Category Archives: IbishBlog

Cirque du Shakespeare: the Folger’s new Othello and the problem of performing Iago

The new production of Othello at the Folger Theatre in Washington, DC is in many ways good fun, but it's deeply flawed and some of those problems illustrate much deeper issues inherent in the play itself. At the Folger, director Robert Richmond has basically blown (and I use that term advisedly) a huge amount of time, effort and, I'm guessing, money as well, on very elaborate special effects that make his Othello a multimedia extravaganza, even in the small space he had to work with. It's certainly a unique take on the play visually, with random contemporary influences ranging from Cirque du Soleil (of all things) to slow motion fighting sequences as originating in East Asian action movies. The problem, predictably enough, is that rather than enhancing the drama of the play, these pyrotechnics detract or at least distract from it, so that what can be a devastatingly terrifying experience becomes about as substantial as a handful of cotton candy.
 
Mr. Richmond has also gone to a great deal of trouble to rewrite and reorder much of the play, especially at the beginning, and I hate to break it to him, but he's not improving it. It's perfectly acceptable theatrical and literary practice to do this, of course, but one runs the risk of unfavorable comparison with something closer to the original, which in this case is unavoidable. The changes make the action harder rather than easier to follow, the characters more rather than less obscure, and in the confusion the complex psychological timeline of the play is also lost. Othello relies on a kind of double time register (as do several other Shakespeare plays), in which the diegetic timeline of the action does not correspond to what's happening psychologically within and interpersonally between the various characters. This deep structure within the play has been noted by critics since at least the middle of the 19th century, and its widespread recognition does nothing to blunt its powerful impact.
 
From a psychological standpoint the diegetic narrative of the play seem to careen forward with an impossible rapidity and this is crucial to subtly, and in many cases probably unconsciously, communicating to the audience a sense of a social order and lives spiraling out of control. The very first thing we see at the Folger, unfortunately, is a modestly shrouded set of images of Othello and Desdemona in a full-blown sexual encounter. This, rather than a marriage scene or merely implied news of the marriage, is what kicks off the opening argument between Iago and Roderigo. There are many ways of rationalizing this staging, of course. Is it their imaginations being manifested, etc.? But it does play merry havoc with the later lines, some of which are not removed, which suggest that this couple has not had time to have sex after they were married because Othello was immediately dispatched to Cyprus. As written, the play adds up although it operates on jarringly contradictory perceived timescales. As rewritten in this way, it doesn't.
 
And for all the effort and attention that was spent on the set, it seems extraordinary that the famous handkerchief that went flying around the stage of the Folger was white with an intricate black geometric pattern, quite clearly not “spotted with strawberries.” When I first saw it, I thought they would certainly remove the reference to its design in the dialogue, but amazingly they did not. It's all the more ridiculous because any piece of white cloth with red or pink splotches would have served the purpose adequately. I focus on this minor but elementary flaw in the production because of the amount of effort that was put into the rest of the set, and because this was so easy to avoid.
 
A quite talented cast works hard to get around all of the special effects bling with which they are smothered, especially Karen Peakes' fine performance as Emilia. But you feel for them because they are figuratively, and at times literally, weighted down with a burdensome production. And nobody suffers more than Ian Merrill Peakes, an obviously talented performer, who is left almost entirely adrift in his crucial role as Iago. I'm confident that with better direction and a more insightful, focused production, Peakes could have produced a very interesting Iago. Unfortunately, the biggest single flaw of the Folger's new production of Othello is that it has given us something I would not have thought possible: a bland and boring Iago. There's just no edge to him at all and I don't think that's the fault of the actor. The whole Cirque du Shakespeare routine just dulls the blade too much. Peakes is left with almost nothing really to work with, except repeatedly telling us how really, really, really pissed off he is. Well, so am I. Frequently. You too. So what? It's really not good enough.
 
There are lots of ways of playing Iago to powerful effect. Just to stick to the well-known, readily available film versions, there's Kenneth Branagh's ice-cold, steel-eyed sociopath (his best film performance to my mind); Bob Hoskins' giggling psychopath (with an emphasis on Iago's working-class consciousness as well); Micheál Mac Liammóir's slimy, aging creep; Frank Finlay's understated, reserved schemer; etc. I suppose I just listed those in a certain order of preference. But however he is interpreted, Iago must have an edge to him.
 
His power is not only that of a master manipulator, but also a master of language. He swings wildly back and forth between the most ornate and obscure verbiage to the most crude and direct. His often overlooked and usually cut (the Folger removed almost all of it in this production) banter with Desdemona and Emelia in Cyprus when they fear Othello may be drowned begins as risqué and playful but ends up downright obscene. That he's egged on in this “dirty talk” by Desdemona herself proves again how little her father really knows her (“a maiden never bold,” etc.). Iago's specialty is debasement, and his favorite storehouse of metaphors and imagery is the bestiary. From the outset, his tropes routinely transform people into animals, especially in order to emphasize their sensuality and sexuality in a particularly repulsive manner in order to alienate them from each other. These manipulations not only transform Othello's perceptions of Desdemona, they also transform his own command of language. Very few, if any, characters in Shakespeare's canon are such powerful poets as Othello and Iago. But when Iago is done with Othello, the eloquent speech of the orator and storyteller who won over not only Desdemona but also the Duke and his counsel with his tales of war and hardship (which Iago dismisses as “fantastical lies”) becomes choppy, convoluted, repetitive, and as fractured as his mind.
 
This also presents a challenge in the interpretation of Othello's own role. He can be performed as serenely calm at the outset, descending rapidly into uncontrolled and animalistic passion at the hands of Iago's “medicine,” or he can be presented from the outset as having the rough edge of a professional soldier. At the Folger, the capable Owiso Odera essentially performs the second version of Othello, rough and passionate from the outset, and this is a perfectly legitimate and common interpretation. But it misses the transformation in not only his language but his character effected by Iago's own manipulative dialogue. What it adds is the interesting prospect that Othello's marriage is more of a mismatch from the outset than might otherwise be supposed and that it is not only Iago's plotting that dooms it, but also that there really is a profound incompatibility between the couple. It's a legitimate choice, but I'm not sure the trade-off is really worth it.
 
The manner in which Iago is interpreted goes directly to the central problem of his character: motivation. It is a hallmark of Shakespeare's art — and one that he pioneered in a most extraordinarily innovative manner — that all characters “have their say.” They all get a chance to explain why they're doing what they're doing, even some of the most minor figures. That these explanations often reflect the human tendency to self-deception in no way undermines this achievement. For even in their delusions, as certainly could be ascribed to Othello at several key passages in the drama, particularly in the moments before he kills himself, the characters reveal much about what drives them, consciously or unconsciously. Iago alone remains an absolute cipher. The only other Shakespeare character comparable to him in villainy, Iachimo in Cymbeline, is not nearly as mysterious or threatening.
 
For centuries critics have grappled with this conundrum (perhaps most famously Coleridge), and argued about whether Iago has “too many” or “too few” motivations for his malevolent rampage. The “too many” school notes that he professes at least four justifications or grievances at different points in the play: 1) he has been passed over for promotion unjustly, and harbors a deep-seated class resentment against privilege; 2) he suspects both Othello and Casio of sleeping with his wife and is enraged at the thought that others do as well; 3) he wants to replace Casio as Othello's lieutenant for personal advancement; 4) he enjoys the malicious plotting a great deal (leading Coleridge to conclude that he is really driven by a desire to demonstrate his intellectual superiority and power over others).
 
Most critics agree that none of these motivations separately or together seem sufficient for his extreme wrath and vengefulness, and, perhaps more importantly, that they do not sit well together (there's also an easily-accessible homoerotic quality to his relationship with Othello that productions have increasingly been exploring, casting his jealousy in yet another light, but no more satisfactorily). Iago's explanations and professed outrage often seem exaggerated, especially in his opening-scene tirade to Roderigo about the injustice of his rank. The “too few” school considers all of these to be absurd rationalizations and excuses that are dismissible out of hand, and does not bother with whether or not they compliment or contradict each other. Either way at the play's close, like Othello, we are simply dying to know, "Why he hath thus ensnared my soul and body?" His answer is surely the most chilling moment in all of Shakespeare's work: "Demand me nothing: what you know, you know; From this time forth I never will speak word."
 
But of course we don't “know” anything for certain, least of all about Iago's "real" motivations. The whole play revolves around the question of how we “know” what we think we know, and the distance between what we believe and what is "true." Instances of deception abound: Desdemona deceives her father in eloping with Othello; she deceives Othello that her handkerchief is not lost; Othello almost certainly engages in a degree of deception with Desdemona and the Duke about his life's story; and Roderigo assumes “an usurped beard” metaphorically, and in many productions literally, to name but a few examples. And, of course, there is all of the self-deception alluded to above (Othello's final speech and possibly many other instances in his case, Brabantio's misreading of his daughter, Desdemona's misreading of Othello as incapable of jealousy, Emelia's almost willful blindness about her husband's villainy, etc.) But in none of these cases are motivations an absolute cipher.
 
Iago, by contrast, who is the author of most of what transpires during the drama, is exactly that: an enigma, an impenetrable mystery. The explanations he offers other characters and the audience directly are plainly unsatisfactory from either the “too many” or “too few” perspectives, and his absolute refusal to offer any accounting whatsoever when confronted is palpably horrifying. There is no other instance in Shakespeare's work in which the audience is invited to retreat into a facile explanation of “pure evil.” Even though Iago is plainly drawn from the stock Morality Play characters Vice and Devil, he's clearly not a simple allegory. Therefore dismissing him as inherently evil is no answer either. All other Shakespeare villains have their reasons, grievances and, usually, mitigations. Iago's refusal to offer any satisfactory accounting for himself in spite of his huge role (he is almost as much a main character as Othello and in many productions ends up having more lines) confronts the audience or the reader with the awful truth that we can never know what really prompts anyone else in their actions, no matter how extreme, and maybe never fully understand our own either.
 
Many commentators, including Sigmund Freud, have considered Shakespeare among the most perceptive observers of the human psyche. Perhaps this is his most horrifying insight: Iago offers no explanation at the end of Othello because he does not have one. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the character himself does not really know what drove him to these extremes. Reading Iago against the rest of Shakespeare's work, precisely because virtually all other characters “have their say,” strongly suggests this is the case. Iago is a cipher, not only to us, but to himself. What's most appalling is the implication that, all too often, we are ourselves driven by “too many” or “too few” reasons for our actions and in the end may not really know why, exactly, we do much of what we do, especially as we are doing it. It's a terrifying concept that directly attacks the ego or a fundamental sense of self-awareness with the suggestion that these are illusory constructs, and beneath them may lie an empty abyss.
 
This is all the more unsettling because Iago not only plays to others' sense of the animalistic within the human, he also unnervingly is the most eloquent and persuasive of all of Shakespeare's characters about the importance and power of reason. On numerous occasions he boasts that what he's saying in the course of his manipulations, whatever his intentions, makes sense or at some level constitutes genuinely good advice. These claims are uncannily hard to dismiss. His lecture to Roderigo against the thought of suicide over Desdemona is a kind of Renaissance — almost proto-Enlightenment — sermon on the power and primacy of reason: “If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to most preposterous conclusions,” etc. Yet he employs appeals to reason and apparent logic in the same way he brutally attacks the reptilian brain, precisely to drive people towards "preposterous [and disastrous] conclusions." As with invocations of passion, the championing of reason is just another weapon in the arsenal of the most malevolent character Shakespeare created. And, just like our attachment to our sense of self and our egos, the human, and especially modern, faith in reason (the impact of this irony has only deepened over time) proves to be dangerously and frighteningly illusory.
 
For all of these effects to work fully on an audience, Iago's edginess, whatever form it might be given in any production, is crucial to the interpretation of the role. As he engages us in his playful but vicious plot, we become, to some extent, complicit in his crimes at an emotional level, no matter how horrified we are at them. Unwilling identification with Iago is essential to creating this sense of horror at the emptiness inside of him — the perfect vacuum through which his actions are propelled — with which we are confronted at the end of the play.
 
The one thing the Folger production gets exactly right about Iago is clearly communicating to the audience the extent to which, unlike almost all other Shakespeare villains, he has no clear plan or even fully set goal at the outset (contrast that with Richard III, for example). He's angry, and he wants revenge, but that apparently could take many forms. His plot unfolds piecemeal, constantly adapting and changing almost like a game, and he invites the audience to think things through with him in real time. At one point he is so unsure of his next move that he observes, "'Tis here, but yet confused: Knavery's plain face is never seen, till used." So not only is the motivation unclear to both us and, apparently, him, Iago's goals are shifting and negotiable, and his schemes are jerryrigged and tactical at best. There is no hint of a broader strategy at work.
 
Not only does this underscore Iago's fundamental hollowness, it powerfully draws the audience into the process of his plotting and implicates us as secret sharers no matter how strongly we object or resist. Or it least it should. But the bland and boring Iago presented at the Folger just doesn't give the audience enough to hook ourselves to him throughout the drama, and we end up identifying with him about as much as a viewer of the Silence of the Lambs will emotionally connect with Hannibal Lecter. It's an engaging spectacle, but not a harrowing revelation.
 
This production also omits one of the most telling passages in Othello, in my view, but also one of the most frequently overlooked. The second song that Iago sings during the revels, as his plot to get Cassio drunk and instigate a crisis moves steadily forward, reveals a great deal about both his own character and the deepest concerns in the drama:
King Stephen was and-a worthy peer,
His breeches cost him but a crown,
He held them sixpence all too dear,
With that he called the tailor lown.
He was a wight of high renown
And thou art but of low degree,
'Tis pride that pulls the country down,
Then take thine auld cloak about thee.
It's usually either left out of productions entirely, or raced through as a quick-paced soldiers' drinking song. This is unfortunate because, even though Shakespeare was adapting what appears to have been an already fairly well-established song usually referred to as "Bell my wife," his version is unique and in this context it neatly summarizes much of what drives the plot of Othello.
 
The whole scene is important for obvious reasons, but also because it shows Iago very comfortably in the role of the rough, earthy soldier. It seems to confirm his opinion of Casio as effete and Casio's of him as decidedly downmarket (“you may relish him more in the soldier than in the scholar” he dismissively tells Desdemona, and on several occasions lectures Iago about his manners and breeding and the proprieties of social hierarchy). Some critics have wondered whether Iago's song is directed specifically towards Casio, to subtly critique or even annoy him in preparation for the instigated brawl. If it's intended to annoy him, it certainly doesn't seem to work, as Casio declares it “a more exquisite song than the other.” But by attacking the arrogance of privilege, it certainly works well as a critique of Casio's attitudes and fits perfectly with Iago's numerous other bitter rhetorical attacks on the wealthy and the powerful.
 
More than anything, though, the song is a warning about the sin of pride, which seems to be at the heart of the tragedy. The play is usually associated, and quite rightly, with patterns of jealousy, most notably Othello's own jealousy over Desdemona, but also of course Iago's almost boundless jealousy against virtually all the other characters. Both are evidently extremely ambitious, although in different ways both pretend to be simple soldiers. Iago is jealous of Casio for his promotion and his apparent higher social status. He's jealous of Othello's power and rank as well. He's jealous in fearing that both of them have slept with his wife. And he consistently and repeatedly attacks social privilege and rails at his own relatively lowly status.
 
But what lies behind this jealousy is pride. Othello attributes his serene (over)confidence to his pride in his achievements, his character and his allegedly royal lineage. His extreme rage depends on Iago quickly flipping this vainglorious overconfidence into unbridled panic and male hysteria, an attack on his essential masculine pride. While neither Othello nor Iago share the arrogant haughtiness of the aristocrats Brabantio, Casio and Roderigo, their pride seems to run deeper and be more brittle. Both characters appear to be driven in their extreme anger by jealousies based on attacks on their pride. It's easy to imagine a daytime TV soap opera parody of Othello with a cheesy title like “The Proud and the Damned” (by the way, the noted critic Prof. Richard Burt, author of the book "Unspeakable ShaXXXspeares," wrote the script for a porn video version of the play called "Hotel O," which I have not seen and apparently even had two sequels). At any rate, in this world pride certainly does bring the country down, and no one is satisfied with their old cloaks. Of course this all comes through anyway in the play, but the song sums up its biggest themes perfectly, if obliquely. It's a pity that it's so rarely given its due.
 
One can't be too tough on the Folger or Mr. Richmond for leaving the King Stephen song out, since cuts obviously have to be made for any performance and this is typically one of the earliest casualties, along with most of the “dirty talk” banter between Iago and Desdemona. And again, when it does appear, it is most frequently performed so quickly that no audience is likely to have an opportunity to gauge its deep significance. The Folger Theatre production is fun and entertaining, but it just doesn't reflect a strong grasp of the play. It does help illustrate much about Othello, but more by calling attention to these profound questions through mistakes and omissions, both common and inexplicable, rather than through presenting any insight of its own.

