Today’s BBC headline says it all: “Egypt crisis: Morsi accused of plotting with Hamas.” In other words, just when you thought things couldn’t get any worse for Hamas, they suddenly did.

Former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi has been arrested on a variety of charges, mainly to do with alleged crimes in collusion with Hamas. The accusations include several attacks on various prisons, including a 2011 jailbreak in which Morsi escaped. Morsi isspecifically charged with collaborating with Hamas “to carry out anti-state acts, attacking police stations and army officers and storming prisons, setting fire to one prison and enabling inmates to flee, including himself, as well as premeditated killing of officers, soldiers and prisoners.” Heady stuff to say the least.

Yesterday in Open Zion, I explained how the Egyptian military, government and a significant percent of the population see Hamas as an integral part of a wide-ranging security crisis. This includes the ongoing and intensifying insurgency by “Jihadist” militants in Sinai, which continues to deteriorate. Hamas is widely believed to have an ongoing cooperative relationship with these extremists, to the detriment of Egyptian national security, and some 35 of its fighters are said to have been killed when the Egyptian counteroffensive began two weeks ago.

That the Sinai insurgency exploded with unparalleled fury immediately after the ouster of Morsi fueled heavy suspicions on the part of many in Egypt that the former president was giving the extremists “a free hand” in Sinai and that Hamas was deeply involved in fueling this crisis. The Egyptian authorities are facing a two-front battle involving Muslim Brotherhood supporters and opponents in competing protests and street clashes, as well as the Sinai insurgency.

Alarm has intensified given a bomb attack on Wednesday against the police headquarters in the city of Mansoura, which killed one soldier and injured 28 others. The bottom line concern is that coordinated, armed anti-government violence seems to be spreading from the Sinai periphery into more central parts of Egypt, and that such violence is at least parallel to, or at worst dovetailing with, unrest stoked by angry Muslim Brotherhood supporters.

Reports that Brotherhood officials have assured local elders that attacks in Sinai would stop if Morsi were reinstated as president reinforce the idea that there is an ideological and, indeed, operational connection between the Brotherhood and the Sinai extremists. Army Chief of Staff General Abdel Fattah Sisi has declared a “war on terrorism,” which seems to be something of a catchall, including Brotherhood violent protests or rioting, attacks such as the bombing of the police station in Mansoura and violent actions by radicals in Sinai. At least from the point of view of the Egyptian state, and much of it society, these are not merely parallel crises, but interconnected ones.

It is into this maelstrom that Hamas has allowed itself—and consequently the long-suffering Palestinian residents of Gaza—to be drawn as a key element. They are at least a crucial secondary target of all of the Egyptian authorities’ security and counterterrorism measures. Most Gaza smuggling tunnels have been destroyed. The border crossing with Egypt is essentially closed. Fuel, food, construction materials, medical and other supplies, and all necessary goods are reaching a crisis level of shortage in Gaza. And in the latest punitive measure from Egyptian authorities, Gaza fishermen are now banned for the first time from Egyptian territorial waters, a move clearly linked to the intensifying tensions with Hamas and framed, naturally, in terms of “national security.”

‘But, rather than reassessing their policies, or repositioning themselves given the dire crisis they, and the Palestinians living under their rule, now face, Hamas seems to have inexplicably decided to double-down on their relationship with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in general, and Morsi in particular.

Hamas understands full well that the charges brought against Morsi center almost entirely around their relationship with him. Of course they vociferously deny any involvement in the 2011 jailbreak or any other form of “interference” in internal Egyptian affairs, including in Sinai. The problem is that there is an enormous amount of both direct and circumstantial evidence to the contrary.

But, astonishingly, rather than distancing themselves from the crisis, Hamas leaders have intensified their engagement in it. A Hamas spokesman actually said, in response to the charges against Morsi, “Hamas condemns this move since it is based on the premise that the Hamas movement is hostile” to Egypt. As if that were not provocative enough, he continued, “This is a dangerous development, which confirms that the current powers in Egypt are giving up on national causes and even using these issues to deal with other parties—first among them the Palestinian cause.”

