Mr. Mileikowsky and the “seal of Netanyahu”: the perilous encounter between modern nationalism and ancient history

I may be trying people's patience a little with my recent riff on nationalism in general, and particularly the Israeli and Palestinian versions, but further exchanges with some of my interlocutors, particularly Jewish ones, prompt me to make one final point. I'd like to illustrate how nationalist discourses use sleight-of-hand to create illusions of historical continuity between ancient history, myths, legends and traditions and contemporary national political programs.

Of course that continuity does actually exist, insofar as all presently existing political agendas are the consequence of the great sweep of human history. But the nationalist identities of Egypt or China are not more authentic or legitimate because they claim direct descent from ancient civilizations and kingdoms than is the American one which celebrates its non-ethnic, sui generis (at the time of its founding anyway), and ideological self-definition. All three are equally the products of a set of developments in global history that produced them in their present form at the current moment. The American version of nationalism based on adherence to political principles and a kind of US civic religion can't be privileged over ethnic nationalisms either, and is also very much grounded in myth, legend and historical fantasy.

But some of my Jewish interlocutors who ought to know better seem absolutely convinced that there is a hierarchy of legitimacy of nationalist claims and that the Israeli one is simply and obviously superior, older, more “authentic” and more deeply rooted than the Palestinian one. This is even true among those who acknowledge a legitimate Palestinian nationalism, but simply assert that there's something more ancient or authentic about the Israeli one. Assurances that there are innumerable Arab and Palestinian arguments that reverse this, casting grave doubts on the legitimacy and authenticity of Israeli nationalism and Zionism, and the idea that the Jewish people are in any meaningful sense a national or ethnic group as opposed to a religious affiliation, don't seem to dent these deep convictions. So, as a last effort to try to demonstrate the ideological processes I have been describing, let me use a pertinent example from Israel.

Current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has in his office what might charitably be described as a relic and uncharitably as a kind of political fetish. It is a 2000-year-old seal in ancient Hebrew bearing the name “Netanyahu.” Here's how Mr. Netanyahu described its political significance to the European Friends of Israel in February of this year:

Now people say, well, you don't really have an attachment to this land. We are new interlopers. We are neo-crusaders. If I could I would invite each of you into my office. You would see a display of antiquities from the Department of Antiquities. It's in a little stand like this. And from the place next to the Temple wall, the Western Wall, from around the time of the Jewish kings, they found a signet ring, a seal of a Jewish official from 2700 years ago, and it has a name on it in Hebrew. You know what that name is? Netanyahu. Now, that's my last name.

What he didn't mention is how, precisely, Netanyahu came to be his last name. His father was not born with it, nor were any other of his identifiable ancestors. His father was born Benzion Mileikowsky in Warsaw in 1910. The Prime Minister's grandfather, Nathan Mileikowsky, was an ardent Zionist who used the name "Netanyahu" as a pen name for political writing. Sometime after moving to British mandatory Palestine, Benzion abandoned the name Mileikowsky altogether in favor of Netanyahu. It was common practice among early Zionists to dispense with European and especially Yiddish names in favor of Hebrew ones.

(It's probably worth mentioning that Benzion X is not a run-of-the-mill Zionist, but one of the most extreme in the history of the movement. He has many times expressed the view that Arabs are by nature and by definition virtually subhuman, and can and should only be dealt with through extreme forms of force. He also adheres to a greater Israel movement which holds the present borders, including occupied territories, to be entirely unsatisfactory. He was unable to establish a viable political career in Israel because his views were considered beyond the limits of respectability even by the extreme right. So, the specific version of the nationalist political agenda actually being expressed in that act of changing the name Mileikowsky to Netanyahu isn't a normal form of nationalism or a normal form of Zionism, but a program of institutionalized racism and regional aggression of a particularly vicious variety. But, of course, the son is not the father.)

So, Netanyahu's father adopted this name as a political act but it has no traceable connection to his family history which as far as can be historically determined seems to be entirely an Eastern European one. While there can be no doubting the deep attachment present day Israelis and Jews from around the world feel towards the land, I'd like to call attention to the series of diversionary gestures in this process designed to not only legitimate Israeli nationalism and Zionism, but to privilege it.

In the first stage, we are presented with the seal bearing the name Netanyahu, from 2000 years ago which confirms what no one denies: there was an ancient Hebrew culture, among many other communities, in this land. But it implicitly foregrounds and privileges that historical moment and that particular culture and community as opposed to all others that existed before, during and after that time.

In the second stage, it is pointed out that this name “Netanyahu” uncannily links some ancient official with the current prime minister. But the prime minister only bears that name because his father adopted it as a 20th-century political act based on 20th-century ideology and nationalism in what can only be described as an appropriation of the past. One could hardly posit a direct connection between a Mr. Mileikowsky of Warsaw and an ancient official called “Netanyahu” based on those two names.

Prime Minister Netanyahu may feel that he is demonstrating some profound historical evidence of the continuity between contemporary Israeli nationalism and ancient history, but in fact what he's doing is demonstrating the extent to which an ancient history in another place and time was consciously and politically appropriated by Jewish Europeans to legitimize their political agenda of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. To those who know his family history, this ring actually calls attention not to the authentic, natural and unbroken continuity between ancient history and contemporary Zionism but rather the usually underappreciated artificiality, or at very least consciously constructed nature, of that connection.

Here we have two synecdoches — parts that stand in for the whole — that are designed to tell a tale about the political legitimacy of the Israeli state based on two separate sleights-of-hand that are combined to create the total effect. First, this ancient seal is meant to stand in for the entirety of the ancient history of the land, and posit a dominant, unified, coherent Jewish culture and civilization which alone has contemporary political relevance. All other aspects of the history of the region are implicitly elided, downplayed or at very least certainly not accorded equal stature as this seal and all it supposedly implies. Every aspect of this implicit narrative, like all contemporary political appropriations of ancient history, is extremely dubious at best and misleading at worst.

The second synecdoche is the fact that the current Israeli Prime Minister's last name is the same as the one on the seal. The seal stands in for all the (at least politically relevant) history of the area between the river and sea, and the Prime Minister for all of the Jewish Israelis. The apparent organic connection between the two is hence presented as proof positive of the great authenticity and legitimacy of the Israeli national project and implicitly the primacy of its claims over all others. It also implicitly posits that contemporary Jews are the sole and only legitimate heirs of the biblical Hebrews, and that Palestinians and others cannot claim any portion of this heritage. It privileges biblical Hebrew history over all others in the land, and privileges the Israeli claim to being the sole heir of that privileged history. Both of these claims, of course, are exceptionally dubious.

Even if the Prime Minister's last name in terms of his family history actually were Netanyahu rather than Mileikowsky, it still wouldn't demonstrate any direct connection between ancient history and contemporary politics (which are almost always strained to the breaking point). But of course it isn't. Neither of these synecdoches work on their own except as reductive and crude generalizations, of the history of the land and of the nature of contemporary Jewish Israeli society and other groups. When put together, they demonstrate perfectly how nationalist discourses that deploy ancient history, myths and traditions are almost invariably engaged in a kind of intellectual shell game: the pea which actually connects ancient cultures and civilizations with contemporary nationalist agendas can never be found, because it does not exist. But of course the shells are impressive, and even more so is the mesmerizing motion of the huckster spinning them around the board so fast almost everyone loses track of the original, core claim.

