From Foreign Policy magazine’s site. It has a great title too — Netanyahu: "What the hell do they want from me?"
Category Archives: IbishBlog
Shock and horror: Ibish was on a radio show!
I see that the some of the more alert denizens of the Arab-American blogosphere have discovered, one month later, that I engaged in a well-publicized radio program with Israel’s consul general in Los Angeles on Middle East peace. The only thing surprising about their outrage is how long it took them to find out about it.
Naturally, the program raised the ire of As’ad AbuKhalil of the California Hezbollah Support Network, who as usual accuses me of working for Muhammad Dahlan (of all people!) I have never met or in any way communicated with Dahlan, with whom I have no connection whatsoever. To apply his own twisted “logic,” AbuKhalil has apparently been personally tasked by Hassan Nasrallah to speak for all sectarian Lebanese Shiites. AbuKhalil himself engaged in a colloquy with an Israeli diplomat in San Francisco recently, which was a virtual textbook of pointlessly obnoxious, completely counterproductive and puerile self-gratification. Clearly, this individual imagines himself to be the drum major in some sort of grand Arab march to oblivion, although the ranks behind him are entirely a figment of his own imagination.
Angry complaints also came from the Hamas Fan Club at the University of Chicago, also known as Ali Abunimah, who twittered, “Who asked ATFP’s Hussein Ibish (not-Palestinian) to ‘negotiate’ for Palestinians & surrender their rights?” This nonsense about “surrendering rights” aside, I work for and with all-Palestinian leadership and Board of Directors of ATFP, if he hasn’t figured that out already. Of course, the fact that I am Lebanese by both birth and dual citizenship never bothered Abunimah during the many years in which we collaborated and co-authored in opposition to the occupation and in support of Palestinian independence (a position he has now completely abandoned, in favor of, as he puts it, a “go Bibi!” pro-Netanyahu approach). Now that we disagree, my background is suddenly not only relevant, but disqualifying. Contrary to claims made in some of these tweets, I have never “passed myself off as a Palestinian,” even if some journalists have made this mistake, although I’m proud to work for a Palestinian-American organization. Indeed, I remember firmly demurring several years ago when the late Hisham Sharabi, at a formal meeting he was hosting, referred to me as “an honorary Palestinian.” I told him and the entire group present that in my view this is a meaningless expression, but that it is my honor to serve the dual and compatible causes of Palestinian national rights and peace in the Middle East.
And where would Larry and Moe be without Curly? On cue, and with their usual sophistication and maturity, the scintillating intellectuals at Kabobfest chimed in with this epic fail. This, of course, is the same blog that has in recent weeks denounced the arrest warrant issued against the president of Sudan for massive war crimes in Darfur, rushed to the defense of a Somali pirate and lauded Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s lamentable speech at the UN racism conference in Geneva.
It might be argued that if one is to have critics, it is best that they are slightly unhinged, so such preposterous blog postings and tweets do no harm whatsoever to me personally. However, the attitudes and sentiments that they promote reflect precisely how and why the Arab-American community has so effectively and for so long marginalized and defeated itself. We know precisely what this idiotic approach produces: nothing. Clearly it is high time for something more serious and more effective, and that is a theme that will no doubt become a regular feature of future postings this site.
Why I am starting this blog
Ever since I came to Washington DC 10 years ago and began working on Arab-American issues at the national level, people have been encouraging me to start a blog. For complex reasons, I never have until now. However, the proximate cause for beginning this blog deserves mentioning at the outset. Recently, a visiting scholar from North Africa at the Wilson Center came to see me to seek my advice on a project. She was attempting to study Arab-American political engagement by looking at community newspapers around the country, and was predictably dismayed by the quality and quantity of comment and analysis to be found in these publications. As we spoke, she began to wonder whether expanding her project to include Arab-American political blogs might produce a richer database that could form the basis of her research. She asked me if I could point her to the major Arab-American blogs on the Internet.
This question threw the rather grim reality into sharp relief. I tried in vain to think of any reasonable, constructive and intelligent Arab-American political blog. In the end, I told her to take 24 hours and see what she could come up with on her own, as I did not want to take responsibility for pointing her in the direction of any of the well-known and frequently updated existing Arab-American blogs of which I am aware. Frankly, it was impossible to think of any major Arab-American blog that is not maintained by angry idiots, political extremists or overgrown juvenile delinquents. The next day she called me up and recited the same list of blogs I would have given her, and it was obvious that she recognized immediately that this commentary, if you can call it that, was not likely to add any depth to her project. My impression was that she had pretty well decided to change focus altogether given the paucity of serious social or political analysis either in print or online.
