https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/annoying_palestine_is_on_the_right_track

Last week the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution threatening a potential cutoff of aid to the Palestinians if they unilaterally declared statehood. It was essentially meaningless bluster, taking a strong stance against something the Palestinians aren’t currently pursuing or even seriously considering.

The real context of resolution is not Palestinian unilateralism, but multilateralism and, especially, bilateralism, and there’s a big difference between the three. Most Palestinian officials acknowledge that as an occupied people with the deck stacked against them, they haven’t got the power to do very much unilaterally.

In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) unilaterally declared an independent Palestinian state in the pre-June 1967 borders. Many developing countries recognized that state. But nothing happened. The only real consequence was to make any future unilateral Palestinian declaration of independence possibly look like a repetition of this embarrassing failure.

The Palestinians are also aware that the physical presence of the formidable Israeli military in the occupied territories means that, as a practical matter, Palestinian independence ultimately depends on Israeli acquiescence, however reluctant; on their own, the Palestinians are unlikely to be able to achieve it. So it’s always been obvious that third-party intervention is essential. During most of the past two decades, both Palestinians and Israelis have looked mainly to the United States, and there is no doubt that in the final analysis an American role as broker and more, is simply indispensable.

However, in the past couple of years, faced with diplomatic impasses, Palestinians have been developing a creative set of new strategies to augment these indispensable negotiations – notably state-building, nonviolent protests and settlement boycotts. They have also been pursuing multilateral and bilateral recognition, but not the unilateralism denounced by the US Congress.

The first efforts, aimed at upgrading the status of Palestinian representation in various UN bodies, were largely blocked by the United States on the grounds that they bypassed the negotiating process. Indeed, US Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton recently warned Palestinians that “unilateral efforts at the United Nations are not helpful and undermine trust.”

Actually, such efforts aren’t unilateral at all, they are multilateral. It’s not surprising that Washington would view such efforts as a kind of end-run around the negotiating process it oversees, but it clearly makes sense for Palestinians to try to enhance their global diplomatic status in preparation for what Clinton has described as “inevitable” Palestinian statehood.

Importantly, the secretary didn’t say anything about the main effort currently being pursued by Palestinian diplomats, which is a series of upgrades to bilateral diplomatic relations. This has most spectacularly borne fruit in Latin America, with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Bolivia all having recognized Palestine within its 1967 borders in recent weeks. More recognitions are expected to follow shortly. In addition, Norway, France and other European countries had been quietly upgrading the diplomatic status of the PLO missions in their countries.

Slowly but surely, the world is adding Palestine to the roster of fully recognized countries and laying the groundwork for its future admission as a member state of the United Nations. If the Americans are annoyed by this, they’re not saying so publicly. It’s not clear why they should be. Since Washington views Palestinian statehood as “inevitable,” and in the end this can only be achieved with Israeli acquiescence and through negotiations, the US role as primary midwife in the birth of this new state is unchallengeable.

Palestinian unilateralism on independence has already proven its pointlessness back in the 1980s, and the Kosovo model – unilaterally declared independence immediately recognized and supported by most of the world’s most powerful countries – isn’t really available to them, at least at this stage. However, this diplomatic offensive for recognition is not only purposive and meaningful; it dovetails perfectly with state-building and, indeed, with American-brokered negotiations with Israel.

The Israelis may be annoyed, but as they continue settlement construction in violation of international law, the “road map” and clearly stated American and international opposition, they’re not in any position to be wagging fingers at anybody about complicating delicate diplomacy.

Palestinians obviously have to pursue negotiations aimed at an agreement with Israel that secures its acquiescence to Palestinian independence. But at the same time, it is vital for the Palestinians to pour as much energy as possible into state-building that prepares them for that independence; to continue pursuing measures that challenge the abusive practices of the occupation; and to seek to upgrade their diplomatic status multilaterally and bilaterally.

Palestinian statehood is becoming inevitable as Clinton says. Diplomatic recognition of that necessary, indispensable state-in-the-making from countries in Latin America and elsewhere, no matter how much it might annoy the Israelis, is simply another recognition of that fact and an important step in the right direction.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/not_walking_away_from_peace_just_yet

US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s speech at the Brookings Institution on December 10 has again shown that the Obama administration is not willing to walk away from efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in spite of the obstacles and setbacks it is facing. The position Clinton laid out presents an important potential opportunity for Palestinians to make the point that they are ready for and serious about peace, and to test Israel’s willingness.

Clinton delivered a well-balanced and clearheaded appraisal of US interests and was unambiguous about the importance of ending the conflict and the occupation. The secretary gave what is probably the strongest ever statement by a senior US official about Palestinian statehood, calling it “inevitable.” She described the occupation as “unacceptable” and “unsustainable,” and left no doubt that from the American perspective it must be ended.

