http://alhayat.com/Details/448904

Whoever wins the election, President Barack Obama or his Republican challenger Mitt Romney, will face the same fundamental problem regarding Palestine. As their foreign policy debate indicated, the two differ little on most international relations issues, and tried to outbid each other on support for Israel.

But, domestic politics notwithstanding, any American administration will face the problem that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not go away. Various administrations, most recently the early period in the first George W. Bush administration, have attempted a policy of “benign neglect,” considering the problem to be either unsolvable and hence to be avoided, or too marginal to be a priority. All such efforts invariably confront the reality that this conflict can be neither managed nor ignored.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems poised to win the January Israeli elections. He aggressively promotes a “fortress Israel” mentality, particularly in the context of the Arab uprisings, and has focused Israeli and American attention entirely onto Iran, and away from the Palestinians and Israel’s relentless colonization of the occupied territories. Obama and President Mahmoud Abbas, through their own missteps, allowed Netanyahu to outmaneuver them both time and again on settlements and negotiations.

Abbas has said that, following a UN vote on nonmember observer states status for Palestine later in November, he would be willing to return to negotiations with Israel without preconditions. This would be an important first step in restoring relations with the West, and acquiring a resumption of badly needed aid that can offset the dangerous and destabilizing Palestinian Authority fiscal crisis.

Even if the Palestinians are ready to resume substantive negotiations, considerable groundwork will be necessary if they are not to prove futile. The calculations of Netanyahu must be shifted. If they yet again give him the space to do so, Netanyahu will avoid negotiations and, no matter how unfairly, place the blame squarely on the Palestinians. For both Americans and Palestinians, therefore, the priority must be to repair their relationship.

Palestinians are extremely unlikely to achieve their national goals without significant American cooperation, no matter how frustrating they find the relationship. And even in their day-to-day activities, they have not been able to discover an alternative to Western support.

The Arab states, too, are facing momentous decisions regarding Palestine. Palestinian national reconciliation is inevitable. The question is, on whose terms will it come, Gaza or Ramallah? The Emir of Qatar cast his vote in his recent trip to Gaza, with promises of massive financial and reconstruction aid to Hamas and the establishment of a diplomatic mission in the territory.

No doubt by embracing Hamas, Qatar has broken with the Arab consensus regarding the exclusive right of the Palestine Liberation Organization to speak on behalf of the Palestinians. And many Arab states have not done enough to help the Ramallah government survive the consequences of its failed UN bid from last year, or the upcoming revived UN effort, both of which they encouraged.

Everyone would prefer to be living in an alternate reality, but it doesn’t exist.

The incoming American administration would undoubtedly like to ignore the Palestinian issue and avoid any quarrel with Israel over settlements or anything else. But it cannot secure the American interest of Middle East peace without a major effort that involves confronting Israel.

Israeli would like the world to let it quietly complete the colonization and de facto annexation of the occupied territories, and hopes to be embraced by the Arab world anyway. But this is not how Arabs and others are going to react to this illegal and expansionist project.

The Palestinians would rather deal with another broker and patron than the Americans, who they reasonably perceive as too close to Israel for their liking. But no other country is interested in playing this role, or able to do it. Indeed, no one else is even compensating the impoverished PA for withheld American aid.

But the task of the next American administration and leaders in Palestine, Israel and the Arab world is to face reality as it is, and not as they wish it were.

If Americans are serious about peace being in their national interests, they must use their influence to secure it, even if it means confronting Israel. If Israelis want to live in peace and security, they must make a reasonable peace agreement with the Palestinians. If Arab states want the problem resolved, they must support those willing to make peace.

If Palestinians want to create an independent state, they must repair their relations with the West, particularly United States, and work with it as partners. Some might find that distasteful. But it is the only way to succeed. The difficult truth is the biggest instrument of leverage the Palestinians have is the American consensus that a two-state peace agreement is in the US national interest.

http://alhayat.com/Details/448607

بصرف النظر عن هوية المرشح الذي سيفوز في الانتخابات، أكان الرئيس باراك أوباما أم منافسه الجمهوري ميت رومني، سيواجه المشكلة الأساسية عينها بالنسبة إلى فلسطين. وقد سبق للمناظرة بينهما حول السياسة الخارجية أن أشارت إلى أنهما لا يختلفان كثيراً في شأن معظم المسائل المرتبطة بالعلاقات الدولية، وقد حاول كل منهما المزايدة على الآخر في دعم إسرائيل.

