If international donors hold firm to their conditions for a bailout, economic and political change may be possible.
The most severe of Lebanon’s intersecting crises is the country’s seemingly inexorable spiral toward economic catastrophe. In only the latest of many harbingers of doom, the likelihood of a default on a government bond due next month has sent stocks crashing to a 15-year low.
It’s not just investors who’re spooked. The national carrier, Middle East Airlines, was panicked into announcing that it would no longer accept Lebanese currency for payments. The decision was quickly rescinded, but it was a stunning vote of no-confidence in the pound, and by extension the economy and the government.
Lebanese authorities have asked the International Monetary Fund for guidance on stabilizing the economy, but international bailout conditions are likely to be painful. A team of IMF experts is scheduled to begin consultations next week.
But it is possible—if only just—to see a silver lining in all this. The desperate need for a bailout, combined with the ongoing people-power movement in the streets, could finally prompt significant economic and political reforms.
The intersection between the economic and political crises isn’t lost on anyone, at home or abroad. The World Bank’s Middle East representative, Ferid Belhaj, has called for reforms, issuing a stark warning for Lebanese leaders: “You cannot continue doing what you’ve been doing for years when you see what the reaction on the street is, and when you see what the state of the economy is.”
The massive street protests that began last October were initially centered on socio-economic grievances, but quickly evolved into a rejection of the entire political elite. The protests continue, but not with the breadth and intensity they had before. It remains to be seen whether the movement is fading, or whether it will regroup and make another major push for political reforms.
The newly-installed Prime Minister Hassan Diab, an ally of Hezbollah, has little breathing room, however. He is being snubbed by Gulf Arab countries that have long been crucial to the Lebanese economy, through aid and remittances from expatriate Lebanese workers. Only Qatar has agreed to receive him. The other Arab countries have clearly indicated they aren’t interested in propping up a government installed, they believe, to do the bidding of the Iran-backed group.
Capital investment has dried up despite another interest-rate cut. The all-important remittances, largely from the Gulf, are in freefall. In the last six months of 2019, Lebanese banks lost $10 billion of deposits, and the country is experiencing a rapidly-intensifying liquidity crisis, with dollars in short supply.
The most immediate threat is a $1.2 billion Eurobond that matures in March and does not appear payable. The IMF may suggest debt-holders must write off up to 70% of such investments, prompting another slide in the already beleaguered pound.
Diab knows an international bailout is the only way out of this mess. But the West and the Gulf countries, and even multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, have made it clear they will not rescue Lebanon unless there are substantial, and painful, economic reforms—including currency devaluation, reduced subsidies and public-sector employment, and a crack-down on corruption.
And this would almost certainly involve significant political change as well. Greater transparency and accountability are crucial to any long-term Lebanese economic recovery. But the current political order has proven incapable of such tough measures and many of the leading national political figures are – as the protesters insist – deeply implicated in endemic corruption.
Nor will the changes be limited to domestic politics. To get long-term international support, Diab will be under pressure to finally enact the “dissociation policy” his predecessors have talked up for years but never implemented. This rather vague policy commits the Lebanese government “in all its components” to refrain from involvement in any regional conflicts or the affairs of other Arab states. To have any meaning, this would require Hezbollah to give up its cherished role as cat’s-paw for Iran in places like Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
But who will bell that cat? Hezbollah has just erected a statue of the slain Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani as a symbol of its—and Iran’—power over Lebanon. Diab’s best hope is that the Hezbollah leadership recognizes that they are inextricably bound to the rest of the Lebanese system, and that if the economy completely collapses, so will their finances.
If Diab is serious about mobilizing an international rescue, he needs to move quickly on the reforms that will be required by donors, especially the reduction of of the national debt and an end to the looting of national wealth by the elites. I wouldn’t hold my breath, though. Diab is, as the protesters have been saying, part of the elite.
Still, even if the Lebanese ruling class is determined to keep changes to the minimum necessary to ensure international support, as long as the donors stay firm on their demands for reform, they can begin to push the ossified power structure toward change. And if the protesters keep up the pressure on the streets, they may be able to force the implementation of constitutional provisions to create a more democratic and non-sectarian lower house in parliament.
If a combination of domestic and international pressure in the context of the emerging economic implosion is not enough to impose serious change on Lebanon, it’s hard to imagine what could.
In the unlikely event the Democratic Party contender beats Trump in this year’s election, his policies will not serve the US well, either domestically or abroad
Along with an apparently sound economy, Donald Trump’s greatest advantage going into November’s US presidential election will be his near-total grip on the Republican Party. Except for one senator – Mitt Romney of Utah, who voted to remove him from office at his impeachment trial – and one governor – Phil Scott of Vermont, who has endorsed one of his marginal rivals – Mr Trump indisputably dominates his party.
Regarding the Democratic Party, there are two competing narratives.
The first holds that, if you combine their aggregate numbers both during the 2018 midterms and the primaries thus far, Democratic centrists are emerging as the dominant force in the party. That would greatly distinguish the Democrats from the Republicans, who largely swung to the extreme right in the aftermath of Barack Obama’s sweeping presidential and congressional victories in 2008.
The second narrative holds that the hard-left Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont has himself already become the dominant figure due to his close second-place finish in Iowa and a narrow victory in New Hampshire. Whether or not he wins the nomination, some argue, Mr Sanders has already transformed the Democratic conversation.
We’ve seen this movie before.
Mr Sanders commands the undying loyalty of approximately 25 per cent of his party’s base voters. In hotly contested primaries, he faces a divided field of largely mainstream rivals. He is opposed by the party establishment. Indeed, he has never even been a formal member of the party. And he is noted for radical views formed in the 1980s, if not the 1970s.
If that sounds familiar, that is because it precisely describes Mr Trump’s own position in the early stages of the Republican primaries four years ago.
Mr Sanders and Mr Trump share other characteristics.
Both are given to magical thinking and wild promises. Both have long histories of being suspicious of foreigners and trade. And both tend to appeal to the emotional and tribal sentiments of their base. These are not uniters, but rather finger-pointing and grievance-driven dividers – though one champions race and the other class.