I cite this example to try, for one final time, to demonstrate to my Jewish readers how this process works, but not to suggest that this is in any sense unique or particular to Jewish nationalism or Israeli identity. On the contrary, it is a universal characteristic of all nationalisms that try to root their present-day claims in appeals to ancient history. Saddam Hussein tried to do just this with Babylon. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been trying to do so as well with pre-Islamic Persian history, Cyrus the Great and so forth, in his losing battle with the Iranian power structure that prefers to cast Iran as an “Islamic” state with the natural leadership of a huge portion of the world rather than simply a “Persian” national project. Palestinians deploy ancient history all the time as well, with equal desperation and fatuousness as everyone else.

I'd say if you want to find the most extraordinary version of this tendency outside the Middle East, the first stop would probably be the Indian subcontinent, where ancient history, traditions, myths and legends are fought over passionately and sometimes to the point of madness. Who were the peoples of the Indus Valley civilization? Was there really an Aryan invasion? What's the relationship between Sanskritic and Dravidian languages and culture, and are they related to that deep past? Where does the caste system fit into it? How should the prolonged periods of Muslim rule in large parts of India be regarded historically, in terms of India's relationship with Pakistan and with regard to India's important Muslim minority? To call these disputes the tip of the iceberg would be an understatement.

What I'm not trying to do here, and what I'm not doing, is questioning the deep religious and emotional attachment of the Jewish people to the land, or the legitimacy of the Israeli national project. But I am trying to demonstrate why, should I wish to do so, Zionism is certainly not one of the better examples that would spring to mind were I to try to assert some kind of continuity between ancient history and a contemporary national project. In any event, the effort would prove futile, as this will always involve tendentious narratives, privileging of certain historical events, times and places over others, and carefully avoiding inconvenient facts that demonstrate the inherent instability of these narratives.

But unlike a great many academics in recent decades who have understood and demonstrated how this process works, I don't dismiss or condemn nationalism as purely a menace or a dangerous illusion. Achieving political effects requires developing constituencies, which are always going to be based on reductive identity groups drawn together by philosophically and intellectually invalid claims. There is a deep conundrum built into the relationship between a healthy understanding of the illusory nature of all reductive identity groupings and their constituting narratives on the one hand and the need to form constituencies to achieve anything on the other hand.

Nationalism has been the source of much suffering, conflict, abuse and repression. But it is also built into modernity at its core level. No large, self-defining people can function in the world today — which is made up of states and citizens of those states — without being part of some national structure. Indeed, no individual can function in the modern world outside national structures. Try traveling without a passport, for example. Hence the particular plight of the Palestinians, by far the largest group of stateless people in the world. They find themselves outside the whale, not second-class citizens or citizens of oppressive states — both of which can plausibly fight for their individual or collective rights within the structures of those states — but noncitizens, citizens of no state whatsoever.

Nationalism is indispensable as a political reality because the nation-state has not been transcended as the dominant political structure in the world today in which people have to function. This is the reality that escaped or confounded a great many of the postcolonial critics who championed nationalism as the only effective weapon against colonial rule in the Third World (that much is too obvious to deny), but who critiqued and rejected the nationalisms of developing societies, usually by definition. There wasn't any other option in seeking independence from colonial rule, and there isn't any other option for functioning in the contemporary global society either. This doesn't mean that separatism, ethnic nationalism or Balkanization is a good idea. On the contrary, it's almost always preferable to keep larger societies together and to avoid partition when people can possibly find a way to live together. History demonstrates that, when it has proven possible, remaining in large, multi-cultural or quite heterogeneous societies is beneficial to all parties.

When this is impossible, obviously a good divorce is better than a bad marriage. Here again nationalism presents itself as much as a solution as part of the problem. Often it's both, simultaneously. Will the people of the new Republic of South Sudan form a relatively harmonious union in spite of their extreme heterogeneity? That very much remains to be seen. But they were virtually unanimous on one thing: they wanted no more to do with the rest of Sudan, especially Khartoum. This new nationalism, such as it is, at very least gives the people of South Sudan a fighting chance at building a better next half century than the last one.

So what I'm offering here is a qualified, contingent and very reluctant defense of nationalism as not so much a necessary evil as simply a reality of the modern world, while at the same time pointing out that its narratives are particularly dubious. This is especially the case when nationalist rhetoric tries to deploy ancient history, myths and traditions, including religious ones, to legitimate its agenda and ideology. As I have been trying to suggest, the only reasonable conclusion is that nationalism needs to be respected as a legitimate and authentic expression of the will or needs of millions of people (assuming it has a real constituency), but not confused with an intellectually legitimate or historically authentic logical continuation of ancient realities.

No doubt there will be Israelis and their friends who will continue to write to me about ancient bowls and glyphs and so forth. And most people will continue to buy into whatever mythologies they are raised with, especially when it comes to their core national, ethnic and religious identities. The threat of this kind of “delegitimization,” of discovering that there never is a pea underneath that nationalist shell, is probably too threatening for a great many people. All I can offer them, beyond this simple example of how such rhetoric performs its ideological legerdemain, is the assurance that there is something deeply liberating in this insight.

Fetishizing nationalism

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/fetishizing_nationalism

For those in the grip of its authority, a clearheaded understanding of how nationalist ideology actually operates seems extremely difficult.

All contemporary nationalisms are based on constructed and imagined narratives about history, geography, culture, ethnicity and religion.

Such narratives invariably involve a great deal of what can only be described as fiction. In particular, reading the past—whether real or imagined—as a justification for present-day political projects is, by definition, intellectually treacherous territory.

Last week I wrote about a new book tracing the history of Palestinian traditional dress in which I ruminated on the development of contemporary Palestinian national identity. Only a lingering degree of naïveté can account for my genuine surprise at the outpouring of outrage the column produced. I haven’t written anything this controversial in years, though all I did was assert that a new book helps demonstrate that Palestinian nationalism—while a contemporary, 20th-century phenomenon—is deeply rooted in broader Arab and ancient traditions and civilizations, and has its own distinctive cultural styles.

I had not taken into account the existential need some nationalists have to deny every aspect of a rival’s authenticity. The pro-Israel voices objecting to these virtually self-evident observations seem unconcerned with defending the Israeli national identity, but obsessed with attacking the invocation of any heritage or tradition on which Palestinian nationalism can draw.

The impulse to negate the other seems overwhelming. It appears much more powerful than any imperative to define, defend or interrogate one’s own nationalist identity, which is taken for granted.

These critics assume all aspects of Jewish and biblical Hebrew mythology, traditions and history automatically legitimize the Israeli national project. However, such claims were highly controversial among the Jews of the world for many decades, and are again being subjected to significant interrogation.

The traditional Zionist narrative holds that only the present-day Jews of the world are the genetic, religious and cultural heirs of the biblical Hebrews and ancient peoples of the “holy land.” Everyone else is a Johnny-come-lately at best, with the Palestinians usually ascribed no deeper origins than the arrival of Islam in the area (a mere 1,200 years ago)—and in many cases much less than that. The idea that they too, and perhaps even more than Jewish Europeans, might have genetic, ethnic and cultural ties to the ancient and biblical peoples of the land—including the ancient Hebrews—has been rarely considered.

In the decades immediately preceding 1948, the word “Israeli” was totally unknown and meant nothing, and the word “Palestinian” meant many things, but certainly not what it means today. Both of these national identities—the Jewish Israeli and the Arab Palestinian—are contemporary constructs born of recent history. They are largely grounded in their encounter with each other. They also embody deep cultural memories, traditions, myths, legends and tendentious narratives that at least to some extent retrofit the past to privilege their own national projects.