لكن، على رغم السياسة المعتمدة محلياً، ستضطر أي إدارة أميركية إلى مواجهة المشكلة، وهي أن الصراع الإسرائيلي – الفلسطيني لن يزول. وقد حاولت إدارات مختلفة، أحدثها العهد الأول من إدارة جورج بوش الابن، اعتماد سياسة «الإهمال الحميد»، معتبرةً المشكلة إما مستعصية، ما يوجب بالتالي تجنّبها، أو ثانوية جداً، ما يحول دون إدراجها ضمن الأولويات. وتتصدى كل الجهود من هذا القبيل للواقع الذي يشير إلى أن هذا الصراع ليس تحت السيطرة ولا يمكن تجاهله.

على ما يبدو، يستعدّ رئيس الوزراء بنيامين نتانياهو للفوز في الانتخابات الإسرائيلية المقرر إجراؤها في كانون الثاني (يناير) المقبل. وهو يروّج بحماسة لعقلية «إسرائيل القلعة»، لا سيّما في سياق الثورات العربية، وقد سلّط الاهتمام الإسرائيلي والأميركي بالكامل على إيران، بعيداً من النشاط الاستيطاني العديم الرأفة الذي تواصله إسرائيل في الأراضي المحتلة. والجدير ذكره أن أوباما والرئيس محمود عباس سمحا لنتانياهو، من خلال الهفوات التي ارتكباها، بالتفوق عليهما مراراً وتكراراً على صعيد فرض المستوطنات والتفاوض.

لفت عبّاس إلى أنه قد يوافق على العودة إلى التفاوض مع إسرائيل من دون شروط مسبقة بعد تصويت للأمم المتحدة على رفع تمثيل فلسطين إلى دولة مراقبة غير عضو في الأمم المتحدة، سيجرى في وقت لاحق من تشرين الثاني (نوفمبر). وسيشكل الأمر خطوة أولى مهمة في سبيل استعادة العلاقات مع الغرب واستئناف أعمال إغاثة ضرورية للغاية، من شأنها التخفيف من حدّة الأزمة المالية الخطيرة والمزعزعة للاستقرار التي تعانيها السلطة الفلسطينية.

وحتى إن قبل الفلسطينيون باستئناف مفاوضات موضوعية، سيكون من الضروري القيام بأعمال تحضيرية كبيرة لإرساء الأسس الضرورية لئلا تكون المفاوضات عقيمة. كما يجدر تحويل حسابات نتانياهو. ففي حال مُنح من جديد متسعاً للتصرف، فسيتجنّب المفاوضات، بغض النظر عن قلّة الإنصاف الذي يتضمنه ذلك، ويلقي اللوم صراحةً على الفلسطينيين. وبالتالي، يجب أن تقوم أولويات كلّ من الأميركيين والفلسطينيين على إصلاح العلاقة بين الطرفين.

ومن المستبعد إلى حد كبير أن يبلغ الفلسطينيون أهدافهم الوطنية في غياب تعاون لافت مع الأميركيين، بغضّ النظر عن مدى الإزعاج الذي تسببه هذه العلاقة في نظرهم. وحتى في نشاطاتهم اليومية، لم يتمكنوا من العثور على بديل من الدعم الغربي.

المصالحة الفلسطينية أولاً

وتواجه الدول العربية بدورها قرارات بالغة الأهمية في شأن فلسطين، حيث لا مفر من المصالحة الوطنية الفلسطينية. أما السؤال، فيُطرح عن الطرف الذي ستُتَّبَع شروطُه، فهل هو غزة أم رام الله؟ وقد اتخذ أمير قطر قراره في هذا الشأن في زيارته الأخيرة إلى غزة، حيث حمل وعوداً بتقديم مساعدات مالية وفي مجال إعادة البناء لحركة حماس، وإنشاء بعثة ديبلوماسية في الأراضي الفلسطينية.

