How Saudi Arabia Can Mend Fences With Biden and the Democrats

After the Obama and Trump eras, mutual suspicions abound, but Riyadh has several potential approaches to improve relations with an incoming Biden administration.

Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s emergence as president-elect following the November 3 U.S. presidential election presents a number of implications for the relationship between the United States and Gulf Arab countries. One of the most immediate and difficult of the likely challenges will be Washington’s relations with Riyadh under a Democratic administration. An indication of these challenges is clear from several comments by Biden and his senior campaign advisors as well as other leading Democrats in recent months: Biden has said some Saudi leaders should be treated as “pariahs” and has vowed to curtail U.S. support for Saudi involvement in the war in Yemen. This would be a significant break with the policies of the administration of President Donald J. Trump, which emphasized strong and personalized relations between the president and his family and the Saudi royal family, strong commercial and energy ties and military contracts between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and steady U.S. support for Saudi Arabia in the Yemen war, particularly through weapons sales.

Democratic Party Grievances

U.S.-Saudi relations have remained strong since the 1940s, despite repeated periods of strain. But during the Trump era, they became a partisan issue in the United States, as a series of substantial grievances created an unprecedented crisis in confidence between the Saudi government and many Democrats. The reciprocal bear hug between Trump and the Saudi government at the beginning of 2017, marked by a high-profile maiden international voyage by the new president to Saudi Arabia, ignited suspicions about the relationship among Democrats.

As the principal opposition party, Democrats criticized Trump’s attack on multilateralism, fixed alliances, and existing trade and arms control agreements. They targeted Saudi Arabia and, to a much lesser extent, the United Arab Emirates, suggesting they were questionable U.S. allies, and they became proxy targets for the Trump administration’s international approach.

The most substantial criticism of Trump’s international policies by Democrats concerned the Yemen war and the administration’s resistance to efforts to limit or prevent any form of U.S. support for the Saudi war against the Houthi rebels. Though the administration of former President Barack Obama had also supported Saudi military engagement in Yemen, the humanitarian crisis greatly intensified and the de facto stalemate in the conflict in northern Yemen became far more evident during the first half of the Trump administration.

The killing of U.S.-based Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government agents at the kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul in October 2018 outraged Democrats and Republicans in Congress. When the Trump administration, especially the president, responded by consistently downplaying and dismissing the killing, it greatly added fuel to the Democratic fire against Saudi Arabia and the U.S.-Saudi relationship. It also helped significantly alienate internationalist Republicans in the Senate, such as Lindsey Graham and Marco Rubio. After Khashoggi’s death, Congress became more serious about legislating limitations on U.S. involvement in the Yemen conflict, including through weapons sales. That reached a crescendo with the first effort by Congress to prohibit U.S. engagement in a conflict via the War Powers Resolution, which received bipartisan support in both chambers of Congress but was vetoed by Trump in April 2019 and therefore did not take effect.

In addition, critics of the U.S.-Saudi relationship under Trump, particularly Democrats, expressed grave concerns about the political crackdown in Saudi Arabia, especially the jailing and alleged abuse of women’s rights activists, such as Loujain al-Hathloul, and writers, such as Raif Badawi. They have also complained about Saudi surveillance of and pressure on government critics living in the United States and Canada and efforts to coerce them into returning to the kingdom to face an uncertain future. An additional source of tension emerged from accusations, which have been supported by the FBI, that Saudi diplomats in the United States helped Saudi nationals flee U.S. jurisdiction to avoid trials on serious criminal charges. Many Democrats also blame Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for being principal instigators against the nuclear agreement with Iran, suggesting they have attempted to drag the United States into a war with Iran on their behalf.

These grievances helped to fuel a narrative among Democrats during the Trump presidency that recast long-standing bipartisan support for the partnership between Washington and Riyadh as a specifically Republican policy orientation. In its more extreme forms, this narrative viewed the U.S.-Saudi partnership as a blunder attributable to Trump personally and his son-in-law and senior advisor, Jared Kushner, who had reportedly developed close relations with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Many Democrats simultaneously developed a narrative about the Obama administration policies toward the Gulf that deemed outreach to Iran and relative distance from Gulf Arab monarchies as their party’s characteristic approach. While largely fictional, this account harmonized well with perspectives viewing the 80-year-old U.S.-Saudi partnership as a wrongheaded, and possibly corrupt, innovation by the Trump administration.

Saudi Suspicions

Many Saudis also misread Obama-era policies as not only solicitous of Iran at the expense of long-standing Arab friends but also as sympathetic to or supportive of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups in post-dictatorship Arab republics. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined in a policy-defining speech on November 11, 2011 that the Obama administration was willing to regard Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties as legitimate participants in the Arab political scene, particularly in newly emerging democracies, but only insofar as they met certain conditions and respected basic democratic norms. Yet once the Obama administration had effectively abandoned support for Egypt’s strongman president and long-standing U.S. ally, the perception began to take hold, particularly in the Gulf, that Washington had decided to effectively support Muslim Brotherhood rule in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Saudi media and others have been openly fretting that a Biden administration could mean a return to such a policy.

In addition, most Gulf Arab countries felt excluded from the nuclear negotiations with Iran and were skeptical of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. They feared that the renewed U.S.-Iranian dialogue would come at their expense, with the unlikely outcome that Washington could abandon Gulf countries to form a regional security arrangement in partnership with Iran. However, Iran’s increasingly belligerent actions and support for regional proxies confirmed that a Washington-Tehran partnership in the Gulf region is practically inconceivable. However, the sense that the Obama administration was unreliable and had failed to give due weight to fundamental Saudi security considerations in this major policy shift toward Iran persisted.

The willingness of the Trump administration to walk away from the JCPOA and impose harsh sanctions against Iran in its “maximum pressure” campaign is a major reason for the Saudi government’s close relations with the Trump White House. Conversely, there are now fears among Saudi leaders that Biden could return to a policy that they felt shortchanged the value of their contributions over many decades to the partnership and threatened their core national security concerns.

A Biden administration would be likely to prioritize efforts to resuscitate the dialogue with Iran, probably under the broad rubric of revitalizing the JCPOA (although that would require negotiations for a new agreement). So, there is potential for renewed tensions if the administration is perceived as making overtures toward Iran again at the Saudi expense, or if Democrats conclude that Saudi Arabia, perhaps along with Israel, has actively impeded efforts to resurrect constructive U.S.-Iranian diplomatic engagement.

Saudi Options

The reputation of Mohammed bin Salman is badly tainted in the eyes of many U.S. officials, particularly Democrats, especially because of the Khashoggi killing. Yet, Saudi Arabia needs a partnership with a major global power to secure its interests and only the United States is in a position to play such a role.

The Saudi government will effectively have three potential approaches to repair this rift: quietly implement a series of modest measures to address existing grievances and hope this is sufficient; make a major overture toward U.S. interests while making it clear that assuaging U.S. concerns was a significant factor in a dramatic and risky policy change; do little or nothing and adopt a take it or leave it attitude and hope for the best.