But all of this is entirely beside the point. Neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli national identity is more or less “authentic” or “legitimate” than the other because both are self-defined nationalisms adhered to by millions of people. The extent to which they are based on imaginary constructs—as all modern national ideologies ultimately prove largely to be—is meaningless in practice. Objecting to these mythologies is the political equivalent of complaining about the rain.

Systematized discrimination or exclusion is, of course, unacceptable for any decent society. But modernity dictates a healthy respect for both the human rights of individuals inherent to their status as human beings and the rights of self-defining national collectivities to self-determination. Contemporary political and national identities, including the Israeli and Palestinian, are invariably based on a confused mélange of myth, legend and history. But that is politically irrelevant. They are what they are, say what we will.

The deployment of myth, legend, history and tradition in the service of contemporary and modern national projects is, at least at a certain register, intellectually and philosophically invalid. Yet nationalist agendas can help people secure their individual and collective rights, achieve self-determination, overthrow colonial domination and serve other useful purposes.

Indeed, no sizable group of people can function successfully in the world of modernity without participating in some national structure.

Hence the urgent need to end the virtually unique statelessness of the Palestinians, who are not citizens of Israel or any other country.

The analytical challenge is to recognize that while not all nationalist claims are necessarily equally valid (they may speak on behalf of very few people, for example, and not really have the constituency they claim), in some important senses they are, however, all equally invalid. Championing one’s own nationalism as self-evidently “authentic” at the expense of a well-established, deeply-rooted and much-cherished rival identity is a particularly lowly form of self-delusion, chauvinism and fetishism.

Penniless Palestine

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68028/hussein-ibish/penniless-palestine?page=show

The financial crisis currently facing the Palestinian Authority is not
just economic; it is also a symptom of the deep political problems
facing the leadership in Ramallah. The PA has based its appeal to the
Palestinian public on a strategy that combines working with Gulf Arab
states, Israel, and the West to produce improvements in the quality of
life for Palestinians under occupation, while at the same time
pursuing independence through international diplomacy. Now a lack of
funding has limited the PA’s ability to meet its payroll, undermining
the credibility and authority of its approach and its leaders.

The situation became especially perilous in late July, when promised
donations failed to materialize, including $330 million that Gulf Arab
states had pledged to provide every six months. This shortfall was
caused by a combination of donor fatigue, impatience with the lack of
progress on Fatah-Hamas unity, and a long-standing tradition of Arab
states not meeting their pledges to the PA. Previously, in May, Israel
also temporarily failed to deliver the Palestinian tax revenues it
controls. As a result of the shortfall, the PA was forced to announce
that government salaries — on which more than a million Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza are dependent — would be cut in half for
August.

The PA’s financial woes undermine the achievements made by the state-
and institution-building program initiated by Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad in August 2009. Public anger at the proposed wage cuts was
palpable: civil servants, doctors, and teachers threatened a mass
strike. The government, meanwhile, mandated a reduction in the price
of bread, the staple food for most Palestinians — a further
reflection of the financial hardships that the crisis is causing to
ordinary people.

Undelivered pledges from Arab states are at the core of the immediate
crisis. (Fayyad has refused to publicly identify which states reneged,
but the group certainly includes Saudi Arabia.) This has been a
perennial problem for many years, since Arab states have often tied
the delivery of their donations to political demands and have at times
raised legitimate questions about the corruption that used to be
endemic in Palestinian financial management.

The uncertain status of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement has
further undermined donor confidence, because governments prefer to
know who precisely will be in charge of the money they are providing.
By signing a vague “national reconciliation agreement“ in Cairo in
April, the PLO and Hamas agreed, in effect, to agree. But since then,
they have not achieved a specific agreement on any issue. The tense
and frequently hostile relationship between the parties remains
unchanged, meaning that Palestinian society, polity, and leadership
remain not only divided but in a de facto cold war.

Both Fayyad’s reputation and that of the entire PA leadership have
suffered as a result of the financial crisis. Some leaders in Fatah
and Hamas have tried to make Fayyad the issue by claiming that
disagreement over whether he should remain in office was the primary
obstacle to reunification. But Fayyad is a convenient red herring. In
reality, there is near-total disagreement between the two sides.
Focusing attention on a manufactured dispute about Fayyad, who is a
member of neither party, has been a means to distract from Fatah and
Hamas’ inability to agree on any substantive issue.

Hamas is the primary beneficiary of the PA’s financial woes and their
political consequences. Indeed, although Hamas is suffering something
of a financial crisis of its own due to tensions with Egypt — and,
especially, Syria — it remains the recipient of significant cash
transfers from other patrons, primarily Iran. Still, the consequences
of Hamas’s financial crisis are greatly mitigated by the fact that its
rival, the PA, continues to pay most public employees in Gaza — even
though Hamas still rules there.

The real core of the PA’s long-term challenge is the ongoing Israeli
occupation, which prevents the Palestinians from having control over
key sectors of their economy and restricts almost every form of
economic development. In April, Mariam Sherman, the World Bank’s
country director for the West Bank and Gaza, said, “While we commend
the solid performance of Palestinian institutions, we are concerned
about the prospect for continued economic growth.” Israel’s ”closure
regime,“ she continued, represents ”the most substantial obstacle to
Palestinian economic viability.” A World Bank report issued at the
same time noted that strong private sector growth is unlikely “while
Israeli restrictions on access to natural resources and markets remain
in place, and as long as investors are deterred by the increased cost
of business associated with the closure regime.”

Such findings echo those of every major multilateral institution,
which emphasize that Israeli restrictions on access and mobility are
the gravest threat to long-term development and financial stability.
Genuine financial viability will ultimately require the creation of an
independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

However, even under occupation, the PA has achieved a great deal in
recent years. According to the World Bank, real economic growth in the
West Bank in 2010 exceeded 9 percent of GDP, which surpassed the PA’s
budget projection estimate of 8 percent. Moreover, under Fayyad, the
PA has overcome a legacy of corruption and patronage to establish a
transparent public finance system that has greatly reassured foreign
donors.

Nevertheless, corruption in other sectors remains an issue. The PA’s
improved image is threatened by an ongoing investigation into alleged
malfeasance by some officials, including four ministers, among them
Minister of the Economy Hassan Abu-Libdah. There are also charges and
countercharges of corruption between Fatah and an ousted former PLO
official, Mohammed Dahlan.

Other obstacles to economic well-being also remain. A June UN report
showed rising unemployment among Palestinians in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem — from 21.7 percent to 25 percent during the last
year. Moreover, what economic growth has occurred has been based on an
increase in construction and retail businesses, not manufacturing or
long-term, self-sustaining enterprises.

The PA’s state- and institution-building program has shown great
promise, but it requires sustained international financial and
political support to continue and expand. Crucially, if it is to
remain politically viable, it must also be seen by the Palestinian
public as part of a broader program to establish an independent state.
There is no Palestinian constituency for a program to create better
living conditions in small autonomous zones within a permanent or
semi-permanent Israeli occupation.

Although the PA’s potential plan to push for UN recognition of
Palestinian statehood is not directly related to the present crisis,
it does contribute to the overall uncertainty about the direction in
which Palestinian politics and national strategy are headed. A UN move
could create additional significant financial problems, including a
withdrawal or reduction in U.S. aid and possible withholding of
Palestinian tax revenues by Israel. At the same time, reported plans
for mass civil disobedience among Palestinians in coordination with a
UN initiative in September further contribute to uncertainty among
donors and investors, and raise additional tensions with the United
States and Israel.