There is another suggestive parallel in their mutual lack of transparency. Mr Trump has denied Americans the customary courtesy of releasing his tax returns though it is unclear exactly what he is hiding. Meanwhile, Mr Sanders has refused to divulge his health records, even though he is a 78-year-old man who in October returned to the campaign trail a few days after suffering a myocardial infarction, which damages and heart muscles, and mandates weeks of rest. Americans have no idea what his likely longevity might be.
Even without seeing his actual medical records, one might question whether his decision to resume campaigning was reckless in the extreme. It raises the issue of his overall judgment and perhaps a willingness to court disaster – even to his continued existence – in order to pursue political goals. The implications for the country are not reassuring.
Aside from sharing an attachment to Russia, Mr Trump and Mr Sanders are two of the more passionate proponents of the neo-isolationism that has gripped the imagination of the Democratic left as well as the Republican right, as typically defined by now-cliched diatribes against “endless wars”.
This is crucial because, if he is elected, Mr Sanders’ far-reaching policy goals on the economy and climate change, among other things, are very unlikely to pass even a Democratic-controlled Congress. However, foreign policy is an area in which presidents have wide – at times, almost unfettered – power.
Both Democrats and Republicans have, since the end of the Cold War – and particularly since the debacle of the 2003 invasion of Iraq – debated the usefulness of international engagement and leadership to ordinary Americans.
Mr Trump’s impulse is to oppose such engagement but his evident desire to look tough to his base sometimes prompts him in a different direction. Mr Sanders shares the disengagement impulse, although he appears to have no attachment to macho posturing. Mr Trump leads a party that is deeply divided between isolationists and hawks, and he continuously tacks between the two. It is not clear that a Sanders-led Democratic Party will be similarly split.
A President Sanders could pose serious problems for Arab countries. He played a significant role in the extraordinary vote last April, eventually vetoed by Mr Trump, through which Congress sought to use the War Powers Act to end all US support for the Arab intervention in Yemen.
Mr Sanders says he wants to withdraw all US forces from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria by the end of his first term, and redirect spending away from international engagement, particularly military outlays, and towards domestic investments. He is likely to prioritise re-engaging with Iran by unilaterally lifting sanctions.
Under either Mr Trump or Mr Sanders, the US is likely to continue to withdraw from international leadership and especially the use of force.
Mr Sanders, who is Jewish, is popular among many Arab and Muslim Americans because he is perceived as a forthright critic of Israel. Compared to Mr Trump, he certainly is. And he is one of the few leading American politicians to suggest using aid to Israel as leverage on peace. But his essential position would return the US to a traditional two-state approach.
Mr Sanders has a long history of supporting far left-wing authoritarians, including the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the Castro regime in Cuba, the now-defunct Soviet Union and others. His Democratic rivals have been circumspect on such issues, and Mr Trump – obviously delighted by the prospect of running against him and not a more formidable challenger – has kept his powder dry as well.
However, when and if Mr Trump and the Republican media machine unleash on Mr Sanders’ domestic and international views, the consequences could be devastating. Think Jeremy Corbyn – times 10.
In a battle of fabulist demagogues, it would be foolish to bet against Mr Trump.
A concerted effort to punish the whistleblower, the witnesses and those who co-operated with the impeachment probe undermines American democracy.
So, the heads are going up on pikes after all.
During US President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial, the lead Democratic Party prosecutor, Adam Schiff, cited reports that Republican Party senators were warned that if they wavered, their “heads would be on pikes”. Republicans feigned outrage. Last week, Mr Trump was acquitted by the Senate Republican majority, which had vowed to do just that before the witness-free trial – essentially just a debate – began. Several of the so-called moderates who were indignant about Mr Schiff’s “pikes” remark justified their acquittal votes by saying the president had “learned” a lesson and would be chastened.
That would be a rational response. But less than 48 hours after the verdict, the president initiated what will almost certainly be an extended campaign of vengeance against his perceived enemies. First to go were two key witnesses against the president and, to add an appropriate level of fear, an innocent bystander.
Few will weep for Gordon Sondland, just fired as US ambassador to the European Union, who donated $1 million to Mr Trump’s inauguration festivities. He is unlikely to get a refund. Yet it is shocking to see anyone dismissed for merely testifying to the US Congress.
Far more disturbing was the summary ouster from the National Security Council staff of Lt Col Alexander Vindman, a decorated Iraq war veteran, and his otherwise uninvolved twin brother, Lt Col Yevgeny Vindman. Both were marched out of their White House offices by armed security guards.
This first round of payback came immediately after Mr Trump railed against the “crooked”, “vicious”, “horrible”, “bad”, “dirty”, “evil and sick” people who had not sided with him. His spokeswoman vowed that such people “should pay”. At the annual National Prayer Breakfast, the president said he rejects the core Christian doctrine of loving your enemies and suggested that his supporters were all pious people while his opponents – including Senator Mitt Romney, a Republican who voted to convict him, and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi – simply use religion to conceal their wicked deeds.
The campaign of intimidation is plainly just beginning. Another likely victim is the whistleblower who first alerted Congress to the president’s efforts to coerce Ukraine into announcing an investigation into Joe Biden, Mr Trump’s possible opponent in the 2020 presidential election, and his son. Indeed, Senator Rand Paul – a Trump ally – has been attempting to expose this whistleblower by name, making further punishment possible. Also at risk is the inspector general of the intelligence community, Michael Atkinson, who allowed the whistleblower’s complaint to be passed to Congress – as legally required.
The Vindmans, the whistleblower and Mr Atkinson all followed the law and did their duties. But they enraged Mr Trump and so must “pay”. Many other officials could similarly be in jeopardy. Republican senators are preparing hearings against Mr Biden and his son. Officials from the Department of Justice are being investigated for having themselves investigated the Trump campaign. And the administration is reportedly searching for ways to strike back at Mr Schiff, Mr Romney and Ms Pelosi, among others.
Mr Trump claimed “full vindication and exoneration” by the Senate. But, in fact, not only was the trial a mockery of any judicial proceeding, and the only Senate trial in US history in which no witnesses were allowed, many of the key senators who ultimately sided with him acknowledged that Democrats had proven their case and that what the president had done was inappropriate, troubling and wrong. Yet except for Mr Romney, all concluded the correct response was to acquit Mr Trump and endorse his re-election.