من خلال تأييد حركة حماس، لا شك في أن قطر انتهكت التوافق السائد بين العرب بمنح منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية الحق الحصري بالكلام نيابة عن الفلسطينيين، علماً أن دولاً عربية كثيرة لم تبذل ما يكفي من الجهود، لتتمكن حكومة رام الله من تحمّل تبعات فشل المبادرة التي قامت بها الأمم المتحدة السنة الماضية، أو الجهود المقبلة التي أعيد إحياؤها، وهي جهود أيّدتها الدول العربية في الحالتين.

ولا شك في أن الجميع يريدون اختبار واقع بديل، لكن هذا الأخير ليس متوافراً.

على صعيد آخر، من المؤكد أن الإدارة الأميركية المقبلة سترغب في تجاهل القضية الفلسطينية وتجنّب أي خلاف مع إسرائيل في شأن المستوطنات أو أي موضوع آخر. لكنها لا تستطيع صيانة المصالح الأميركية المتأتية عن السلام في الشرق الأوسط من دون بذل جهود كبيرة تشتمل على مواجهة مع إسرائيل.

وتتمنى إسرائيل أن يدعها العالم تنجز بهدوء استعمارها ومصادرتها الفعلية للأراضي المحتلة، وتأمل في أن يتقبل العالم العربي ذلك في مطلق الأحوال. إلا أن ردّ فعل العرب سيكون مختلفاً على هذا المشروع التوسعي الخارج عن القانون.

ويفضّل الفلسطينيون التعامل مع وسيط وراعٍ غير الولايات المتحدة التي يعتبرونها مقربة أكثر مما ينبغي من إسرائيل. ولكن، ما من دولة أخرى مهتمة بأداء هذا الدور أو قادرة على الاضطلاع به، كما أنه ما من طرف آخر من شأنه حتّى التعويض للسلطة الفلسطينية الفقيرة عن الإغاثة الأميركية التي لم تصلها.

غير أن مهمة الإدارة الأميركية التالية وقادة فلسطين وإسرائيل والعالم العربي ستقوم على مواجهة الواقع كما هو، وليس كما يتمنونه أن يكون.

وفي حال كان الأميركيون جـديين بـشأن كون السلام يخدم مصالحهم الوطنية، فعليهم استعمال نـفوذهـم لضـمانه، وإن عنى ذلك مواجهة مع إسرائيل. وإن أراد الإسـرائيليون العيش بسلام وأمن، فحريّ بهم التوصل إلى اتفاق سلام منطقي مع الفلسطينيين. وفي حال أرادت الدول العربية إيجاد حل للمشكلة، فعليها أن تدعم الأطراف المستعدة لإحلال السلام.

وإن أراد الفلسطينيون إنشاء دولة مستقلة، فعليهم أن يصلحوا علاقاتهم مع الغرب، لا سيّما الولايات المتحدة، والتعاون معها كشركاء. وقد يعتبر البعض هذا الأمر مثيراً للاشمئزاز، إلا أنها الطريقة الوحيدة لتحقيق النجاح، وتقوم الحقيقة الصعبة على أن أكبر أداة دعم يملكها الفلسطينيون هي التوافق الأميركي على أن اتفاقية سلام تشمل دولتين تخدم المصالح الوطنية الأميركية.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=452119

The recent video by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri ought to be readily dismissible. Unfortunately, his carefully crafted remarks require serious scrutiny. They had multiple messages aimed at numerous constituencies and represent al-Qaeda’s first major effort at an ideological intervention in the emerging Muslim political landscape.

His principal task was twofold. Until now, al-Qaeda has not known how to respond to the Arab uprisings. Al-Qaeda did not anticipate, inspire or inform them, and their emphasis on elections, democracy and nationalism all run counter to its ideology. Al-Qaeda once again seemed moribund, with many of its leaders killed and its ideology rejected by the overwhelming Arab majority. But renewed political and military chaos in Muslim states threatens to resurrect it, and Zawahiri’s address outlined where al-Qaeda sees new opportunities.