Clinton also said the Obama administration plans to intensify its support for Palestinian state-building efforts. Since it now views Palestinian statehood as inevitable, Washington has a strong interest in using the state-building program to advance that cause in parallel to the diplomacy and to lay the groundwork for a successful, rather than a failed, state.

The secretary cautioned Palestinians against unilateral diplomatic moves, and Israel, in slightly stronger language, against “provocative announcements on East Jerusalem.” And she dismissed out of hand any notion of “economic peace,” saying that “economic and institutional progress … is not a substitute for a political resolution,” and that such ideas are “wrong” and “dangerous.”

In addition, Clinton left no doubt that the US remains committed, perhaps more than ever, to resolving the conflict through an agreement that establishes a Palestinian state. US diplomatic language on this point is deepening and intensifying, and this reflects a growing policy commitment to that outcome.

Clinton also said the US will press the parties to make their positions on key final-status issues as specific and clear as possible. This could spell trouble for leaders on both sides (particularly Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu), who for political reasons prefers to remain ambiguous about some controversial questions. If the Palestinians present straightforward positions on the final-status issues and Netanyahu does not, it will not only be an enormously clarifying development, but will also potentially set the stage for a more assertive American role in spite of Israeli objections.

It would be wrong to be cynical when senior US officials make Washington’s commitment to this outcome so unmistakably clear. The US has many options, but the situation is so delicate that most of them would probably make matters worse. The path the administration has chosen – to make sure everyone understands what is expected at the end of the day and that the US is not walking away – and at the same time emphasizing caution and recognizing the delicacy of the politics on both sides while pushing them to reveal their own intentions, is probably the most advisable course at present.

A combination of quiet diplomacy, looking for openings with the parties and getting them to take clear, specific positions on core issues, along with intensified support for state-building, might be the only serious, politically plausible US response at this stage.

Palestinians were unwise to allow themselves to be sucked into the settlement freeze extension gimmick, and should welcome the opportunity to focus on final-status issues, such as borders and Jerusalem. In the end, any practicable agreement will require Israel to relinquish control over a considerable amount of the settlements it has built anyway, so the settlement issue is a subset of the border issue, which is the real bone of contention.

No matter how frustrated they might be with the failure to secure an extension to the partial, temporary settlement freeze moratorium, Palestinians should welcome the renewed and rhetorically intensified US commitment to ending the occupation and securing the establishment of a Palestinian state. The bottom line is that while Washington remains committed to Israel’s security, it is also committed, in its own interests, to Palestinian independence and an end to the Israeli occupation. In other words, the world’s only superpower and Israel’s patron is genuinely committed to securing the Palestinian national goal.

Clinton gave the Palestinians a lot to work with and welcome, but, like the Israelis, they have yet to convince Washington of their seriousness about achieving a negotiated agreement. They should embrace the secretary’s call for the parties to take clear positions on final-status issues and lay out their vision for the future as specifically as possible. They would then probably be able to demonstrate that their vision of the future is closer to the US view than Israel’s is, assuming the Israelis are willing to reveal any vision at all.

Palestinians would thereby give the United States every reason to increase its support for the party better in sync with its own policies.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/a_narrow_road_to_palestinian_freedom

A narrow road near the small West Bank village of Qarawat Bani Hassan is now the implausible epicenter of the Palestinian drive for freedom and independence. At first glance, the two-kilometer stretch is remote and of little practical significance, since it does not lead to any major hub and has no strategic value. But it is, quite literally, the frontline of the Palestinian state and institution-building program being led by Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.

The road’s significance comes from two crucial political facts. First, it is located in Area C, constituting 60 percent of the West Bank that the interim Oslo Accords, which were supposed to last for only five years between 1993 and 1998, designated to remain under full Israeli control. And second, the paving of the road was organized and paid for by the Palestinian Authority under the state-building rubric.

Consequently, and citing their alleged prerogatives in Area C, the Israeli authorities have destroyed the paved asphalt. Both Fayyad and local villagers have vowed to repave it time and again, and the Palestinian Authority has already allocated funds to do just that.

This road, in its own small, understated way is the first major practical embodiment of the long-term political and strategic logic of the Palestinian state and institution-building program, and a modest, quiet demonstration of how that that project inevitably leads to powerful challenges to the occupation.

The state-building program confronts Israel with a simple question about not only Areas A and B, but C as well: Is this land going to be part of the Palestinian state or is it part of Israel? If it is part of Israel, what’s the point of even discussing a two-state solution? But, if it is ultimately going to be part of a Palestinian state, how can that state ever be created if Palestinian infrastructure, development and institution-building are actively thwarted by the occupation? Who will create this state if not the Palestinians, and how can they if they are physically prevented from doing so by the Israeli military?

All of these questions lead to the most important one Israel has to ask itself, one on which there is no clarity or consensus whatsoever among Israeli leaders: What is their vision of the future in the occupied Palestinian territories? In other words, what do they intend to do with this land and the millions of stateless noncitizens who live there? What is it that Israel ultimately wants?