So rather than trying to adjust to the new situation, ways of easing tensions with the Egyptian government and military, and ease the political crisis facing Hamas is a movement, not to mention the humanitarian and economic crisis people of Gaza as a population, Hamas’ leaders have decided the best move at the current stage is to reinforce their association with Morsi and take a hostile and belligerent attitude towards the new Egyptian government.

It may be ideologically consistent, but this approach is strategically incomprehensible. It can only further deepen the crisis that has been intensifying without respite for Hamas since Morsi’s downfall.

The new Egyptian authorities are playing a game of chicken with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has been hoping to mobilize popular outrage against the military and has been pushing a narrative of unlawful “usurpation of legitimacy” based on democratic elections, backed up by “massacres” against peaceful Islamist protesters. So far, there is every indication that the overwhelming bulk of the Egyptian public isn’t buying it at all.

It’s possible that with the intensifying crackdown on the Brotherhood leadership, the government may be going too far. But so far, that doesn’t seem to have happened. In so far as they are associated in the public mind, fairly or unfairly, with the Mansoura police station bombing, and with riots and unrest, the Brotherhood’s popular credibility appears to be tanking even further than ever. Heated rhetoric about “martyrdom” and “civil war” from Brotherhood firebrands may be tasty raw meat for their enraged rank-and-file, but they alienate and, indeed terrify, the vast majority of Egyptians.

But even if the military and the government and up overplaying their hand in a crackdown against the Brotherhood and others, it’s still almost inconceivable to construct a scenario in which the Muslim Brotherhood returns to a position of government power in Egypt anytime in the foreseeable future. The Army’s loss is not necessarily the Brotherhood’s gain. Those could end up badly discredited in public opinion, but the military and the government are in a much stronger position at least over the medium run, and, indeed, into the foreseeable future.

It would be fascinating to learn what is going on in the heads of Hamas leaders who appear to be bending over backwards to insure that they are high on the list of targets of Egypt’s new “war on terrorism.” That they are at the center of the charges the authorities decided to file against Morsi today, especially considering that there were many other potential accusations that could have been lodged against him instead, puts them on clear notice that they are very much in the line of fire. Yet they don’t seem to be interested in finding a way to get themselves, or the people of Gaza, out of the crosshairs. On the contrary, their current attitude seems to be “bring it on.”

It’s unfathomable, and because they are directly responsible for the well-being of the people of Gaza, unforgivably irresponsible.

Except when they have come under direct Israeli bombardment or attack, the Palestinian residents of Gaza have rarely suffered more from Hamas’ mistakes and misrule than they do now. A low-level insurgency by extremists in the Sinai Peninsula, which has been going on for at least two years, erupted with much greater intensity following the ouster of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.

The Egyptian military claims that Morsi was essentially giving “a free hand” to the Sinai extremists and that this may have contributed to his ouster. The army has now launched amassive counteroffensive, without Israeli opposition, in the restive areas of Sinai, including much of its northern section and the border region with Gaza.

The Egyptian military, government and much of its public strongly suspects Hamas has been involved with the Sinai extremists in one capacity or another and regards any porous qualities to the border area as a key strategic asset of the insurgents. This is based on a great deal of highly suggestive evidence of collusion and collaboration, including Egyptian military claims that 34 Hamas members were killed in the initial fighting when they began their new campaign.

Therefore, Hamas is a crucial secondary target of the Egyptian military counteroffensive against the extremists. And it is the economy and people of Gaza that are paying the price. This has meant the shutting down of an estimated 80 percent of all Gaza smuggling tunnels, at least 850 of them in the past two weeks. It’s estimated that these closures cost the Gaza economy at least $230 million in June alone, and that number is quickly rising.

Additionally, Egyptian restrictions on the movement of people and goods through the Rafah crossing have never been tighter. The border is now generally closed, and occasionally and temporarily opened to allow stranded Palestinians to return to their homes in Gaza—or for a much smaller group, to leave them and enter Egypt, generally for certified medical or other exceptional reasons.

Reconstruction and new construction in Gaza is at a standstill. Few Gaza businesses remain unaffected by the economic crisis, and Gaza’s dependency on Palestinian public sector employee salaries, which are not paid by Hamas but by the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, has become even greater than ever.