Small Steps

One option for Saudi leaders would be to begin a quiet dialogue with the Biden administration and senior internationalist Republican leaders in the Senate to address many of the grievances about Saudi conduct without a major policy shift. Saudi Arabia could release women’s rights activists and other prisoners of conscience whose imprisonment doesn’t actually enhance Saudi national security or political stability. Immediately after U.S. news outlets announced Biden’s victory over Trump, senior Saudi diplomats began publicly musing about the possibility of releasing some of the more prominent women activists on humanitarian grounds, possibly linked to the G-20 summit.

In addition, even if it denies that its diplomats had helped Saudi nationals flee U.S. criminal prosecution, Riyadh could quietly assure Washington that steps would be taken to ensure that this won’t happen in the future. Saudi Arabia might even consider returning some of the more egregious suspects even though there is no formal extradition treaty. Saudi Arabia has many options for measures that would convince U.S. leaders that it is trying to bring a modicum of justice to the Khashoggi killing and ensure no such action is ever undertaken in the future, including demonstrable consequences for nonroyal figures widely believed to have played a key part in the killing. And, most important, since a Biden administration would be likely to emphasize the renewed centrality of U.S. diplomacy in foreign policy, Saudi Arabia would be able to work more closely with the United States to help develop a pathway for ending the war in Yemen.

Dramatic Moves

Even the Trump administration made it clear that it wanted Saudi Arabia to end the Yemen war. And Saudi Arabia, too, wants an exit strategy, but Houthi rebels have achieved dominance in most of northern Yemen and demonstrated the ability to threaten Saudi territory directly. As things stand, the Houthis have little incentive to cooperate in helping Saudi Arabia extricate itself from this costly stalemate.

It is unrealistic to expect Saudi Arabia to simply withdraw from Yemen without enforceable security guarantees. But such conditions could be negotiated with help from the United States. At the very least, Saudi Arabia could make clear to a Biden administration the redlines that are minimally required for a Saudi withdrawal: an end to cross border incursions and missile and rocket attacks on Saudi Arabia from Yemen. In addition, Saudi Arabia would surely seek assurances regarding limitations on Iranian and Hezbollah activities in Yemen, but those might prove considerably harder to enforce.

Washington’s assistance could be helpful in rallying the international community to help pressure the Houthis to cooperate with U.N. peace efforts, especially the joint declaration. And it can also help persuade the Yemeni government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to go along with the arrangement. Should Saudi Arabia seriously commit to ending the conflict, lay out its broad terms, and even begin drawing down its presence in the country, that would be seen by Washington as a very significant step forward. If that withdrawal were primarily based on, and legitimated by, more rigorous antimissile defenses and border protection systems, and especially if Riyadh were to acknowledge U.S. government support for these measures, that would be a major breakthrough with Democrats and Republicans.

At least one other major gesture might score points with Democrats. Even though Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain all went to great lengths to heavily credit the Trump administration with the Abraham Accords, which began a process of normalized relations, mainstream Democrats warmly welcomed the development. It corresponds to their model of how international relations in the Middle East should proceed: through diplomacy, the integration of Israel into the region, the strengthening of ties between pro-U.S. powers, and other initiatives to strengthen a multilateral and rules-based international order. As a result, the UAE was able to ingratiate itself with Democrats, undoing a good deal of damage from its involvement in the Yemen war, human rights concerns, and a close association with Saudi regional policies.

Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Salman could repair the kingdom’s image in the United States, especially with Democrats, by also agreeing to normalize relations with Israel. Of course, Saudi Arabia has a series of major concerns its smaller Gulf neighbors don’t share, including the impact on its regional Arab leadership role, its pan-Islamic leadership role, and far more complicated, and potentially volatile, its domestic political scene. Yet it is precisely for those reasons, and because of Saudi Arabia’s prominence and strategic importance, that a diplomatic breakthrough with Israel would be seen as so important by a Biden administration. It would also bring much closer together two of Washington’s key partners in the closely linked efforts to contain the spread of Iranian hegemony and maintain stability and the status quo in the Middle East. It could prompt many Americans to reassess their attitudes toward Mohammed bin Salman personally. Since he is likely to inherit the throne in coming years and potentially remain the Saudi monarch for decades, such reputational restoration is going to be necessary.

Take It or Leave It

Saudi Arabia’s third option is risky but plausible: to effectively do nothing. Riyadh may feel that while it still needs Washington, Washington also needs Saudi Arabia. If the United States wishes to remain a major, if not dominant, global power, it cannot abandon the Gulf region and its energy resources to other regional and global powers or to rampant instability. Even a “pivot to Asia” reinforces the continued strategic and economic centrality of the Gulf states because East and South Asian economies are dependent on Gulf energy. And, while Saudi Arabia needs a global patron, the United States requires a local partner in the Gulf.

The key reason for the longevity of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and its ability to survive numerous major stressors is the value both countries continue to place on it. This was recently again made apparent during the Saudi-Russian oil price war in March. Saudi Arabia demonstrated its unique ability to quickly impact prices. It has two key advantages over most of its competitors, including Russia. It can stop and start production without damaging most of its oil fields, and it remains far more able to borrow money to cover immediate losses. This gives it enormous flexibility regarding production and therefore power over raising and lowering prices. The importance of this to Washington was demonstrated by Trump’s appeal to Saudi Arabia to cut production to raise prices to defend U.S. oil-producing companies and states.

Reviewing the long-standing history of the U.S.-Saudi partnership, Riyadh might believe it remains indispensable to Washington and adopt a “take it or leave it” attitude. This option would be bold and risky, but, given that a Biden administration would undoubtedly seek to reassert U.S. global leadership with an emphasis on traditional alliances and stability, isn’t necessarily doomed to failure either.

With Biden in the White House, Saudi Arabia will be suddenly confronted with significant new challenges in dealing with its indispensable ally, the United States. The good news for Saudi leaders is that they have several potential strategies. The challenge for Riyadh is to choose carefully among the options before it based on a careful reading of early signals from the administration regarding the terms on which it is ready to rebuild trust with the kingdom.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/has-trump-destroyed-america-s-two-party-system-1.1111886

With most Republicans supporting his refusal to concede, how can the US democratic process recover?

The refusal of President Donald Trump and almost all senior Republicans to concede that he lost the November 3 election is easily the most degraded spectacle in modern US political history. It can’t go on much longer, but the damage to democracy the world over could be profound.

For over a week it has been clear that Joe Biden soundly defeated Mr Trump.

In 2016, Mr Trump won the presidency with 306 electoral college votes, though he lost the popular tally to Hillary Clinton by almost 3 million. Mr Biden has also secured 306 electoral college votes, but won the popular vote by over 5 million.

Despite this decisive outcome, for the first time in US history a losing candidate is stubbornly refusing to concede. Mr Trump insists he actually won, but the election is being “stolen” through some massive fraud.

There is no evidence for this whatsoever.