The bottom line is that the PA’s financial crisis threatens the
achievements and potential of the state-building program, which has
been the basis of significant but limited economic growth in the West
Bank in recent years, as well as the credibility of the moderate
leaders who have created and led it. The success of the program in
terms of economic development must be linked to a viable political
path to national independence — not symbolic gestures at the UN that
have no effect on realities on the ground — or even its creators and
leaders will abandon it. Fayyad and other PA officials conceptualized
their project as a bottom-up supplement to top-down diplomacy, not as
an alternative to it.

The mainstream Palestinian leadership in Ramallah has staked its
entire political future on this policy of independence through a
combination of state-building efforts at home and diplomacy abroad. If
the Palestinian public sees this strategy as having permanently and
irrevocably failed, particularly if there are ongoing or regular
financial and economic crises, they will look to an alternative
leadership and program. The alternatives are either chaos or Hamas,
with inevitably dire consequences for the Palestinian national
movement and for U.S. and Israeli interests as well.

Those parties who do not want the Palestinians to go ahead with a UN
initiative — such as the United States, some European countries, and
Israel — should make every effort to ease the financial crisis. The
Palestinian leadership needs a clear and reasonable incentive to avoid
a confrontation at the UN in September, which would probably be very
damaging to Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. interests in the broader
Middle East. Otherwise, the Palestinians might feel they have no other
diplomatic options and an overwhelming domestic political necessity to
go forward with plans that carry significant risks.

Meanwhile, those parties, including some Arab states, who are
encouraging Palestinians to go forward with a UN initiative in spite
of the risks have an obligation to protect them from the political,
diplomatic, and financial consequences. But so far, the opposite has
occurred: the pattern of unmet pledges undermines the ability of
Palestinian leaders to make constructive decisions, places them at the
mercy of domestic political calculations and public anger, and weakens
their ability to lead. It is pushing them toward a confrontation with
the United States (and for that matter, much of the West) and with
Israel that they can ill afford, leaving them alone and exposed.

There is, however, the potential for compromise. Fears of a
Palestinian failure at the UN producing a backlash in the West Bank
are justifiably widespread. Yet a perceived success at the UN, met
with an initial wave of euphoria but followed by disenchantment as
living conditions remain unchanged or worsen because of Israeli or
U.S. retaliation, could produce an equal backlash. Instead, a
compromise strategy could produce a limited but real Palestinian
achievement in New York. Such a strategy would involve an upgrade of
the PLO observer mission at the UN, a reiteration of the Obama
principles (negotiations based on 1967 lines with agreed-upon land
swaps) , and a UN declaration clarifying that the international
community will not accept any outcome other than a two-state solution.

Massive international investment in state- and institution-building
could ensure a major upgrade in the quality of life for Palestinians
in the West Bank and could defuse the impact of any disappointment.
Whatever happens in New York in September, the day after needs to look
better, not worse, for Palestinians on the ground. Ultimately, the
Palestinian national aspiration for independence must be met. But
institution-building, investment, and financial support for a
leadership that is opposed to violence and committed to peace with
Israel can buy time and patience — probably for years, but certainly
not for decades.

The fabric of Palestinian identity

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=299083

What can a book about traditional folkloric costumes tell us about contemporary politics? Quite a lot as it happens.

Hanan Karaman Munayyer’s beautiful new volume, “Traditional Palestinian Costume: Origins and Evolution” (Interlink, 2011) combines superb photography of the renowned Munayyer collection of traditional Palestinian dress with an analysis of their origins, evolution and variations. Since the 1980s, Munayyer and her husband Farah have been assembling these costumes and other artifacts of Palestinian traditional life in their Palestinian Heritage Foundation.

Between the two of them and their foundation, they are among the most important documentarians and preservationists of this history and heritage, not just in the United States, but in the world. Their collection, which dates from the 1850s to the present, has been exhibited at the Kennedy Center in Washington and in museums and galleries across the globe.

Munayyer’s important new book demonstrates a number of very salient points with serious implications about the present and future for the Palestinian people. First, it shows that traditional and folkloric Palestinian costumes are distinctive from other Levantine ones. Within Palestinian society, in various areas and villages, the costumes have their own particular features, handed down largely from mother to daughter, over decades and indeed centuries. But there is still a distinctive Palestinian style, strongly connected to other Levantine traditional dress, with forms and patterns all their own.

Second, this rich history yet again demonstrates—and unfortunately this point continuously needs to be reaffirmed against pro-Israel propaganda that attacks the idea relentlessly—that an ancient and unbroken Palestinian history and culture really does exist. Like Walid Khalidi’s invaluable volumes “Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History Of The Palestinians 1876-1948” (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984) and “All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948” (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), Hanan Karaman Munayyer’s book stands as a stark refutation of the negation of Palestinian identity, history and culture.

The days are long gone when Golda Meir’s infamous remark about the Palestinians is still taken seriously in the West. The onetime Israeli prime minister stated that “[t]here is no such thing as a Palestinian people… It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their country. They didn’t exist.” Yet there remains a hard-core contingent among Israelis and pro-Israel Westerners who persist in denying Palestinians their identity, history and heritage.

Therefore, documenting that history and those traditions is not only a vital project of collective memory and an important academic task in itself, it is also a quintessentially political act. It is, above all, an act of passionate, dedicated and deeply meaningful resistance to the continued efforts at the negation of Palestinian identity and history.

This is Palestinian sumud, or steadfastness, at its finest. Beyond bluster, slogans and canned rhetoric, Munayyer’s volume has something deeply serious and meaningful to say about both the origins and the future of Palestinian national identity. That it is an important reference work in its own right and a stunning contribution to art history is an added bonus.

Beyond Palestinian particularism, the book also sheds important light on the relationship between different Arab cultures over the centuries and their relationship with ancient, pre-Arab traditions and civilizations. Perhaps even more importantly, it also examines the cross-pollination between Western and Middle Eastern cultures in the field of textile arts. Like so much of the rest of this fertile exchange, its most important moments were the confrontational interactions of civilizations during the Crusades and the colonial era.

Understanding the continuous interaction between the art and culture of the West and the Middle East undermines any notions of binary oppositional relationships between these societies and the dangerous concept of a “clash of civilizations.”

The West and the Arabs have been learning from each other for more than 1,000 years, and they continue to do so. Even a history as specific as that of traditional Palestinian costume demonstrates that contemporary cultures are rooted in an ancient past, an evolutionary process of cross-cultural exchange and influences, and, at its best, a healthy respect for each other’s contributions and traditions.

The book also helps to show that while Palestinian identity is distinctive and draws on particular cultural styles, it is also deeply rooted in the broader Arab Levantine tradition. This identity has been shaped more by its 20th century political encounter with Zionism and Israel than any pre-existing distinctive nationalist identity.

By focusing in great detail on a very narrow aspect of Palestinian life, Munayyer’s book has much to teach us not only about the past and future of the Palestinian people, but also about how culture in general functions in daily life and in shaping present-day political identities. Such flashes of insight help us understand the origins of our contemporary national identities, but also their broader ancient and regional roots, and their deep connection to a never-ending process of human cultural interaction across vast swaths of time and space.

Facts on the Ground: Israel’s latest settlement move is a dagger aimed at the two-state solution

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/08/facts_on_the_ground?page=full

With negotiations hopelessly stalled and the deadline for a potential confrontation at the United Nations in September rapidly approaching, the Israeli government apparently decided that now would be the appropriate time to announce a major expansion of one of its most provocative settlements. Interior Minister Eli Yishai said last week that final approval has been given for 900 new units in the Jerusalem “Har Homa” settlement, an area known to Palestinians as Jabal Abu Ghneim.

