http://www.ibishblog.com/article/2012/02/21/muslims_must_speak_against_kashgari_scandal

It’s hard to know where to begin in cataloging the outrages associated with the arrest of Hamza Kashgari. The 23-year-old Saudi columnist was recently detained on trumped-up “blasphemy” charges, for which he potentially faces execution.

First, Saudi extremists took umbrage at some tweets in which he expressed admiration, disapproval and bewilderment at various aspects of the Prophet Mohammed’s legendary life. This outrage was orchestrated by clerics as part of a campaign to increase their power.

Second, the Saudi state reacted by appeasing the fanatics and ordering Kashgari’s arrest for “blasphemy.” In effect, they confirmed the ability of extremists to dictate the agenda of, if not bully, the government on religious matters.

Third, Kashgari had already left the country to evade persecution, but was apprehended by Malaysian authorities in Kuala Lumpur, possibly with the assistance of Interpol, and returned to Saudi Arabia. So at least one foreign government and possibly a multilateral policing agency have connived in this travesty.

Fourth, the Saudi government says it may seek the death penalty for Kashgari. There can be no freedom of conscience or religion where blasphemy is a crime, but the Saudi state has never respected or acknowledged either of those principles. Yet Kashgari hasn’t committed blasphemy. All he did was express complex religious feelings. And it is shocking that a government would consider executing, or even prosecuting, anyone for either of these “crimes.”

Fifth, while there have been some limited efforts to protest this scandalous injustice and intercede on behalf of Kashgari’s life and liberty, they have thus far been insufficient. Muslim states, governments and individuals have an especial, and urgent, responsibility to categorically oppose this outrage.

Muslims, including Saudi officials and citizens, are properly vociferous in denouncing Islamophobic misrepresentations of Islam as an inherently violent and intolerant religion. Doctrinally and historically, it is clearly not. However, the reputation of Muslims and Islam is also, and far too often, called into severe disrepute by the conduct of some important Muslim-majority states claiming to act in the name or defense of Islam.

The persecution of Kashgari, not by cynical Saudi clerics weeping hysterically on YouTube, but by the state itself, is another disturbing reflection of this phenomenon. One cannot claim to be tolerant or opposed to violence while considering beheading someone for expressing mild religious doubts about a figure who, in his own lifetime, reportedly insisted on his own status as a fallible human being.

The government of Saudi Arabia doesn’t represent the norm or authority for the Muslims of the world. But it is a large and influential Muslim state and is claiming to act on behalf of Islam in this ugly affair.

Silence implies consent. If Muslims don’t want their religion to be misrepresented by such actions, they must openly and loudly repudiate them. And, if there is any virtue or truth in religion, it hardly needs enforcement on pain of death.

The good news is that because he is a relatively prominent Saudi citizen, and the case has become a minor international cause célèbre, Kashgari is unlikely to be executed. The pattern in such cases suggests that if he shows “repentance” or there is an international outcry, or both, Kashgari’s sentence may initially be harsh but will almost certainly be commuted.

The most likely outcome is that Kashgari will end up sometime in the next few years permanently relocated to another country. Kashgari is lucky that he’s not from a remote village or irrelevant family or, worse, a migrant worker. In that case he might really need to start contemplating bearing his neck to the sword.

This scandal is indicative of a broader growth of intolerance in Saudi social and religious rhetoric of late, which also comes in the context of Shia unrest in the Eastern Governorate of Qatif. Extremist clerics have been upping the ante at every stage over the past few months, and clearly believe that they have just won an important victory. They are now demanding the cancellation of cultural and book festivals. At public events, their thuggish, unauthorized and un-uniformed street forces, known as the “Mohtasbeen,” have been reportedly trying to upstage the official religious orthodoxy beadles, the “Muttaween.”

While non-Muslims cannot honestly claim that Saudi Arabia represents Islam, Muslims cannot dismiss the kingdom as irrelevant either. Saudi Arabia’s religious and cultural influence, byproducts of its wealth and custodianship of the two most holy Muslim sites, is undeniable. The extremist shift in Saudi social and religious attitudes therefore has troubling implications.

Nobody can force the Saudi state to behave in a reasonable manner if it doesn’t want to. But all other Muslims can and should make it clear that they strongly disapprove of the persecution of Hamza Kashgari and the mentality that lies behind such actions.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=364757

The growing split that has been emerging within the leadership of Hamas has exploded into a bitter public feud. It was prompted an agreement reached last week in Qatar between the head of Hamas’ political bureau, Khaled Meshaal, and the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas. According to the deal, Abbas would take on the additional role of prime minister until elections are held later this year.

Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings, the divergence of interests between Hamas’ leadership in Gaza and its leadership abroad has been steadily intensifying. External leaders, Meshaal in particular, have come under increasing pressure to adapt to regional transformations, particularly the growing sectarian split in the Middle East.

It has become impossible for Hamas to remain friendly with Sunni Arab governments and Islamist movements while being simultaneously allied to Syria and Iran. The days in which the mythology of an “axis of resistance” could rationalize a Sunni Islamist movement being part of an Iranian-led—essentially Shia—alliance are long gone. Hamas leaders proved unable to side with Bashar al-Assad while their colleagues in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood are a key component in the uprising against his regime. No Hamas official remains in the movement’s Damascus headquarters.

The external Hamas leadership has a branding and identity crisis, and needs desperately to find new patrons and headquarters, and a new international political and strategic profile. Hence Meshaal has been intensively courting Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, among others, seeking alternative sources of support and a new regional orientation.

The Gaza leadership does not share much of this crisis. Their rule is effectively unchallenged, and they continue to draw on various sources of income. From their perspective, there is no immediate need for a major reorientation. They argue that sooner rather than later their fellow Islamists will gain unchallenged power in Egypt and other key Arab states, and that it makes no sense to compromise with Abbas or anyone else at this stage. This is a gamble the external leadership cannot afford.

Many Gaza leaders clearly think the external leadership is making momentous decisions for its own purposes, but at their political expense. Resentment has boiled over. Already, last year a Hamas hardliner in Gaza, Mahmoud Zahhar, was disciplined for insisting that the primary leadership of Hamas was the one in Gaza. That proved to be a foretaste of the current crisis.

The “Change and Reform” bloc in Gaza, which includes Zahhar and the de facto prime minister, Ismail Haniyyeh, immediately reacted to the agreement with Abbas by issuing a blistering “legal memorandum.” The document laid out detailed and categorical objections to the accord, declaring it illegal. Zahhar, speaking on behalf of many and openly attacking Meshaal, said that “no one in the organization had been consulted,” and described the deal as “a mistake” which “could not be implemented” and “a real crisis.”

Meanwhile, Haniyyeh visited several Gulf states, and more importantly Iran, to shore up Iranian support, despite the dispute over the Assad regime. If the Gaza leadership is to mount an effective pushback against this new initiative, which enjoys Arab Gulf backing, it is going to require significant support from Iran. The Iranians might have incentives to continue to fund Hamas in Gaza to try to sabotage the Arab-led Palestinian reconciliation agreement, and to retain Hamas as a potential chit in the face of a possible Israeli or American attack on its nuclear facilities.

How the crisis in Hamas develops depends on several factors. A close ally of Meshaal, Ahmed Youssef, has implied that Qatar promised strong financial backing in return for the agreement. If that is delivered, especially if it is augmented by aid from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, it will require a great deal of Iranian and other leverage for the Gaza-based leaders to prevail.

The position of the Hamas paramilitary Ezzeddine al-Qassam Brigades will also be crucial. Its leaders, Ahmed Jabari and Marwan Issa, have traditionally deferred to the leadership of the political bureau, and reportedly urged Meshaal not to step down as its chief. But they have also expressed dismay at some of Meshaal’s recent comments regarding the tactical value of nonviolent resistance.

The power struggle in Hamas reflects regional rivalries and strikingly divergent interests that have developed in the context of the Arab uprisings. But a complete split in the movement is highly improbable, and one side is going to prevail.

Whether the agreement with Abbas is implemented or not, Hamas will only go as far as it absolutely must to adjust to new realities. But relying on states like Qatar, Egypt and Jordan will necessitate very different behavior than being a client of Syria and Iran. And Hamas leaders counting on the Arab Spring turning into an “Islamic Awakening” that fulfills their ideological fantasies are spending more time reading coffee grounds than the emerging regional order.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=361870

Last week’s election in Kuwait was the most interesting, but in many ways also the most depressing, in that country’s history. Technically, the process was better than ever, but the results are deeply troubling.