To the contrary, no state election officials report significant irregularities. Although Mr Trump is championing a bizarre conspiracy theory about massive electronic vote tampering, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which is tasked with protecting elections, announced there’s no evidence any votes were changed or compromised and that this election was “the most secure in American history”.

The public overwhelmingly accepts the result. Polls show 80 per cent of Americans understand that Mr Biden won, compared to a mere 3 per cent who think Mr Trump did, with the rest being unsure.

By refusing to acknowledge this clear outcome, Mr Trump and his allies have launched a massive rhetorical attack on the American democratic system, and the very notion of truth itself.

It’s often almost comical. “There will be a smooth transition… to a second Trump term,” a chuckling Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared.

Mr Trump is blocking any start to transitioning the administrative leadership of the US government, which is the world’s largest organisation, thereby endangering US national security including the coronavirus pandemic response as every day sees new record numbers of infections.

So, it’s virtually certain that Mr Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris will be inaugurated on January 20.

In theory, there are four ways of stopping this, but none are remotely plausible.

The first is to get state officials to change the outcome by retroactively invalidating huge numbers of Biden ballots, or at least delaying certification of the results past the required deadlines. If the voters don’t choose you, perhaps you should choose the voters?

The second path is to get courts to intervene on spurious technicalities. Numerous lawsuits are pending, but all are meritless, and none would change the overall outcome. Not even the now-thoroughly Republican-appointed Supreme Court is going to reverse a free and fair election based on no evidence. And lower courts, tossing such frivolous cases out immediately, aren’t even going to give them the chance.

A third path is, as Mr Trump has reportedly discussed, getting Republican-dominated state legislatures to appoint pro-Trump electors despite the vote. None seem interested, and in many states it would be unlawful.

The following timetable is delineated by law and not optional. December 8 marks the practical end of any chance to change the outcome of state elections. On December 14, electors vote in each state and the results are certified. On January 6, Congress holds a joint session, overseen by the vice president, at which votes are formally tabulated and, if anyone receives 270 or more, a winner is declared.

It’s simple, but not always painless. In 2001, then vice president Al Gore had to declare George W Bush the winner against himself although their election was effectively tied and the Supreme Court decided the outcome on a partisan basis. Mike Pence must now do the same for Mr Biden and Ms Harris.

Deviating from this strict timeline would effectively jettison the entire US political system. Mr Trump may believe his continued grip on power is worth that, but very few others will.

If all else fails, a fourth option could see Mr Trump invoking his authority as commander-in-chief to stage a military “autogolpe” (a “self-coup,” as sometimes performed by military or fascist dictatorships in Latin America). Despite the sudden installation in the past few days of several unqualified Trump loyalists to lead the Pentagon, military leaders will never agree, especially since he reportedly called slain American soldiers “suckers” and “losers” and the generals “cowards” and “babies”.

The President needs someone to save him from an election he lost. But if state officials won’t cook the books, courts won’t rewrite the rules, Congress won’t ignore the laws, and the military won’t keep him in office by force of arms, then the election wins.

Mr Trump slowly seems to be getting the message. He almost blurted out “the coming Biden administration” during his Friday coronavirus press briefing, but caught himself. And his new blood-feud with Fox News suggests he’s planning a competing right-wing channel, where he can pose as the “shadow, legitimate president” who “really won”, and continue dominating the Republican Party.

Mr Trump is behaving true to form and exactly as he warned he might, but the complicity of many Republican leaders in this extremely dangerous charade is genuinely shocking.

Together they are communicating to Americans and the world that the US political system is fraudulent, rigged and corrupt, even though it plainly isn’t. And their boasting about how many Republicans won congressional seats in the same election, often on the same ballots, renders their narrative ridiculous as well as patently false.

The clear message to international strongmen is, never accept the outcome of a lost election. Instead stonewall and try to throw out the results. The likes of Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus must feel massively vindicated.

Obviously if Mr Trump could find a way to overturn the election and invalidate democracy, he would. And his party would support him, as always. If he suddenly unearths one now, what else could they say or do?

American presidential election losers have invariably conceded because both parties accepted the basic democratic trade-off: potential wins and losses, with the prospect of future victories.

Yet what are the long-term prospects of a two-party representative democracy in which only one party remains fully committed to respecting elections and is willing to accept defeat without unprincipled chicanery?

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/there-are-reasons-for-both-democrats-and-republicans-to-be-happy-1.1107969

Trump was repudiated but Democrats and Republicans both have reasons to be happy.

Saturday in Washington was like nothing I have experienced in 22 years living in this city. Horns honked, cheers resounded, fireworks crackled and people danced in the streets. It felt like a long, painful war was ending with an almost visceral wave of relief.

Four days after the US election, major news organisations finally and unanimously announced that Democrat Joe Biden had won. President Donald Trump and his allies angrily insist that he somehow is the real winner but they have no coherent narrative to explain why.

Against a backdrop of unprecedented anxiety, the 2020 election mainly produced good news. For many, there’s profound satisfaction that Mr Trump was defeated. Many distinguished figures had warned that a second Trump term could pose an existential threat to democratic institutions, accountability and the rule of law. A major counter-argument was that he lacked the ability, but not the instinct, to push for autocracy.

Any such danger has been avoided.

The presidential win is cathartic for Democrats. It is rare and increasingly difficult to unseat a sitting president.

And the numbers are impressive. In 2016, Mr Trump beat Hillary Clinton in the electoral college by securing 306 votes, though she won the popular tally by almost 3 million. Mr Biden is also heading for 306, but is beating Mr Trump by over 4m popular votes, a double mandate.

Democrats reconstructed the mid-western “blue wall” that Mr Trump grabbed in 2016, including Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania. They scored major breakthroughs in traditionally Republican Arizona and Georgia. Democrats would have salivated over this map 12 months ago, though their hopes became exaggerated more recently.

But there’s much to please Republicans, too. They made surprising gains in the House of Representatives and crucial state legislatures. Control of the Senate will be decided by two January run-off elections in Georgia. If Republicans win both, they can effectively wield a veto over most of Mr Biden’s domestic agenda.

Mr Trump helped inspire the biggest voter turnout in over a century, which was also due to expanded postal and early voting because of the pandemic.

In what was effectively a Trump referendum, no votes prevailed by 4-5m. But there were over 70m yeses, including most of his 2016 voters and significantly expanded blocs of Latinos and African-Americans, particularly younger men who appear to admire his swagger.

So, while many Republicans may be despondent, their party actually did fairly well.

Republican leaders might quietly welcome the potential end of Mr Trump’s party leadership. But their refusal to publicly acknowledge Mr Biden’s victory suggests they are still terrified of Mr Trump’s base, and unwilling to defy him.

American democratic norms and processes prevailed. None of the well-publicised nightmare scenarios played out.

Though an anti-democratic hazard was soundly rejected, the best news of all was non-partisan, structural and institutional. Political systems functioned admirably despite profound social and partisan polarisation and the raging coronavirus pandemic.

Foreign meddling was contained. There was no violence or intimidation at polling places and no effort to disrupt the election process. Irregularities appear minor at worst.

