https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-white-house-is-talking-a-great-game-over-the-iran-nuclear-deal-but-will-it-lead-to-a-workable-plan-of-action-1.667055

After the announcement of Donald Trump’s “new Iran strategy” everyone, both those panicked and elated, need to take a deep breath. For all the drama and bluster of the Trump speech and the White House’s companion Iran strategy summary document, very little has changed thus far. And there’s little indication of when, how, or into what, US policy will change.

Mr Trump did not assert that Tehran is not in compliance with the nuclear deal. That is because it is. However, Washington is also still fully in compliance with the deal. And there’s no clear reason to expect that either side will really walk away from it now.

What Mr Trump did was assert a subjective judgement he has held for years: the nuclear deal isn’t in the American national interest and therefore he won’t certify it is. Almost all of the reasons for this are what is not in the deal, not what Iran is failing to do within the context of the agreement. He doesn’t like it and never did.

Mr Trump and others point out that many of the agreement’s terms will expire in 10 to 15 years. Arms control agreements are, by their very nature, temporary, and Iran would still be bound by the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Moreover, Mr Trump focused on Iranian misbehaviour that the deal doesn’t – and couldn’t have – addressed. Missile testing and development, sponsorship of terrorist groups and militias around the Middle East, and the unjust detention of Americans and others were all elements of a lengthy and accurate bill of particulars against Tehran.

But the scope and passion with which Mr Trump denounced the agreement, and his anger against Iran for its real transgressions, is wholly inconsistent with the remedies he announced, especially regarding the nuclear agreement.

Mr Trump is asking US Congress to legislate a new set of conditions in which sanctions would be automatically re-imposed against Iran. This is very odd indeed. Mr Trump does not need it to legislate any new sanctions. He could re-impose them himself. Moreover, he doesn’t need Congress to legislate new sanction triggers. He could simply announce them himself.

One of the biggest mysteries – and there are several – is why any president would ask Congress to take a series of actions that are well within the prerogative of the executive? It is highly unusual for any president to defer to it on foreign policy, even when the legislature has a plausible claim on authority. In this case, it seems inexplicable.

Alas, one possible answer is that Mr Trump wants to make a big show over the issue, but actually force the real decisions onto someone else. He has done that many times since taking office, though this seems the most striking example yet.

At any rate, for all his bluster, Mr Trump has thus far done exactly nothing practical to end US participation in, and compliance with, the nuclear agreement. He has merely invited others to consider mapping a possible path to potentially doing so.

So, fans of the nuclear deal can relax a little.

But those who are excited about the new White House strategy to counter Iran – which has been officially praised by the governments of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Israel – should probably attenuate their expectations.

True, the White House is talking a great game. Both the strategy summary and Trump speech invoked an ambitious, but very vague, agenda to counter Tehran, with the strengthening partnerships with Washington’s regional allies repeatedly highlighted.

Mr Trump pledged to stop Tehran’s “destabilising activity and support for terrorist proxies in the region.” He also promised “additional sanctions on the regime to block their financing of terror,” and measures to counter the “proliferation of missiles and weapons that threaten its neighbours, global trade and freedom of navigation.”

All that certainly sounds good. But there may well be a lot less here than meets the eye. For example, Mr Trump announced a range of new treasury department sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for its support of terrorism. But there have already been two previous treasury sanctions executive orders against the IRGC, with little impact.

Had the White House wanted to really impress Tehran, they could have added the IRGC as an entity to the state department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations, a far more meaningful threat.

Therefore, while the accusations about Iran’s malfeasance may sound reassuring, no one should expect that much serious action after the kabuki show over decertifying the nuclear deal and the third-rate sanctions gesture.

A final reason not to get too enthusiastic about Mr Trump’s new Iran approach is that nothing in his speech or policy summary statement actually suggests there’s a coherent or comprehensive strategy in place or underway.

If it seems emotional, melodramatic, rhetorical and, above all, political, that’s because it probably is.