First, he was trying to present al-Qaeda as the vanguard of all Salafist movements in post-dictatorship Arab states that have emerging, quasi-orderly political systems rather than ongoing, armed civil conflicts. Second, he was trying to position al-Qaeda as the brand-name for all Salafist-Jihadist groups fighting in war-torn regions, particularly the Syrian uprising.

Zawahiri was offering himself as the leader of all the Salafists in the Arab world in their emerging rivalry with the Muslim Brotherhood and other less extreme Islamist forces, especially in Egypt. Zawahiri, remember, is himself Egyptian, a leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group before moving to Afghanistan and merging with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Zawahiri’s most pointed attack was on the new Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi, who he said had “no authority.”

Zawahiri lambasted Morsi at length over Egypt’s continuing ties and maintenance of its peace treaty with Israel. As usual, Zawahiri preposterously tried to pose as a champion of the Palestinian cause (for which he plainly has no actual regard whatsoever). Moreover, he clearly implied that the Muslim Brotherhood had “betrayed” the Egyptian revolution, accused the new government of being corrupt and failing to implement Sharia Law, encouraged the kidnapping of Westerners and implicitly endorsed armed resistance against the new Egyptian government.

Zawahiri’s attack on the Muslim Brothers was also implicitly aimed at Salafists in Libya and Tunisia, suggesting the new governments there were at least as unsatisfactory as Morsi’s in Egypt. The problem for al-Qaeda is that its message is deeply unpopular with the overwhelming majority of Arabs and Muslims, and that even the Salafist groups are decidedly heterogeneous and often more interested in preparing for elections than in his message of armed “jihad.”

The even more sinister element of his remarks is al-Qaeda’s efforts to associate its brand with Salafist-Jihadist activities in lawless Muslim states, particularly the uprising in Syria. The Syrian armed opposition is becoming increasingly Islamist due to a combination of Western neglect and funding from supporters of “jihad.” Al-Qaeda is clearly hoping that Syria will become its new focal point following Iraq, and seems to be watching that indeed developing.

Meanwhile, its co-ideologists in Afghanistan and Pakistan are thriving, and could benefit from a coming US withdrawal. American drone attacks, it could be argued, do as much harm as good, as they are often indiscriminate and engender deep local resentment.

Al-Qaeda’s worldview is making disturbing headway in numerous parts of Africa. Ansar al-Dine is wreaking havoc in Mali. And while they are unpopular in Libya, Salafist-Jihadists may well have been directly responsible for the attack that killed US Ambassador Christopher Stephens. Salafist-Jihadist forces are finding fertile grounds in the increasingly lawless Sinai Peninsula, and operate with impunity in large parts of Yemen.

As Hamas is making significant headway in rejoining the mainstream Sunni Arab fold under Qatari patronage, the even more extreme religious right in Gaza is taking on an increasingly Salafist-Jihadist tinge, apparently linked to like-minded forces in Sinai. Jordan, where the traditional social contract is increasingly threatened, is also displaying unmistakable signs of infection by this brand of politico-religious extremism, with the recent thwarting of an extremely sinister terrorist plot.

But it is Syria, left fallow by Western neglect, that is providing Salafist-Jihadist groups with their primary new battle and training ground, and lease on life.

The old al-Qaeda, led by Zawahiri, has been mainly reduced to a propaganda outfit and brand name. But his recent video was a disturbing effort to imprint that brand on the fighting in Syria, and similar conflicts in Yemen, rural Libya, parts of Iraq, and, increasingly, various areas in Africa.

Al-Qaeda’s methods are repugnant. Its message is unpopular. Its appeal is highly limited. But where there is warfare, chaos and conflict, it will continue to find new incubators, and the cancer will continue to metastasize. Zawahiri knows this, and his video demonstrates he sees opportunities in both war-torn and more politically stable new Arab political environments. We have been warned.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/24/hamas-rising.html

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=450203

The En-Nahda Tunisian Islamist party should be celebrating a year in power. Instead it is reeling from a series of powerful blows to its credibility, its appeal to the broader public and its mandate to govern, even in coalition with its troika partners. The past two weeks have seen the eruption of long-simmering grievances against En-Nahda and the sudden coming together of a major political and discursive backlash against it.