With breath-taking cynicism, Yishai claimed that the cost-of-living crisis and housing bubble, which has spurred escalating protests and sit-ins across Israel, caused Israel to go ahead with this particularly controversial project. In announcing the decision, he said that “the real estate crisis is serious and we shall not halt projects” and that the move is merely part of “an effort to enable all Israeli citizens to purchase an apartment.” But given that the economic crisis is about the prices of housing, student fees, and cottage cheese, and not about the number of houses as such — and given that there is plenty of space in Israel where the government could build houses — nobody is buying this argument, above all because there is no more sensitive or strategically significant area anywhere under Israeli control, except the Old City of Jerusalem itself.

The expansion in Har Homa is not only highly damaging to prospects for peace, but it also taps into the deepest Palestinian fears of relentless and carefully choreographed settlement activity designed to permanently foreclose the possibility of their meaningful independence. The bitterest experience for Palestinians in their dealings with Israel since negotiations began in 1993 was the doubling of the number of settlers in the occupied territories from 200,000 to 400,000 during the 1990s, when they believed they were negotiating an end to the occupation. Not only did the occupation not end and no Palestinian state get created, but the number of settlements and settlers greatly increased throughout the entire era of the “peace process.” Including East Jerusalem, they now number more than half a million.

Har Homa, which didn’t exist before 1993, as Jerusalem expert Daniel Seidemann correctly points out, “is viewed by the Palestinians as the quintessential post-Camp David unilateral act.” It will be difficult for any Israeli government to agree to cede control of it, but almost impossible for Palestinian leaders not to insist on that very point, especially because the area is crucial to connecting Jerusalem with the rest of the West Bank. It has been a sticking point whenever raised in border negotiations. For Palestinians, an economic crisis in Israel being used to justify the most damaging of land grabs only reinforces their sense of powerlessness and the urgent need to find some means of confronting an unacceptable status quo.

The Har Homa announcement is particularly ironic because Palestinians are being lectured ad nauseam by Israel and the United States about their supposedly “unilateral” initiatives at the United Nations in September involving some sort of acknowledgment of Palestinian statehood. Of course, Israel settlement activity is without question unilateral — as well as a violation of the Geneva Conventions, the Roadmap of the Quartet, and many other crucial obligations. Palestinian U.N. initiatives may be outside the context of negotiations, but are not in fact unilateral, because the United Nations is a multilateral body.

In an effort to stave off a damaging confrontation at the United Nations — and to fend off the threat of shifting the issue to a multilateral forum beyond its control — the United States has been trying to find a way to revive the bilateral negotiating process it has overseen since 1993. In May, U.S. President Barack Obama proposed a generalized vision for new talks, based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed land swaps and focusing on borders and security first. Palestinians cautiouslywelcomed the idea but asked for clear terms of reference. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, categorically, and even angrily, rejected the formula.

With September approaching, however, Palestinian leaders are making it clear that they intend to go forward with some U.N. initiative — though precisely what is not yet known — unless they are offered a clear reason not to do so. They have understandably said that though their first choice is to resume negotiations, they find the present impasse intolerable and are determined to find some path forward.

Everyone faces a substantial “day after” problem in September. Any U.N. initiative, whether or not it is regarded by the Palestinians as a diplomatic success, will not change realities on the ground. Whatever happens in New York, if life for Palestinians under occupation doesn’t change or — because of American or Israeli retaliation — actually gets worse, an outpouring of widespread public anger is a real possibility. Some Palestinian officials have been encouraging mass nonviolent demonstrations coordinated with a U.N. initiative. But Israeli troops facing large Palestinian crowds, even nonviolent ones, are likely to resort to the use of force. And there are numerous Palestinian groups committed to armed struggle that would undoubtedly quickly move to take advantage of a chaotic or confrontational environment.

Leaks from the Israeli prime minister’s office have suggested that Netanyahu may now be willing to agree to talks based on the 1967 borders as long as the Palestinians recognize Israel as a “Jewish state,” whatever that might mean. The Obama administration has not confirmed the existence of such an agreement, and nothing remotely resembling a framework for negotiations or terms of reference has been made public. The reported proposal is a non-starter, though, because Netanyahu would basically be asking the Palestinians to agree to a very significant concession on an issue that was never raised until 2007 in exchange for a reaffirmation of what has been understood by all parties as the basis of negotiations since 1993. It’s a perfect example of asking for something very substantial in return for nothing whatsoever.

Some formula may yet be found, however, because almost all Palestinian options at the United Nations would constitute symbolic victories at most, but incur substantial costs and risks. A U.S. veto in the Security Council — or even a General Assembly vote pitting a large bloc of developing states against most of the West and Japan (which Israel is likely to claim as a coalition of the “civilized world” in its camp) — would do little to advance the cause and could actually damage chances for achieving Palestinian independence.

A losing confrontation with the United States over the issue of statehood in the Security Council would be particularly dangerous to the Palestinian national interest. The U.S. veto in February of a resolution on settlement activity effectively left Israel with a free hand to build with barely any protests, at least until now.

The Har Homa announcement, however, may be a step too far. Every U.S. administration has been strongly opposed to settlement activity in this area because it prejudices the outcome of negotiations on Jerusalem and greatly damages the prospects for an agreement. In 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accurately described Har Homa as “a settlement the United States has opposed from the very beginning.” It is imperative that the Obama administration, no matter how allergic it may have become to the settlement issue, also takes a firm stance on this latest plan.

Expanding the settlement at Har Homa is unlikely to help the Israeli government mollify the huge cost-of-living protests. But it will certainly give the Palestinians yet another reason to regard the present situation as not only intolerable but desperate, and to press forward with a U.N. initiative in spite of the substantial risks. The United States and others wishing the Palestinians to refrain from any ambitious U.N. initiative in September need to provide their leaders with a politically plausible and diplomatically meaningful reason to do so. With its new announcement about Har Homa, the Israeli government could not have given Palestinians a greater incentive to despair about where both present realities and the moribund American-led peace process are taking them, and, in spite of the considerable costs at stake, go ahead and roll the dice at the U.N. casino in New York.

Encountering evil: my “conversation” with Robert Spencer

After the dreadful massacre in Norway by crazed right-wing terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, you’d think those whose messages of hate, chauvinism and paranoia had plainly inspired the rampage, and the ideology torturously expressed in his 1,500 word manifesto, would feel some impulse to either critical self-reflection about what their ravings had produced, or at least have the decency to keep a low profile for a few weeks. No chance.

Last night I had the following amazing exchange with Robert Spencer on Twitter. Let me simply begin by noting that Breivik cited Spencer no fewer than 50 times in his manifesto, and was plainly an avid reader and follower of Spencer’s vicious hatemongering. Indeed, Breivik went so far as to write that Spencer would be “an excellent choice” for the Nobel Peace Prize. It’s clear that Breivik’s murder-spree, one of the most brutal terrorist acts in modern history, was directly inspired by a paranoid, chauvinist and hate-filled Islamophobic ideology, and that Robert Spencer was the principal source (among many) for the radical opinions that informed Breivik’s radical actions.

This undeniable fact has noted been by all serious commentators who have written on the subject, including Abe Foxman of the ADL, who pointed out in a Washington Post commentary the obvious truth: “The Oslo perpetrator in his manifesto quoted extensively from the writings of European and American bloggers — including Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller — who promote a conspiratorial anti-Muslim agenda under the pretext of fighting radical Islam.” And he pointed out to his fellow Jewish Americans that “we must always be wary of those whose love for the Jewish people is born out of hatred of Muslims or Arabs,” just as I and many others often caution that supporters of Palestinian human and national rights should reject “support” from those animated by anti-Semitism.