Gilad Atzmon and John Mearsheimer: self-criticism, self-hate and hate

I've long been an advocate that self-criticism, both as an individual and as a group, is an essential element of healthy political engagement. Group-think, political orthodoxy and correctness, and chauvinistic received wisdom are the worst kinds of political poison. Triumphalism and/or paranoia are the inevitable consequences, and they lead to grotesque distortions of perception and judgment. Self-criticism, especially of a group one identifies with and participates in, is not only healthy, it is indispensable. Without it, political thought is reduced to mere cheerleading, defensiveness and quickly degenerates into irrational hatred of the other while indefensibly championing the self.
 
So healthy self-criticism is to be applauded and supported whenever it emerges. It is also an essential element of dialogue between groups, because without it an understanding of other parties' grievances and the failings and even crimes done in one's own name are simply not acknowledged. While continuously defending Arabs, Arab Americans and Muslims from anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia, I've tried to engage in as much self-criticism of the failings of these identity groups as possible in my writings, and this has inevitably garnered me a great deal of criticism from those who disapprove of it. Some have argued that at a time when the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States are under heavy attack from bigots and racists, now is the time to circle the wagons and not to look inward, openly, honestly and self critically. Anyone who reads my work will know that I reject this categorically.
 
Self-criticism, though, is very different from its more extreme relative: self-hatred. When constructive self-criticism gives way to embracing bigoted narratives that demonize and stigmatize identity groups with which one either does or did identify with, this is no longer self-criticism but self-hatred. There is a small coterie of professional former Muslim Islamophobes, such as the man who sometimes calls himself “Walid Shoebat,” and anti-Arab racists of Arab origin most notably Brigitte Gabriel, who make a tidy living off of peddling this garbage to credulous American audiences, particularly from the evangelical Christian and Jewish ultra-right lecture circuit and book-buying public. It is one of the great tragedies of contemporary American public discourse that there is a real, and indeed growing, market for this kind of bile, no matter how over the top. These individuals, in fact, compete with and outbid each other in how extreme they can be in their anti-Arab and anti-Muslim rhetoric, and often have acrimonious relationships based on market share jealousy.
 
The dichotomy between self-criticism versus self-hatred has recently reemerged in a controversy regarding the endorsement by University of Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer of a new book by the Israeli (or former Israeli) jazz saxophonist and political agitator Gilad Atzmon. Mearsheimer has been heavily criticized in some quarters for this endorsement, and has defended himself on the Foreign Policy blog of his some-time co-author Harvard professor Stephen Walt. Mearsheimer's main defense is that he found nothing objectionable in the book (which I have not read and will not bother to read either, for reasons which will become abundantly clear), and was not familiar with Atzmon or his other writings. The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that it was incumbent on Mearsheimer not simply to pick up the text he was sent but do a little bit of homework on the author he was being asked to embrace. Had he done so, he would have realized that Atzmon long since crossed the line from Jewish self-criticism to self-hatred in a repulsive and indefensible manner.
 
In his defense, Mearsheimer acknowledges that Atzmon is, indeed, self-hating, but he seems to confuse unhealthy self-hatred with healthy self-criticism: "The more important and interesting issue is whether Atzmon is a self-hating Jew. Here the answer is unequivocally yes. He openly describes himself in this way and he sees himself as part of a long dissident tradition that includes famous figures such as Marx and Spinoza." But Aztmon is not a dissident, in any meaningful sense of the word, leveling constructive criticism against his fellow Jews and Israelis. Instead, as Mearsheimer would have discovered if he had done his homework, Atzmon frequently traffics in the worst kind of anti-Semitism. Comparing him to Spinoza is simply absurd, and he goes far beyond Marx in his condemnations of his fellow Jews. Moreover, I don't know any self-respecting Marxists who aren't embarrassed by some of the harsher passages in Marx's writings about other Jewish Europeans.
 
I'm not going to subject my readers to any lengthy catalog of the worst of Atzmon. It's well-documented, and the fact that Mearsheimer is, or at least claims to be, unaware of any of this is, in itself, an embarrassment to any self-respecting academic who wants to comment on such issues. Atzmon calls himself a leftist, but in a straightforwardly racist manner distinguishes between genuine Marxism and a pathological Jewish version: "Jewish Marxism is very different from Marxism or socialism in general. While Marxism is a universal paradigm, its Jewish version is very different. It is there to mould Marxist dialectic into a Jewish subservient precept. Jewish Marxism is basically a crude utilisation of ‘Marxist-like’ terminology for the sole purpose of the Jewish tribal cause. It is a Judeo-centric pseudo intellectual setting which aims at political power." According to Atzmon, "Jewish Marxism is there to suppress any form of engagement with the Jewish question by means of spin. It is there to stop scrutiny of Jewish power and Jewish lobbying." As Andy Newman correctly noted in The Guardian, "This is a wild conspiracy argument, dripping with contempt for Jews."
 
Atzmon has also disturbingly argued that, "American Jewry makes any debate on whether the "Protocols of the elder of Zion" [sic] are an authentic document or rather a forgery irrelevant. American Jews (in fact Zionists) do control the world." Atzmon argues that he is only referring to Zionists and not Jews, so these comments cannot be considered anti-Semitic. Yet the first sentence in the passage clearly refers to “American Jewry” in general and the second to “American Jews” which he describes in general as being “in fact Zionists.” His disclaimers are completely unconvincing and are absolutely belied by the language and structure of his text, which are not equivocal. It's also noteworthy that this article appears to have been permanently removed from his website, but it can still be accessed here. As Atzmon himself notes, the bracketed comment “in fact Zionists” does not appear in his original text, and he added it later to try to establish that his essay “contains no anti-Semitic or anti Jewish sentiment." I'd challenge any reader of the full original text linked above to agree with that assessment.
 
One could go on much further, but there's no need. The above quotations demonstrate unequivocally that, for whatever reason, Atzmon does not traffic in healthy self-criticism, but in fact indulges in fairly extreme forms of anti-Semitism, and therefore in self-hatred of an extremely unhealthy variety. A lot of this is very reminiscent of the anti-Semitic ravings of another self-described former-Israeli, "Israel Shamir," who my former co-author, Ali Abunimah, and I warned pro-Palestinian activists about back in April 2001. Not surprisingly, Atzmon is a big fan of Shamir, claiming that, “As an ex-Jew, Shamir is a very civil and peaceful man and probably is the sharpest critical voice of ‘Jewish power’ and Zionist ideology.”
 
Regarding Shamir, Abunimah and I wrote, “Perhaps some are ready to overlook statements that appeal to anti-Semitic sentiments because the person making them identifies himself as a Jew. But the identity of the speaker makes such statements no less odious and harmful. We do not have any need for some of what Israel Shamir is introducing into the discourse on behalf of Palestinian rights, which increasingly includes elements of traditional European anti-Semitic rhetoric. Such sentiments will harm, not help, the cause.” Based on his comments cited above, and so many others, obviously exactly the same calculation applies to Atzmon. He may see himself as a champion of Palestine and the Palestinians, but through his self-hatred, which has degenerated, at least in those statements, into hatred pure and simple, he can only harm it, and indeed badly.
 
Gilad Atzmon is no Israel Shahak, a real leftist critic and a genuine heir of Spinoza, who was at the same time a devoted citizen of Israel who served all his required military and other civic duties while railing against its policies and attacking what he saw as the idiocies of Jewish religious fundamentalism. Shahak is often falsely cited as self-hating or anti-Semitic, but he was neither. His was a genuine, healthy form of self-criticism, and although he occasionally took self-criticism to its extremes, he knew where the line between self-criticism and self-hatred was, and he never crossed it. Atzmon, as the above citations demonstrate, does what Shahak never for a moment did, and engages in a fairly advanced version of self-hatred. And with self-hatred of this degree, there is really no distinction with simple hatred itself. As many of the anti-Arab racists and Islamophobes of Arab and Muslim origin demonstrate, being a part or formerly a part of an identity group doesn't in and of itself stop someone from becoming a purveyor of the worst forms of hate against it.
 
Why Mearsheimer found Atzmon compelling in spite of these attitudes, even if they are largely concealed, implicit or downplayed in his book, is a very disturbing question. Ever since he and Walt began criticizing the role of the pro-Israel lobby (Jewish power in Israel and the United States being a subject that deserves serious interrogation of the kind being done by Peter Beinart, among others), Mearsheimer (far more than Walt) has been developing an outright vendetta with the Jewish mainstream that, I fear, has become deeply personal and therefore distorted. Last year he gave a dreadful speech at the Palestine Center in Washington in which he abandoned his long-standing good advice to Arab and Muslim Americans to develop an alliance for a two-state solution with peace-minded Jewish Americans. Instead, he counseled Palestinians and their allies that Israel would never agree to the creation of a Palestinian state and that because of demographics and other factors, Palestinians would ultimately prevail, and that in effect they need do nothing to achieve that victory (save, he noted, not engaging in the kind of violence that might rationalize another round of Israeli ethnic cleansing). In response to that worst of all possible advice, I dubbed him the “Kevorkian of Palestine,” because I believe he was preaching a form of assisted suicide. He was repeating the siren song Palestinians and other Arabs have been telling themselves about Israel and Zionism since the 1920s: that demographics are destiny and steadfastness alone would secure a victory over the Israeli national project. To say that history has proven this logic incorrect, and led from defeat to defeat, would be a gross understatement.
 
I cannot claim to see into Mearsheimer's mind, but it struck me at the time that this terrible speech was probably prompted more by a desire to provoke and annoy his antagonists in the pro-Israel lobby than being intended to do anything to help Palestinians achieve independence or an end to occupation (or, for that matter, anything constructive whatsoever). In the same vein, it's hard not to see his endorsement of Atzmon's book as anything other than another extension of this unconstructive, unhealthy and unhelpful two-way vendetta he has with the Jewish-American mainstream. Like the anti-Semitic ravings of Shamir and Atzmon, Mearsheimer's endless quarrel with the Jewish-American establishment does nothing whatsoever to help Palestinians or Arab Americans achieve any of their important goals, most especially ending the Israeli occupation.
 
There is, of course, plenty of hatred that is not self-hatred but simple hatred of others. A recent video released by a Jerusalem Post editor, Caroline Glick, and her cohort Noam Jacobson is an excellent example of how certain strands of Jewish Israeli discourse are so rooted in a paranoid chauvinism that it shamelessly expresses itself in the most ugly racist stereotypes against a wide variety of other ethnicities and identities. There has been a shameful silence from mainstream Jewish-American groups and commentators about this video, and I would say that for the sake of their own credibility, Jewish Americans who agree with what I have said so far in this posting about Atzmon need to end that silence immediately and condemn this video for what it is: the most repulsive form of racism aimed at many ethnicities. One can only imagine the uproar had an editor of a major Arab newspaper produced a video remotely approaching this one in terms of stereotyping, racism and shameless hatred.
 
The phenomenon of Arab anti-Semitism is also disturbingly common and well-documented, and I've been a strident critic of it, especially here on the Ibishblog. Combating racism directed towards others from within one's own community is the first step in a serious self-critical engagement with one's fellows, compatriots and coreligionists. But self-criticism that crosses the line into self-hatred and becomes, therefore, hatred pure and simple directed against one's own community of origin isn't any better because of the identity, or former identity, of the purveyor of hate. There is no difference between chauvinistic hatred of the other based on ethnic paranoia and internalized hatred of what is, or used to be, one's own community based on some kind of neurotic and probably Oedipal rebellion and rejection. There are lots of outstanding Jewish and Jewish Israeli critics of Israeli policies, culture and attitudes, and lots of Arab and Arab-American critics of Arab governments, culture and attitudes as well. Walid Sheobat and Brigitte Gabriel are not among them, and neither are Israel Shamir or Gilad Atzmon. Hate is hate, and the source is immaterial and no defense whatsoever.
 
As for Mearsheimer, his defense of his endorsement is unconvincing, and by standing by it even when confronted with what he claims he did not know about Atzmon before "blurbing" his new book, he has provided his strongest critics with powerful new ammunition to dismiss his opinions as too distorted to merit serious consideration. He certainly can't be compared with Atzmon, and it may be that some of the accusations against him have been unfair. But there's no excuse for his ongoing endorsement, particularly now that he is fully aware of Atzmon's history and views, which he openly agrees amount to self-hatred but has not yet admitted clearly cross the line into anti-Semitic hate speech. Yet again, Prof. Mearsheimer gets a well-deserved F. With this latest blunder, he has finally and permanently flunked out of the respectable conversation about the Middle East and anything related to it.

Why I will no longer appear on Iran’s Press TV

Several times in recent months various people asked me why I agree to be interviewed from time to time on the Iranian English-language station Press TV. They suggested it was improper to cooperate in any way with an official organ of a repressive regime of which I have openly and vehemently disapproved for many years. My response was always that it is my general policy to speak to any news outlet whatsoever as long as the interview is live, unedited and I am completely free to speak my mind. Until now, that has largely been the case with Press TV. No longer.

Yesterday morning at about 6:30 AM Washington time I rolled groggily out of bed to appear (somewhat disheveled) on Skype on a Press TV program dealing with a potential Palestinian UN initiative during the upcoming UN general assembly meeting. The interview itself was fairly straightforward, and I repeated my well-established analysis that full UN membership is not available to the Palestinians because the United States has made it clear it would veto any such initiative, and that less ambitious initiatives in the general assembly also might carry significant risks for the Palestinians. I argued, as I have been for a long time, that the best solution would be a compromise that avoids a confrontation that is not in the interest of any party.

In other words, I repeated my standard analysis. The interview itself was fine. However, the Press TV website posted the video of the interview with the following outrageous headline: “US main obstacle to peace in Palestine.” The quotation marks strongly imply that this is something I said, or implied. Obviously I neither said nor implied anything of the kind, because it is a ridiculous, and indeed offensive, position. In addition to that, the transcript ends incorrectly with me supposedly saying “The problem is that in the end nobody else wants to be a broker. It is not just that the United States is hoarding the process; it is that there are any other candidates…” What I actually said was that “The problem is that in the end nobody else wants to be a broker. It is not just that the United States is hoarding the process; it is that there AREN'T any other candidates, no one else is volunteering to do it.”

So not only does the headline attribute to me a sentiment which I absolutely do not agree with and did not either say or imply, and which I find completely ridiculous, the transcript has me suggesting that there are other candidates to broker the process when in fact what I was saying is that there are no other candidates volunteering to broker the process. All of this is clearly reflected in the video, thankfully.

But I find this entire experience not only unprofessional but unethical. I believe my attitudes have been deliberately misrepresented and my words misconstrued, and this is simply not acceptable. The point of this blog posting is first of all to clarify the record and make sure everybody understands that I never said or implied anything remotely resembling the idea that the “US [is the] main obstacle to peace in Palestine.” Second, it is to explain that I will not be appearing on Press TV in the future and why. So much for that.

Mr. Mileikowsky and the “seal of Netanyahu”: the perilous encounter between modern nationalism and ancient history

I may be trying people's patience a little with my recent riff on nationalism in general, and particularly the Israeli and Palestinian versions, but further exchanges with some of my interlocutors, particularly Jewish ones, prompt me to make one final point. I'd like to illustrate how nationalist discourses use sleight-of-hand to create illusions of historical continuity between ancient history, myths, legends and traditions and contemporary national political programs.
 
Of course that continuity does actually exist, insofar as all presently existing political agendas are the consequence of the great sweep of human history. But the nationalist identities of Egypt or China are not more authentic or legitimate because they claim direct descent from ancient civilizations and kingdoms than is the American one which celebrates its non-ethnic, sui generis (at the time of its founding anyway), and ideological self-definition. All three are equally the products of a set of developments in global history that produced them in their present form at the current moment. The American version of nationalism based on adherence to political principles and a kind of US civic religion can't be privileged over ethnic nationalisms either, and is also very much grounded in myth, legend and historical fantasy.
 
But some of my Jewish interlocutors who ought to know better seem absolutely convinced that there is a hierarchy of legitimacy of nationalist claims and that the Israeli one is simply and obviously superior, older, more “authentic” and more deeply rooted than the Palestinian one. This is even true among those who acknowledge a legitimate Palestinian nationalism, but simply assert that there's something more ancient or authentic about the Israeli one. Assurances that there are innumerable Arab and Palestinian arguments that reverse this, casting grave doubts on the legitimacy and authenticity of Israeli nationalism and Zionism, and the idea that the Jewish people are in any meaningful sense a national or ethnic group as opposed to a religious affiliation, don't seem to dent these deep convictions. So, as a last effort to try to demonstrate the ideological processes I have been describing, let me use a pertinent example from Israel.
 