One should always hope for the best. After all, Washington is still fully in compliance with the nuclear deal. So is Tehran. And the United States says it wants to seriously counter Iran’s nonnuclear misdeeds.

http://www.agsiw.org/regional-winners-losers-hamas-fatah-deal/

On October 12, rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas agreed to a national reconciliation pact that began to sketch out a new political arrangement that could lead to far-reaching changes in Gaza with broad, regional implications. Since the decisive break between the two factions in 2007 – each ruling their respective territories in the West Bank and Gaza, which were therefore also sundered – Palestinians have reached many such accords. All of them have failed. However, the new arrangement goes much farther than any of its predecessors and seems to enjoy a wide range of regional backing, including from some key Gulf countries, and the prospect of real benefits for almost all parties. Therefore, there is a very good chance that this new arrangement will actually be implemented in Gaza, at least for a time.

The deal, reportedly brokered by Egypt with the strong support of the United Arab Emirates, was signed by Hamas and Fatah negotiators at the headquarters of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service. While the text of the agreement has not been made public, the deal apparently involves a commitment by Hamas to turn over control of Gaza’s borders and crossings to the Palestinian Authority. This could lead to a rapid opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, the main lifeline in and out of Gaza for its nearly 2 million residents, most of whom are refugees. Hamas has also promised to relinquish day-to-day governance and administration in Gaza to a PA-controlled authority, including PA security forces from the West Bank that have developed a strong track record of coordination with Israel. Hamas apparently intends to incorporate its own bureaucrats into the new governance system.

Yet many of the most difficult issues dividing the nationalist Fatah and Islamist Hamas factions remain unresolved. Hamas continues to insist that it will not disarm its paramilitary Qassam Brigades or compromise on the right of armed struggle against Israel. PA and Fatah leaders are openly fretting about the prospect that Hamas may seek to retain a powerful independent militia, while handing the burden of governance to their rivals.

The idea is to implement a system that gives each Palestinian party something it wants, but without addressing the key issues that divide them. Hamas gets relief from overwhelming pressure, including from the Gaza public and the burden of governance. Fatah pockets significant concessions from its rivals and, therefore, a major political victory, and returns in some kind of triumph to Gaza. And the millions of Gaza residents are likely to get a good measure of relief from the unconscionable privation and isolation they have suffered since 2006 at the hands of Israel, Egypt, Hamas, and the PA.

Yet the core differences dividing the Palestinians remain totally unresolved. This includes trying to fit the square peg of Hamas’s ideological commitment to armed struggle until “victory” against Israel into the Palestine Liberation Organization’s round hole of seeking a negotiated agreement for a two-state solution. Nonetheless, it’s likely that the benefits to all sides mean that some kind of effective unity government in Gaza will actually be formed – at least until the underlying differences become unmanageable and the powder keg once again explodes.

The winners and losers among the outside parties are fairly clear cut. Egypt has demonstrated its ongoing regional relevance, in particular its unique ability to broker an effective Palestinian negotiating process (in contrast to other aspirants to this role such as Turkey and Qatar). In addition, Egypt may have found a formula to stabilize Gaza, which has been a bleeding wound on its northern border, and cut off support and sanctuary for Egyptian extremist groups in Sinai. Cairo has also delivered another crushing blow to the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE has played a crucial supporting role, working closely with the Egyptians and promising to fund the construction of a new power plant that would provide desperately needed electricity to Gazans and a fund for families of fighters killed in intra-Palestinian violence, particularly in 2007 when Hamas expelled Fatah from Gaza.

Egypt and the UAE have also probably succeeded in getting PA President Mahmoud Abbas to make a concession of his own, although all the formal ones came entirely from Hamas. Both countries have been angling to promote the return of former Fatah security chief Mohammed Dahlan to Gaza, where he retains popularity with Fatah members and has strong personal relations with some of the new generation of Hamas leaders. Yet he continues to be largely unpopular in the West Bank, and Abbas and Dahlan despise each other. Yet, if the agreement is going to be implemented, someone is going to have to lead the new Fatah-dominated administration and security structure in Gaza, and it is very likely to be Dahlan, who has been living in Abu Dhabi since 2011 and reportedly has close relations to UAE leaders.

It may be that, under the circumstances, the other benefits to Abbas were so attractive that he is finally ready to swallow the bitter pill of Dahlan returning to power in Gaza under the rubric of both Fatah and the PA. Indeed, for months Dahlan has been engaged in friendly talks with senior Hamas figures such as Yehya Sinwar and contributing money raised in the UAE. And he has been at the center of laying the groundwork for much of the new reconciliation deal.

