Tag Archives: #Gaza

By cracking down on the Gaza protests, US universities are betraying their core mission

This op-ed was published by The National on April 24, 2024

Free speech at American universities is enduring one of its most severe stress tests in decades. Israel’s war of vengeance in Gaza, precipitated by the October 7 killing spree by Hamas-led militants from Gaza, has riveted and appalled the world, even eclipsing the perhaps historically more significant Russian assault on Ukraine.

Huge coalitions of US students have united against Israel’s rampage that has targeted not just Hamas but Gaza society generally, damaged or destroyed the vast majority of buildings, and killed at least 35,000 Palestinians, mainly civilians. The slaughter has been shocking, even given the vicious savagery of the October 7 attack.

Since the end of South African apartheid, Palestine has been the most likely focal point of US student international social justice outrage. This movement was predictable and predicted. Yet pro-Israel constituencies appear taken aback by outrage at the butchery in Gaza and sympathy for Palestinians roiling American campuses, particularly at elite schools. Not since the Vietnam War have university leaders looked this discombobulated, unable to placate any faction or to credibly and creditably defend their institutions from such intense internal and external pressure.

Turmoil over Gaza has already contributed to the downfall of several major university presidents. Others, most recently the Egyptian-American president of Columbia, Minouche Shafik, have committed extraordinary miscalculations. Following several other elite university leaders, she was recently grilled by a highly aggressive Republican congressional committee, and told to take tougher action against pro-Palestinian protesters, particularly by Representative Elise Stefanik who is angling to be Donald Trump’s running mate in the coming election.

 

Ms Shafik tried to placate the right-wingers by labelling phrases such as “from the river to the sea” and even just the word “intifada” as “incredibly hurtful”, without any additional context. Upon returning to campus, she ordered police to arrest more than 100 students encamped on a campus lawn. Even the authorities appeared uneasy at the operation, with New York Police Department Chief John Chell noting that “the students that were arrested were peaceful, offered no resistance whatsoever, and were saying what they wanted to say in a peaceful manner”.

This unnecessary and chilling crackdown had the inevitable effect of galvanising student protests at Columbia and elsewhere. Ms Shafik is now predictably squeezed between demands for her resignation from dissatisfied pro-Israel Democratic and Republican legislators and a pro-free-speech censure motion filed by outraged faculty in the University Senate.

University leaders find themselves trapped between two competing and crucial values: upholding the protesters’ right of free speech while simultaneously protecting a sense of safety and security for pro-Israel Jewish students.

While the protests have been almost entirely nonviolent, instances of harassment and speech that either is, or is interpreted as, hateful have left many Jewish students – like their Arab and Muslim counterparts, some of whom have even been shot – feeling shaken and unsafe. Both are left wondering if they are truly welcome at their own schools.

Meanwhile, the demonstrators are being systematically and unfairly painted as all or mostly followers of Hamas, proponents of terrorism, and violent anti-Semites. They are being generally conflated with the worst elements of the far left that have, of course, seized a golden opportunity of outbidding everyone with extremist rhetoric that dominates media attention and trying to gain control of a potent fledgling oppositional movement.

The political right, abetted by some liberals, is similarly relishing the chance to paint criticism of Israel as inherently anti-Semitic and claim that liberal-dominated universities have in recent decades created an atmosphere of casual left-wing extremism by not being more conservative. For supporters of Israel’s otherwise indefensible bloodbath in Gaza, pointing to the genuinely extreme, rhetorically violent, or effectively anti-Semitic screeds of the most radical protesters is a desperately needed means of discrediting and delegitimising vigorous opposition to the war.

Panicky universities are not just mishandling a delicate and difficult fissure. They are missing a rare and profound opportunity for academia to demonstrate its unique social role and putative worth.

Rather than arresting students en masse and denouncing them as anti-Semitic because they object to a barbaric war on top of an unjust, predatory occupation, university leaders should be embracing their institutional mission of education. Nothing is going to magically make traumas and bitter divisions evaporate. But everything necessary for universities to foster serious dialogue on a mass and highly sophisticated level is readily available.

There are countless constructive and serious scholars and advocates on both sides who are ready for such a conversation, which should most certainly include students. And the communication technology that all students, and much of society, access daily provides many excellent platforms. These forums should resonate with calm but passionate and principled voices on all sides.