And while the people of Gaza suffer because of its policies, Hamas has entered the greatest political crisis since its founding in 1987. The overthrow of Morsi has created a generalized crisis of credibility, authority and confidence for Sunni Arab Islamists generally, and Muslim Brotherhood parties in particular. Hamas is the hardest hit of them all.

The organization’s strategic posture is now totally untenable. In the context of the Syrian conflict it was forced to choose between its alliance with Tehran and Damascus and its affiliation with the regional Muslim Brotherhood movement. Since the Syrian Brotherhood was one of the key groups in the anti-regime uprising in Syria, Hamas could not stay neutral. Under the direction of its political leaders, especially Khaled Mishaal and his deputy Mousa Abu Marzouk, Hamas chose to essentially abandon its relationship with Damascus and flee Syria, and greatly reduce its political ties to Tehran.

Instead, it sought funding from Qatar and Turkey, and political and logistical support from the now-overthrown Muslim Brotherhood government in Cairo. They never got much support from the Morsi government except kind words, tea and sympathy. During his rule, the Egyptian military clamped down on the border area and the smuggling tunnels moreharshly than they had during the former dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak.

Nonetheless, Hamas hoped and expected that eventually the Islamist regime in Egypt would create more amenable policies, and that this would be linked to the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood governments in many other Arab states.

Those hopes are now dashed. On the contrary, the new Egyptian government is, if anything, openly hostile to Hamas. They are being investigated not only for colluding and collaborating with Sinai extremists, but for various forms of “interference in internal Egyptian affairs.” One example of this is the investigation that has been launched into their alleged participation in a 2011 jailbreak that freed Morsi and a number of other key Islamist prisoners. Hamas angrily denies any “interference” in Egyptian affairs, understanding that this perception is not only exceptionally dangerous in Egypt, but also in the broader Arab world.

Several authorities in the United Arab Emirates, for example, have accused the Muslim Brotherhood movement in general, of plotting to overthrow the governments there and take control of that confederation and its vast oil wealth. The sense that most of the Arab regimes and much of the Arab public that the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is essentially a predatory and subversive one greatly undermines the prospects for greater regional support for Hamas.

There are elements in Hamas that were never happy with the break with Iran and have tried to keep ties open in spite of the decisions of the Political Bureau leadership. Gaza firebrand Mahmoud Zahar—who was openly critical of the Politburo on multiple issues—was removed from the leadership group, partly because of his opposition to the decision to radically distance the group from Iran. And behind the scenes Marwan Issa, leader of the paramilitary Qassam Brigades, worked to keep ties open and weapons coming from Iran despite the political differences.

These leaders, and others who questioned the Politburo’s massive gamble are now in a position to gloat over being right. But the essential conditions that led Hamas to realign itself with the Sunni Muslim states remain in place. Reviving the alliance with Iran would be not only slow and difficult, it would also alienate the few patrons and options, still has left. Doha is rumored to have significantly reduced aid, but continues to fund Hamas. And now, the beleaguered Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is in such grave political difficulty at home that he might find positioning himself as the champion of Hamas and Palestinian resistance an attractive prospect.

But these are fairly small comforts and slim hopes. The soft power of Qatari cash and Turkish diplomatic and financial support means little compared to the hard power of the Egyptian army, which controls the only border Hamas can access other than those dominated by Israel. Indeed, in recent months, Egyptian lack of cooperation, even under Morsi, was so great that Hamas had to rely on expanded exports to Europe and other markets through crossings controlled by Israel; essentially asking and receiving Israeli permission for their economy to function. Given Hamas’ stated positions regarding Israel, this was embarrassing and humiliating, but necessary.

Now the situation is totally out of control. Hamas is completely at odds with the new Egyptian government, increasingly unpopular with the Egyptian public, and has very few options left. For now its control of Gaza remains unchallenged. But if the situation continues to deteriorate, that could start to change quickly. Hamas has accused Egypt of wanting to resume the direct control of Gaza it had from 1948-1967.

No Egyptian government would possibly want or allow that. But even such a silly accusation reflects the growing sense among Hamas leaders that, like their erstwhile friend Mr. Morsi, their days in power may also be numbered.

Hamas is a total mess.

With the overthrow of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, and the accompanying crisis for Islamists across the region, the organization’s regional strategy lies in tatters. A year ago they were convinced they were on the cusp of a “green wave” of Islamist victories.

