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Hamas: Still Not Ready for Prime Time Players

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/23/hamas-still-not-ready-for-prime-time.html

In a wide-ranging interview with the Jewish Daily Forward, Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook again demonstrated the difficult position in which his organization finds itself. Due to the Arab uprisings, the region’s strategic landscape is now primarily defined by sectarian allegiances. As a result, Hamas’s external leadership is trying to reintegrate the organization into the mainstream Sunni Arab fold, cultivating closer ties with states like Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, while distancing itself from Iran and abandoning Syria altogether.

The leadership in exile, including Abu Marzook, therefore finds itself at odds with much of the Gaza-based leadership, which does not have the same urgent need to find either new headquarters and patrons or a new regional brand and identity. Their rule in Gaza is uncontested. They have income from smuggling, and through efforts by Gaza-based Hamas leaders like Mahmoud Zahar and Ismail Hanniyeh, they maintain relationships, and at least some funding from, Iran. So, they see much less need to make radical changes.

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Dr Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook of Hamas in 1997 in a New York prison (Jon Levy / AFP / Getty Images)

Reaching out to a major American Jewish publication to explain his thinking serves many functions for Abu Marzook. His carefully calibrated and mixed message walks the tightrope the external leadership now has to traverse: adopt positions the Arab states can tolerate; align more closely with in the policies of other Muslim Brotherhood parties, especially Egypt’s; and help to create a softer image in the West and Israel, without abandoning the organization’s core principles.

For many years Abu Marzook has been eclipsed by his former deputy, Khaled Mishaal. But the current crisis has produced a complex power struggle within Hamas, both inside and outside Gaza. This interview may also have been part of an effort to position himself as a compromise figure between Mishaal and more hard-line leaders.

The external leadership of Hamas knows it has to pay a price for adapting to the new regional realities, but it wishes to keep this to a minimum. Hamas leaders want to avoid being perceived by other Palestinians as adopting policies towards Israel indistinguishable in practice from the mainstream national leadership in Ramallah—especially the goal of a two-state solution. If it openly accepted that this was its strategy for national liberation, Hamas would then have to compete with Fatah largely on the basis of religious and social conservatism. But its social and religious agenda in Gaza, the most conservative part of Palestinian society, has not proved popular. If Hamas is to retain a competitive political advantage over Fatah, it must be by outbidding them on Israel.

Abu Marzook was careful not to cede too much. He insisted that the most Hamas could accept is a long-term truce (“hudna”), but not peace, with Israel; that it would not be bound by any agreements made by the PLO (the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people); and that Hamas would not recognize Israel.

On this last point, he hedged in a manner indicative of the need to placate both Western and Arab governments committed to a two-state outcome, and those parts of his own constituency unalterably opposed to it. He cagily noted, “Maybe my answer right now [about recognizing Israel] is completely different to my answer after 10 years.” This can be read as leaving the door open for an evolution towards recognition of Israel, or as leaving the door open for a resumption of armed struggle and a cancellation of the truce. The Forward emphasized, “Abu Marzook was at pains to knock down suggestions… [that] Hamas is preparing to abandon armed resistance against Israel…”

Suffice it to say, the Abu Marzook interview was not reassuring. Hamas is in crisis, and it’s trying to adapt. Still, even its external leaders, as they are trying to project a softer image, in fact are still clinging to a hard line that rejects the conditions laid out by the Middle East Quartet—the US, the EU, the UN and Russia—for it to be recognized as a legitimate political actor: renunciation of violence; recognition of Israel’s right to exist; and acceptance of the validity of existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements.

From the point of view of the Palestinian national interest, Hamas is still part of the problem, not part of the solution. Its fundamental positions, even in theory, are strictly dysfunctional with regard to the international community. They cannot serve as the basis of serious negotiations with Israel. And they are out of sync with the consensus of the Arab world, as reflected in the Arab Peace Initiative and the policies of most Arab governments.

Abu Marzook’s interview demonstrates that as far as Palestinian national leadership is concerned, Hamas is still very much not ready for prime time, and neither is he.

The New Pushback Against Arab Sectarianism

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=386874

During the course of 2011, it became increasingly apparent that the regional strategic order in the Middle East was being reshaped along sectarian lines. This generally pitted Arab Sunni Muslims against confessional minorities. However, a series of recent developments has started to undermine this dominant narrative and push back against a regional system too starkly defined by sectarianism.

The sectarian narrative was, more than anything else, an extension of the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and their respective allies. It was no longer possible for an organization like Hamas, for instance, to remain comfortably a part of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood network and, simultaneously, a key ally of Tehran and its non-Sunni clients. The popularity and regional influence of Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah nosedived, while those of Turkey, led by a Sunni Islamist party, soared. Across the Arab world, governments and organizations took sides based on religious affiliation, most notably in the conflicts in Syria and Bahrain.

Many Western observers framed the rise of sectarianism simply as “counterrevolution,” and accused the Saudis of being behind it. There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states promoted a sectarian narrative, but so did Iran and many of its allies, including the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, while Saudi Arabia was appalled by the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, it also supported the uprisings against Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi and Assad. Therefore, its policies have been selectively counterrevolutionary, but not necessarily so.

Throughout 2011, both the Saudis and Iranians, and most other players in the Middle East, either tried to exploit sectarianism or wittingly or unwittingly fell into its trap. Few if any emerged with clean hands. However, there were always other considerations lurking under the surface of what appeared to be a sectarian binary. New developments have brought some of those issues to the forefront and are allowing us to look beyond the interpretation of a regional order divided along strict sectarian lines.

One challenge to the sectarian paradigm is Iraq’s role in the Arab world. By adhering to a purely sectarian narrative, the Sunni Arab world could have virtually ceded Shia-dominated Iraq to Iran’s sphere of influence. However, the successful holding of the Arab League summit in Baghdad, which was attended by the emir of Kuwait no less, as well as the appointment of a Saudi ambassador to Iraq, clearly reflected an interest among Sunni Arab states to reintegrate Iraq into the Arab mainstream. Iraq’s leaders, too, have shown a significant interest in reintegrating with the Arab world and pursuing policies that keep Iran’s influence at arm’s length.

The uprising in Syria has also frayed what had been a united Sunni Arab front categorically in favor of regime change. There has been discernible uneasiness with the potential consequences of civil conflict inside the country and its potential to destabilize the region. This hesitation, which is shared by some Sunni Arab states, has been fueled by a lack of confidence in the Syrian opposition, and a growing sense that the costs of regime change may outweigh its benefits.

Such concerns have been expressed more forthrightly in private than in public. However, the divisions within the Arab League over how vigorously to pursue regime-change policies in Syria are no longer, as they once were, simply defined by sectarianism.

A further example of an anti-sectarian push back comes from the other side. Iran has strived to keep parts of Hamas, especially some of its Gaza-based leadership, within its orbit. Hamas leaders not in exile have appeared receptive. For example, Mahmoud Zahhar and Ismail Haniyeh have both made well-publicized, very friendly visits to Tehran in recent months.

Zahhar and Haniyeh have seemed willing to scupper the efforts of Hamas leaders in exile, notably the head of the Political Bureau, Khaled Meshaal, to integrate Hamas into a purely Sunni Arab camp by cultivating states such as Qatar, Jordan and Egypt. There are others, too, who, for their own reasons, hope to revive the comatose “axis of resistance” narrative that allowed for an extremist trans-sectarian Middle Eastern alliance, or at least keep it on life support.

National interests, ideology, concerns about regional stability, personal and political rivalries, and a growing understanding of the costs of a regional order strictly divided along sectarian lines are increasingly disrupting the new sectarian narrative. Regional sectarian divisions are still the biggest single factor in the new Middle East, but other considerations are finally starting to make a significant comeback.

Leave room for the unbelievers

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=385202

As Islamists continue to gain ground in post-dictatorship Arab societies, alarming signs are emerging that real freedom of religion may not be among the dividends of the uprisings.

Even in Tunisia—the Arab society furthest along in transforming from dictatorship to a constitutional system, and which has a large secular constituency and tradition—severe attacks on religious dissidents are being carried out by the new government.