By channeling Palestinian energies into the mundane, workaday tasks of building state infrastructure and institutions, Fayyad is deliberately breaking from a well-established tradition of “heroic” and romantic Palestinian nationalism based on grand gestures and, even more typically, grand statements. There isn’t anything in the history of contemporary Palestinian nationalism that would have allowed us to predict that the act of paving a two-kilometer road in the middle of nowhere would actually become a potentially important moment, however understated, in the Palestinian struggle for freedom. But that’s exactly what has happened.

The state-building program, which has largely been welcomed by Israelis as long as it is restricted to constructive efforts and security cooperation in Area A, can only survive if it grows and expands. It does not allow for stasis. It was a matter of time before it began to creep into Area C and elsewhere, confronting Israelis with the difficult but unavoidable questions. As the quiet battle over this road demonstrates, Israel has a simple choice forced upon it by the state-building program: Either allow it to spread into Area C and continue to expand in every way, or interfere and, in effect, kill the entire project. If Israel chooses the latter, it will announce to the world and to itself that it never intended to allow a viable Palestinian state and must then explain to the world and itself precisely what its alternative is.

State-building efforts are also quietly at work in occupied East Jerusalem, with the Palestinian Authority renovating and re-inaugurating schools and other institutions. Israel has prevented Fayyad from going to ceremonies marking those efforts, but appears to be surprised to learn about what the Palestinian Authority was quietly doing to address Palestinian needs, even in Jerusalem.

Those who denounce the state-building effort and the Palestinian Authority’s activities generally as “collaboration” fail to understand the way in which that project inevitably leads to confrontations with the occupation that force moral and political clarity; or these critics oppose Palestinian statehood altogether in favor of a broader agenda.

However, as demonstrated by the “Freedom Road,” as Palestinians have now dubbed this little stretch of asphalt, built into the logic of the state-building program is what will increasingly become a series of quiet altercations with the occupation that will either lead, both practically and politically, to the creation of a Palestinian state, or force Israel to openly admit it will never allow any such thing to happen.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/four_lions_is_no_laughing_matter

Chris Morris’ new film “Four Lions,” which attempts to satirize “homegrown” Jihadist terrorists in the United Kingdom, is a disappointing and distasteful fiasco.

Morris is best known as a British television current affairs satirist on programs such as “The Day Today” and “Brass Eye” who revels in controversial and edgy subjects. “Four Lions” premiered at the 2010 Sundance film festival, has done well at the box office and received considerable and largely positive attention in the United States and the UK. The theater in which I saw the film in Washington DC was sold out, and the audience appeared extremely receptive in spite of elements of working-class northern English and South Asian immigrant cultures that few Americans are familiar with.

“Four Lions” tells the story of four young British Muslims in Sheffield who have, for reasons the film does not explain, decided to embrace the ideology of Al-Qaeda and conduct terrorist acts in the UK. Two of the men, Omar and Waj, go to Pakistan for “mujahideen training,” during which they accidentally blow up a terrorist training camp.

The other two extremists are the particularly dimwitted Faisal and the most extreme and irrational of the group, Barry, an English convert. Their essential features, both as individuals and as a group, are extreme stupidity and incompetence, which do not prevent them from being very menacing. But at heart, this is just another version of the gang that couldn’t shoot straight. Inevitably, however, the four end up causing brutal mayhem at the London Marathon.

Since the film focuses on an extremely serious, important and under-analyzed (maybe even under-conceptualized) phenomenon, it should have been both funny and insightful. Unfortunately, it is neither.

That there are people like the ones depicted in the film is beyond question. That some of these people really are as bizarre and incompetent is also evident from counterterrorism surveillance and several spectacularly bungled attempted “homegrown” Jihadist attacks, particularly in the United States. The extremists, their radicalism and, in some cases their stupidity, are not only legitimate grounds for satire, they virtually scream for it. Yet “Four Lions” fails miserably both as a satire and as a critique.

It’s not really an Islamophobic movie, I hasten to add. The only aspect of the film that rings profoundly false and might be considered socially and politically objectionable is the representation of Omar’s young professional wife, not to mention his cheerful young son, as calmly and demurely supportive of his plan for suicidal terrorist mayhem. The record strongly suggests that such extremists go to great lengths to hide their plans not only from others in their Western Muslim communities broadly; but specifically also from family members including parents and spouses. I’m as skeptical about Omar’s wife representing a real phenomenon as I am convinced that he does.

Morris has said that he believes he has made “a good-hearted film,” but I don’t know how he could possibly think so. There’s nothing wrong with black comedy, at which the British excel, or gallows humor for that matter, but the image of a mentally challenged would-be terrorist suddenly exploding because he has wrapped himself in a homemade bomb and inadvertently collided with a sheep just isn’t that amusing. This is the most troubling thing about “Four Lions”: it sounds funny in theory, and it should be funny, but in practice it merely proves to be predictable, tedious and frequently repulsive.

