http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/09/abbas-speech-palestinian-elections?

The recent announcement by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas that he would not seek a second term in office or run in elections has prompted considerable speculation, even confusion, around the world. His decisions contains much ambiguity while conveying different messages to different parties at the same time.

It is almost certainly true that Abbas would prefer to no longer continue as president. He clearly feels let down and betrayed by most if not all his allies, including the Arab states and the Obama administration, and seems genuinely fed up with being put in impossible political situations over issues such as the elusive Israeli settlement freeze agreement and the Goldstone report into the Gaza war.

Unlike most politicians, Abbas did not really crave the presidency and never seemed fully comfortable or effective in the job. Given his experiences, any sentiment on his part to move on is understandable.

However, his statement was not a resignation speech at all, but a layered message and the most important layer was addressed to his American allies, in whom he is clearly extremely disappointed. Left out on a limb once too often, Abbas is now asking Washington to seriously consider the alternatives. It’s a not particularly subtle reminder that they are unlikely to find a more amenable peace partner any time in the foreseeable future, and that without Palestinian co-operation, no progress is possible.

One of the most powerful points Abbas made in his speech was his complaint that, in spite of the fact that the Palestinian position on permanent-status peace seems much closer to the American view than Israel’s, the US persistently sides with the government it disagrees with. This is because in the US matters regarding Israel are primarily driven by domestic political interests, with foreign policy considerations as secondary.

Abbas is saying that as long as the US finds itself essentially incapable of putting genuine pressure on Israel, or finding a way to prove it holds meaningful political support for its Palestinian partners, it is going to be almost impossible for Palestinian leaders to bridge the gap between diplomatic necessities internationally and political credibility domestically.

A similar message is being directed at Israel – aimed at the entire society, not just the present government. Abbas is urging it too to consider the probable relationship with a different Palestinian leadership from among the presently existing alternatives.

The most worrisome of these alternatives to many would be Hamas, another clear target of Abbas’s mixed messages. The president’s announcement was entirely framed around the question of elections, which Hamas has been opposing at every stage almost certainly because of a sustained collapse in its popularity and credibility over the past six months. Even the fiasco over the PLO’s mishandling of the Goldstone report has apparently not rescued its fortunes.

Fatah can seriously claim to have gone the extra mile in pursuit of elections: first it signed an Egyptian reconciliation plan that better served Hamas interests and called for elections in June, but Hamas refused. Then, Abbas called for elections in January, as required by Palestinian law – again, Hamas angrily refused. Now he has raised the stakes by saying he will not run for office again.

Abbas is almost daring Hamas to change its mind. Of course, if it does change its mind, he may change his. The lack of any obvious successor, the clear factional disunity within Fatah, his position as unchallenged party leader and his position as chairman of the PLO all make it very hard to imagine him being able to continue to demur in the event of actual elections. Because Palestinian law does not provide a practical alternative to elections for the replacement of the president, it’s going to be difficult for anyone to credibly complain about Abbas continuing in office.

As things stand, he can claim: “I really don’t want this job and I’ve made that pretty clear, but there isn’t any practical alternative so I’m going to have to continue in office. It’s everybody else’s fault but mine.”

http://www.juancole.com/2009/11/ibish-against-one-state-solution.html

Last Thursday on Informed Comment, Juan Cole uttered a powerful cris de coeur about prospects for a two-state agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, echoing warnings by chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat that if Israeli colonization continues, Palestinians may switch to demanding equal rights in a single state. Such pessimism is not only justified, it is requisite given the difficulties facing the prospects for peace, and can only be intensified by a similarly despairing announcement by Pres. Abbas that, because of Israel’s refusal move seriously towards peace, he would not seek another term in office.

Erekat’s statement, while unusual, is hardly unprecedented from senior Palestinian and PLO figures. Similar “threats” to abandon the quest to end the occupation in favor of a single-state agenda have been issued several times in the past as I describe in my new book, What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda? In 2008, former Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei and other leading Palestinians, including the “Palestine Strategy Study Group,” expressed similar views.

In contrast with the one-state rhetoric among pro-Palestinian activists in the West, which generally holds Palestinian independence to be both unachievable and undesirable, Palestinians in the occupied territories who raise this specter generally do so as a tactic designed to compel greater seriousness by Israel on negotiations and warn about the consequences of a failure to achieve a two-state agreement. Erekat’s comments clearly reflected this. In his speech Abbas declared that he was personally fed up but that everything in his experience indicated that a two-state agreement is possible.