Two young bloggers, Jabeur Mejri and Ghazi Beji, were both sentenced to an astonishing seven years in prison “for violation of morality and disturbing public order.” Their offense was to post images of a naked Prophet Mohamed on Facebook. Mejri is in jail, while Beji has reportedly fled the country. Meanwhile, the head of the Nessma television station is awaiting trial for “blasphemy” for airing the animated film “Persepolis,” which includes an image of God.

The situation in neighboring Egypt isn’t any more encouraging. In early April, a 17-year-old Coptic youth, Gamal Abdou Massoud, was sentenced to three years in prison for “insulting Islam and its Prophet,” again through Facebook caricatures.

Islamists, especially those now touring Western capitals, never tire of professing a deep commitment to freedom, equality and democratic values. But at the same time, they insist that Islam must be the basis of all of these freedoms and that there is no contradiction between equal citizenship rights for every individual and the essential teachings of Islam as they interpret them.

The prosecutions in Tunisia and Egypt strongly suggest otherwise. What they indicate, instead, is a determination to intensify the use of religious intolerance as a tool of state power and social control.

Islamists, trying to portray themselves as moderates, speak in broad terms about tolerance, pluralism and the rights of individual citizens. But there are many areas in which their professed and long-established ideologies contradict these values, not least when it comes to preserving equal rights for women and religious minorities.

But these are not the most elemental test cases of their commitment to real equality. The issue of women’s rights can be negotiated or even finessed in many ways. There are many contemporary Arab Islamists who are far less invested in upholding traditional and oppressive gender roles than some of their older or more conservative comrades.

At the same time, since Islam traditionally regards Judaism and Christianity as legitimate, though imprecise, monotheistic faiths, it is not hard to imagine an Islamist-influenced Arab political order protecting the religious and civic rights of these relatively small minorities, even if the most extreme Islamists won’t want to do this. The question of political representation is important, but in most Arab countries also essentially symbolic, since members of minorities are unlikely to aspire to national power by winning, for example, a presidency.

What is most disturbing is that it is almost impossible to imagine an Islamist-influenced system protecting the religious rights of skeptics, agnostics and atheists. Blasphemy, satire, independent scholarly investigation of early Islamic history, or merely a profession of fundamental skepticism about faith in general (and not simply Islam) are all likely to remain criminal offenses. Protection for apostasy and conversion are another key test of real religious freedom.

Religious freedom was not generally well protected by the old dictatorships, and all the evidence suggests that the policing of independent thinking will intensify in the new systems. This means that there is a whole class of citizens virtually guaranteed of being denied its fundamental rights, and of being persecuted by Islamist-influenced regimes: agnostics, atheists, apostates and skeptics. Unless, of course, these individuals keep their mouths shut.

Professed commitment by Islamists to pluralism and tolerance is almost always framed in terms of faith. It seems beyond the scope of their imagination that, while people may belong to various religions, any sane person would question the very notion of religious belief, and view all religious claims with rational skepticism.

Yet without genuine religious freedom and pluralism, real freedom and equal citizenship will be illusory. What Islamists, and many other Arabs, have yet to accept is that in order for freedom of religion to be genuine, it must allow the freedom to reject faith entirely and to promote non-religious perspectives. Islamists might win broad popular support—and not just from Muslim but also Christian voters—in the name of the rule of a devout majority to deny  individuals the right to profess and promote religious skepticism.

The new Arab regimes may not be Islamic theocracies, but there’s every reason to fear that they will intensify the suppression of skeptical opinion and thereby fail to protect genuine religious freedom. This must include the freedom to reject religion entirely.

No, Of Course I’m Not a “Zionist”

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/11/still-not-a-zionist.html

Since the emergence of the one-state movement, I’ve been routinely described by the pro-Palestinian far right and ultra-left as a “Zionist,” and even a “traitor” and “collaborator,” because I remain committed to ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Of course, most of these people were, in the past, themselves supporters of a two state solution, so by their logic they were also once “traitors” and “collaborators.”

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An Israeli soldier patrols near a Palestinian house in the center of the West Bank city of Hebron (Jack Juez / AFP / Getty Images)

Essentially, those Arabs who still support peace with Israel based on ending the occupation are being stigmatized for not changing our minds in the same way and at the same time as those who have abandoned all hope for, or any interest in, a two-state solution and have adopted, instead, a one-state agenda. There is more than a hint of a totalitarian mentality at work here, in which disagreement is a self-evident symptom of intentional wickedness.

The fact that support for a two state solution also represents, according to almost every existing poll, the Palestinian majority position, as well as that of the Palestine Liberation Organization (universally recognized as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”) doesn’t matter. In certain segments of pro-Palestinian discourse, any willingness to recognize the existence or legitimacy of Israel now immediately qualifies one simply as “a Zionist.”

Much of the pro-Israel right, of course, considers me an “anti-Semite,” and even a “jihadist,” to complete a perfect symmetry of ideological misrecognition.

To call me a “Zionist” because of commitment to peace is to strip language of all meaning. By this logic, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were “Maoists” because they made peace with Communist China. And any Israeli who is committed to Palestinian statehood alongside Israel is also, therefore, a “Palestinian nationalist.”

For some, the term “Zionist” is simply a useful pejorative to attack the reputation of Arabs who seek peace, or who deviate from the increasingly intolerant one-state dogma. I’ve been amazed at the number of one-state advocates who adamantly refuse to agree to disagree and I’ve lost a number of once very close personal friendships simply because I do not follow their new party line.

I don’t think Norman Finkelstein was exaggerating at all when he recently described this movement as “a cult” led by self-appointed “gurus.” Like all cults it recasts the world in simple binary terms: the good people who agree and the bad people who do not.

So, of course I’m not a “Zionist.” Whether or not to define oneself as a Zionist is really an issue for those who identify themselves as Jewish. However, as many Jews of varying backgrounds and perspectives have demonstrated, one can be staunchly pro-Israel, and in that sense “Zionist,” without supporting occupation, settlements or racism against Palestinians.

Zionism remains the dominant Jewish national narrative, and this narrative can and should be understood, by others, especially in the interests of peace. It is also necessary that Jewish Israelis and their allies understand the legitimacy of the Palestinian national narrative, even if they cannot embrace it.

All present-day national narratives and identities are ultimately based on fantasies about the past, present and future. From a historical, intellectual and philosophical perspective they are as firm and fixed as children’s sandcastles. But they serve the immediate needs, aspirations and yearnings of their constituencies and, as political realities, they must be respected, despite their well-concealed hollowness.

The real problems that must be dealt with are not the narratives informing Zionism or Palestinian nationalism, but rhetoric, policies and practices on all sides that are prolonging the conflict, especially Israel’s immoral, indefensible and unsustainable occupation. It is this occupation, more than anything else that sentences all of us to a grim and uncertain future if it is not resolved.

The only practicable, viable means to end the conflict is through ending the occupation and creating a Palestinian state to live alongside Israel, with both states serving the interests of all of their citizens equally. So, without any illusions about the difficulties for achieving this, especially in the near term, I strongly support peace between Israel and a Palestinian state in the territories occupied in 1967. And that certainly doesn’t make me a “Zionist” in any meaningful way.

However hard it may now seem to achieve, ending the occupation by creating a Palestinian state still offers the only workable conflict-ending solution. Recognizing and supporting that is not Zionism, Palestinian nationalism, or American imperialism. It’s not even buying into the deep logic of nationalism as a political or philosophical category. It’s a simple recognition of unavoidable political reality. It should be embraced by anyone who cares more about peace, preserving human life, and building a better future than about ideologies, narratives and slogans.

An Islamist bid for power in Egypt?

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=383077

In the weeks following Egypt’s parliamentary elections, it seemed as if the country was beginning to stagger toward the orderly emergence of power-sharing agreements. But as events have developed more recently, especially the reversal of the Muslim Brotherhood’s pledge not to field a presidential candidate, the Egyptian political scene has become increasingly chaotic.

Efforts to craft a power-sharing arrangement acceptable to all three established power centers—the military, the “felool” (the remnants of the former regime, including the secret police) and the Muslim Brotherhood—along with the unorganized but socially powerful protest movement have essentially broken down.

