Yes, a settlement boycott can work

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=380578

Peter Beinart’s recent call in the New York Times for Jewish Americans to boycott Israeli settlement goods has been met with angry responses from many Jewish Americans. This includes some who are opposed to the settler movement. The most important of these objections hold that a boycott cannot work because Jewish Americans won’t go along with such a program and there isn’t much to boycott anyway. Both arguments hold little water.

In Jewish American circles, this is a new idea. Initial resistance on the grounds of ethnic solidarity and because of a bitter history of anti-Semitic boycotts was predictable. But there is no reason to think that a sustained campaign to convince Jewish Americans that boycotting settlements is an important aspect of salvaging Israel’s character as a “Jewish” and democratic state cannot make headway.

Already, a significant proportion of Jewish Americans deeply oppose the occupation and settlements. Beinart’s plan is the first program to give them a way to express this opposition in a proactive manner.

Over time, the agenda could catch on, especially among young liberal Jewish Americans in need of a practical program to contest the occupation and support a two-state solution. The vociferous rejection of a boycott implies that one just might work. If the scheme were completely ridiculous, ignoring it would be sufficient.

“Pro-Israel, pro-peace” Jewish American organizations are divided on the idea. J Street has rejected it, while it is embraced by Americans for Peace Now. Others groups argue that the idea is pointless because “there isn’t much to boycott anyway.” This is incorrect.

First, such a boycott need not seek to have a devastating economic impact on the settlement economy. The settlement project is heavily subsidized and is not conceived of as a moneymaking venture. Rather, it is an ideological program. With the exception of the Jewish settlements in the Golan Heights and a few others in the West Bank, what we have is historical irredentism at work, not entrepreneurship. The boycott is a political and symbolic statement. It should be conceptualized as expressing profound political objections, and a refusal to cooperate, whether or not it can make any real dent in the settlement economy.

Moreover, the idea that the economic activities connected with more than 500,000 Israeli settlers are immune from pressure is simply silly. These people live, work and produce on land that does not belong to them in contravention of black-letter international law. In fact, there is a great deal to boycott, while also maintaining the distinction between the occupation and Israel itself.

Since the boycott campaign was initiated by Palestinians, Israel and its supporters have reacted furiously. This again suggests that such a campaign can be effective. However, apart from the refusal of individuals to visit or perform in Israel, almost all meaningful acts of boycott and divestment have been connected to the occupation itself.

British trade unions have endorsed boycotts of companies benefiting from the occupation. The Netherlands recently canceled the visit of a delegation of Israeli mayors because it included settlement leaders. A group of Israeli academics announced they would boycott Ariel University. Several Italian and Irish supermarket chains won’t stock Israeli produce because Israel refuses to label what comes from the settlements, to distinguish it from what is grown in Israel proper. The Norwegian government pension fund divested from two Israeli companies doing business in the occupied territories.

The boycott led by the Palestinian Authority has reportedly led to the closure of numerous factories in several settlements. Elbit Systems, an Israeli company that provides components for Israel’s illegal separation barrier, has been divested from by numerous European companies and governments. The German state-owned rail company has refused to do business with an Israeli firm building a rail line linking Israel to the occupied territories. These are a few examples of how such boycotts can work, and in fact are growing.

Since most countries are united in seeing Israeli settlement activity as illegal and illegitimate, they must at least force the Israeli state to label goods accordingly and maintain separate statistics for the Israeli and settler economies.

Those critics who oppose both the boycott idea and the settlements would be more convincing if they offered viable alternatives, for instance backing the creation of a fund to provide settlers with incentives to return to Israel. But as long as they don’t outline any realistic substitutes, then it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that they prefer to let settlement activity go forward with some mild scolding.

Bret Stephens’ Crisis of Empathy

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/27/bret-stephen-s-crisis-of-empathy.html

Sometimes crude binaries can be instructive, and it’s possible to distinguish two different types of people: those who seek out generous and universalist empathy with others, and those who prefer the warm cocoon of tribal solidarity.

In his new book, The Crisis of Zionism, Peter Beinart very much places himself in the first category, while in his review of it for Tablet, Bret Stephens, unfortunately, demonstrates that he squarely belongs in the second. Stephens’ angry, mean-spirited tirade against Beinart begins with a frank display of this mentality. He opens his lengthy denunciation of Beinart by angrily condemning him for daring to imagine that a young Palestinian boy called Khaled Jaber “could have been my son.”

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Palestinian children fly kites bearing the Palestinian and Japanese flags crossing symbolic national boundaries in the southern Gaza Strip (Said Khatib / Getty Images)

Beinart writes that the evolution of his views on Israel and its occupation was kick-started by watching a video of the child crying out in horror as his father was being hauled away by Israeli occupation forces for “stealing water.” Beinart’s innate decency and humanity were, for whatever reason, deeply touched by this highly affecting scene. It’s always possible to be desensitized to the suffering of others, but for whatever reason he was moved by the child’s plight—and no doubt the irony of Israeli occupiers arresting a Palestinian for “stealing” what is, after all, the water that belongs to Palestinians and not to the Israeli occupiers. It tapped into humanist and universalist sentiments deep enough to see his own son in the young boy and, implicitly, himself in the father living under a system of systematic and brutal oppression and exploitation.

But Stephens is having none of it. How, he asks indignantly, could “someone named Khaled Jaber…have been Beinart’s son?” The answers are so simple and fundamental that they are embarrassing to posit. He could be his son because all people are brothers and sisters, and we all can and should identify with each other across ethnic, racial, religious and cultural divides. Beinart can do this. Stevens, apparently, can’t, and indeed is offended when others do. He demands to know “Are they [the Jabers] supporters of peaceful co-existence with Israel or advocates of terrorism?” With these and other litmus tests, Stephens posits that Beinart’s expression of human fellowship is in fact a failure of journalistic integrity. It’s true that Beinart never stopped to ask if these are “good Arabs” or “bad Arabs,” but simply identified with a child suffering from the abuses of an occupation. Indeed, the occupation itself rarely stops to ask such questions; the occupation treats almost all Palestinians as noncitizens and denies their basic human and national rights.

It’s even more ironic that Stephens would harp on Khaled Jaber’s name given that his own family name is itself an adopted one. His paternal grandfather apparently was named “Ehrlich,” just as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s father was born with the surname Mileikowsky (although the Prime Minister often tries to draw a connection between his family’s ideologically-adopted name and that on an ancient Jewish relic found in Jerusalem bearing the name Netanyahu).

There’s nothing wrong, of course, with adopting the classically Anglo-Saxon “Stephens” as a more socially convenient surname in the New World. It just that, under those circumstances, Stephens’ dismissal of the notion that Beinart could possibly have a son called “Khaled Jaber” denotes a peculiar blindness to Stephens’ own complex family history of name-changing and a very narrow and rigid view of what names might meet in any given human family. My own maternal surname is Schenck, because my mother is a direct descendent of one of the original Dutch inhabitants of Brooklyn, while my paternal name is Ibish, which derives from Syrian Kurdish ancestry. If Schenck and Ibish can meet in me, why not Jaber and Beinart (or Stephens, or Ehrlich, for that matter) in someone else? Stephens’ outrage that Beinart would dare to imagine that he might have a son like, or even called, Khaled Jaber is not only mean-spirited, it’s downright disturbing.

Stephens’s review boils down to an extended defense of Israel’s occupation. Citing the predictable, if not inevitable, consequences of unilateral Israeli actions (as opposed to mutual Israeli agreements with Arabs such as the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan), specifically the “unilateral redeployment” in Gaza conducted by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005 (which Sharon correctly never called a “withdrawal”), Stephens argues “against further territorial withdrawals, at least until something fundamental changes in Palestinian political culture.” Of course, what supporters of peace are asking for is a reasonable two-state Israeli-Palestinian agreement, not unilateral “withdrawals.”

Stephens cites Leon Wieseltier of The New Republic as quite correctly observing that, “characterizing anti-Semitic acts as a response to something Jews did doesn’t explain anti-Semitism.” Yet he’s quick to return this compliment directly to the Palestinians; for Stephens, things Palestinians do or don’t do justify occupation and all of the abuses that go with it. For Stephens, Palestinian actions do explain morally and politically indefensible anti-Palestinian sentiments and policies. “Would Beinart,” he demands, “object to an argument that African-Americans are at least partly responsible for white racism because they commit a disproportionate share of violent crime in the United States?” Yet this is precisely the logic Stephens employs when it comes to the Palestinians.

“Palestinians need not celebrate suicide bombers or cheer the murder of Jewish children,” Stephens writes, as if this were the typical Palestinian mentality or majority position. In fact for the past fifteen years at least the majority of Palestinians, like the majority of Israelis, have been in favor of a two-state peace agreement. But they both just do not believe the other side is sincere.

The behavior of both parties has given ample scope for doubt on each side, and for those, like Stephens and his numerous Arab counterparts, there is no difficulty whatsoever in finding any number of reasons to dismiss the sincerity of the other party. It’s an extremely simple matter to come up with reasons not to cooperate with rivals and those who have been historical enemies. It’s much harder, but much more noble and constructive, to—as Beinart has—frankly acknowledge the faults on both sides and look for grounds on which to cooperate and find a mutually-beneficial conflict-ending solution. But this requires a political, intellectual and moral leap beyond comforting narrow identifications and tribal narratives. It requires embracing principles and enlightened strategic goals.

It is, sadly, the moral aspect of this challenge that Beinart, like others on the Arab side, has had the courage to embrace that bothers Stephens the most. Stephens casts Israel as surrounded by “the ardent, sometimes fanatic, hostility of 350 million neighboring Arabs,” more than 1 billion additional Muslims and its own Palestinian citizens. Without any basis in fact he declares that, “The Arab Spring has become an Islamist winter,” even though Islamists are not actually in power in any Arab country at all thus far. And, he posits, Iran is poised to become a nuclear power bent on the destruction of Israel. Under such circumstances, he argues that since politics always involves choosing “the lesser evil,” Israel’s policies of not only maintaining its occupation but continuing to expand its settlements are somehow rational. He dismisses Beinart’s call for a boycott of the settlements in Israel’s own interests as part of “modern-day Israel bashing,” and refuses to acknowledge the threat that the settlements pose to Israel’s security, not to mention its self-definition as a “Jewish” and “democratic” state. The fact that the de facto Israeli state, which for most of its existence has included the occupied Palestinian territories, is now neither Jewish nor democratic in any meaningful sense does not appear to cause Stephens any serious concern. He certainly proposes no solution to this issue or even recognizes it as a serious problem.