I’m not sure what happened to her project, but this exchange led me to the conclusion that something needed to be done. My intention in this blog is to add a serious, responsible and constructive perspective to the Arab-American blogosphere, to reflect the universal values in which I deeply believe, and to provide a much-needed corrective to irresponsible and destructive rhetoric of many varieties, including political extremism of the left and the right, bigotry including both Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, opposition to peace in the Middle East, and religious fanaticism of all stripes. It is my hope that readers will find the commentary and analysis that is forthcoming to be interesting and engaging, even if they do not always agree with it. Above all, it is my hope to add a thoughtful, sincere and positive voice to the shrill din that passes for much of Arab-American political discourse online, that will reflect my decade of experience working in Washington DC and, I believe, the often-unrepresented views of many people in our community who want to seriously engage with our fellow citizens, our government and our political system.
Can Lebanon Repair Relations with Saudi Arabia?
http://www.agsiw.org/can-
New Lebanese President Michel Aoun visited Saudi Arabia on January 9 in an effort to heal a rift that has been damaging to both countries’ interests but, until now, did not seem readily resolvable. How did relations become so strained and how much progress has Aoun’s trip yielded?
In early 2016, following a string of what it regarded as intolerable provocations by a Lebanese government it saw as unduly influenced by the pro-Iranian Shia group Hizballah, Saudi Arabia began to pull away from Lebanon. It cut aid to the government and Saudis and others pulled back from supporting various private groups and organizations in a rapid series of devastating blows to Lebanon and its relationship to Riyadh. Yet the moves also left Saudi Arabia with little leverage remaining with its Lebanese allies and almost none at all with the clients of its Iranian rivals, Hizballah and its main Christian ally, retired General Michel Aoun.
Neither side benefitted from the breakdown, which came to a head when Lebanon declined to support an Arab League condemnation of the sacking of Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, followed by allegations that Hizballah was providing military support for the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels at war with Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen. Saudi Arabia cut $4 billion in aid to the Lebanese military and another $1 billion in support for Lebanese intelligence services. Many Saudi-supported entities in Lebanon, such as several noted newspapers, also lost all or some of their Gulf funding. Riyadh’s Gulf Cooperation Council allies joined it in issuing travel warnings to Lebanon, damaging the vital tourism sector, and in other measures designed to pressure Lebanon. Both the GCC and the Arab League designated Hizballah a terrorist group, support for the organization was made illegal in several Gulf countries, and Lebanese residents were expelled, reducing vital remittances.
There were reportedly also dark warnings, apparently mainly in private from Saudi officials, about a potentially disastrous withdrawal of deposits in Lebanese banks. Lebanese fears have focused on the potential loss of $1 billion from Saudi Arabia deposited in Lebanon’s central bank and an ensuing crisis of confidence in the country’s all-important banking and financial services sector. This has never happened, though the prospect alone has caused many sleepless nights in Beirut.
Although Saudi Arabia certainly needs Lebanon far less than the other way around, handing Iran and its regional allies, most notably the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, uncontested sway in Lebanese politics is a clear setback for Riyadh’s regional agenda. By cutting off its engagement with Lebanon, Saudi Arabia was, at least to some extent, conceding defeat in its competition with Iran over influence in Lebanon.
Therefore, the Saudi rift with Lebanon was always likely to be a short-term affair, modified by at least some degree of re-engagement in the medium term. The election of Aoun and his visit to Saudi Arabia may have initiated that process. Aoun has long been the most important non-Shia ally of Hizballah, and therefore also Assad and Iran, in Lebanon. This apparently unlikely partnership – since Aoun built his early career on vehemently opposing Syrian influence in Lebanon and appealing to a strong Maronite Christian sectarian identity – has been one of the most enduring and definitive features of recent Lebanese politics. There is also something quintessentially Lebanese in the partnership of such unlikely bedfellows informed by a set of pragmatic quid pro quos that batted aside ideology and rhetoric, and bothered or surprised no one in the country while confounding many outside observers.
Hizballah’s main aim in recent years in domestic Lebanese affairs has been to thwart any potential challenge to its state-within-a-state status in the country, including military, intelligence, and infrastructural assets that allow the group to conduct what amounts to an independent foreign and defense policy to which the rest of Lebanon must adapt. The massive contribution of Hizballah to the war in Syria, including much of the cream of its military forces and thousands of fighters, illustrates the extent to which these assets are increasingly part of an Iran-inspired and directed agenda, which includes the group’s activities in Yemen and elsewhere beyond Syria. Of course, the survival of the Assad regime is an existential imperative for Hizballah, but this is inseparable from its status as an Iranian client – the Assad regime is an indispensable bridge to Iran, land conduit for Iranian aid and contacts, and support for Hizballah’s powerful political position in Lebanon.