Last night, out of the blue, a tweet was posted, directed at me, from someone I do not know who uses the name @VotingFemale:

Hey @Ibishblog ??? World Wide Known FACT: Muhammad a Friggin’ Pedophile Criminal cc: @Hahyrningur #islam #muslim #HAMAS #Palistine #iran

Run-of-the-mill Islamophobic stuff, largely wasted on a lifelong skeptic and agnostic such as myself, but nonetheless sufficiently hate-filled to warrant the following comment from me, which was neither a reply to @VotingFemale nor directed at anyone in particular:

Just got the hourly Islamophobic tweet from the loony right. So, everything normal in Nuttsville, USA, aka, the social media world.

What was amazing was that I immediately received a reply from Robert Spencer, who tweets as @jihadwatchRS (I had never had any Twitter exchange with him in the past), who seemed particularly delighted with @VotingFemale’s Islamophobic comment:

Hey brother, I am glad SOMEONE is talking some sense in your world!

As I say, shame, doubt, self reflection and self-criticism simply do not exist among such fanatics. I replied:

This Robert Spencer @jihadwatchRS is completely & utterly without shame, remorse for the terrorist havoc he inspired in Norway, or anything.

Spencer retorted:

I know your an expert on shameless, but I inspired Breivik like the Beatles inspired Charlie Manson.

The “conversation” proceeded as follows.

Ibish:

You can argue that fatuous lie all you like. The whole world now sees the kind of raw hate, carnage and terrorism you promote.

Spencer:

I didnt see the Tweet, but if you think it’s “Islamophobic hate” it was probably truths you found inconvenient — or medifast

Ibish:

Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood Clean from your hand? No, this your hand will rather The multitudinous seas incarnadine, Making the green one red.

Spencer:

Don’t kid yourself: Shakespeare wrote about you: sort of a cross between Jack Falstaff and Iago.

Ibish:

It’s amazing! @jihadwatchRS actually is completely unmoved by Norway massacre he inspired & continuing to lay groundwork for more massacres!

Spencer:

Watch it Fat Boy — I have no guilt for Norway, and your defamation could be actionable — keep it coming, I am noting it down

Ibish:

Your writings, Robert Spencer @jihadwatchRS, directly inspired 1 of the worst terrorist acts in history. You think you can sue me for that?

Spencer:

Ibish is continuing to lay groundwork for his next eclair…

Spencer:

yeah and jodie foster inspired hinckley to shoot reagan. You’re only fooling ur fans.

Ibish:

No shame, no remorse, no basic humanity, no decency. Just hate. How do you, Robert Spencer @jihadwatchRS, live with yourself after Norway?

Spencer:

sure — no remore because no guilt. Goebbels taught you well.

This twitter exchange was so remarkable that I thought it ought to be not only registered on this blog, but also noted and analyzed. Let’s take Spencer at his word: he didn’t see the original tweet, he only saw me complaining about an Islamophobic comment. That only makes matters worse for him, because it means that he instantly celebrated an Islamophobic remark as “talking sense” by definition, without bothering to check what it was or exercising any kind of judgment on the propriety or decency of the remark. That it was Islamophobic was good enough for him. I can’t imagine a stronger self indictment. He likes Islamophobia on principle, and doesn’t even bother looking at it before pronouncing it “sense.”

Of course Spencer’s grasp of American tort law is almost as weak as his grasp of Islamic history, theology and sharia, which he makes a tidy living defaming in order to spread exactly the kind of fear, paranoia and hatred about Muslims in general, and particularly Western Muslims, that inspired the Norway massacre. Spencer cannot sue me for saying that he inspired Breivik and continues to lay the groundwork for further acts of anti-Muslim-inspired terrorism (although Breivik’s victims seem to be entirely fellow Euro-Norwegians). This is because in the United States, under the First Amendment of the Constitution, I am entitled to that opinion and to express it. If he wants to sue people for saying this, he will be taking on almost all commentators who have looked into the matter, and he might as well begin with Mr. Foxman of the ADL, who has much deeper pockets than I do. The list of potential frivolous lawsuit defendants on such fatuous bases is exhaustive and almost all-inclusive, and in many jurisdictions Spencer would run the serious risk of being fined for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Summary judgment against the plaintiff in such a preposterous action is virtually guaranteed in almost any jurisdiction or circumstance. And, I very much doubt that any attorney, unless exceptionally well-paid and unethical, would agree to go forward with even a pro forma filing because there are absolutely no grounds to do so.

More importantly, however, under American libel law (as Spencer may or may not know) truth is an absolute defense. These are opinions, and I’m entitled to express any opinion I like (not to claim specific facts that are false, have an intention based on “actual malice,” and result in measurable financial damages). I’m not claiming any specific facts in this Twitter exchange, only opinions. But if Spencer wants the assertion that he was a direct inspiration for Breivik and his terrorist rampage tested in a court of law, he’s going to find that his greatest obstacle is not the protection of opinion (which, in any event, he could not get around) but rather the demonstrable fact that this assertion is true. Breivik was clearly motivated by a hate-filled and fanatical ideology developed and propagated by the likes of Spencer, Pamela Geller (Spencer’s closest collaborator) and the late Oriana Fallaci (to whom Spencer gave an award). Breivik was an avid reader and fan of Spencer and his specific ideas.

Charles Manson did not act on an ideology promoted by the Beatles. He was delusional and manipulative and convinced his followers that there were “hidden messages” in the White Album and other bizarre concoctions that simply were not there. Hinckley wanted to impress Jodie Foster, but she never said or did anything that could possibly have inspired his attempted assassination of President Reagan. Spencer, on the other hand, has spent more than a decade promoting very detailed paranoid, chauvinistic, Islamophobic and extreme political opinions which Breivik gobbled up with impressive enthusiasm and then translated into political action by shooting almost 100 of his fellow Norwegians because he thought they were traitors in the holy crusade against Islam (the idea of a war of religions, civilizations and cultures being the primary informing theme of all of Spencer’s ravings).

Obviously Spencer doesn’t want to admit it, but the truth — the undeniable, unavoidable, indisputable truth — is that his writings were among the most direct influences on the thinking of the perpetrator of one of the worst terrorist acts in modern history. All Breivik did was take Spencer’s ideas to their logical conclusion. The correct analogy would be to the vicious rhetorical anti-Semites of the 19th and early 20th centuries who preached fear and hatred of Jews and Judaism, but would have disavowed any responsibility whatsoever for the Holocaust. Were they directly culpable for the genocide of the Jews? No. But do they have a responsibility for the logical consequences of their words taken to extremes by homicidal madmen? Yes. The same goes for radical Muslim preachers who rail against “infidels,” “apostates,” “hypocrites,” Arab and Muslim regimes and the West. Many of them never call directly for violence, but what serious person does not see the direct connection between hateful language and the violent deeds they predictably inspire? Preachers of anti-Semitic or radical Islamist hate deserve no exoneration for the consequences of their deliberate promotion of loathing. Spencer, Geller and their ilk must also bear the same responsibility.

Spencer can no more sue me for saying that he was a direct inspiration for Breivik and his terrorist rampage then I can sue him for calling me fat. In both cases this is a matter of opinion, protected by the First Amendment. But, even more importantly, in both cases truth asserts itself as an absolute defense. I am in fact fat, and only a delusional person would deny that obvious truth. Spencer did inspire Breivik and his actions, and that is equally — and equally obviously — true.