“Israel,” Stephens writes, “exists so that the Chosen People might suffer a little less as a Choosing People,” and if it “chooses” to extend the occupation indefinitely denying millions of Palestinians their basic human and national rights for whatever reasons it sees fit, so be it. The notion that anyone might raise moral or enlightened, long-term strategic objections to such a choice—the de facto policy of the present Israeli government, which includes numerous senior figures who have dismissed both the possibility and the need for a peace agreement with the Palestinians—he identifies as “the core problem” with Beinart’s book.

I don’t think Stephens has any real appreciation for how deep or dangerous these waters he is leaping into really are. If Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims in general were to embrace the same attitudes towards Israel, especially if the Israeli state were to follow his prescriptions, what kind of policies should we expect them to adopt in the long run? His law of the jungle—an unabashed version of Hobbes’ “war of all [tribes] against all”—leaves little room for a bright future for Israel and its people.

Were Stephens to have been born with the name “Jaber” rather than his own (or “Ehrlich,” for that matter), to what faction of Palestinian politics would he adhere? He wouldn’t necessarily be a member of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, but he certainly couldn’t, on the basis of this logic, be among those nobly striving to seek peace with Israel, building institutions on the ground in spite of the occupation, persisting in what is universally recognized as extremely effective security cooperation with occupation forces in “Area A” of the West Bank despite the lack of any clear path towards liberation, or seeking to reconcile themselves to permanent coexistence with an Israeli state that defines itself as Jewish.

His logic of choosing between “unpalatable alternatives” and emphasizing tribal self-protection above all other values militates passionately against any of those policies. And would he not also surely be informed by the Palestinian mirror image of his own Jewish tendentious, chauvinistic and, frankly, paranoid worldview? It should come as little comfort to him that, indeed, there are lots of Palestinians and other Arabs who share his mentality. But it should be a great comfort to the rest of us that the large majority, like most Israelis, do not.

Eastern Promises: Anthony Shadid masterfully recounts an immigrant homecoming

http://www.bookforum.com/inprint/019_01/9157

ANTHONY SHADID, the lead Middle East correspondent for theNew York Times, died on February 16 at only forty-three, succumbing to an asthma attack as he snuck out of Syria while covering the popular uprising against President Bashar al-Assad. Shadid, who had twice won the Pulitzer Prize, was universally acknowledged as the premier American reporter on the Middle East of his generation. He left behind an extraordinary body of work, culminating in the just-published House of Stone.

However, House of Stone is not a work of Middle East reportage; it is, rather, a memoir, devoted to Shadid’s deeply personal quest to uncover his heritage in war-torn Lebanon—and specifically in his ancestral town of Marjayoun, which his grandfather and grandmother, then neighbors but not relatives, both separately left in the early 1920s for the United States. Between the 2006 war pitting Hezbollah against Israel and the outbreak of a mini–civil war, mainly in Beirut, in 2008, Shadid took a year off from his then position at the Washington Post to rebuild his great-grandfather’s abandoned and dilapidated home in Marjayoun. Shadid describes the project as “a small odyssey,” a “meaningful search” for his family’s roots and a new sense of his own personal belonging in their land of origin. It’s clear from the outset that he anticipated discovery and reconnection as the outcomes of his building project, and as it unfolds, the completed project indeed grants Shadid a new sense of identity and purpose. The house, he writes, “makes a statement: Remember the past. Remember Marjayoun. Remember who you are.”

House of Stone alternates between two stories: the account of Shadid’s effort to rebuild the house (in regular font), and the story of his family’s immigration to the United States (in italics). The structure of an alternating narrative cutting back and forth between a contemporary story and an older history that informs it is well established in both fiction and nonfiction, and in film as well. Think, for example, of another immigrant narrative, The Godfather, Part II, which intersperses the steady assimilation of Michael Corleone (into the culture of the Mafia and the American dream alike) alongside the formative saga of Vito Corleone’s immigration to the United States and gradual emergence as a Mob kingpin. This simple format works exceptionally well for Shadid. His two narratives unfold slowly—like the house itself—in both harmony and counterpoint to explain the motivations behind his project and its deeper purposes.

 

No one should turn to House of Stone for a sustained analysis of Lebanese politics or of the Arab political condition. This book has no index, and indeed does not need one; it won’t serve as a source for any sustained research project, save into the story of Shadid’s life or his readopted hometown. But it will provide non-Arab readers a very strong sense of Lebanese town culture and mores. Shadid is no anthropologist or sociologist, althoughHouse of Stone conveys tremendous insights into the social forces that shape life (for better and worse) in Lebanese towns—and in some ways in Levantine and even broader Arab societies as well. With the fair-handed sensibility and narrative voice he established in his dispatches for the Times, Shadid spares no one their sins or embarrassments. Yet, like so much else in Shadid’s writing, this book humanizes Arabs, both individually and collectively, for an American audience otherwise starved for such crucial moments of recognition with our present culture’s quintessential “Other.”

Shadid’s great skill as a journalist was that of a master storyteller, and he’s never been more effective than in his final book. The work essentially belongs to the tradition of nonfiction belles lettres, as noteworthy for its style and prose elegance as for its subject matter. But Shadid’s book also very much belongs to a particular genre of postcolonial literature: the journey back from the metropolis to the periphery by the immigrant—or, in this case, the immigrants’ descendant.

Such works have become a major strand of postcolonial literature as the immigrant experience shifts to tracking returns from the metropolitan center to the periphery. Shadid, returning to not only the country but also the physical home of his great-grandfather, provides the latest instance of this narrative of immigrant return to a lost and in many ways imagined homeland. Probably the most famous iteration of this genre is the story of Saladin Chamcha in Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988). In the moving and powerful closing section of Rushdie’s much-misunderstood novel, Chamcha returns to India, reconciles with his estranged father, and reassumes his previously discarded Indian identity.

Shadid is more than one step removed from Chamcha, as a grandson of immigrants. Yet the project of recovering his Arab, Lebanese, and Marjayouni identity is essentially a hybrid of this literary genre—as well as an Arab-American iteration of the more specifically American “roots” quest of the identity-politics era. One of his relatives even sardonically invokes the name Kunta Kinte, the half-invented protagonist of Roots, Alex Haley’s 1976 book seeking to reconstruct his own family’s African-American migration story. In this “roots” sense,House of Stone is a quintessentially post–civil rights movement American book, exploring the contours of the hyphen in a hyphenated identity.

It’s also, in every sense, not only an Arab-American story, but the Arab-American story. The saga of his family’s emigration from Marjayoun to Oklahoma is a representative snapshot of the Arab-American experience at its core: an all-American immigrant narrative, but shaped very deeply by its Arab protagonists, their circumstances and their cultural heritage. In the United States, he writes, “fortunes were accumulated, not found,” and “for those who worked hard, profits were good.” At the same time, though, his family’s assimilation to American life often meant changing names, negotiating identities, and self-reinvention—as Shadid recalls, the members of his migrant family were “determined to be like their neighbors in Oklahoma.” I doubt that the Arab-American experience has ever received more affecting treatment than Shadid delivers here in his characteristically elegant prose. He describes, for example, the tension for these early immigrants between pragmatic assimilation and a no-less-powerful impulse to cling “defiantly to the traditions that they believed set them apart.” “Food was the mainstay,” he writes, as these Arab immigrants doggedly persisted in eating the familiar fare of their homeland, and “socializing was a necessary priority” among this diaspora community. “Visits kept to a village cadence,” Shadid notes, and “impromptu parties were convened on any night.” And during these gatherings, “never a word of English was spoken. On those nights, they were back in Marjayoun. They were home, together.”

By contrast, Leila Ahmed’s brilliant memoir, A Border Passage (1999), may have been written in English and in the United States, but it’s very much an Arab, rather than an Arab-American, book. Its chapter “On Becoming an Arab”—which describes the process by which Egyptians of her generation were, from her perspective, virtually shanghaied into an ideological Arab-nationalist worldview during the 1950s—has received far too little attention. It’s fascinating to read Ahmed’s account as a counterpoint to Shadid’s enthusiastic embrace of his inherited Arab identity. Shadid, the roots-conscious hyphenated American, sees his journey back from the American metropolis as not only natural but healing and restorative; Ahmed, on the other hand, describes a far more rigid and oppressive Arab identity—and an enforced dislocation from a broader, more cosmopolitan, and richer cultural heritage in her native Cairo.

Several other recent memoirs have narrated the rigors of Arab migration, or in some cases exile—–most notably, perhaps, Edward Said’s Out of Place (1999). But Shadid seems to have tapped into something much more fundamental in the experiences that formed today’s Arab-American community. Said found himself most comfortable in a cosmopolitan, always-alienated, and intellectually rarefied cultural environment informed by Adorno’s “negative dialectics,” which held that “dwelling, in the proper sense, is now impossible.” More prosaically, Shadid yearns for something reassuringly fixed and settled: a home, and the recovery of something “lost”—a much more typical impulse among third-generation immigrants. For Said, cosmopolitan displacement was intellectually liberating, whereas for Shadid—and I suspect for most people—“being torn in two often leaves something less than one.”

The house in House of Stone serves as a potent and multivalent metaphor in Shadid’s imagination: It represents stability in the present; hope for the future; reconnection with a long-lost—and, he admits, in many senses imaginary—past; the continuity of family memory and commitment; and all the nuanced meanings of the untranslatable and overdetermined Arabic word bayt. As Shadid notes, bayt possesses connotations that “resonate beyond rooms and walls, summoning longings gathered about family and home,” and represents “the identity that does not fade.” It also stands in for Lebanon itself, that anarchic mosaic of ill-fitting parts, stabilized only through an equilibrium of inherently unstable elements. Lebanon is a country with no majority community, instead consisting of dozens of smaller groups often finding themselves in open confrontation and coexisting uneasily in adjacent sectarian enclaves. These qualities have doomed it to be the perennial site of foreign meddling and a venue for devastating civil conflicts and proxy wars. It’s impossible not to read in many passages the suggestion that the house stands in for the country built around it: “In its destruction, the house, liberated, revealed its origins. . . . In chaotic geometry, smaller stones climbed over each other in the rugged, disordered perfection of the Cave’s arcade.”

Indeed, writers addressing Lebanon’s inscrutable and tragic character have often used this same metaphor, characterizing Lebanon as a unique, marvelous, and impossibly divided “house.” Lebanon’s premier historian, Kamal Salibi, titled his definitive work on modern Lebanese history A House of Many Mansions (1988). Salibi was, of course, deliberately citing a saying of Jesus as recorded in John 14:2 to highlight what he viewed as the pressing question of how Arab Christians would fare in Lebanon in particular and the Middle East in general. Likewise, Shadid devotes of a good deal of House of Stone to the troubled history of Christians in his homeland—a theme that emerges as he recounts both his family history and his dealings with a host of Lebanese Christian villagers in the effort to rebuild his ancestral home. There is a widespread sense, which Shadid repeatedly expresses, that numerous factors, including the sectarian attitudes of Arab Christians themselves, are placing the future of Lebanon’s Christian communities at risk. As Shadid unsparingly observes, an allegiance to marginalized, sectarian identity in Muslim-majority cultures for Christians means that “we faced our own extinction.”

