The Biden administration has stopped complaining about oil production cuts and did the Saudis favors on Yemen aid and a Khashoggi lawsuit.
After weeks of recriminations between Washington and Riyadh following the Saudi-led OPEC+ production cut on Oct. 5, it appears that the longstanding partnership has weathered this storm and is quietly emerging stronger than ever.
The most recent indication of improved relations was an intervention by the White House, threatening a presidential veto, forcing Senators to put off a vote on a bill banning US support for Saudi military activities in Yemen.
President Joe Biden’s administration cited language that would define intelligence sharing and support operations as “hostilities,” saying this could severely damage US support for Ukraine and other partners such as Israel. This is pretty much sophistry: The proposed legislation deals specifically with US-Saudi relations. In truth, the White House’s objections just made the case for preserving the defense relationship with Saudi Arabia, including in Yemen.
There is a growing understanding in the administration and among some in Congress that the main obstacle to a lasting cease-fire in Yemen comes from Iran-backed Houthi militants rather than Saudi Arabia. More important, most of those serious about US global strategy have realized that a vital American competitive advantage depends on preserving security in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian and Red Seas — in particular, the chokepoints of the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz.
Anger over oil pricing has also subsided. The most recent OPEC+ meeting, on Dec. 4, ended with an agreement to continue the reduced production quotas set in October. But this time there was no US backlash. That’s because the Saudis proved correct that production reductions would not cause prices to soar.
The current price per gallon at pumps around the US is politically and economically acceptable to the administration. Fears that the Russian economy would be unduly strengthened didn’t materialize. (Russia is the “plus” in OPEC+.)
The October quarrel was also linked to the midterm elections, with many Democrats suspecting, without evidence, that Riyadh was attempting to help Republicans. Given that the Democrats overperformed spectacularly, those misgivings became moot. The Saudis would have figured prominently in any blame game following a Democratic debacle, but that didn’t happen.
Even the much-ballyhooed state visit to Saudi Arabia by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, accompanied by a long list of mutual cooperation agreements between the two countries, appears to have done little to antagonize Washington. While the US rightly regards its presence in the Gulf region and surrounding areas as key leverage in great-power competition with Beijing, it doesn’t have a problem with its Gulf Arab partners strengthening ties with their biggest customer, at least to some degree.
As long as China-Gulf Arab relations are based on commerce, investment and even infrastructure projects that don’t have potential military or intelligence uses, such agreements are tolerable to Washington. Indeed, they help undermine the China-Iran partnership that’s a long-term concern to the US. And while we haven’t seen all the details, nothing that’s known thus far about the new Saudi-Chinese agreements touches any third rails.
There have been other signs of better relations. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates reportedly played a key role in mediating the prisoner exchange that freed US basketball star Brittney Griner from a Russian prison. In early November, US jets were scrambled in an assertive flight toward Iran that apparently deterred a planned attack against Saudi Arabia.
And on Nov. 18, the Biden administration ruled that, as a foreign head of government, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has immunity from civil lawsuits in US courts — in this instance, regarding a suit related to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018.
In sum: Over the last few months US-Saudi ties have passed a series of significant tests, any of which could have done considerable long-term damage. But behind the scenes, the relationship is not only repairing, it’s being reconceptualized on both sides in a way that should make it stronger.
No longer is it simply a matter of trading oil for security, rendering Saudi Arabia, as some hostile members of Congress put it in October, a “client state.” Even if that was never fully true, there is a growing understanding among national security professionals on both sides that this is a relationship of partners seeking mutual goals, such as maritime security that benefit both, with significant burden sharing.
That’s a far more sustainable basis for cooperation in an increasingly multipolar era. Ironically, it has quietly taken root just when many thought the US-Saudi partnership was in its death throes.