Much of Kuwaiti society appears to have retreated to its most primal identity groupings, and it seems fractured as never before. Tensions between urban constituencies and more rural tribesmen boiled over into vandalism as the election tent of Mohammed Al-Juwaihel—a candidate who repeatedly suggested that Bedouin tribesmen, especially of the large Mutairi clan, were fundamentally disloyal—was burned to the ground. He nonetheless won a seat in the Third District (out of five in Kuwait, with 10 seats each), which has been considered a diverse constituency, either in spite of, or worse still because of, his aggressively intolerant rhetoric.

Religious sectarianism was also stronger than ever, with Shia candidates hoping, probably in vain, to protect their interests by continuing to ally with the royal family. They now face empowered opponents such as Mohammed Hayef Al-Mutairi, elected in the Fourth District, who specialize in vitriolic anti-Shia demagoguery.

The Muslim Brotherhood won four seats and their close allies another three, beating their all-time best of six. It marks a major comeback from 2009 when the Brotherhood was down to only one parliamentarian. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist politicians deftly claimed credit for protests late last year that finally brought down the deeply unpopular and long-serving prime minister, even though they were late-comers to the movement and their grandstanding showed the crassest opportunism. But clearly their strategy of hijacking the protests worked well at the polls.

Pro-government forces and liberals, such as they are, both took a severe drubbing at the hands of various forms of conservative and identity-candidates. Most depressingly, there are no women at all in the new parliament, with all four incumbent females ousted.

This situation is a prescription for deadlock as the ruling family retains most power and can, and probably will, dissolve parliament before long if it goes too far in harassing the executive. Knowing this, the majority of opposition parliamentarians may keep their powder dry for now, not wanting to be seen as a source of constant deadlock. But sooner or later tensions will almost certainly again boil over.

But the biggest scandal in Kuwait, and one that has received very little local, regional and international attention, is the plight of the stateless in that country. There are an estimated 120,000 people “without citizenship” (bidoun jinsiya), among 1.6 million citizens, who are themselves divided into a hierarchy of classifications that allot varying rights and responsibilities. Most bidoun are by any measure, and under stated provisions of Kuwaiti law, entitled to citizenship, but live in limbo without basic rights and legal status.

Very few Kuwaiti politicians and organizations pay the least attention to this issue, unless it is to attack the bidoun and oppose their rights. Bidoun have been increasingly organizing and protesting during the past year, but the government recently announced that they were not allowed to protest and that any who did would be deported. It is not clear, however, to where they could be deported.

In Kuwait, even peaceful protest is a right reserved solely to those classified as “citizens.” Unlike protesting “citizens,” bidoun have been routinely beaten, tear gassed and rounded up without charge or legal representation.

Bidoun issues are handled by a committee headed by a noted opponent of their rights. This committee announced reforms in November 2010 that remain almost entirely unfulfilled. Last year the government promised to address the stateless issue, but added that only 34,000 bidoun were eligible to be naturalized. It is estimated that 100,000 applications are pending but only 16,000 have been approved in the past two decades. Kuwait has never approved more than 2,000 such requests in any given year.

The victory of Islamist and tribal opposition candidates, lack of sympathy for the bidoun in most of Kuwaiti society and in the royal family, and intensified divisions among Kuwaiti citizens do not bode well for the bidoun, who have precious few allies. The shameful silence on this issue by the United States, one of the only countries with any real influence in Kuwait, only makes matters worse.

The Kuwaiti elections were fascinating, and in a grim way even entertaining. However, they offer little hope for the most vulnerable in the country—the bidoun and also the large numbers of migrant, and especially migrant domestic, workers. Government promises to address the plight of these communities have proven hollow in the past. Nothing in the election results gives any real hope that these urgent moral issues will be seriously addressed in the near future. Kuwaiti society appears more divided than ever, and suspicion, hatred and demagoguery are the order of the day.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/02/safer-side-by-side-why-israel-needs-palestine.html

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=356316

The stage seems to be set for February and March to be the scene of a significant intensification of tensions in Bahrain. The period will mark the one-year anniversaries of the protest movement, the government crackdown, and the “Peninsula Shield” intervention by Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council forces. More importantly, recent developments have pushed almost entirely away from substantive moves toward national accommodation or reconciliation.

Since the failure of the “national dialogue” last summer, clashes between security forces and largely Shia protesters have regularly taken placed during emotional funerals following the deaths of individuals under suspicious circumstances.