The turning point appears to have been an exceptionally messy fight over the makeup of the Constituent Assembly created by the Islamist-dominated parliament to craft a new constitution for the country. Breaking earlier pledges not to align with the Salafist al-Nour Party, the Muslim Brotherhood joined with it to stack the hundred-member Assembly with at least 65 Islamists. Many non-Islamist members vowed not to participate.

With the apparent support of the military and possibly the Supreme Constitutional Court itself (which also withdrew its representative from the Constituent Assembly), non-Islamist groups have launched two lawsuits. The first challenges the electoral law that produced the current parliament, and the second the procedure for establishing the Constituent Assembly. Islamists had been attempting to shift the balance of power in Egypt’s political system away from the presidency and toward the parliament but were faced with multiple layers of opposition from all other forces in that effort.

This may be among the main reasons that the Muslim Brotherhood broke its long-standing pledge not to field a presidential candidate and nominated Khairat al-Shater for the position. The organization is going for broke and attempting to seize all levers of political authority rather than being satisfied with whatever increased powers it could negotiate for the parliament. Shater’s candidacy, however, is in question because, although he was released from prison, he is still serving out a criminal sentence and has not yet been pardoned.

The Muslim Brotherhood was also probably increasingly concerned with the rise in popularity of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who was expelled from the organization last year for disobeying orders that no member should stand for the presidency. Aboul Fotouh, a long-standing rival of the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme guide, Mohamed Badie, has been running significantly to the left of the organization as a “liberal Islamist.” He has apparently developed a significant following among Muslim Brotherhood youth members and some liberals who see him as both a less threatening figure and someone untainted by connections to the Mubarak regime.

Tensions between the military and the Islamists have boiled over into open confrontation. Real doubts now hover over the presidential prospects of the former head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa. A few months ago Moussa seemed exceptionally well-positioned to emerge as Egypt’s next president and has outstripped all rivals in every survey and opinion poll since the fall of Mubarak.

However, he will now have to contend with not only the rising popularity of Aboul Fotouh, but also the formidable organizational power of the Muslim Brotherhood behind the frankly uncharismatic Shater. Moussa’s connection with the former regime may have finally begun to undermine his candidacy, particularly given recent scandals over highly controversial charges brought against non-governmental organization workers by other former regime figures.

It’s also possible, however, that Moussa will benefit from a split within the Islamist vote given that Shater and Aboul Fotouh will be competing for such votes with at least two other significant candidates, the Salafist Hazem Abu Ismail, who has also demonstrated unexpectedly strong public support, and another “liberal Islamist” candidate, Mohamed Salim al-Awa. Awa has repeatedly warned, in vain, that a split in the Islamist vote would only benefit non-Islamist candidates such as Moussa.

If either of the pending lawsuits by the non-Islamist groups succeed, the emerging process for drafting a new constitution will be gutted. This is one path for the military and other non-Islamist forces to block an overt power-grab effort by Islamists.

The Muslim Brotherhood may well be overreaching and could have alienated even many of its supporters by so cynically breaking its word. But underestimating the organizational strength and discipline of the group, especially as other political forces are scrambling to play catch-up, would be highly unwise.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s bid for complete control of Egypt’s elected political power is facing the concerted opposition of virtually all non-Islamist forces in the country, in effect led by the military. The rest of Egyptian society would be reluctant to accept an Islamist president as well as an Islamist-dominated parliament. But the options for resisting or reversing that, should it come to pass, bode very ill for the emergence of an orderly, democratic system in the new Egypt.

We Now Return to Our Regularly Scheduled Conflict

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/23/we_now_return_to_our_regularly_scheduled_conflict

The spread of conflict and violence across the Middle East is dampening widespread hopes of an “Arab Spring” that followed the peaceful ousters of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. Anti-government demonstrations in Bahrain have taken on an increasingly bitter sectarian character, especially with the military intervention of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and the uprising in Libya has degenerated into an all-out civil war compounded by an international no-fly zone intervention. Meanwhile, the situations in Yemen and Syria continue to deteriorate, suggesting that the relatively bloodless revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia may be more difficult to replicate than was initially hoped.

And now, with escalating violence between Israel and Palestinians — punctuated on March 23 with the bombing of a Jerusalem bus station that killed one Israeli woman — another potentially dangerous flashpoint may be emerging that could further push the region away from orderly democratic reform.

A quiet tit-for-tat war between Israel and Hamas has been brewing along the Gaza border for almost two weeks and appears very close to spiraling out of control. For the first time in many months, rockets have been fired from Gaza into southern Israel, and Israeli airstrikes have killed numerous Palestinians, including children and the elderly. Perhaps the most horrifying incident was the murder of an entire settler family in their beds in the West Bank settlement of Itamar, which has been widely assumed to be the work of Palestinian extremists, though Hamas denies any connection to the attack.

Even against their better judgment, Israeli politicians might again feel the need to retaliate for these attacks with a wide-scale assault on Gaza with ground forces — a replay of Operation Cast Lead, which was launched in December 2008. That conflict resulted in enormous devastation and loss of life in Gaza. The war also had extremely damaging political effects for Israel, as it led to widespread international condemnation and the Goldstone report, which accused the Israel Defense Forces of committing war crimes during the conflict.

A redux of Operation Cast Lead could have a major impact on the popular uprisings and reform movement sweeping the Arab world. The last war in Gaza created a powerful narrative in certain sections of Arab public opinion that cast the region as being the scene of a historic conflict between “the martyrs” (largely Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah and their small but vocal left-nationalist supporters), who were prepared to struggle and die against Israel and Western imperialism, and “the traitors” (pro-Western Arab governments and the Palestine Liberation Organization). Even more dangerously, it implied a corrective corollary: The “martyrs” should defeat the “traitors” and install Islamist governments, which would be supportive of “resistance” movements and take a generally hostile attitude toward the Western presence in the Middle East.

One of the most encouraging aspects of the popular revolts in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and many other Arab states is that they have not adopted this narrative or Islamist ideology, but rather have been based on patriotism, social consciousness, and demands for democracy and accountability. In Egypt in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood has wisely kept to the sidelines, understanding that the anti-government movement was secular, ecumenical, and patriotic, rather than Islamist. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood is obviously hoping to benefit from the newly opened political space and early elections, and is stealthily inching toward a more prominent role in shaping the new Egyptian order.

The Qatari-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi has been emerging as the regional spearhead of efforts to spin the Arab reform movement in a more Islamist direction. Most notably, Qaradawi’sspeech on Feb. 18 in Tahrir Square was strikingly bold in its use of buzzwords that implied the need for an Islamist orientation to Egypt’s political future. While Qaradawi denounced “this cursed sectarianism” and was very conciliatory toward Coptic Christians, he explained the revolution in almost entirely Islamic terms. “Be on your guard against the hypocrites, who are ready to put on, every day, a new face, and to speak with a new tongue,” he warned, employing rhetoric typically used to denounce secularists and opponents of Islamist politics.

The Islamists’ attempt to carefully move toward seizing the reins of these popular movements is not limited to Egypt. The anti-government protests have been overtly Islamist in Jordan, while in Bahrain, radical Shiite Islamist opposition groups like the al-Haq party have rapidly risen  to prominence.

Whatever the reason for Hamas’s obvious lack of restraint in recent weeks, it is not helping the party’s reputation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Its popularity among Palestinians continues to decline: A mid-March opinion poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research had Hamas support at a mere 33 percent of people in Gaza and 21 percent in the West Bank. Fatah, on the other hand, enjoys 42 percent support in Gaza and 39 percent in the West Bank. Hamas’s brutal crackdown on national unity rallies in Gaza on March 15, including the killing of at least one female protester, further discredited the organization. Perhaps Hamas hopes that another confrontation with Israel would bolster its foundering domestic credentials.

Israel’s own overreaction through its excessive bombing campaign in Gaza may partly be driven by anxieties exacerbated by regional instability, but its right-wing government in Jerusalem may also see advantages to shifting attention to another violent confrontation with Islamists. Israeli leaders have made no secret of their deep distrust of the Arab reform movement and their anxiety about democratic governments in the Arab world. It’s no stretch to imagine that Israel has concluded that it is better able to live with autocratic governments than secular, ecumenical, and democratic ones. And, of course, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has welcomed any opportunity to focus on security questions and place everything else on the back burner, as happened during the short-lived direct negotiations with the PLO last year. This wouldn’t be the first time the Israeli right and Hamas rode to each other’s rescue under the guise of conflict.