The humor in the film, for those familiar with the evolution of British comedy, is mostly old-fashioned, drawing mainly from the Peter Cook tradition, especially the millennialist fools in his classic “The End of the World” sketch from the “Beyond the Fringe” review, which debuted in 1960. The voice of these “Jihadist British Muslims” is, in both tone and structure, pretty much indistinguishable from what was on offer at the Edinburgh Festival 50 years ago.

Morris has defended his script by pointing out that he has drawn some of his material from actual counterterrorism surveillance documents. No doubt that’s true. But I doubt that, ludicrous and disturbing as many of those conversations may be, they are anymore more entertaining or amusing than his film proves.

In the final analysis, satire has to have a point. “Four Lions,” insofar as I can tell, simply doesn’t. Yes, such people exist, and they’re frequently morons. Yes, ignorant, weird converts are often the most extreme ones (Barry keeps insisting that what they really should blow up is the local mosque to “radicalize the moderates”). Yes, the police are often equally cretinous, and occasionally perhaps equally ruthless. Yes, at a certain level political extremism proves in practice to be a sick joke. We knew all that already.

I watched Morris’ film carefully, and I just have no idea what, beyond such obvious and even undeniable banalities, he was really trying to communicate to his Western audiences. The danger with this kind of satire is that it trivializes a serious set of problems, and the payoff has to be insight or analytical clarity offsetting such trivialization. “Four Lions” tries much too hard to be edgy without ever actually asking any of the most difficult questions its subject matter begs. In the end, it’s as foolish and incompetent as are its own main characters.

http://onfaith.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2010/10/muslim_extremism_stems_from_alienation.html

The recent arrest of Farooque Ahmed on charges of conspiring with undercover law enforcement officers to bomb metro stations in the greater DC area has once again turned attention to the growing problem of “homegrown” terrorist threats emerging on the fringes of the Muslim American community. While this overdetermined phenomenon lacks a single, discrete cause or simple profile, some rough outlines can be confidently sketched about the nature and motivation of this form of extremism.

First and foremost, these “lone wolf” or spontaneous homegrown eruptions of Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist impulses, like most forms of domestic terrorism, would appear to be principally the result of alienation. This alienation, from mainstream American society and
culture or US government policies, sets the stage in an individual’s mind for an interest in extremist ideology. Particularly when combined with personal crises or meltdowns, alienation, extremist ideology and despair are frequently found at the basis of violent outbursts or impulses.

In the case of domestic Muslim extremism, alienation is almost always not only from mainstream American society, but from the mainstream Muslim American community as well. In almost all recent cases of domestic Muslim extremism, the accused have been little, if at all, known to local Muslim communities, and almost never engaged in local mosque, community or civic activities. This means that while Muslim Americans will collectively and unfairly pay a price for this kind of extremist sentiment or activity, there is very little their community organizations can do to protect against it.

Such extremists do not have a theology as such, and are largely driven by political rather than religious ideas, although their sense of the political may be expressed through religiously-inflected language. Generally speaking such extremists are motivated by a paranoid and chauvinist worldview akin to ethnic nationalism. This is also true of the more organized self-described “Salafist-Jihadist” groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic world.

Essentially, this worldview centers on the notion that there is a colonialist and predatory relationship between the West and the Islamic world, motivated by some nefarious purpose ranging from control of the region’s natural resources to a global conspiracy to destroy or defeat Islam as a religious or political force. As with all forms of violent extremism, these individuals see themselves as “fighting back” against an aggressive enemy, although in the Arab and Islamic worlds the fight is focused mainly on local regimes that are seen as either too pro-Western or insufficiently “Islamic,” or both.

The recent spate of cases involving Americans of Pakistani and Afghan origin that seem to be connected to anger about US military presence and activities in Afghanistan or drone strikes in Pakistan demonstrate the connection between some of these extremist sentiments and more widespread objections and even outrage about US policies prevalent in those societies.

This worldview is also the latest soup du jour of an apparently omnipresent appetite for political extremism at the margins of both American society and many parts of the world. It taps into sentiments of alienation, grievance, injustice, righteous anger and implacable opposition to the status quo that would have drawn vulnerable individuals into the orbit of violent ultraleft factions in the 1960s and 70s or the ultraright militia movement in the 1990s, to cite two other recent examples. The apparently disproportionate number of converts to extreme versions of Islam involved in such violent radicalism is another indication of this phenomenon.

The good news is that very few of these cases have resulted in injury or loss of life, and many of them seem to involve individuals with the apparent willingness but not the ability to actually cause harm. In several high-profile cases, undercover law enforcement officers egged these individuals on, sometimes to the point of appearing to border on entrapment.