These two versions of one-state rhetoric may one day merge into a unified agenda, but for now they remain distinct phenomena, most clearly divided by their ultimate goal: Palestinian leaders still seek independence and an end to the occupation, aims that are angrily rejected as insufficient and even outrageous by many diasporic one-state advocates.

Under the present circumstances it seems most probable that if the strategy of the secular-nationalist forces in Palestine were to collapse or be abandoned, the main beneficiaries would not be one-state advocates. The real political contest among Palestinians is between the nationalists and the Islamists, and the declining fortunes of either almost axiomatically advances the interests of the other.

Even if Palestinians were somehow to abandon their long-standing national aim of independence, avoid their national movement becoming entirely dominated by Islamists, and adopt the goal of equal rights in a post-nationalist state, it is very hard to imagine that this would leave them in an improved strategic position.

A noted one-state advocate has accused me of suggesting an interview with the Atlantic website that “the one-state solution is bad because Jews don’t want it.” This is to misread not only my analysis but the fundamental political reality, which is extremely simple: a one-state solution will be impossible as long as an overwhelming or even a solid majority of Jewish Israelis don’t want it. The added irony is that most one-state advocates have not only done nothing to try to create a message that can appeal to mainstream Israelis, they have crafted one that encourages the greatest possible fear and suspicion.

In reality, it’s almost impossible to imagine a one-state “solution,” although it’s certainly possible to envisage a one-state outcome. The distinction is crucial: the second formulation recognizes the incredible amount of brutality, violence and mutual exhaustion that would be required for both parties to surrender their cherished national agendas to some formula for post-nationalist power-sharing in relatively equal numbers. Consider the violence of the past 60 years, without any real dent in the nationalist fervor of either party, and then try to imagine what would be required to actually get them to abandon these ideals.

One should be under no illusions that the final abandonment of a two-state agenda will give way to a campaign of nonviolent resistance, boycotts and sanctions that will somehow succeed in bringing Israel to its knees. The alternative to an agenda of negotiations is crystal clear: increasing conflict, violence and occupation that is increasingly dominated by religious fanatics on both sides. The religious right is well-positioned in both societies, ready to lead a battle to the death between bearded fanatics over holy places and the will of God.

We face a simple choice: either a slow, gradual and, yes, painful, inching towards a two-state agreement, or war, conflict and occupation into the foreseeable future, very possibly leading to a catastrophe. Despairing, giving up and walking away is too irresponsible for anyone with the best interests of Palestinians, Israelis and Americans at heart. This is an existentialist crisis we are facing, like Beckett’s suicidal unnnamable: we can’t go on, we’ll go on.

Cries of despair are intellectually and morally justified and, perhaps, necessary, but the only rational policy for all responsible parties is to avoid calamity and continue to somehow try to find a way to make the only plausible peaceful solution work.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/palestinian-statehood-institution-building?

In an article last week, Ahmad Samhi Khalidi derisively dismissed the plan of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to build the infrastructural, administrative and economic framework of a Palestinian state in spite of the occupation.

His arguments essentially made Israel’s case for it: that the Palestinians are not capable of building state institutions, lack the legal authority to do so, and can only create structures that do not challenge the occupation. One can only marvel at expatriate Palestinian intellectuals making Israel’s case against a dynamic, proactive Palestinian plan to transform realities on the ground and attack the very essence of the occupation.

The PA plan provides a mechanism that complements diplomatic efforts to end the occupation and frees Palestinians from being entirely dependent upon discussions with others. It enables them to shape their own future. Khalidi, however, argues that no such state-building project is possible because “every PA action is determined by the Israeli occupation”. This is only true to the extent that the Palestinians submissively accept it and refuse to embark on what Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad describes as “positive unilateralism“. While Israel might be theoretically capable of blocking such moves, its ability to do so in practice may prove quite limited.

What the PA is proposing is consistent with stated Palestinian, American and Israeli intentions and, in effect, calls Israel’s bluff. Moreover, the PA plan could and should be provided with powerful diplomatic and political support by the US, Europe and other international players that have considerable sway with Israel.

Even Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu has stated that the ultimate goal of negotiations is the creation of a Palestinian state. Under such circumstances, it would be politically costly, and hard to explain, if any attempt were made to block measures that peacefully move in that direction and pose no threat to legitimate Israeli interests. It would be doubly difficult if specific projects are conducted in practical co-operation with American, European and international institutions, whose financial and technical support will undoubtedly be required for the success of much of the programme.

Even if the PA plan does succeed, Khalidi argues that the result will be “a partial, ersatz entity”, insufficient in every respect for the realisation of Palestinian national aims. Khalidi is completely wrong to suggest that institution-building negates or substitutes for the kind of robust diplomacy that insists on a genuinely independent Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem. Nothing whatsoever in the plan either suggests or promotes any other outcome.