The report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, which found that security forces had engaged in the excessive use of force, appears to have done nothing to inhibit the use of tear gas and other suppressive measures. Indeed, this behavior seems to have intensified. At least eight protesters have been killed since the report was filed, mostly by tear gas inhalation, including reportedly a baby.

In their own defense, the authorities have pointed to changes in the leadership of the security services, the hiring of Western policing experts, and the investigation of a number of deaths in custody. They cite the impending trial of five security officers, none of them Bahraini, for the death of a blogger while being held by the police. And King Hamad has proposed some limited constitutional reforms that are supposed to enhance the power of the legislature.

None of this has impressed any major actors in the opposition. The main Shia opposition grouping, Al-Wefaq, has continued to boycott parliament and the by-elections intended to fill the seats opened by the mass resignation of its parliamentarians. There is still no vehicle for meaningful dialogue between the government and opposition forces. Hardliners on both sides appear to have been gaining ground over those interested in a meaningful compromise.

There are signs of a serious hardening of the position of important opposition voices and groups. Most significantly, on January 12, Nabeel Rajab, the president of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and a figure with both national and international credibility, gave a speech that seemed to break new ground for the mainstream opposition. He stated bluntly, “Our problem is with the king of Bahrain.” Addressing the king directly, he said, “If you cannot get rid of the heavy weights of your regime and the crimes that your regime has committed, then it is the appropriate time now for you to leave.”

It is not clear if he was calling for abdication or the end of the monarchy. However, the statement brings calls for what amount to regime change, which had previously been restricted to smaller and more radical opposition groups such as Al-Haq, much closer to the rhetoric of the mainstream Bahraini opposition. It may or may not prove to be a milestone, but it certainly represented a significant intensification of demands. It is worth noting that Rajab was beaten, detained and hospitalized following a January 6 protest.

There also appears to be more activity and influence by the shadowy, underground opposition groups calling themselves the “February 14 Youth Coalition,” whose rhetoric emphasizes a not-clearly defined “Right of Self-Determination.” The increased activity of the “February 14” groups demonstrates a growing impatience at the street and popular levels with mainstream organizations like Al-Wefaq that now are perceived as too conciliatory by some activists.

Some pro-government hardliners have also been escalating their rhetoric and pushing for stronger confrontation. When a civilian court overturned the death sentences handed down against two protesters by a military tribunal, extremist elements associated with the pro-government National Unity Gathering called for their lynching and created mock gallows in which they hanged photographs of the men.

Not enough has been done to defuse tensions, and an obvious step the government has so far unwisely avoided is a broad-based amnesty for the hundreds of people arrested and charged in connection with protests, and in many cases the simple exercise of free expression. In particular, the government cannot hope to open a meaningful dialogue with an opposition, 21 of whose leaders were jailed in a mass trial last year that did not distinguish between moderate and extreme figures. Their harsh sentences were upheld on September 28.

The release of important figures such as Abdulhadi Abdulla Hubail Alkhawaja, the former president and co-founder of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, and, above all, Ibrahim Sharif—the sole Sunni defendant in the mass trial, who is the leader of the social democratic reform group Al-Waad—would be an indispensible step away from confrontation. It is probably a sine qua non for real dialogue. Without such serious measures, the situation in Bahrain is set to deteriorate significantly in the coming months.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=353648

The path to Egypt’s presidency for former foreign minister and former Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa has just opened up substantially. As things are lining up, not much seems to stand between him and a victory in elections next summer.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which has been ruling as the de facto presidency since the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, has confirmed that presidential nominations will be opened in mid-April and the election held in mid-June.

Like many others, I was skeptical that the military could pull off credible, orderly parliamentary elections beginning on November 28 in the midst of unrest in Tahrir Square and some other urban centers. I was wrong. Turnout was high in the first round, and even many protesters voted in spite of their vehement objections to the current order. There was enthusiasm across the board in Egyptian society for going forward with elections and voting.

All three election phases are now complete, with less controversy, violence and irregularities than one might have feared. The results are not fully in, but it seems clear that Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist parties have won the bulk of the seats.

Having successfully held parliamentary elections under difficult conditions, there seems no reason to doubt that the military will be able to oversee similarly conclusive presidential elections. Indeed, it’s hard to imagine what, other than a full-fledged popular rebellion in the coming months, could successfully disrupt this.

The second development that has helped clear the decks for Moussa is the announced withdrawal of one of his main potential rivals, former International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed ElBaradei, leader of the National Coalition for Change. Last week ElBaradei bitterly complained that the military, which he did not explicitly name, was “insisting on taking the old route as if no revolution had taken place and no regime had fallen.”