In other cases, especially involving individuals with military training such as the Fort Hood murder Maj. Nidal Hasan, as with the Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, the tragedies have been all too real.

But, while there is no doubt homegrown, spontaneous and “lone wolf” instances of domestic Muslim American extremism are a growing concern, especially for the Muslim American community itself which pays the highest price for such radicalism, the reality is that the actual threat it poses to life and property is, as far as anyone can tell, very limited indeed. As long as it remains, as it is, a marginal phenomenon attracting fringe, alienated and isolated individuals, it will be a challenge with which our society can readily cope.

http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=28628&lan=en&sid=0&sp=0&isNew=1

Whether or not a solution to the crisis over settlements is achieved in the coming days, it’s becoming increasingly clear that the direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are in serious trouble. The Israeli daily Ha’aretz quoted unnamed Western officials as saying the talks are “going nowhere.” And the most cautious, sober and measured of the senior PLO leadership, Yasser Abed Rabbo who is a member of the negotiating team, has been moved to declare that, “there will be no serious political process with Netanyahu’s government.”

Most reports strongly suggest that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been unforthcoming on permanent status issues. According to these sources, Netanyahu refuses to meaningfully discuss core question such as borders and insists that security must be the main issue at this stage. This has led to frustration not only among the Palestinians and other Arabs, but in many circles in the West and the United States.

This frustration is amplified by Netanyahu’s refusal thus far to accept an exceptionally generous American inducement package in exchange for a 60-day extension to the partial settlement moratorium that expired in September. Indeed, the New York Times called the package “overly generous.” Moreover, it is unclear what the Obama administration expects to be different in two months time, when the parties are likely to find themselves in precisely the same situation. If the Americans have a game-changing approach to unveil over the course of eight weeks, it’s the best-kept secret in Washington.

The American hope may be that borders can be agreed in short order, rendering the settlement issue largely moot, but the parties themselves show little sign of believing that. We therefore have to face the fact that negotiations would appear to be both stalled in substance and threatened with a political crisis that may produce a breakdown. It might be possible to keep the ball in the air by returning to indirect negotiations or finding some other temporary stopgaps. But the experience of the past few weeks does not augur well for prospects of any kind of significant success in the foreseeable future.

The prospect of a breakdown again raises the spectre of another intifada, since many Palestinians may conclude that the occupation is either permanent or that diplomacy is simply an ineffective tool in resolving it and that a new uprising is the only remaining way to pressure Israel.

The flashpoints are obvious. Especially in Arab neighbourhoods of occupied East Jerusalem, tensions are running high. Recently a Palestinian man was shot under extremely questionable circumstances by a settler guard, and a 14-month-old baby was killed by teargas fired by Israeli security forces. Numerous buildings and even neighbourhoods are under fierce contention between aggressive settlers supported by both the national and municipal Israeli authorities and Palestinians struggling to cling onto their homes. If another intifada erupts, it may very well begin there.

But it is essential that Palestinians do not turn to, or allow themselves to be sucked into, another round of violence with Israel. A third intifada would undoubtedly follow the pattern established by the relationship of the end of the first intifada to its beginning, and of the second intifada to the first; a process has entailed ever-increasing levels of violence, death and religious fanaticism on both sides. Because of this pattern, the consequences of the second intifada were disastrous for the Palestinian people and national movement. A third is likely to be even worse.

For Israel, a third intifada could well signal the squandering of the last opportunity to divest itself of the occupation in a rational, workable manner, rendering what will become the de facto Israeli state as neither Jewish nor democratic in any meaningful sense and developing and entrenching an apartheid character especially in the occupied territories.

It is imperative that some way is found to keep diplomacy alive, even if it means a return to less-than-optimal indirect negotiations. In the end, both parties have no option but to work towards a negotiated two-state peace agreement or continue with an ever-deteriorating conflict. It is essential that international actors such as the United States, the European Union and the Arab League help find a formula to allow Israel to make restrained settlement expansion, and the Palestinians to make continued negotiations, politically plausible among both of their domestic constituencies.

In the meanwhile, Palestinians should redouble their state and institution building efforts with international support, recently reiterated by both the United States and the Quartet. And they should continue to explore what kind of momentum can be secured to complement diplomacy through non-violent protests, and boycotts of settlement, but not Israeli, goods. Confronting the occupation at every level is essential, but a return to violence, no matter who instigates it, would be a disastrous miscalculation on the Palestinian side.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/biding_time

The United States will most probably succeed in convincing Israel to extend its partial and temporary settlement moratorium for another two or three months. It has already offered a package of benefits that seems completely disproportionate to what is being asked for, and which even US newspaperThe New York Times has described as “overly generous.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has, at the time of writing of this column, declined to accept what was being offered and is apparently holding out for more. And no wonder. The US administration looks desperate, almost panicked, to keep the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians going until after the US November midterm elections.