Current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has in his office what might charitably be described as a relic and uncharitably as a kind of political fetish. It is a 2000-year-old seal in ancient Hebrew bearing the name “Netanyahu.” Here's how Mr. Netanyahu described its political significance to the European Friends of Israel in February of this year:
Now people say, well, you don't really have an attachment to this land. We are new interlopers. We are neo-crusaders. If I could I would invite each of you into my office. You would see a display of antiquities from the Department of Antiquities. It's in a little stand like this. And from the place next to the Temple wall, the Western Wall, from around the time of the Jewish kings, they found a signet ring, a seal of a Jewish official from 2700 years ago, and it has a name on it in Hebrew. You know what that name is? Netanyahu. Now, that's my last name.
 
What he didn't mention is how, precisely, Netanyahu came to be his last name. His father was not born with it, nor were any other of his identifiable ancestors. His father was born Benzion Mileikowsky in Warsaw in 1910. The Prime Minister's grandfather, Nathan Mileikowsky, was an ardent Zionist who used the name "Netanyahu" as a pen name for political writing. Sometime after moving to British mandatory Palestine, Benzion abandoned the name Mileikowsky altogether in favor of Netanyahu. It was common practice among early Zionists to dispense with European and especially Yiddish names in favor of Hebrew ones.
 
(It's probably worth mentioning that Benzion X is not a run-of-the-mill Zionist, but one of the most extreme in the history of the movement. He has many times expressed the view that Arabs are by nature and by definition virtually subhuman, and can and should only be dealt with through extreme forms of force. He also adheres to a greater Israel movement which holds the present borders, including occupied territories, to be entirely unsatisfactory. He was unable to establish a viable political career in Israel because his views were considered beyond the limits of respectability even by the extreme right. So, the specific version of the nationalist political agenda actually being expressed in that act of changing the name Mileikowsky to Netanyahu isn't a normal form of nationalism or a normal form of Zionism, but a program of institutionalized racism and regional aggression of a particularly vicious variety. But, of course, the son is not the father.)
 
So, Netanyahu's father adopted this name as a political act but it has no traceable connection to his family history which as far as can be historically determined seems to be entirely an Eastern European one. While there can be no doubting the deep attachment present day Israelis and Jews from around the world feel towards the land, I'd like to call attention to the series of diversionary gestures in this process designed to not only legitimate Israeli nationalism and Zionism, but to privilege it.
 
In the first stage, we are presented with the seal bearing the name Netanyahu, from 2000 years ago which confirms what no one denies: there was an ancient Hebrew culture, among many other communities, in this land. But it implicitly foregrounds and privileges that historical moment and that particular culture and community as opposed to all others that existed before, during and after that time.
 
In the second stage, it is pointed out that this name “Netanyahu” uncannily links some ancient official with the current prime minister. But the prime minister only bears that name because his father adopted it as a 20th-century political act based on 20th-century ideology and nationalism in what can only be described as an appropriation of the past. One could hardly posit a direct connection between a Mr. Mileikowsky of Warsaw and an ancient official called “Netanyahu” based on those two names.
 
Prime Minister Netanyahu may feel that he is demonstrating some profound historical evidence of the continuity between contemporary Israeli nationalism and ancient history, but in fact what he's doing is demonstrating the extent to which an ancient history in another place and time was consciously and politically appropriated by Jewish Europeans to legitimize their political agenda of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. To those who know his family history, this ring actually calls attention not to the authentic, natural and unbroken continuity between ancient history and contemporary Zionism but rather the usually underappreciated artificiality, or at very least consciously constructed nature, of that connection.
 
Here we have two synecdoches — parts that stand in for the whole — that are designed to tell a tale about the political legitimacy of the Israeli state based on two separate sleights-of-hand that are combined to create the total effect. First, this ancient seal is meant to stand in for the entirety of the ancient history of the land, and posit a dominant, unified, coherent Jewish culture and civilization which alone has contemporary political relevance. All other aspects of the history of the region are implicitly elided, downplayed or at very least certainly not accorded equal stature as this seal and all it supposedly implies. Every aspect of this implicit narrative, like all contemporary political appropriations of ancient history, is extremely dubious at best and misleading at worst.
 
The second synecdoche is the fact that the current Israeli Prime Minister's last name is the same as the one on the seal. The seal stands in for all the (at least politically relevant) history of the area between the river and sea, and the Prime Minister for all of the Jewish Israelis. The apparent organic connection between the two is hence presented as proof positive of the great authenticity and legitimacy of the Israeli national project and implicitly the primacy of its claims over all others. It also implicitly posits that contemporary Jews are the sole and only legitimate heirs of the biblical Hebrews, and that Palestinians and others cannot claim any portion of this heritage. It privileges biblical Hebrew history over all others in the land, and privileges the Israeli claim to being the sole heir of that privileged history. Both of these claims, of course, are exceptionally dubious.
 
Even if the Prime Minister's last name in terms of his family history actually were Netanyahu rather than Mileikowsky, it still wouldn't demonstrate any direct connection between ancient history and contemporary politics (which are almost always strained to the breaking point). But of course it isn't. Neither of these synecdoches work on their own except as reductive and crude generalizations, of the history of the land and of the nature of contemporary Jewish Israeli society and other groups. When put together, they demonstrate perfectly how nationalist discourses that deploy ancient history, myths and traditions are almost invariably engaged in a kind of intellectual shell game: the pea which actually connects ancient cultures and civilizations with contemporary nationalist agendas can never be found, because it does not exist. But of course the shells are impressive, and even more so is the mesmerizing motion of the huckster spinning them around the board so fast almost everyone loses track of the original, core claim.
 
I cite this example to try, for one final time, to demonstrate to my Jewish readers how this process works, but not to suggest that this is in any sense unique or particular to Jewish nationalism or Israeli identity. On the contrary, it is a universal characteristic of all nationalisms that try to root their present-day claims in appeals to ancient history. Saddam Hussein tried to do just this with Babylon. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been trying to do so as well with pre-Islamic Persian history, Cyrus the Great and so forth, in his losing battle with the Iranian power structure that prefers to cast Iran as an “Islamic” state with the natural leadership of a huge portion of the world rather than simply a “Persian” national project. Palestinians deploy ancient history all the time as well, with equal desperation and fatuousness as everyone else.
 
I'd say if you want to find the most extraordinary version of this tendency outside the Middle East, the first stop would probably be the Indian subcontinent, where ancient history, traditions, myths and legends are fought over passionately and sometimes to the point of madness. Who were the peoples of the Indus Valley civilization? Was there really an Aryan invasion? What's the relationship between Sanskritic and Dravidian languages and culture, and are they related to that deep past? Where does the caste system fit into it? How should the prolonged periods of Muslim rule in large parts of India be regarded historically, in terms of India's relationship with Pakistan and with regard to India's important Muslim minority? To call these disputes the tip of the iceberg would be an understatement.
 
What I'm not trying to do here, and what I'm not doing, is questioning the deep religious and emotional attachment of the Jewish people to the land, or the legitimacy of the Israeli national project. But I am trying to demonstrate why, should I wish to do so, Zionism is certainly not one of the better examples that would spring to mind were I to try to assert some kind of continuity between ancient history and a contemporary national project. In any event, the effort would prove futile, as this will always involve tendentious narratives, privileging of certain historical events, times and places over others, and carefully avoiding inconvenient facts that demonstrate the inherent instability of these narratives.
 
But unlike a great many academics in recent decades who have understood and demonstrated how this process works, I don't dismiss or condemn nationalism as purely a menace or a dangerous illusion. Achieving political effects requires developing constituencies, which are always going to be based on reductive identity groups drawn together by philosophically and intellectually invalid claims. There is a deep conundrum built into the relationship between a healthy understanding of the illusory nature of all reductive identity groupings and their constituting narratives on the one hand and the need to form constituencies to achieve anything on the other hand.
 
Nationalism has been the source of much suffering, conflict, abuse and repression. But it is also built into modernity at its core level. No large, self-defining people can function in the world today — which is made up of states and citizens of those states — without being part of some national structure. Indeed, no individual can function in the modern world outside national structures. Try traveling without a passport, for example. Hence the particular plight of the Palestinians, by far the largest group of stateless people in the world. They find themselves outside the whale, not second-class citizens or citizens of oppressive states — both of which can plausibly fight for their individual or collective rights within the structures of those states — but noncitizens, citizens of no state whatsoever.
 
Nationalism is indispensable as a political reality because the nation-state has not been transcended as the dominant political structure in the world today in which people have to function. This is the reality that escaped or confounded a great many of the postcolonial critics who championed nationalism as the only effective weapon against colonial rule in the Third World (that much is too obvious to deny), but who critiqued and rejected the nationalisms of developing societies, usually by definition. There wasn't any other option in seeking independence from colonial rule, and there isn't any other option for functioning in the contemporary global society either. This doesn't mean that separatism, ethnic nationalism or Balkanization is a good idea. On the contrary, it's almost always preferable to keep larger societies together and to avoid partition when people can possibly find a way to live together. History demonstrates that, when it has proven possible, remaining in large, multi-cultural or quite heterogeneous societies is beneficial to all parties.
 
When this is impossible, obviously a good divorce is better than a bad marriage. Here again nationalism presents itself as much as a solution as part of the problem. Often it's both, simultaneously. Will the people of the new Republic of South Sudan form a relatively harmonious union in spite of their extreme heterogeneity? That very much remains to be seen. But they were virtually unanimous on one thing: they wanted no more to do with the rest of Sudan, especially Khartoum. This new nationalism, such as it is, at very least gives the people of South Sudan a fighting chance at building a better next half century than the last one.
 
So what I'm offering here is a qualified, contingent and very reluctant defense of nationalism as not so much a necessary evil as simply a reality of the modern world, while at the same time pointing out that its narratives are particularly dubious. This is especially the case when nationalist rhetoric tries to deploy ancient history, myths and traditions, including religious ones, to legitimate its agenda and ideology. As I have been trying to suggest, the only reasonable conclusion is that nationalism needs to be respected as a legitimate and authentic expression of the will or needs of millions of people (assuming it has a real constituency), but not confused with an intellectually legitimate or historically authentic logical continuation of ancient realities.
 
No doubt there will be Israelis and their friends who will continue to write to me about ancient bowls and glyphs and so forth. And most people will continue to buy into whatever mythologies they are raised with, especially when it comes to their core national, ethnic and religious identities. The threat of this kind of “delegitimization,” of discovering that there never is a pea underneath that nationalist shell, is probably too threatening for a great many people. All I can offer them, beyond this simple example of how such rhetoric performs its ideological legerdemain, is the assurance that there is something deeply liberating in this insight.

Encountering evil: my “conversation” with Robert Spencer

After the dreadful massacre in Norway by crazed right-wing terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, you’d think those whose messages of hate, chauvinism and paranoia had plainly inspired the rampage, and the ideology torturously expressed in his 1,500 word manifesto, would feel some impulse to either critical self-reflection about what their ravings had produced, or at least have the decency to keep a low profile for a few weeks. No chance.
Last night I had the following amazing exchange with Robert Spencer on Twitter. Let me simply begin by noting that Breivik cited Spencer no fewer than 50 times in his manifesto, and was plainly an avid reader and follower of Spencer’s vicious hatemongering. Indeed, Breivik went so far as to write that Spencer would be “an excellent choice” for the Nobel Peace Prize. It’s clear that Breivik’s murder-spree, one of the most brutal terrorist acts in modern history, was directly inspired by a paranoid, chauvinist and hate-filled Islamophobic ideology, and that Robert Spencer was the principal source (among many) for the radical opinions that informed Breivik’s radical actions.
This undeniable fact has noted been by all serious commentators who have written on the subject, including Abe Foxman of the ADL, who pointed out in a Washington Post commentary the obvious truth: “The Oslo perpetrator in his manifesto quoted extensively from the writings of European and American bloggers — including Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller — who promote a conspiratorial anti-Muslim agenda under the pretext of fighting radical Islam.” And he pointed out to his fellow Jewish Americans that “we must always be wary of those whose love for the Jewish people is born out of hatred of Muslims or Arabs,” just as I and many others often caution that supporters of Palestinian human and national rights should reject “support” from those animated by anti-Semitism.
Last night, out of the blue, a tweet was posted, directed at me, from someone I do not know who uses the name @VotingFemale:
Hey @Ibishblog ??? World Wide Known FACT: Muhammad a Friggin’ Pedophile Criminal cc: @Hahyrningur #islam #muslim #HAMAS #Palistine #iran
Run-of-the-mill Islamophobic stuff, largely wasted on a lifelong skeptic and agnostic such as myself, but nonetheless sufficiently hate-filled to warrant the following comment from me, which was neither a reply to @VotingFemale nor directed at anyone in particular:
Just got the hourly Islamophobic tweet from the loony right. So, everything normal in Nuttsville, USA, aka, the social media world.
What was amazing was that I immediately received a reply from Robert Spencer, who tweets as @jihadwatchRS (I had never had any Twitter exchange with him in the past), who seemed particularly delighted with @VotingFemale’s Islamophobic comment:
Hey brother, I am glad SOMEONE is talking some sense in your world!
As I say, shame, doubt, self reflection and self-criticism simply do not exist among such fanatics. I replied:
This Robert Spencer @jihadwatchRS is completely & utterly without shame, remorse for the terrorist havoc he inspired in Norway, or anything.
Spencer retorted:
I know your an expert on shameless, but I inspired Breivik like the Beatles inspired Charlie Manson.
The “conversation” proceeded as follows.
Ibish:
You can argue that fatuous lie all you like. The whole world now sees the kind of raw hate, carnage and terrorism you promote.
Spencer:
I didnt see the Tweet, but if you think it’s “Islamophobic hate” it was probably truths you found inconvenient — or medifast
Ibish:
Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood Clean from your hand? No, this your hand will rather The multitudinous seas incarnadine, Making the green one red.
Spencer:
Don’t kid yourself: Shakespeare wrote about you: sort of a cross between Jack Falstaff and Iago.
Ibish:
It’s amazing! @jihadwatchRS actually is completely unmoved by Norway massacre he inspired & continuing to lay groundwork for more massacres!
Spencer:
Watch it Fat Boy — I have no guilt for Norway, and your defamation could be actionable — keep it coming, I am noting it down
Ibish:
Your writings, Robert Spencer @jihadwatchRS, directly inspired 1 of the worst terrorist acts in history. You think you can sue me for that?
Spencer:
Ibish is continuing to lay groundwork for his next eclair…
Spencer:
yeah and jodie foster inspired hinckley to shoot reagan. You’re only fooling ur fans.
Ibish:
No shame, no remorse, no basic humanity, no decency. Just hate. How do you, Robert Spencer @jihadwatchRS, live with yourself after Norway?
Spencer:
sure — no remore because no guilt. Goebbels taught you well.
This twitter exchange was so remarkable that I thought it ought to be not only registered on this blog, but also noted and analyzed. Let’s take Spencer at his word: he didn’t see the original tweet, he only saw me complaining about an Islamophobic comment. That only makes matters worse for him, because it means that he instantly celebrated an Islamophobic remark as “talking sense” by definition, without bothering to check what it was or exercising any kind of judgment on the propriety or decency of the remark. That it was Islamophobic was good enough for him. I can’t imagine a stronger self indictment. He likes Islamophobia on principle, and doesn’t even bother looking at it before pronouncing it “sense.”
Of course Spencer’s grasp of American tort law is almost as weak as his grasp of Islamic history, theology and sharia, which he makes a tidy living defaming in order to spread exactly the kind of fear, paranoia and hatred about Muslims in general, and particularly Western Muslims, that inspired the Norway massacre. Spencer cannot sue me for saying that he inspired Breivik and continues to lay the groundwork for further acts of anti-Muslim-inspired terrorism (although Breivik’s victims seem to be entirely fellow Euro-Norwegians). This is because in the United States, under the First Amendment of the Constitution, I am entitled to that opinion and to express it. If he wants to sue people for saying this, he will be taking on almost all commentators who have looked into the matter, and he might as well begin with Mr. Foxman of the ADL, who has much deeper pockets than I do. The list of potential frivolous lawsuit defendants on such fatuous bases is exhaustive and almost all-inclusive, and in many jurisdictions Spencer would run the serious risk of being fined for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Summary judgment against the plaintiff in such a preposterous action is virtually guaranteed in almost any jurisdiction or circumstance. And, I very much doubt that any attorney, unless exceptionally well-paid and unethical, would agree to go forward with even a pro forma filing because there are absolutely no grounds to do so.
More importantly, however, under American libel law (as Spencer may or may not know) truth is an absolute defense. These are opinions, and I’m entitled to express any opinion I like (not to claim specific facts that are false, have an intention based on “actual malice,” and result in measurable financial damages). I’m not claiming any specific facts in this Twitter exchange, only opinions. But if Spencer wants the assertion that he was a direct inspiration for Breivik and his terrorist rampage tested in a court of law, he’s going to find that his greatest obstacle is not the protection of opinion (which, in any event, he could not get around) but rather the demonstrable fact that this assertion is true. Breivik was clearly motivated by a hate-filled and fanatical ideology developed and propagated by the likes of Spencer, Pamela Geller (Spencer’s closest collaborator) and the late Oriana Fallaci (to whom Spencer gave an award). Breivik was an avid reader and fan of Spencer and his specific ideas.
Charles Manson did not act on an ideology promoted by the Beatles. He was delusional and manipulative and convinced his followers that there were “hidden messages” in the White Album and other bizarre concoctions that simply were not there. Hinckley wanted to impress Jodie Foster, but she never said or did anything that could possibly have inspired his attempted assassination of President Reagan. Spencer, on the other hand, has spent more than a decade promoting very detailed paranoid, chauvinistic, Islamophobic and extreme political opinions which Breivik gobbled up with impressive enthusiasm and then translated into political action by shooting almost 100 of his fellow Norwegians because he thought they were traitors in the holy crusade against Islam (the idea of a war of religions, civilizations and cultures being the primary informing theme of all of Spencer’s ravings).
Obviously Spencer doesn’t want to admit it, but the truth — the undeniable, unavoidable, indisputable truth — is that his writings were among the most direct influences on the thinking of the perpetrator of one of the worst terrorist acts in modern history. All Breivik did was take Spencer’s ideas to their logical conclusion. The correct analogy would be to the vicious rhetorical anti-Semites of the 19th and early 20th centuries who preached fear and hatred of Jews and Judaism, but would have disavowed any responsibility whatsoever for the Holocaust. Were they directly culpable for the genocide of the Jews? No. But do they have a responsibility for the logical consequences of their words taken to extremes by homicidal madmen? Yes. The same goes for radical Muslim preachers who rail against “infidels,” “apostates,” “hypocrites,” Arab and Muslim regimes and the West. Many of them never call directly for violence, but what serious person does not see the direct connection between hateful language and the violent deeds they predictably inspire? Preachers of anti-Semitic or radical Islamist hate deserve no exoneration for the consequences of their deliberate promotion of loathing. Spencer, Geller and their ilk must also bear the same responsibility.
Spencer can no more sue me for saying that he was a direct inspiration for Breivik and his terrorist rampage then I can sue him for calling me fat. In both cases this is a matter of opinion, protected by the First Amendment. But, even more importantly, in both cases truth asserts itself as an absolute defense. I am in fact fat, and only a delusional person would deny that obvious truth. Spencer did inspire Breivik and his actions, and that is equally — and equally obviously — true.
What’s most amazing is that the horror in Norway does not appear to have caused Spencer a moment of self-reflection, doubt or criticism. I think there are ample grounds, based on that alone, to question the extent to which he’s really unhappy about the evident consequences of his hate-mongering. His closest collaborator, Pamela Geller, has made no bones about her barely disguised glee at the killings at the Norway youth camp, which she called an “anti-Semitic indoctrination training center.” She referred to the “antisemitic war games” conducted there, decried “Norway’s antisemitism and demonization of Israel,” and said that fellow lunatic “Glen Beck was not far off when he compared it to the Hitlerjugend or Young Pioneers.” Blaming the victims and blatantly justifying the attack in spite of her denials and protestations to the contrary, she wrote “Breivik was targeting the future leaders of the party responsible for flooding Norway with Muslims who refuse to assimilate, who commit major violence against Norwegian natives, including violent gang rapes, with impunity, and who live on the dole… all done without the consent of the Norwegians. . .
Well, who could blame him then? If this isn’t, in effect, a self-defense or justifiable homicide argument, I don’t know what is. And there’s no doubt that she did remove an original and openly racist caption of a photo of the assembled Norwegian youth victims of the massacre that read: “note the faces which are more Middle Eastern or mixed than pure Norwegian.” Her posting was full of denials that she was doing so, but consisted of little more than justifications, rationalizations and barely disguised sympathy for the terrorist outrage.
There are also grounds for thinking that Geller’s blog may have been the site of an ominous posting by Breivik. In 2007 someone in Norway commented on her blog, “We are stockpiling and caching weapons, ammunition and equipment. This is going to happen fast.” As Glenn Greenwald has noted, “she said she was purposely shielding the identity of the letter-writing — by publishing it anonymously – in order to prevent the writer from being investigated and prosecuted.” Most of this has been deleted from her website, for obvious reasons. If the comment was from Breivik, Geller’s responsibility goes far deeper than mere inspiration.
Geller is not Spencer, but their collaboration is deep and their partnership strong, which is unusual because both of them, Spencer in particular, have a long history of falling out with collaborators. Both of them give every appearance of being emotionally unbalanced subjects (also a First Amendment protected opinion, thank you very much). These people clearly do not feel any responsibility for what their writings inspired in Norway, nor do they seem particularly bothered by the terrorist outrage. And they are doing nothing whatsoever to question their approach, moderate their tone, or do anything at all to help prevent this from happening again. All of this makes it difficult to believe that they are, in reality, unhappy about the massacre in Norway.