ElBaradei may be betting that the next president will be perceived as a front man for the military and the system it is trying to create, and will eventually go down with that ship. If so, it’s a bold gamble.

In the past, ElBaradei, a favorite among some Egyptian liberals, has also flirted with an alliance with Islamists. But this unlikely coupling appears to have broken down completely over the past few months. His chances of defeating Moussa looked slim, and he may have felt that he had better prospects of retaining a prominent political role by serving as the voice of those rejecting the SCAF-dominated system.

More to the point, ElBaradei never seemed comfortable in the role of politician. He doesn’t appear to have mastered or to enjoy public speaking or campaigning before large crowds, and has pulled back on occasions when he might have emerged as a central national figure.

Amr Moussa’s other two declared rivals appear even weaker. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh has been expelled from the Muslim Brotherhood for running for president, since the organization does not wish, for a number of tactical reasons, to occupy that position. Mohammed Salim Al-Awa, another Islamist, mainly threatens to take votes away from Aboul Fotouh, strengthening Moussa’s hand. The other obvious potential candidates pose even less of a threat.

There have been at least eight public opinion polls or surveys since the downfall of Mubarak, all of which have shown Moussa leading all other potential candidates. This is hardly surprising. He, alone, is a familiar national figure and a Western-style politician well positioned to appeal to a broad set of constituencies in Egyptian society.

Moussa’s popularity stems from the fact that he can present himself as a man who spent time under the former regime defending Egypt’s international role and leadership in the Arab world. He could uncharitably be described as a kind of Egyptian “Henry Kissinger,” whose foreign policy role allowed him to rise above scandals that swallowed most of his former colleagues.

Last summer I wrote that the most likely outcome in Egypt was a power-sharing arrangement between a military that retains a final say on defense and national security, a foreign policy-oriented presidency and a parliament with broad domestic powers. The Islamist victory in parliamentary elections and what looks to be a clear path for Moussa to the presidency lends weight to this speculation.

The division of powers between these three emerging institutions will be hotly negotiated, of course. But all three are likely to try to avoid overplaying their hand. The biggest obstacle to the emergence of such an arrangement is the potential that violence against Egyptian citizens could backfire against the military in an analogous way it did for the Mubarak regime. So far, that doesn’t appear to be happening.

http://www.ibishblog.com/article/2012/01/10/course_gaza_still_occupied

It never ceases to amaze how much leaders of Hamas and the Israeli far-right agree about. But the latest iteration of this bizarre de facto alliance is a real doozy: alone in the world, they both say the Gaza Strip is not occupied by Israel.

Part of the Israeli right has been trying to claim that the occupation of Gaza has been over since Ariel Sharon pulled Israeli forces out of the interior of Gaza in 2005. The then-prime minister accurately described this as a “unilateral redeployment,” not a “withdrawal.”

Moreover, Israel continues to regard Gaza as part of the territories subject to final-status negotiations. It has been such a source of political tension in Israel that Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has suggested a real withdrawal from Gaza, to the deep chagrin of his colleagues. If Israel had, in fact, already done so, there wouldn’t be any argument about his extremely controversial suggestions.

Of course, the same Israeli rightists also say that none of the territories are occupied, merely “disputed.” But if there is any “dispute” about the legal status of the territories occupied in 1967, it’s not between Israel and the Palestinians; it’s between Israel and the international community, including the UN Security Council, which has been unanimous on the issue since the occupation began.

Now Gaza-based Hamas hardliner Mahmoud Zahhar has made the same claim: Gaza is no longer occupied by Israel. He’s saying this in order to try to promote the idea that it is Hamas’ “resistance,” which is now almost entirely rhetorical, as opposed to the negotiations carried out by the Palestine Liberation Organization, that has actually produced gains for Palestinian independence.

I can’t imagine that these ludicrous comments won’t harm him even further in the eyes of other Palestinians, including members of Hamas. I’m sure there isn’t a single person in Gaza who doesn’t know full well the extent to which they are still legally and politically occupied by Israel. And that is true even if Israeli forces are not permanently stationed in the territory’s population centers and even if settlements have been evacuated.