The Muslim Brotherhood victory in Egypt, they reasoned, was a harbinger of the Arab political future. Hamas expected the new Egyptian government to end its isolation, help it dominate Palestinian national movement, and transform its strategic relationship with Israel.

But none of that happened. Egypt continued to put its own national interests first. It maintained and even enhanced security cooperation with Israel, kept tight control over border crossings, and launched a campaign against smuggling tunnels, flooding them with raw sewage.

Yet the hope remained that all this was temporary. Eventually the Brotherhood would assert control and deliver a foreign and security policy favorable to Hamas. Even at its high point, that was exceptionally wishful thinking.

Now, however, with Morsi gone and the whole Islamist movement regionally in varying stages of shock and disarray, Hamas finds itself suddenly more isolated, divided, and hapless that it may have ever been since its founding in the late 1980s.

The new Egyptian government, and much of the public, take a decidedly dim view of Hamas. They see it as conniving in the low-level, but extremely dangerous, insurgency in Sinai that greatly intensified after Morsi’s overthrow. Hamas, and the Palestinians living under its misrule, have paid a heavy price for the Egyptian military counteroffensive against Sinai extremists. Egyptian forces reportedly killed 35 Hamas fighters and destroyed 850 smuggling tunnels. Fuel and other shortages, and a financial crisis, have consequently intensified in Gaza.

Egyptian anger is also stoked by a sense that Hamas may have been interfering even more deeply in internal Egyptian affairs, beyond Sinai and the border region. For example, Hamas is being investigated for its alleged participation in a 2011 jailbreak that freed Morsi and several other key Islamist prisoners.

Hamas knows how dangerous these Egyptian, and broader regional, perceptions about its connections to other extremist movements are. They reacted furiously to Fatah’s reference to this interference, calling it nothing short of “incitement.”

Along with the post-euphoric crash following Morsi’s downfall, and the death of the dream of an “Islamic Awakening,” Hamas must also cope with nostalgia about the “good old days” of the now long-lost “axis of resistance.” For most of the last decade, Hamas pulled off the unique and highly implausible balancing act of being both a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood party and a member of the pro-Iranian alliance simultaneously.

The civil war in Syria closed down any room for such a split identity, especially since the Brotherhood in Syria is a key component of the Syrian uprising. Hamas had to essentially choose between abandoning its longstanding headquarters in Damascus and patrons in Tehran, and gamble on the rising tide of Sunni Islamism in post-dictatorship Arab societies.

After much dispute, Hamas’ Political Bureau decided to basically turn its back on Damascus and Tehran, and seek other patrons. Khaled Mishaal was dispatched to Doha and Ankara in search of funding, and his deputy Mousa Abu Marzouk to Cairo for political and logistical support. Against strong opposition from some members, Hamas’ political leadership effectively put all their chips on 32 red in the great Middle East strategic roulette wheel. But the ball just landed on 23 white.

With a predictable degree of schadenfreude, political leaders like Mahmoud Zahar – who lost his seat on the Politburo for his opposition to this gamble – and Hamas’ paramilitary leader Marwan Issa – who never fully broke with the Iranian Republican Guard, as the rocket exchange with Israel last year demonstrated – can now turn to their colleagues and smugly crow: “I told you so.”

Now Hamas cannot really now turn back towards Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah and remain a viable part of the Sunni Muslim Arab world. But they may have one or two more chips yet to play.

Qatar has reportedly scaled back, but not cut off, funding for the group. And the embattled and increasingly desperate Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may now need them as much as they need him. There is always the possibility regional Islamists might make a comeback, including in Egypt. And their rivals in Fatah are facing significant difficulties of their own, although their options seem broader and more viable.

Lacking any obvious, immediate strategic alternatives, Hamas’ most likely response to this series of calamities is to once again hunker down and hold on to their dominance in Gaza purely on the basis of brute force and repression. And, once again, it will be the people of Gaza, and the Palestinian cause in general, that pay the price for their unending folly.