On Thursday, Washington signed a deal long-coveted by Tel Aviv to sell the new and highly-advanced F-35 stealth fighter jets to the Jewish state, a rarefied military support that is completely unconnected to Israel’s cooperation on peace. Reports said that the US administration might even commit to some kind of a long-term Israeli security presence in the Jordan Valley after a Palestinian independence becomes a reality, a thing that would be considered a deal breaker for many Palestinians. In other words, Washington might be offering Israel commitments it cannot live up to in the long run.

But the bigger question remains: What is really the point behind all this?

Keeping the Middle East peace talks going is an important, laudable and essential goal. After all, nothing will ever be resolved without diplomacy. However, why the US administration is fetishizing a settlement freeze which will be short-lived and which has always been a political gimmick rather than a real restriction on settlement expansion is highly questionable. Obviously, the most immediate goal is to find a formula allowing the Palestinians to remain in the negotiations. A settlement moratorium extension would certainly guarantee that. But what then?

It is not clear what would change in eight or even 12 weeks. The only difference would be that Israel will then have under its belt a large number of US concessions and guarantees without having done anything substantial to earn them. Wouldn’t the damage to the credibility and viability of negotiations and the Palestinian negotiators be even greater then?

It is possible that the US administration has a plan, but if it does, then it is the best-kept secret in Washington. No one knows what Washington expects to accomplish within two or three months should Tel Aviv agree to extend its settlement freeze. The widespread suspicion is that the US will deal with that problem when it is faced with it.

But this has to be more than an exercise in kicking the can down the road. There couldn’t be a greater tragedy for the parties, the region and the political environment in general than for those who maintained from the beginning that failed negotiations would be worse than no negotiations to be proven right in the end.

The US administration now finds itself riding the tiger: in two or three months, it will probably be able to either seize the postelection moment to start really cracking heads together on peace – a thing that will come at an exorbitant price – or it can face one of the most humiliating US diplomatic failures in living memory. One thing is for certain, we are getting to the point where there really isn’t a lot of middle ground left.

So, if Israel decides it makes most sense to just pocket whatever it is the US is offering in exchange for a few weeks of more of the same – even if it comes at a certain political cost to Netanyahu – then Washington will have to act quickly in order to prevent a humiliating and possibly disastrous rapid return to the political crisis of the past few weeks.

The most obvious measure would be an effort to have all parties move quickly to negotiate the future borders of a Palestinian state and to try to resolve the issue before the settlement freeze expires. While it is true that most points pertaining to the land issue have been negotiated almost to completion in the past, there is every reason to be skeptical that the present Israeli government and Palestinian leadership would be capable of reaching a formula in the immediate future that satisfies both parties. This would also leave the question of Jerusalem unresolved, and potentially explosive, unless both sides agree to maintain the status quo along the lines of the Clinton parameters, with Israel only building in established Jewish neighborhoods.

It would probably make more sense to focus in the immediate future on realities on the ground, deliverables that will improve the quality of life for both parties, such as increased security arrangements for the Israelis and an expansion of the Palestinian Authority’s role in West Bank Areas B and C that are presently under Israeli control. But until the crisis over settlements, which is not only an Israeli-Palestinian problem, but an Israeli-US one as well, is resolved rather than endlessly postponed, it is not going to be possible even to focus on modest deliverables, let alone permanent status issues.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/separating_gimmickry_from_reality_on_settlements

Israel’s temporary, partial settlement construction moratorium has finally expired without being renewed in any way. This is in spite of repeated American entreaties to the Israeli government to extend the moratorium and repeated Palestinian warnings that negotiations could not continue if building resumes. As things stand, the issue is unresolved and poses a serious threat to the future of negotiations, with the United States urgently looking for a compromise and the Palestinians putting off any final decision for at least another week.

However, it is likely that both parties will seek a way out, since neither can afford to be blamed for a meltdown of the negotiations at this early stage. The main weapon Washington has, since it prefers to keep itself at arm’s length from final-status issues for now, is the finger of blame it can point in either direction should the talks flounder. The Palestinians could be blamed at less political cost to the Obama administration and probably have more to lose in any confrontation with the US than Israel does. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also very concerned about appearing to be the party at fault. Both the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships have been in this situation over the past year and a half, and neither wishes to experience it again.

The strong Palestinian line on this matter is understandable but also problematic. There is no doubt it is a serious political problem for the Palestine Liberation Organization to continue direct negotiations with Israel without any extension of the moratorium. However, it would be even more damaging diplomatically and in terms of the Palestinian national interest for the PLO to end up in a major confrontation with Washington, especially if it were blamed for a breakdown in talks.

In fact, the settlement issue is not really so much a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian question as a bilateral Israeli-American one. It was the Obama administration that pushed the settlement issue when it began to strongly reengage Middle East peace efforts. The Palestinians were following the American lead, albeit with far less maneuverability. And the Palestinians on their own do not have leverage with Israel to have much impact on such a sensitive domestic political issue. As a practical matter, if the Palestinians are going to get anything out of the Israelis on settlements, it’s going to be the Americans who get it for them.