The worst misapprehension Khalidi harbours is the idea that the programme is essentially “apolitical” and plays into Netanyahu’s ridiculous idea of “economic peace”. In fact, building Palestinian institutions is one of the most radical and effective acts of resistance to occupation imaginable. It will demonstrate the Palestinians are effectively governing themselves, and building the practical framework for a state supported by an overwhelming international consensus.

Khalidi understands that it is essential to continue to strive politically and diplomatically for such a state, but for some reason seems bitterly opposed to any efforts to prepare for it to be well-functioning, stable and effective.

So what do he and the other detractors actually propose? That Palestinians continue to demand statehood, but not prepare for it in a meaningful way? That, because of the occupation, they pay no attention to improving their society, administration and infrastructure? That they have no responsibilities beyond political rhetoric? That they have no agency beyond simple demands for statehood? That they remain entirely dependent on the peace process without trying to alter conditions on the ground to improve not only their society but also their strategic position vis-à-vis Israel?

One of the most important elements of the programme is that it begins to create an administrative and governance structure among the Palestinians that is bureaucratised and institutionalised, and therefore insulated from the untoward dominance of political parties. Fayyad’s second tenure as prime minister has already seen a meaningful distinction develop between party and administration that has been healthy for both. And, far from exceeding his authority in doing this, he is implementing the policies of Palestinian president and PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas.

Either Khalidi does not recognise the importance of this or he doesn’t like it. Independent, effective administrative apparatuses would protect Palestinian governance structures from undue influence by both parties and traditional elites. This is what really informs much of the internal Palestinian opposition to a programme that would empower the Palestinian people, improve their strategic position, and can only bring forward the moment of independence.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/Oct/07/Credit-Barack-Obama-with-resolve-on-a-Palestinian-state.ashx#axzz2axJWowPa

Under the administration of President Barack Obama, the United States has vigorously re-engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and made commitment to Palestinian statehood an American national security and foreign policy priority. Obama has said that it is “absolutely crucial” to US interests to resolve the conflict, and appears determined to persist despite all difficulties and obstacles.

There are several crucial reasons for this intensification. First, while the benefits to American interests of ending the conflict have been clear for many years, the substantial costs to the United States of failing to secure a peace agreement are becoming more widely understood. The conflict in the Middle East has become an exceptionally powerful weapon in the hands of fanatics throughout the region and beyond, fueling anti-American sentiment. The Obama administration has understood that ending Israel’s occupation would be a singularly effective counterattack against those manifestations of extremism.

Second, the Obama administration is taking a more holistic approach to retooling the American relationship with the region, when compared to its predecessors. Rather than viewing each regional relationship and problem independently, and dealing with it on a case-specific and usually bilateral basis, this administration understands that these problems and relations are both independent and interconnected.

Third, it has become increasingly clear to many American friends of Israel, including numerous prominent Jewish Americans, that a peace agreement with the Palestinians and an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab land in general is not only in the United States’ national interest, it is also in Israel’s interest. If it persists with the occupation, Israel can be neither Jewish nor democratic in a meaningful way, and will not know either peace or regional acceptance.

This understanding has allowed many prominent Jewish Democrats, including key members of the US Congress, to support Obama’s push for an Israeli settlement freeze.

Indeed, Obama’s initial strategy for advancing the peace process was to secure Israel’s implementation of its commitment under the “road map” to peace, issued under former President George W. Bush, to freeze settlement activity in the Occupied Territories. Obama was also trying to secure diplomatic gestures from Arab states as a reciprocal move.

The US president met with only partial success on both sides, with Israel reportedly agreeing to a temporary settlement freeze in the West Bank, but not in occupied East Jerusalem. At the tripartite meeting held at the UN headquarters between Israeli, Palestinian and American leaders on September 22, Obama made it clear that he did not accept this proposed compromise on settlements by Israel, but was setting the issue aside for now and moving forward on permanent-status talks.

While previous US administrations would almost certainly have embraced the proposed Israeli compromise, Obama continues to reject the legitimacy of Israeli settlement activity and has left the issue unresolved. At his UN General Assembly speech the following day, Obama laid out a number of stipulations for the negotiations that strongly favor the Palestinian position, pledging to “end the occupation that began in 1967.” The president insisted, above all, that the status of Jerusalem was to be addressed in new talks.

Including Jerusalem in the talks runs directly counter to Israeli positions and strongly reinforces the Palestinian view that the city must be the capital of any future Palestinian state. It is, indeed, a central question that cannot be ignored. Perhaps even more than settlements, the issue will prove extremely challenging for Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu, especially given his coalition partners’ uncompromising stance on the future of Jerusalem.