Another war between Israel and Hamas would, however, likely result in a lose-lose scenario for both sides. As with the last round, it would probably yield at best short-term political benefits but no long-term strategic changes, particularly because Israel is not prepared to fully reoccupy the Gaza Strip.

Even more worrying, a new war in Gaza could join the civil war in Libya, the sectarian confrontation in Bahrain, and the looming potential disintegration of Yemen in casting a negative pallor over what ought to be the beginning of an Arab political renaissance. It could set anti-Israeli and anti-Western sentiments into motion that have been largely absent from the productive impulses for reform in the region. It could also add to the sense that, however inspiring the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences may have been, subsequent developments risk spreading chaos — thereby bolstering tolerance for the status quo.

The saving grace of the Arab Spring is that the movement for reform is based on domestic considerations — accountability, good governance, democracy, and human rights. Even another bloody war between Israel and Hamas cannot avert attention from those grievances for long. Arab citizens likely know that agitating for good governance and accountability isn’t a panacea for all regional ills and that it can sometimes be a bloody process, as the examples of Libya and Yemen show. Moreover, they realize that Islamism, while it has its constituency, is both divisive and a political dead end.

If Israel and Hamas believe it is in their interests to start — or find themselves unable to avoid — another mutually self-destructive conflict, it certainly won’t aid the process of Arab reform and democratization, and raises some very troubling concerns about its future. But there’s almost no chance a resurgence of the Israel-Hamas conflict can stop the reform movement dead in its tracks either.

Bret Stephens’ Crisis of Empathy

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/27/bret-stephen-s-crisis-of-empathy.html

Sometimes crude binaries can be instructive, and it’s possible to distinguish two different types of people: those who seek out generous and universalist empathy with others, and those who prefer the warm cocoon of tribal solidarity.

In his new book, The Crisis of Zionism, Peter Beinart very much places himself in the first category, while in his review of it for Tablet, Bret Stephens, unfortunately, demonstrates that he squarely belongs in the second. Stephens’ angry, mean-spirited tirade against Beinart begins with a frank display of this mentality. He opens his lengthy denunciation of Beinart by angrily condemning him for daring to imagine that a young Palestinian boy called Khaled Jaber “could have been my son.”

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Palestinian children fly kites bearing the Palestinian and Japanese flags crossing symbolic national boundaries in the southern Gaza Strip (Said Khatib / Getty Images)

Beinart writes that the evolution of his views on Israel and its occupation was kick-started by watching a video of the child crying out in horror as his father was being hauled away by Israeli occupation forces for “stealing water.” Beinart’s innate decency and humanity were, for whatever reason, deeply touched by this highly affecting scene. It’s always possible to be desensitized to the suffering of others, but for whatever reason he was moved by the child’s plight—and no doubt the irony of Israeli occupiers arresting a Palestinian for “stealing” what is, after all, the water that belongs to Palestinians and not to the Israeli occupiers. It tapped into humanist and universalist sentiments deep enough to see his own son in the young boy and, implicitly, himself in the father living under a system of systematic and brutal oppression and exploitation.

But Stephens is having none of it. How, he asks indignantly, could “someone named Khaled Jaber…have been Beinart’s son?” The answers are so simple and fundamental that they are embarrassing to posit. He could be his son because all people are brothers and sisters, and we all can and should identify with each other across ethnic, racial, religious and cultural divides. Beinart can do this. Stevens, apparently, can’t, and indeed is offended when others do. He demands to know “Are they [the Jabers] supporters of peaceful co-existence with Israel or advocates of terrorism?” With these and other litmus tests, Stephens posits that Beinart’s expression of human fellowship is in fact a failure of journalistic integrity. It’s true that Beinart never stopped to ask if these are “good Arabs” or “bad Arabs,” but simply identified with a child suffering from the abuses of an occupation. Indeed, the occupation itself rarely stops to ask such questions; the occupation treats almost all Palestinians as noncitizens and denies their basic human and national rights.

It’s even more ironic that Stephens would harp on Khaled Jaber’s name given that his own family name is itself an adopted one. His paternal grandfather apparently was named “Ehrlich,” just as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s father was born with the surname Mileikowsky (although the Prime Minister often tries to draw a connection between his family’s ideologically-adopted name and that on an ancient Jewish relic found in Jerusalem bearing the name Netanyahu).

There’s nothing wrong, of course, with adopting the classically Anglo-Saxon “Stephens” as a more socially convenient surname in the New World. It just that, under those circumstances, Stephens’ dismissal of the notion that Beinart could possibly have a son called “Khaled Jaber” denotes a peculiar blindness to Stephens’ own complex family history of name-changing and a very narrow and rigid view of what names might meet in any given human family. My own maternal surname is Schenck, because my mother is a direct descendent of one of the original Dutch inhabitants of Brooklyn, while my paternal name is Ibish, which derives from Syrian Kurdish ancestry. If Schenck and Ibish can meet in me, why not Jaber and Beinart (or Stephens, or Ehrlich, for that matter) in someone else? Stephens’ outrage that Beinart would dare to imagine that he might have a son like, or even called, Khaled Jaber is not only mean-spirited, it’s downright disturbing.

Stephens’s review boils down to an extended defense of Israel’s occupation. Citing the predictable, if not inevitable, consequences of unilateral Israeli actions (as opposed to mutual Israeli agreements with Arabs such as the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan), specifically the “unilateral redeployment” in Gaza conducted by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005 (which Sharon correctly never called a “withdrawal”), Stephens argues “against further territorial withdrawals, at least until something fundamental changes in Palestinian political culture.” Of course, what supporters of peace are asking for is a reasonable two-state Israeli-Palestinian agreement, not unilateral “withdrawals.”

Stephens cites Leon Wieseltier of The New Republic as quite correctly observing that, “characterizing anti-Semitic acts as a response to something Jews did doesn’t explain anti-Semitism.” Yet he’s quick to return this compliment directly to the Palestinians; for Stephens, things Palestinians do or don’t do justify occupation and all of the abuses that go with it. For Stephens, Palestinian actions do explain morally and politically indefensible anti-Palestinian sentiments and policies. “Would Beinart,” he demands, “object to an argument that African-Americans are at least partly responsible for white racism because they commit a disproportionate share of violent crime in the United States?” Yet this is precisely the logic Stephens employs when it comes to the Palestinians.

“Palestinians need not celebrate suicide bombers or cheer the murder of Jewish children,” Stephens writes, as if this were the typical Palestinian mentality or majority position. In fact for the past fifteen years at least the majority of Palestinians, like the majority of Israelis, have been in favor of a two-state peace agreement. But they both just do not believe the other side is sincere.

The behavior of both parties has given ample scope for doubt on each side, and for those, like Stephens and his numerous Arab counterparts, there is no difficulty whatsoever in finding any number of reasons to dismiss the sincerity of the other party. It’s an extremely simple matter to come up with reasons not to cooperate with rivals and those who have been historical enemies. It’s much harder, but much more noble and constructive, to—as Beinart has—frankly acknowledge the faults on both sides and look for grounds on which to cooperate and find a mutually-beneficial conflict-ending solution. But this requires a political, intellectual and moral leap beyond comforting narrow identifications and tribal narratives. It requires embracing principles and enlightened strategic goals.

It is, sadly, the moral aspect of this challenge that Beinart, like others on the Arab side, has had the courage to embrace that bothers Stephens the most. Stephens casts Israel as surrounded by “the ardent, sometimes fanatic, hostility of 350 million neighboring Arabs,” more than 1 billion additional Muslims and its own Palestinian citizens. Without any basis in fact he declares that, “The Arab Spring has become an Islamist winter,” even though Islamists are not actually in power in any Arab country at all thus far. And, he posits, Iran is poised to become a nuclear power bent on the destruction of Israel. Under such circumstances, he argues that since politics always involves choosing “the lesser evil,” Israel’s policies of not only maintaining its occupation but continuing to expand its settlements are somehow rational. He dismisses Beinart’s call for a boycott of the settlements in Israel’s own interests as part of “modern-day Israel bashing,” and refuses to acknowledge the threat that the settlements pose to Israel’s security, not to mention its self-definition as a “Jewish” and “democratic” state. The fact that the de facto Israeli state, which for most of its existence has included the occupied Palestinian territories, is now neither Jewish nor democratic in any meaningful sense does not appear to cause Stephens any serious concern. He certainly proposes no solution to this issue or even recognizes it as a serious problem.