Meanwhile, Mr Trump seems not only un-chastened, but enraged and even emboldened. He has specialised in using the powers of his office to attack his perceived enemies in an unprecedentedly personalised and vindictive manner. For example, he repeatedly urged his officials to persecute and legally prosecute his opponents, particularly Hillary Clinton, his presidential opponent in 2016, and James Comey, the former FBI director.
To get back at CNN he tried to block the acquisition of AT&T by CNN’s parent company, Time Warner. Also angered by Washington Post reporting, he has moved to block Amazon from being considered for major government contracts and to try to double what the US Postal Service charges Amazon for deliveries. Both Amazon and the Post are owned by Jeff Bezos.
The Department of Homeland Security is no longer providing crucial travel services to New Yorkers, which looks like a first measure against New York, a hotbed of ” the resistance”.
Undoubtedly more metaphorical heads on pikes will soon decorate the Washington landscape.
Meanwhile, Mr Trump’s children are being lionized like royalty. The National Association of Manufacturers is bestowing its prestigious Alexander Hamilton award to his daughter, Ivanka, because, they preposterously claim, “Like no one in government has ever done, she has provided singular leadership and shown an unwavering commitment to manufacturing.” Servility, not achievement or competence, is now the coin of the realm.
Republicans in Congress show few signs of discomfort with the budding retaliation campaign, and those that have urged caution were reportedly rebuffed. The president has plainly drawn the inevitable lesson. Throughout his life he has relied on bluster, bullying and threats and has got away with skirting laws, norms and conventions. And most of his supporters will cheer the persecution of the likes of Lt Col Vindman, his brother and the whistleblower.
The last major democratic guardrail still standing is the November election. Mr Trump’s popularity numbers are robust and the sound economy he inherited from Barack Obama remains hardy. Besides, having just got away with an attempt to subvert the coming election, Mr Trump might be tempted to try again.
If he is re-elected by whatever means, there is every danger that the accelerating slide towards American autocracy could well be completed.
To undermine the Trump proposal, Mahmoud Abbas must show flexibility and compromise.
The Palestinian leadership has publicly responded to President Trump’s so-called peace proposal with “a thousand no’s.” So far, so predictable. But if President Mahmoud Abbas has any hope of limiting the damage from the Trump plan—which gives Israel license to annex large parts of the West bank and leaves the Palestinians at best trapped in an unworkable Bantustan—he needs to craft a more serious rejoinder.
U.S. officials have invited the Palestinians to come up with a counteroffer; Arab and European governments would welcome one that validates their opposition to the Trump plan and continued commitment to the two-state framework. Abbas has said he will present a proposal in the next couple of weeks, likely at the United Nations.
The momentum is on his side. The Europeans have rejected the plan, pointing out that it is utterly at odds with international law, existing agreements and understandings. There was some initial ambivalence from the Arabs: Seeking closer ties to Israel in their confrontation with Iran, some Arab countries had hoped to embrace the proposal. Ambassadors from the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Bahrain were present at the launch ceremony. But an Arab League summit unanimously rejected the proposal as “unjust,” and warned Israel not to proceed with its annexation plans. The Arab position was reiterated by the 57-state member Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
The Trump plan poses the greatest threat to potential Palestinian independence in decades, yet it has also strengthened Abbas’ authority at home by uniting the political factions, including Hamas, in opposition to it and, perforce, around his national leadership.
The stage is perfectly set for Abbas to present a bold new Palestinian vision for peace with Israel. The easy, and wrong, thing to do—and going by his track record, what he is most likely to do—would be to simply frame the Palestinian position as a vague, two-state formula based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. This was exactly the position he took at the UN last year, but times have changed dramatically.
A reprise of that speech might be politically popular with Palestinians, where Abbas would be seen as sticking to their national talking points. But it would achieve nothing for them: the Trump plan has already altered the political landscape, and it may not be long before Israeli annexation irreversibly changes facts on the ground too.
To undermine the Trump initiative, Abbas will need to show political courage and leadership—and flexibility. His own plan should embrace significant compromises on key final-status issues.
If he can’t produce a detailed conceptual map of proposed borders for the Palestinian state—those details would require negotiating with Israel–Abbas can at least identify some of the Jewish settlements that Palestinians are willing to trade for equal areas of unpopulated land in Israel, and a transit corridor to Gaza. He can concede that most Palestinian refugees will have to make do with compensation and citizenship in a Palestinian state rather than a return to what is now Israel. (He can cite himself as an example of this, as he has in the past.)
He can commit to reasonable security arrangements and a non-militarized state along Costa Rican lines—with police and security forces but no standing military, and committed to staying out of all conflicts—but not one controlled or surrounded by Israel.
And he can affirm that Jerusalem would serve as the capital for both Israel and Palestine.
But Abbas should also insist that the Palestinian state be fully sovereign and in control its borders, airspace and electromagnetic spectrum and coastline.
Finally, he should agree that such an understanding would be an end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to all claims against each other.
All this would be entirely consistent with the positions the Palestinian leadership has presented at the negotiating table for decades, but has never honestly explained to its own public. As a result, such a plan would be controversial among Palestinians, but Abbas should point out that the Trump proposal is a national emergency, requiring the breaking of some political taboos.
At the UN, Abbas should also hold up a copy of the signature page of 1993 Declaration of Principles, signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Israel and the U.S., and note that it is formal and binding. He can easily demonstrate that his vision is entirely consistent with its provisions while the Trump proposal is not. All negotiations, he should insist, must be based on this signed and agreed-upon framework, and not some new diktat from the White House.
If Palestinians respond with such a serious counteroffer, they will reinforce Arab and European opposition to the Trump proposal, and make any Israeli annexation effort far more difficult and costly. They will also greatly strengthen the hands of those in Washington who are committed to restoring sanity and viability to U.S. policy on Israel and Palestine.
The lengths the Senate has gone to get the president acquitted has troubling implications for the country’s constitutional order
As evidence surrounding US President Donald Trump and the Ukraine scandal mounts almost daily, the Republican Party-controlled Senate voted on Friday to refuse to hear any witnesses or subpoena relevant documents. He is therefore set to be acquitted next week after the only Senate impeachment “trial” in US history without any witnesses.