Israel and the United States are both maintaining an arms-length distance from the agreement, but neither moved to stop the agreement. According to U.S. and Arab sources, the administration of U.S. President Donald J. Trump approves of the deal. And while Israel has been insisting publicly that Hamas must meet a long list of requirements that it is unlikely to agree to, Israeli officials were reportedly in Cairo on October 10 to confer with the Egyptian negotiators who brokered the agreement that was formally signed two days later. Therefore, it appears that although the United States and Israel are not publicly celebrating the accord, both are quietly pleased that control of Gaza borders may soon be in the hands of relatively trusted forces from Egypt and the PA.

The biggest loser, regionally and internationally, is almost certainly Qatar. Doha has long sought to be a major player in Gaza, and has viewed the Hamas government there as a key part of its regional network, along with other Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups and Turkey. However, as the confrontation between Qatar and the quartet of countries opposing Doha’s policies has festered, the campaign to squeeze Hamas in Gaza gained steam: The PA cut a range of support and services, Israel withheld electricity due to nonpayment, and pressure came from Egypt and elsewhere. Indeed, pressure from Cairo, which controls the Rafah crossing, had already pushed Hamas in May to renounce ties to the transnational Muslim Brotherhood movement.

Moreover, Cairo and the UAE made it clear that serious benefits were on offer, but with certain conditions, in particular, breaking the strong alliance with Doha. The first clear indication that such a choice was being made came with the October 2 visit to Gaza by PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah, a move that presaged the formal agreement between Hamas and Fatah. If Hamas is willing to take a backseat in the administration of Gaza, it therefore seems to have chosen, for now, to embrace Egypt and the UAE, and distance itself from Turkey and, much more importantly, Qatar.

It appears likely that this latest agreement, with its strong international support and regional backing and financing, will produce a new governance arrangement in Gaza. However, given continuing profound disagreements on the major national questions that persist among the Palestinian groups, the long-term prognosis for national reunification – and even the stability of the new administration in Gaza – are very questionable. Meanwhile, however, these developments can only be seen as a significant blow to the regional fortunes of Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood, and their allies, and a very significant victory for Egypt and the UAE, and their partners.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/what-the-tillerson-trump-tensions-mean-for-the-middle-east-1.664893

Rumours of tensions between Donald Trump and US secretary of state Rex Tillerson were confirmed, rather than dispelled, by the latter’s extraordinary press conference last week in which he denied that he’s considering resigning.

Mr Trump, in turn, expressed “total confidence” in his top diplomat. Mr Tillerson didn’t deny calling Mr Trump a “moron”, though his spokesperson insists he “does not use that type of language”. That leaves only the precise wording still unknown.

Many commentators have concluded Mr Tillerson won’t stay much longer. If personal and political differences were the decisive factors, as in any normal government, that would be correct, but Mr Trump’s administration doesn’t obey the laws of either classical or quantum political mechanics.

If it did, Jeff Sessions wouldn’t still be the attorney general. Instead, it’s all driven by the whims of a leader who can most charitably be described as impulsive and mercurial, and hence fundamentally unreadable.

So, while it’s very hard to know where Mr Trump’s caprices and “instincts” will take him and us all next, there’s no particular reason to think Mr Tillerson is, in fact, going anywhere.

To the contrary, the two seem, at least for now, stuck together. Mr Tillerson can’t go back to Exxon Mobil, and it’s not clear what he’d do after leaving office other than retire. Mr Trump can’t keep hemorrhaging senior officials. And what other plausible figure would accept the position, especially after what Mr Tillerson and the others have been through?

No matter how bad the personal and policy differences between the two might seem, the current arrangement actually suits both.

So, while nothing is ever predictable, let alone logical, in the Trump era, Mr Tillerson probably isn’t packing his bags.

Some in the Gulf have developed a pronounced aversion to Mr Tillerson, but even if he’s forced out or storms off, that won’t necessarily promote better policies. And it would certainly intensify the atmosphere of instability and chaos at the White House.

Dissatisfaction with Mr Tillerson is understandable for many reasons, but the appropriate response isn’t to imprudently ignore him or the state department, or pointlessly hope for his removal. Instead, US allies would be well advised to focus on a broad and institutional approach to gaining influence in Washington.

Even within the executive branch in any administration, it’s not just a matter of dealing with the right people in the White House, including the president. Even there, one deals with endless feuding factions.