“Israel,” Stephens writes, “exists so that the Chosen People might suffer a little less as a Choosing People,” and if it “chooses” to extend the occupation indefinitely denying millions of Palestinians their basic human and national rights for whatever reasons it sees fit, so be it. The notion that anyone might raise moral or enlightened, long-term strategic objections to such a choice—the de facto policy of the present Israeli government, which includes numerous senior figures who have dismissed both the possibility and the need for a peace agreement with the Palestinians—he identifies as “the core problem” with Beinart’s book.

I don’t think Stephens has any real appreciation for how deep or dangerous these waters he is leaping into really are. If Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims in general were to embrace the same attitudes towards Israel, especially if the Israeli state were to follow his prescriptions, what kind of policies should we expect them to adopt in the long run? His law of the jungle—an unabashed version of Hobbes’ “war of all [tribes] against all”—leaves little room for a bright future for Israel and its people.

Were Stephens to have been born with the name “Jaber” rather than his own (or “Ehrlich,” for that matter), to what faction of Palestinian politics would he adhere? He wouldn’t necessarily be a member of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, but he certainly couldn’t, on the basis of this logic, be among those nobly striving to seek peace with Israel, building institutions on the ground in spite of the occupation, persisting in what is universally recognized as extremely effective security cooperation with occupation forces in “Area A” of the West Bank despite the lack of any clear path towards liberation, or seeking to reconcile themselves to permanent coexistence with an Israeli state that defines itself as Jewish.

His logic of choosing between “unpalatable alternatives” and emphasizing tribal self-protection above all other values militates passionately against any of those policies. And would he not also surely be informed by the Palestinian mirror image of his own Jewish tendentious, chauvinistic and, frankly, paranoid worldview? It should come as little comfort to him that, indeed, there are lots of Palestinians and other Arabs who share his mentality. But it should be a great comfort to the rest of us that the large majority, like most Israelis, do not.

Yes, a settlement boycott can work

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=380578

Peter Beinart’s recent call in the New York Times for Jewish Americans to boycott Israeli settlement goods has been met with angry responses from many Jewish Americans. This includes some who are opposed to the settler movement. The most important of these objections hold that a boycott cannot work because Jewish Americans won’t go along with such a program and there isn’t much to boycott anyway. Both arguments hold little water.

In Jewish American circles, this is a new idea. Initial resistance on the grounds of ethnic solidarity and because of a bitter history of anti-Semitic boycotts was predictable. But there is no reason to think that a sustained campaign to convince Jewish Americans that boycotting settlements is an important aspect of salvaging Israel’s character as a “Jewish” and democratic state cannot make headway.

Already, a significant proportion of Jewish Americans deeply oppose the occupation and settlements. Beinart’s plan is the first program to give them a way to express this opposition in a proactive manner.

Over time, the agenda could catch on, especially among young liberal Jewish Americans in need of a practical program to contest the occupation and support a two-state solution. The vociferous rejection of a boycott implies that one just might work. If the scheme were completely ridiculous, ignoring it would be sufficient.

“Pro-Israel, pro-peace” Jewish American organizations are divided on the idea. J Street has rejected it, while it is embraced by Americans for Peace Now. Others groups argue that the idea is pointless because “there isn’t much to boycott anyway.” This is incorrect.

First, such a boycott need not seek to have a devastating economic impact on the settlement economy. The settlement project is heavily subsidized and is not conceived of as a moneymaking venture. Rather, it is an ideological program. With the exception of the Jewish settlements in the Golan Heights and a few others in the West Bank, what we have is historical irredentism at work, not entrepreneurship. The boycott is a political and symbolic statement. It should be conceptualized as expressing profound political objections, and a refusal to cooperate, whether or not it can make any real dent in the settlement economy.

Moreover, the idea that the economic activities connected with more than 500,000 Israeli settlers are immune from pressure is simply silly. These people live, work and produce on land that does not belong to them in contravention of black-letter international law. In fact, there is a great deal to boycott, while also maintaining the distinction between the occupation and Israel itself.

Since the boycott campaign was initiated by Palestinians, Israel and its supporters have reacted furiously. This again suggests that such a campaign can be effective. However, apart from the refusal of individuals to visit or perform in Israel, almost all meaningful acts of boycott and divestment have been connected to the occupation itself.

British trade unions have endorsed boycotts of companies benefiting from the occupation. The Netherlands recently canceled the visit of a delegation of Israeli mayors because it included settlement leaders. A group of Israeli academics announced they would boycott Ariel University. Several Italian and Irish supermarket chains won’t stock Israeli produce because Israel refuses to label what comes from the settlements, to distinguish it from what is grown in Israel proper. The Norwegian government pension fund divested from two Israeli companies doing business in the occupied territories.

The boycott led by the Palestinian Authority has reportedly led to the closure of numerous factories in several settlements. Elbit Systems, an Israeli company that provides components for Israel’s illegal separation barrier, has been divested from by numerous European companies and governments. The German state-owned rail company has refused to do business with an Israeli firm building a rail line linking Israel to the occupied territories. These are a few examples of how such boycotts can work, and in fact are growing.

Since most countries are united in seeing Israeli settlement activity as illegal and illegitimate, they must at least force the Israeli state to label goods accordingly and maintain separate statistics for the Israeli and settler economies.

Those critics who oppose both the boycott idea and the settlements would be more convincing if they offered viable alternatives, for instance backing the creation of a fund to provide settlers with incentives to return to Israel. But as long as they don’t outline any realistic substitutes, then it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that they prefer to let settlement activity go forward with some mild scolding.

Bret Stephens’ Crisis of Empathy

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/27/bret-stephen-s-crisis-of-empathy.html

Sometimes crude binaries can be instructive, and it’s possible to distinguish two different types of people: those who seek out generous and universalist empathy with others, and those who prefer the warm cocoon of tribal solidarity.

In his new book, The Crisis of Zionism, Peter Beinart very much places himself in the first category, while in his review of it for Tablet, Bret Stephens, unfortunately, demonstrates that he squarely belongs in the second. Stephens’ angry, mean-spirited tirade against Beinart begins with a frank display of this mentality. He opens his lengthy denunciation of Beinart by angrily condemning him for daring to imagine that a young Palestinian boy called Khaled Jaber “could have been my son.”

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Palestinian children fly kites bearing the Palestinian and Japanese flags crossing symbolic national boundaries in the southern Gaza Strip (Said Khatib / Getty Images)

Beinart writes that the evolution of his views on Israel and its occupation was kick-started by watching a video of the child crying out in horror as his father was being hauled away by Israeli occupation forces for “stealing water.” Beinart’s innate decency and humanity were, for whatever reason, deeply touched by this highly affecting scene. It’s always possible to be desensitized to the suffering of others, but for whatever reason he was moved by the child’s plight—and no doubt the irony of Israeli occupiers arresting a Palestinian for “stealing” what is, after all, the water that belongs to Palestinians and not to the Israeli occupiers. It tapped into humanist and universalist sentiments deep enough to see his own son in the young boy and, implicitly, himself in the father living under a system of systematic and brutal oppression and exploitation.

But Stephens is having none of it. How, he asks indignantly, could “someone named Khaled Jaber…have been Beinart’s son?” The answers are so simple and fundamental that they are embarrassing to posit. He could be his son because all people are brothers and sisters, and we all can and should identify with each other across ethnic, racial, religious and cultural divides. Beinart can do this. Stevens, apparently, can’t, and indeed is offended when others do. He demands to know “Are they [the Jabers] supporters of peaceful co-existence with Israel or advocates of terrorism?” With these and other litmus tests, Stephens posits that Beinart’s expression of human fellowship is in fact a failure of journalistic integrity. It’s true that Beinart never stopped to ask if these are “good Arabs” or “bad Arabs,” but simply identified with a child suffering from the abuses of an occupation. Indeed, the occupation itself rarely stops to ask such questions; the occupation treats almost all Palestinians as noncitizens and denies their basic human and national rights.