State and local administrators who oversee American elections generally behaved impeccably. Democratic and Republican officials, and countless volunteers and election officers, worked together across the country without incident or rancour.

Americans in their conduct overwhelmingly upheld cherished democratic norms and traditions. The country may be polarised, but citizens on both the left and right appear sincerely committed to these values and mores. This is profoundly reassuring.

Mr Trump may be hoping that the Supreme Court, now bolstered with his latest conservative appointee, Amy Coney Barrett, will intervene and save him, as he repeatedly predicted it would during the campaign. He is going to be deeply disappointed.

This result is not within what is cynically but accurately called “cheating distance”, and no pending case would overturn the outcome. If the court tried to overturn a free and fair election on a technicality, it would create an unprecedented constitutional crisis and do irreversible damage to the institution.

Mr Biden’s challenges will be enormous. He inherits a country still beset by a raging pandemic and struggling economy, and deeply divided along partisan, cultural and ethnic lines.

In his first speech as President-elect, he pledged to end the “grim era of demonisation” under Mr Trump and rebuild a spirit of compromise, co-operation and bipartisanship, but that won’t be easy.

Much depends on what happens in the Senate, through both its composition as determined by the two Georgia run-off races, and the strategy adopted by Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. He ground governance to a virtual halt during much of the Barack Obama presidency, and could choose to repeat that strategy.

Mr Trump ought to help matters by at least acknowledging his defeat, but he seems incapable of that. He appears determined to promulgate a classic right-wing “stabbed in the back” theory that insists he is still the legitimate President, and so exacerbate tensions and further divide Americans.

Reports suggest he might nonetheless be willing to negotiate a normal transfer of power. His terms are unclear, but he faces significant potential criminal charges at both the federal and state levels, and has reportedly expressed concern he may face prosecution when he loses the protection of the presidency. He could be hoping for salvation through the art of the deal.

Mr Trump will probably be the first modern US President to refuse to concede defeat and participate in his successor’s inauguration. More likely is a new media-centred career of insisting that he’s still the real President and American democracy is a corrupt fraud.

He could inflict significant national damage while he is still formally in office until January 20, but he could also be restrained or even ignored, including by subordinates. His options might be more limited in practice than in theory.

Once he’s gone, however unwillingly, much of the country will try to move on. But the willingness and ability of the Republican Party to get past the Trump era remains an open question. The immediate US political future may hang on the answer.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2020-us-election-is-not-just-trump-v-biden-1.1103244

National identity, character, role in the world, and democratic values are all on the ballot this Tuesday.

This week’s US presidential election isn’t just between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, but between two visions of what the country is and ought to be – and everything those competing perspectives imply.

So, what’s really on the ballot?

First is national self-definition.

Mr Biden embodies the view that the US is, essentially, the expression of a set of ideals, founded to realize enlightenment values of democracy, equality, rule of law and freedom. The corollary is that, whenever possible, Washington should use its global influence to promote these values, particularly over time and in the biggest picture.

Mr Trump, by contrast, is the strongest modern proponent of a very different kind of nationalism, a blood-and-soil nativism reflecting the self-interests of a clearly defined, distinctive people linked by history, ethnicity and culture. Hence his abiding antipathy towards all forms of immigration. Since his worldview flows from a radical distinction between “us” and “them”, social diversity is usually regarded as threatening.

Second is international relations.

Mr Trump calls his approach “America First”, but he also clearly views the US as just another country that, like any other, seeks to maximize its competitive advantages. Hence his denigration of traditional partners and alliances, and of any guiding principles in foreign policy beyond narrow, immediate self-interest.

Mr Biden seeks to return the US to an idealistic sense of its own expansive vision, both internally, in pursuit of greater justice and equality, and as a source of order, stability and democratic influence in the world, buttressed by robust immigration. He cultivates a much more fluid sense of where “our” interests and identities intersect or even meld with those of others.

Elements of these conflicting concepts about what the US is and how it should behave in the world have been present since the founding of the republic. But recent developments have forced them into a dramatic confrontation.

In foreign policy, the lack of an existentially threatening and universally accepted adversary such as the former Soviet Union has meant the entire Cold War approach is now up for debate and isolationism is back. The foreign policy establishment has failed to convince ordinary American voters of the benefits of traditional levels and forms of international leadership and engagement, which all too often feels to them like an intolerable burden. That’s certainly how Mr Trump portrays it.

Third is national identity.

Humans are at the beginning of a remarkably thorough and a dizzyingly rapid revolution of life defined by radical new technologies such as artificial intelligence, genetic engineering and nanotechnology. This is clearly going to be more drastic, disruptive and sudden than any analogous past transformation.

The economic components are often mischaracterized as “globalization”, but the reality is far broader. In fact, the way people live and, especially, work, is being dramatically upended, far more quickly than most people can understand or anyone can effectively manage.

That’s all very frightening, and encourages tribalism, nativism and the false reassurance of narrow identities.

In the US, it’s compounded by a fundamental social shift that began in the late 1960s whereby the traditionally all-powerful white Christian majority becomes far smaller and less privileged, and must share authority with other social groups.

Mr Biden represents Americans who embrace this change as the realization of founding ideals and a source of social and economic revitalization. Mr Trump speaks for those who dread these developments and want to fight them tooth and nail.

Mr Biden’s America is defined by freedom and democracy. Mr Trump’s America is built on the primacy of the white ethnic community, its culture and conservative Christianity.

Fourth is the meaning and significance of democracy.

Mr Trump and most Republicans now openly pursue and defend minority rule. For years, Republicans sought to restrict voting and avoid anything that smacked of an equitable one-person, one-vote system. But they always vociferously denied it.

Such evasions are no longer possible, so they just don’t bother anymore. In the current election, having failed to block widespread postal and other forms of mass voting, they are now focusing on intensive and multi-faceted efforts to invalidate millions of already-cast ballots.

Before Tuesday, the astonishing figure of 100 million early ballots will have been cast, in some key states already exceeding the total number of votes in 2016. This is deeply alarming to Republicans.

Mr Trump keeps reiterating that he expects the Supreme Court to secure his victory by disenfranchising huge numbers of American voters through various technicalities. But that would yield an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy.

Hillary Clinton beat Mr Trump by almost 3 million votes in 2016, yet he became President through the federal electoral college system. If Mr Biden secures a significantly larger victory, as seems very likely, but Mr Trump nonetheless remains President, the crisis of legitimacy and structural collapse of democracy will only be matched by the total absence of any practicable legal or constitutional remedies or means of redress – an impossible stalemate.

Fifth is American decline and the prospect of autocracy.

Mr Trump’s autocratic maneuvers consistently intensified during his presidency. His latest, and potentially most damaging, move on government institutions is a new effort to abolish measures protecting the political independence of the administrative civil service.

That would effectively gut 19th-century reforms that began eliminating once-pervasive political corruption and patronage, and resurrect controversies from the 1880s.

But making these jobs political gifts is indispensable to fully realized autocracy. The Republican Party appears to have become a wholly owned subsidiary of Mr Trump’s family business. Given another four years, the entire government could follow.