Shadid’s book is impressively self-aware and never shrinks from asking difficult questions, but it does not dive deeply into philosophical problems. Still, it’s possible to tease out, in Shadid’s sustained contemplation of the myriad meanings of the terms house and bayt, another body of complex thought from an unlikely touchstone: Heidegger’s musing on the overdetermined meanings of “dwelling” in his renowned essay “Building Dwelling Thinking.” Heidegger claims that “only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build,” and that “to build is in itself already to dwell.” Heidegger’s ponderous, difficult philosophical essay and Shadid’s light, accessible memoir have an unexpected resonance despite their radical differences. For Shadid, too, home begins with dwelling as thinking, an act of creative imagination that gives meaning to family, identity, and continuity. He imagines bringing his daughter to the house he rebuilt and teaching her the Arabic words of his great-grandfather: “This is bayt,” he writes. “This is what we imagine.”

There are even hints of Freud’s sense of the uncanny as the unhomely—the familiar made unfamiliar by neurotic symptoms—in Shadid’s story. American readers have especially prized Shadid’s work for its accessible transmission of the attitudes and experiences of Arabs in the Middle East—but for highly assimilated Arab-Americans like him, the Arab world (at least at first) is precisely such an uncanny place, simultaneously radically different and oddly familiar. Shadid’s project of rebuilding his great-grandfather’s house of stone is certainly neurotic—he describes it as “quixotic” and explicitly links it to the divorce from his wife that destroyed his American home—an effort to make the unheimlich homely and to refashion himself as “native” to a place that is both familiar and strange. He also seems to relish almost anything that links him with the “crazy” Shadids of Marjayoun village lore, merchants who drove impossibly hard bargains and were quick to anger, take offense, and bear endless grudges. This, too, is the kind of neurotic symptom Freud posited as the indispensable origin of art, culture, and civilization itself.

But if we were to boil the guiding metaphor in House of Stone to one primary element, the home Shadid ultimately discovers at the end of his quest is the book in the reader’s hands. The narrative of the construction of the house is, in effect, the story of the writing process at work. As Shadid patiently reconstructs his family’s home on its original site, he uses this struggle toward completion to recover in these pages the story behind the house—his family’s history. Throughout House of Stone, Shadid’s use of metaphor is simple, elegant, and effective. Tiles evoke historical and family detail, ancient trees summon forth the idea of social and familial continuity, new plants and flowers signal a fresh understanding of the past and present. Shadid’s rich, often anthropomorphic images, presented in the larger framework of the book’s alternating and intersecting narratives, nestle perfectly into each other like Russian dolls, revealing ever more nuance and detail. “The tiles at my feet were the remnants,” he writes, “artifacts of an ideal, meant to remind and inspire, vestiges of the irretrievable Levant, a word that, to many, calls to mind an older, more tolerant, more indulgent Middle East.”

But in more than one passage, Shadid is let down by overexplicitness, explaining the metaphor so baldly that it breaks the spell, like a conjurer walking us through the mechanics of the illusion during the magic trick. In a section describing his friend Assaad’s inability to decide whether he should return to Wisconsin, where he had settled only to leave, Shadid writes, “He was a man caught between two places, one where he would always be a stranger, one where he was no longer a native.” He continues, “Sometimes, it seemed to me, I saw Assaad’s displacement everywhere I looked.” Such painstaking literalness is, paradoxically,too direct: It actually subverts the impact of the narrative’s imagery, which, left on its own and never very far from the surface, generally gives the book a very effective and artful structure. In this manner, the book’s countless seemingly trivial details gain enough breathing room within the narrative to artfully enrich and interrogate its author’s broader concerns. One also occasionally gets the sense that some underzealous editing, probably as a consequence of an understandable readerly enchantment with the rich details and resonant themes of House of Stone, allowed the book to drag slightly in places. But these are quibbles about what is on the whole an exquisitely written text.

Still, the one metaphor that really lets Shadid down is precisely the one that many readers will probably find most urgent: his bid to link his story to the “Arab Spring” protests that have convulsed the Middle East since late 2010. Most efforts to impose any form of grand narrative about these ongoing and unresolved uprisings seem premature and jury-rigged, and that’s very much the case with the epilogue to House of Stone. Shadid’s commentary on the region’s political upheavals feels uncomfortably tacked on to what is otherwise a very finely integrated story, and it stretches a bit to connect the story of Shadid’s uneasy homecoming to the broader quest for democratic reform in the Arab world. In Tahrir Square, for example, Shadid writes that “Egypt reimagined home,” much as he had done—via a collective “act of imagination . . . [creating] a different kind of community linked to what once was.” That’s a reasonable description of a great deal of what happened in Egypt and Libya, although he agrees the liberatory “Tahrir moment” might be very fleeting, referring to “what had once more, at last, been imagined.” Even so, the interpretive scheme here feels rather strained; his readers will be hard-pressed to see an evident connection—or even an implicit one—between the Tahrir protests and Shadid’s struggles to reimagine and refashion his forebears’ house and his own identity in the process. The only way to make sense of such a comparison is to posit that all acts of imaginative redefining are of a kind.

It’s an especially curious elision, since over the past year or so Shadid—who, for most of his career, had lacked the supple feel for political analysis that he typically brought to his reporting on the ground—was starting to emerge as a very impressive analyst of Arab political developments. Consider, for example, an especially trenchant anatomy of the Syrian crisis that he wrote early last November for PBS’s Frontline, titled “In Assad’s Syria, There Is No Imagination.” With a minimum of personal or confessional commentary, Shadid was able to persuasively interpret the Arab uprisings as creative acts of collective imagination, and the crisis in Syria as a failure of imagination. And what he wrote then is still true: The brutality of the government means “Syria is still subsumed in the logic of fear, which forces once diverse societies to hew to their smaller parts, obliterating the ability to imagine broader communities and other identities,” and the “lack of vision” by the opposition has not effectively counteracted this trend. The opposition forces in Syria have thus far crucially failed to reassure ethnic and sectarian minorities that their fears about a post-Assad future are unfounded. Shadid himself takes the leap of imagining a “post-Ottoman” milieu in which “people can imagine themselves as Alawite, Levantine, Arab, Syrian, Eastern—or some hybrid that transcends them all.”

Such a vision might be a little fanciful, but Shadid was extremely incisive in focusing on the indispensability of citizenship, with all its rights and responsibilities—a concept that has not been central to contemporary Arab political discourse—as the key to a better future for Arab societies now emerging from the suffocation of dictatorship. Whether cleverly, naively, or simply matter-of-factly, he cites the Tunisian Islamist Said Ferjani’s observation that “only in citizenship . . . could diversity be preserved and protected,” and allow Arab societies “to become greater than our parts.” Real citizenship, Shadid suggests, “would allow us to imagine” and therefore create an Arab future that is a genuine liberation, a factor that will almost be the single most important force that determines the long-term outcome of these uprisings. Even if he attributed this insight to Ferjani, Shadid demonstrated the rapidly developing strength of his own analytical skills—and, sadly, it still really does take an imaginative leap to dream of an Arab world defined by citizens, none better or worse than any other, free to define themselves and to participate fully in their societies.

A major story based on Shadid’s interview with Ferjani appeared in the New York Times on February 17, the day after Shadid’s death. It is, illogically but inevitably, more uncanny and unsettling to read the work of recently deceased authors—pieces written by my friend Christopher Hitchens are still coming out, though he passed away several months ago—than it is to encounter a newly discovered work of a long-dead writer. The Ferjani story and other short posthumous pieces merely set up the deeply moving experience of reading House of Stone in the full knowledge that Shadid tragically died in the few months between the book’s completion and its publication. It’s impossible not to note, however, the numerous passages that seem almost to anticipate the tragedy—though of course nothing of the sort could have remotely been on Shadid’s mind. A friend says of Marjayoun when Shadid is beginning his project, “The only time people arrive here is when they’re dead. . . . They bring people here to bury them.” A relative tells him defiantly, “This is where I will come when I die. I have a big, beautiful grave ready.”

Shadid’s construction project in Marjayoun was clearly an exercise in self-reconstruction: an effort to recuperate as well as reimagine the history of his family and to provide a new future for them and for himself. He clearly didn’t intend it as such, but the house will now stand not as a tomb, but as a living monument to Anthony Shadid for his relatives and the townsfolk of Marjayoun. A few days after his death, Shadid’s ashes were scattered in the garden he created around the house he rebuilt. To the rest of us, he bequeaths a very different monument: his extraordinary writing, which reached its apex with House of Stone.

Show, Don’t Tell: Why the Apartheid Analogy Falls Flat

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/26/show-don-t-tell-why-the-apartheid-analogy-falls-flat.html

series of recent articles have pointlessly debated whether or not Israel can accurately be described as “an apartheid state.” But the problem with the apartheid analogy is less its inaccuracy, and more that, however emotionally appealing some people may find it, it’s just not useful in ending the occupation and advancing the Palestinian cause.

True, apartheid is (vaguely) defined as a war crime under the Statute of Rome, but neither Israel nor most Arab countries (nor the United States, for that matter) are members of the Assembly of Parties at the International Criminal Court. In fact, the apartheid argument really is a historical analogy to the systematized, racist legal discrimination that used to exist in South Africa.

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Neither Israel nor most Arab countries subject to the International Criminal Court (Juan Vrijdag / Getty Images)

This historical analogy is vague and in some ways inaccurate. Inside its own borders, Israel’s social and political structure significantly discriminates against the large Palestinian minority (about 20 percent of the citizenry). But this cannot be accurately compared to apartheid. The system enforced by the Israeli military in the occupied territories, however, has a great deal of similarity to apartheid in South Africa. In some ways it’s not as onerous, but in many ways it’s worse.

Therefore, the analogy is tempting. Still, pro-Palestinian activists would be wise to avoid it, for several reasons.

First, it’s a conversation stopper, especially in the United States. Because they do not understand what life under occupation means for Palestinians, most Americans are not ready to accept at the outset of any conversation that Israel practices apartheid. They will simply assume that they are being exposed to hyperbolic anti-Israel propaganda and stop listening before they hear the facts.