المعنى الحقيقي للإسلاموفوبيا ليس الهجوم على تعاليم وطقوس الدين الإسلامي. إنه الهجوم على المسلمين، بشراً ومجتمعات، خصوصاً منها تلك الجديدة، ولكن النامية، الموجودة في الغرب. وتهدف هذه الهجمات إلى تحديد قابلية هذه المجتمعات على لعب دور فعال في المجتمعات ذات التعددية، والمشاركة بشكل كامل في الثقافة والاقتصاد العالميين. اذا كان هذا هو تعريف الإسلاموفوبيا، إذن بالتأكيد نحن نحتاج إلى إجراء مراجعة لتعيين من هم أكثر المعادين للإسلام وأشدهم خطراً وتدميراً له.

لأول وهلة قد تعتقد أن الجواب عن هذا السؤال بديهي وبسيط. ولكنني أقول إنهم ليسوا من امتهنوا تشويه الإسلام والمسلمين مثل روبرت سبنسر الذي سخّر نفسه لهذا الهدف وكأنه أحد جنود الحروب الصليبية. وليسوا هم من اتخذوا هذا المجال هواية غبية مثل اليهودية الأميركية المتطرفة باميلا غيلار. وليسوا حتى أولئك العنصريين، ولو بصورة مخففة، من امثال الكوميدي الأميركي الليبرالي غير المتدين بل ماهر الذي يكره كل الأديان ولكنه يخصص نقده اللاذع للإسلام من دون الأديان الأخرى. وليس حتى السياسيين في الولايات المتحدة والدول الغربية الأخرى مثل بيتر كنغ او ميشيل باكمان الذين حاولوا أن يفوزوا بأصوات الناخبين من خلال طرح انفسهم الحماة ضد «الطابور الخامس المسلم.»

على الرغم من كل الأذى الذي يتسبب به المعادون التقليديون للإسلام فإن اكثرهم سوءاً – أو بالأحرى المعادين الحقيقيين للإسلام – لا بد أن يكونوا المتشددين الإسلاميين الدمويين الذين يغذّون مادة المعاداة للإسلام ويوفرون لها ذخيرتها الموضوعية في بعض الأحيان. مع ذلك فإنه من السخف أن يُساوى الإسلام مع الإرهاب وكأن الاثنين مترادفان، فهناك عدد لا يُحصى من الإرهابيين غير المسلمين ممن يمارسون العنف السياسي. ولا يجب أن ننسى أن المتشددين الإسلاميين الدمويين هم ليسوا فقط أقلية، بل أقلية داخل أقلية. إلا أن أفعالهم المدمرة تتسم بخصوصية لافتة في كونها تهدد، وأحياناً تنجح، في مفاقمة الخوف من المسلمين وزيادة الكراهية ضدهم في الغرب وحول العالم.

يبدو أن المفارقات ليس لها حدود في هذه النقطة، فمثلاً نقلت صحيفة «نيويورك تايمز» عن تامرلان تزارنييف، منفذ هجمات ماراثون بوسطن الإرهابية «إنه غاضب من تصوير العالم للإسلام بأنه دين عنف». لذلك قرر أن يثبت للعالم صحة رؤيته للإسلام بقتل ما يستطيع من المدنيين المنهمكين بممارسة الرياضة في ذلك اليوم.

وهنا تفوق تامرلان بضرره على الإسلام والمسلمين حتى على أولئك العنصريين الذين يصرخون بالويل والثبور ضد المسلمين وتجاوزت اساءته دعاية دعاة الكراهية ضد المسلمين أيضاً، فضرر هؤلاء يصغر أمام حجم الضرر الذي تسبب به تامرلان على القضية التي يدّعي الدفاع عنها، وهي سمعة الدين.

منذ ظهورهم في العصر الحديث، صنّف أصحاب العنف السياسي من السنّة والشيعة أنفسهم على أنهم حماة المستضعفين. وكان من بين أهم القضايا التي طرحوها هي غضبهم من الطريقة التي يصور بها الغرب والمجتمعات غير المسلمة الأخرى الدين الإسلامي والمسلمين.

بإعطائه مثالاً جديداً داعماً لأسوأ ما يوصف به المسلمون من أوصاف بذيئة ومبتذلة (على أنهم متطرفون دمويون)، قام تزارنييف باتباع تقليد يعود إلى السبعينات من القرن الماضي عندما سعى سلفيون جهاديون و»خمينيون» وبطريقة مستغربة إلى ما قالوا انه حماية لشرف الإسلام وسمعته من خلال اقتراف جرائم قتل جماعي بحق المدنيين الأبرياء.