Ultimately, the main message senior administration officials, including Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, are sending is that the administration is “determined” to achieve a two-state peace agreement.

This determination, a willingness to take political hits and keep on going, was evident in Obama’s words at the UN General Assembly meeting. There, he declared: “[E]ven though there will be setbacks, and false starts and tough days – I will not waiver in my pursuit of peace.” Any party counting on wearing down, waiting out or chasing this administration away from negotiations must now seriously reconsider its strategy.

http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=26406&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0&isNew=1

Washington, DC – Under US President Barack Obama’s Administration, the United States has vigorously re-engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and made commitment to Palestinian statehood a national security and foreign policy priority. Obama has said that it is “absolutely crucial” to American interests to resolve the conflict, and appears determined to persist despite all difficulties and obstacles.

There are several crucial reasons for this intensification.

First, while the benefits to American interests of ending the conflict have been clear for many years, the substantial costs to the United States of failing to secure a peace agreement are becoming more widely understood. The conflict has become an exceptionally powerful weapon in the hands of fanatics throughout the Middle East, fuelling anti-American sentiment throughout the region. The administration has understood that ending Israel’s occupation would be a singularly effective counterattack against extremism.

Second, the Obama Administration is taking a more holistic approach to retooling the American relationship with the region, compared to its predecessors. Rather than viewing each relationship and problem independently, and dealing with them on a case-specific and usually bilateral basis, this administration understands they are both independent and interconnected.

Third, it has become increasingly clear to many American friends of Israel, including numerous prominent Jewish Americans, that a peace agreement with the Palestinians and an end to the occupation is not only in the United States’ national interest, it is also in Israel’s interest. If it persists with the occupation, Israel can be meaningfully neither Jewish nor democratic, and will not know either peace or regional acceptance. This understanding has allowed many prominent Jewish Democrats, including key members of Congress, to support Obama’s push for an Israeli settlement freeze.

Indeed, Obama’s initial strategy for advancing the peace process was to secure Israel’s implementation of its commitment under the roadmap for peace, issued under former US President George W. Bush, to freeze settlement activity in the occupied territories. Obama was also trying to secure diplomatic gestures from Arab states as a reciprocal move.

Obama met with only partial success on both sides, with Israel reportedly agreeing to a temporary settlement freeze in the West Bank, but not in occupied East Jerusalem. At the tripartite UN meeting between Israeli, Palestinian and American leaders on 22 September, Obama made it clear that he did not accept this proposed compromise on settlements by Israel, but was setting the issue aside for now and moving forward on permanent status talks.

While previous administrations would almost certainly have embraced the proposed Israeli compromise, Obama continues to reject the legitimacy of Israeli settlement activity and has left the issue unresolved.

At his UN General Assembly speech the following day, Obama laid out a number of stipulations for the negotiations that strongly favour the Palestinian position, pledging to “end the occupation that began in 1967” and insisted, above all, that the status of Jerusalem is to be addressed by new talks.

Including Jerusalem in the talks runs directly counter to Israeli positions and strongly reinforces the Palestinian view that the city must be the capital of any Palestinian state. It is a central question that cannot be ignored. Perhaps even more than settlements, this issue will prove extremely challenging for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, especially given his coalition partners’ uncompromising stance on Jerusalem.

Ultimately, the main message senior administration officials, including Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, are sending is that the administration is “determined” to achieve a two-state peace agreement.

This determination, a willingness to take political hits and keep on going, was evident in Obama’s words at this week’s UN General Assembly meeting when he declared, “…Even though there will be setbacks, and false starts and tough days–I will not waiver in my pursuit of peace.” Any party counting on wearing down, waiting out or chasing this administration away from negotiations must now seriously reconsider its strategy.

The Daily Star (Beirut)
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=10623…

On college campuses in the United States and the United Kingdom, and increasingly among grassroots activists in the West generally, the cause of ending the Israeli occupation and securing independence for a Palestinian state is being abandoned in favor of a much more far-reaching goal of replacing Israel with a single, democratic state for all Israelis and Palestinians, including all of the refugees. Until now, this rhetoric has been largely unchallenged from a pro-Palestinian perspective, which has probably been a significant factor in its appeal.

My new book, “What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda?”, traces the development of this agenda and interrogates its assumptions and claims.

The outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, which inflicted profound suffering and created deep ill-will on both the sides of the Palestinian-Israeli divide, bolstered stridently nationalist perspectives among Israelis and Palestinians. For many, it prompted a negative re-evaluation of what kind of peace was possible and desirable.