Transcript of my interview with Press TV on Israel’s announced new settlement housing units in Har Homa

The following is the transcript of my Press TV (Iranian English-laguage station) interview about the new Israeli announcement of 900 new settlement housing units in the area called Har Homa. The transcript was re-edited by me for greater accuracy. The original video and a not fully-accurate transcript can be seen here.

Press TV: Could it be that these housing crisis protests turn into a bad thing for Palestinians, and any prospects of peace? 

Ibish: I don't think the protests themselves have any particular ramifications on the peace process, it is an internal Israeli matter but it is being used as an excuse by [Israeli] Interior Minister Eli Yishai for the 900 housing units in Jebel Abu Ghneim, the settlement which the Israelis call Har Homa. You have to understand that it is not exactly in Jerusalem as such. It is in the extreme south-west corner of what Israel redefined in 1967 as municipal Jerusalem. I mean, Jerusalem under the Ottomans, the British and the Jordanians was really the city but Israel made the first of its major land grab by extending the boundaries of municipal Jerusalem deep into the West Bank what. 

What we are talking about here is a Jewish settlement that is right on the border of Bethlehem, deep into the West Bank and what is significant about this new housing project is that it will create a new ridge in this Har Homa settlement which, which, if it is finished, will cut the Bethlehem off from East Jerusalem which will make it much more difficult to ever have a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem alongside an Israeli state, which is the only peace agreement. 

So it's a very dramatic, significant thing and I expect it will meet with significant international opposition. The US has been deeply opposed to this and the whole international community has been deeply opposed to it so this is an announcement that is made in the context of the housing crisis, with the Israeli right saying, well, we just have to make more settlements as if the cost of living bubble, the housing market bubble were connected to some kind of housing shortage and as if the only land available to build houses in Israel was Palestinian occupied land; it is all ridiculous but it is the argument that is being made by people who are determined to entrench the occupation and never allow the Palestinian their freedom. 

Press TV: Israel's largely claimed that settlements are approved years in advance. Is it possible that trust it at this juncture, especially, as mentioned, in Netanyahu's reputation, due to these protests isn't doing well? 

Ibish: I think that is right, he is in bad shape and I don't think this is particularly going to help him out, the protesters in the tent city and the middle class, who have their cost of living rising, are not going to be impressed that the settlement movement is using their housing price and cost of living protest to advance the settlement project. 

In fact I think there are a lot of people in Israel who are wondering about the financial cost of occupation, this is not a cheap thing, taking people's lands away, taking these settlers there, giving them generous subsides, because many Israelis have moved to settlement in and around Jerusalem because they have to been subsidized to do so, becuase it is a good deal for them and the settlers get all kinds of benefits that ordinary Israelis, like the ones who are protesting, do not 

I don't think this is going to help [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu domestically and I think he is in a lot of trouble over this; increasingly the settlement activity is not going to get him out of it. 

What it will probably get him into is another argument with the US. It is true the veto the US has cast at the end of the last year at Security Council on the settlement resolution kind of killed the issue and I think it was a miscalculation on the Palestinian part to push forward knowing the US was going to veto a resolution that used the word “illegal” even though the US agrees it is illegal. They would have been willing to have said “illegitimate.” 

The Palestinians pushed the issue for many different reasons, both because it is true and for the domestic political reasons, but they paid a heavy price because from then until now the settlements have been gone forward without any comments. I think this may be different, I think really you might see some pushback from the US, from the Europeans, etc, on this because if it is completed, it would really cut Bethlehem and other parts of the West Bank off from East Jerusalem and make the eventual border much more difficult to draw. 

You are right about these announcements, the Israelis announced them and they always say these decisions were made previously and then they are going to be completed sometime in advance and this project has been one that has been discussed since 2000 and it has not been completed because it is so sensitive. 

I think there is a very good chance, especially if there is an appropriate amount of international pressure, that there will be another of these announcements that doesn't eventually get completed. This is an extremely crucial area, this is not another annex to another settlement like Maale Admumim that probably will be part of a land swap. It's a dagger aimed at the heart of a peace agreement.

Press TV: With the building of settlements pretty much the status quo at this point, where does this leave a two-state solution, the Palestinian-statehood-bid at the UN, etc.? 

Ibish: It is in grave jeopardy, it really is, and nothing could threaten it more than a settlement project like Har Homa. There are plenty of settlement blocks which if the Israelis build more buildings in them wouldn't really change the strategic equation, it will still be a violation of international law and it would be bad and increase the number of people who don't want to make a deal. But this is very strategic, this totally changes the strategic landscape so this really undermines the very the prospect of a two-state solution, which is really the only solution that would actually work. 

The Palestinian statehood initiative at the UN, if it happens and depending on the form it happens, is not really going to be connected to this except in so far as it is an expression of how stuck diplomacy is and how desperate the Palestinian people are, people who are living under occupation and who cannot afford to wait and let these things sort themselves out and come back to this in a year or half or two years time, they don't have that luxury. 

I really don't think a confrontation at the UN is a great idea from anyone's point of view and I think there needs to be very urgent work here to figure out a compromise that can avert any kind of explosion on the ground or a major diplomatic fight that would harm everybody and particularly the weakest party always ends up losing the most and in this case it unfortunately is, again the Palestinian people again.

The Trouble with Jeffrey

In Alfred Hitchcock's 1955 black comedy, The Trouble with Harry, in an idyllic small town nobody knows what to do with an inconvenient person (in that case, the trouble with Harry is that he's a corpse and everyone is convinced they were somehow involved in his death and don't know how to dispose of the body). Washington and the broader political world, especially online, can be like that too. There is a powerful inclination to rhetorically do away with inconvenient people, and tremendous anger from the enforcers of various versions of ethnic and ideological correctness against the heretics, schismatics and apostates who, it is assumed, should naturally belong to the ranks of the faithful. When someone from “the other side” is taking an objectionable position, that's fine because it only reinforces reassuring binaries, clichéd narratives and the certainty of the converted that the received wisdom is indeed the One True Faith. This is even more intense when it comes to ethnic (let's face it, tribal) expectations. And the intensity reaches its crescendo when it comes to anything remotely related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic magazine is a fascinating case in point. He's an influential columnist and blogger with a strong ethnic Jewish perspective and a deep attachment to Israel. This makes him anathema to many Arab and Muslim Americans (I've been vilified for agreeing to be interviewed by, and later — horror of horrors — coauthoring an article with, him), and to many on the extreme left, including some ultraleft Jewish Americans. But he's also a strong critic of the occupation; the settlements (he has written sympathetically about settlement boycotts); Islamophobia (I'd note that his initial speculation that Islamists might have been involved in the Norway terrorist attacks was hardly out of bounds and bore no resemblance to the disgraceful ravings of Jennifer Rubin or John Podhoretz); paranoid TSA pseudo-security practices (about which he has written hilariously); and bigotry in general. This provokes the ire of a great deal of the extreme right, including the Jewish far-right. So the extremes on all sides dislike him a great deal, and they are disliking him more with every passing day.

The trouble with Jeffrey is that he thinks independently. He doesn't fit neatly into any simple category. As far as I can tell he is basically a liberal, but with some hawkish views (especially on some Israeli wars and Iran, that I strongly disagree with), and other ideas that don't fit well with a kind of dumbed-down knee-jerk liberalism. So conservatives don't like him because he's basically a liberal and liberals don't like him because he thinks critically enough to take plenty of "deviant" positions. He's keenly aware of and writes frequently about his Jewish identity and all matters Jewish-American. But he resists knee-jerk thinking here too, particularly on matters regarding settlements and the occupation, and is a powerful voice against Islamophobia. So anti-Semites don't like him because he's proudly Jewish, and Jewish absolutists don't like him because he strays from the reservation when he thinks it's important, either pragmatically or on principle, to do so.

Goldberg's willingness to take on Israeli orthodoxy over settlements and the occupation was recently played out on Twitter in an extraordinary exchange he had with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon. Goldberg harassed Ayalon remorselessly about an absurd YouTube video Ayalon produced and has been promoting. It is a remake of a settler video and essentially argues there is no occupation, so there are no settlements, and strongly implies the occupied territories belong to Israel anyway. On his blog, Goldberg correctly noted that the video "argues, in essence, the following: The West Bank belongs to Israel now and forever, so fuck off." On Twitter, Goldberg (@Goldberg3000) bluntly told Ayalon (@DannyAyalon), “Your entire project is designed to legitimize Israel’s hold over the territories forever.” When Ayalon accused him of engaging in “1984” tactics by drawing logically unavoidable conclusions about the deputy foreign minister's intentions from his own statements, Goldberg devastatingly replied, “You, of all people, invoking '1984'? Your government supported a bill that punishes free speech! Talk about Orwellian." Part of the exchange was catalogued and analyzed by Tablet.

For this blasphemy, Goldberg was subject to a mandatory ritual lapidation by the self-appointed Beth Din at Commentary magazine, delivered with tremendous wrath and furious anger by none other than the high priest himself, Jonathan Tobin. For Goldberg, he wrote "the mere mention of Jewish rights… is wrong." In Tobin's worldview, Goldberg is a heretic because, “To speak of the West Bank as disputed territory rather than 'occupied Arab land' is beyond the pale, because it hurts the feelings of the Palestinians and puts the two claims on a level playing field." Both Tobin and Ayalon are, of course, perfectly aware of the small mountain of UN Security Council resolutions, all voted for by the United States one might add, that clearly hold that East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights are occupied territories and Israel is the occupying power. But what are the small matters of international law and requirements of peace, or for that matter the rights of millions of Palestinians, when it comes to the metaphysical, transhistorical, divinely-ordained and indisputable Jewish “right” to all of “The Land of Israel”?

As I noted in a recent episode of Al Jazeera English's The Stream program that was largely based around the Ayalon video, anybody is entitled to their opinion about the occupied territories, but because the Security Council is the legal and political arbiter of such matters in the international community, we can state as a legal and political fact that these territories are occupied by Israel, end of story. In other words, you can have an opinion that the sky is green if you like. None of the rest of us are bound to take that remotely seriously, and we are perfectly entitled to laugh in your face when you say so or, as in this case, detect something more sinister in the deception. Tobin accuses Goldberg, in effect, of lying about supposed “Jewish rights” in the occupied territories in order to sustain, "the mainstream Jewish liberal conventional wisdom to which he subscribes." Presumably this is a reference to the outrageous heresy of belief in peace with the Palestinians.

The attacks on Goldberg from the far-right do not, of course, begin or end there. On his blog he reports recently receiving the following love letter: “Pamela Geller is right, you want to see America and Israel destroyed. Why do you love Muslims so much? Are you a secret Muslim?” In this case the motivation was not his opposition to the outrageous Ayalon video but his strong stance against Islamophobia (he was one of the strongest supporters of the rights of the backers of the Park 51 planned lower Manhattan Islamic Center, a.k.a. “the Ground Zero mosque”). And Goldberg has been one of the most persistent critics in the mainstream American media of Geller, Robert Spencer and other professional Islamophobes.

Much of the far-left also has a profound distaste for Goldberg, including the Jewish ultra-left. Max Blumenthal rather hilariously described him as the "Chief Rabbi of a one man island," although this metaphor makes no sense whatsoever. Neither does attacking someone one thinks is completely irrelevant, or as the analogy implies, has no audience at all. Some left wing critics acknowledge that he's not exactly without any audience, such as Joseph Dana, who recently referred to Goldberg as “the dark lord of American Zionist hasbara.” Well, if all of this is the work of Netanyahu's American “dark lord of propaganda,” the Israeli government's public diplomacy is in much worse shape than even I thought it was. Goldberg is also, needless to say, a favorite target of the oddball Mondoweiss website (as am I). The intellectual and moral character of that site can be simply gauged by the fact that its proprietors, Philip Weiss and Adam Horowitz, have seen fit to publish articles questioning the right of anyone to sit in judgment of Palestinians who commit drive-by shootings against random settlers, including pregnant women, implicitly defending, therefore, a fairly cold-blooded variety of murder.