One year ago today, En-Nahda’s star seem to be rising fast. It didn’t secure a majority in the October 23 parliamentary elections. But with 41 percent of votes and 89 out of 217 seats, it had far overshadowed its nearest competitors. En-Nahda had little difficulty securing a troika coalition with two smaller, left of center parties, the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol, and making its secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali, the new Prime Minister.

To be sure, En-Nahda was outnumbered in Parliament by secularists, but they were divided among more than 20 separate parties. With elected Islamists almost entirely concentrated within its own ranks, En-Nahda, at least at first glance, looked virtually unstoppable back then.

But now En-Nahda’s narrative and strategy for achieving national dominance are in dire straits. Two weeks ago, its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, ignited a firestorm of public outrage when he was videoed telling a group of hard-line Salafists to be patient while En-Nahda fended off any “comeback” from secularists and worked to secure Islamist control of the police and army.

This video exploded the narrative – aimed at both Tunisia’s majority and the West – of the “moderate” En-Nahda: reform-minded and relatively liberal Islamists willing to work within a broad-based, tolerant and pluralistic civil state framework. Ghannouchi’s comments implicated En-Nahda in sympathy with at least the motives, if not the methods, of violent Salafist attacks against “un-Islamic” culture, including art galleries, hotels, bars, cultural festivals, and so forth. And it reinforced concerns that En-Nahda engages in a double-discourse, and, in spite of its public protestations, fully intends to secure and enforce an Islamist Tunisia in the long run.

Fears that, behind its public façade of moderation, a violent extremism lurks in the heart of En-Nahda were strongly reinforced over the past weekend. An official of the secular Nida Tounes party – which vies for key constituencies coveted by En-Nahda – died during an attack by En-Nahda cadres in the southern city of Tataouine. Nida Tounes leader Beiji Caid Essebsi emotively called Lotfi Nakdh’s death “the first political assassination in the political struggle of Tunisia.” On Monday, a small but passionate protest against En-Nahda, in response to the killing, was held in Tunis. The atmosphere of simmering violence was underscored by a US State Department “travel warning” regarding Tunisia, and a widespread sense the country could fall victim to rival militias.

The violence is compounded by a struggle over control of the media. Most of Tunisia’s journalists mounted a strike against what they see as En-Nahda’s efforts to reassert state control of the press characteristic of the Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali dictatorship. The primary response of En-Nahda and its partners – to try to bypass mainstream media by establishing their own web-based station to highlight “government achievements” – did nothing to inspire greater confidence in their commitment to a free press.

An even more significant potential long-term threat emerged last week, when the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) launched its National Dialogue Congress (NDC), drawing together some 50 opposition groups.

The UGTT has long cast a shadow over En-Nahda’s aspirations. It is the one group that, under current circumstances, might be able to create a large enough coalition with sufficient power to confront or, if it came to it, conceivably even unseat the Islamist group. As Tunisia’s economy continues to founder, with almost no government effective response, labor-led initiatives become all the more potent.

Although leaders of all three troika parties, including Jebali, attended the NDC opening, it is being boycotted by En-Nahda as a party. The Congress for the Republic officially rejects the NDC as well, but its leaders emphasize they don’t intend to remain in coalition with En-Nahda after 1213.

The NDC has now emerged as, in effect, an alternative to parliament, a parallel and more broadly representative national deliberative body that is treating the troika’s decisions on new elections, the draft constitution and so forth as mere suggestions. Depending on En-Nahda’s long-term stance, the NDC could serve as either a life-line of conciliation or a focal point of confrontation.

This isn’t the beginning of the end for Tunisia’s Islamists, but it is the end of the beginning. It’s going to be very difficult for En-Nahda, or any Islamist party, to achieve the level of dominance or influence the party acquired exactly one year ago. En-Nahda may well have squandered its best opportunity to secure control of Tunisia.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=446911&MID=0&PID=0

The narrative about an inexorable, ineluctable Islamist rise to power in post-dictatorship Arab societies has been further undermined by a series of under-appreciated and quietly dramatic developments in North Africa. The failure of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi to replace the country’s chief prosecutor could be seen as a mere hiccup in the Muslim Brotherhood’s accumulation of dominance in that country. But recent events in Tunisia and, especially, Libya, are clear signs of the limitations of Islamist influence in those societies.