But many powerful departments and agencies, beginning with the mighty Pentagon and including numerous others, have their own institutional cultures, imperatives and interests. And, of course, their own infighting cabals. Sometimes a really effective president can successfully overrule his own subordinates, but that’s surprisingly rare.

And then there’s Congress. In theory, the legislature has a limited role in foreign policy. But, in fact, US allies need congressional support to get what they want most of the time.A good example was the recent cut in aid to Egypt. Abdel Fattah El Sisi, Egypt’s president, has a strong personal relationship with Mr Trump, who has lavishly praised him. Cairo and its friends were, therefore, stunned when, in August, the administration cited human rights in cutting US$100 million (Dh368 million) in US support for Egypt and withholding another $195 million pending improvements.

Mr Trump’s personal goodwill towards Mr El Sisi appears sincere, but wasn’t decisive. Elements in his own administration were determined to punish Egypt, particularly regarding a restrictive new NGO law that Washington warned Cairo against. Moreover, the administration sought to forestall a looming and far larger congressional aid cut.

Beyond the executive and legislative branches of government, which includes most of the policy-making apparatus, lies a large and diverse, but highly influential, and in many subtle ways also powerful, policy-framing community.

This includes a wide spectrum of media, think tanks, academic institutions, lobbies, single-issue pressure groups and civil society organisations.

The US government was designed to be lobbied. The first amendment to the constitution prohibits congress from abridging “the right of the people…to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” In practice, that means lobbying and, in every other legal way, trying to influence law and policy.

Small but passionate and empowered minorities can even ensure the continuation of policies, like the Cuba embargo that pointlessly persisted for decades, or the ongoing lack of sensible firearm regulations, that majorities disagree with but don’t prioritise.

Whether Mr Tillerson stays or goes isn’t likely to have much impact on Mr Trump’s foreign policies. And Gulf countries should recognise that no matter how much some people may like Mr Trump or dislike Mr Tillerson, neither man nor any other individual or small group – not even a president – holds the keys to American foreign policy.

Instead, it’s formed over time by a complex web of interconnected inputs, a wide range of institutions and groups that, together, constitute a system which is open, constantly in flux, and beyond anyone’s ability to truly control.

The secret of American foreign policy is that there is no secret.

http://www.agsiw.org/saudis-are-about-to-buy-a-major-russian-missile-system-or-are-they/

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/kurds-need-to-combine-diplomacy-strategy-and-persistence-to-advance-their-cause-1.662805

Nothing about the Kurdish independence referendum in Iraq ought to surprise anyone. Kurdish politicians were too busy scoring nationalistic points to postpone it, as would have been wise. The Kurds’ neighbours – Iran, Iraq and Turkey – by recklessly and foolishly throwing their weight and bluster around in the run-up to the vote, ensured both a high turnout and an overwhelming “yes” result of more than 90 per cent, neither of which were by any means guaranteed a few weeks ago.

And Washington, which discouraged the referendum, has once again demonstrated that, these days, even its closest friends rarely heed its advice.

So, what now? Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani says a “long process” of negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad will soon commence about the terms of separation. Obviously, a dialogue between the Kurds and the Arabs of Iraq, as well as Turks, Iranians and others, is necessary and inevitable. Hopefully, it will be an exchange of words rather than bullets. But that’s hardly guaranteed.

The Kurds’ antagonists are all being decidedly belligerent.

Not only are the Iraqis and Turks holding joint military exercises adjacent to Kurdish territories, but the Iranians are also conducting military manoeuvres of their own, also unmistakably aimed at intimidating Erbil.

Perhaps even more significantly, Baghdad has imposed what, thus far, appears to be a fairly effective air-traffic blockade against the Kurdish government.

Because Iraqi authorities legally control the airspace over the Kurdish territories, their demand that all international flights cease left most carriers with little choice but to suspend travel or face a wide range of unpalatable problems, including prohibitive insurance rates.

It is unlikely Baghdad will have as much success with its demand that the Kurdistan Regional Government hand over control of its two international airports. But what use are runways if nobody will fly in and out of them?

These responses are all designed to remind the Kurds that not only are they surrounded by potential enemies, but their territory is also landlocked, and thus dependent on the minimal goodwill of at least one, if not all, of its immediate neighbours. Right now, they’ve managed to thoroughly alienate them all.

Moreover, a potential immediate flashpoint looms menacingly.