Indeed, these attacks from fringes only makes sense, and only really occur, when there is a belief that the intended target has an audience and is genuinely influential. They are an acknowledgment that one is having an effect and an impact. And for the Guardians of Purity, those who think for themselves are especially dangerous. There is a vast amount, especially about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that Goldberg and I disagree about passionately. But one thing is for sure: I never know exactly what to expect from him. And I doubt any of my readers know exactly what to expect from me either. Key perspectives become obvious over time, but people who think for themselves are likely to throw out curveballs on a regular basis, and this is the thing that the Guardians of Purity hate more than anything else: not inconsistency, but consistent independence of thinking.

In some cases it is the influence alone that I think accounts for the objections. I have several friends who are staunch liberals but not ultraleft, who are not Arabs or Jews, and who are not that heavily invested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or anything around it, yet who have expressed a strong distaste for Goldberg which they have been unable to fully explain to me. As best I can understand it, there is a strong objection because they perceive him to be a kind of arbiter of Jewish liberal opinion in some sort of an unhealthy, hegemonic manner. It almost sounds something like the resentment Booker T. Washington used to face from those who thought all “respectable” African-American public opinion and major funding for community organizations needed to be approved by “the Wizard of Tuskegee.” I'm afraid I don't understand this. Maybe I'm just not close enough to the inner workings of the Jewish American community, but it seems to me a very heterogeneous bunch, and honestly I can't see that the Emperor Goldberg has a particularly vast dominion or endless brigades of lockstep followers. That he is influential is without question; all the more reason to be glad when he takes on Israeli extremists, including the deputy foreign minister, or Islamophobes, or what have you. But the unquestioned arbiter of a mass body of important opinion? Really? I have detected this resentment factor, but I haven't fully comprehended it.

It should be obvious that in spite of our many disagreements, I identify with Goldberg in this one respect: being the subject of campaigns of ideological and ethnic purity from the high priests of the True Faith on both extremes of the spectrum simultaneously. An amazing amount of balderdash was spewed out last week in a press release by the Zionist Organization of America about the American Task Force on Palestine in general and me personally, and it's only the most recent and noteworthy example of attacks on ATFP and/or me from the Jewish far-right. By the way, the vice-chairman of the ZOA recently wrote in the Jerusalem Post that Israel should annex all of the West Bank but provide neither votes nor citizenship to the millions of Palestinians living there, which tells you pretty much exactly where they're coming from. And of course there are the daily love letters to me from the Arab extreme left, including more than one website largely devoted to praising my every statement and two twitter "parody" feeds that are, sadly, underwhelmingly unfunny. Not a week goes by that I'm not described online by somebody as a “terrorist,” a “jihadist,” or a “radical Islamist” on the one hand and a “traitor,” a “collaborator,” and an “Arab Zionist” on the other hand. It goes with the territory. Such are the perils of life in the political center, the rejection of dogma in favor of independent thinking, refusal to adhere to prefabricated formulae, resistance to the dictates of stage-managed rituals of ethnic solidarity, and the willingness to say what one actually thinks knowing full well these are the inevitable consequences.

As with all sustained and coordinated vitriolic attacks, I suppose one must take these things as a compliment, because they are certainly an acknowledgment that one is having a major impact, or at least is considered, by the self-appointed enforcers of ethnic and/or ideological purity, profoundly threatening. These communal comisars are, of course, stultifyingly predictable in their own thinking. Indeed, they are frozen in non-thought. The thing that alarms them the most is an independent thinker willing to take nuanced, balanced and, worst of all, unpredictable positions based on reason and principle rather than ethnic affiliation or prefabricated ideologies. So in the end, the trouble with Jeffrey (and the trouble with Hussein for that matter) is strongly analogous to the Trouble with Harry: what to do with an inconvenient, disconcerting, unsettling, and, ultimately, terrifying presence that disrupts the otherwise idyllic space of the pristine ideological imagination?

The costs and benefits of Palestinian UN options

Talk delivered at the 65th Middle East Policy Council Capitol Hill Conference, "Arab and Israeli Peace Initiatives: A Late Chance for Negotiations?", July 25, 2011. For video of the event and a full transcript, click here.

 
 
I’m going to look at what looms ahead potentially at the United Nations in September, because that seems to be the most immediate diplomatic and political context, from a Palestinian perspective anyway, and has huge repercussions.
 
First of all, I’d like to put this whole conversation in its context, at least the way that as I understand it, and also the way the Palestinian leadership and a lot of Palestinians who are talking about some kind of U.N. initiative in September, understand it.
 
The first point is that while it’s certainly true that there are a lot of Israelis and Americans and Europeans and others who are frustrated at the lack of progress diplomatically, the lack of viable, working peace process or any negotiations, Palestinians live under occupation. And they uniquely find the status quo not only untenable but unbearable, intolerable. And that has very profound implications for Palestinian leaders and the Palestinian political scene, because while it is frequently alleged on the Israeli right and on the Arab left that the leadership in Ramallah of the PLO and the PA is content with the status quo because their rule in Area A of the West Bank is fairly stable and relatively unchallenged, this is, I think, completely wrong.
 
Over the medium and long term, they’re not content at all, because they understand that if their policy and their program of achieving Palestinian statehood and independence through – primarily through diplomacy and negotiations, augmented by state-building and other measures is seen by the public as having permanently failed, they will be finished in Palestinian society, that they don’t have a future beyond that approach. And when that approach is shelved, people will look elsewhere. And who they’d look to is not mysterious. A lot of people posit the emergence of a third force – that could happen – but right now, the alternative to the PLO and the PA is sitting there in Gaza. We know exactly who it is, what they say, what their agenda is. And I think we can speculate about the consequences to the Palestinian national movement of an Islamist takeover of that cause.
 
So the status quo, in fact, is totally unacceptable to the Palestinian leadership in spite of whatever stability they have in the areas that they control in the West Bank and despite of these accusations. The breakdown in diplomacy after the direct talks failed and particularly after the United States was unable to get Israel to agree to a three-month extension of its partial temporary settlement freeze moratorium, in spite of a very attractive and generous package of inducements, led, I think, the Palestinian leadership to conclude that the process as it’s structured now is simply dysfunctional, it’s simply not working for them; and if they continued to rely primarily on – for their long-term goals on a process that is dependent on Israeli enthusiasm for making an agreement and American determination, that really they were surrendering themselves too much to a process that they couldn’t control and in which they didn’t have sufficient initiative or agency.
 
So there was this tremendous desire to find an alternative formula, an alternative path forward diplomatically, while at the same time continuing to stand strongly against violence and these other principles that they are committed to. And I think also there’s a kind of subtext here that’s important to appreciate, which is that this frustration over the past couple of years with Prime Minister Netanyahu, with his cabinet and with the American role – not with the Obama administration particularly but with the American role generally – has led many Palestinian leaders to want to find a way of demonstrating to these two parties that it has actually viable and maybe even powerful alternatives, that in other words, it’s not completely dependent, that it has other options and second-best scenarios, so to speak. So this is another impulse, I think, that’s very important.
 
Now, the other really crucial thing to understand, to contextualize these ideas, is that the official position and, I think, the real position of the PLO leadership, as continuously emphasized by President Abbas, is that they prefer negotiations to any kind of U.N. initiative, and it’s understandable, as I’ll explain, because virtually every idea about approaching the U.N. carries with it significant dangers and cost. So it’s completely understandable that from a Palestinian point of view, this is perceived as a kind of leverage to get negotiations restarted if they possibly can. In fact, today, Abbas’ quote is this is: negotiations is our first, second and third choice. This is literally what he said. So he’s really trying to emphasize how much they would like to negotiate.
 
And what they’re asking for, looking for, are clear terms of reference, which have not been forthcoming, and a framework for the negotiations, which also has not been forthcoming. They’re interested in President Obama’s speech and the framework that was suggested by it: talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon land swaps and focusing – although this makes both parties uncomfortable – on borders and security first. They’re potentially open to that.
 
There were two extras, two little fillips thrown in by the president for both parties:  one, for the Israelis, that the Palestinians ought to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, whatever that means, which I think is the right answer to that request – well, what does that mean? Please provide a definition. And I think that ought to at least make the request a little clearer. And for the Palestinians, a full and phased withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the territories that will become a Palestinian state. That’s fairly new. That’s a new formulation anyway, from the United States. And it was important.
 
But nothing has been achieved to create terms of reference or a negotiating framework out of that vision. And as a matter of fact, the Quartet at its last meeting was unable to reach any consensus on this. It was apparently three to one over this Jewish state question and maybe some other divisions. And the European Union is also rather badly divided, with its last meeting issuing a rather anodyne statement.
 
So not only has the West not produced a clear, working framework or set of terms of reference or anything like that; I think it’s fair to say that Western policy is extremely divided, unusually divided, on this subject. Really, the role of the Quartet until now has been to give international backing to American-led initiatives. And that’s failed to be produced. I don’t think it’s ever happened since the founding of the Quartet, frankly. So you have on top of everything else a kind of breakdown in the coherence of the Western approach to the specifics of negotiations, which are essential to restarting them. And that only pushes the Palestinians further toward the United Nations. However, none of the options, as I say, is cost-free to say the least. And I just want to look at each of the three main ones that have been considered or discussed publicly.
 
When they first started talking about this in public and people started speculating about it in public, the terminology that was usually used was that the Palestinians would look for recognition from the U.N. in September, which is meaningless, because the U.N. doesn’t recognize states. States recognize each other. The U.N. has member states. So it was assumed that what Palestinians would do – and it’s still widely assumed what Palestinians would do is submit an application to the secretary-general to be referred to the Security Council, which is required for a recommendation to the General Assembly and a two-thirds vote by the General Assembly, which would make a potential state, a member state, of the United Nations.
 
I don’t think there’s much doubt the Palestinians could get the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, but there’s also no doubt that the United States will veto this in the Security Council, and so it won’t happen. And there is a significant potential cost to a confrontation with the United States over the question of statehood in the Security Council, which I think is putting it rather mildly. I’ll illustrate it only by reminding you of the veto cast last year on the question of settlements, which effectively killed that issue, because ever since then, Israel has had in effect a kind of a free hand on settlements. It announces settlements all the time, and there’s virtually no international response. The last thing I heard was Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief saying she was "disappointed" by some very provocative announcement – which is the mildest possible language – and even muted Palestinian responses.
 
So for the time being, that sort of shelved the issue. Now, I really think it behooves everyone to think very carefully about repeating that potentially on the issue of statehood. I mean, the issue of settlements is bad enough. So a confrontation with the United States in the Security Council over the question of statehood carries with it simply enormous political and diplomatic costs for the Palestinians, which is why I think it’s less likely than likely, in spite of the political pressure to do it.
 
The second thing that was talked about quite a lot was some kind of a resolution in the General Assembly under General Assembly Resolution 337, the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution from 1950, that was designed to get around vetoes by a Security Council member. It was prompted by American frustration with continuous USSR vetoes in the late ‘40s on the question of Korea. And this particularly animated the Israeli press because it permits member states to take various coercive actions to meet breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and whatnot. But its practical implications seem very, very nebulous because there already are states that have been practicing sanctions and boycotts against each other in all kinds of conflicts without any 337 Resolution, and that includes the Middle East Conflict. And it doesn’t go to the question of statehood or the question of membership. It seems entirely off point, frankly, and without practicality. So we haven’t really heard much about that since people looked at it carefully.
 
The idea that’s dominating the conversation now, at least in public, is the idea of a Palestinian application, either instead of a move in the Security Council to request full U.N. membership recommendation to the General Assembly or after it, would be a request directly to the General Assembly for non-member state status. Right now, the Palestinian representation in the U.N. is the PLO observer mission, which is not a non-member state.  It’s a political entity, observer mission. And there are a number of those, in particular the EU and the Holy See.
 
And that would require, as I understand it, 50 percent plus one, which the Palestinians would certainly get. And this is appealing in some ways and also not appealing in some other ways and carries very significant costs if it’s pursued. The first thing that it wouldn’t do, of course, is it wouldn’t establish an independent state of Palestine. This just would be kind of a declaration by the U.N., by the General Assembly – that's all.
 
I think it’s hard to imagine it accomplishing the goal that President Abbas and others keep sort of suggesting it might. I mean, they don’t really put it in the context of non-member state status, but this is how I take it anyway, of getting on a more equal footing with Israel in the diplomatic register. And particularly, there’s an emphasis on wanting to negotiate about the future of the territory of another state, not the territory of an undefined area under military occupation. I am not sure that such a vote in the General Assembly would actually accomplish that in practice.
 
Let me tell you, however, about what it might achieve. What it might do is first, as at least some people are hoping, is possibly give the Palestinians access to the International Criminal Court.  It’s, I guess, conceivable, since I can’t see anything that absolutely precludes a Palestinian entity that is a non-member state in the general assembly at least trying to accede to the Statute of Rome and become a part of the assembly of parties at the International Criminal Court. It’s theoretically possible.
 
But there are a couple of problems with that. And first of all, would this status actually be taken as real state status, especially when it comes to the question of territory? And the question of territory is very important for the ICC, because Israel is not a party to the Statute of Rome, which means that Israeli citizens cannot be prosecuted based on actions they take within Israel or because of their status as Israeli nationals.
 
What the PA tried to initiate in January of 2009 with a letter to the ICC was an authorization to the court to have jurisdiction or request that the court exercise jurisdiction in the territories nominally or supposedly under the control of the PA, including Gaza – this really was kind of a reference to the Gaza War – because if the PA or Palestine were regarded as a state by the ICC, Israel could be liable for actions committed within the territory that is assumed or recognized to be under the control of that state, if any.  So you see the importance of territory here. So this non-member state might not be understood to actually control territory in any kind of sovereign way, so it might become extremely complicated.
 
However, I do think this has been one of the guiding concerns of Israel about all of this, because the Statute of Rome has several elements that might be seen as very threatening and alarming to the Israelis, should they ever fall under it. All belligerent parties are potentially liable to war crimes such as, you know, unlawful use of force against civilians or property or whatnot. But there are two things, two passages that might apply – that might particularly apply to the Israelis.
 
One is that the Statute of Rome specifically lists settlement activity and the transfer of population into an area under military occupation as a war crime. This must be alarming to the Israelis because there’s no doubt – the Security Council has reaffirmed many times that this is an area – the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights for that matter, are under Israeli occupation and that Israel is the occupying power. So this is a concern.
 
There’s also a crime called crime of apartheid, which is described roughly as a system of discrimination favoring one ethnic group over another, with the intention of perpetuating that system. That last part might be the out there, but I think if you looked at any sort of political system or social system anywhere in the world, probably the system that Israel operates under the occupation falls closest to meeting that definition than any other. It’s obviously a vulnerability.
 
As I say, it’s not at all certain or even likely that such a recognition, or such status accorded, by the General Assembly would actually give Palestinians direct access to the ICC or give the ICC, in its own mind, jurisdiction over the territories it claims.  But that’s one possibility that’s been discussed. The ICC, when they received the letter in ’09, made no determination. They received it without prejudice, and they never came to any conclusion about it. Whether this would help them do that – although statehood was obviously an issue, territory was obviously another issue for them – whether that would resolve this issue or not is very much in question.
 
The other thing that appeals, I think, to Palestinians about this idea is that there have been 16 non-member states in the history of the U.N., not including the Vatican, the Holy See, which is currently the only non-member state. And if you allow for states that have united – Vietnam and Germany – all 16 of those are now member states of the United Nations. And this history must be, at least in an aspirational sense, very appealing to the Palestinians.  If a state of Palestine can become a state observer – and the Vatican has never wanted to become a member state – and became the latest state that intends ultimately to become a member, it might be, they would hope, difficult to prevent that in the future.
 
There are costs. I’ll try to explain these significant costs. First is Israeli unilateral retaliation, which they’ve threatened. They’re currently talking about revoking or abrogating the Oslo Agreements, whatever that might mean – possible annexation, who knows. There’s American retaliation. Congress has threatened the cutoff of aid.  And the U.S. is the single biggest donor annually to the PA, not if you include all the EU, but alone. That’s a significant amount of money that’s at stake here, plus general relations with the United States, which is very important.
 