The crisis is both of very real significance and also entirely symbolic. The settlement issue is crucial because with every significant expansion of the Israeli presence in the Occupied Territories, the borders of a Palestinian state become more difficult to draw, and the – often belligerent – constituency in Israel with a vested interest in opposing territorial compromise is enlarged, entrenched and strengthened. At the same time, the idea of extending what was always a partial, temporary moratorium on settlement construction that never included Jerusalem and had many loopholes was essentially a political gimmick.

Since the moratorium did not ever have much impact on settlement activity, the best way out of the impasse may be to separate gimmickry from reality. On the one hand, influential portions of Israeli society want to see more settlement activity in the coming months. On the other, all sensible parties, including Israeli parties, must recognize that, however it is marketed, Israel cannot be allowed to continue to reshape the strategic landscape while negotiations are proceeding.

This suggests the usefulness of an informal understanding, enforced by the US, that Israel can build modestly in “consensus areas” generally understood to be the likely subject of a land swap between Israel and a new Palestinian state. However, Israel must not engage in significant new land expropriation in the West Bank, incursions into Palestinian neighborhoods of occupied East Jerusalem, or building in the “E-1 corridor” that would cut Jerusalem off from the West Bank.

Not only would such an understanding resolve, for a limited period of time, the strategic problems posed by continued settlement activity, it could and should buy time for negotiators to focus on fixing the borders of a Palestinian state, which would defuse the issue over a much longer term. However, being both informal and a compromise that gives something to both parties, but not what each really wants, the proposal leaves both leaderships facing potential domestic political challenges.

For all its obvious imperfections, such an informal compromise, if seriously enforced by the Obama administration, could defuse the crisis and buy significant and precious time for negotiators. One way or another, both Israel and the Palestinians in their short-term diplomatic and long-term national interests need to find a way to go forward with negotiations without allowing political gimmickry to cloud the vital strategic imperatives. Talks must continue, but Israel cannot continue to alter the strategic landscape as they proceed.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/netanyahus_subtle_insidious_unworkable_demand

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has recently been reiterating the demand he has focused on since regaining power that Palestinians and other Arabs recognize Israel as not only a “Jewish state” but specifically as “the nation-state of the Jewish people.” This demand has been flatly rejected not only by the Palestinian leadership, but more recently by the Arab League.

The demand for explicit Arab recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state” is a relatively new phenomenon, and was not part of either the Oslo process or the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. It was formally introduced into the conversation for the first time during the Annapolis meeting of November 2007, in which then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert demanded the Palestinians make some kind of statement recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. They refused, and the Israelis asked President George W. Bush to do so in his address. Yet Bush simply reiterated language from the Balfour Declaration about Israel as “a homeland for the Jewish people,” which has very different political and legal connotations.

The reason the Americans avoided such a formulation at the time was that they agreed with the Palestinians that the demand, at that stage of negotiations, was an attempt to foreclose the refugee issue, and that such a step would be bad for negotiations as a whole because reciprocal compromises on that issue and Jerusalem would probably be required to reach a successful agreement. The Palestinians are obviously also concerned that any recognition on their part of Israel as a “Jewish state” might imply an acceptance of discrimination against the large Palestinian minority in Israel.

The Palestinian point since Annapolis has been that the Palestine Liberation Organization has already recognized Israel through the letters of mutual recognition that are the core documents of the Oslo process and all subsequent Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and that Israel is free to define itself, as Palestine will be. The Palestinians rightly point out that it is extremely unusual if not unprecedented in international relations for a state to ask its neighbors to define its character. Many others agree that adding the issue to the negotiations introduces a new complication in an already vexed set of problems.

Since regaining power, Netanyahu has raised the stakes in two ways: first, because of the importance he has given the demand; second, in the specific language he is insisting on, which is exceptionally problematic from a Palestinian and Arab point of view.

The Netanyahu formulation – “the nation-state of the Jewish people” – is so crammed with subtle significance that it demands careful unpacking. It is a significant move away from the idea of Israel merely as “a Jewish state,” with its indefinite article and very broad range of potential interpretations. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Jewish Israelis undoubtedly see Israel as a Jewish state, but there is absolutely no consensus among them about what that means, apart from the fact that there is a majority community that both sees itself and is defined by the government as “Jewish.”

Netanyahu’s version moves away from the indefinite article and imposes two definite articles that are probably the most significant aspect of this language. It is categorically “the nation-state,” nobody else’s and none other, of “the Jewish people,” a constituency that is implicitly clearly defined, discrete and readily identifiable.