It is infinitely more powerful to show rather than tell. Rather than leading with an announcement that Israel practices apartheid, it is much more effective to simply describe the realities: Every aspect of daily life in the occupied Palestinian territories for every individual is defined by whether the Israeli government categorizes them as an Israeli settler, and therefore a citizen of the state with all the rights and responsibilities accruing to citizenship, or a Palestinian noncitizen living under occupation. If you simply describe life under occupation, audiences will draw their own parallels between the occupation and apartheid in South Africa or Jim Crow laws in the segregationist American south.

This discrimination applies to the laws people live under: where they may live; what roads they may use; what access they have to resources like land, water, education, and social services; whether they may be armed for self-defense; whether they may travel freely or have to pass through rigorous checkpoints with the permission of a foreign army; whether they may leave their country with any reasonable expectation of being able to return unimpeded; whether they have any say in the government that rules them or are totally disenfranchised; and whether they are routinely subjected to severe abuses under detention and military tribunals. All these, and almost all other aspects of daily life in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel, are all radically separate and unequal on an ethnically-defined basis.

The system of ethnic discrimination imposed by military force and Israel’s “civil administration” in the occupied territories is by far the most extreme form of discriminatory abuse anywhere in the world today. When they learn these details, audiences conclude for themselves that this is a wicked, immoral and indefensible system and can see the apartheid parallels in a way that will not make them recoil before they know the details.

Secondly, the  analogy  incorrectly suggests that because these parallels exist, the solution must be the same. But while South African apartheid was ended by a reasonable quid pro quo that was the best deal possible for white and black South Africans alike, no such mutually beneficial arrangement in a single state has yet been articulated for Jewish Israelis and Palestinians. It’s a politically misleading analogy that invites strategic error.

Finally, the analogy falls into the trap of conflating Israel and the occupied territories, which plays into the hands of Israeli maximalists and the settler movement. The implied one-state solution suggests that Israel is simply practicing extreme discrimination within an already-existing single state. This effectively lets Israel off the hook completely when it comes to the occupation. And, worse, it suggests that the expansion of settlements is merely construction taking place within that existing state rather than illegal colonization in occupied territories.

No decent person who is made aware of the realities of life under occupation for Palestinians can fail to see its immorality. Demonstrating the immorality of the occupation and the moral and political imperative to end it, not harping on inexact and misleading historical analogies, should be the imperative for pro-Palestinian activism.

Three Cheers for a Settlement Boycott

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/21/three-cheers-for-a-settlement-boycott.html

The backlash against Peter Beinart’s principled call for Jewish Americans to boycott Israeli settlement goods mirrors a debate that has been raging within the pro-Palestinian community. While many Jewish Americans, including those who are highly critical of the settlements, have reacted angrily to Beinart’s idea and reject the notion of any boycott of any Israelis whatsoever, in pro-Palestinian circles the debate has been whether or not to boycott all of Israel or to focus on the occupation and the settlements.

For several years now I have been strongly advocating robust boycotts aimed at the apparatus of the occupation and settlement goods, but not against Israel as such.

This position has been based on two essential understandings: first, that a generalized boycott against Israel would find few takers in the United States; and second, that such a boycott would unite Israelis and play into the hands of those who argue that “the future of the settlements is the same as the future of Tel Aviv.” This stance has won me considerable condemnation from many supporters of the BDS movement.

I’ve also argued that grassroots boycott campaigns that are disconnected from the policies of the Palestinian national leadership are pointless: any momentum they generate cannot be translated into political gains. The Palestinian Authority has not only supported settlement good boycotts, it has enforced them by law in areas under PA control in the occupied territories. This was wise and overdue, as it is unjust and unreasonable for Palestinians to continue underwrite the colonization of their own lands by purchasing goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements. But the Palestinian national leadership has not supported generalized boycotts against Israel for numerous reasons, not least of which that ultimately they must negotiate a peace agreement with the State of Israel.

Some of Beinart’s critics have argued that a Jewish American boycott of settlement goods is unjustifiable because they say “Palestinian intransigence” is the primary reason for the lack of peace. David Frum has even argued that the settlements are the consequence of such supposed intransigence, not a cause of it. But he has never explained how that justifies continued settlement expansion. His argument is a total non sequitur: how does Palestinian intransigence justify settlements?

In fact, Israel’s settlement activities are incompatible with a viable, reasonable peace agreement with the Palestinians. Every settlement expansion increases the size and power of the Israeli constituency with a vested interest in opposing territorial compromise and makes any potential border more difficult to draw. Moreover, settlement activity is clearly illegal under black letter international law, most importantly Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention is a human rights instrument designed to protect civilians. Settlement activity is prohibited because it is a human rights violation against those living under occupation, who have a right not to have their lands seized and given to other people.

Others, such as Jeffrey Goldberg, have expressed queasiness about the idea because of the bitter history of anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic boycotts in the past. The argument is essentially a tribalist one, that Jews should not be pitted against other Jews. However, everyone interested in peace will need to see beyond bitter histories and be prepared to pay serious prices to end the conflict. Indeed, Jews need to confront other Jews, as Arabs need to confront other Arabs, to stop policies, actions and rhetoric that are making peace unattainable. Refusing to do so on the basis of ethnic solidarity is an unprincipled copout. Moreover, in a 2001 New York Times article I co-authored with Goldberg, we argued that, “It is understandable that Palestinians are supporting boycotts of products made in settlements… since the settlements are illegitimate and must not be legitimized.” Why, then, would it not be equally understandable for Jewish Americans to take the same position?

The final objection to Beinart’s proposal is that it won’t work. But why not? Every effective BDS action I am aware of to date has been clearly linked to the occupation. One of the biggest problems in pursuing peace is that Israeli society feels little pain from the occupation and mainstream Israelis have no incentive to confront the powerful and belligerent settlement movement. Boycotts that focus clearly on the occupation and settlements are vital to getting the Israeli majority to understand that even its friends vehemently object to settlement activity and underscoring the distinction between the occupation and Israel itself.

Opponents of Beinart’s call at the very least need to propose a viable alternative that can achieve these effects. If they don’t have one, they should either admit that they prefer allowing settlement activity to go forward, or they should think again.

Match, Spark…

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/14/match-spark.html

The recent flareup of violence between Israel and Palestinian militants in Gaza has all the disturbing qualities of a foretaste of more bitter things to come. Most troublingly, this latest round of attacks and counterattacks, which achieved nothing for either side, brings us ever closer to a possible third Palestinian intifada.

All evidence suggests that neither the mainstream Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, nor the Palestinian majority, has any interest in another uprising at the moment. But there is no political initiative presently offering any hope to the Palestinian people. Negotiations with Israel are in a semi-permanent deep-freeze, UN initiatives forestalled, and national unity talks also at an impasse.

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No one wants a third Intifada (Jaafar Ashtiyeh / AFP / Getty Images)

Meanwhile, the financial crisis, particularly in the West Bank, which is largely the consequence of a decline in foreign aid, has undermined the extent to which Palestinians can at least have confidence that their living conditions are improving.

All progress, therefore, appears stymied, and this is an extremely dangerous and combustible equation. We are at a point where even though most people don’t want one, even a small spark in the right time and place could ignite a significant explosion.

Most Palestinians were undoubtedly outraged by the heavy bombardment of the Gaza Strip by Israel, and especially at the civilian casualties. However, there was also little sympathy for Islamic Jihad.  Widespread skepticism about the motives of the Palestinians involved in the fighting prevented this round of violence from catching the public mood of frustration and provoking more widespread unrest.

Few would have put it as bluntly, but many people agreed with the sentiments expressed by Tariq Alhomayed, editor of the influential London-based daily Asharq Al-Awsat, when he asked: “I challenge anybody from Hamas or any other Gaza organization to come out with a compelling answer about why ‘tinplate’ rockets were fired into Israel in the first place, and whose interests are served for the lives of the Palestinian people to be lost in this saddening manner?”

Alhomayed specifically linked the participation by Palestinian extremist groups in Gaza in the latest round of violence with efforts to distract from the uprising in Syria. Others would see an even more direct connection to Iranian interests. Having lost much if not all of their influence with Hamas due to regional realignments prompted by the Arab uprisings, Tehran has redirected its focus among Palestinians to Islamic Jihad.

Both Iran and Islamic Jihad have an obvious interest in challenging Hamas control in Gaza, and outbidding it on militancy towards Israel. In the recent past, Hamas has been strict in forbidding attacks on southern Israel, particularly by other groups. In this case, they were either unable or unwilling to do so.

One possible motivation for Hamas leaders in Gaza to turn a blind eye, at least for a time, to attacks against Israel by more extremist groups is the internal split within the organization pitting its external leaders who are trying to adapt to a new regional environment against a Gaza-based leadership that is reluctant to make any radical changes.

The latest round of violence reinforces the status quo between Israel and Gaza, re-inscribes Gaza as the hub of armed resistance against Israel, and reaffirms the importance to both countries of Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation. All accounts strongly suggest that security cooperation between Israel and the new Egyptian government, even, if not especially, during the recent violence, remained very strong.

All of this serves to undermine recent moves by Hamas Politburo leaders abroad to reorient the organization away from Iran and armed struggle and towards policies conducive to those of Gulf Arab states, particularly Qatar, and Arab Sunni Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Israeli motivations are also highly suspect. Israel claims it initiated the current round of violence by assassinating Zuhair Qaisi, a leader of the so-called “Popular Resistance Committees,” because he was in the final stages of planning “a major terrorist attack against Israel.” But the timing of the assassination, which would inevitably have provoked at least some upswing in violence, is highly suggestive. It came just as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was returning, openly dissatisfied, from a trip in which he apparently tried to convince President Barack Obama another US officials of the need to attack Iran.

Israeli officials openly speak of viewing the recent round of violence as “a mini-drill” for a conflict with Iran, particularly regarding its new Iron Dome missile defense system. Iran, too, is open to suspicion of using its Palestinian proxies to test the effectiveness of this new Israeli weapons system.

The apparent cynicism of most of those involved in the latest round of violence and skepticism about their motivations was probably a key factor in explaining why it did not produce levels of outrage sufficient to spark a third popular uprising against Israeli occupation. However, the long-term impact on Palestinian sentiments, particularly regarding Palestinian civilian deaths, could be latent and insidious.

Once again Israel has reinforced, through violence, its role as the occupier, and reminded all Palestinians, no matter what they think of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and/or Iran, that they remain at the mercy of the Israeli military. This latest round of violence, even if it is contained to what has already happened for now (as it seems it will be), has certainly increased tensions across the board and added another layer of Palestinian grievance and frustration.

Another intifada probably won’t be sparked by what happens in Gaza, or anything involving crude and cynical violence between Israel and Palestinian extremist groups. But the latest flareup has heaped more kindling on the tinderbox building in the West Bank, which now even the smallest flame, in the right time and place, could ignite at any time.

Yes, America can act in Syria!