The otherwise idyllic town of Tuz Khurmatu, 90 kilometres south of the disputed city of Kirkuk, has been the scene of deep sectarian tensions in recent years. It is split between largely Shiite Turkmen and largely Sunni Arabs and Kurds, “protected” by sectarian Shiite militias on one side and Kurdish Peshmerga forces on the other.

If sectarian Shiite “Popular Mobilisation Forces”, or even the Iraqi military, react violently to the Kurdish independence moves, it will probably begin in or near Tuz Khurmatu, but it will be hard to keep it there. If violence erupts and spreads, it could engender a more generalised conflagration.

And if things go badly for the Shiite militias, it’s not hard to imagine Hizbollah, no longer as urgently needed in Syria as before, dispatching its own forces across yet another border in support of Iranian hegemony.

All this must be avoided in everyone’s interests.

Eventually, Kurds will undoubtedly achieve their statehood. But they can’t do that if their neighbours, particularly the Arabs of Iraq and, most of all, Turkey, haven’t yet been convinced of the benefits.

No one knows what Mr Barzani has in mind when he invokes a “long process”. But if it’s as long as it could, and probably should, be, then another obvious step towards eventual Kurdish statehood would be the development of a radically decentralised, extremely loose, confederated system within a nominally and formally united Iraq.

In such a scenario, Kurds could negotiate virtually everything they would practically want out of statehood, but without some of the formal trappings, while also gaining time to get their deeply dysfunctional domestic political house in order and begin to lay the groundwork with the rest of Iraq, Iran and, especially, Turkey, for the next stage at some future date.

There are clear benefits to all the other parties as well, particularly since such a scenario avoids the bloody conflict that has accompanied almost all successful secession movements in recent decades, with the exception of Slovakia.

On September 22, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, on Twitter recommended that Iraqis consider the “flexibility and functionality” of the Emirates’ experience with a federal system.

Obviously, the arrangement in Iraq would look radically different from that in the UAE. But this suggestion offers not only a way out of a dangerous quagmire, but a serious, practical and wise path forward, for all parties, above all the Kurds in their morally unquestionable but still politically labyrinthine quest for eventual statehood.

De facto independence in a highly decentralised and federated, but nominally unified Iraq, wasn’t what the Kurds voted for last week. But it would be a strategically shrewd move towards their ultimate goal of de jure independence.

http://www.agsiw.org/gulf-arab-countries-kurdish-referendum/

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities in Iraq have reported a predictably huge “yes” vote, over 90 percent, in the nonbinding referendum on Kurdish independence that was held September 25. The KRG’s immediate neighbors – Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (all of which have substantial Kurdish populations) – reacted with anger, and the United States expressed strong disapproval, while Israel praised the vote and endorsed Kurdish statehood. But most of the Gulf Arab countries have had a more ambivalent response, reflecting their own diverse interests in the Kurdistan region and what the vote, and potential Kurdish independence, could auger, both positively and negatively, from their perspectives.

Broadly speaking, several Gulf Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, see an opening in the Kurdistan region to expand the pro-Arab Sunni Muslim bloc in the Middle East, enhance the position of Sunni Arabs in other parts of Iraq, frustrate Iran on a number of fronts, and create additional leverage with Turkey. Their primary concerns include the potential outbreak of conflict, the uncontrolled potential disintegration of Iraq, a crisis in the battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, or the Kurdish issue somehow playing into the hands of Iran and its clients in Iraq and beyond.

This ambivalence was reflected in the reaction in Gulf Arab countries in the run up to the referendum. There was strong support in the Saudi and Emirati traditional and social media for the vote, but both governments formally expressed concerns about Iraq’s territorial integrity and the need for stability. Bahrain also advised Kurdish leaders not to rush into an independence vote that might destabilize Iraq. Kuwait was even more forthright in emphasizing that its primary interest was in the continued national unity and independence of Iraq. Oman did not take a public position. Qatartook the strongest Gulf Arab position in opposition to the Kurdish vote, expressing “deep concern” that the referendum could “pose a threat to the unity of Iraq and the security and stability of the region.”