A particularly insightful commentary on what’s at stake in next week’s election is Richard Byrne’s 17-minute online video play, “A Pair of Shoes“, which subtly reads current battles over American decay and resurgence through Edward Gibbon’s classic 18th-century history, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.

As the play suggests, and millions of Americans obviously understand, the underlying choices on Tuesday’s ballot are extraordinarily clear and consequential.

With most Americans, for once, fully engaged and participating, the US is set to redefine both itself and its relations with the outside world. This election really is that momentous.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/will-democrats-follow-republicans-to-the-fringe-1.1099236

The Future of Both Parties, and Centrist Politics in General, Will be Strongly Shaped by the Coming Election.

There is barely a week left before November 3, when polls close in the most momentous American election in decades, if not a century or more. Fifty-six million ballots have already been cast by early and postal voting. If results are close, counting could go on for days and litigation for weeks. But a decisive outcome could be clear as early as election night.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden’s edge over incumbent Republican President Donald Trump has been amazingly consistent. Since early summer, he has held a strong, typically double-digit, lead in national polls, and smaller but significant ones in most swing states, with almost no deviation.

Democrats are haunted by Mr Trump’s unexpected victory over Hillary Clinton four years ago. Many Republicans appear convinced that he will somehow pull off another stunning upset.

But with the economy struggling and the coronavirus pandemic again surging, the underlying circumstances are radically different. Mrs Clinton was deeply unpopular, but there is no sign Mr Trump has provoked widespread dislike or mistrust of Mr Biden or demonstrated that he is senile or secretly radical.

Early voting data heavily favors the Democrats. Yet Mr Trump could still win, particularly if he inspires a large group of those among his core constituency of non-college-educated white Americans who typically don’t vote to go to the polls on election day. A marked surge of new Republican voter registrations in key states provides the main hope that he will prevail after all.

The all-important Senate, meanwhile, seems a real toss-up and is now the main focus of serious Republican efforts.

Four years ago, many Trump-backers cast the election in starkly existential terms. Now he is being even more lurid and aggressive, warning that a Biden victory would destroy the country, wreck its economy, prompt waves of non-white immigration, and hand power to radical socialists.

This time, however, Democrats and numerous prominent disaffected Republican commentators and operatives (though few serving elected officials) agree that the stakes are historically and nationally existential. Mrs Clinton, by contrast, never took Mr Trump seriously until he won, and no one knew how he would behave in office.

Mr Trump’s campaign proclaims that American culture, capitalism and, in effect, white ethnic power are at stake. Mr Biden’s allies insist that democratic institutions and the rule of law might not survive four more years of Mr Trump. The “soul of the country”, both sides say, is on the ballot.

The outcome will therefore force a far more dramatic reckoning within the losing party than any normal defeat would.

To counter Mr Trump’s narrow but deeply passionate base, the Democratic Party and its own base voters strategically chose to unite, tack strongly to the center and, through the staunchly moderate Mr Biden, build the broadest national coalition they could, including by courting receptive conservatives.

Democrats have bet everything on their center-left mainstream leadership, essentially the old guard from the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama eras. They are basically offering Americans a return to pre-Trump “normalcy” through a familiar, moderate standard-bearer backed by a historically unprecedented bevy of his Republican former opponents who agree that democratic processes and institutions are in mortal peril from the current president.

If Mr Biden wins, this gamble will be strongly vindicated and reinforced. As the clash between Mrs Clinton and Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont four years ago demonstrated, there is a bitter Democratic split between a typically younger and passionate left-wing camp, and the centrist, often literally old, guard still in charge.

That division will persist and perhaps grow. But a Biden victory will mean the new generation of leftists, now led by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, must be patient. They can still pursue control of the party, but will have to proceed cautiously, given the success of the centrist gambit, and, especially at first, the glow of victory.

But if Mr Trump wins, their ascendancy will be rapid. Amid bitter recriminations, the left would surely seize control of the party, shifting it radically in their direction.

Among Republicans, as Mr Trump’s presidency demonstrates, populist hardliners have already decisively defeated and marginalised the centre-right old guard, such as 2012 GOP presidential candidate Senator Mitt Romney of Utah.

If Mr Trump is re-elected, this radicalism will be strongly reinforced, and his personal control become so entrenched that one of his own children may inherit his party leadership.

If Mr Trump is narrowly defeated while loudly charging fraud, and especially if Republicans retain the Senate, the stage will be set for him to attempt a comeback in 2024, health permitting. Failing that, one of his core “America First” supporters – perhaps Senators Tom Cotton of Arkansas or Josh Hawley of Missouri, or the notorious white nationalist TV commentator Tucker Carlson – could take the helm of a doggedly extreme Republican Party.

Even if he is trounced and Democrats take the Senate, a rapid resurgence of the beleaguered Republican centre-right seems unlikely. The base is now so extreme that what is needed is another programmatic Republican de-radicalization campaign, even more extensive than efforts in the 1960s to marginalise the fanatical John Birch Society.

Instead, former South Carolina governor Nikki Haley is poised to try to amalgamate populist Trumpians and traditional Reaganite conservatives. She has strong Reaganite credentials but served as Mr Trump’s UN ambassador without alienating him or his base.

Having painstakingly planted a foot in each camp, she has positioned herself to offer Republicans a viable future under a conservative, Christian woman of color in an increasingly diverse country – a plausible opponent to another Indian-American, Mr Biden’s running mate and possible successor, Senator Kamala Harris.

If Trumpism implodes in the coming days, a new Haley-led conservative fusionism could be the sequel. But there is no sign of any Republican leaders preparing to banish or subdue the increasingly empowered menagerie of fanatics, white nationalists, QAnon and other bizarre cultists in their ranks.

If Mr Biden loses, the US could find itself trapped between two extremist parties, with moderates sidelined in both. But if he wins, centrists and all Americans still committed to traditional institutions of democracy and the rule of law will retain a strong, even commanding, voice into the foreseeable future.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-22/saudi-arabia-uae-should-avoid-an-arms-race-with-iran?srnd=opinion&sref=tp95wk9l

They have an insurmountable lead in military hardware, but should worry about Tehran’s acquisition of technology.

Iran secured a significant diplomatic victory on Sunday when the United Nations arms embargo, imposed in 2007 over concerns about Tehran’s nuclear program, expired. Efforts by the Trump administration to extend it in the Security Council ended in an embarrassing American failure, as did the effort to invoke the grievance mechanism within the 2015 nuclear deal.

The Islamic Republic’s beleaguered President Hassan Rouhani cited the expiration of the embargo as a major accomplishment of the nuclear agreement. At least in theory, Iran is now back in the market to buy and sell conventional weapons. Russia and China are eager to supplyit with advanced jets, tanks and missiles.

This is alarming for its Gulf Arab neighbors, and especially for its primary adversaries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They will be tempted to enter an arms race with Iran, using their deeper pockets — and easy access to American weapons systems — to maintain their substantial technological edge over Tehran. It has been suggested that the UAE’s eagerness to acquire F-35 jets, for instance, anticipates the Iranian purchase of new planes to update its air force.