On some matters there are arbiters authorized to distinguish between opinions and established legal and political facts. When it comes the matter of belligerent occupation, there are three key international arbiters that determine the legal reality in such matters: the UN Security Council, the United Nations more broadly, and the consensus of the international community, all in that order of relevance.

Israel continues to control Gaza’s airspace, territorial waters, the entry and exit of people and goods (with the exception of the Egypt crossing), its electromagnetic spectrum, a “buffer zone” in which unarmed Palestinians are routinely killed, and deploys into all parts of the territory and withdraws at will. As a consequence, no impartial observer can or does doubt that occupation continues.

Clearly the Security Council continues to consider Gaza under Israeli occupation. The UN Secretariat made its position clear in 2008, stating that “the UN defines Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem as occupied Palestinian territory.”

As for the international community, no country other than Israel has ever suggested that Gaza is not still under Israeli occupation. Even the websites of the United States government continue to list Gaza as part of the territories occupied by Israel. So does every edition of the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, including the 2010 edition released on April 8, 2011.

Perhaps the weirdest argument made by some supporters of Israel is that Gaza is no longer occupied because the territory has been blockaded, and that these two things are somehow mutually exclusive. Obviously a territory may be blockaded without being occupied. But an occupied area may also be blockaded.

Some also complain that since UNESCO has admitted Palestine, implicitly including the Gaza Strip, as a full member, this somehow means the territories can no longer be considered occupied. But territories of member states of UN agencies or other multilateral institutions can indeed be occupied by other member states.

Some right-wing Israelis want to say that Gaza is no longer occupied because they don’t want any responsibility for the people who live there, while maintaining all the prerogatives of an occupying force. Some Hamas leaders, meanwhile, want to pretend that they have “liberated” an area that remains not only occupied but besieged.

However, their opinions are irrelevant. The Security Council, UN Secretariat, and the international community, including the United States, is absolutely unanimous: Gaza is still occupied by Israel. This judgment is based on the fundamental realities of the situation in the territory. It has the status of a legal and political fact, whatever dishonest politicians want to claim for their own purposes.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/too_early_to_judge_the_arab_revolts

A year into the Arab uprisings, it’s far too early to come to any definitive conclusions about where the upheavals will lead. But it is helpful to try to keep terms and categories straight in order to follow what has happened and what may happen into the future.

Some commentators are trying to characterize in broad-brushstrokes what is taking place in Arab political culture. Some are identifying the main feature as a liberationist imperative that has gripped the Arab political imagination. Others warn that popular uprisings without clear aims will inevitably lead to the “victory” of Islamists. Others say we have entered into a period of protracted chaos that will be characterized by increasing violence and conflict within states and regionally.

All these views are premature. Elements of each and of all can be found in the events of the past year. But, a clear, overriding narrative that sums up the essence of what is taking place in the Arab world is beyond anyone’s reach.

The convulsions are so multifaceted, with so many variables and so much that remains to be determined, that we must content ourselves simply with accepting that we are witnessing historic and transformative events. However, there have also been definite dynamics characterizing the uprisings in various countries. So we can be precise about what exactly has and has not been taking place.

I was on a television panel last week with the insightful Egyptian commentator Mamoun Fandy, for a year-end round up of the uprisings. Fandy observed that “there has not been one Egyptian revolution, there have been two.” I pointed out that there had been no revolutions at all in Egypt. What took place with the fall of President Hosni Mubarak was regime decapitation, not regime change. Faced with growing popular pressure, the military and other parts of the power structure removed the president and certain other key high-level figures in order to preserve as much of their power as possible.

Egypt is now the scene of a contest for power within and between previously existing institutions – principally the military and the only political party that is truly effective, the Muslim Brotherhood. This hardly qualifies as a “revolution.”

The Tunisian case is somewhat different. There, analogous regime decapitation did not lead to military rule; it led to what we could call a “pacted transition” to an emergent constitutional system, one that has been brokered but not dominated by the military.

So far, the only Arab country to have seen a real “revolution” is Libya, the product of a fully-fledged civil war and limited external military intervention. But the new order in Libya lacks institutions and is dominated by rival armed militias and a growing rivalry between the east and west of the country that has yet to be resolved.

In Syria, popular protests have not turned into a revolution yet, but armed resistance to the regime is growing, in spite of the misgivings of much of the political opposition. Syria seems well into an insurgency phase, and may be headed toward outright civil war. However, that will require the defection of mechanized units of the army or heavy weapons being provided to rebels from the outside.