عندما تُصور الرسوم الكاريكاتورية الدنماركية على أنها إهانة للنبي محمد (صلى الله عليه وسلم)، وتغتنم منظماتٌ متطرفة الفرصة لتنظيم احتجاجات دموية تؤدي إلى سقوط قتلى، فمن هي الجهة التي تسيء لسمعة الدين؟ بعض من هذه الرسوم كان عنصرياً، وبعضها الآخر سخيفاً. كان يمكن لهذه الرسوم أن تمر من دون أي أذى يذكر لو لم تُثر كل تلك الضجة والصخب حولها. إذا كانت نية أصحاب الرسوم إثارة الخوف والكراهية ضد المسلمين والإسلام فإن من قام بعملهم بدلاً منهم هي الجماعات المتطرفة واحتجاجاتها الشريرة والتهكمية. هذه هي الإسلاموفوبيا، وأكثر إساءة يمكن أن توجه للإسلام والمسلمين.

ربما أول سابقة لهذا النوع من الإسلاموفوبيا الغريبة والذاتية كانت فتوى الموت الإيرانية التي اصدرها آية الله الخميني ضد سلمان رشدي عام 1989. لم تكن روايته، «آيات شيطانية»، لها أية صلة بالإسلاموفوبيا أو كونها معادية للمسلمين، على الرغم من أنها احتوت ايحاءات كاريكاتورية للخميني نفسه والتي كانت ربما السبب الحقيقي وراء اصدار الفتوى، فضلاً عن اسباب اخرى سياسية انتهازية. ولكن الفهم الخاطئ للكتاب وما رافقه من ادانة وحرق في المجتمعات الإسلامية، خصوصاً في بريطانيا والهند، صدرت من ناس لم يكونوا قد قرأوا حرفاً واحداً من الكتاب، الا إنهم لهثوا وراء عصبية جاهلة وغير موضوعية قبلت طرحاً سياسياً يصنف الكتاب على انه «مسيء للإسلام» على الرغم من أنه لم يكن كذلك. مرة اخرى، الأذى الحقيقي الذي تلقاه الدين والمسلمون جاء بسبب رد الفعل المتعطش للدماء والهستيريا المتمثلة بتهديدات القتل والاحتجاجات وتظاهرات حرق الكتاب وكل اشكال الغضب المصطنع والمفبرك.

ربما احدث ما وقع من أفعال «اسلاموفوبية» كان جريمة قتل الجندي البريطاني البشعة على يد رجلين نيجيريين في ضاحية «وولويتش» في لندن. وفي خضم فعلتهما المستنكرة كانا يجتران مقولات وسواسية ومتخيلة تصور العالم الإسلامي رازحاً تحت حصار غربي مفترض. ولم يفتهما بالطبع أن يعلنا رفضهما لصفة «التطرف» والتي قررا ان ينفياها عن طريق تقطيع جسد الجندي في وسط الطريق وفي وضح النهار.

وهكذا فإن مجموعات ضئيلة غارقة في ذهنية جنونية وشوفينية قررت أن افضل طريقة لمجابهة العرض السلبي للإسلام هو باتباع نفس السلوك الذي يتخذه «الاسلاموفوبيون الغربيون» كأدلة على صحة الصورة التي يطرحونها ضد الإسلام والمسلمين بصورة عامة. وهم بذلك يثبتون وبإخلاص تام نبوءة «الإسلاموفوبيين الغربيين» من خلال تقمصهم لنفس الصورة التي يدعون كراهيتها. ومن دون هذا العون الذي يقدمونه، فإن «الاسلاموفوبيين الغربيين» وببساطة سيظهرون على حقيقتهم التي تتسم بالسخافة. ولكن المتطرفين الدمويين الإسلاميين يوفرون لهؤلاء تبريراً غير مستحق وغير واقعي لتسويق الخوف والكراهية ضد مجتمعات المسلمين التي يدعي هؤلاء المتطرفون الدفاع عنها. لا أحد يغذي الاسلاموفوبيا بهذا القدر من التدمير والشدة مثلما يفعل هؤلاء المتطرفون الإسلاميون. انهم بحق «الإسلاموفوبيون الحقيقيون.»