Gulf States’ Relations with the KRG

Diplomatic relations between Gulf Arab countries and the KRG are limited, as the Gulf Arab states have had to balance between building relations with the Kurds and maintaining their relations with, and interests in, the broader Iraqi state. The UAE has the most extensive diplomatic and political ties with the Kurdish capital of Erbil having established a consulate general there as early as 2012. That was followed by Kuwait in 2015, and then Saudi Arabia in 2016, an upgrade in relations that was conducted despite Iran’s objections. KRG President Masoud Barzani visited a number of Gulf countries in 2015, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The KRG granted Emirati, Qatari, and Kuwaiti citizens the right of nonvisa entry in 2014. Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar do not have high-level representation with the KRG.

Several of the Gulf countries have extensive investments in the Kurdistan region, particularly the UAE and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia. As early as 2014, Iraq had risen to seventh place among the UAE’s trading partners, with most Emirati investment in Iraq concentrated in the Kurdistan region and with 130 Emirati companies registered as doing business there. Kuwait also has substantial and early investments in the Kurdistan region, although most of its presence in Iraq tends to be in the south. But the diplomatic and political concerns of Gulf countries in northern Iraq now far outweigh any commercial interests, no matter how substantial.

Kuwait’s interests in the Kurdistan region are, perhaps, the most straightforward. As with Kuwait’s attitude toward the rest of Iraq, its relations with Erbil are viewed primarily through the lens of the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and the determination to avoid any repetition of such a scenario. Therefore, Kuwait has long seen an interest in maintaining good relations with Iraqi leaders, particularly insofar as they represent some national, regional, confessional, or ethnic constituencies, and above all in the south of the country near the Kuwaiti border. The potential violent total disintegration of Iraq poses the same threat of chaos to Kuwait as it does to all of its neighbors. However, Kuwait’s interest in promoting a more fragmented and less unified Iraq in which regional authorities have considerable power – thereby reducing the potential for the resurrection of an overwhelmingly mighty, integrated, and potentially predatory neighbor to the north – certainly predates that of its fellow Gulf Arab countries.

The KRG’s Regional Strategic Role

More recently, however, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also begun to see strategic and political benefits to some rise for the Kurds – potentially to the extent of independent statehood, but certainly including maximal autonomy in a federal Iraq. Iraqi national unity and territorial integrity, at least in their most formal and nominal senses, are still important values for these countries. The final, formal breakup of Iraq through the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, unless it were amicably negotiated between Erbil and Baghdad, would probably not be a peaceful affair and could initiate a long, bloody, and highly destabilizing conflict that would not serve the interests of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are fundamentally status quo powers in the Middle East, at least in general, and are unlikely to welcome much redrawing of the established political map.

However, the strengthening of the KRG specifically, and the Kurdish position in Iraq in general, has become a powerful strategic interest for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The KRG is now viewed as an important new addition to a struggling Sunni Muslim bloc in the Middle East, even if its relations with Turkey and some other potentially important members of that camp are particularly strained under the circumstances. The notion that an empowered KRG is a significant obstacle to Iranian interests has become irresistible. At a minimum, the KRG would be geographically equidistant from Tehran and Riyadh, and at the very least slightly tilted toward the latter. At a maximum, Gulf Arab countries could develop a strategic relationship with Erbil in which the KRG emerges as a fully-fledged member or adjunct of the group of Middle Eastern actors actively opposing Iran.

This is particularly important because the Kurdistan region could be a substantial barrier to the development and maintenance of a “land bridge” from Iran, through Iraq and into Syria and Lebanon, linking Tehran with both its clients in those countries and the strategically crucial Mediterranean Sea. Such a land bridge, if consolidated under the complete control of Iran and its proxies, would alter dramatically the Middle Eastern strategic equation. Given the success of the pro-Iranian and pro-President Bashar al-Assad forces in Syria, particularly after the fall of Aleppo, preventing the consolidation of such a land bridge is one of the chief goals of Iran’s adversaries in the Middle East.

The KRG’s Political and Strategic Role in Iraq

This goal will be further advanced if Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others can help foster better relations between Erbil and the Sunni Arab leadership in western Iraq (much of whose territory would include the only other route from Iran to Syria). Strong relations have been brewing for several years as Iraqi Sunni Arab political leaders who have had to flee from Shia militias, the government, or ISIL have largely sought refuge in Erbil. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has been strengthening its relations not only with the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in Baghdad, but with Iraqi Sunni political and tribal leaders in western Iraq. The disposition of these forces, particularly in the post-ISIL period, combined with the orientation of Erbil, will do much to determine the power balance inside Iraq.