What Netanyahu’s language essentially does with its definite articles is foreclose alternatives or pluralisms. In that sense, it represents a return not only to classical Zionism but even to an anachronistic pre-state ideology that privileges a global Jewish “national” identity over an Israeli one. Such categorical language cannot be entirely a matter of comfort for many in Jewish communities around the world who feel intense loyalty to their own nation-states.

From a Palestinian point of view, the language is unacceptable because it implies that Israel is not only a “Jewish state” because it has a Jewish ethnic majority and consequent self-definition, but that it “belongs” not to its citizens or its ethnic majority but rather to “the Jewish people” around the world and for all time. Netanyahu is asking Palestinians to accept that Jews (by Israel’s official definition of the term) around the world, no matter where they are and what, if any, connection they have to Israel or Palestine, enjoy political rights that are privileged and superior over any other group in a metaphysical, permanent and non-contingent manner.

The obvious implication here is that Jews around the world, most of whom are not Israeli citizens, have superior political and national rights in Israel to the Palestinian citizens of that state. Netanyahu is asking the PLO and other Palestinians to not only embrace and endorse Zionism, but a very old-fashioned Zionism at that.

Netanyahu is also asking Palestinians to accept Israel as a fait accompli, a reality, and a legitimate member state of the United Nations, but also as an entity that transcends itself and has a trans-historical, supra-political and even quasi-religious status as “the nation-state of the Jewish people,” no matter who happens to live there or what they collectively decide. He’s not asking for recognition of the Israeli state; he’s asking for a permanent deed to the global Jewish community of the land and political rights in it for all time. This is a unique demand as far as I can tell in the history of international relations, and a completely unreasonable one at that.

In the end, to make a Palestinian-Israeli agreement work it may be necessary, especially after the refugee issue is resolved, to find language through which Jewish Israelis and Palestinians recognize each other’s right of self-determination in their respective states, and I don’t think this is unrealistic or unreasonable. But Netanyahu’s language is subtle, insidious and completely unworkable.

http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=28497&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0&isNew=1

While the build up to the renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – the first direct talks in almost ten years to be brokered by the United States – was largely greeted with an excess of pessimism on the part of many observers, the fact that they have been resumed is, on its own, something of an achievement for US President Barack Obama and his administration. Indeed, it took almost a year of intensive diplomacy in order to get to these direct negotiations to get them going.

Both Israelis and Palestinians expressed satisfaction with the first round of talks in Washington, and the mood of the Palestinian delegation in particular seemed to be considerably improved when they left. Following the second round of negotiations in Egypt, US officials including Obama, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US Special Envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell all made upbeat comments.

Leading up to the talks, attention both in the Middle East and in the West generally focused on the obvious obstacles to achieving agreement: politically weak leadership on both sides, powerful domestic opposition, total lack of trust between the parties, the unresolved issue of settlement expansion and, most significantly, seemingly unbridgeable differences on key final-status issues, including borders, refugees’ right of return, Jerusalem and security. In particular, the question of Jerusalem remains a huge sticking point. Several key members of the Israeli cabinet insist that control of Jerusalem is not up for negotiation, while the Palestinians cannot consider any agreement that does not provide them with a capital in East Jerusalem.

All of these issues will be very difficult to overcome, but it is surely premature – and counterproductive – to dismiss the negotiations as pointless or doomed to fail simply because reaching an agreement will be painful and complicated.

In many cases, the pessimism has been a consequence of focusing solely on obstacles, rather than potential incentives for an agreement for both parties. In other cases, it reflected not so much pessimism about, but rather opposition to, a negotiated agreement based on serious compromises. These include both short-term compromises by Israel on issues such as territorial control by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and increased security measures by the Palestinians, as well as long-term compromises required of Israel on Jerusalem and the Palestinians on the right of return for refugees.

Similarly, undue optimism has also taken hold in some quarters as the talks continue, in spite of the lack of any concrete achievement thus far. The impressive political spectacle engineered by the White House moved some noted sceptics, including the veteran American negotiator Aaron David Miller, to attenuate their resounding “no’s” into muted “maybe’s” about whether the peace process can work. The US administration’s unrelenting persistence on the issue, coupled with the presence of both Israeli and Palestinian leaders insisting that an agreement is possible, seems to have at least temporarily won over some cynics.

Moreover, there is evidence of the effectiveness of American influence on the parties, if not their enthusiasm for negotiating with each other: the Israelis did not allow the murder of four settlers near Hebron by Hamas on the eve of the talks to prompt a pullout, and the Palestinians did not invoke either the flotilla attack in May or the ongoing settlement controversy to prevent their attendance.

That the talks are even continuing in the face of such serious difficulties is a testament to the will of the negotiators, the influence of the United States and the deep reluctance of Israel and the Palestinians to be blamed for any failure. Neither optimists nor pessimists will find anything that has happened in the negotiations thus far to seriously challenge any of their assumptions. But pessimists should bear in mind that if we are ever to have successful negotiations leading to a peace agreement, they are inevitably going to begin as modestly as this.