Truth has, predictably, been the first casualty.
The Senate did not even want to hear from John Bolton, the former national security adviser, who has written a draft book claiming that, as early as last May, the president was plotting to leverage US military aid to coerce Ukraine into publicly smearing Joe Biden, Mr Trump’s potential opponent in the 2020 presidential election, as well as his son. He reportedly details the involvement of other senior figures, including Mr Trump’s lead impeachment attorney, Pat Cipollone.
On Saturday, the White House moved to suppress 24 emails that purportedly also document the president’s intentions towards Ukraine.
To justify their unprecedented aversion to information, Senate Republicans have floated some especially ridiculous arguments.
Lisa Murkowski of Alaska denounced the Democratic Party’s partisanship while joining almost all her fellow Republicans in defending their leader against the facts. She complained that the trial was not fair, but somehow blamed the House of Representatives for this – and not the White House, which suppressed critical testimony and documents, nor the Senate, including herself, which is cheerfully refusing them.
Lamar Alexander of Tennessee admitted that the Democrats proved their case against Mr Trump, but argued that, therefore, there is no need for any further evidence. He argued that while the president’s actions were clearly “inappropriate”, that was no reason to remove him from office, or punish him in any way. Indeed, he endorsed Mr Trump for re-election.
The party is ratifying a new and dangerous standard of presidential immunity and impunity. Mr Trump’s lawyers and most elected Republicans, either implicitly or explicitly, are arguing that the removal of a president requires a criminal act that is also politically corrupt.
One Trump lawyer, Alan Dershowitz, claimed that not only would a president have to be guilty of a statutory crime, his motive would also have to be corrupt. Mr Trump therefore cannot be removed because the House only charged him with corruption and abuse of office, not a criminal act.
Mr Trump’s defenders add there can be no question of corruption if, in abusing his authority, a president believes he is acting in the public interest – even if simply by securing his own re-election. If Mr Trump was trying to subvert the coming election by coercing Ukraine into smearing his opponent, so long as he believes he is the right person for the job, this theory holds that would be just fine.
All told this creates a shocking standard, almost every element of which is a severe blow to the traditional American constitutional order. It strongly suggests that a president could, for example, try to ensure his re-election by using his vast law enforcement authority to jail his opponents en masse, and that would not be impeachable.
That would render American democracy practically meaningless.
There might be some slow-witted Republican House members who sincerely believe that Mr Trump did nothing wrong or that such presidential impunity is constitutionally valid. But almost all senators know better.
Some undoubtedly fear Mr Trump’s wrath and the backlash of his passionate supporters. But Mr Alexander, 79, is retiring. His example suggests that Republicans do not require ulterior motives or bizarre delusions. Ideological affiliation and pure power politics explain their eagerness to defend Mr Trump despite everything – and, indeed, to heartily endorse him for re-election.
Marco Rubio of Florida summed up this astounding position by arguing that even when there are ample grounds to remove a president, implicitly as of now, that does not mean the Senate should do it. Obviously not, if you or your party might be harmed in the process.
Republicans seem to be embracing and ratifying the White House’s argument that a sitting president cannot be charged with a crime or in any way investigated by law enforcement, can absolutely stonewall Congress, and only be impeached or removed based on this almost impossible, virtually monarchical, standard.
The last democratic guardrail still standing is the presidential election in November. Even then, it is expected that, as in 2016, Mr Trump could well win with only a minority of popular votes through the quirks of the federal electoral college system.
Republican Senators point to the coming election, even though the Constitution does not provide any such impeachment exemption. It should be “left up to the people”, they said.
That flies in the face of the US constitutional system but, more importantly – and the lingering problem of minority rule aside – blatant election manipulation has already begun.
Mr Trump has just got away with an extensive effort at doing so via Ukraine. The Senate’s refusal to hear evidence was mainly motivated not to justify their upcoming acquittal of the president, which was apparently set in stone, but to deny the voting public the chance to hear people such as Mr Bolton and see the documents that detail the whole story.
The relevant portions of Mr Bolton’s book could well be suppressed, if not permanently, at least until November. The administration has put an indefinite hold on its publication, while it is “reviewed” to protect classified information and, strikingly, vast claims of “executive privilege”.
Would Democrats perform better under similar circumstances? One cannot be sure, though they have never put themselves in such a predicament.
American democracy is experiencing a profound crisis. But it is not Mr Trump who poses the primary challenge to the US constitutional order. It is the leadership and most elected officials and the institutions of the Republican Party.
Responses from Gulf Arab states to Trump’s plan have differed, but they all praised U.S. efforts without endorsing the proposal.
Most Gulf Arab countries responded to President Donald J. Trump’s Israeli-Palestinian peace plan announced January 28 with cautiously worded statements that balanced thanks and encouragement for U.S. efforts with a noncommittal stance toward the details of the proposal. This delicate balance reflects the intricate mix of political and strategic interests these countries are seeking to juggle more than emotional or ideological ambivalence, illustrating the underlying concerns for Gulf Arab states on one of the Middle East’s most volatile and intractable conflicts, as well as relations with Washington.
Gulf Reactions to the Trump Plan
The most supportive among the Gulf Arab states of Trump’s proposal have been the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Bahrain, which sent their ambassadors to attend the announcement ceremony. And though these countries, as well as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, issued formal statements that struck appreciative and encouraging notes, they avoided embracing the plan itself, let alone any of its specifics.
The most important of these countries from the U.S. and Israeli perspectives, Saudi Arabia, set the tone by issuing a statement that was appreciative of U.S. efforts and urged Palestinians and Israelis to re-engage in direct negotiations. It did not endorse the plan or any of its details or even say it should be the basis of new talks. But, notably, neither did it repeat the centrality of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative that Saudi Arabia has championed in the Arab League for over 15 years, and the provisions of which stand in stark contrast to Trump’s proposal. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia issued a second statement reporting a telephone call between King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in which Saudi Arabia says its monarch reiterated its “steadfast stance on the Palestinian issue and the rights of the Palestinian people.” Palestinians have said that the Saudi monarch confirmed that the kingdom would support any decision taken by the Palestinian people regarding their future.