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=375483

Last week, I argued that the United States was not doing enough to engage proactively with the unfolding struggle in Syria, and that this inaction was ceding the field to others in an unwise, unnecessary and avoidable manner. The response from many friends and colleagues was, “What would you have us do?”

Opponents of a more robust US policy toward Syria pointed to statements by unnamed senior US intelligence officials quoted by The Washington Post that President Bashar al-Assad is still “is very much in charge” of the country. They generally ignored the second part of the quote in which the official said that even though “the odds are against them,” Syria’s leaders “are going to fight very hard.”

President Barack Obama and other senior administration officials have implicitly defended a policy of inaction by arguing that “the regime’s days are numbered” and that “it is not a matter of whether but when” the Syrian government is overthrown. If that is the case, then why feel impelled to act?

Although it is difficult indeed to sketch a long-term scenario in which the Syrian regime survives in anything like its present form, nothing is inevitable, and that includes Assad’s downfall. This “inevitability” argument serves as stopgap logic for the United States to continue to do very little to influence events in Syria—a policy, or absence of policy, that may have a great deal of appeal during an election year. Of course, if 8,000 Israelis had died in the past year, its relevance to the American national interest would not be debated.

Obama has said that he would not “act unilaterally” in Syria. This is a shot aimed between the eyes of a straw man. Not even the most vocal proponents of robust American action, such as Senator John McCain, have suggested that Washington do anything unilaterally.

Many close allies and supporters of the administration, including the Center for American Progress in a recent report, have beenemphasizing the alleged lack of good options the United States has regarding Syria. A former State Department official, Aaron David Miller, laid out the case for inaction the Foreign Policy website a few days ago. Surveying what he suggested were the options facing American policy, he warned against “reckless ideas of how to make the Syrian tragedy ours.” Miller did admit, however, that “the longer the killing goes on, the more likely we be will dragged into doing more.”

We can be certain that in fact the war will intensify. Miller, the Center for American Progress and others have warned of the difficulties and dangers of creating safe havens or arming rebel groups. No one denies that giving weapons to the rebels carries risks. But critics have yet to answer the point that others will go ahead and arm Syria’s opposition, and by doing so will gain influence, empower their own Syrian allies, and therefore help to define the very nature of the opposition.

It’s a red herring to suggest that because the situation is complex, American leverage is limited and coordination with allies is essential, therefore little can be done. It may be that the diplomatic groundwork and the level of the crisis on the ground, particularly with regard to Turkish policy, is not yet sufficient to establish safe havens or buffer zones. However, that does not preclude developing a policy that anticipates and begins to prepare for limited intervention when it becomes necessary, as even Miller acknowledges it probably will.

In the meantime, there are some clear steps the Obama administration can take to enhance its policies and behave proactively rather than reactively. First, it should stop talking about the “inevitable” fall of the Syrian regime and clearly announce that regime change in Damascus is a goal of US policy. Having determined and announced that, a great deal of clarity should follow.

Second, the United States should, like the European Union and others, formally recognize the Syrian National Council as “a legitimate representative of the Syrian people.”

Third, the administration should publish a series of benchmarks that the Syrian National Council, or any other opposition group seeking this role, must accomplish in order to gain eventual recognition as, in effect, a government in exile. These should include, but not be limited to, developing well-structured relations with the Free Syrian Army and other armed rebel groups, and doing much more to reach out to Syrian confessional and ethnic minorities, as well as offering far-reaching, ironclad guarantees about their status in a post-Assad future.

Fourth, Washington should begin identifying those in the political opposition as well as armed groups on the ground that it believes can represent a better future for Syria. And then it must do everything possible, within the bounds of prudence, to strengthen their hands against both the regime and other opposition forces.

None of these are wild-eyed ideas or flights of fancy. Nor are they reckless or ill-advised. In fact, they are the minimum conceivable corrective to a policy of inaction that is both reckless and ill-advised.

Yes, America can act in Syria!

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=375483

Last week, I argued that the United States was not doing enough to engage proactively with the unfolding struggle in Syria, and that this inaction was ceding the field to others in an unwise, unnecessary and avoidable manner. The response from many friends and colleagues was, “What would you have us do?”

Opponents of a more robust US policy toward Syria pointed to statements by unnamed senior US intelligence officials quoted by The Washington Post that President Bashar al-Assad is still “is very much in charge” of the country. They generally ignored the second part of the quote in which the official said that even though “the odds are against them,” Syria’s leaders “are going to fight very hard.”

President Barack Obama and other senior administration officials have implicitly defended a policy of inaction by arguing that “the regime’s days are numbered” and that “it is not a matter of whether but when” the Syrian government is overthrown. If that is the case, then why feel impelled to act?

Although it is difficult indeed to sketch a long-term scenario in which the Syrian regime survives in anything like its present form, nothing is inevitable, and that includes Assad’s downfall. This “inevitability” argument serves as stopgap logic for the United States to continue to do very little to influence events in Syria—a policy, or absence of policy, that may have a great deal of appeal during an election year. Of course, if 8,000 Israelis had died in the past year, its relevance to the American national interest would not be debated.

Obama has said that he would not “act unilaterally” in Syria. This is a shot aimed between the eyes of a straw man. Not even the most vocal proponents of robust American action, such as Senator John McCain, have suggested that Washington do anything unilaterally.

Many close allies and supporters of the administration, including the Center for American Progress in a recent report, have been emphasizing the alleged lack of good options the United States has regarding Syria. A former State Department official, Aaron David Miller, laid out the case for inaction the Foreign Policy website a few days ago. Surveying what he suggested were the options facing American policy, he warned against “reckless ideas of how to make the Syrian tragedy ours.” Miller did admit, however, that “the longer the killing goes on, the more likely we be will dragged into doing more.”

We can be certain that in fact the war will intensify. Miller, the Center for American Progress and others have warned of the difficulties and dangers of creating safe havens or arming rebel groups. No one denies that giving weapons to the rebels carries risks. But critics have yet to answer the point that others will go ahead and arm Syria’s opposition, and by doing so will gain influence, empower their own Syrian allies, and therefore help to define the very nature of the opposition.

It’s a red herring to suggest that because the situation is complex, American leverage is limited and coordination with allies is essential, therefore little can be done. It may be that the diplomatic groundwork and the level of the crisis on the ground, particularly with regard to Turkish policy, is not yet sufficient to establish safe havens or buffer zones. However, that does not preclude developing a policy that anticipates and begins to prepare for limited intervention when it becomes necessary, as even Miller acknowledges it probably will.

In the meantime, there are some clear steps the Obama administration can take to enhance its policies and behave proactively rather than reactively. First, it should stop talking about the “inevitable” fall of the Syrian regime and clearly announce that regime change in Damascus is a goal of US policy. Having determined and announced that, a great deal of clarity should follow.

Second, the United States should, like the European Union and others, formally recognize the Syrian National Council as “a legitimate representative of the Syrian people.”

Third, the administration should publish a series of benchmarks that the Syrian National Council, or any other opposition group seeking this role, must accomplish in order to gain eventual recognition as, in effect, a government in exile. These should include, but not be limited to, developing well-structured relations with the Free Syrian Army and other armed rebel groups, and doing much more to reach out to Syrian confessional and ethnic minorities, as well as offering far-reaching, ironclad guarantees about their status in a post-Assad future.

Fourth, Washington should begin identifying those in the political opposition as well as armed groups on the ground that it believes can represent a better future for Syria. And then it must do everything possible, within the bounds of prudence, to strengthen their hands against both the regime and other opposition forces.

None of these are wild-eyed ideas or flights of fancy. Nor are they reckless or ill-advised. In fact, they are the minimum conceivable corrective to a policy of inaction that is both reckless and ill-advised.

Arabian Fights: Why it’s a little early for dramatic and sweeping statements about the Arab uprisings.

http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/arabian-fights.php

How does one evaluate or even describe the nature and effects of a tornado when it’s still swirling? This is the conundrum facing anyone writing about the tumultuous changes taking place in the Arab world. These qualities of extreme flux and fluidity—what Frantz Fanon termed an “occult zone of instability”—are what have given rise to the dizzying plethora of terms coined to try to describe the unrest: “Arab Spring,” “Arab uprisings,” “Arab revolution(s),” “Arab awakening,” and Iran’s particularly misguided phrase, “Islamic awakening,” are just a few. Since concerted popular protests began in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, anti-government unrest has spread to many Arab countries. Several dictators have fallen, and others appear to be on their way out. But the outcomes in different Arab states undergoing these radical changes, and for strategic relations in the region as a whole, remain undetermined and, to some extent, unreadable.

The reshaping of the political and strategic landscape of one of the most important regions on earth properly commands the attention of the entire world. There are profound implications for U.S. foreign policy given that virtually everything most Americans, including policy-makers, thought they knew about Arab societies and political culture turns out to be incorrect or no longer applies. The uprisings clearly require a thorough reconceptualization of American and other Western attitudes toward Arab peoples, culture, and societies, and the casting aside of moldy orientalist stereotypes and anachronistic assumptions.

Because everything is changing so quickly and in so many places at the same time, following the trajectory of developments is daunting enough, let alone trying to analyze and understand exactly what they mean or where they’re going. The most obvious and persistent questions are almost impossible to answer. Are we seeing the emergence of liberal Arab democracies, Islamist systems, or entirely new hybrid post-Islamist political orders? Will the new Arab world be more pluralistic or embolden sectarianism? Will the changes bring greater stability or more conflict? Will they be the basis for economic revival or the chaos underwriting economic collapse? Developments are shifting so dramatically that it is difficult even to formulate the right questions, let alone to investigate possible answers.

Under such circumstances, reporters and journalists who limit themselves to narratives describing and contextualizing events have it a little easier than analysts and academics, who are supposed to produce “big picture” evaluations. Two new books, Liberation Square by Ashraf Khalil and The Arab Uprising by Marc Lynch, are excellent illustrations of the strengths and limitations of both approaches. Khalil focuses primarily on telling the story of the days between the outbreak of the protest movement in Egypt on January 25, 2011, and the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak 18 days later. Lynch, on the other hand, tries to provide a broad-based analysis of the unprecedented events in the region, and to posit a comprehensive methodological framework for understanding them.

Having set himself a much more limited, manageable, and straightforward task, Khalil, a reporter who has covered the Middle East for several major Western publications including The Los Angeles Times, succeeds admirably. But his book doesn’t offer any guide to what happened after Mubarak fell in Egypt, or what is likely to happen in that country or anywhere else in the future. Lynch’s project is infinitely more complex and, ultimately, unrealizable, at least at this stage. He certainly deserves a lot of credit for trying, and I’m not sure anyone else could have done any better than Lynch, a professor of political science at George Washington University. As a consequence of being both impossibly broad and clearly premature, Lynch’s book suffers from serious flaws. In many passages it feels rushed, at times even becoming a hodgepodge of incongruous arguments, and Lynch is fixated on the influence of the Qatar-based Al Jazeera television network. But unlike Liberation SquareThe Arab Uprising does offer a broad framework for understanding not only what has happened, but what may well happen in the Arab world, and some sober suggestions about what this implies for the United States.

