A reader kindly asks the following question regarding the upcoming election in Lebanon:
?What are your thoughts on the up and coming election in Lebanon? Winners, losers, implications on the region etc…? Will US FP towards Lebanon change drastically if Hizb is perceived to be in power? What will the reaction be on the Hill vs. the Administration? How do you think the election (if march 8th wins a majority) will effect the Presidents agenda towards the Middle East, and more specifically towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process??

Thank you so much for this excellent question.

It?s very difficult to judge how the election will come out, and I think one is foolhardy to make it confident prediction. A couple of months ago, many people were confidently predicting a strong opposition victory. But that seems less likely these days.

It does seem that support for General Aoun, who appears to be a mentally unbalanced subject, has eroded in recent years for numerous reasons, including his alliance with Hezbollah. It seems as if the General, who once commanded a solid majority support among Lebanese Maronites, is now something like on par in communal support with the coalition of most other Maronite groupings in the March 14 camp. This alliance, which is a complete reversal of his position from the early 1990s until the removal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and his return to the country a few years ago, seems ideologically strange to many observers, but those familiar with Lebanese politics understand that the dynamics of sectarian alliance have nothing to do with ideology and everything to do with narrow self-interest, and that given time everyone will eventually have found themselves to at some point have been allied with and against everyone else.

It strikes me that there are only two plausible explanations for the Aoun-Hezbollah alliance. First, the General appears to be monomaniacally and megalomaniacally obsessed with making himself the president of the Republic. However, during the period between his ouster from the country and the ?Cedar Revolution,? he managed to adopt the only position that would categorically preclude him from attaining that position: an anti-Syrian stance. Following his return to the country, he immediately again adopted the only position that would still categorically preclude him from it: an effectively pro-Syrian stance. It strikes me that the General is one of the most astonishing case studies in pathological self-defeat I have ever witnessed.

The second reason might be a shared antipathy to constitutional reform. Hezbollah?s main task since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 has been to avoid being disarmed, thereby losing its main coercive power in domestic Lebanese politics (which was, for the first time, used in an internal power struggle at the national level in May last year). General Aoun and his supporters may fear that any serious domestic effort to politically arrange for the disarmament of Hezbollah?s militia, which is absolutely necessary for Lebanese stability and security, would undoubtedly entail constitutional reforms to address the serious underrepresentation of Lebanese Shiites in the ?confessional? constitutional system and other measures that have historically discriminated against that community in a most unfair and indeed outrageous manner, and that these reforms would mainly be at the expense of Lebanese Maronites, especially in terms of parliamentary representation (also, possibly, in terms of traditionally reserved government positions including the presidency, chief of staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and head of the Central Bank). In other words, it is entirely possible to see the Aoun-Hezbollah alliance as a pro-status quo coalition that intends to resist constitutional reforms in order to avoid disarming Hezbollah?s militia and revisiting political gerrymandering and some other indefensible privileges for the Maronite community.

It would appear, however, that for a number of reasons, the General?s support has been slipping, especially among the more educated and urbanized Lebanese Maronites. He still commands enormous support, but this erosion has led many to question the extent to which the opposition can hope for a clear victory. Another area of concern for the opposition must be the rapprochement between Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri, who is both an ally of and a rival to Hezbollah. This renewed warmth between these two figures suggests that Berri may not be as solidly a part of the March 8 opposition in practice following the election as he has been in recent years.

Of course, Hezbollah still commands enormous support in the south of the country and among Lebanese Shiites generally. That the March 8 opposition will have a strong showing still seems likely, but there is no longer any consensus that they can look forward to a clear majority. As for March 14, they continue to be bedeviled by serious problems including continuous significant internal tensions and contradictions, and the inordinate burden of being perceived as being a major US ally without receiving concomitant practical American support (the same problem that has plagued the Palestinian Authority leadership for many years). The United States has been asking some of its Arab allies, particularly in the Lebanese government and the Palestinian Authority leadership, to accept the costs of being perceived as an American ally domestically and in the region while receiving limited benefits (probably because Israel and its supporters in the United States do not necessarily feel comfortable with the Lebanese and Palestinians who have adopted positions consistent with broader US foreign policy goals). This phenomenon of being damned with faint support is compounded by the fact that Iran, Syria and others have no compunction about giving all possible aid to their allies without reservation. The consequences of this were on full display on the streets of Gaza in 2007 and Beirut in 2008.

If the March 8 coalition and Hezbollah are perceived as the clear victors in the upcoming election and also perceived as dominating the next Lebanese government, obviously this will not sit well with Washington. Certainly, there will be significant pressure from Congress for a serious change of policy towards Lebanon, although the administration will face a more difficult set of choices. The United States has already made a distinction between governments in which Hamas and Hezbollah have been a part. When Hamas was a major part of the Palestinian government between 2006 and the first half of 2007, the United States and most of the international community imposed a significant and thoroughgoing policy of isolation against the entire government, which was a disaster for the Palestinian people. However, when Hezbollah has been part of Lebanese cabinets, American officials did deal with the government generally but declined to meet directly with any Hezbollah cabinet ministers. Therefore, a mixed government that is not perceived as dominated by, but does include some elements of, Hezbollah would not be an untenable situation for Lebanon. However, if the government is perceived as Hezbollah-dominated, it is entirely possible that a change of policy would be strongly considered by the Obama administration.

This is particularly likely if the administration continues its strong push for progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace, which suggests the need to identify and isolate those that will be unequivocally uncooperative and resistant to progress towards an agreement. Hezbollah?s current policies place it squarely in that camp, and any Lebanese government that is perceived as being guided or heavily influenced by those policies may find itself placed in the category of the uncooperative rejectionists who are to be isolated and pressured in order that they are not able to thwart progress and laying the groundwork for a significant breakthrough in the future. Obviously, this would be a disaster for Lebanon. International isolation would strike at almost everything the country depends on for its well-being, stability, and potential for development and continued resurrection from the various wars on which it has been wracked since 1975. An inconclusive election victory does not necessarily mandate this eventuality, but a clear opposition victory would make it disturbingly plausible.