatives.

That’s not a hallmark of a failed or incoherent policy, but a realistic and mature one. Any approach that prudently avoids disasters, and embraces the bad in preference to the worse, when no better options are evident, deserves support.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/iran_and_the_arab_spring

As anti-government protests are sweeping the Arab world, it’s easy to forget that less than two years ago Arabs looked on in amazement as the people of Iran took to the streets to demand their rights.

Following an obviously rigged election in the summer of 2009, the Iranian “Green Movement” – which united conservatives, and even Islamists, disenchanted with the regime with opposition groups of various kinds – formed as a nonviolent civil rights movement. Many Arab commentators, myself included, wrote about why this apparently could happen in Iran but not in Arab states, and asked what it would take for Arabs to emulate the Iranian example.

Iran’s Green Movement has been successfully repressed, while the momentum of popular struggle for political freedoms unexpectedly shifted to the Arab world at the end of last year. And while the Iranian movement appears dormant, at least for now, patience is the watchword of opponents of the regime.

I recently took part in a panel in Washington DC on a new book, The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future, an important collection of contemporaneous responses and interventions to four different stages in Iran’s Green Movement, edited by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel. Joining me were BBC World Service reporter Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar and Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council.

The most interesting part of the conversation, for me at least, was our discussion about the relationship between the Arab uprisings and both Iranian foreign policy and the future of the Green Movement.

Parsi offered a fairly subtle analysis that focused on the rise of Turkish influence in the Middle East as a rival, but not an outright enemy, of Iran. He suggested that a combination of competition and cooperation between those two states could offer a degree of stability in the region, especially since, he argued, they had a history of managing disputes by containing them and avoiding outright confrontation.

Parsi also suggested that not only might the rule of hard-liners in the Iranian government be undermined by democratization in the Arab world, it could also be weakened by an application of Turkish “soft power” in the region. Here he saw powerful implications of ongoing events in the Middle East for the Green Movement over the long run, and potential opportunities to push reform in Tehran.

Tabaar emphasized the patience of the Green Movement and the commitment of almost all of its factions not to push the country into chaos or uncontrolled revolutionary change. He also noted that, partly because of the fallout from the Green Movement, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was becoming increasingly isolated from the ruling faction and shifting his positions in an effort to avoid marginalization.

Both Parsi and Tabaar agreed that the Iranian ruling faction views the Arab uprisings as part of an “Islamic awakening” and expects to benefit greatly from changes in the Arab world. I suggested there were many reasons to doubt this.

Islamist ideology has not informed most of the Arab uprisings so far.

While Sunni Arab Islamists might benefit from opened political space and elections in countries like Egypt, they might well not come to power. If they do, they might be politically or constitutionally constrained in their use of it. Even if they are unimpeded, they might nonetheless not be particularly friendly toward Tehran because of sectarian suspicions or national interests. The idea that Islamists will cooperate across ideological and national divisions no matter what isn’t any more realistic than the early 20th century fantasy that all Communist states would pursue harmonious foreign policies.

Moreover, the latest wave of the “Arab Spring” is rapidly threatening the stability of the government of Iran’s closest and most important Arab ally, Syria. Everything is in play in the Arab world. All groups in power, and all assets every party believes it possesses, are potentially at risk because most of this change is uncontrolled and undirected. Even Iran’s most obvious new opportunity for advancing its interests in the Arab world – Bahrain – has yet to deliver much to Tehran other than the embarrassment of invoking the rights of Bahraini protesters with memories of the violent crushing of the Green Movement so fresh.

The fact is that in spite of Arab unrest and the optimism of the Iranian ruling faction, they have not yet accrued a single tangible, strategic or stable benefit from these uprisings. The entire panel agreed that, whatever the fantasies or expectations of the Iranian regime, the “Arab Spring” offers at least as many challenges to their agenda as it does opportunities. And, in the long run, it may well help breathe new life into the dormant Green Movement. The demand for reform, which spread from Iran to the Arab world, may soon enough swing back in the direction of Tehran.