While many Jewish students hear the chant “from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” as an exclusionary call to get rid of Jews, surveys demonstrate that most Arab and Muslim students hear merely a call for freedom. No one is asking the demonstrators what they mean by such slogans. Instead, malign sentiments are being inferred or presumed. A dialogue is therefore urgently required. What would freedom from the river to the sea entail? Is anyone against freedom? Can everyone have it equally? Must an area be under a single sovereign or system to be free? Is this really anti-Semitism?

Rather than fostering such a novel and broad conversation, many universities are instead trying to limit speech, not just by arresting or otherwise punishing and maligning protesters, but also, as in the shocking and shameful case of the University of Southern California, silencing it outright.

USC cancelled the graduation ceremony speech by valedictorian Asna Tabassum because of her criticism of Israel, citing highly credible and numerous violent threats. This yet again confirms that extreme harassment and intimidation are coming from both sides. Worse, assuming its rationale is sincere, USC is effectively pioneering a preemptive and presumptive heckler’s veto.

Like Columbia and others, USC is charging headlong in the wrong direction. Rather than finding creative ways of tapping into a huge appetite, and the vast intellectual and other resources at hand, for serious, albeit difficult and potentially painful, dialogue – and thereby fulfilling academia’s socially indispensable educational mission – these schools are turning to suppression, marginalisation and demonisation of speech that offends some students, reactionary politicians and pro-Israel donors.

It’s a betrayal of the core mission of academia, a cowardly and short-sighted blunder, and a missed opportunity of epic and historic proportions.

 

 

Going after UNRWA is a charade the world must reject

This op-ed was published by The National on February 5, 2024

Ten days ago, Israel began circulating accusations that 12 employees of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Gaza had involvement in the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on October 7. This led to a crisis of indispensable, largely western, funding for this crucial humanitarian services provider for Palestinian refugees, especially in Gaza, where a large majority are refugees from what has become southern Israel.

But this latest campaign is just part of a decades-long attack on the agency by Israel, which is itself just a subset of the broader campaign to eliminate the Palestinian refugee issue by eliminating Palestinian refugees as an internationally monitored and protected group.

On January 18, UNRWA chief Philippe Lazzarini attended his monthly meeting with Israeli officials. He was presented with allegations that 12 of the 13,000 Palestinian employees of UNRWA in Gaza were directly linked to the October 7 attacks. The UN itself publicly revealed the claims by announcing that it had dismissed nine of the 12 accused employees (two were dead).

The news provoked a cascade of demands for UNRWA’s dissolution and defunding, particularly since it broke on the same day that the International Court of Justice issued a favorable initial finding for South Africa’s genocide case against Israel.

Israel added, without evidence, that 10 per cent of UNRWA’s Gaza workforce is linked to Hamas. That was likely intended to offset the obvious observation that if UNRWA could keep Hamas supporters or even members to a mere 12 out of 13,000 staffers in Gaza, that’s an outstanding performance. UNRWA is not a government and it has no investigative or intelligence wing that would allow it to carefully vet thousands of workers – and it routinely shares its employment rolls with Israel.

But the useful immediate distraction is part of a larger and longer campaign that is even more insidious than it initially appears. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to paint Israeli anger as partly motivated by UNRWA-related testimony regarding Israeli abuses in Gaza cited in South Africa’s ICJ case. But even that is a relatively minor detail in Israel’s animus against UNRWA.

The real offence by the organization, for which Israel has labored mightily for decades to discredit and eliminate it, is that its very existence reflects the persistence of the Palestinian refugee problem and issue. This simultaneously points both backward to the past, to the origin of Israel’s founding, as well as forward to the future and to the need to resolve the refugee question as a key part of any agreed-upon final status arrangement. Both are utterly unacceptable to not merely the Israeli political far-right, but deeply threatening to most Jewish Israelis.

Israel never tires of complaining that UNRWA is a unique refugee agency, dedicated to one particular people, as if that were somehow unfair to Israel. But, crucially, this is because when the agency was founded in 1949, the same year as the armistice agreements that formed Israel’s de facto international borders, and Israel’s membership in the UN General Assembly, the international community was well aware that for the first and only time, it played a direct role in creating a major refugee crisis that otherwise probably would never have existed.