For a detailed, day-by-day account of exactly what happened in Tahrir Square, one need look no further than Liberation Square. This is exemplary reportage: fair, serious, dynamic, and engaging. It is at its most vivid in Chapter Nine, “The Fall of the Police State,” in which Khalil describes in detail the process by which protesters finally overwhelmed the Egyptian security units and forced the military into making a final decision whether or not to intervene to crush the rebellion. He is clear, and correct, that this was the decisive turning point: “Egypt’s nonviolent revolution wouldn’t have happened without some people who were willing to be extremely violent at times. Over a four-day period, a hardcore cadre of protesters confronted and physically shattered the Egyptian police state.” Khalil brings to life a “full-blown rock war” on the crucial day of confrontation, January 28, pitting stone-throwing protesters against tear gas and baton charges from security forces. He explains how “the protesters worked in organized shifts; those returning from the front lines of the conflict were treated for tear-gas exposure and buckshot wounds by makeshift triage units,” while others “dragged a blanket loaded with hundreds of rocks and concrete chunks toward the front to be thrown at the police.”

But Khalil’s three-word final paragraph, after describing the removal of Mubarak by the military, is profoundly misleading: “It was over.” As subsequent events in Egypt have conclusively shown, if by “it” one means the tumultuous changes transforming the Egyptian political scene and system, then “it” had only just begun. The overthrow of Mubarak was, in fact, not a revolution at all, but a regime decapitation by elements of the existing power structure seeking to preserve as much of their supremacy, privileges, and wealth as possible in the face of a popular rebellion. As this essay goes to press, Egypt is still firmly in the grip of the Mubarak-era military. A year after Mubarak’s downfall it would still be possible, and probably accurate, to argue that the fundamental transformation of that country, if that is indeed what is taking place, remains in its infancy.

The greatest strength of Liberation Square is Khalil’s masterful contextualization of the genesis of the Egyptian uprising. He grounds it in the plight of what University of Illinois sociology professor Asef Bayat has perfectly described as the “middle-class poor” in the Arab world, mainly educated and primarily young people who simply cannot find jobs commensurate with their education and expectations. Khalil’s most revealing passages vividly describe the “palpable sense of despair and helplessness…taking hold” in much of Egyptian middle-class poor society in the last decade of Mubarak’s rule. Through an insightful reading ofCultural Film, a superficially lightweight comedy released in 2000, Khalil describes how, because “[t]here are no jobs out there—at least none that pay enough” for young professionals and couples to get their own apartments, their lives are placed on hold for years if not decades. Both careers and romantic relationships fall apart under such strains. Khalil suggestively wonders “just how much pure sexual frustration fed into Egypt’s revolutionary rage.” While the film ends on a contrived happy note, he aptly points out that its main characters in fact “would have no true options other than to start a revolution, join a fundamentalist cell, or kill themselves.”

It’s hard to overstate the centrality to these uprisings of the economic, social, personal, and, indeed, often sexual frustrations faced by the young middle-class poor that make up such a huge percentage of so many Arab societies. One of the most serious problems with Lynch’s book is that it occasionally acknowledges but ultimately pays very little attention to this vital class and materialist element. Instead, Lynch grounds his analysis in the subject of his last book, 2005’s Voices of the New Arab Public, which was mainly about Al Jazeera. He therefore reads the uprisings, which he thinks of as a unified movement or phenomenon, as primarily driven by “the rise of the ‘new Arab public sphere.’” He mainly attributes this to Al Jazeera, and also to some extent social media and the Internet, as well as cheap mobile phones.

There’s no doubt that the phenomenon that Lynch returns to time and again of a technologically driven and relatively new “Arab public sphere” is essential to understanding the uprisings. Lynch is correct in noting that because of this development, “the ability to credibly align with the Arab public on its core issues and to shape those convictions will become an ever greater source of power and influence,” and that “the unified political space will increase the linkage between issues across the region.” He also correctly identifies this as a significant challenge to American foreign policy, particularly regarding the question of Palestine.

But Lynch ultimately is too focused on the media. One could make a drinking game based on every time he mentions Al Jazeera. You’d be in real trouble on page 90, in which Al Jazeera is mentioned no fewer than nine times, as well as credited with having “owned the revolution.” This fixation occasionally draws Lynch into indefensible hyperbole such as “Al Jazeera now found itself in a position to make or break uprisings,” as if Arab public opinion were simply a marionette dancing on the strings of the puppet masters in Doha.

Lynch acknowledges that Arab politics in the past decade were dominated by competition between a “resistance axis” and a “moderate axis,” and that this “came to define all regional interactions in classic bipolar fashion, giving regional strategic meaning to local events and bringing together unlikely coalitions.” But he doesn’t explain what those unlikely coalitions were, how they have broken down and, most importantly, what they have been replaced with. The primary narrative promoted by Al Jazeera and some other influential Arab media in the past decade was that the Arab world was the scene of a historic confrontation between a “culture of resistance” (mainly the Islamist groups and the Iranian-led alliance) and a “culture of accommodation” (most of the Arab governments). This narrative informed and rationalized extremely strong and sincere Arab Sunni support for Hezbollah in its war with Israel and, more emphatically, the combined Sunni Islamist and Iranian-alliance support for Hamas.

But Lynch misreads Al Jazeera’s role in promoting the “culture of resistance” as merely a symptom of “its refusal to sign on to the Saudi-led campaigns.” He is likewise wrong to say that the network’s “sympathetic coverage of Hezbollah” simply “reflected the views of the vast majority of the Arab public with which it identified.” Both assertions elide the domination within Al Jazeera’s on-air talent and management of Islamists and pro-Islamist anti-imperialists and left-nationalists with a strong ideological tilt toward the “culture of resistance.” (They also elide the usefulness of such rhetoric to Qatari foreign policy.) The narrative spread by Al Jazeera and other like-minded Arab media in fact created the ideological space for these trans-sectarian alliances, based on the mythology of the “resistance axis.” This “accommodation versus resistance” story line threatened to give the various protest movements that Lynch describes in detail a prescriptive character—that “accommodationist” governments needed to be replaced by “resistance” movements—but in the event it did not.

Al Jazeera no doubt did help create a new Arab public sphere and consciousness. But its rhetoric over the past decade did not, in fact, anticipate or set the stage for the uprisings in Tunisia or Egypt. Had it done so, those uprisings would have been far more Islamist in character and oriented toward anti-imperialism regionally rather than mainly focusing on social justice, accountability, and democracy at home. A very different emancipatory spirit took hold on the streets of Arab capitals. Like the Islamist parties it generally promoted, the station and its analysts were also largely taken aback by the protests and essentially had to play catch-up with movements they neither informed nor fully understood. Both rushed to try to benefit from the unexpected uprisings, and to some extent they have, but neither were the authors of them.

While developments in each individual Arab state are shaped mainly by local contingencies, the effect of the uprisings regionally has been the emergence of a new strategic landscape based mainly on sectarian identification that has been increasingly pitting Arab Sunnis against all confessional minorities and vice versa. Lynch incorrectly implies that sectarianism in the Middle East was much stronger in the middle part of the last decade than it is now. In fact, the sectarianism that has been emerging in recent months is far starker than what was circulating then. The space for trans-sectarian alliances is now foreclosed. Hamas, for example, can no longer be aligned with the Syrian regime, Iran, or Hezbollah because it has been forced to choose between its Sunni Islamist ideology and its alliance with Damascus and Tehran. It has an identity and a branding crisis of unprecedented proportions, and is hoping to avoid paying a major price in having to readjust its policies in a manner that would severely undermine its ability to challenge the mainstream Palestinian nationalists. The identities of both the pro- and anti-regime camps in the Syrian struggle have changed. This is not a reflection or extension of the old dichotomy, but a new and largely sectarian one. It doesn’t fit well with Lynch’s model of a new, unified, empowered Arab public brought together by Al Jazeera and the Internet, but in fact it’s defining how regional actors are lining up on issue of the legitimacy and survival of the Bashar al-Assad regime and, indeed, how Syrian society itself seems to be dividing internally.

Lynch argues that because Al Jazeera shone the spotlight on the regime’s violence, “both Syrians and other Arabs consciously placed the unfolding events within the broader Arab story. In that story, Assad was the villain, regardless of his ‘resistance’ foreign policy.” That’s an accurate reflection of how almost all Sunni Arab public opinion has shifted regarding the Syrian regime and its allies, but it doesn’t reflect the completely different understanding of events embraced by most Arab Shiites, many if not most Levantine Christians, and others. Yet Lynch manages to write almost 20 pages entirely devoted to the uprising in Syria without ever delving into its increasingly sectarian character, or the nature of its minority Alawite government and all that this implies given the new regional realities.

He briefly acknowledges that the conflict in Syria seems to be giving rise to “a sectarian narrative” in “troubling ways,” but it’s a momentary flash of recognition. Lynch suffers from a similar blind spot regarding Bahrain, which is a mirror image of Syria: an oppressive minority Sunni regime almost unanimously supported by Arab Sunni governments, Islamist groups, and most prominent organizations. He is convinced that “the Arab public saw the Bahraini protesters as part of its shared struggle, and the regime as equivalent to its own hated regimes,” until a Saudi-led “steady barrage of sectarian accusations” undid this solidarity. But it was difficult to ever detect any particular Arab Sunni sympathy for the Bahraini protesters outside of narrow circles of liberal youth and online activists.

Lynch is at his strongest when discussing the American policy debate on how to respond to the Arab uprisings, and he provides a powerful and convincing intervention. He makes the case, which I agree with strongly, that the Obama Administration has done a reasonably good job in reacting to the immediate challenges of the unanticipated uprisings, but that the United States needs to develop a much more coherent approach to Middle Eastern change, because “if it continues to act as a status quo power…it will fail” to promote either its interests or its values. Lynch is absolutely right that the more empowered Arab publics and the highly significant emergence of “the new Arab public sphere” will make the issue of Palestine more, not less, important and that as long as the United States is mainly perceived as “playing defense on Israel’s behalf…this will no longer work.” He offers powerful and effective critiques of the realist and neoconservative approaches, and sensibly puts little faith in “a left-leaning academic tradition” that “likely does not want to offer useful advice” for the United States to advance its interests in the region.