In Israel, this was manifested in the collapse of the “peace camp,” a radical shift to the political right and the election of Ariel Sharon, who became prime minister. Among the Palestinians, Islamists, especially Hamas, gained significant ground. In the Palestinian diaspora, where support for Hamas is limited and, especially in the United States, politically untenable and even legally risky, this same disillusionment and radicalization was largely expressed through the rise of the one-state agenda.

More generally, the one-state agenda reflects the conclusion that Israel will never agree to seriously end the occupation and allow for the creation of a fully sovereign, viable Palestinian state, therefore that negotiations and diplomacy are pointless. At the end of Part One of my book I pose a series of pointed questions that are not usually addressed to, or have been insufficiently answered by, one-state advocates, and that in many cases their sympathizers have not adequately considered. Here are the six of them:

First, if Israel will not agree to end the occupation, what makes anyone think that it will possibly agree to dissolve itself? If Israel cannot be compelled or convinced to surrender 22 percent of the territory it holds, how can it be compelled or convinced to surrender or share 100 percent of it?

Second, what, as a practical matter, does this vision of a single, democratic state offer to Jewish Israelis?

Third, what efforts have Palestinian and pro-Palestinian one-state advocates made in reaching out to mainstream Jews and Israelis and to incorporating their national narrative into this vision?

Fourth, how do one-state advocates propose to supersede or transcend Palestinian national identity and ambitions? Why is it that no significant Palestinian political party or faction has adopted the one-state goal?

Fifth, how, apart from empty slogans about largely nonexistent and highly implausible boycotts, do one-state advocates propose to realize or advance their vision? What practical steps do they imagine and what is their road map for success?

And sixth, since they reject both Palestinian independence and the ongoing agenda of infrastructural and institutional development presently defining the strategy of what they consider the “quisling” Palestinian Authority, what do one-state advocates, as a practical matter, offer those living under occupation other than expressions of solidarity and interminable decades of continued struggle and suffering?

It is striking that the most ardent and tenacious one-state advocates seem to be taking a great deal of their time in even starting to formulate answers to these questions. Assad AbuKhalil, who comments on anything and everything on his blog, has remained strangely silent. Ali Abunimah, who is surely the most ardent and prolific one-state proponent in the United States, and who also runs a well-read blog, also appears at a loss for words. Even the overgrown juvenile delinquents at the Kabobfest blog, who have exhibited signs of suffering from a cybersphere version of Tourette’s syndrome, are also strangely passing up what would seem to be a golden opportunity to repeat their usual accusations about “traitors” and “collaborators.”

I have no doubt that sooner or later a response, and hopefully a calm and thoughtful one, will be forthcoming from some of the committed one-state advocates. But the amount of time it is taking for them to offer any sort of answer to these extremely relevant questions suggests, perhaps, that they are proving difficult to formulate and quite possibly were not anticipated.

But there surely must be a considerable burden of proof on those proposing that the Palestinian national movement abandon its long-standing goal of ending the occupation, which is based on a huge body of international law and reflects a regional and international consensus, in favor of a grand experiment in almost entirely uncharted waters that poses significant risks and offers uncertain benefits. One-state proponents have an obligation to explain how exactly they think they can achieve the extraordinary task of compelling or convincing Israel to effectively dissolve itself.

Unless it offers answers to simple, clear and obvious questions such as these, the one-state rhetoric will be an agenda for accomplishing very little if anything. Rather it will merely be a convenient vehicle for rejecting any and all things Israeli and adopting a position of uncompromising confrontation.

This is not an abstract intellectual exercise. Those seeking to liberate the Palestinian people cannot allow themselves to be beguiled by the narcissistic thrill of “winning” an academic debate on campuses while contributing nothing, even doing harm, to the causes of peace and Palestine.

The Daily Star (Lebanon)
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=1033…

For years now, my colleagues and I at the American Task Force on Palestine have argued that advocates of a two-state resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict need to form a real, functioning national coalition in the United States to support this goal. President Barack Obama has put a great deal of his political credibility and capital on the line in pursuit of negotiated resolution, forcefully articulating what all parties must do to build momentum toward this goal. The most interested parties outside of the region, specifically Jewish-American friends of Israel and Arab-American supporters of Palestine, have been alienated by decades of mistrust. However, to fully live up to this historic opportunity, these two communities need to do everything possible to work toward this common objective.

Historically, most American Jews and Arabs have largely seen each other through the distorted lens of a zero-sum perspective, assuming that what is good for Israel is necessarily bad for the Palestinians and vice versa. If this was ever true, it isn’t now. It may seem counterintuitive, but Israelis and Palestinians have the same need: a workable peace agreement based on two states. It follows that their supporters in the US should be able to unite under a common cause in pursuing this goal.