What’s most amazing is that the horror in Norway does not appear to have caused Spencer a moment of self-reflection, doubt or criticism. I think there are ample grounds, based on that alone, to question the extent to which he’s really unhappy about the evident consequences of his hate-mongering. His closest collaborator, Pamela Geller, has made no bones about her barely disguised glee at the killings at the Norway youth camp, which she called an “anti-Semitic indoctrination training center.” She referred to the “antisemitic war games” conducted there, decried “Norway’s antisemitism and demonization of Israel,” and said that fellow lunatic “Glen Beck was not far off when he compared it to the Hitlerjugend or Young Pioneers.” Blaming the victims and blatantly justifying the attack in spite of her denials and protestations to the contrary, she wrote “Breivik was targeting the future leaders of the party responsible for flooding Norway with Muslims who refuse to assimilate, who commit major violence against Norwegian natives, including violent gang rapes, with impunity, and who live on the dole… all done without the consent of the Norwegians. . .”

Well, who could blame him then? If this isn’t, in effect, a self-defense or justifiable homicide argument, I don’t know what is. And there’s no doubt that she did remove an original and openly racist caption of a photo of the assembled Norwegian youth victims of the massacre that read: “note the faces which are more Middle Eastern or mixed than pure Norwegian.” Her posting was full of denials that she was doing so, but consisted of little more than justifications, rationalizations and barely disguised sympathy for the terrorist outrage.

There are also grounds for thinking that Geller’s blog may have been the site of an ominous posting by Breivik. In 2007 someone in Norway commented on her blog, “We are stockpiling and caching weapons, ammunition and equipment. This is going to happen fast.” As Glenn Greenwald has noted, “she said she was purposely shielding the identity of the letter-writing — by publishing it anonymously – in order to prevent the writer from being investigated and prosecuted.” Most of this has been deleted from her website, for obvious reasons. If the comment was from Breivik, Geller’s responsibility goes far deeper than mere inspiration.

Geller is not Spencer, but their collaboration is deep and their partnership strong, which is unusual because both of them, Spencer in particular, have a long history of falling out with collaborators. Both of them give every appearance of being emotionally unbalanced subjects (also a First Amendment protected opinion, thank you very much). These people clearly do not feel any responsibility for what their writings inspired in Norway, nor do they seem particularly bothered by the terrorist outrage. And they are doing nothing whatsoever to question their approach, moderate their tone, or do anything at all to help prevent this from happening again. All of this makes it difficult to believe that they are, in reality, unhappy about the massacre in Norway.

Transcript of my interview with Press TV on Israel’s announced new settlement housing units in Har Homa

The following is the transcript of my Press TV (Iranian English-laguage station) interview about the new Israeli announcement of 900 new settlement housing units in the area called Har Homa. The transcript was re-edited by me for greater accuracy. The original video and a not fully-accurate transcript can be seen here.

Press TV: Could it be that these housing crisis protests turn into a bad thing for Palestinians, and any prospects of peace?

Ibish: I don't think the protests themselves have any particular ramifications on the peace process, it is an internal Israeli matter but it is being used as an excuse by [Israeli] Interior Minister Eli Yishai for the 900 housing units in Jebel Abu Ghneim, the settlement which the Israelis call Har Homa. You have to understand that it is not exactly in Jerusalem as such. It is in the extreme south-west corner of what Israel redefined in 1967 as municipal Jerusalem. I mean, Jerusalem under the Ottomans, the British and the Jordanians was really the city but Israel made the first of its major land grab by extending the boundaries of municipal Jerusalem deep into the West Bank what.

What we are talking about here is a Jewish settlement that is right on the border of Bethlehem, deep into the West Bank and what is significant about this new housing project is that it will create a new ridge in this Har Homa settlement which, which, if it is finished, will cut the Bethlehem off from East Jerusalem which will make it much more difficult to ever have a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem alongside an Israeli state, which is the only peace agreement.

So it's a very dramatic, significant thing and I expect it will meet with significant international opposition. The US has been deeply opposed to this and the whole international community has been deeply opposed to it so this is an announcement that is made in the context of the housing crisis, with the Israeli right saying, well, we just have to make more settlements as if the cost of living bubble, the housing market bubble were connected to some kind of housing shortage and as if the only land available to build houses in Israel was Palestinian occupied land; it is all ridiculous but it is the argument that is being made by people who are determined to entrench the occupation and never allow the Palestinian their freedom.

Press TV: Israel's largely claimed that settlements are approved years in advance. Is it possible that trust it at this juncture, especially, as mentioned, in Netanyahu's reputation, due to these protests isn't doing well?

Ibish: I think that is right, he is in bad shape and I don't think this is particularly going to help him out, the protesters in the tent city and the middle class, who have their cost of living rising, are not going to be impressed that the settlement movement is using their housing price and cost of living protest to advance the settlement project.

In fact I think there are a lot of people in Israel who are wondering about the financial cost of occupation, this is not a cheap thing, taking people's lands away, taking these settlers there, giving them generous subsides, because many Israelis have moved to settlement in and around Jerusalem because they have to been subsidized to do so, becuase it is a good deal for them and the settlers get all kinds of benefits that ordinary Israelis, like the ones who are protesting, do not

I don't think this is going to help [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu domestically and I think he is in a lot of trouble over this; increasingly the settlement activity is not going to get him out of it.

What it will probably get him into is another argument with the US. It is true the veto the US has cast at the end of the last year at Security Council on the settlement resolution kind of killed the issue and I think it was a miscalculation on the Palestinian part to push forward knowing the US was going to veto a resolution that used the word “illegal” even though the US agrees it is illegal. They would have been willing to have said “illegitimate.”

The Palestinians pushed the issue for many different reasons, both because it is true and for the domestic political reasons, but they paid a heavy price because from then until now the settlements have been gone forward without any comments. I think this may be different, I think really you might see some pushback from the US, from the Europeans, etc, on this because if it is completed, it would really cut Bethlehem and other parts of the West Bank off from East Jerusalem and make the eventual border much more difficult to draw.

You are right about these announcements, the Israelis announced them and they always say these decisions were made previously and then they are going to be completed sometime in advance and this project has been one that has been discussed since 2000 and it has not been completed because it is so sensitive.

I think there is a very good chance, especially if there is an appropriate amount of international pressure, that there will be another of these announcements that doesn't eventually get completed. This is an extremely crucial area, this is not another annex to another settlement like Maale Admumim that probably will be part of a land swap. It's a dagger aimed at the heart of a peace agreement.

Press TV: With the building of settlements pretty much the status quo at this point, where does this leave a two-state solution, the Palestinian-statehood-bid at the UN, etc.?

Ibish: It is in grave jeopardy, it really is, and nothing could threaten it more than a settlement project like Har Homa. There are plenty of settlement blocks which if the Israelis build more buildings in them wouldn't really change the strategic equation, it will still be a violation of international law and it would be bad and increase the number of people who don't want to make a deal. But this is very strategic, this totally changes the strategic landscape so this really undermines the very the prospect of a two-state solution, which is really the only solution that would actually work.

The Palestinian statehood initiative at the UN, if it happens and depending on the form it happens, is not really going to be connected to this except in so far as it is an expression of how stuck diplomacy is and how desperate the Palestinian people are, people who are living under occupation and who cannot afford to wait and let these things sort themselves out and come back to this in a year or half or two years time, they don't have that luxury.

I really don't think a confrontation at the UN is a great idea from anyone's point of view and I think there needs to be very urgent work here to figure out a compromise that can avert any kind of explosion on the ground or a major diplomatic fight that would harm everybody and particularly the weakest party always ends up losing the most and in this case it unfortunately is, again the Palestinian people again.