But the greatest threat to Iran’s neighbors will come, not from any big-ticket spending by Tehran, but from its acquisition of technologies that enhance its homemade weapons. State-of-the-art targeting and guidance systems for missiles and drones can help Iran inflict more damage than planes and tanks.

If the Russians and Chinese are willing to brave American sanctions — and give a cash-strapped Tehran very generous terms — it is conceivable that the Iranians will order jets and heavy armor. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps hasn’t been able to import advanced hardware in decades.

It may not be possible to prevent Iran from following Turkey in acquiring the Russian S-400 missile-defense system, which would be a significant upgrade from its existing S-300s. Moscow will likely argue that the S-400 is defensive, and therefore represents no threat to Iran’s neighbors. (The Russians are keen to sell it to Gulf Arab countries, as well.)

But defensive weapons such as missile-defense systems form a part of an overall integrated military structure, and as significant for offensive as defensive actions. Upgrading its capabilities in this area would greatly strengthen Iran’s strategic position. Even more alarming for the Arab states are prospects of Iran acquiring new offensive missiles and drones. Presumably, a great deal of American effort, whether diplomatic or punitive, will be directed at preventing this.

But in the medium-term, the greatest threat would come from relatively small purchases of precision-guidance technology, to greatly upgrade Iran’s domestic production. Many of Iran’s home-made missiles are based on models acquired from North Korea; these have been significantly altered and, in some cases, improved by Iranian engineers. Iran has also developed substantial drone-making capabilities.

Its enemies have already experienced the potency of these missiles and drones, whether executed by the IRGC or its proxy militias in the Middle East. The most dramatic demonstration came in the missile-and-drone swarm attackagainst Saudi oil installations last year. Now imagine how much more mayhem might be unleashed if those firing off the missiles and drones had better guidance and targeting technology.  

In all of this, the first line of defense for the Gulf Arab states will be the U.S. Treasury’s secondary sanctions on companies, and possibly even countries, engaging in major weapons deals with Tehran. But Iran’s neighbors will also want to be forearmed against the new threats.

While the question of F-35 sales to the UAE has made the headlines recently, the real game-changer in the current proposed package from Washington is the EA-18G Growler, which comes with the latest electronic-warfare technology, including jamming pods and communication countermeasures. This is the kind of weapon Arab states will hope to deploy against more sophisticated Iranian attacks.

But the best way for the Saudis and Emiratis to respond to an Iran armed with more potent conventional weapons to work with the U.S. to create an effective secondary sanctions regime: The Treasury Department will do the heavy lifting, but they can help by refusing to cooperate with entities and individuals that go too far in arming their enemy. They should press China, Russia and former Soviet republics against providing Tehran with greatly expanded conventional firepower.

The Gulf states would also be wise to find a way to end their quarrel with Qatar and present a more unified Gulf Arab front. If they’re willing to be more ambitious, they should create a collective Gulf Arab missile-defense system. And, of course, the whole point of a robust military stance is to facilitate effective diplomacy with adversaries.

All of this can be achieved without an indiscriminate, wasteful arms race.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-20/shutting-the-u-s-embassy-in-baghdad-would-be-counterproductive?srnd=premium&sref=tp95wk9l

A smaller presence would better fit current American ambitions.

Since last fall, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad has been under constant attack by pro-Iranian militias. Now Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is threatening to shutter the vast complex if the Iraqi government can’t protect it. But cutting and running would be a huge mistake.

Every sensible person agrees the giant embassy is a burdensome anachronism: At 104 acres, it is the largest and most expensive American outpost in the world, an outsized relic of the George W. Bush administration. The scale reflects a vision in which the U.S. would be embedded throughout the Iraqi government.

American ambitions in Iraq have long since been downsized, so this giant footprint is an expensive and highly vulnerable target. Toward the end of last year, at the height of Iran’s “maximum resistance” campaign against the U.S., the embassy and other American installations in Iraq came under rocket attack almost weekly.

Eventually, American and British personnel were killed at a military base, leading to counterstrikes on the headquarters of the pro-Iranian militia group Kata’aib Hezbollah, killing at least 26 of its cadres. That group responded by besieging the embassy, which in turn provoked the Jan 3 drone strike that killed senior Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and Kata’aib chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, among others.

Tehran swore Soleimani’s killing would be avenged, and Kata’aib Hezbollah seemed intent on continuing to bombard U.S. positions, including the embassy. In recent days, there have been indications that Iran may rein in its militias, but the reprieve is at best temporary.

For years, U.S. officials have demanded that the Iraq government do more to prevent such attacks. That never happened, because taking on these militia groups, which are technically part of the Iraqi security forces, is politically and practically daunting.

It would appear that Pompeo is serious about the threat to close the embassy. That would be counterproductive, since it would deal a real political blow to the government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. 

The Kadhimi government is the most reasonable and forthcoming one the U.S. has dealt with in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. The prime minister, more than his predecessors, is making a real effort to weaken the pro-Iranian militias. His efforts are being undermined by the threat to close the embassy, which has been received as a victory by these militia groups and their Iranian patrons. The propaganda message is predictable: The U.S. is running away, leaving its Iraqi allies in the lurch.

No one doubts that Washington needs an embassy commensurate with the far more limited diplomatic role it intends to play in Iraq. But such a change must be executed carefully. A safe and secure transfer to a right-sized facility would require the outlay of hundreds of millions of dollars, which must be secured from Congress in advance of any such announcement. It’s also crucial that Washington doesn’t act in a manner that appears to reflect weakness, let alone defeat.

If the new embassy is successfully integrated into the local Baghdad infrastructure for supplies of electricity, water, telecommunications and so on – at least to some extent – that would also intensify the buy-in by Iraqis and broaden the local constituency for wanting the embassy to be where it is.

Douglas Silliman, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq — and, full disclosure, now a colleague at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington — observes that the way the U.S. pulled out of the consulate in Basra in September 2018, played into the hands of Iran and its allies. “A lot of people felt demoralized or abandoned by the U.S. and our allies, who left the field to our strategic competitors. A lot of Basrawis who dealt with us were harassed, kidnapped and killed.”

The lesson for the Baghdad embassy, he tells me, is to look for an option between keeping the presence as it is and shutting it down altogether, both of which would be big mistakes. “But,” Silliman notes, “the first thing is to decide what the main purpose of the presence is, and then suit the infrastructure to fit the mission.”

As with so much else about U.S. policy in the Middle East, the solution to this problem must start with Washington finally deciding what it wants to accomplish.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/for-republicans-amy-coney-barrett-s-confirmation-will-reign-supreme-1.1095537

Although the hearings weren’t remotely interesting, the most consequential development in Washington these days is the confirmation process for Judge Amy Coney Barrett, nominated to replace the late liberal hero Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the US Supreme Court. As President Donald Trump inches closer to possible defeat in the November 3 election, the Republican party finds itself poised for a massive generational victory, finally securing a solid 6-3 conservative majority on the high court.