It’s even more ironic that Stephens would harp on Khaled Jaber’s name given that his own family name is itself an adopted one. His paternal grandfather apparently was named “Ehrlich,” just as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s father was born with the surname Mileikowsky (although the Prime Minister often tries to draw a connection between his family’s ideologically-adopted name and that on an ancient Jewish relic found in Jerusalem bearing the name Netanyahu).

There’s nothing wrong, of course, with adopting the classically Anglo-Saxon “Stephens” as a more socially convenient surname in the New World. It just that, under those circumstances, Stephens’ dismissal of the notion that Beinart could possibly have a son called “Khaled Jaber” denotes a peculiar blindness to Stephens’ own complex family history of name-changing and a very narrow and rigid view of what names might meet in any given human family. My own maternal surname is Schenck, because my mother is a direct descendent of one of the original Dutch inhabitants of Brooklyn, while my paternal name is Ibish, which derives from Syrian Kurdish ancestry. If Schenck and Ibish can meet in me, why not Jaber and Beinart (or Stephens, or Ehrlich, for that matter) in someone else? Stephens’ outrage that Beinart would dare to imagine that he might have a son like, or even called, Khaled Jaber is not only mean-spirited, it’s downright disturbing.

Stephens’s review boils down to an extended defense of Israel’s occupation. Citing the predictable, if not inevitable, consequences of unilateral Israeli actions (as opposed to mutual Israeli agreements with Arabs such as the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan), specifically the “unilateral redeployment” in Gaza conducted by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005 (which Sharon correctly never called a “withdrawal”), Stephens argues “against further territorial withdrawals, at least until something fundamental changes in Palestinian political culture.” Of course, what supporters of peace are asking for is a reasonable two-state Israeli-Palestinian agreement, not unilateral “withdrawals.”

Stephens cites Leon Wieseltier of The New Republic as quite correctly observing that, “characterizing anti-Semitic acts as a response to something Jews did doesn’t explain anti-Semitism.” Yet he’s quick to return this compliment directly to the Palestinians; for Stephens, things Palestinians do or don’t do justify occupation and all of the abuses that go with it. For Stephens, Palestinian actions do explain morally and politically indefensible anti-Palestinian sentiments and policies. “Would Beinart,” he demands, “object to an argument that African-Americans are at least partly responsible for white racism because they commit a disproportionate share of violent crime in the United States?” Yet this is precisely the logic Stephens employs when it comes to the Palestinians.

“Palestinians need not celebrate suicide bombers or cheer the murder of Jewish children,” Stephens writes, as if this were the typical Palestinian mentality or majority position. In fact for the past fifteen years at least the majority of Palestinians, like the majority of Israelis, have been in favor of a two-state peace agreement. But they both just do not believe the other side is sincere.

The behavior of both parties has given ample scope for doubt on each side, and for those, like Stephens and his numerous Arab counterparts, there is no difficulty whatsoever in finding any number of reasons to dismiss the sincerity of the other party. It’s an extremely simple matter to come up with reasons not to cooperate with rivals and those who have been historical enemies. It’s much harder, but much more noble and constructive, to—as Beinart has—frankly acknowledge the faults on both sides and look for grounds on which to cooperate and find a mutually-beneficial conflict-ending solution. But this requires a political, intellectual and moral leap beyond comforting narrow identifications and tribal narratives. It requires embracing principles and enlightened strategic goals.

It is, sadly, the moral aspect of this challenge that Beinart, like others on the Arab side, has had the courage to embrace that bothers Stephens the most. Stephens casts Israel as surrounded by “the ardent, sometimes fanatic, hostility of 350 million neighboring Arabs,” more than 1 billion additional Muslims and its own Palestinian citizens. Without any basis in fact he declares that, “The Arab Spring has become an Islamist winter,” even though Islamists are not actually in power in any Arab country at all thus far. And, he posits, Iran is poised to become a nuclear power bent on the destruction of Israel. Under such circumstances, he argues that since politics always involves choosing “the lesser evil,” Israel’s policies of not only maintaining its occupation but continuing to expand its settlements are somehow rational. He dismisses Beinart’s call for a boycott of the settlements in Israel’s own interests as part of “modern-day Israel bashing,” and refuses to acknowledge the threat that the settlements pose to Israel’s security, not to mention its self-definition as a “Jewish” and “democratic” state. The fact that the de facto Israeli state, which for most of its existence has included the occupied Palestinian territories, is now neither Jewish nor democratic in any meaningful sense does not appear to cause Stephens any serious concern. He certainly proposes no solution to this issue or even recognizes it as a serious problem.

“Israel,” Stephens writes, “exists so that the Chosen People might suffer a little less as a Choosing People,” and if it “chooses” to extend the occupation indefinitely denying millions of Palestinians their basic human and national rights for whatever reasons it sees fit, so be it. The notion that anyone might raise moral or enlightened, long-term strategic objections to such a choice—the de facto policy of the present Israeli government, which includes numerous senior figures who have dismissed both the possibility and the need for a peace agreement with the Palestinians—he identifies as “the core problem” with Beinart’s book.

I don’t think Stephens has any real appreciation for how deep or dangerous these waters he is leaping into really are. If Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims in general were to embrace the same attitudes towards Israel, especially if the Israeli state were to follow his prescriptions, what kind of policies should we expect them to adopt in the long run? His law of the jungle—an unabashed version of Hobbes’ “war of all [tribes] against all”—leaves little room for a bright future for Israel and its people.

Were Stephens to have been born with the name “Jaber” rather than his own (or “Ehrlich,” for that matter), to what faction of Palestinian politics would he adhere? He wouldn’t necessarily be a member of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, but he certainly couldn’t, on the basis of this logic, be among those nobly striving to seek peace with Israel, building institutions on the ground in spite of the occupation, persisting in what is universally recognized as extremely effective security cooperation with occupation forces in “Area A” of the West Bank despite the lack of any clear path towards liberation, or seeking to reconcile themselves to permanent coexistence with an Israeli state that defines itself as Jewish.

His logic of choosing between “unpalatable alternatives” and emphasizing tribal self-protection above all other values militates passionately against any of those policies. And would he not also surely be informed by the Palestinian mirror image of his own Jewish tendentious, chauvinistic and, frankly, paranoid worldview? It should come as little comfort to him that, indeed, there are lots of Palestinians and other Arabs who share his mentality. But it should be a great comfort to the rest of us that the large majority, like most Israelis, do not.

Eastern Promises: Anthony Shadid masterfully recounts an immigrant homecoming

http://www.bookforum.com/inprint/019_01/9157

ANTHONY SHADID, the lead Middle East correspondent for theNew York Times, died on February 16 at only forty-three, succumbing to an asthma attack as he snuck out of Syria while covering the popular uprising against President Bashar al-Assad. Shadid, who had twice won the Pulitzer Prize, was universally acknowledged as the premier American reporter on the Middle East of his generation. He left behind an extraordinary body of work, culminating in the just-published House of Stone.

However, House of Stone is not a work of Middle East reportage; it is, rather, a memoir, devoted to Shadid’s deeply personal quest to uncover his heritage in war-torn Lebanon—and specifically in his ancestral town of Marjayoun, which his grandfather and grandmother, then neighbors but not relatives, both separately left in the early 1920s for the United States. Between the 2006 war pitting Hezbollah against Israel and the outbreak of a mini–civil war, mainly in Beirut, in 2008, Shadid took a year off from his then position at the Washington Post to rebuild his great-grandfather’s abandoned and dilapidated home in Marjayoun. Shadid describes the project as “a small odyssey,” a “meaningful search” for his family’s roots and a new sense of his own personal belonging in their land of origin. It’s clear from the outset that he anticipated discovery and reconnection as the outcomes of his building project, and as it unfolds, the completed project indeed grants Shadid a new sense of identity and purpose. The house, he writes, “makes a statement: Remember the past. Remember Marjayoun. Remember who you are.”