One of the main symptoms of Lebanon’s status as a regional battleground was the inability of the Lebanese Parliament to select a new president for 29 months. Internal Lebanese factors cannot be discounted in the impasse, but most of them are ultimately linked to the interests of external patrons as much as they are to purely domestic considerations.
Two dramatic developments in 2016 ultimately pushed Lebanese actors toward the deal that broke the impasse with Aoun emerging as president: the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies from direct engagement in Lebanese political affairs early in the year and the growing sense that Assad was poised to win a decisive victory in key battlegrounds in Syria (particularly Aleppo) due to the massive military intervention by Russia, Iran, Hizballah, and Iraqi militias. This was a huge victory not just for Assad and Iran but also for Hizballah, which has claimed vindication for its gamble in committing so many resources to a war in another country. This combination of Saudi withdrawal and Hizballah’s successful campaign in Syria set the stage for the domestic political victory of Aoun.
Aoun’s essential political strategy has been to consolidate his role as the pre-eminent leader of the most sectarian and identity-conscious segment of the Maronite Christian community and achieve his long-standing personal ambition of becoming president of the republic. His theoretically implausible alliance with Hizballah, which seemed an insurmountable obstacle in his quest for the presidency, suddenly became his key asset, as he had long gambled it eventually would. The partnership began with the signing of a formal memorandum of understanding in 2006 and culminated with Aoun’s election as president on October 31.
Aoun and his constituency also share a key goal with Hizballah: Both seek to block the implementation of the final stages of the 1989 Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese Civil War. For Hizballah, that could mean dissolving its militia and losing most of its independent power and usefulness in the regional Iranian alliance. Aoun and his supporters fear that the inevitable quid pro quo would involve electoral and political reforms to the old National Pact arrangement, already partially introduced in Taif, that further undermine the gerrymandering and various other guarantees that assure Maronites an increasingly disproportionate degree of, at least formal, political power in Lebanon.
It might, at first glance, seem odd that Aoun’s first foreign trip as president would be to Riyadh and, even more, that Saudi Arabia would welcome him. But in fact it makes perfect sense for both parties. Now that he is president, Aoun must move quickly to try to rebuild bridges with the Sunni Muslim and other pro-Saudi and pro-Western constituencies – including many Christians and even many of his fellow Maronites – in Lebanon with which he has been at odds for so long. Going to Riyadh sends a clear signal to them that he wants to move beyond the polarization that created the political gridlock that has plagued Lebanon in recent years.
Moreover, Aoun needs to move quickly to try to repair diplomatic and economic relations with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia but also the United Arab Emirates and other key GCC members. Lebanon needs the aid, investment, remittances, and other financial support from the Gulf countries that were such a large part of its economic viability, and it needs to ensure that there is, at the very least, no additional deterioration in ties. Rebuilding relations with Saudi Arabia will not be easy for Aoun, given his track record and political profile, but he has no choice but to make a sincere effort and, almost as importantly, be seen by other Lebanese to be doing do.
Saudi Arabia, too, has clear incentives for welcoming Aoun now despite its probable frustration with Lebanon and many Lebanese, including some of its traditional allies. But Riyadh cannot afford to permanently walk away from Lebanon or concede political domination of the country to Iran and its allies given the range of potential options Saudi Arabia retains in Lebanese affairs. Exploring what can be possible with the new president makes sense for Riyadh. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has moved past its primary reliance on Prime Minister Saad Hariri and other traditional allies in Lebanese affairs and is exploring new possibilities as a corollary of that already-established shift. So, even though Aoun has a long history of being on the other side of regional divides, it makes perfect sense for Saudi Arabia to explore what could be accomplished in dealing with him.
Aoun has confidently said that relations between the two countries are “recovering,” although in what way and to what extent is unclear. The Lebanese task, which is shared with some other Middle Eastern states, is convincing the Saudis that they have no choice but try to accommodate elements of both Iranian and Gulf interests in their policies. This is a tough sell, to say the least, in the current regional context. Early reports, mainly from Lebanese sources, Saudi Arabia “unblocked” the 2016 suspension of $3 billion in military aid appear to be premature. It’s now reported that the issue will be “discussed” in further meetings between the countries’ defense ministers.
It’s perfectly logical for Saudi Arabia to have listened carefully to whatever Aoun had to say, but the kingdom is likely to remain skeptical about what he’s willing to offer and capable of delivering. Riyadh no doubt recognizes that as long as the situation in Syria remains so favorable to Hizballah, the chances of curtailing the group’s power in Lebanon will be slim. If and when Riyadh decides to re-engage in Lebanon, it might not want to give full credit for that to Aoun, and other actors, more commitments, and further moves will probably have to be brought into the mix. Therefore, while the groundwork for a potential, at least partial, restoration of Saudi-Lebanese ties seems to have been laid, most of the hard work, especially on the Lebanese side, remains to be done.