Qatar, Iran, and Turkey

A year ago, Qatar might have shared many of these perspectives. However, given the confrontation between Doha and the quartet of countries opposing Qatar’s policies, the Qatari position is much more sensitive to the concerns of Iran, which is quietly supporting Doha, and, especially, Turkey, which is Qatar’s main regional ally – hence Qatar’s unusually strong warnings against the Kurdish referendum. However, Turkey is not shocked by the referendum. It has been living with the “Kurdish question” since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Iraqi Arabs are also angered, but they too are not shocked, having watched the groundwork for Kurdish independence in the region built since the establishment of the no-fly zones in Iraq in 1991 and, especially, the fallout of the U.S. invasion in 2003.

Iran, however, is both alarmed and shocked, not only by the strategic implications of Kurdish power in northern Iraq, but also by the sudden eruption of unprecedented displays of Kurdish nationalism inside Iran (which has a much smaller Kurdish population than Turkey, but a larger one than Iraq). Up to now, the main ethnic concerns inside Iran have focused on the Baluchi and Arab minorities. However, increasingly the Kurds of Iran appear to be restive and highly dissatisfied. This nationalistic Kurdish sentiment inside Iran is obviously linked to independence moves in the KRG, and that, too, contributes to sympathy in parts of the Gulf Arab states for the referendum and the Kurdish independence movement more generally.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s Goals

The ideal scenario regarding the KRG in the long run, from the point of view of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, would be the emergence via negotiations of a hyper-empowered and de facto independent Kurdish entity in the context of a formal but loosely confederated Iraq. This would allow the Kurds to play their regional and Iraqi roles with maximum effectiveness, but without risking the violence of a secession struggle. It would allow the Kurds to serve as a balancing power against Iran in the region, including in Iraq. It should, at least in theory, strengthen the hand of Sunni Arabs inside Iraq, and therefore, regionally. And it would greatly reduce the prospects for the consolidation of Iran’s land bridge to Lebanon and the Mediterranean.

Moreover, the model of a loosely united federal system in Iraq would allow Sunni Arabs to control their own areas, creating another brake on Iran’s influence in Iraq. Furthermore, from a Saudi and Emirati perspective the loose federation model serves as a potential workable and minimally acceptable solution for the long-term future in Syria. In fact, it is likely they will now use their influence to promote the development of federal systems in both countries.

However, Arab opposition to full and formal Kurdish independence is not, by any means, absolute. Should the project of thwarting Iran’s influence by strengthening Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Iraq, developing stronger ties to the Abadi government and other wings of the Iraqi Shia political spectrum, and eventually promoting a loose confederation in Iraq fail in the long run, the equation would dramatically change. If Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab states must ever choose between full and formal Kurdish independence in northern Iraq and the consolidation of an Iranian-controlled, more integrated Iraqi state, the former would undoubtedly win out, despite the inevitable qualms about the breakup of a major Arab country.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-kurdish-referendum-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-issues-at-stake-1.660981

Not only is the process designed to burnish the nationalist credentials of Kurdish politicians, it is also a substitute for the actual, binding elections that these parties don’t want to have

On the eve of their scheduled independence referendum on Monday, the Kurds once again find themselves with no friends but the mountains.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-us-must-find-a-third-way-over-iran-one-that-is-neither-reticent-nor-reckless-1.628957

A proposed plan would involve sticking with the nuclear deal, while stepping up pressure on Tehran over its destabilising policies

The internal debate regarding the Trump administration’s policy towards Iran is coming to a head. A sensible – and indeed significantly improved – American approach is now competing with foolish and potentially disastrous impulses. The coming weeks will provide very strong indications of which will prevail.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/hizbollah-s-regional-agenda-is-a-surefire-recipe-for-more-war-1.624945

The group’s willingness and ability to unilaterally decide when and how Lebanon is dragged into conflicts is among many telltale signs of its menace

It is excellent news that ISIL has been driven out of Lebanon. Yet serious alarm is warranted regarding the evolving role of Hizbollah.

ISIL has been defeated in Tal Afar in Iraq and is rapidly losing Raqqa, its main redoubt in Syria. ISIL was therefore already struggling when its positions along the Syrian-Lebanese border were simultaneously attacked by the Lebanese military and Hizbollah from its strongholds in Syria.