He clearly outlines the challenges facing the United States: It must engage more fully with the Arab publics and position itself on the right side of history and Middle Eastern transformations; undertake “a serious rethinking of America’s relationship with Israel”; “respond rationally to the public participation of Islamist movements” by accepting they are an unavoidable and important part of the new Arab political scene; combat Islamophobia in the United States; and “accept the limits of its ability to control the Middle East.” This is an excellent summary of the challenges facing the development of a new, more effective American policy toward the Arab world, which will be urgently required in the coming months and years. I don’t think Lynch can be faulted for very ably laying out the challenges rather than suggesting any solutions.

Khalil’s book describes the economic and class bases that are central to the uprisings, as well as their liberationist passion. Lynch’s book foregrounds the crucial development of a “new Arab public sphere.” Above, I have described the rise of a dangerous new sectarianism in the emerging regional order. Many others have noted that while their rhetoric and organizations did not dominate the protests, Islamist parties are proving to be the primary and immediate beneficiaries of newly opened political space in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere. Others point out that the process of rebellion and of participating in new systems is itself transforming the Arab Islamists and forcing them to adopt a more pragmatic and less dogmatic worldview. Still others note the regional rise in influence of Turkey and the precipitous decline of Iran. Yet all of these dramatic changes are but strands in a complicated weave, the broad patterns of which we cannot yet fully discern.

The causes and the symptoms of the uprisings are identifiable, but not their ultimate nature or outcomes. Both Lynch and Khalil have written significant books that should help the American public and policy-makers alike comprehend the complexity and the magnitude of the challenge facing the American role in the Middle East. A little bit of humility under such circumstances, not only for commentators and analysts, but also for the country, goes a very long way indeed.

Ibishblog guest post: Seth Duerr responds to my Coriolanus post

[NOTE: Two days after I posted my take on Coriolanus and the new Fiennes interpretation of it, I received the following exceptionally thoughtful and insightful response from Seth Duerr, Artistic Director of The York Shakespeare Company in New York City. As he notes, Seth approaches these plays from a completely different perspective than I do, since he is a professional actor and director who specializes in Shakespeare's work. From that unusual but indispensible angle, he adds many new dimensions to the conversation about the play and the film. In particular, having directed himself in the role of Coriolanus, Seth disagrees with my view of the character as an impossible and insufferable one that cannot function in his society or be identified with by most readers and audiences. Given his experiences with and reading of the play, Seth argues that, on the contrary, Coriolanus is indeed an accessible and sympathetic character, and it is rigid Roman society that is simply unwilling to accept him as he is. With his permission, I am posting Seth's entire commentary below as an Ibishblog guest post and I'm deeply grateful to him for taking the time to explain his exceptionally well-informed perspective.]

I hope that everyone with even a passing interest in Shakespeare gets to see the film and read your comprehensive analysis. If they stuck with the conversation thusfar, then I imagine some further commentary may be welcome.

Firstly, I concur with virtually all of the analysis. The following thoughts are more addition than dissension. Secondly, I approach this from a rather different arena and hope to shed some light on the murkier challenges offered by the playwright from the perspective of a theatrical practitioner. For your readers' edification, I am the Artistic Director of The York Shakespeare Company, charged with the same duties that Mr. Fiennes assigned himself on this project, and directed the play for the stage, playing the title role in 2002. Hopefully, I can clarify how the play is meant to work, share a different way of looking at the title role and explain, from a professional standpoint, the demons with which Fiennes was struggling.

Your initial statement that the film “has much to offer, especially if it can succeed in re-connecting parts of the public with an undeservedly neglected masterwork” is the main reason that the film is valuable. Despite my intense dislike of the script-cutting and the consequent one-dimensionality of the central performance, the very idea that we’re having a discourse about this play is spectacular. Only a small percentage of the global population is familiar with the play, and most people dismiss it as problematic.

It is the “problem plays” of Shakespeare that usually interest me the most. I do not choose to work on a play if I think it is a problem, as it is not my duty to “fix” them, merely to share great stories with an audience. As warning for the future, if you ever notice in the publicity/director notes for a production a description of the play as a “problem”, then save your time and money and don’t go. Otherwise, you will be in for an evening of the director’s condescension to the audience and devaluation of the playwright. The play will generally undergo cuts, additions and re-interpretations that would make the playwright roll over in his or her grave, or, if they are still alive, seriously ponder suicide(see our discussion of The Merchant of Venice and the abuse it has undergone in Shylock’s usurpation of a play that actually belongs to Portia).

Coriolanus spoke to me very early on in my career and I decided to produce it in my first rotating rep at York Shakespeare, with Timon of Athens, Henry V and King Lear. We generally work in the classical Actor-Manager system, an increasingly obscure term used to describe leading actors who also produce the plays and handle the duties ascribed to what we have termed since the 1870’s as “director." As film took over the storytelling landscape, theater was necessarily impacted, and it became more and more rare for the leading actor and the director to be the same individual. While film is rightfully the medium of the director, theater fares better as the medium of the playwright and actor. Fiennes, with this film, has simply tried to revive a dying approach. While actor-managers were generally ubiquitous and revered for the last half-millennium (Garrick, Kean, Kemble, Forbes-Robertson, Irving, Forrest, several Booths, Beerbohm-Tree, Olivier, Welles, Gielgud, to name but a few), the rise of the Director has made them exceedingly rare. No wonder then that Fiennes had such a difficult time working in an all-but-dead profession. Kenneth Branagh seemed poised to take up the proverbial mantle in the late 80’s, but even he has found this process to be so complicated that his output as actor-manager has been less and less frequent over the last few decades. Every so often, someone like Fiennes comes along to breathe fresh air into the actor-manager system and sadly falls victim to its traps. Hopkins tried it, once. McKellen, once. All this is to say that I’ve been doing this consistently for the last decade and understand the predicament in which he placed himself and would like you to keep that in mind while examining his choices as director, producer and actor of this film.

As director/producer, Fiennes, and his screenwriter, John Logan, face two immediate dilemmas:

1)   How do we ensure that modern audiences, increasingly inculcated with attention-deficits created by the majority of film and television, will stay engaged in the story and avoid being distanced by Shakespearean language?

2)   Since Shakespeare works primarily in imagery and film is a visual medium, which images should the characters speak and which should just be shown?

As to the first issue, which rears its ugly head in the theatre as well, the answer is simple: clarity and pace. The length of plays like Coriolanus is deceptive. Despite the fact that it may take between three and four hours to play, uncut, it actually moves obscenely fast. Assuming that actors are speaking at the alleged rate of the Elizabethan performers: approximately 1,000 lines of verse per hour. Coriolanus contains 3,583 lines, so you do the math. Also, it is a common misnomer that Shakespeare’s plays are Middle English (e.g. The Canterbury Tales) or Old English (e.g. Beowulf). Shakespeare’s language is simply modern English with a more complex vocabulary and syntax. Shakespeare’s plays cannot function if actors and directors dumb down the script by over-explanation or retardation of speed. Your point on the virtual elimination of contractions is well taken here, a device that Shakespeare utilized more and more toward the end of his career, and which connotes even quicker pace than usual. Such truncated productions make for hideous experiences in any medium. I can certainly understand why Fiennes/Logan looked to modernization to fool us into accessing the world of the play, and you’re correct that the “contemporary Balkan setting is powerful and suggestive…[and]…the use of multi-media is ingenious and, mostly, surprisingly effective.” However, it was all for naught, as the cutting of the script to foster a running time of less than two hours completely destroyed any evidence of the real argument of the play and any understanding of it’s central role.

Think of all the films of Shakespeare’s plays. Now consider how very few of them actually work. Take a look at Branagh’s oeuvre: Henry V and Much Ado generally soar, Love’s Labour’s Lost and Hamlet almost completely fail. Or Taymor: Titus perhaps the greatest Shakespeare film, The Tempest possibly the worst. I’m not considering modernized adaptations like O, Ethan Hawke’s Hamlet or 10 Things I Hate About You, etc. as they’ve already chosen the easy way out of the language question and simply created a modern film influenced by the source material. Nor shall I discuss here the genius that is Kurosawa’s output. All of those are hit or miss, but are not germane to the instant discussion. The point is that, with modern versions in Shakespeare’s English, it is exceedingly difficult to strike the right balance of visual engagement and sufficient communication of the playwright’s story.

Which brings us to the second dilemma: the decision of which images to speak, which to show, and when to do both, is incredibly difficult to negotiate. While Taymor’s Titus and Branagh’s Henry V are always visually arresting, they are simultaneously very intelligent about which pieces of the text must remain for the playwright’s story to be effectively communicated. Bear in mind that before film and television, people went to go hear a play as much as see one. Even more so of the former was primary in Elizabethan England. Stage direction was so minimal by modern standards that your experience with eyes closed or open would be relatively similar. Good luck closing your eyes in the audience of a Shakespeare film and experiencing anything comprehensive after most directors/screenwriters hack the text to shreds.

I’d argue that Shakespeare and other great playwrights of the time would be filmmakers today. Character after character, speech after speech, images are projected from the actors’ mouths onto the screen that is the mind’s eye in each audience member. Film does the exact same thing, except with exponentially more images (generally a minimum of 24 frames per second) and more through visual means than aural. Note that theater certainly has a visual element, just as film has an aural one, and that all great storytelling must traverse this tightrope very carefully. While there are several thousand “heard images” provoked in a theatrical audience’s imagination at any given play, there are literally millions of actual images displayed on a movie screen. Now put yourself in the shoes of the people who must decide which of the 3,583 lines of imagery should be spoken, shown or both.

As a cinematic technique, I agree with your assessment that “many of the debates (that survive the extreme cuts in the text) are shifted to faux television news programming, and the like, with impressive results.” They certainly mimic the sense of urgency Shakespeare requires via a convention in which a modern audience has grown conditioned to respond (e.g. the brilliant use of media in M. Night Shyamalan’s Signs, a film which is perfect till the last ten minutes, or Orson Welles’ usage in The War of the Worlds broadcast.) However, the question is whether or not the modernization techniques used here were necessary. Based on the results, I’d have to say they were not. Plenty of period pieces are produced in film on television, with great effect, each year. There is nothing so very strange about Rome, and its period depictions on screen have often met with great success (Gladiator, Rome). 21st Century American audiences hardly require entrée into a world so very like our own. We are yet another permutation of a minority of Imperialist oligarchs ruling over a majority of lower and middle classes. Your point about the intelligence of this particular Roman mob is well taken. These are not the fools and simpletons on display in Henry VI Part Two, or, more to the point, the easily manipulated populous of Julius Caesar. It is evident from the brilliantly crafted first scene of the play (largely cut) that the citizens are highly intelligent and it takes great effort on the part of Menenius to sway them. You mention that “the imagery in Coriolanus relies on the heavy use of antithesis and contradiction, even oxymoron, to make its points, and a great deal of this gets lost in the multimedia extravaganza.” I would add, however, that the most unkindest cut of all was actually the use of synecdoche set up in the play’s opening, the linguistic technique of a part of something used to refer to the whole, or a whole used to refer to one or more of its parts.