In Libya a few weeks ago, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to prevent Mahmoud Jibril from becoming prime minister by a margin of two votes. But the man they backed, Mustafa Abu Shagur, proved unable to form an acceptable cabinet. On Sunday, congress elected Ali Zidan, a Jibril ally, to be the next prime minister, defeating the Brotherhood’s preferred candidate, Mohamed Al-Harari, by eight votes. This is a somewhat delayed but clear dividend of Jibril’s crushing defeat of Islamists in the party section of the Libyan election.

Zidan’s election is not a disaster for the Libyan Islamists. But it’s a definite setback and a clear defeat. Before the vote, there were reports that the Brotherhood might be willing to support Zidan, but the close result indicates that in the end they did not. It’s going to be extremely difficult for the Brotherhood to completely refuse to cooperate with him in the formation of a new cabinet because the impatience of the Libyan people with the government’s lack of progress, particularly on security, has been expressed through angry protests. There’s clearly a strong public desire for a more effective new government, making the cost of noncooperation with Zidan, especially at this early stage, exceptionally risky.

In Tunisia, recent Islamist setbacks have been more nuanced, but they are also unmistakable. They began with the leaking of a scandalous video of En-Nahda party chief Rached Ghannouchi’s remarks to Tunisian Salafists. Ghannouchi lectured the extremists, who have become deeply unpopular in Tunisia due to their aggressive rioting and lawlessness, that all Islamists should be patient and “consolidate their gains” because secularists “could make a comeback.” He urged patience while his party works to gain control of the army and police.

Ghannouchi’s comments were exceptionally damaging as they strongly implied an unstated, private alliance between En-Nahda and the Salafists, suggested an ideologically-driven conspiracy to take over national institutions, and reinforced the worst suspicions about his party’s long-term intentions. They also played into long-standing and well-founded accusations that even “moderate” Islamist parties engage in a double-discourse, saying one thing to the general public and something quite different to other Islamists.

In the wake of this scandal, and proposed initiatives by opposition labor movements, the ruling troika of En-Nahda, the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol suddenly announced that they had agreed on the draft of a new constitution, the date for new elections and retaining the well-regarded head of the elections commission.

It’s clear that this sudden announcement was designed to staunch the bleeding caused by Ghannouchi’s remarks, the slow progress on forging a new constitution and repairing the economy, and the planned labor initiatives. But it’s also clear that in order to get an agreement with its non-Islamist coalition partners, En-Nahda had to make several serious concessions. They agreed that the president would be elected directly by the public, as opposed to the almost entirely parliamentary system they have been advocating since the revolution. The respective powers of the president and parliament are not yet clear, but this can only be seen as a setback from their perspective.

In addition, a proposed anti-blasphemy clause, dear to En-Nahda’s agenda, has reportedly been dropped from the body of the draft constitution, where it might have served as the basis for a law. It has been moved to the preamble, in which it will almost certainly be an aspirational statement without actionable legal weight.

It might be argued that En-Nahda ‘s brokering of a deal with its non-Islamist coalition partners is a victory of sorts, and confirms their leading role in the new government, but the significant concessions that were required to achieve it demonstrate that non-Islamist forces in Tunisia remain powerful and cannot be bypassed on crucial issues.

These developments in Libya and Tunisia again illustrate that there is no certainty that Islamist forces will come to dominate post-dictatorship Arab societies. They are influential, but must contend with other social and political forces that have the ability to defeat or extract major concessions from them.

The lazy, facile narrative of an “Islamist Spring” persists in both Western and Arab political discourses. But evidence is mounting that what we are looking at is infinitely more complex and nuanced. Any realistic assessment must accurately appraise the relative clout of non-Islamists as well as Islamists in post-dictatorship Arab societies.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/15/the-lessons-of-novembers-past.html

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=444581

The recent exchange of attacks between Israel and militants in the Gaza Strip is unlikely to lead to a broader conflict, but it helps illuminate some of the dramatic changes happening within Hamas. It is yet another indication of the increasing willingness of Hamas factions in Gaza to resume not only countenancing but participating in rocket attacks against Israel. This, in turn, reflects the increasing influence and independence of more militant elements within the organization and their strategy for trying to wrest control of Hamas away from externally-based leaders.