Obama has stated that Palestinians need to improve security measures and combat incitement; that Israel must end settlements and avoid measures that preclude Palestinian statehood; and that the Arab states need to become more involved in the peace process. A commitment to these principles is needed on all sides. Supporters of Israel may reiterate what is required of the Palestinians and the Arabs, but they cannot remain silent about Israel’s commitments. Supporters of Palestine may insist that Israel live up to its obligations under the “road map,” but they cannot ignore Palestinian responsibilities. Those with influence over Arab governments should be pressing them to do everything they can to support Obama’s initiative and seize this historic opportunity.

Jewish and Arab Americans cannot allow their past differences and historical competition to impede what has become a common imperative. Long-standing prejudices and misperceptions must be jettisoned if we are to play the role required of us. No other groups in the US have deeper ties, more connections, or a more sophisticated understanding of the history and perceptions that motivate both parties to the conflict than Jewish- and Arab-Americans. We cannot leave this to the government alone.

The history of rivalry and alienation between Jewish- and Arab-American communities has left deep scars, but must be moved beyond. Sincere, responsible people in both communities can demonstrate their constructive intentions by combating their peers who would continue to advocate rejectionism, violence, occupation and conflict.

Many Jewish-Americans remain suspicious that the support of Arabs and Arab-Americans for a peace agreement based on two states is merely the first step in a “plan of phases,” intended ultimately to lead to Israel’s destruction. Equally there are many Arab-Americans who have yet to be convinced that Israelis and their supporters who say they favor peace negotiations are not simply trying to buy time to build more settlements and consolidate the occupation so that no Palestinian state will ever be possible. Mutual distrust masks that most people in both communities are articulating the same goal. They are certain of their own sincerity, but extremely dubious of the intentions of those on the other side. Rather than assuming at the outset that the other party is playing a game of deception, it would make more sense to test the waters and see if it is not possible that, because Israelis and Palestinians have similar needs, their friends in the US can sincerely work together in that direction.

It is necessary, of course, to gauge each other’s sincerity, but this can only be done through active engagement and a sustained effort to forge a serious alliance based on common interests. But, it is neither necessary nor helpful to try to analyze opposing motivations, or insist that competing narratives become harmonized. It should be understood from the outset that, just as Israelis and Palestinians require the same peace agreement each for their own purpose, their friends and supporters in the US will have very differing motivations for joining a national coalition in support of a two-state agreement. A great virtue of a two-state resolution is that it does not require that Israelis and Palestinians reconcile their narratives. Each can live in its own state, with internal minority groups, and forge its future according to its own understandings and imperatives.

Since Obama called for more concrete measures to achieve peace, we should not only be increasing our efforts at outreach and dialogue. Responsible organizations and individuals should develop joint statements and efforts in pursuit of peace to support the president’s initiatives. It is time for mainstream and politically significant Arab- and Jewish-Americans to think about articulating a formal statement of principles that can give shape to an effective national coalition for a two-state agreement in the Middle East. Religious and other peace-oriented organizations and corporate entities with a stake in Middle East peace should be included in these efforts from the earliest opportunity.

The urgency and intensity of Obama’s political and diplomatic emphasis on building momentum toward peace brings an extraordinary, possibly unique, perhaps even final opportunity for Jewish- and Arab-Americans who both say they want Middle East peace based on a two-state solution to begin seriously working together to achieve this result. The president is doing his part. It is now up to all of us who agree with him to do ours.

http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/16/how_netanyahu_helps_the_palestinians

The response from Palestinian and Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu’s defiant foreign policy speech last Sunday has so far consisted mainly of throwing up their hands in despair. While understandable given the prime minister’s intransigence on Israel’s prior commitment to a complete settlement freeze and other key issues, this approach is not likely to accomplish very much.

By reproducing rhetoric from the 1990s that led to massive Palestinian frustration, Netanyahu may be hoping to provoke a reaction that is more visceral than strategic. If the Palestinians and Arabs adopt a less than constructive attitude at this stage, there is every danger that President Barack Obama and his administration will conclude that the Israelis and the Palestinians are simply two recalcitrant and irresponsible parties that are impervious to reason, and walk away to focus on other matters. But Obama’s new approach, combined with Netanyahu’s unconstructive attitude, presents a rare opportunity for Palestinian leaders to seize the initiative in the peace process.