House of Stone alternates between two stories: the account of Shadid’s effort to rebuild the house (in regular font), and the story of his family’s immigration to the United States (in italics). The structure of an alternating narrative cutting back and forth between a contemporary story and an older history that informs it is well established in both fiction and nonfiction, and in film as well. Think, for example, of another immigrant narrative, The Godfather, Part II, which intersperses the steady assimilation of Michael Corleone (into the culture of the Mafia and the American dream alike) alongside the formative saga of Vito Corleone’s immigration to the United States and gradual emergence as a Mob kingpin. This simple format works exceptionally well for Shadid. His two narratives unfold slowly—like the house itself—in both harmony and counterpoint to explain the motivations behind his project and its deeper purposes.

 

No one should turn to House of Stone for a sustained analysis of Lebanese politics or of the Arab political condition. This book has no index, and indeed does not need one; it won’t serve as a source for any sustained research project, save into the story of Shadid’s life or his readopted hometown. But it will provide non-Arab readers a very strong sense of Lebanese town culture and mores. Shadid is no anthropologist or sociologist, althoughHouse of Stone conveys tremendous insights into the social forces that shape life (for better and worse) in Lebanese towns—and in some ways in Levantine and even broader Arab societies as well. With the fair-handed sensibility and narrative voice he established in his dispatches for the Times, Shadid spares no one their sins or embarrassments. Yet, like so much else in Shadid’s writing, this book humanizes Arabs, both individually and collectively, for an American audience otherwise starved for such crucial moments of recognition with our present culture’s quintessential “Other.”

Shadid’s great skill as a journalist was that of a master storyteller, and he’s never been more effective than in his final book. The work essentially belongs to the tradition of nonfiction belles lettres, as noteworthy for its style and prose elegance as for its subject matter. But Shadid’s book also very much belongs to a particular genre of postcolonial literature: the journey back from the metropolis to the periphery by the immigrant—or, in this case, the immigrants’ descendant.

Such works have become a major strand of postcolonial literature as the immigrant experience shifts to tracking returns from the metropolitan center to the periphery. Shadid, returning to not only the country but also the physical home of his great-grandfather, provides the latest instance of this narrative of immigrant return to a lost and in many ways imagined homeland. Probably the most famous iteration of this genre is the story of Saladin Chamcha in Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988). In the moving and powerful closing section of Rushdie’s much-misunderstood novel, Chamcha returns to India, reconciles with his estranged father, and reassumes his previously discarded Indian identity.

Shadid is more than one step removed from Chamcha, as a grandson of immigrants. Yet the project of recovering his Arab, Lebanese, and Marjayouni identity is essentially a hybrid of this literary genre—as well as an Arab-American iteration of the more specifically American “roots” quest of the identity-politics era. One of his relatives even sardonically invokes the name Kunta Kinte, the half-invented protagonist of Roots, Alex Haley’s 1976 book seeking to reconstruct his own family’s African-American migration story. In this “roots” sense,House of Stone is a quintessentially post–civil rights movement American book, exploring the contours of the hyphen in a hyphenated identity.

It’s also, in every sense, not only an Arab-American story, but the Arab-American story. The saga of his family’s emigration from Marjayoun to Oklahoma is a representative snapshot of the Arab-American experience at its core: an all-American immigrant narrative, but shaped very deeply by its Arab protagonists, their circumstances and their cultural heritage. In the United States, he writes, “fortunes were accumulated, not found,” and “for those who worked hard, profits were good.” At the same time, though, his family’s assimilation to American life often meant changing names, negotiating identities, and self-reinvention—as Shadid recalls, the members of his migrant family were “determined to be like their neighbors in Oklahoma.” I doubt that the Arab-American experience has ever received more affecting treatment than Shadid delivers here in his characteristically elegant prose. He describes, for example, the tension for these early immigrants between pragmatic assimilation and a no-less-powerful impulse to cling “defiantly to the traditions that they believed set them apart.” “Food was the mainstay,” he writes, as these Arab immigrants doggedly persisted in eating the familiar fare of their homeland, and “socializing was a necessary priority” among this diaspora community. “Visits kept to a village cadence,” Shadid notes, and “impromptu parties were convened on any night.” And during these gatherings, “never a word of English was spoken. On those nights, they were back in Marjayoun. They were home, together.”

By contrast, Leila Ahmed’s brilliant memoir, A Border Passage (1999), may have been written in English and in the United States, but it’s very much an Arab, rather than an Arab-American, book. Its chapter “On Becoming an Arab”—which describes the process by which Egyptians of her generation were, from her perspective, virtually shanghaied into an ideological Arab-nationalist worldview during the 1950s—has received far too little attention. It’s fascinating to read Ahmed’s account as a counterpoint to Shadid’s enthusiastic embrace of his inherited Arab identity. Shadid, the roots-conscious hyphenated American, sees his journey back from the American metropolis as not only natural but healing and restorative; Ahmed, on the other hand, describes a far more rigid and oppressive Arab identity—and an enforced dislocation from a broader, more cosmopolitan, and richer cultural heritage in her native Cairo.

Several other recent memoirs have narrated the rigors of Arab migration, or in some cases exile—–most notably, perhaps, Edward Said’s Out of Place (1999). But Shadid seems to have tapped into something much more fundamental in the experiences that formed today’s Arab-American community. Said found himself most comfortable in a cosmopolitan, always-alienated, and intellectually rarefied cultural environment informed by Adorno’s “negative dialectics,” which held that “dwelling, in the proper sense, is now impossible.” More prosaically, Shadid yearns for something reassuringly fixed and settled: a home, and the recovery of something “lost”—a much more typical impulse among third-generation immigrants. For Said, cosmopolitan displacement was intellectually liberating, whereas for Shadid—and I suspect for most people—“being torn in two often leaves something less than one.”

The house in House of Stone serves as a potent and multivalent metaphor in Shadid’s imagination: It represents stability in the present; hope for the future; reconnection with a long-lost—and, he admits, in many senses imaginary—past; the continuity of family memory and commitment; and all the nuanced meanings of the untranslatable and overdetermined Arabic word bayt. As Shadid notes, bayt possesses connotations that “resonate beyond rooms and walls, summoning longings gathered about family and home,” and represents “the identity that does not fade.” It also stands in for Lebanon itself, that anarchic mosaic of ill-fitting parts, stabilized only through an equilibrium of inherently unstable elements. Lebanon is a country with no majority community, instead consisting of dozens of smaller groups often finding themselves in open confrontation and coexisting uneasily in adjacent sectarian enclaves. These qualities have doomed it to be the perennial site of foreign meddling and a venue for devastating civil conflicts and proxy wars. It’s impossible not to read in many passages the suggestion that the house stands in for the country built around it: “In its destruction, the house, liberated, revealed its origins. . . . In chaotic geometry, smaller stones climbed over each other in the rugged, disordered perfection of the Cave’s arcade.”

Indeed, writers addressing Lebanon’s inscrutable and tragic character have often used this same metaphor, characterizing Lebanon as a unique, marvelous, and impossibly divided “house.” Lebanon’s premier historian, Kamal Salibi, titled his definitive work on modern Lebanese history A House of Many Mansions (1988). Salibi was, of course, deliberately citing a saying of Jesus as recorded in John 14:2 to highlight what he viewed as the pressing question of how Arab Christians would fare in Lebanon in particular and the Middle East in general. Likewise, Shadid devotes of a good deal of House of Stone to the troubled history of Christians in his homeland—a theme that emerges as he recounts both his family history and his dealings with a host of Lebanese Christian villagers in the effort to rebuild his ancestral home. There is a widespread sense, which Shadid repeatedly expresses, that numerous factors, including the sectarian attitudes of Arab Christians themselves, are placing the future of Lebanon’s Christian communities at risk. As Shadid unsparingly observes, an allegiance to marginalized, sectarian identity in Muslim-majority cultures for Christians means that “we faced our own extinction.”