In Yemen, popular protests have also not turned into a revolution. Rather, they have been more or less hijacked by various members of the political elite in a complex power struggle that is slowly dragging the country into ever-greater levels of disintegration.

In Bahrain, popular protests not only did not lead to a revolution, protestors probably did not seek a revolution (at least at first). The uprising thus far appears to have been contained by the royal family and its Gulf allies. However, the status quo is unsustainable and the potential for a campaign of urban terrorism by opposition or Shia extremists remains potentially a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Algerian government appears particularly concerned about the potential for an uprising. Morocco and Jordan have relatively popular monarchs, and some Gulf states are protected by wealth. But even if uprisings were to spread to these countries, it is impossible to predict what form they would take. Meanwhile, Iraq and Lebanon are heavily driven by sectarian forces and are especially sensitive to regional developments.

The best anyone can really do – apart from describing in immediate terms what has been happening in specific Arab states and in the broader region – is not to try to characterize the Arab uprisings in sweeping terms. It is preferable to use precise terms rather than resort to frequently emotional rhetoric about “revolutions.”

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=348411

A year into the Arab uprisings, it’s far too early to come to any definitive conclusions about where the upheavals will lead. But it is helpful to try to keep terms and categories straight in order to follow what has happened and what may happen into the future.

Some commentators are trying to characterize in broad-brushstrokes what is taking place in Arab political culture. Some are identifying the main feature as a liberationist imperative that has gripped the Arab political imagination. Others warn that popular uprisings without clear aims will inevitably lead to the “victory” of Islamists. Others say we have entered into a period of protracted chaos that will be characterized by increasing violence and conflict within states and regionally.

All these views are premature. Elements of each and of all can be found in the events of the past year. But, a clear, overriding narrative that sums up the essence of what is taking place in the Arab world is beyond anyone’s reach.

The convulsions are so multifaceted, with so many variables and so much that remains to be determined, that we must content ourselves simply with accepting that we are witnessing historic and transformative events. However, there have also been definite dynamics characterizing the uprisings in various countries. So we can be precise about what exactly has and has not been taking place.

I was on a television panel last week with the insightful Egyptian commentator Mamoun Fandy, for a year-end round up of the uprisings. Fandy observed that “there has not been one Egyptian revolution, there have been two.” I pointed out that there had been no revolutions at all in Egypt. What took place with the fall of President Hosni Mubarak was regime decapitation, not regime change. Faced with growing popular pressure, the military and other parts of the power structure removed the president and certain other key high-level figures in order to preserve as much of their power as possible.

Egypt is now the scene of a contest for power within and between previously existing institutions – principally the military and the only political party that is truly effective, the Muslim Brotherhood. This hardly qualifies as a “revolution.”

The Tunisian case is somewhat different. There, analogous regime decapitation did not lead to military rule; it led to what we could call a “pacted transition” to an emergent constitutional system, one that has been brokered but not dominated by the military.

So far, the only Arab country to have seen a real “revolution” is Libya, the product of a fully-fledged civil war and limited external military intervention. But the new order in Libya lacks institutions and is dominated by rival armed militias and a growing rivalry between the east and west of the country that has yet to be resolved.

In Syria, popular protests have not turned into a revolution yet, but armed resistance to the regime is growing, in spite of the misgivings of much of the political opposition. Syria seems well into an insurgency phase, and may be headed toward outright civil war. However, that will require the defection of mechanized units of the army or heavy weapons being provided to rebels from the outside.

In Yemen, popular protests have also not turned into a revolution. Rather, they have been more or less hijacked by various members of the political elite in a complex power struggle that is slowly dragging the country into ever-greater levels of disintegration.

In Bahrain, popular protests not only did not lead to a revolution, protestors probably did not seek a revolution (at least at first). The uprising thus far appears to have been contained by the royal family and its Gulf allies. However, the status quo is unsustainable and the potential for a campaign of urban terrorism by opposition or Shia extremists remains potentially a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Algerian government appears particularly concerned about the potential for an uprising. Morocco and Jordan have relatively popular monarchs, and some Gulf states are protected by wealth. But even if uprisings were to spread to these countries, it is impossible to predict what form they would take. Meanwhile, Iraq and Lebanon are heavily driven by sectarian forces and are especially sensitive to regional developments.

The best anyone can really do – apart from describing in immediate terms what has been happening in specific Arab states and in the broader region – is not to try to characterize the Arab uprisings in sweeping terms. It is preferable to use precise terms rather than resort to frequently emotional rhetoric about “revolutions.”