Saudi Arabia has been notably silent on the status of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem under the Trump plan, which remains unresolved. On the one hand, Trump and other U.S. officials have repeatedly emphasized that there will be no changes to the status quo at the Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount, the third holiest site in Islam, which is under the control of a Muslim Waqf religious trust. Under current arrangements, Jews and other non-Muslims can visit the site, which many believe once contained the holiest of Jewish temples, but they cannot pray or hold religious ceremonies there. The written version of the Trump plan appears to suggest that people of all faiths should be allowed to pray at the site, which would be a radical deviation in the status quo. Under agreements from the 1990s, Jordan is designated as the custodian of Muslim holy places in occupied East Jerusalem, but there have been rumors that the United States, and possibly Israel, have been trying to entice Saudi Arabia into supporting the new U.S. approach by offering to replace Jordanian custodianship with that of Saudi Arabia. Nothing of the kind has been referred to in public by any of the parties, and there is no mention of it in the Trump proposal. However, Riyadh’s silence on these questions reflects the uncertainty of the U.S. position and the delicacy of these questions regarding the kingdom’s relations with Washington, Israel, and even Jordan.
Other Gulf Arab states fell on either side of Saudi Arabia’s down-the-middle approach. The three most invested in better ties with Israel, and hence more leverage with Washington and ballast against Iran, are the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Bahrain. By dispatching their ambassadors to the Trump plan rollout event, they were signaling stronger investment in the bid to restart negotiations, if not the specifics of the proposal itself. All of them have urged Palestinians to return to the negotiating table. Their positions tend to put the onus on Palestinians to agree to a new round of talks in the context, if not on the basis, of the new U.S. initiative. The UAE’s foreign minister even retweeted a New York Times article highly critical of the Palestinian position by former Jerusalem Post editor Bret Stephens – “Every Time Palestinians Say ‘No,’ They Lose.”
Qatar and Kuwait, feeling more vulnerable than their neighboring monarchies to various Arab and regional pressures, also applauded U.S. efforts, but hedged much more toward reiterating traditional Arab baseline positions. Both emphasized the importance of previous agreements, implicitly the 1993 Declaration of Principles and its five permanent status issues framework that the Trump proposal effectively abrogates. They cited the need for peace based on the 1967 borders, a reasonable agreement on Palestinian refugees, and the necessity of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem and respect for non-Jewish holy places there. These traditional Gulf Arab touchstones were generally missing from the other four formal responses.
This caution comes from specific interests that distinguish Qatar and Kuwait from the other Gulf Arab states, but also from each other. Kuwait, with a relatively open political system and a delicate balance between ideological and religious constituencies, is loath to be dragged into any regional or transnational controversies. Kuwait, therefore, feels a stronger need than many other Gulf countries to protect its pro-Palestinian bona fides. Meanwhile, no Gulf country has been more forthcoming on building closer ties to Israel than Qatar, and the high point of Israel’s diplomatic representation in Gulf Arab states was its formal presence in Doha in the 1990s. Since then, however, and particularly after the boycott by three of its Gulf Arab neighbors and Egypt was launched in the summer of 2017, Qatar has had to pay careful attention to its increased dependence on Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran for support. Qatar also has strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood movement and Arab nationalist groups, including leading Palestinian politicians and commentators, to which it must attend. Qatar’s regional strategy for years, including during the period when it grew much closer to Israel, has included consistent outreach to populist groups and movements throughout the Arab world, almost all of which are categorically anti-Zionist and anti-Israel. Competing Concerns in the Gulf
Gulf Arab countries are keen on maintaining the strongest possible relations with Washington, especially considering the United States’ “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. They are aware that Trump’s modus operandi can involve sudden reversals in which former enemies, like North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, suddenly are portrayed as beloved friends. Therefore, it is not just a matter of encouraging Washington to be tough with their Iranian rival; they are also hedging against any potential sudden shift by the White House if a dialogue with Tehran abruptly develops.
Israel has become an important factor in staving off Iranian hegemony in the Middle East and the potential rise of Turkey as another regional power with interests often opposed by many Arabs and Israelis. Israeli spokespeople and officials exaggerate when they speak about an “alliance” with various Arab countries against Iran, or even “our Sunni Arab allies,” but there is a potentially viable understanding between them to counter Iranian, and possibly Turkish, influence in the region. There is more quiet cooperation than is publicly acknowledged by Gulf Arab countries, especially on security and intelligence matters. Therefore, a degree of sensitivity about Israeli, as well as U.S., perceptions influence Gulf Arab responses to the White House proposal.
Yet three broad sets of issues ensure that even the most enthusiastic of the Gulf Arab countries remain unwilling to engage in a broader and open rapprochement with Israel.
The first is the potential political blowback they face, largely from domestic opposition groups. After decades of fulminating against Israel and the occupation, to grow closer to Israel without any major progress on Palestinian rights or the occupation would be politically dangerous.
The second consideration involves values. Even if they privilege their national interests and personal and political concerns, they remain Arabs and Muslims with genuine sympathies for the dispossession and exile of the Palestinians. Even those leaders or individuals who lack patience with the Palestinian leadership nonetheless remain moved by many decades of suffering by the Palestinian people and are deeply concerned about the fate of Muslim holy places, particularly in Jerusalem.
Third, and most important, these governments are concerned about the strategic threat posed by the continued Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and the persistence of the Palestinian plight as a destabilizing political variable in their region. The unresolved question of Palestine remains highly contentious and allows a wide range of actors – from Iran and Hezbollah, to Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, to even al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – to score political points through angry rhetoric and appearing to outbid others regarding opposition to Israel, Zionism, the West, and, therefore, the existing Arab political order. Gulf Arab governments understand that until there is a resolution of the Palestinian issue and a mutually acceptable end to the occupation, they will not enjoy the stability and security to which they aspire.
Israel May Be Squandering a Limited Opportunity
For these reasons, Gulf Arab countries cannot abandon Palestine or openly embrace a strategic alliance with Israel despite the evident incentives for doing so. Israel is arguably making a dangerous assumption that the Gulf Arab interest in pursuing closer relations will continue to intensify as it has over the past decade. This presumes that tensions with Iran, and possibly Turkey, will persist or increase in the coming years. That is possible. But there could alternatively be a change of government or policy in Tehran or some sort of reconciliation between Gulf Arab countries and Iran. And the rise of Turkey as a regional threat remains largely hypothetical.