Arabs Must Engage with the U.S. Political System

http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/294651

The United States has just entered its extended presidential and
congressional election season with the Republican battle over their
party’s nomination well underway and President Barack Obama having
formally launched his reelection campaign. This regular feature of the
American political system has important implications for US foreign
policy and vital lessons for the Arab world.

As always, the election context has a direct influence on both the
conduct of, and the debate over, US foreign policy. For example, while
the Obama administration clearly regards progress on peace between
Israel and Palestinians as essential and not optional for US
interests, no major peace initiative can be expected during the
campaign season. These built-in restrictions are an integral part of
the cautious American approach to pushing Obama’s outline of renewed
talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon land swaps
and a focus on borders and security first. They also help explain why
so little progress has been made in translating them into clearly
defined negotiating terms of reference rather than generalized
principles.

The election season has also helped produce a hardening of attitudes
in Congress towards the Palestinians, with administration officials
having to defend continued aid to the Palestinian Authority against
vehement criticism. And it prompted grandstanding by Republican
lawmakers who threatened to defund the mission in Libya. It is
unthinkable that Republicans would have threatened to defund a
military effort by a Republican president, and they would have
questioned the patriotism of anyone who tried to do so.

Electioneering unquestionably distorts foreign policy, as it brings
politics into conflict with policy, which is always a problem, even
more than usual. But it helps clarify the mechanics through which US
foreign policy is determined and the US national interest is defined.

Many Arabs, and even Arab-Americans, tend to think of US policies as
predetermined or subject to the machinations of small and shadowy
groups of powerful players. To the contrary, as election seasons
demonstrate most dramatically, the levers through which Americans
define their interests and develop a policy consensus are, in fact,
largely open, transparent and played out in public.

The two main sources of leverage in American politics, including on
foreign policy, are votes and money. These, more than any other
factors, determine exactly who gets elected, and on what platforms.
Media coverage, publicity and policy advocacy, especially when
connected to broad national or influential elite sentiments, are also
an important factor.

These levers are available to all Americans, and there are no laws or
mechanisms restricting who can apply them if they have the means and
the will. History demonstrates that a sustained application of such
resources eventually has a powerful impact on shaping how the country
defines its national interests and what its policies will be.

Arabs and Arab-Americans seem remarkably resistant to either
understanding how the system works or, at least, deciding to
participate in it enthusiastically. We have generally opted out of the
process altogether, leaving an open playing field for others on many
of our most cherished issues.

Arab-Americans have failed to create strong, effective national
institutions. Every single national Arab or Muslim American
organization is smaller or in some way less effective than it was on
September 10, 2011, which is a shocking indictment of the lack of
interest of the community in defending itself or promoting its
concerns. I’m not aware of a single registered lobbyist working for an
Arab-American organization with Congress on Capitol Hill. The
consequences of such woeful inaction are evident across the board.

While direct political participation is reserved for American citizens
only, Arab societies and governments have also demonstrated a
bewildering disinclination to understand the importance of encouraging
and supporting the development of Arab-American organizations. What
Arab societies need in the United States are not clients but friends;
allies, not employees. There has to be room for significant
disagreement as well as agreement. But influential Arabs have shown a
consistent preference for working with non-Arab-American organizations
and companies that do not understand or really care about broader Arab
concerns, and wasted huge amounts of money on this dead end.

Both the Arabs and the Arab-Americans have the means, talent and
resources to have a significant impact on the American policy
conversation through the established political system, which is open
to them in different capacities as citizens or noncitizens. The
negative consequences of their persistent non-engagement or
wrongheaded engagement is always evident, but becomes even more clear
as elections approach.

If we want Americans to sympathize with our positions, for example by
adopting a more evenhanded policy towards Palestine, we must give them
a reason to do so. Serious, sustained and meaningful engagement with
the American political system, and creating and supporting relevant
institutions, is the only way to accomplish this. Not doing so
guarantees continued failure.

Arabs Must Engage with the U.S. Political System

http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/294651

The US policy of “managed transition” in Syria has failed

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=296779

The massacre of over 100 protesters in the Syrian city of Hama on Sunday not only shocked the conscience of the world, it has created something of a crisis for American policy toward Syria.

In recent weeks, the Obama administration’s approach to Syria could be summed up in two words: managed transition. The preferred solution to the Syrian crisis was to try to reach out to members of both the opposition and the power structure simultaneously to try to begin a real dialogue about Syria’s future. That now looks increasingly unlikely, and the prospect of what Washington fears most—sectarian civil war—is increasingly possible.

For many months, Washington tossed lifelines to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, calling on him to lead the transition and begin the process of reform. Although most informed observers were convinced from the outset that the regime was, literally, incapable of reform for a myriad of unsavory reasons, the United States had profound and reasonable concerns about chaos and civil conflict in Syria.

In particular, the American concern has been that a raging, and especially sectarian, civil conflict in Syria could spill over into neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, and possibly even be the tipping point for a wider regional conflict. Israel’s and Turkey’s anxieties have also figured prominently in American thinking. A particular concern is Turkey’s apparent inclination, at a minimum, to militarily create a buffer zone in northern Syria, especially in Alawite and above all Kurdish areas, in the event of a civil war or sustained anarchy.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton came under particular criticism after a March 27 statement in which she declared that “[m]any of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe [Assad] is a reformer.” However, as the regime’s brutality escalated, Washington was unable to sustain this tone and imposed limited sanctions in April and May. The administration essentially abandoned the idea that Assad himself could institute reforms, with President Barack Obama bluntly stating that if he could not do so, he should “get out of the way.”

American efforts to try to avoid Syrian civil conflict have been led by the ambassador in Damascus, Robert Ford, whose credibility was greatly enhanced by his controversial July 8 “unauthorized” visit to Hama. Calls to pull the US diplomatic presence in Damascus were rejected on the implicit grounds that Ford was leading the quest for “managed transition” by keeping lines of communication open to figures in both the Syrian opposition and ruling elite.

That strategy, however, appears to have borne little if any fruit so far. Even before the Hama massacre, Ford was recalled to Washington for consultations. American concerns remain the same, but the approach to achieving regime change or transition in Damascus without all-out civil conflict plainly needs considerable and urgent revision.

Hama prompted the strongest words by far from Obama: “al-Assad is ensuring that he and his regime will be left in the past.” Yet American options remain limited, and a Libya-style military intervention is out of the question. Increased sanctions, particularly in the energy sector, are overdue. So is pressure through the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has referred the Syria file to the Security Council.

After last weekend’s massacre, the prospect of a referral of Syrian officials to the International Criminal Court or the creation of a special tribunal on Syria has received renewed attention. Syria is not a party to the Statute of Rome, meaning the Security Council would have to authorize an ICC investigation, as it did in Sudan. However, Russian and Chinese opposition to such a move may not be easily overcome at this stage.

Even though American options are limited, the Obama administration now has no choice but to significantly and publicly increase the pressure on the Assad regime. Concerns about stability are understandable, but it’s impossible not to recognize that the Assad regime itself is now the greatest source of instability. Indeed, it is undoubtedly dragging Syria toward civil war, quite possibly on a sectarian basis, and is most probably doing so deliberately.

This means that the calculation has to change immediately. The United States and its allies might not be able to prevent the Assad regime from forcing a brutal and probably sectarian conflict on its own country, but the best hope for avoiding this is moving away from a policy based on cautiously managed transition to one based on bolder actions aimed at regime change. Such steps can also help ensure that the pitched battle, if it must come, is quicker and more decisive, and that its destabilization of the region is better contained.