The UN’s predecessor organization, the League of Nations, after the First World War issued a self-contradictory mandate to Britain over Palestine. As with all the other mandates, Britain was instructed to prepare the (almost entirely Arab) population for self-government and independence without altering the local society, and simultaneously repeated verbatim Britain’s commitment to transform that society into a Jewish “homeland” as expressed in the earlier Balfour Declaration.

After the Second World War, the new UN itself had voted to partition Palestine between its overwhelming Arab majority and the Jewish settlers who were still less than 30 per cent of the population but were to receive 56 per cent of the territory.

In the subsequent war, between 1947-49, about 700,000-800,000 Palestinians, or 80 per cent of the Arabs in what became Israel, were displaced and forbidden to return. Thus, almost overnight, an Arab society vanished and was indeed replaced by a Jewish one. The creation of UNRWA was a clear recognition of the international community’s direct hand in this tragedy of the dispossession and displacement of one people to make way for another.

Many Israelis would regard all of that as the Palestinian national narrative at best, and Arab propaganda at worst. But not only is it true, but it is the truth as the rest of the world understood it at the time. Yet this history of dispossession as the indispensable foundational necessity for Israel is the subject of intense and systematic repression at home and suppression abroad. The mere existence of UNRWA threatens both.

In the present day, it isn’t merely that seeking to deny UNRWA’s relief services to the Palestinians in Gaza is part of Israel’s war of vengeance, though the agency could shut down by the end of February if funding isn’t restored. Israel has long viewed the refugee issue and the “right of return” as a potent bargaining chip, one that is on par, and often paired with, Jerusalem, and a powerful form of Palestinian leverage in negotiations and international public diplomacy.

UNRWA’s work requires it to carefully tally Palestinian refugees, providing accurate numbers and crucial legal status. Israel therefore sees the existence and work of UNRWA as the decisive obstacle to redefining the Palestinian refugees out of existence, and maintains that only those who themselves were physically displaced nearly 80 years ago deserve that status. Hence the astonishing spectacle that the country that created and refuses to resolve one of the world’s great refugee crises blames the agency that cares for those refugees, because they are and remain refugees.

It’s so simple: no refugees, no issue.

The cynical and cruel campaign against UNRWA operates at nearly every level of Israel’s relentless conflict with the Palestinians: as part of the collective war in Gaza; key to suppressing historical realities and memories dangerous to Israel’s self-serving national mythology (and, conversely, central to Palestinian mythologies); and crucial to eliminating a potent source of Palestinian leverage at the bargaining table and on the global stage.

The international community needs to see this charade for what it is and, while demanding reasonable reforms and accountability, redouble the commitment to the humanitarian services that UNRWA provides, what it stands for, and the role it must continue to play unless and until the displacement and dispossession of the 1940s is, at last, redressed.

Is US-Israel disagreement on a two-state solution unresolvable?

 

This op-ed was published by The National on January 22, 2024

Last week, the penny finally dropped between the US and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu owned up that he’s been dissemblingfor decades, at least in English and in public, about being open to a two-state solution. He flatly ruled out any form of Palestinian statehood without offering an alternative addressing basicPalestinian human rights like citizenship. This has effectively been Israel’s consistent policy, with a few notable hiccups, since the assassination in 1995 of former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin by an Israeli extremist.

Since at least 1990 implicitly, and explicitly once George W Bush formally endorsed in 2002, Palestinian statehood has been a US foreign policy goal. Even Donald Trump framed his 2020 proposal as a two-state solution, even as it envisaged Israel annexing 30 per cent of the occupied West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, which would have rendered Palestinian statehood effectively nominal. The plan’s titular architect, Jared Kushner, now says it was only meant as “a starting point” for negotiations intended to produce much smaller annexations.

As President, Joe Biden moved quickly to repair US policy by reaffirming Washington’s commitment to a meaningful Palestinian state and opposition to annexation and settlement expansion. More recently, Mr Biden tried to use both the triangular negotiations with Saudi Arabia and Israel, and the post-October 7 crisis to put eventual Palestinian statehood back on the international and, especially, Israeli agenda.