 

Between the unparalleled demonstrations that began on Sunday, and the breadth and depth of Egyptian consensus on that stage on Wednesday evening, there could be no question. The entirety of organized, politically and socially active Egyptian society—of course excluding the Muslim Brotherhood and its immediate allies—have united in supporting the Army removing the government. If this goes badly, the blame cannot fall on the Armed Forces alone, for they have not acted alone. They have responded to an extraordinary outpouring of mass and popular anti-Brotherhood sentiment, and marshaled a huge coalition in support of their decision to end the current presidency and impose a new transitional order.

By agreeing to the military’s “framework” for transition, most of the other major national forces, particularly the non-Islamist ones, have been essentially made parties to the “implementation of the will of the people,” or the “coup,” or whatever one might care to call it. For it is both of those things, and neither.

In some ways it resembles the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. But Morsi was elected under the law. On the other hand, the essence of the failure of the Morsi government—an utter unwillingness or inability to compromise, conciliate, cooperate or come to terms—was actually exemplified in the extraordinary national unity that surrounded the rejection of his continuation in office.

First we saw a petition that drew over 25 million signatures calling for new elections. The former president dismissed this out of hand. Then the untold millions (the real number will never be known), from all walks of life and all Egyptian descriptions, poured out onto the street since Sunday calling for his resignation.

Even then, Morsi might have saved the day for himself. The turning point was probably his angry, belligerent, aggressive and paranoid rant to the nation on June 26. For more than 2 and a half hours, he bellowed and cooed, barked and berated, scolded and cajoled. His message was simple: “We are the revolutionaries. I am their leader. No one dare challenge me. Obey my authority.”

Inevitably, it alienated the entire country. And it reminded them that he had no policy answers to the problems that plague daily life for most Egyptians. And yet even when al-Sisi issued his 48 hour ultimatum, Morsi still had a chance. True enough, the whole point of the 48 hours was to tell the demonstrators all they had to do was hang in there for two days. But had the President called in the opposition, created a national unity government, announced new elections, or offered anything really  substantive that smacked of change, he might
well have survived.

Instead, he reacted furiously. His speech on Tuesday was a veritable tirade against everyone who is not an immediate supporter. He blamed the demonstrations on counterrevolutionaries, traitors, agents of foreign powers, scofflaws and hooligans. It was an expression of the most profound contempt for the ordinary people of the country and showed how out of touch he was, and the extent to which his loss of legitimacy was irrevocable.

Meanwhile, al-Sisi did exactly what Morsi should have done, but either could or would not. If there was ever any question about who was the better politician as an individual, or a more savvy institution, it’s been completely resolved now. He and his military colleagues held a set of intensive and serious consultations with representatives of the mainstream opposition coalition, the NSF, representatives of religious and other important social forces, Islamist groups outside the Muslim Brotherhood, and, indeed, almost the whole spectrum of organized Egyptian social and political life.

The consequence was, ultimately, the development of a consensus regarding the basic elements of what al-Sisi announced, and what was endorsed by the other key figures at the podium, Wednesday night. The Constitution is suspended temporarily, and a committee will be formed to amend key provisions in the new Constitution that are generally regarded as unacceptable. The Constitution was rammed through by Morsi and his Islamist allies after a red herring “constitutional declaration,” in which he assigned himself virtually monarchical powers. He rescinded the declaration only to mollify public anger about the terrible new Constitution that was immediately rammed through an Islamist-stacked committee. That mockery reiterates almost everything that was objectionable about the old constitutions, and adds a layer of potentially very oppressive “Islamic” legislation.

The issue of the Constitution is the most important one by far. Without serious revision, the Constitution that was forced through by the Muslim Brotherhood and their Salafist allies is a death sentence to any hope for a tolerant, pluralistic, democratic and open-minded Egyptian political system. On the contrary, it opens the door to an endless stream of abusive, pandering majoritarian oppression of unpopular individuals, disfavored or despised minorities, and subjugated women.