Finally, the Israelis have the idea of countering any Palestinian majority in the General Assembly with a group of 30 states that would be small in number but represent the most powerful, influential countries: most of the West plus Japan. And they would present this, in effect, or maybe even overtly as the camp of the so-called “civilized world,” and claim that all these countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America might be with the Palestinians, but, you know, the important countries, the “civilized world” or something like that, they’re with us. And this might be another kind of victory for Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
 
So, all these options carry with them very serious costs. And all parties, including the Palestinians, have a very serious day-after problem; what do they do the day after? And particularly, from a Palestinian point of view, if any of these measures is seen as a diplomatic “success,” but nothing changes on the ground for Palestinians and because of Israeli retaliation the loss of U.S. aid or other measures, things actually get worse as a consequence for people’s daily lives, plus the frustration, there is a potential for an outbreak of popular anger.
 
Now, people look at the nonviolent movement in the West Bank and the nonviolent nature of a lot of the Arab uprisings and hope – and I hope so too – that if there is another explosion of anger, that it would take a nonviolent form. But the occupation is the system of control and discipline. I do not think the Israelis have many options of dealing with a sustained campaign of nonviolence other than the use of force eventually. And there are many Palestinian factions who are totally committed to armed struggle and violence and would certainly take advantage of that kind of situation. So how long it could stay nonviolence, even if it started in a nonviolent way, is extremely questionable and would be a headache for the Israelis and the PA as well.
 
So there are very powerful incentives, which is the subject of this panel, to resume negotiations, for everyone, but such talks might be indirect. Even providing a framework, even providing a road map or especially providing terms of reference that is seen to be meaningful might be enough to stave off any kind of train wreck or confrontation.
 
And the most obvious way out is for everyone to agree that Palestinians would seek a mission upgrade, not a change of status exactly, to keep the PLO observer mission as the Palestinian presence in the U.N. but with upgraded rights and privileges, sort of EU-minus, since they probably can’t aspire to have all the privileges of the EU without provoking some kind of politically damaging, diplomatically damaging confrontation, but they could get more rights and responsibilities and privileges than they have now. That would be a kind of diplomatic victory.
 
I think the bottom line is that the Palestinian leadership politically and diplomatically needs an incentive not to do this. They need a political reason not to do this. They certainly need something they can turn to their public and say: This is why we decided not to. If they’re left with absolutely nothing, they’re going to be in an extremely difficult political situation and also diplomatic one. And that might precipitate something that would harm – a confrontation that would harm all parties and that would be best avoided.

The evolution of Syrian policy towards Palestine and the Palestinians

Talk delivered at the ATFP/Carnegie Endowment briefing, "Owning a Piece of Palestine: Syria’s Assad Regime and the Palestinian Question," July 27, 2011. For an audio recording and full transcript of the event, click here.

 
The policies of the Hafez and Bashar Al-Assad regimes in Syria have systematically undermined independent Palestinian national leadership and asserted control over the Palestinian cause and movement. These policies did not arise in a vacuum, but rather are a continuation and intensification of traditional Syrian approaches to the question of Palestine. These Syrian efforts to “own a piece of Palestine" — if not the whole thing, at least as an issue — are not unique among the Arab states. Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and others have also been involved in efforts to deploy this issue in the service of their own foreign policies. None, however, has been as adamant about its right to define and control the Palestinian issue, the subordination of that issue to a broader Arab agenda which it also defines, and to consistently oppose and undercut the independent Palestinian leadership by supporting opposition movements first from the far left and more recently the religious right under the Orwellian rubric of “independent opposition.”
 
As the Ottoman Empire was being dismantled following World War I, most Syrians, Palestinians and other Arabs regarded Palestine as “Southern Syria,” and particularly during the era of Prince Faisal's rule in Damascus, agitated for the “reunification” of a greater Syria as opposed to the creation of several independent states. Faisal was seen as the one leader who might unite a broad alliance of Arabs to both unify a "greater Syria" and, from a Palestinian point of view, be the vanguard of a broad-based Levantine opposition to Zionist ambitions. Over time, however, the Palestinian national movement gained an increasing sense of independence in several stages. First, after the downfall of Faisal, there was a need to focus on defending Palestine from Zionist plans to establish a Jewish state rather than reunification with the rest of "greater Syria." Second, before, during and immediately after the establishment of Israel, several Arab states, particularly Syria, Egypt and Jordan were maneuvering to try to both mitigate the damage it caused to them and to foreclose each other's ambitions.
 
After the collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961, and particularly the crushing defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, Palestinians were confronted by the unavoidable necessity of creating independent national institutions and decision-making. Several Arab states sought to control this process, but Palestinians proved adept in playing one off against the other to gain as much space as possible. Syrian governments initially supported Fatah as an insurgent challenge to the first incarnation of the PLO, but rapidly turned against the organization, at least at the ideological level. From the 60s through the 90s, Palestinians were divided between three main perspectives: 1) independent nationalists led by Fatah; 2) Arab nationalists led by the PFLP; 3) Marxist-Leninists led by the PDFLP. Syrian regimes strongly preferred the second two groupings, but even more their own self-created "Palestinian" institutions, particularly the PFLP-GC and As-Sa'iqa, as well as Syrian dominated elements of the Palestine Liberation Army. All three of these forces came to blows with the mainstream national leadership throughout the decades.
 
This pattern was intensified following the establishment of the Baathist regime by Hafez Al-Assad in the early 1970s. As a Baathist, Assad was by definition part of the absolutist Arab nationalist camp, however within the Baath party he was leader of a pragmatic and Syria-first camp. From these twin and often seemingly contradictory ideological positions he continuously harassed the PLO for decades, frequently accusing its leadership of treason and betrayal of the Arab and Palestinian causes, while at the same time unabashedly asserting particular Syrian national interests and imperatives, including occasionally bluntly resurrecting the assertion that Palestine remains, in essence, “southern Syria.” This ideological oscillation between maximalist, absolutist forms of Arab nationalism and strident assertions of Syrian particularism and primacy gave the Assad regime a unique ability to harass independent Palestinian national leadership on multiple fronts simultaneously.
 
The main Syrian ideological position, or the one repeated most consistently, was that the Palestinian cause was subordinate to a broader Arab revolution, and that Palestinians should be a vanguard of transformation in the entire Arab world first, before their own cause was attended to. The PLO, particularly under Yasser Arafat, essentially took the contradictory stance that while Arab states and societies had a responsibility to assist the Palestinian cause by whatever means possible, the Palestinians nonetheless had a completely free hand in decision-making. In early decades, this PLO expectation included launching attacks against Israel from the territory of those states, with or without permission. Plainly neither of these stances is, on its face, politically functional or defensible, and reflects not only strongly opposing but also fundamentally unreasonable positions.
 
The Assad regime also repeatedly confronted the Palestinian national leadership with force, including numerous assassinations, proxy conflicts and occasionally direct armed conflict. This was most dramatically expressed in Lebanon, where in the 1970s the Syrians consistently sided with anti-PLO elements and militarily intervened on behalf of forces confronting the Palestinians and their allies. It was even more starkly revealed by strong Syrian backing for Lebanese Shiite forces, as well as direct military intervention by their own forces, in the “war of the camps” when the PLO tried to reassert its presence in Lebanon following the 1982 Israeli invasion. However, despite decades of relentless effort, the Syrians were never able to gain control of the Palestinian movement or place its subordinates in leadership positions.
 
In the late 1980s and early 90s — following the Gulf War, the first intifada and the collapse of the Soviet Union — both Syrian and Palestinian calculations shifted. The PLO completed the process of moving away from a program of armed struggle to one based on negotiations and eventually entered the Oslo Accords with Israel. Syria, on the other hand, became the leading Arab state opponent of this approach and rhetorical champion of Arab rejectionism. However, it shifted its support from left and nationalist opposition groups, which had lost support and momentum after the collapse of the USSR, to right-wing Islamists, particularly Hamas.
 
While the PLO had carefully avoided numerous efforts to get it to locate or relocate its headquarters in Damascus, understanding the implications of such a decision, for the bulk of its existence Hamas' Politburo and much of its military command has been based in the Syrian capital. By shifting its attention from left and nationalist Palestinian opposition to that based on the extreme religious right, in spite of the ideological incoherence of this position, the regime of Bashar Al-Assad has continued the tradition established by his father of confronting and co-opting the Palestinian national independent leadership and agenda by whatever means possible.
 
Events since the Syrian uprising began illustrate the cynicism of this approach. The manipulation of border regions on this year's Nakba and especially Naksa days; the killing of at least 11 Palestinians by the pro-Assad PFLP-GC at the Yarmouk refugee camp; the virtual split with Hamas because of its inability to side openly with the regime against the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood; and the recent move to recognize independent Palestinian statehood in contradiction to all past ideological pronouncements and almost a century of Syrian policy that has opposed such independence, all demonstrate that for this regime, as with the last one, the Palestinian issue is a card to be played in foreign policy, regional affairs and, at long last, in a bid to clinging to power by any means necessary. In fairness it should be noted that other Arab states have also tried to manipulate the Palestinian issue to similar ends, although none with the same intensity and harm caused by that of Syria. It's also worth noting that almost none of the Arab states have had any comment on the brutal suppression of the Syrian uprising by the regime, and that includes the Palestinian national leadership.
 
Were the regime to survive its present extreme difficulties, it is almost certain that the rhetorical recognition of an independent Palestine would prove as cosmetic as Syria's recognition of Lebanese independence. In neither case have the regime and its supporters truly accepted that these are independent societies and states, and in both cases efforts to exercise Syrian hegemony, at an absolute minimum, over their leaderships and decision-making is virtually guaranteed. And so is a determination to continue to "valiantly fight" against Israel… at least until the last child in Gaza and southern Lebanon, that is.

Male hysteria in the bell tower: Buñuel’s El as the primary source for Hitchcock’s Vertigo

Alfred Hitchcock's 1958 masterpiece Vertigo has been the subject of so much commentary and analysis — especially since its re-release in 1983 after it had been removed from circulation for 10 years along with four other Hitchcock classics — that it is extremely difficult to write or even think anything new about the film. Some would say that it's been done to death (“oh God, not another Vertigo essay,” etc.). However, I'm about to undertake that quixotic mission not once, but twice, on the Ibishblog (hopefully in rapid succession), and this is my first offering on the subject.

What I'm suggesting here, in a nutshell, is that the (as far as I can tell) completely overlooked primary source outside of Hitchcock's own work for Vertigo is Luis Buñuel's 1953 classic El, one of the earlier of his quasi-surrealistic Mexican melodramas that have received far too little attention in critical circles. I don't think there's any doubt that Hitchcock and Buñuel were keen observers and admirers of each other's work, and the parallels between the two films are extremely profound. Both deal with male hysteria about women and loss of identity as a primary theme and have crucial sequences involving jealous, controlling men throwing, or threatening to throw, the women they seek to possess from colonial Spanish-style bell towers. Of course one can't, and I don't intend by any means, to simply let that observation stand as a case on its own, but it surely qualifies as exceptionally powerful prima facie evidence of a deep connection between the two films.

El and Vertigo share a common theme, one that is a major feature of art throughout the ages, and deeply connected to cinema in particular: male hysteria. In most cinema, the possessing, devouring (and often murderous) gaze is implicitly male, its fixation the fetishized, objectified female form. Male hysteria, in this case, refers not simply to neurotic symptoms, but to those directly connected to male anxiety about women: control and possession of women, the psychic and social implications of such control, and its powerful role in the construction and maintenance of an illusory sense of male identity and ego. It reflects, of course, not only the loss of identity but also the threat of emasculation. Historically hysteria was considered entirely a feminine phenomenon, for many centuries beginning with the ancient Greeks, linked to the bizarre notion that the womb itself as an organ (hystera in ancient Greek) could actually physically relocate itself for various reasons, creating physical and behavioral symptoms. Before Charcot and especially Freud, these notions persisted although there was a brief period of recognition of male hysteria in the 18th century, especially in Britain, when it was described as “the English Malady.”

In spite of the resistance from general culture and medical thought to embrace the concept of male hysteria until the 20th century, it's been a consistent theme of art since ancient times. In his invaluable book Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness (Harvard University Press, 2009), Mark S. Micale listed writers such as Burton, Shakespeare, Mandeville, Hume, Cheyne (author of The English Malady), Johnson, Wordsworth, Mill, and Flaubert as notable investigators of male hysteria and its various symptoms. I'd argue the list is actually far longer, and includes most of the canonical writers of Western classical literature, the Renaissance and all stages of modernity and postmodernity. In other words, in my view, the theme is virtually ubiquitous.

However, there is a particular affinity between the cinematic medium and the theme of male hysteria, particularly because of the centrality of the power of the gaze. In the outstanding essay, Male Hysteria and Early Cinema, Lynne Kirby examines the way in which Hale's Tours in the first few years of the 20th century used early cinematic train images to provoke fear and fascination with the new medium in the audiences. Both cinema and train travel, when first introduced, created widespread anxiety and even panic. The combination was irresistible. The shock of cinema was invoked to re-create the shock of train travel, often to devastating effect. Kirby argues that the train-related hysteria experienced by late 19th-century males was a key factor in permanently demolishing the idea that hysteria was exclusively a female phenomenon, and that the obsession of early cinema with the train as an instrument of trauma links film directly to that realization.

She appropriately quotes Walter Benjamin as noting that, “film is the art form that is in keeping with the increased threat to his life that modern man has to face. Man's need to expose himself to shock effects is his adjustment to the dangers threatening him. The film corresponds to profound changes in the apperceptive apparatus – changes that are experienced on the individual level by the man in the street in big-city traffic, on the historical scale by every present-day citizen.” Kirby suggests that cinema itself, at its earliest stages, produced de-gendered subjectivities in audiences: passive, traumatized, “feminized” male viewers and “masculinized” women. The intimate connection between the medium and this cultural crisis of patriarchy is fully played out in both El and Vertigo.

Hitchcock was an obsessive watcher of other people's films. He had a miniature cinema in his own home and, by all accounts, watched a new movie almost every night. His debt to Eisenstein is completely obvious and he acknowledged that on many occasions. There are other instances of direct influence that are quite obvious, and I think Luis Buñuel is a rather obvious case in point. In the 40s, Hitchcock composed a dream sequence in Spellbound with Buñuel's early collaborator and friend Salvador Dalí, which is in many ways interesting but also profoundly disappointing. The two were not a great fit artistically, for obvious reasons. Hitchcock was not a surrealist, while Dalí was only a surrealist, even in his “paranoid” period of paintings that can exhibit at least two distinct images depending on how they are viewed. Buñuel was not particularly well-known or admired in the United States during his period of exile from fascist Spain in Mexico during the 1950s, in which he made primarily surrealist-tinged melodramas. Without going into any details beyond the comparison I'm making here, I think it's obvious that a great exception was Hitchcock, who obviously admired his fellow master filmmaker.

El investigates a somewhat different version of male hysteria from Vertigo. El is about jealousy and paranoia that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: an easily accomplished union destroyed by almost deliberate self-sabotage. Vertigo is about fantasy and longing for an unattainable object, an object that is a construct of the mind of the delusional Scottie Ferguson and that he inevitably destroys. In El the destruction is aimed at the self and the relationship; in Vertigo it is aimed equally at the object and the self, in a total obliteration of any form of rational coherence. Yet both films are about the inability of a male protagonist to control a female object of desire. In both films, neurotic symptoms give way to deeper, underlying delusions and, ultimately, outright psychosis (that, at the end, we understand was there from the beginning). Their subject matters are therefore not precisely the same, but rather parallel and complementary.

However, there are strong indications that El served very directly as the primary antecedent for Vertigo. A great deal of work has been done in cataloging the influences on and sources for Vertigo, but if anyone has included Buñuel's 1953 classic, I'm not aware of it. For example Ken Mogg's essay The Fragments of the Mirror: Vertigo and its Sources exhaustively looks at potential influences on Hitchcock's masterpiece, but makes no mention of El. This is remarkable because on one obvious point, there is no mistaking the connection.

No image is more closely associated with Vertigo than that of the bell tower at the Mission San Juan Batista, a set constructed by Henry Bumstead, Hitchcock's brilliant art director on the film (and several others). Both Madeline and Judy die by falling from the bell tower. Indeed, it's impossible to think of Vertigo without immediately thinking of various images inside and outside of the bell tower, in particular the shattering final shot of Scotty standing, arms outstretched in limp defeat, as he looks down on the consequences of his crazed, careening set of maniacal actions.

El opens with credits that are entirely shot over the image of a bell in a bell tower. This is not any old bell tower, this is one in Mexico, as the Mission San Juan Bautista would essentially have been during the “old California days” before the territory became part of the United States. Madeline tells Scotty when she first describes the scene that it is a “village in Spain.” Indeed not. It is a village in Mexico. Not only do the two films share this iconic image as a defining motif, Buñuel gives us a template for the deaths of both Judy and Madeline. And it's impossible not to note that in both films, religion is associated with obsession, sexuality, danger and death. The bell tower, after all, is the highest point, the extremity, of a church, and source of the call to the faithful to attend prayers, but in these films it is also the scene murder, mayhem and symbolic rape. The suggestion, of course, is that taken to its extreme, like all obsessions, religion is a powerfully destructive force.