This apparently unstoppable Senate confirmation realises a project that began in the 1970s. Outraged by 20 years of judicial hammer blows – beginning with Brown versus Board of Education, which effectively prohibited racial segregation in 1954, and culminating with Roe versus Wade’s guarantee of abortion and privacy rights in 1973 – conservatives sought a right-wing court majority.

The gold standard for conservatives was Ms Barrett’s mentor, the late justice Antonin Scalia, but she seems even more right-wing.

For example, Scalia, an ardent opponent of gun control, allowed that, perhaps, the government can bar convicted felons from owning weapons. Not so, says Ms Barrett. Gun ownership rights are so fundamental that the government must prove a significant, imminent public danger in every case. That puts her on the most extreme wing of an already extremely pro-gun constituency.

Both political parties are guilty of putting up nominees who refuse to discuss anything substantial on the ridiculous grounds that it might somehow compromise their independence. So, like all her recent predecessors, Ms Barrett declined any meaningful colloquy.

She refused to opine on whether the President could delay the election (he can’t), or whether it is unlawful to intimidate voters (it is). If asked whether the sky looks blue, she would have probably cited the need to hear arguments and research relevant litigation before commenting.

But the Senators were little better.

Timorous Democrats avoided any mention of Ms Barrett’s membership in a religious group that emphasises male supremacy, speaking in tongues, prophesying and other potentially relevant beliefs. Much as Mr Trump is counterfactually calling the moderate Mr Biden a “socialist”, Senate Republicans denounced Democrats for attacking her faith though they never mentioned it.

All Senators burbled tinned speeches, generally totally unconnected to constitutional law.

It’s a pity, because Ms Barrett is a champion of “Originalism”, a specious doctrine central to the programmatic conservative legal agenda. She said that it means: “I interpret the Constitution as a law, I understand it to have the meaning that it had at the time people ratified it.”

That’s plainly convenient for the political right. But it is absurd. It assumes there is a fixed or identifiable “public meaning” that is somehow defined during the ratification process (although by whom, precisely, and how, exactly, is undefined or contested) when obviously there almost never is.

Clearly, even when different people agree on the same language, they typically have radically different motivations and understandings of what they want it to mean.

Moreover, such legal “Originalists” usually ignore historians, as if only their own legal scholarship provides a genuine grasp of mindsets from the distant past. Common sense and bitter experience strongly suggest otherwise.

It’s also unlikely that the “original” constitutional understandings of 1787 survived the post-Civil War reconstruction and amendments from 1866-1877 that, as president Abraham Lincoln vowed, redefined the country, enshrined equality for all citizens and made the federal government – and not the states – the guarantor of that equality.

Democrats didn’t engage any of this, presumably because there aren’t many votes in methodology. But there are in health care, so Democrats insisted she is being rushed through for a case against the popular Obamacare health insurance law scheduled for arguments on November 10. But that case is so ridiculous that she and a majority will probably reject it.

Instead, Democrats should have emphasised what Mr Trump openly says he wants from Ms Barrett: support in rulings immediately after the election to affect the outcome. If Mr Trump tries to use courts as the primary means to stay in power despite the voters, Democrats may regret not having highlighted it and pressed her more strongly to recuse herself from any 2020 election issues, as would be ethical.

In the long run, all eyes will be on the Roe ruling, which she has strongly denounced, and a set of potential coming liberal reforms.

Washington may soon find itself reliving the 1930s, where a leftover, pre-Depression, ultra-conservative Supreme Court majority consistently blocked president Franklin Roosevelt’s economic restructuring until he threatened to expand its membership. Both sides ultimately backed down.

The potential for revisited “court packing” is the one campaign issue that Democratic nominee Joe Biden has severely mishandled. While “let’s see if she gets confirmed” would have sufficed, he has been repeating: “I’ll tell you my policy after the election” – a mystifyingly clumsy position.

Republicans are focused on controlling courts not only because they remember the liberal gains accrued between the 1950s through the 70s, but also because that’s the least democratic and accountable branch of government. That is bound to appeal to the party mainly of white, non-college-educated, and non-urban Americans, a constituency that is transitioning from being a solid majority to much greater potential vulnerability.

Democrats already see several of the Supreme Court’s conservative justices as illegitimate.

There is a much stronger case today against Clarence Thomas than in 1991, when a former subordinate named Anita Hill stood alone accusing him of improprieties during his confirmation hearing. Many believe Brett Kavanaugh similarly perjured himself. Neil Gorsuch is only on the bench because Republicans blocked Barack Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, claiming that it would be “improper” given a mere 10 months left in the president’s term.

Now Ms Barrett’s nomination is being rammed through while voting is already under way. And all of it is being done by a President and Senate majority elected without majority support.

What the Barrett hearings suggest is that a huge American train wreck over the Supreme Court, and other federal appellate courts, is likely if – as many suspect – Democrats consolidate elected executive and legislative authority in coming years.

If Ms Barrett enters the arena of power as Mr Trump exits it, perhaps even bringing down the Republican Senate majority down with him, she and her conservative colleagues on the Supreme Court may be the most politically powerful and relevant Republicans in Washington for many years.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-10-14/why-hariri-s-return-might-give-lebanon-a-chance-for-reform?sref=tp95wk9l

He’ll find that the country’s political factions are less resistant to change.

After a tumultuous year, Lebanese politics seems firmly rooted in the proverbial square one . Last October, Prime Minister Saad Hariri was brought down by a series of widespread street protests against the entire ruling elite. Now Hariri looks likely to return, possibly as soon as this week.

At first glance, this might bode ill for the prospects of real reforms in Lebanon. But much has changed in the year since Hariri’s resignation. The worsening economy and the catastrophic August 4 explosion in Beirut have helped to soften political resistance to change. If Hariri plays his cards right, it is just conceivable that he could oversee a meaningful shift — however modest — in the Lebanese power structure.

That would require him to persuade Hezbollah, along with its local partners and Syrian and Iranian patrons,  to accept changes in the way the Lebanese state is governed and its resources managed. Some reports suggest the two sides have reached an informal understanding. Harder still, Hariri will have to win over the people who forced him from office a year ago.

Their desire for change is undiminished. Lebanese have made their disgust with the political system, with its sectarian quotas and networks of patronage, abundantly clear. They hold their leaders responsible for destroying their economy and currency, ruining their lives and livelihoods—and for the explosion that shattered their capital. All political factions are under enormous pressure to respond to the growing anger.

Pressure for change is also coming from abroad. Lebanon’s economy needs a multi-billion-dollar bailout from the International Monetary Fund; international investors would be loath to sink money into the country until it has a new IMF-approved framework. But a bailout would come with significant economic and political conditions.

For Lebanese with power and privilege, that means the terrifying prospect of opening the Pandora’s Box of reform. Any IMF-imposed moves toward transparency and accountability in economic management will inevitably impinge on the political elite’s ability to appropriate national resources.