Rather than simply dismissing Netanyahu’s words, it is vital that they instead move quickly to draw a stark contrast based on a constructive stance of their own, and position themselves in as close alignment as possible with the American president. The Palestinians should be emphasizing their moves to fulfil their road map commitment on security, as recently demonstrated by the Palestinian Authority’s bold and politically costly security operations against Hamas militants in the West Bank.

A new initiative to bolster security measures by combating incitement by militant groups, as Obama urged Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to undertake at their White House meeting in May, would strongly reaffirm Palestinian seriousness to fully play their part in promoting peace and would be an effective means of keeping the focus on Israel’s continued avoidance of its own responsibilities.

It is also important that the Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, express a sincere desire to engage productively in the peace process in response to significant Israeli moves such as a complete settlement freeze. They should frame such a move as operationalizing the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

Future public diplomacy efforts by the Palestinians and Arab States should also focus their attention on the mainstream American Jewish Community. A large number of American Jews support Obama’s efforts to push Israel toward a settlement freeze, a fact Netanyahu is keenly aware of. He seems to be calculating that his rather tepid, theoretical acceptance of the concept of Palestinian statehood and his rhetorical invocations of Israeli nationalism might weaken support for the president’s efforts. The extent to which Netanyahu is effective in gaining currency with this crucial constituency may be an important factor in determining whether the Obama can remain firm with the Israeli government without intolerable domestic political cost.

Obama has placed a great deal of political capital at stake on the issue of settlements. In order to successfully shift the Israeli government from its present position, he is going to need help.

If a settlement freeze can be achieved, along with reciprocal gestures from the Palestinian Authority and Arab states, such as maintaining security and continuing diplomatic overtures, the parties can move quickly into permanent status negotiations, tackling such bedrock questions as borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and security. Many on the Israeli right, possibly including Netanyahu, would prefer to avoid these issues because they may not yet be prepared to take the necessary steps to advance peace.

By supporting Obama’s position through constructive measures, Palestinians and Arabs can greatly strengthen the prospects that permanent status talks become unavoidable, and that with strong American leadership the parties could soon find themselves in serious peace negotiations for the first time since January 2001.

The Press-Enterprise

It is regrettable that Amir Abdel Malik Ali has become a regular speaker at Muslim student events on several southern California college campuses, including, recently, UC Irvine and UC Riverside.

Ali is a convert to Islam and an imam at an Oakland mosque who has expressed overtly anti-Semitic views and bizarre conspiracy theories, especially regarding the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. He is noted for incendiary rhetoric regarding “Jewish control” of the media, although he appeared deeply confused about who is Jewish when he wrongly cited Rupert Murdoch as an example. Ali’s rhetoric is often implicitly violent, and, by any standards extreme and intolerant.

Though Ali is frequently invited to speak on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, his only qualifications regarding the complexities of the Middle East appear to be his religious and political fanaticism. Ali is not only categorically anti-Israel, he has also denounced the Palestinian national leadership as “Uncle Tom Palestinian leaders.”

“Silence is Consent” was the title of one of Ali’s recent talks at UC Irvine — an ironic reminder for responsible Muslim Americans to vocally reject the idea that he is a worthwhile contributor to the dialogue about the Middle East.

It seems that national and California Muslim-American organizations have not succeeded in convincing these student groups that by inviting speakers such as Ali, they do palpable damage to the interests of the Muslim-American community.

Student groups will ultimately do what they like, but if responsible leaders fail to take a public stand against this kind of speech, the silence will indeed be taken as “consent.” The organizers of these events should ask themselves what they hope to achieve by inviting Ali to speak, and what they think the political consequences are likely to be.

It is immoral and counterproductive to promote extreme and anti-Semitic rhetoric. Moreover, it is impossible to take a serious and effective stance against “Islamophobia” while promoting or condoning anti-Semitism. These two forms of bigotry are intimately connected, both thematically and historically. Neither the Jewish community nor the Islamic community can advance its legitimate interests or perspectives by promoting fear and hatred of one another.

Intolerant views and defamation only serve to discredit any cause. In this case, invitations to speakers such as Ali discredit rather than promote the Palestinian cause. In addition, extremist speech by such otherwise marginal figures helps to feed fear and hatred of the Muslim-American community, especially when it is endorsed through repeated invitations by large student organizations.

At a time when an increasing number of Jewish American individuals and organizations are recognizing that the occupation in Palestine is bad for Israel and the United States as well as for the Palestinian people, supporters of Palestine and friends of Israel should look for common ground rather than waste time hosting religious and political fanatics.

Historically, there has been little scope for common ground between American friends of Israel and American friends of the Palestinians. However, with a growing consensus nationally and internationally about the urgent need to end the occupation and create a Palestinian state to live alongside Israel in peace and security, unprecedented opportunities for cooperation are beginning to emerge. The development of a common purpose in favor of peace requires goodwill and outreach on both sides.