Hamas acknowledges that it has coordinated the rocket responses to Israeli attacks with its long-standing Gaza rival, Islamic Jihad. Gaza-based Hamas factions have worked diligently in recent months to repair their often-strained relations with Islamic Jihad, participating in its recent anniversary celebrations and making repeated declarations of common cause.

The power struggle is based on competing interests. The power and influence of the externally-based Politburo, which has traditionally dominated Hamas’ decision-making, has been waning badly since its leaders had to abandon their headquarters in Syria. The rift with Syria, and by extension Iran, was underlined recently by unprecedented attacks against Politburo chief Khaled Meshaal by Syrian state media, which accused him of being, among other things, “a Zionist agent.”

Meshaal has reportedly made it clear that he intends to resign as head of the Politburo, even though he probably still remains its single most influential member. But his decision to step aside reflects not only an intensifying power struggle between Gaza-based and external Hamas leaders, but also the growing crisis within the Politburo itself.

The external leadership has been unable to secure a stable, centralized base to replace Damascus, meaning that its members are scattered throughout the Middle East. This renders them less effective in every sense, particularly since under such circumstances they will inevitably develop distinct incentive structures based on relationships with different patrons that have varying interests.

Meshaal has been concentrating on developing Hamas’ relationship with Qatar. And Doha has attempted to cement its bid to become the organization’s new primary patron, literally by announcing millions of dollars in reconstruction efforts in Gaza, and politically by announcing that it would open the first formal foreign diplomatic mission in the territory.

But Qatar’s soft power, based almost entirely on financial clout, is proving no match for Egypt’s hard power vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ hopes to benefit from the “Arab Spring” are still largely based on the conviction that in the long run it will enjoy a better relationship with a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Egypt. In reality, however, the new government of Mohammed Morsi has done nothing to aid Hamas or Gaza, and instead has tightened restrictions on the border and engaged in a campaign to destroy smuggling tunnels that has damaged Gaza’s economy and undermined some of Hamas’ most lucrative enterprises.

There has been such little progress with Egypt that Hamas has been reduced to ridiculous social campaigns in Gaza, such as arresting teenagers with hip hop-style baggy pants and prominent underwear, and extending its campaign against motorcycles in general and especially women riding on them. When political organizations can’t achieve anything practical, crudely playing to the base is an appealing prospect. But this hasn’t helped Hamas’ extremely weak popularity with Palestinians in Gaza or in general.

It’s ironically appropriate that Meshaal’s apparent valedictory is to be whooped out of the “culture of resistance” by the very voices, such as official Syrian propaganda, that once trumpeted him as one of its most important leaders. Speculation suggests that the leadership battle to replace him will largely be fought between his longtime deputy and rival, Moussa Abu Marzouk, and his preferred successor, Saleh Al-Aruri. Aruri, a founder of Hamas’ paramilitary wing, is based in Turkey and would represent a last-ditch effort by Meshaal’s faction to retain control.

Abu Marzouk’s main appeal is that he is based in Cairo and has been focusing on developing relations with the new Egyptian government on which so much of what does and doesn’t happen in Gaza will be based. If he does win, Hamas’s external leaders will be doubling down on their bet that an Islamist-dominated Egypt will ultimately prove the group’s salvation, even though there is no indication of this whatsoever to date.

There has also been speculation that Hamas’ most prominent Gaza-based leader, Ismail Hanniyeh, could also be a candidate for the post, but that seems unlikely at the moment. In the long run, however, a shift from domination of decision-making by externally-based leaders to those based in Gaza will be difficult to avoid. This trend likely means that a more militant, radical and strident strain within the organization will become increasingly influential and will recklessly use tensions with Israel, such as those that have erupted in recent days, to advance its interests.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/09/where-settler-terrorism-comes-from.html

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/03/the-reality-of-anti-blasphemy-laws.html