The opening sequence of El, which is an elaborate set piece during a high mass in a grand Catholic church (likely to appeal to Hitchcock's deeply Catholic sensibilities), is, in spite of the ambient noise of the service, essentially an exercise in what Hitchcock called “pure cinema.” It relies entirely on framing, montage and camera movement to tell the story, rather brilliantly, and there is no way that the artist responsible for the "pure cinema" of, for example, Marnie's deft escape from the Rutland office in spite of the cleaners would not have admired this. Buñuel was probably as much of a devotee of “pure cinema” as Hitchcock, and both of them have significant passages in almost all their films of it.

The scene depicts the sexually fetishistic and indeed masochistic ritual washing of the feet of pretty young altar boys by the priest, Padre Velasco, all officiated by rather pompous lay helpers including our protagonist. The scene is not only fetishistic, but ritualistic and extremely theatrical, with numerous shots of huge crowds in the cathedral straining to look at the priest's abjection before the novices whose feet he is worshiping. The most fetishistic image of all is the symmetrical row of bare novice feet waiting to be washed and kissed. The foot fetish theme, observed and aided by Francisco, who is one of the deacons whose job is to pour the water into the basins with which each quasi-catamite foot is cleansed and adored, is then repeated by him as he turns and casts his gaze across the row of feet among the worshipers. The shot pans over an analogous, echoing, row of them, only to return (in a classic Buñuel camera movement) quickly to a pretty pair of young, elegantly clad extremities. A similar “pure cinema” gesture is repeated in Buñuel's much later masterpiece Belle du Jour, as the unnamed title character's feet are shown drawn to, recoiling from, and then drawn back to the fetishistic brothel in which she eventually prostitutes herself.

At this point in El, the camera pans up, revealing an elegant, demure young woman who apparently immediately captures Francisco's imagination. At his possessive gaze, which she does not return or seem to acknowledge at first, she looks down, demurely, as if embarrassed by his sudden attention. Her gaze slowly rises to meet his intense stare. An obsession has begun. In an important contextualizing shot, the camera pulls back through the crowd in the cathedral, leaving the scene of fetishistic sexual/religious ritual and the instant attraction it seems to have engendered between the to-be couple, re-emphasizing the social gaze and the religious context of permissible fixation in which the drama is taking place.

The differences between Francisco's obsession with Gloria and Scottie's obsession with Madeline are obvious. In El, it is religiously and culturally inflected if not determined, whereas in Vertigo it is, to some extent at least, constructed by a deliberate criminal conspiracy. But there are some crucial similarities. One of the most important of these parallel themes is the tendency of both Francisco and Scotty to view Gloria and Madeline/Judy as disembodied objects, focusing on discrete aspects of their physiology or attire as their essential attributes. Francisco has a foot fetish. Scotty has a hair fetish. Scotty is fascinated by Madeleine's spiral hairdo, and it is the final flourish in his remaking of Judy into Madeleine: he cannot have her hair done in any other way. Elster calls his attention to it as well. There's also the repeated fetishistic focus on Carlotta's necklace, and, in the eeriest scene of all in Vertigo, the close-up shots of the lips, nails and hair of Judy as she is being re-transformed into Madeleine on the obsessive, hysterical instructions of Scotty.

The two characters have a marked tendency to obsess about the discrete parts of the female objects of their desire, as opposed to the person as a whole who seems irrelevant, uninteresting, unfinished or unsatisfactory. Everything must be right, but the discrete elements are individually greater than the sum of those parts. An anti-Gestalt is in effect. Even when Judy is finally and apparently satisfactorily recreated as Madeline — and a whole greater than the sum of its parts seems at last to have been achieved for Scotty — Carlotta's necklace — the ultimate fetishistic object in Vertigo — asserts its primacy and shatters the cumulative effect of the summation of the parts. Leaping off of the mirror in his gaze, coming to life from his dream, this fragmentary object single-handedly destroys his illusion and undoes the campaign to reimagine Judy as Madeline. There is much more to be said about this moment and this object in another essay, but what is important to note here is that in both of these films the synecdoches are invariably much more important than the totality of the desired other.

Francisco sees Gloria from afar in formal settings, many of them religious or reverential. She appears aloof, demure and inaccessible, but also caught up in the semi-spontaneous and un-staged impromptu moment in a theatrical environment supposedly not designed to produce this effect. She refuses his initial advance, registering a degree of shock at his boldness in a holy place, as he extends his hand to her and she walks off with an older woman, presumably her mother. Madeline, on the other hand, seems uncannily unaware of Scotty's rather unmistakable and barely disguised presence as he follows her around San Francisco on her merry dance, spiraling downward into himself. As he leaves the church in an effort to follow the two women, Francisco is briefly waylaid by Velasco and two other priests. When he tells them he must go do something “important,” Velasco admonishes him that, “if it's important, it's not good for Christians!” He has been warned.

Francisco lives in a bizarre house that is one third gothic, one third Art Nouveau and one third Antonio Gaudi. It doesn't have any analogues in Vertigo, certainly not Scottie's apartment, unless it is the sheer weirdness of Scotty's own mind. But it does call to mind, to some extent, Manderley in Hitchcock's first American movie Rebecca, and its “Alice in Wonderland” disproportionality between various figures, especially the young wife, and the exaggerated physical dimensions of the dwelling itself. In this case the strangeness of the flowing fixtures are another element. They certainly represent the odd amalgam of incongruous, warped ideas at war in Francisco's brain.

In Vertigo, these are expressed more directly in Scotty's actions, visions and delusions. In El, they are manifested in the physical structure itself, although perhaps it could be argued that the weird, spiraling, undulating landscape of San Francisco itself is Hitchcock's larger analogous framework to Francisco's house (in this sense, Scotty's home is not Francisco's, but San Francisco). This is, of course, emphasized by the idiotic priest Velasco's declaration that the house's architect, apparently guided by “sentiment, emotion and instinct… not reason,” must have been the opposite of Francisco who is so “normal and levelheaded.” This echoes Elster's disingenuous description of Scotty as the “hardheaded Scot,” when, of course, he is the ultimate romantic, and indeed delusional, ultimately, psychotically so. Both of these men have cultivated a manifest appearance of normalcy, levelheadedness and rationality, but both of them are in the grip of profoundly irrational, neurotic and indeed psychotic impulses.

Between the protagonists in El and Vertigo, there is a marked class difference. Francisco is fantastically wealthy, much closer to Gavin Elster, whom he somewhat resembles physically. Scotty is a man of “fairly independent means,” meaning he can freely retire from the police force and offer to support Judy, but he lives modestly, drives a middle-class car and shows no evidence of extravagance. Francisco is obsessed with his supposedly lost land in Guanajuato, and this drives his manifest neurosis, behind which lurks a more malevolent, misogynistic and psychotic streak. Scotty's neurotic symptom is acrophobia, the fear of heights, his vertigo, which is the screen behind which his own misogyny and psychosis lurks from the very beginning. So while their manifest symptoms and psychopathologies are very different, Francisco and Scotty share some deep-seated latent pathological tendencies that link the two films' images and concerns. Francisco's obsession, like Scotty's, is deeply rooted in the early 19th century, in this case his alleged ownership of large areas of Guanajuato, and in Vertigo the urban legend/historical legacy of the mad Carlotta and her unnamed lover/abuser. Both men are obsessed by the past of old Mexico and California, a Spanish colonial legacy and familial past that haunts them in their hysterical male fantasies of possession and desire.

Francisco is a control and neat freak about everything. Scotty is fastidious and careful, and obsessively controlling with Madeline and above all Judy, but mess and clutter don't seem to bother him. Scotty also seems to be satisfied with vague accounts of the urban legend of Carlotta, while Francisco is insistent on the details of documents so old (his lawyer tells him they are, after all, early 19th-century deeds) that they are no longer legally enforceable. Yet the need to control the narratives swirling around and haunting them, and through which they define their identities, is a powerful analog between the two characters. Both are repeatedly advised to leave well enough alone. Neither is capable of doing so, and take great offense at their allies who suggest it.

When Francisco enters the church for the second time, in a repetition compulsion looking for Gloria, he enters a very similar space in a very similar way as Scotty does in his entrance to the old chapel at the Mission Dolores while following Madeleine into the cemetery garden. The shot is extremely similar, even eerily so, and both are accompanied by haunting organ music. He stares at her from behind, with her hair done up in a bun, reminiscent of Scotty looking at Madeleine at the Palace of the Legion of Honor. But in this case, rather than being icily and preposterously indifferent to his presence, Gloria feels his gaze immediately, and becomes perceptibly excited and/or uncomfortable by it. She deliberately leans back to hear what it is he has to say to her. This is not the undead, aloof, ghostly ice queen Madeline. This is a warm-blooded woman who responds to male approaches, whatever the outcome might be.

Francisco confesses he's been coming to the church on a daily and nightly basis (though his role in the opening scene suggests he might be doing that anyway), on the grounds that he's been waiting for her to return. Repetition compulsion is in the air. She turns with her hand on her heart, apparently affected, and looks at him with wild-eyed amazement. She leaves quickly, but he follows her out and makes his pitch. She says she can't see him anymore, and the chase is on. His car follows hers, as Scottie follows Madeleine. In another instance of Hitchcockian or, Buñuel-esque, “pure cinema” Francisco observes Gloria meeting in a restaurant with her fiancé from outside the window. Her back is to him, just as Madeleine's is to Scottie in his first sighting of her at Ernie's restaurant. The affect is similar: jealousy, plotting, and a desire for possession.

Francisco knows and goes to visit the fiancé, who is an engineer at a construction company, and like Gavin he builds things (he calls the damn he's working on, “a hopelessly complicated job,” as Francisco's project also proves to be), although in this case it is Francisco who is constructing something. In Vertigo, Elster's shipbuilding construction is a metaphorical invocation of his elaborate murder plot, subtly in motion in the background of his first conversation with Scotty in his office. Francisco invites them both, and her mother, to come to a dinner party at his surrealistic mansion. Gloria is taken aback by Francisco's appearance as the host. As part of his pitch over dinner to Gloria, Francisco launches into a soliloquy about love at first sight, or more properly, the "amour fou" that was so beloved of the original Surrealists, including Buñuel. He insists that love cannot be built over time, but is immediate; that it emerges between people in an instant, and is instinctive, irrational, and, implicitly, self-destructive. Naturally he says this looking directly at Gloria. Another of the guests describes this as “a poisoned arrow.”

This also, apparently, is Scotty's view. His rational choice would have been Midge, or anybody else. Yet he is drawn instinctively to a woman who doesn't exist, seems to be insane and suicidal, is certainly at least completely disturbed, and who he believes is already married to an old school chum. His infatuation couldn't be more absurd or false, but it appears utterly irresistible and instantaneous. So obviously, Francisco and Scotty have similar perspectives on the matter of romance. Francisco thinks the love for a woman is “nurtured from infancy, and that a man walks past 1,000 women then suddenly meets one… that instinctive one! She fulfills a dream, answers the longing, this is a man's lifetime wish.” This might have been Scottie speaking at Ernie's.

As the party continues, Gloria is aware of Francisco's devouring, ravenous gaze and is both excited and alarmed by it. At the moment of her discomfort, the scene is disrupted by a commotion and explosion of dust from a storage room as Francisco's butler is trying to uncover a bridge table. This cluttered, dirty, profane interior space recalls the storage room behind the flower shop which is the first place Madeline leads Scotty — and also the outer portion of the fruit cellar in Psycho — a physical manifestation of the sudden, unexpected and unwelcome uncovering of a long-forgotten, polluted and filthy psychic interior – the return of the repressed indeed. As Francisco orders the butler out and the clouds of dust begin to settle, the piles of junk in the room appropriately collapse in ruins.

Francisco emerges to find Gloria staring out of one of the warped windows into the garden. He approaches her from behind, and the camera jumps to the other side of the window, looking at their conversation through the glass darkly. They converse animatedly and excitedly, but all we can hear is the distant piano playing from within. Their conversation is withheld, another gesture of “pure cinema,” and reminiscent of numerous scenes in Hitchcock films in which diagetic dialogue is deliberately, tantalizingly withheld from us. The most obvious example of this in the later Hitchcock classics from the 1950s is in the film immediately following Vertigo, North by Northwest, in which a very important dialogue between Thornhill and "The Professor" is suddenly and ostentatiously obscured by the roar of airplane engines. There are aspects of what is going on that we can only understand at most through our gaze, through the camera lens, and not through any dialogue. Words have been transcended, and deliberately withheld. Both Francisco and Gloria seem excited and even transported, though the asymmetrical and warped quality of the window is heavily foregrounded, and each is depicted in a separate, barred space as if in two separate frames, or two separate connected but unbridgeable spaces.

He passes around her from behind and opens the door to the garden. With their emergence into this space, dominated by ominous life-size statues of praying monks, (foreshadowing Francisco's own wretched and self-created fate), the dialogue resumes. He tells Gloria that his grandfather built the house there because he liked to live near the trees, and she says, “something in me loves trees, too.” Madeleine, in contrast, hates the giant redwood trees, because they tell her that she knows she has to die. But in this case, Francisco and Gloria have found one more thing, other than Catholicism and repetition compulsion, they share in common. Little else will emerge as the plot continues. Francisco grabs her and the two kiss passionately, followed by a fade to black. This is immediately succeeded by dramatic images of construction site explosions and giant rising cranes, the kind of "cheap Freudian joke" Hitchcock engaged in frequently and also publicly derided in himself. The most obvious examples are probably the fireworks during the kiss in To Catch a Thief and the inexcusable and notorious final shot in North by Northwest. Neither of these auteurs trafficked greatly in psychoanalytic subtlety.

It becomes clear that while the dam project has run into significant difficulties, so have the fiancée's plans to marry Gloria. He must return to the capital, but he wishes he never has to, and we already know why. Driving through Mexico City, he almost runs over a harried, dilapidated looking woman, who turns out to be Gloria. She seems horrified and afraid to see him, and turns away, but he is delighted and approaches her. As she explains she doesn't feel well, a large sign in the background reads “Bambi,” another not particularly subtle reference (Disney made that film more than ten years earlier, in 1942). On second thought she accepts a ride from him, in spite of her obvious fear, and on the ride she begins a long film noir-style flashback narrative.

She explains that her marriage went wrong on the very first night, as they travelled by train to Guanajuato (the site of his manifest obsession and hysteria) for their honeymoon. In a scene that is the inverse of the dreadful rape scene in Marnie, on the train Francisco immediately accuses her of thinking of other people and, in effect, being unfaithful. He withholds his affections in a cold, cruel and aloof manner. In the classic paranoid style, he takes her denials to be further evidence of his suspicions of her infidelity. Initiating a recurring pattern of hot/cold male hysteria, he awakens in the night to beg her forgiveness. She grants it without question with a passionate kiss, and onrushing train shots represent both the sexual implications repeatedly invoked by train shots in North by Northwest, and the careening, unstoppable nature of his hysteria. It also, of course, reminds us of the link between male hysteria, trains and the cinema established by Kirby.

The sweeping landscape panoramas of Guanajuato during the honeymoon scenes are highly reminiscent of the loving shots of San Francisco in Vertigo, especially when Scotty supposedly emerges from his catatonic melancholia after the inquest into Madeline's death. Yet Francisco remains largely obsessed with what he thinks belongs to his family, determined to possess what he believes is “rightfully” his, in both land and people. His manifest mania is for “justice,” and so is that of the former police detective and would-be chief of police, Scottie Ferguson in Vertigo. Both, of course, are in fact the agents of the most grotesque injustice, to themselves and to all those around them. In Guanajuato, Gloria meets an old acquaintance, and Francisco's suspicions began to run wild instantaneously. Many of the buildings in old Guanajuato are deeply reminiscent of the "old San Francisco" edifices that characterize both Elster's fantasy world created for Scotty and the scenes of his encounters with Madeline. The low-shot framing of the characters against the buildings is extremely similar, as if they were dominated and haunted by constructions of the past.