Mr. Netanyahu’s declaration is both ideologically pure and cynically political. Israel is under significant pressure both in public and, especially, private, including from Washington and its potential normalization partner Saudi Arabia, that any day-after scenario to the Israel-Gaza war would, rationally, have to involve forming an alternative, post-Hamas Palestinian government in Gaza (albeit, perhaps, with Hamas’s acquiescence) and, more importantly, the restoration of the peace process but this time as a starting point with Israel explicitly acknowledging the Palestinian right to a state.

I’m always struck by how few people realise that Israel has not just never recognised a Palestinian state, but has never even acknowledged the Palestinian right to a state. To the contrary, all Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy to date has been based on a 1993 exchange of “letters of mutual recognition”, which kicked off the Oslo process. That quickly led to the prevailing status quo in the occupied territories, but ground to a halt as soon as Rabin was murdered.

In a letter to Rabin on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which is universally recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people diplomatically (even by Hamas), chairman Yasser Arafat recognised Israel and its right to peace and security. In reply, on behalf of Israel, prime minister Rabin recognised the PLO as a legitimate interlocutor and undertook to negotiate with it. That’s all.

Many argue Israel implicitly recognized the Palestinian right to a state throughout its negotiations with the PLO, but that is simply not true. Israel never brought itself to acknowledge this Palestinian right, and, in that tradition, Mr. Netanyahu has now categorically rejected it. The world knew that he and the Israeli right were merely pretending to be at all interested in peace while sabotaging a two-state solution diplomatically and strategically developing settlements to make it politically impossible.

His Likud party has Jewish control “from the river to the sea” – a geographical formulation routinely labelled as “genocidal” when Americans declare that “Palestine will be free” in the same area – as a key part of its founding document. At this year’s UN General Assembly, during his address Mr Netanyahu brandished a map that included all the occupied territories in “Israel”.

That’s the ideological part.

Cynically, Mr Netanyahu knows that he’s in big trouble because of the security meltdown on October 7, among other failings. So now he’s been saying, bluntly: “The world is pushing us on Palestinian statehood, even in theory. Re-elect me and I will block this forever.” He’s similarly been claiming “credit” for sabotaging the Oslo agreements, which is no idle boast.

Washington should make important aspects of bilateral relations with Israel contingent on, at a minimum, a formal Israeli declaration recognising the Palestinian right to a state

The Palestinian issue was once a marginal matter in Israeli-American relations, but recent decades have shown howfalse that istime and again. So, now, at least with Mr Netanyahu in charge, and probably almost any other plausible Israeli prime minister as well, the US and Israel are at categorical odds on a two-state solution, and therefore peace.

Mr Netanyahu’s position is simply not tenable for Washington, because – since he’s certainly not willing to offer Palestinians citizenship in Israel – he’s making it virtually impossible to rebut accusations that Israel maintains an apartheid-like political system in the occupied territories. Even in the medium term, Washington cannot be associated with that, particularly under the Democrats, including the over-35s like Mr Biden who, unlike younger liberals, are inclined to give Israel every benefit of the doubt.

Mr. Biden tried to shrug this crisis off by saying: “We’ll be able to work out something.” He tried claiming that Mr. Netanyahu might be prepared to accept a non-militarized Palestinian state, but was immediately and flatly contradicted by Mr. Netanyahu’s spokespeople.

After decades of US and Israeli leaders dancing around the issue and performing extraordinary rhetorical and logical contortions to obscure the fact that their policies on this most central of issues are totally at odds, the jig is up. In a bid to be re-elected, Mr Netanyahu has put extremism on the table and on the ballot.

Even if he loses, unless his successor flatly contradicts these proclamations – which is extremely unlikely since this really is and has long been the Israeli position – then Washington must also stop pretending. The US is either going to have to give up on peace and the Palestinians altogether, which could prove fatal to sustaining its regional leadership, or break with Israel over this dramatically.

Within the next 24 months at the latest, Washington should make important aspects of bilateral relations with Israel contingent on, at a minimum, a formal Israeli declaration recognising the Palestinian right to a state in the normative Westphalian and UN meanings, which still leaves much to be negotiated. Almost 25 years after the disastrous 2000 Camp David summit – when some Arab leaders first began questioning Washington’s post-Cold War leadership – a failure to confront Israel over peace could form part of a historic inflection point marking a potentially fatal crisis of US leadership in this vital region.

Washington must be clear that the “special relationship” is only sustainable with an Israel that’s genuinely open to peace.