Territorially, the operation was a success. However, in a bizarre surrender agreement, reportedly unilaterally agreed by Hizbollah, several hundred ISIL terrorists and their families were allowed to escape in air-conditioned buses to eastern Syria. They are now being hunted by American warplanes. In return, the bodies of eight Lebanese fighters were located.

Hizbollah apparently did not consult the authorities in Beirut, but did inform Syrian president Bashar Al Assad.

This underscores Hizbollah’s willingness and ability to unilaterally decide when and how it coordinates with the Lebanese state or usurps its authority. Hizbollah is using the victory to increase its already alarming dominance of Lebanese politics.

Worse, the Syrian war has transformed the nature and role of Hizbollah. The organisation has become much better armed, experienced, connected and capable. It now controls highly strategic areas in Syria, answering only to Tehran, and not Damascus, let alone Beirut.

Hizbollah is no longer simply, or even primarily, a Lebanese political organisation or just another dangerous militia. It is becoming a regional player, serving, in effect, as the armed vanguard of pro-Iranian forces as far afield as Yemen.

Indeed, Hizbollah has a plausible claim to being the most powerful non-state fighting force, depending on how that’s defined, in human history.

The organisation has long been more than a non-state militia, serving as a sub-state actor that carries out many state functions and prerogatives in parts of Lebanon and now Syria. But it is also a supra-state actor operating on a regional level, playing a crucial role within the pro-Iranian alliance in a growing list of battlegrounds.

Hizbollah’s role as a hyper-empowered and transnational sub-state entity spells big trouble for the region in general and Lebanon in particular.

For years, Hizbollah has maintained an independent foreign and defence policy to match its autonomous military capability. And it has demonstrated a brazen willingness to drag the rest of Lebanon into disastrous conflicts, particularly with Israel, without warning.

In July 2006, apparently hoping to seize prisoners for a swap, Hizbollah launched a cross-border raid that killed three Israeli soldiers. This, almost inevitably, provoked a massive Israeli response that left about 1,000 Lebanese dead and much of the country devastated.

Hizbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, described this debacle as a “divine victory”, but later apologised to other Lebanese, claiming he would never have authorised the attack had he anticipated the consequences. No one, however, even remotely familiar with Israel’s policies could have failed to anticipate them.

The truth is that Hizbollah acted in its own interests, and those of its Iranian masters, and both its own constituency and the rest of Lebanon paid the price.

With the primary fighting in the main part of the Syrian civil war effectively resolved by the fall of the rebel-held parts of Aleppo eight months ago, Hizbollah is not only stronger than ever, but also no longer fully occupied or bogged down in Syria. Indeed, it has emerged from that conflict as a much graver strategic threat to Israel, among many others, than it ever was in the past.

Israeli alarm is evident, and all year long the two sides have been exchanging dire, and very real, threats.

Hizbollah has been touting its undoubtedly greatly improved missile capabilities, threatening to attack all of Israel, including Tel Aviv, and even the nuclear reactor at Dimona.

The Israelis have made it clear that no part of Lebanon will be spared in any future conflict. Israel never cared much what other parts of Lebanon suffered in its conflicts with Hizbollah. But now it has sent the message that next time it will actively seek to brutally punish everyone and everything.

Can Israel live with a hyper-empowered, regionally significant and ascendant Hizbollah more dominant than ever in Lebanon, ruling parts of Syria and threatening its cities and nuclear reactors? Israel has already struck several times in Syria to prevent weapons transfers to Hizbollah forces in Lebanon.

If no other means of containing or reversing Hizbollah’s rise develops, then a broader Israeli campaign designed to significantly degrade this perceived threat could be a matter of when, not if. Alternatively, Iran might decide to unleash Hizbollah against Israel for its own reasons. Or Hizbollah could again deliberately initiate a conflict.

In any of these scenarios, most other Lebanese would pay an appalling price for a decision over which they have practically no influence.

Lebanese Shiites plainly need effective leadership to defend their interests. But they don’t need, and neither they nor their Lebanese compatriots can afford, to be the playthings of a region-wide terrorist network answerable to no one except the most cynical hardliners in Tehran.

Hizbollah’s growing power and nefarious regional agenda isn’t just a nightmare for Lebanon. It’s a serious threat to the whole region and a surefire recipe for yet more war.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/if-the-us-walks-away-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal-it-will-live-to-regret-it-1.626768