Shadid’s book is impressively self-aware and never shrinks from asking difficult questions, but it does not dive deeply into philosophical problems. Still, it’s possible to tease out, in Shadid’s sustained contemplation of the myriad meanings of the terms house and bayt, another body of complex thought from an unlikely touchstone: Heidegger’s musing on the overdetermined meanings of “dwelling” in his renowned essay “Building Dwelling Thinking.” Heidegger claims that “only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build,” and that “to build is in itself already to dwell.” Heidegger’s ponderous, difficult philosophical essay and Shadid’s light, accessible memoir have an unexpected resonance despite their radical differences. For Shadid, too, home begins with dwelling as thinking, an act of creative imagination that gives meaning to family, identity, and continuity. He imagines bringing his daughter to the house he rebuilt and teaching her the Arabic words of his great-grandfather: “This is bayt,” he writes. “This is what we imagine.”

There are even hints of Freud’s sense of the uncanny as the unhomely—the familiar made unfamiliar by neurotic symptoms—in Shadid’s story. American readers have especially prized Shadid’s work for its accessible transmission of the attitudes and experiences of Arabs in the Middle East—but for highly assimilated Arab-Americans like him, the Arab world (at least at first) is precisely such an uncanny place, simultaneously radically different and oddly familiar. Shadid’s project of rebuilding his great-grandfather’s house of stone is certainly neurotic—he describes it as “quixotic” and explicitly links it to the divorce from his wife that destroyed his American home—an effort to make the unheimlich homely and to refashion himself as “native” to a place that is both familiar and strange. He also seems to relish almost anything that links him with the “crazy” Shadids of Marjayoun village lore, merchants who drove impossibly hard bargains and were quick to anger, take offense, and bear endless grudges. This, too, is the kind of neurotic symptom Freud posited as the indispensable origin of art, culture, and civilization itself.

But if we were to boil the guiding metaphor in House of Stone to one primary element, the home Shadid ultimately discovers at the end of his quest is the book in the reader’s hands. The narrative of the construction of the house is, in effect, the story of the writing process at work. As Shadid patiently reconstructs his family’s home on its original site, he uses this struggle toward completion to recover in these pages the story behind the house—his family’s history. Throughout House of Stone, Shadid’s use of metaphor is simple, elegant, and effective. Tiles evoke historical and family detail, ancient trees summon forth the idea of social and familial continuity, new plants and flowers signal a fresh understanding of the past and present. Shadid’s rich, often anthropomorphic images, presented in the larger framework of the book’s alternating and intersecting narratives, nestle perfectly into each other like Russian dolls, revealing ever more nuance and detail. “The tiles at my feet were the remnants,” he writes, “artifacts of an ideal, meant to remind and inspire, vestiges of the irretrievable Levant, a word that, to many, calls to mind an older, more tolerant, more indulgent Middle East.”

But in more than one passage, Shadid is let down by overexplicitness, explaining the metaphor so baldly that it breaks the spell, like a conjurer walking us through the mechanics of the illusion during the magic trick. In a section describing his friend Assaad’s inability to decide whether he should return to Wisconsin, where he had settled only to leave, Shadid writes, “He was a man caught between two places, one where he would always be a stranger, one where he was no longer a native.” He continues, “Sometimes, it seemed to me, I saw Assaad’s displacement everywhere I looked.” Such painstaking literalness is, paradoxically,too direct: It actually subverts the impact of the narrative’s imagery, which, left on its own and never very far from the surface, generally gives the book a very effective and artful structure. In this manner, the book’s countless seemingly trivial details gain enough breathing room within the narrative to artfully enrich and interrogate its author’s broader concerns. One also occasionally gets the sense that some underzealous editing, probably as a consequence of an understandable readerly enchantment with the rich details and resonant themes of House of Stone, allowed the book to drag slightly in places. But these are quibbles about what is on the whole an exquisitely written text.

Still, the one metaphor that really lets Shadid down is precisely the one that many readers will probably find most urgent: his bid to link his story to the “Arab Spring” protests that have convulsed the Middle East since late 2010. Most efforts to impose any form of grand narrative about these ongoing and unresolved uprisings seem premature and jury-rigged, and that’s very much the case with the epilogue to House of Stone. Shadid’s commentary on the region’s political upheavals feels uncomfortably tacked on to what is otherwise a very finely integrated story, and it stretches a bit to connect the story of Shadid’s uneasy homecoming to the broader quest for democratic reform in the Arab world. In Tahrir Square, for example, Shadid writes that “Egypt reimagined home,” much as he had done—via a collective “act of imagination . . . [creating] a different kind of community linked to what once was.” That’s a reasonable description of a great deal of what happened in Egypt and Libya, although he agrees the liberatory “Tahrir moment” might be very fleeting, referring to “what had once more, at last, been imagined.” Even so, the interpretive scheme here feels rather strained; his readers will be hard-pressed to see an evident connection—or even an implicit one—between the Tahrir protests and Shadid’s struggles to reimagine and refashion his forebears’ house and his own identity in the process. The only way to make sense of such a comparison is to posit that all acts of imaginative redefining are of a kind.

It’s an especially curious elision, since over the past year or so Shadid—who, for most of his career, had lacked the supple feel for political analysis that he typically brought to his reporting on the ground—was starting to emerge as a very impressive analyst of Arab political developments. Consider, for example, an especially trenchant anatomy of the Syrian crisis that he wrote early last November for PBS’s Frontline, titled “In Assad’s Syria, There Is No Imagination.” With a minimum of personal or confessional commentary, Shadid was able to persuasively interpret the Arab uprisings as creative acts of collective imagination, and the crisis in Syria as a failure of imagination. And what he wrote then is still true: The brutality of the government means “Syria is still subsumed in the logic of fear, which forces once diverse societies to hew to their smaller parts, obliterating the ability to imagine broader communities and other identities,” and the “lack of vision” by the opposition has not effectively counteracted this trend. The opposition forces in Syria have thus far crucially failed to reassure ethnic and sectarian minorities that their fears about a post-Assad future are unfounded. Shadid himself takes the leap of imagining a “post-Ottoman” milieu in which “people can imagine themselves as Alawite, Levantine, Arab, Syrian, Eastern—or some hybrid that transcends them all.”

Such a vision might be a little fanciful, but Shadid was extremely incisive in focusing on the indispensability of citizenship, with all its rights and responsibilities—a concept that has not been central to contemporary Arab political discourse—as the key to a better future for Arab societies now emerging from the suffocation of dictatorship. Whether cleverly, naively, or simply matter-of-factly, he cites the Tunisian Islamist Said Ferjani’s observation that “only in citizenship . . . could diversity be preserved and protected,” and allow Arab societies “to become greater than our parts.” Real citizenship, Shadid suggests, “would allow us to imagine” and therefore create an Arab future that is a genuine liberation, a factor that will almost be the single most important force that determines the long-term outcome of these uprisings. Even if he attributed this insight to Ferjani, Shadid demonstrated the rapidly developing strength of his own analytical skills—and, sadly, it still really does take an imaginative leap to dream of an Arab world defined by citizens, none better or worse than any other, free to define themselves and to participate fully in their societies.

A major story based on Shadid’s interview with Ferjani appeared in the New York Times on February 17, the day after Shadid’s death. It is, illogically but inevitably, more uncanny and unsettling to read the work of recently deceased authors—pieces written by my friend Christopher Hitchens are still coming out, though he passed away several months ago—than it is to encounter a newly discovered work of a long-dead writer. The Ferjani story and other short posthumous pieces merely set up the deeply moving experience of reading House of Stone in the full knowledge that Shadid tragically died in the few months between the book’s completion and its publication. It’s impossible not to note, however, the numerous passages that seem almost to anticipate the tragedy—though of course nothing of the sort could have remotely been on Shadid’s mind. A friend says of Marjayoun when Shadid is beginning his project, “The only time people arrive here is when they’re dead. . . . They bring people here to bury them.” A relative tells him defiantly, “This is where I will come when I die. I have a big, beautiful grave ready.”

Shadid’s construction project in Marjayoun was clearly an exercise in self-reconstruction: an effort to recuperate as well as reimagine the history of his family and to provide a new future for them and for himself. He clearly didn’t intend it as such, but the house will now stand not as a tomb, but as a living monument to Anthony Shadid for his relatives and the townsfolk of Marjayoun. A few days after his death, Shadid’s ashes were scattered in the garden he created around the house he rebuilt. To the rest of us, he bequeaths a very different monument: his extraordinary writing, which reached its apex with House of Stone.