That technique above all others illustrates the argument of the play and the tragedy its central role will undergo:

MENENIUS

Either you must
Confess yourselves wondrous malicious,
Or be accused of folly. I shall tell you
A pretty tale: it may be you have heard it;
But, since it serves my purpose, I will venture
To stale 't a little more.

First Citizen

Well, I'll hear it, sir: yet you must not think to
fob off our disgrace with a tale: but, an 't please
you, deliver.

MENENIUS

There was a time when all the body's members
Rebell'd against the belly, thus accused it:
That only like a gulf it did remain
I' the midst o' the body, idle and unactive,
Still cupboarding the viand, never bearing
Like labour with the rest, where the other instruments
Did see and hear, devise, instruct, walk, feel,
And, mutually participate, did minister
Unto the appetite and affection common
Of the whole body. The belly answer'd–

First Citizen

Well, sir, what answer made the belly?

MENENIUS

Sir, I shall tell you. With a kind of smile,
Which ne'er came from the lungs, but even thus–
For, look you, I may make the belly smile
As well as speak–it tauntingly replied
To the discontented members, the mutinous parts
That envied his receipt; even so most fitly
As you malign our senators for that
They are not such as you.

First Citizen

Your belly's answer? What!
The kingly-crowned head, the vigilant eye,
The counsellor heart, the arm our soldier,
Our steed the leg, the tongue our trumpeter.
With other muniments and petty helps
In this our fabric, if that they–

MENENIUS

What then?
'Fore me, this fellow speaks! What then? what then?

First Citizen

Should by the cormorant belly be restrain'd,
Who is the sink o' the body,–

MENENIUS

Well, what then?

First Citizen

The former agents, if they did complain,
What could the belly answer?

MENENIUS

I will tell you
If you'll bestow a small–of what you have little–
Patience awhile, you'll hear the belly's answer.

First Citizen

Ye're long about it.

MENENIUS

Note me this, good friend;
Your most grave belly was deliberate,
Not rash like his accusers, and thus answer'd:
'True is it, my incorporate friends,' quoth he,
'That I receive the general food at first,
Which you do live upon; and fit it is,
Because I am the store-house and the shop
Of the whole body: but, if you do remember,
I send it through the rivers of your blood,
Even to the court, the heart, to the seat o' the brain;
And, through the cranks and offices of man,
The strongest nerves and small inferior veins
From me receive that natural competency
Whereby they live: and though that all at once,
You, my good friends,'–this says the belly, mark me,–

First Citizen

Ay, sir; well, well.

MENENIUS

'Though all at once cannot
See what I do deliver out to each,
Yet I can make my audit up, that all
From me do back receive the flour of all,
And leave me but the bran.' What say you to't?

First Citizen

It was an answer: how apply you this?

MENENIUS

The senators of Rome are this good belly,
And you the mutinous members; for examine
Their counsels and their cares, digest things rightly
Touching the weal o' the common, you shall find
No public benefit which you receive
But it proceeds or comes from them to you
And no way from yourselves. What do you think,
You, the great toe of this assembly?

First Citizen

I the great toe! why the great toe?

MENENIUS

For that, being one o' the lowest, basest, poorest,
Of this most wise rebellion, thou go'st foremost:
Thou rascal, that art worst in blood to run,
Lead'st first to win some vantage.
But make you ready your stiff bats and clubs:
Rome and her rats are at the point of battle;
The one side must have bale.

This entire exchange is deceptively amusing. Shakespeare, at the top of each and every one of his plays, makes clear the inciting action and how we should examine what follows. We are being asked to consider how the Rome of this play functions and what is reasonable to require of its individual members.

While the tragic flaw of Martius is certainly his pride, it is not what makes the play tragic. Rare in Shakespeare, but the tragedy comes from without more than within. The tragedy of the play is that the very society that Coriolanus has served unfairly requires personability, approachability, gratitude and likeability as items in his job description. Coriolanus’ service to Rome is beyond reproach, with each character at some point or other acknowledging that fact. Why then must this man conform to a list of “normal” behavior if it does not in any way affect his ability to perform the primary tasks of his soldiership and, in fact, may diminish those abilities should he pervert his nature? To put it another way, the question of the role and the play is “How much should society as a whole determine the behavior of any of its parts and how does the behavior of any one or more parts affect the whole of society?”

This question hardly requires modernization for a contemporary audience to comprehend and engage with the material. Take current attitudes all over the world on gay citizenry. Does society have the right to define whom its members may or may not sleep with or marry and, conversely, do the actions of gay citizens adversely affect society in any way, shape or form? In regards to the question of gay marriage, the left has pointed out more and more often that the right is on the wrong side of history. With each state (and country the world over) eventually approving gay marriage, the majority is adjusting. This occurs in the play as well. Despite a few tribunes having mild success contorting the plebeians views of Coriolanus, the citizens battle with this very deeply, and after Coriolanus displays himself in humility before them, they end up siding with him and decide that his personality should not affect his right to consulship. They are, briefly, on the right side of history. Unfortunately, the tribunes sway the citizens back to their conditioned attitudes on how people are supposed to behave. Part of the tragedy of the play is that Shakespeare illustrates such change on their part was/is possible.  Coriolanus is living in and serving a society not ready to accept him as he is. (N.B. the comparison to gay marriage and the homoerotic tones of the play are merely coincidental. For a much deeper exploration of a homosexual tragically rejected by religious and societal standards you should look to Antonio in The Merchant of Venice. Coriolanus defies sexual categorization and is most likely asexual more than any alternative option.)

This leads us to your claim that “Martius lacks or withholds from us any deep psychological motivations for his shifts and turns” and that he is “unsympathetic”. This is the main point on which I must disagree with you. In the instances where the philosophical/psychological/emotional/intellectual argument above is clearly staged, an audience will quite easily sympathize with Coriolanus as they will find the citizenry and especially the tribunes as hideous, prejudiced and damning as Coriolanus does. If anything, his motivations and nature are all too simple and clear. He is the chosen protagonist specifically because we are supposed to view the play’s society through his eyes. He is, by nature, an outsider, and a lot of behavior can be forgiven when a character is understood. As for his endless invective, he merely calls a spade a spade. This, too, is in service of his country; he is quite an honest physician. As to your point, that “Coriolanus does not trust language, does not know how to use it properly, and is constantly betrayed by its subtleties”, I would argue the exact opposite. Faced with the prospect of battling his sword or his tongue, I’d certainly select the former. Again, this is the fault of cutting. The Coriolanus Fiennes/Logan have offered is quite a blunt and stupid instrument; Shakespeare’s character is not. The verbal/philosophical Olympics of Act III are the greatest evidence:

CORIOLANUS

'Shall'!
O good but most unwise patricians! why,
You grave but reckless senators, have you thus
Given Hydra here to choose an officer,
That with his peremptory 'shall,' being but
The horn and noise o' the monster's, wants not spirit
To say he'll turn your current in a ditch,
And make your channel his? If he have power
Then vail your ignorance; if none, awake
Your dangerous lenity. If you are learn'd,
Be not as common fools; if you are not,
Let them have cushions by you. You are plebeians,
If they be senators: and they are no less,
When, both your voices blended, the great'st taste
Most palates theirs. They choose their magistrate,
And such a one as he, who puts his 'shall,'
His popular 'shall' against a graver bench
Than ever frown in Greece. By Jove himself!
It makes the consuls base: and my soul aches
To know, when two authorities are up,
Neither supreme, how soon confusion
May enter 'twixt the gap of both and take
The one by the other.

Note how, several acts since the opening, synecdoche is still the primary linguistic tool. Additionally, regard how precise and insightful Coriolanus is as diagnostician.

Finally, we are left with the question of Fiennes’ acting. Our entire experience of the play comes down to how clearly we understand Coriolanus as a victim of his society. This is one of the reasons I produced it in rotating repertory with Timon of Athens as they are mathematical complements. They both center on two characters on either end of the behavioral spectrum, one exceedingly standoffish the other extremely friendly, who are used and discarded by society, self-banished and search out death. I found that these two plays informed each other quite well and our audiences had much clearer access to the arguments-at-hand. Like Richard II, a play I’ve put on many times, Shakespeare usually displays extreme antithesis, and the only way out of unhealthy behavior for a protagonist is to throw away extremity and find some semblance of moderation.  However, unlike Timon’s sociopathic generosity and Richard’s egotistical tyranny, it would be profoundly flawed to presume that Coriolanus’ behavior is ‘wrong’ or ‘extreme’.

Fiennes/Logan’s greatest misstep was the almost complete elimination of the title role. Coriolanus is one of Shakespeare’s largest roles at 872 lines, which means that he speaks 25% of all play’s lines. He, alone, is a full quarter of a very large play. With a profoundly cut central role the arguments of the play and the role cannot be properly explored. I suspect that Fiennes lacks the ego of most of the great actor-managers, which is healthier than it sounds. He may very well have wanted to appear a team player and/or remove from audiences’/critics’ minds the phrase “vanity project.” Certainly, no one could accuse him of stealing this film and suppressing his supporting actors. Redgrave handily walks away with the movie, upsetting the balance of the story, and while it’s a genius performance, titling the film anything other than “Volumnia” is tantamount to false advertising.

I saw Fiennes play Coriolanus under the expert direction of Jonathan Kent, in both England and the U.S. I mention this as it means that I’ve seen proof that he knows exactly what to do with the role and how it fits into the story as a whole. He did this in rep with Richard II, also brilliant played. I only mention the latter, as his Richard was far more affecting when I saw him England and his Coriolanus more so when he played it here. Further evidence, I think, that Coriolanus is particularly accessible to a modern U.S. audience.

As for the actual playing of the role, Coriolanus is an outsider, and in many ways cruel. However, so many characters with whom we sympathize could be described this way: Richard II, Richard III, Iago, Lear, John Proctor, Sweeney Todd, Salieri. The very fact that we understand them during the course of the play and see society through their eyes is what makes their respective plays sing. Strange that we can value Fiennes’ portrayal of Goeth in Schindler’s List or Voldemort in the Harry Potter franchise, and yet he distrusts our ability to sympathize with Coriolanus without extensive cutting.

It is unfortunate that Fiennes did not trust himself and the playwright enough to present an unencumbered view of the play and its central role. What a great step forward for Shakespeare on film such an event may have been.