Under such circumstances, Israel could find itself in much less demand in Gulf Arab countries and could discover that the leeway it has enjoyed of late on the Palestinian issue has diminished. Alternatively, Gulf Arab countries could find themselves in a crisis, including an existential armed conflict with Iran, in which the necessity of a closer strategic relationship with Israel becomes irresistible and considerations regarding the Palestinians are pushed even further to the margins.
No one can be sure in which direction this relationship is headed. But one thing is certain: The mutual attraction between Israel and Gulf Arab countries is, like all commodities, contingent on a range of variables and could become more or less intense depending on a range of factors. And while many Israelis may feel that the Trump administration’s proposal presents a historic opportunity for annexation and territorial expansion, taking advantage of that opening may badly damage the broader goal of reconciliation with key Arab countries and integration into the Middle East region. What happens in the coming months in the occupied Palestinian territories will be watched closely by the Gulf states. Several of them are evidently intent on exploring the possibility of a strategic arrangement with the Israelis. But the broader context will, no doubt, transform over time.
The Palestinian Authority has, not surprisingly, expressed disappointment at the Arab, and particularly Gulf, response to the Trump proposal, and will be pushing for greater unity behind its rejection of the plan at the upcoming Arab League summit. Despite their differences, all the Gulf Arab countries’ reactions shared certain features. They all welcomed the U.S. effort and called for more negotiations. But none of them endorsed any of the plan’s specific provisions, strongly suggesting that they aren’t preparing to abandon the Palestinians or embrace Israel anytime in the foreseeable future.
It’s hard to imagine any other credible response to Trump’s “peace plan.”
For Palestinians, a long-dreaded day of reckoning is fast approaching. The so-called peace plan unveiled by the Trump administration on Tuesday invites Israel to immediately annex large chunks of the occupied West Bank and the Jordan Valley. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is wasting no time in doing just that, possibly as early as next week.
For Palestinians, that would signal the end of all hope for a genuinely independent state alongside Israel. The Trump proposal envisages an Israeli-dominated, non-sovereign Palestinian “state” that is an enclave within a hyper-empowered greater Israel. And even that can only be accomplished after Palestinians meet an unheard-of set of conditions to Israel’s satisfaction.
When the Camp David summit in July 2000 failed, my father asked me what I thought. I said Israelis would eventually enforce the highly circumscribed “statehood” Palestinians had just rejected. They would try to use their overwhelming power to gobble up large parts of the occupied territories, without absorbing the Palestinian population or allowing genuine Palestinian independence.
Until this week, they were blocked from doing this because the U.S. was a third signatory to the 1993 Declaration of Principles that prohibits unilateral annexation. Now David Friedman, the American ambassador to Israel is openly encouraging Israel to annex big chunks of Palestinian territory.
The Palestine Liberation Organization for decades sought to negotiate a two-state agreement with Israel. If the Israelis go ahead with this annexation and Washington perseveres with the new Trump policies, they will look like the biggest dupes imaginable. Hamas, which insists on armed struggle, will appear vindicated despite the continuous disasters their violence have wrought on Palestinian lives and fortunes.
How should Palestinians respond?
The clever move would be to thank Trump for his ideas, and welcome the opportunity to sit down with the other parties to discuss how, if at all, these new proposals fit with the formal and binding framework signed and agreed to in 1993. (Spoiler: they don’t.)
If life were a debating society or courtroom, all Palestinians need do is hold up the signature page of the Declaration of Principles and win the argument every time.
But life isn’t like that. For years Palestinians were harangued and punished by Israelis and Americans for supposedly violating the spirit of the Oslo agreements by “unilaterally” seeking greater international recognition. Now Israel and the U.S. have blithely wrecked those agreements, which evidently aren’t sacred after all.
Besides, Palestinian politics won’t allow the PLO to play that game. Their constituents are too outraged to be satisfied with debate-hall arguments, and Hamas will capitalize on any perceived PLO weakness.
Palestinians might be able to recuperate their diplomatic position if Israel doesn’t go ahead with annexations in the coming weeks and Trump is defeated in November. Then it would be up to the Democrats to urgently restore sanity to U.S. policy. That is not impossible, but it requires Palestinians to simply wait and see what happens.
Beyond that, Palestinian options are highly limited. Unless the international community moves quickly to restore hope for genuine Palestinian statehood through diplomacy, the arguments against another major uprising will be crippled.
If it becomes obvious that Palestinians are indefinitely trapped as noncitizens in a formalized, apartheid-style greater Israel, and that the international community isn’t going to rescue them from such a fate, they are essentially left with two choices.
In the abstract, what would make most sense would be to, in effect, declare themselves conscripted Israelis and fight through uncompromising but nonviolent means for full political as well as civil rights in the de facto greater Israel. But Palestinian nationalist narratives don’t provide the basis for such a strategy. And there is little historical precedent for a people securing their rights in this way.
Armed struggle is the other option; Hamas and others will be clamoring for it. If Trump and Netanyahu get their way, Hamas will probably succeed at last in taking over the Palestinian movement. Or, to prevent that, the PLO itself will return to armed struggle.
The only thing that may give the Palestinians pause is the fear that any violence might invite disproportionate Israeli response, including a widening of the annexation horizon and mass expulsions of people from these areas.
But it’s hard to imagine any people simply accepting the fate to which Trump and Netanyahu are sentencing the Palestinians. If my father were to ask me about the likeliest outcome of the latest “peace plan,” I would tell him that violence is coming, if not right away then soon enough. Effective arguments against such a path, reckless and self-destructive as it is, are dwindling rapidly.
To understand this, ask yourself if you would accept a permanent subjugation. If the answer is “no,” then you can anticipate the disastrous consequences of Trump’s peace plan.
This election-year charade will only inflame tensions on the West Bank.
The Trump administration’s plan for Israel and the Palestinians is the biggest blow to any hopes for peace since the Oslo agreements were signed in 1993. It may even be fatal.