But there are signs that the political class is beginning to accept that without reforms Lebanon would face total social collapse. Even Hezbollah has dropped its formerly adamant opposition to any deal with the IMF. It now seems willing to go along with French President Emmanuel Macron’s plan, which requires the formation of a government of technocrats, and committing to an agreement with the IMF. Other, less powerful leaders like Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt recognize they can’t block or veto such a deal and are maneuvering to join the new government.

Most of the political factions regard Hariri as a useful interlocutor with the IMF. This, taken together with regional and international support, will lend credibility to his claim to speak for the Lebanese power structure in making real concessions.

Even Hezbollah, long his opponents, will welcome Hariri’s return. His departure, and the political paralysis that it precipitated, left the pro-Iranian militia responsible for the Lebanese government, a very uncomfortable position, particularly in such hard times.

Hezbollah much prefers the old arrangement that allowed it to assert its primacy on the issues it considers vital, such as maintaining the  independence of its fighters and military infrastructure, while leaving the messy work of governing to others. Hariri’s return will allow it to once again wield power without responsibility. In exchange, he might be able to extract concessions on debt restructuring and public sector reforms that he can take to the IMF.

Hariri says he will follow Macron’s plan. An early signal of his seriousness would be the independence and credibility of key members of his cabinet—and especially the minister of finance, a position Hezbollah would be loath to fully relinquish. Announcing a truly independent, credible cabinet might win Hariri some leeway from ordinary Lebanese, who would otherwise regard his return with suspicion.

There is much that could go wrong. Hezbollah might yet balk at serious reform, and the protesters who brought Hariri down last October might not be inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt.

But these are desperate times, and what was once unthinkable is now possible. Consider the maritime border negotiations with Israel, which under almost any other circumstances would have provoked outrage among Lebanese. Now, not even Hezbollah can summon any serious opposition to haggling with the old enemy.

Lebanese desperation might — just might — help Saad Hariri to finally move his country beyond square one.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/trump-s-kryptonite-is-thinking-he-s-superman-1.1091782

The US president has failed to recast his fraught relationship with both the pandemic and the society it has devastated.

President Donald Trump had a remarkable vision for how to stage his return to the White House following his time in hospital with Covid-19, The New York Times reports. He planned to pretend to be exaggeratedly feeble, only to tear off his jacket and shirt to reveal a Superman costume. Apparently, he was dissuaded – but the very idea is troubling and revealing.

Mr Trump may be returning to health, but his campaign continues to suffer from self-inflicted wounds with little time left to bounce back before the November 3 election.

For many months uninterrupted, former vice president Joe Biden has maintained a national lead of roughly 8 to 12 percentage points. It is becoming hard to imagine how Mr Trump can break that remarkably stable and large advantage.

The debates were an obvious opportunity, but his aggressive and often obnoxious performance at the first event on September 29 was of no help. Last week’s vice-presidential debate was more decorous, but did not yield a clear advantage to either Vice President Mike Pence or Mr Biden’s running mate, Senator Kamala Harris.

The star of the show was generally reckoned to be a large black fly that for some reason appeared strongly attracted to Mr Pence.

Americans don’t really vote for the vice president, so Mr Trump had a major opportunity in the second presidential debate scheduled for October 15. Yet he pulled out altogether when the organizers announced it would be held online rather than in person to prevent further infections. His advisors apparently convinced him that, trailing in the polls, he needed the opportunity more than his opponent, and he relented. But Mr Biden had already scheduled an alternative event and the organizing committee refused to add an additional date as Mr Trump then demanded. He may get one final chance to directly confront Mr Biden at a third debate on October 22, but no one would be surprised if that’s also cancelled.

Mr Trump’s abrupt swings on the debate reflected his greater-than-usual volatility since his release from hospital, which some doctors have suggested may be linked to his treatment with dexamethasone, a powerful steroid that can produce agitation, mood swings and hyper-aggressiveness.

That, perhaps, could help explain his prolonged and mystifying self-sabotage over failed negotiations on a new pandemic disaster relief/economic stimulus bill with both fellow Republicans, who want a much smaller amount than he does, and Democrats, who are insisting on an even larger intervention.

Although the president clearly needs a major relief initiative to aid his re-election, he suddenly and inexplicably called off negotiations with Democrats on Tuesday night. Two days later, however, he demanded that Congress “go big”, and insisted he wanted an even more generous initiative than the Democrats. Both sides appear to have given up on him, Congress has gone into recess, and anything passed now would probably come into effect too late to affect the election.

A personal bout with the coronavirus presented the president with a golden opportunity to recast his fraught relationship with both the pandemic and the families and society it has devastated. Instead, as I suggested that he might in these pages last week, he continues to dismiss its significance, essentially maintaining that it is not a big deal, although it is now the third leading cause of death in the US after cancer and heart disease, and has claimed well more than 200,000 American lives.

The president shocked many by suggesting families of fallen soldiers may have given him the disease.

He gave conflicting accounts of his Covid-19 experience, which he inexplicably called “a blessing from God”.

On one hand, he confided that “I was not in great shape” and “I might not have recovered at all”. On the other hand, he boasted: “I’m back because I’m a perfect physical specimen and I’m extremely young.” The president is 74.

In a video message aimed at older voters, Mr Trump implied this is a little-known secret, allowing that: “I’m a senior. I know you don’t know that. Nobody knows that.”

He unleashed unparalleled vitriol at his adversaries, demanding that Attorney General William Barr arrest and prosecute his election opponent, Mr Biden; his 2016 election opponent, Hillary Clinton; and his predecessor, Barack Obama. He suggested he might personally take such action if need be. In the same interview, he described Ms Harris as a “monster” twice and a “communist” four times.

Astoundingly, Mr Trump and his allies responded to the thwarting of a conspiracy by right-wing extremists to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer by condemning her for criticizing him in the past and appeared nonchalant about the terrorist plot itself.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, without much pushback, described the president as being in an “altered state”. But whether this outlandish behavior is attributable to steroids or the looming prospect of defeat, or both, is unknowable.

Still, Americans typically look to their leaders for reassurance and stability in times of crisis. In recent months Mr Biden has been cultivating such an image, while Mr Trump has not. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell pointedly added that he has avoided the White House since August 6 because of Mr Trump’s lax approach to preventing coronavirus infections.

Twenty-one confirmed cases are connected to the White House or the Trump campaign, which is resuming live mass events. Mr Pence held a large rally on Saturday at a Florida retirement centre with little social distancing and few masks. Mr Trump plans similar events soon.

So, many leading Republicans are now directing most available time and money to saving their Senate majority instead of Mr Trump’s dwindling re-election prospects. Party operatives are concentrating on restricting voting and preparing to contest ballots rather than winning him more votes.

Both campaigns are now fixated on Pennsylvania, because they agree Mr Trump will not win re-election if he loses there. But any candidate pinning all hopes on winning a single swing state without which national defeat is inevitable, and whose party operatives are reportedly focused on suppressing voting and contesting ballots, is plainly in deep trouble. And, of course, there is no Superman costume under his suit.