Francisco tells Gloria that he is most attracted to her “kindness and air of resignation” (whatever the latter might mean), but she tells him that her mother thought “the opposite,” without elaborating. She says, ironically, that she was most attracted by his “self-assurance,” the one quality he least possesses in reality. She does say, when pressed, that she finds him sometimes “unfair,” an accusation already manifestly demonstrated in word and deed. It couldn't be better calculated to offend a man whose manifest obsession is with “justice,” and he insists few men possess as a keen sense of it is he does. He takes the inevitable degree of umbrage, and this is reinforced by the appearance of the acquaintance at another table nearby. Demonstrating her point, he rushes to the conclusion that she may well be being stalked by the other man (who he also thinks is laughing at him, when he shares a joke with the waiter), which not only undermines Francisco's claim to a keen sense of fairness and justice, but also is an expression of his own stalking inclinations (which he shares with Scotty) and his acute paranoia. Other men are trying to steal his lands and his woman. He is characterized almost entirely by an exceptional degree of hysterical jealousy and possessiveness.

Once back in the room, his foot fetishism and obsessive/compulsive disorder reassert themselves when he picks up her shoes from the floor and lovingly puts them in the closet, rearranging them at the last second facing forward just as they were when he first saw her feet in the cathedral. When he discovers the acquaintance has the adjoining room, he becomes enraged and picks a fight with a man, leading to the acquaintance's ignominious expulsion from the hotel. In his rage, Francisco blames Gloria for everything, and she says the rest of the honeymoon was without any happiness. Upon their return, Francisco doesn't let her see anyone, including her own mother.

One day he unexpectedly bursts into her room in a good mood, presenting her a birthday present and ecstatically extolling the virtues of his new lawyer, who he is sure will be able to finally win his quixotic lawsuit. He announces the man is coming to dinner and orders her to be a perfect hostess, paying close attention to the main guest. Again, the framing divides them between windowpanes that are warped and twisted, and with theatrical curtains for effect. At the party, Francisco demands that Gloria pay close attention to the young lawyer, but inevitably becomes extremely jealous as they socialize and dance together. The lawyer tells her that the case is extremely difficult and that Francisco's optimism is ungrounded, totally contradicting what he has been saying all day. However, Padre Velasco does contrast the supposedly salacious way (it doesn't appear so to us) the lawyer is dancing with Gloria, noting that she is a married woman, with the "proper" manner Francisco is dancing with his partner (in whom he has no interest). There does seem to be an attenuated attraction between them, but no real reason for concern… yet.

The two go into the garden, on the same path that Francisco led Gloria when he first wooed her, between the twin statues of the reverent monks, although in this case other people are also present. When the butler tells Francisco they have gone into the garden, his reaction is palpable dismay, even though he virtually ensured and demanded that outcome. That night she is plainly excitedly preparing for a sexual encounter, but again he withholds his affections, going into his room and locking the door behind him. It is evidently a cruel punishment for a vivacious young woman. It is the beginning of a campaign of ignoring her consistently.

The spell is broken by the return of his incessant masochistic foot fetish, when at dinner after continuing to pretend she doesn't exist, he drops something, looks down and sees her feet. He arises with a look of affection and desire, which provokes an immediate positive response in her. The hot tap is on again, and he kisses her passionately, claiming he will “forget everything,” even though, as she professes, she has "done nothing” to forgive. She protests that the dinner table is not the time and place for such passion, and he immediately accuses her of being infatuated with the lawyer.

That night, the household is awakened in the wee hours by the sounds of her screaming and crying. It's evident some sort of sadistic exercise is taking place, although the nature of it is entirely unclear. Whatever is happening, Francisco's male hysteria is wreaking some kind of terrible vengeance on Gloria, much as Scotty's hysteria is unleashed on Judy in the second bell tower scene at the end of Vertigo. The next day, Gloria tries to enlist her mother's help but Francisco has already intercepted the mother, and frames matters in a way which induces her to admonish Gloria to understand his jealousies and “be good to him,” even after Gloria shows her a bruise on her upper arm. She has a similar experience with Padre Velasco.

When she returns from her meeting with the priest, who was also pre-prepared by Francisco, he follows her into her room armed with a gun. He shoots her point blank, but with blanks, just as Eve Kendall does with Roger Thornhill in North by Northwest. The campaign of terror continues, in the vain effort to exercise total control both over another person and over wild, self-fulfilling paranoid fantasies. She tells her ex-fiancé that after the fake shooting, he “seemed like a different man” and the hot tap began to run again. But, she says, the worst happened that morning. The flashback continues with Francisco ranting on the phone with his new lawyer about the case, insisting that something must be done to win the unwinnable suit. She wants to visit her mother, but he says he needs her by his side, and tells her he's going to take her to “a wonderful place.” And here begins the greatest parallel between Vertigo and El.

This marvelous space turns out to be… a bell tower. The first shot of it is the same one that dominates the credits, looking directly up, vertiginously, into the heart of a giant bell. He drags her down, not up, a short flight of stairs, to look at the people far below. He describes them as “worms that could be squashed in an instant,” recalling both the "god's eye" shots from far above the bell tower in Vertigo immediately after Madeline's death in which Scotty appears as a tiny figure exiting the building to the extreme lower right of the frame, and also the image of Roger Thornhill fleeing the UN building after the murder of Lester Townsend. Francisco praises his own egoism and says if he were God, “I would destroy them all.”

She runs away from him to stand immediately under the largest bell, and he goes to her and tells her that since they are alone “no one could stop me from pushing you.” “What if I took you by the neck and I threw you all the way down?” he asks her, leaping upon her in a rape-like action that seems a prelude to an actual murder. In the struggle, he tells her he could be “sending you hurtling down against the sidewalk!” If this isn't the strongest possible and most immediate antecedent in any work of art I have ever encountered to the deaths of both Madeleine and Judy, I can't imagine what would be (the dragging of Judy up the steps has a rape-like quality as well). She struggles away from him and descends the spiral staircase as the bells toll ominously in the background. Francisco collapses, utterly defeated, and, although sitting, in a rather similar stance of utter confusion to that of Scotty in the shattering final shot of Vertigo, also in a bell tower with tolling in the background.

The flashback is ended, and her former fiancé tells her she seems to enjoy suffering, which at this point is fair enough, and consistent with the unrelenting sadomasochistic nature of this narrative. The same might be said of Scotty and Judy, if not all the main characters in Vertigo. The ex-fiancée says she has ample grounds to leave him, but she says she can't but doesn't know why. He promises to help her in any way he can, and she leaves to go back in the house, but we can see that Francisco has observed who has brought her home. The ex-fiancée and Gloria both appear as tiny figures in the distance, exactly the sort of entities that Francisco, were he God, would like to “squash.” He confronts her, she admits that her ex-fiancé brought her home, and Francisco accuses her of being a slut. She declares that this is the final straw, and she only wishes it were true because he deserves it.

In his utter despair, sure she has been unfaithful to him, Francisco is framed in the bars of the railings of the staircase of his house, a very familiar//// image William Rothman brilliantly established as a Hitchcockian motif of being barred, trapped and psychically inaccessible in his masterpiece of cinematic criticism The Murderous Gaze. The most obvious analog in late Hitchcock is Lila Crane, framed behind similar wooden posts at the top of the staircase to the fruit cellar in Psycho hiding from Norman, yet inextricably pulled towards her confrontation with “mother.” Francisco collapses while going up the staircase, pulls out one of the carpet rods and, in a bizarre and infantile display of maniacal repetition compulsion begins beating out an inane repetitive rhythm against the staircase. A very deep shot of the giant room is streaked with night shadows that form a perfect //// pattern. Whatever the nature of his psychosis, it is approaching its very apex. Gloria, hearing the racket, wisely locks her bedroom door.

The next morning, Francisco is in the grip of a neurotic writer's block: he feels a compulsive need to write a letter to the governor demanding “justice” in his lawsuit, but cannot compose it. He induces Gloria to write it on the grounds that she is as familiar with the details of the case as he is. She dutifully begins, but he stops her, saying that it is too humiliating. He tries to do it himself, but again proves impotent. They determine to write it together, but by dinnertime when the butler asks if they want to eat, it appears she is composing it entirely on her own. The hot tap comes on full again, and Francisco begs forgiveness in an abject manner, telling her the letter doesn't matter and that he has been making her miserable. She assures him she doesn't hate him and he begs her not to leave. He tells her he understands that she would confide in her fiancée out of desperation. She says she didn't want to but she had no choice. He becomes utterly enraged, and says this is the one thing he could never forgive, the cold tap now running at full freezing level.

That night, Francisco prepares a most gruesome and classically Buñuelian male hysterical plot. At the stroke of midnight he prepares a palette of grisly instruments: bandages, gauze, alcohol, razors, scissors, twine and a large needle, fastidiously arranged needless to say. Placing these items in the pocket of his dressing gown, he picks up two large strands of heavy rope, each tied into large nooses. His intention is not mysterious, no matter how grisly it might be. This concept, which in the works of the Marquis de Sade (Justine, to be precise) is been described as “stricturing," the sewing up of the vagina, is a recurrent theme in the films of Buñuel, an impulse he plainly felt was the ultimate expression of male hysteria and desire to control women (Buñuel was a great admirer of de Sade, like all the early Surrealists, and especially 120 Days of Sodom). The nooses, though plainly intended as an instrument of restraint, of course also invoke murder and hanging. As he approaches Gloria's bed, the noose fills the screen, emphasizing again the murderous, life-obliterating quality of the intended act. As he attempts to place the noose-restraints around her wrists in preparation for his grisly operation, she awakens with an appropriately terrified response of screaming and fighting back. The servants are roused. Francisco recovers the evidence of his attempted crime, and flees the room but collapses in hysterics on the ground of his own bedroom, sobbing inconsolably and beating the floor like a child.

While this concept is present in a number of Buñuel films, he mercifully never allowed it to actually be enacted, much in the same way he prevented the trapped aristocrats in The Exterminating Angel from actually descending to the point of cannibalism, something he later said he regretted. How far one should go with these gruesome tropes is hard to gauge, but Buñuel's repeated reference to the idea is plenty for me. Indeed, the original French poster for his last masterpiece, That Obscure Object of Desire, features a pair of female facial lips crudely sewn together with twine. It's an arresting image, and probably as much as I'd ever want to see, although I will admit to owning an original copy of the first French poster. If it were not a metaphor, I wouldn't want to see it, let alone own it. So, if Buñuel can be accused of a certain diffidence, cowardice, and even a lack of courage, in this case that's what I appreciate. The suggestion is more than enough, thank you very much. Much the same can be said about all the intimations about necrophilia in Vertigo. The idea is there, but the act is not, and we should all be grateful for that.

Francisco is awakened to the news that his wife has fled, loads his gun, and goes off in pursuit of her about the town. In his quest, Francisco is pursued and preceded by giant shadows of himself, doppelgängers come to life more extravagantly than ever, and imagines that random servants are laughing at him when they clearly are not. The total psychotic break has certainly occurred, or at least reached its apex. He believes he spots her in a car, and in a perfect repetition of his initial pursuit of her by taxi, he jumps in a cab and orders the driver to follow her. The repetition compulsion motif is another very clear linkage between the male hysteria in El and Vertigo. The lost object is to be found by retracing steps and reenacting initial gestures. Scotty also repeatedly mistakes vaguely similar women in familiar spaces for Madeline, though they really do not resemble her at all. Francisco follows what he believes to be Gloria and her ex-fiancé into the same cathedral he first saw her, fondling his gun. He confronts the couple, but it is not her. Like Scotty after the death of Madeline, he has seen the lost object in all kinds of vaguely reminiscent distant images.

Francisco collapses in despair, but when an old man walks by him and coughs, it sets off a chain reaction of him imagining the entire church alternately laughing at him, coughing, and cutting back to normalcy. Many make horned gestures, the signs of the cuckold. This seems to have influenced a culminating scene in Roman Polanski's third installment in his claustrophobic trilogy, The Tenant. It also invokes Shakespeare's most extreme example of male hysteria, Leontes in The Winter's Tale, with his repetitive, thumping, pounding declaration of false cuckolding and horns: "Inch-thick, knee-deep, o'er head andears a fork'd one!" Francisco even believes that Padre Velasco is mocking him, and attacks the priest, turning on everything he supposedly believes in and destroying his carefully crafted public image of piety and respectability.

The dénouement of El features Gloria, a young boy (obviously her son), and a man who is not immediately identifiable approaching a monastery. Cassock-clad monks wander around, like the statues from Francisco's garden suddenly come to life. She is with Raul — her ex-fiancé, and now clearly her husband — and their seven or eight-year-old boy. They receive an exemplary report about the behavior of Francisco from the prior, who is surprised to discover they have named their son Francisco. Interestingly, when the monk asks if it is their son, they avoid the question and leave. He may be named Francisco because he is Francisco's.

Wandering again in the maze-like church garden, at least somewhat reminiscent of the graveyard at the Mission Dolores in Vertigo, the prior meets Francisco, who asks him if the visitors have left. He says he saw them and asks if it was “the engineer” and his wife, and if that was their son. He is told it was indeed. In a perfect Buñuelian ironic gesture, Francisco claims ultimate vindication: “then I wasn't as mixed up as they claimed. Time has proven my point!” He winds his way down a garden path towards a black hole in an ivy covered wall, veering wildly from side to side, like one of the statues from his garden come to life, totally obliterated in identity and unable to keep anything straight, including his own path.

Gloria and her husband had asked if he was going to be admitted into the order, and were assured by the prior that he was not suitable material. Francisco is no longer Francisco, and not even a Franciscan. He is reduced to nothing. He continues to veer wildly towards oblivion, and the music includes very loud and striking bell tones, much like the final passages in Bernard Herrmann's score of Vertigo. The film fades to black. (Several pieces of music in El echo Herrmann's magnificent score. There is a swirling passage in the otherwise unremarkable opening credits of El with its bell tower backdrop that sounds very reminiscent of a recurring motif in Vertigo. The piano music that is being played towards the end of Francisco's first dinner party in which he tries to win over Gloria as he walks over to the piano near where she is standing is also extremely reminiscent of the Wagnerian Liebestod quotations in the theme for the "love" sequences in Vertigo.)

Much like Scotty at the end of Vertigo, Francisco is staring into oblivion. He has lost his identity. His worst fears, self-created and self-inflicted, have come to life. He can claim vindication, but at what cost? His neuroses were a cover for a much deeper psychosis. His male hysteria, which seemed to be aimed at female targets, emerges as more of a self-directed, self-inflicted self-destruction. There is nothing of the old Francisco left, just as at the end of Vertigo, Scotty looks down from the edge of the bell tower into the abyss, into oblivion. Both films end abruptly with the male hysteric heading towards a black hole of nothingness, having lost their identity, and having consumed themselves in mania.

With a few exceptions, Buñuel's Mexican melodramas during his exile from fascist Spain are greatly underappreciated globally, and especially in the United States. The proto-feminist classic Susanna; his Mexican version of Wuthering Heights, Abismos de pasión, by far the best film adaptation of that novel (not even available on DVD in our own Region One at present, which is a scandal); and, of course, El, among many others are, in effect, forgotten masterpieces. But I think it highly unlikely that as attentive and obsessive a student of cinema as Hitchcock was disinterested in the great films Buñuel was producing in Mexico in the 1950s. While I can't demonstrate with any certainty that Hitchcock watched El before constructing Vertigo I find it almost impossible to believe that he didn't. The parallels are overwhelming, and if it is coincidental, it falls in the category of uncanny synchronistic phenomena, more than anything else.

There's no doubt at all that the differences in the films are more striking than the similarities. In no way could it be argued that Hitchcock “ripped off” Buñuel in Vertigo. Hitchcock's film could not have been more personal, idiosyncratic or unique. And, there is a difference in quality. Vertigo is one of the greatest pieces of 20th century art in any medium. El is in every sense superb and masterful, but it does not rise to that level. What I'm arguing, however, is that the parallels between El and Vertigo are powerful and not coincidental. In particular, it seems almost impossible to me that the bell tower scenes are utterly disconnected. Enormous work has been done in attempting to catalog the antecedents to Vertigo. I think there's little doubt that El surpasses all non-Hitchcock candidates as a direct predecessor, and indeed a direct influence, on that masterpiece.

Moreover, Buñuel's classic, like his entire Mexican quasi-surrealist melodrama ouvre has been grossly underrated, ignored and devalued. Like El, many of these superb films, while posing as potboilers, are cinematic art of the highest order, and had a considerable impact on other directors. It is, after all, implausible to think that Buñuel began as one of the most important pioneers of avant-garde cinema and cinematic art, and surrealism generally, but was simply wasting his time in Mexico (or perhaps producing the occasional noteworthy minor achievement), and then suddenly sprang back to life in Spain and France in the late 60s and early 70s producing the acknowledged masterpieces of the end of his career. In fact, I haven't seen any Buñuel Mexican surrealist melodrama that doesn't qualify as cinema art of the first order, the great bulk of them being masterpieces of the highest rank. And I think I've made my case that it's not really possible to talk about influences on Vertigo outside of Hitchcock's own work without putting El at the very forefront of the conversation.