The functions of the presidency will now be assumed by the Chief Justice of the High Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour. He will be sworn in to this function on Thursday. New presidential elections will be held “at the earliest possible date,” followed by parliamentary elections. In the meantime, a government of “technocrats” will be formed, very possibly headed by ElBaradei. One of the less encouraging announcements was that of a “media code of ethics” to guarantee “professionalism,” which can hardly result in anything other than censorship. Hopefully the kind of suppression of free speech through quasi-legal means that was employed in such a reckless way under Morsi whose government brought more prosecutions for insulting the presidency in his one year in office than Mubarak’s did in his more than 30—will be prevented by the military’s coalition partners.

There will also be a commission for national reconciliation, whatever that means. But Egyptian society, political forces and leading personalities are going to have to try to learn the principle of national unity from their own public. The Egyptian people came together across many different lines of division to reject an arbitrary   government that had gone too far and was abusing its authority and dragging the nation into the abyss. But it is crucial to understand that the Muslim Brotherhood is not going away. It is not a spent force. It is not an irrelevancy. It is a major national institution with a huge constituency. Indeed, after the army, it is probably the single largest and most effective national organization in all of Egypt.

Therefore, any impulse to institutionalize the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood will be a catastrophe. The lessons from the Algerian experience must hang heavy in the air. The Brotherhood left no choice for the whole rest of society, united, to reject their governance. But, if they stay within the law and eschew major outpourings of violence, they should not be persecuted or prosecuted. If they turn to violence, as some of their rhetoric suggests they might, this will be a calamity. It will lead to civil war, at least of a kind. They will lose, but it will be a generalized catastrophe.

If, on the other hand, non-Islamist forces who have now seized power by popular acclimation seek to systematically exclude the Brothers even if they continue to try to play by the new rules, they will be courting disaster. They must allow the Brotherhood to run in upcoming elections, and hope that they will learn their lesson and behave in a more reasonable, normative and inclusive manner if elected. If not, they will be rejected again. Democracies, from the outset, have always had to incorporate and accommodate non-democratic and authoritarian-minded forces (which the Brotherhood most certainly is) in spite of their hostility to the pluralistic order in which they participate. It is one of the great hazards of a free, open and democratic system: to be true to itself, it must generously afford oppressive groups more liberty than such groups would allow anyone else.

Yet there is a serious danger that the Egyptian Islamists may turn to violence. They may kid themselves, as other Arab Islamists have in the past, that “we’ve tried democracy, and it doesn’t work.” Since we want power, we have to try the more direct route again: violence. Morsi himself has articulated precisely this kind of mentality in his recent speeches, particularly on the evening before he was overthrown. All of his repeated pledges to sacrifice his own blood and body in the cause of “legitimacy” were just so much red meat for anyone in the Brotherhood who wants to instigate violence. But many of the Brotherhood leaders have been placed on an indefinite travel ban. The point is not to stop them from enjoying the fine weather in Fiji at this time of year. The message is simple: if you or any of your supporters, or anyone linked to you, starts blowing things up or shooting people on the streets, you can and will be arrested and held responsible.

A degree of violence now is virtually inevitable. Indeed, it’s been going on for quite some time. And it may intensify. But as long as it is contained, then the prospects for a productive, constructive transition remain viable. The danger is that some Brothers or others might feel that such a huge injustice has been done to “legitimacy,” and their simple majoritarianist misunderstanding of “democracy,” that only an armed response is sufficient. Some of Morsi’s supporters are openly speaking in terms of “civil war” and pledging to “sacrifice their lives in this situation.”

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has done enormous damage to itself already through its mismanagement of government and politics. If it wants to make matters worse, it can exploit these young people and destroy its reputation, at least in Egypt, forever. And the fate of the Brotherhood in Egypt will have tremendous implications for the fortunes of similar Islamists throughout the Arab world.

Whether in the United States or the rest of the West, or in the Arab or Islamic worlds, the idea that the Arabs and the Muslims are basically Islamists, or easily won over by anyone who grabs the Quran and clutches it to their chest while screaming “follow me to salvation,” must surely now be finally debunked. Most Arabs are faithful Muslims, but they are not Islamists. They do not welcome the Muslim Brothers’ authoritarianism, oppression and heavy handedness, and they will not put up with it. That’s a lesson not only for Islamists throughout the Middle East. It’s a lesson for policymakers in Washington, and around the world as well.