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=344594&MID=0&PID=0

Hamas is on the move, both literally and figuratively, but how far it
can and will go very much remains to be determined.

Hamas is in an impossible position, given the regional realignments
following from the Arab uprisings, and is frantically trying to adjust
without paying too high a price.

For more than a decade, Hamas’ strategy was based on being
simultaneously allied with both the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood network
and the, essentially, Shiite, Iranian-led alliance. This incongruous
ideological contortion was made possible by a narrative embraced by
both of these broader anti-status quo alignments: that the Middle East
was the site of a trans-historic battle between a “culture of
resistance” and a “culture of accommodation.”

This narrative has collapsed completely, and is rapidly being replaced
by a new sectarian order pitting Sunni actors, including both Arab
governments and Islamists, as well as Turkey, against what is now
perceived as the non- or even anti-Sunni alliance led by Iran. This
realignment has been most starkly illustrated in Syria, whose
pro-Iranian government is now supported entirely by non-Sunni forces
in the Middle East and opposed by virtually all Sunni ones.

Hamas can no longer have a foot in each of these camps when they are
increasingly at odds, often in existential ways. The movement’s
political bureau cannot long remain based in Damascus since the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood is a core part of the uprising trying to overthrow
the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The break with Assad also means a break
with Tehran.

Hamas needs not only a new home but also new sponsors and a new
regional profile, since the strategic landscape in which it operates
has shifted so dramatically.

Literally on the move, its de facto “prime minister” in Gaza, Ismail
Haniyyeh, is planning a tour of Arab states, beginning with Qatar and
possibly including Turkey. Khaled Meshaal, who heads Hamas’ political
bureau, meanwhile, has been trying to engineer a reconciliation with
Jordan, and has been planning a trip there that has yet to happen.
Both sides insist this has not been canceled.

Figuratively on the move, Meshaal, according to Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas, has agreed that resistance to occupation must be
nonviolent and must seek to create a Palestinian state based on the
1967 borders. A spokesman for Hamas leaders in Gaza appeared to
confirm these commitments, but reiterated that Hamas would not
recognize Israel.

This apparently difficult readjustment has exposed latent tensions
within Hamas. The organization is divided along multiple axes, but the
most obvious is the division between many in the leadership in Gaza,
which is entrenched in power and only stands to lose from any changes,
and the external leadership, which has no choice but to urgently find
new headquarters and patrons.

This squabble has been most publicly expressed in an ongoing feud
between Meshaal  and a Hamas hardliner in Gaza, Mahmoud Zahhar. In
May, Zahhar was harshly critical of Meshaal for recognizing the
authority of Abbas and the Palestine Liberation Organization to
negotiate with Israel. Worse still, he questioned the authority of the
political bureau itself, claiming, “the leadership is here [in Gaza],
and the part that is abroad is just a part of that.”

However, Meshaal reportedly retains the support of key Hamas leaders,
including Ahmed Jabari, the head of its paramilitary Ezzedine
al-Qassam brigades. The group reportedly imposed “severe disciplinary
measures” against Zahhar in response to his challenge to the authority
of Meshaal and the political bureau.

The big question is whether Hamas’ need to adjust to the changing Arab
political order will compel the movement to moderate its positions.
Probably not if Hamas can help it, for it remains locked in a
long-term power struggle with Fatah over leadership of the Palestinian
national movement. Yet its ability to remain a viable contender for
such leadership cannot be based on Islamist social conservatism alone.
If it cannot outbid the PLO when it comes to the struggle with Israel,
it’s hard to see what its broad appeal will be.

Hamas is hoping that the Arab uprisings will strengthen its hand by
bringing its Muslim Brotherhood allies to power in numerous Arab
states. It has reportedly recently formally joined an international
umbrella group of the Brotherhood movement. But as it has to abandon
the Iranian-Syrian alliance and explore deeper relations with Qatar,
Egypt and even Jordan, Hamas will be dealing with states that, at
least for now, will not be willing to take responsibility for the
movement’s traditional policies and actions.

The outcome of the Arab uprisings and realignment writ large will
probably determine the future of Hamas. Fatah, too, will have to
adjust to the emerging strategic and political environment. These new
regional realities will probably affect the future of both
organizations more than anything the Palestinian groups decide
independently or between themselves.