Rhetoric that clings to an outmoded “zero-sum” analysis that pits Israeli and Palestinian interests as irreconcilable and diametrically opposed, even though the future of both peoples depends on peace, is bad enough. Speakers who engage in demagoguery and spread anti-Semitic and violent ideals poison the national interests of the Palestinian people and their supporters in the United States. With “friends” such as Amir Abdel Malik Ali, the Palestinians need no additional enemies.

Muslim Americans, including student organizations, should steadfastly reject anti-Semitic language. This would best serve their own interests, the interests of the legitimate causes in which they believe, and the interests of our country. As Martin Luther King Jr. said, “Our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter.”

http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2009/03/the-gaza-war-what-both-sides-must-do/

The recent war in Gaza proves yet again what all reasonable people understood about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for many years: there is no military solution for either side, and both peoples’ hopes for a better future depend on reaching a peace agreement with each other.

Israel showered down extraordinary levels of death and destruction upon both Hamas and the innocent civilian population, killing more than 1,400 people (by most estimates, largely civilians) and destroying or severely damaging more than 21,000 homes and businesses. But the war did not succeed in changing the political status quo ante: Hamas remains in power in Gaza, and may have even been politically strengthened by the conflict. Palestinians remain under occupation, and Israelis continue to live without security.

Israel can certainly kill people, both combatants and innocents, and destroy buildings, but it cannot obliterate the presence of the Palestinian people on their own land or their determination to be free. Until Israelis and Palestinians can achieve an end-of-conflict agreement, Israel will remain a country at war — conducting a foreign military occupation over the land and lives of more than 5 million Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip – and will continue to be denied legitimacy by most of the people and the states of the Middle East.

The Palestinian national interest also depends on achieving an agreement with Israel. Hamas’ reckless actions in firing rockets into southern Israel only succeeded in delivering death and devastation to the people of Gaza. Palestinians cannot possibly hope to achieve independence and an end to the occupation through violence and armed struggle. In order to achieve independence and statehood, Palestinians will have to secure an agreement with Israel.

Friends of Israel and friends of the Palestinians do neither party any favor by rationalizing belligerence or defending indefensible actions. In published documents from March and June 2008, the American Task Force on Palestine warned that Hamas rocket attacks would ultimately provoke a disproportionate wide-scale Israeli military action that would be devastating to the people of Gaza but would not resolve any of the fundamental political problems or enhance security for Israelis in the long run. It has given us no satisfaction whatsoever to see this grimly predictable scenario play itself out so precisely.

Both parties have demonstrated that, on their own, they cannot overcome domestic political opposition to the compromises necessary for peace. Israelis and Palestinians require serious and sustained third-party support, which can only come from the United States. The war in Gaza has served as an important reminder to the incoming Obama Administration that the question of Palestine cannot be placed on the back burner, contained or “managed.” It must be resolved. Early signs from the new administration point towards an intensified American engagement, but this will require both determination and persistence.

Both Israeli and Palestinian societies are split between those who seriously seek a peace agreement and those who would continue to fight in vain for control of the entire territory. Palestinians are divided between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which is committed to achieving a peace agreement with Israel, and Hamas in Gaza that refuses to commit to this goal. The recent election in Israel left the Knesset deeply divided along the same lines.

Obviously, serious American engagement is required to lay the groundwork among both Israelis and Palestinians for a return to public confidence in the prospects for peace. This means helping the PA develop the Palestinian economy and institutions, particularly the security forces, that can serve as the building blocks of an independent state and restore the credibility of the PA leadership and its strategy of negotiations.

However, the most significant step required in helping Israelis and Palestinians move away from conflict and towards an agreement would be securing a freeze to Israeli settlement activity. Recently revealed documents suggest that various ministries in Israel have been planning huge increases in settlement activity in coming months and years. This must be prevented in order to secure the credibility and viability of peace negotiations.

The settlements, by deepening the political and logistical difficulties in establishing a Palestinian state to live alongside Israel in peace with every expansion, are the greatest single threat to a peaceful future. They ensure that the conflict only deteriorates over time. United States can build on its strategic relationship with Israel to provide sufficient political space and incentives for the Israeli leadership to take this essential but politically difficult step.

It would be wrong to downplay the difficulties facing the quest for peace. But it would be even more shortsighted and wrong not to acknowledge that a peace agreement is crucial, not only to Israel and the Palestinians, but to American national interests as well, and that, if we do what we must now, it is not yet too late.