Standing next to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Benny Gantz, Donald Trump purported to outline a two-state solution. But what he proposed is apartheid: a single state of Israel with limited Palestinian autonomy in some regions.
The “Palestinian state” outlined in the Trump plan isn’t a state at all, but the box that a state might have arrived in. This entity would be surrounded by areas annexed by Israel; demilitarized; forbidden from entering into agreements or joining multilateral institutions; lack control of its airspace, coastal waters and electromagnetic spectrum; and be subjected to a range of other limitations. Israel could even veto which Palestinian refugees could enter this Palestinian “state.”
The Trump plan acknowledges this deception by claiming that “Sovereignty is an amorphous concept that has evolved over time.” Netanyahu has long called for a “state-minus” for the Palestinians, who are presumably “humans-minus.” The Prime Minister then seized the annexationist moment, pledging that Israel will “apply its laws to the Jordan Valley and all settlements” in the occupied West Bank. An actual two-state solution could never survive that.
Palestinians in areas annexed by Israel would not be granted Israeli citizenship. Yet Israel would retain full extraterritorial jurisdiction over the tiny number Jewish Israelis who would find themselves living in this Palestinian non-state.
The obvious historical analogy is the fictional Bantustans in apartheid-era South Africa, nominally independent African countries that were in fact political and legal fictions for the convenience of white rule.
As they say, you can put lipstick on a pig and call it Sally, but it’s still a pig.
The plan’s deep cynicism is exemplified by the claim that Palestinians would get a capital in Jerusalem, even though Jerusalem would remain undivided and under complete Israeli sovereign control.
The shell game goes like this: a few Palestinian villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem which Palestinians have never considered part of Jerusalem would be renamed “Al Quds” (Jerusalem in Arabic) and made the nominal Palestinian capital. Thanks to this artful rebranding, Palestinians would magically have their capital in “Al Quds” but Israel would retain complete control of an undivided actual Jerusalem.
The plan thus gives Israelis everything they could want, except for those few extremists demanding total annexation of all Palestinian areas rather than just de facto control of them. And it gives Palestinians virtually none of their core goals. No Palestinians were even present for the announcement.
The truth is, it’s not a real proposal at all. It’s pure domestic politics for both leaders.
The timing gives the game away. Trump is facing impeachment, and Netanyahu is facing indictment, and both of them are relying on reelection to avoid serious legal threats. Trump and Netanyahu were doing a victory dance, with Gantz thrown in as window-dressing on the off chance he might win the upcoming Israeli election.
Trump got to pose as a peace-making statesman and pander to his evangelical base. And Netanyahu got to pose as the man who could deliver the occupied territories and annexation at last to Israeli voters.
But although the plan is a fake, the damage will be real and profound — even if nothing, including annexation, ever comes of it.
What Trump is purporting to do is breathtaking. In 1993 the Palestinians, the Israelis and the United States all signed a Declaration of Principles that laid out the basic framework of the peace process, including five final-status issues. All of them have now been abrogated by the United States and the entire agreed-upon negotiating framework is in ruins.
That’s been the main aim all along. The Israeli right never accepted the Oslo agreements, and now the Trumpian right doesn’t either.
When the Israelis failed to get the Palestinians to accept this kind of limited, compromised statehood at the Camp David summit in 2000, this moment probably became inevitable. The asymmetry of power is so stark that it was virtually certain that one day Israel would try to impose by force and fiat what they could not get Palestinians to agree to voluntarily.
Until now, the Israelis have been constrained by the fact that their American patrons were co-signatories to the 1993 agreement. Trump has just effectively freed Israel from all limitations imposed by Oslo and done away with the logic of two genuinely sovereign, independent states in favor of a radically separate and unequal Greater Israel. The main questions now are whether the damage can be repaired, and how much blood will be spilled as a direct result of this political malpractice.
This isn’t a peace proposal. It is an anti-peace proposal.
Moqtada al-Sadr’s about-face leaves the demonstrators vulnerable, and the country in greater peril.
Over the past weekend, the anti-government protests in Iraq reached a critical juncture, with the Shiite political elite uniting to put down this rebellion. The leaderless protest movement, its ranks made up mainly of Shiite youths, now finds itself confronting a solid block of organized political opposition.
The turning point came when the volatile Shiite cleric-politician Moqtada al-Sadr withdrew his support for the protesters, paving the way for a bloody crackdown by security forces.
Since they began in early October, Sadr had been trying to co-opt the protests by feigning solidarity with their anti-corruption message: his supporters joined the demonstrations in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square and other Iraqi cities. This served his interests in the internecine competition within the Shiite political elite, where his main rival is the Iran-backed Hadi al-Amiri. Sadr and Amiri have been locked in a contest to name Iraq’s next prime minister since the resignation of Adel Abdul Mahdi.
The pro-Iranian faction, targeted for special derision by the protesters, had hoped that the killing of Qassem Suleimani and other key figures in a U.S. drone strike would turn national attention away from Tahrir Square. But the protests continued, demonstrating that Iraqi youth were not about to forget their grievances against their government in favor of a campaign focused on driving U.S. forces out of the country.
Sadr, perhaps alarmed that his rivals were stealing his anti-American thunder, called on his followers to come out last Friday in their “millions” against the U.S. military presence. This was also calculated to show up the Tahrir Square protesters, who had planned their own demonstration that day.
The crowds that came out for Sadr were impressive, and they were enthusiastic in chanting anti-American slogans and hanging effigies of President Donald Trump. But on Saturday, the squares were again filled by protesters calling for the ouster of the entire political elite. Sadr was alarmed to discover that he was not exempted from the list of leading “tails,” the protesters’ epithet for all corrupt politicians.
Sadr then made common cause with Amiri and ordered his followers to leave Tahrir Square and other protest venues. Some reports suggest that, in return, the pro-Iranian faction will let him pick the next prime minister. Whatever Sadr’s motives, his withdrawal was a signal for the government to unleash hell.
This is not the first time the protesters have endured such attacks. Security forces and militias have been responsible for the deaths of at least 500 demonstrators in recent months. The killings were often targeted and tactical, with snipers picking off protest leaders while others tried to violently disrupt their logistical support network for food, water and other supplies.
But the crackdown on Saturday turned up the dial several notches, attacking protesters and destroying their tents. In the southern city of Nasiriyah, several protesters were killed.
If the Shiite elite now remain united and break the back of the protests, they can preserve the self-serving status quo in which they carve up government ministries amongst themselves, to plunder as they please. But if the protests persevere despite the crackdown, the political parties may eventually be compelled to make some of the demanded changes.
A key role will likely be played by Iraqi President Barham Salih. The Kurdish leader is respected by all political factions; among the protesters, he may be the least-loathed of the major national figures. He also has strong ties to Washington, and a good working relationship with Tehran. The Kurds retain the swing vote in parliament, which will be crucial for the prospects of government reform. If a broader deal needs to be struck between the politicians and the protesters, Salih is one of the few who could broker one.
Meanwhile, the febrile political climate poses risks for the U.S. Pro-Iranian groups, with open support from Hezbollah in Lebanon, have outlined a three-pronged approach to driving out the American military presence: political efforts in parliament, popular protests in the street and violent attacks. The rockets that struck the U.S. embassy in Baghdad on Sunday will not be the last. In the absence of a new deal with the Iraqi government over the American troops, the Trump administration could return to the brinksmanship with Iran that led to the Soleimani killing.
Sadr’s volte face on the protests may have united the Shiite political class, but it may prove to have set Iraq on a more dangerous course.
By rushing to impeachment because of their own election calendars, Democrats are committing a significant blunder.
The first week of US President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial concluded on Saturday morning, and none of the main players seem poised for a meaningful victory. The question is rather how much each stands to lose.
The Democratic “managers” (in effect, prosecutors) from the House of Representatives, which impeached Mr Trump in December, presented the case against the president on two counts: abuse of power by allegedly attempting to leverage military aid to Ukraine to secure an investigation announcement into the son of one of his rivals, Joe Biden; and obstruction of Congress for withholding documents and trying to block major testimony.
Because of that obstruction, there were significant holes in the prosecution’s case, but, overall, the factual narrative against Mr Trump was overwhelming and largely unchallenged.
On Saturday, the president’s defence team began its own presentation, which was strikingly thin on facts but long on categorical declarations and misleading claims – for instance, the allegation that Republicans were not allowed to participate in House hearings in secured areas when, in fact, they were.
Public opinion remains about equally divided for and against convicting Mr Trump. Consequently, Republican senators don’t seem prepared to resist Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s push for a trial without witnesses, documents or any fact-finding.
The Senate appears unwilling to demand testimony from key figures, such as former national security advisor John Bolton – whose unpublished memoir reportedly confirms that Mr Trump withheld Ukraine aid to secure a smear against the Bidens – acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and others, or to demand the documentary paper trail that would irrefutably demonstrate what happened.
Republicans are adamantly opposed to such evidence because the case is already extremely strong and most of the factual assertions are not being challenged. Instead, they are simply denounced and dismissed.
The last thing Republicans want is to confront the mounting evidence, including text messages and recordings recently released by Lev Parnas, which seem to corroborate the case against Mr Trump.
House managers’ arguments that by withholding military aid to Ukraine Mr Trump was acting in his own interests, and not those of the United States, were almost irrefutable. This is not a legitimate policy dispute, as his lawyers claim, but the hijacking of policy by personal politics.
But Republicans do not want Mr Trump removed and, unless compelled by public opinion, will acquit him as soon as possible. The danger posed to them by the existing evidence explains why they want no further information whatsoever. It cannot possibly help them.
Yet this will not be a victory for Mr Trump. He will have been exonerated not in fair or open proceedings, but through the modern-day US equivalent of Stalin-era Moscow political show trials in which the verdict is a foregone conclusion and most factual evidence is prohibited.
He will claim vindication, but under the circumstances, it will be hollow. He will live under the shadow, not only of impeachment, but of acquittal through farce. If Mr McConnell gets his way, this will be the first of scores of impeachment trials of US officials – including those of Presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton – that excludes any witness testimony.
Mr Trump will enjoy a technical, legal acquittal, but face a moral, and probably historical, conviction.
Many Senate Republicans are also worried. Several are facing re-election in swing states that may not reward their adamant refusal to face the facts or consider the truth. Mr McConnell may not care, but a number of these Republican senators probably realise they are helping to badly damage the US constitution and political system.
It is not just that they are conducting a sham of a trial. Worse is that they will be effectively endorsing Mr Trump’s behaviour regarding Ukraine and the election, and essentially greenlighting future presidents to leverage all manner of foreign policy tools for their personal political benefit.
Mr Trump’s lawyers claim a statutory crime is required for impeachment and are casting the whole process as an attack on democracy and elections. That’s not only constitutional nonsense, it is an unprecedented assault on the impeachment powers of Congress.
If affirmed, Mr Trump’s actions would constitute one of the most astonishing expansions of the power of the presidency, at the expense of Congress, in the country’s history.
Republicans surely tell themselves they will just reverse their position if a Democratic president ever did something like this. But it is not that simple. Like it or not, they are setting a precedent that could hardly be more dangerous or less attuned to the spirit of the Constitution.
But by rushing to impeachment because of their own primary and election calendars, Democrats are committing a significant blunder.
Their political hastiness has contributed mightily to this constitutionally cancerous development, as I have repeatedly warned in these pages, and many others also foresaw.
Unless there is a sudden reversal by Senate Republicans, in which they vote to hear testimony and examine documents, the only thing that could recuperate this impeachment trial for the Democrats would be if it can be said to have contributed to a victory in November.
But the political impact of this process is extremely hard to predict. It might, and certainly should, further tarnish Mr Trump’s image with many voters. But it also might enrage and rally his base, and stoke the bitter national divisions on which he depends.
This is only the third presidential impeachment trial in US history, and seems set to be the shortest, least credible and most insubstantial. It may not have any long-term political impact at all, especially if the lack of movement in the opinion polls over the past week is anything to go by.
The president will almost certainly remain in office, but he will be badly tarnished. Senate Republicans could hardly appear more compromised and cynical. And the Democrats, yet again, will look like losers.
If there are any winners in this fiasco, they are hiding brilliantly.