Author Archives: Rasha Aqeedi

Mr. Mileikowsky and the “seal of Netanyahu”: the perilous encounter between modern nationalism and ancient history

I may be trying people's patience a little with my recent riff on nationalism in general, and particularly the Israeli and Palestinian versions, but further exchanges with some of my interlocutors, particularly Jewish ones, prompt me to make one final point. I'd like to illustrate how nationalist discourses use sleight-of-hand to create illusions of historical continuity between ancient history, myths, legends and traditions and contemporary national political programs.
 
Of course that continuity does actually exist, insofar as all presently existing political agendas are the consequence of the great sweep of human history. But the nationalist identities of Egypt or China are not more authentic or legitimate because they claim direct descent from ancient civilizations and kingdoms than is the American one which celebrates its non-ethnic, sui generis (at the time of its founding anyway), and ideological self-definition. All three are equally the products of a set of developments in global history that produced them in their present form at the current moment. The American version of nationalism based on adherence to political principles and a kind of US civic religion can't be privileged over ethnic nationalisms either, and is also very much grounded in myth, legend and historical fantasy.
 
But some of my Jewish interlocutors who ought to know better seem absolutely convinced that there is a hierarchy of legitimacy of nationalist claims and that the Israeli one is simply and obviously superior, older, more “authentic” and more deeply rooted than the Palestinian one. This is even true among those who acknowledge a legitimate Palestinian nationalism, but simply assert that there's something more ancient or authentic about the Israeli one. Assurances that there are innumerable Arab and Palestinian arguments that reverse this, casting grave doubts on the legitimacy and authenticity of Israeli nationalism and Zionism, and the idea that the Jewish people are in any meaningful sense a national or ethnic group as opposed to a religious affiliation, don't seem to dent these deep convictions. So, as a last effort to try to demonstrate the ideological processes I have been describing, let me use a pertinent example from Israel.
 
Current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has in his office what might charitably be described as a relic and uncharitably as a kind of political fetish. It is a 2000-year-old seal in ancient Hebrew bearing the name “Netanyahu.” Here's how Mr. Netanyahu described its political significance to the European Friends of Israel in February of this year:
Now people say, well, you don't really have an attachment to this land. We are new interlopers. We are neo-crusaders. If I could I would invite each of you into my office. You would see a display of antiquities from the Department of Antiquities. It's in a little stand like this. And from the place next to the Temple wall, the Western Wall, from around the time of the Jewish kings, they found a signet ring, a seal of a Jewish official from 2700 years ago, and it has a name on it in Hebrew. You know what that name is? Netanyahu. Now, that's my last name.
 
What he didn't mention is how, precisely, Netanyahu came to be his last name. His father was not born with it, nor were any other of his identifiable ancestors. His father was born Benzion Mileikowsky in Warsaw in 1910. The Prime Minister's grandfather, Nathan Mileikowsky, was an ardent Zionist who used the name "Netanyahu" as a pen name for political writing. Sometime after moving to British mandatory Palestine, Benzion abandoned the name Mileikowsky altogether in favor of Netanyahu. It was common practice among early Zionists to dispense with European and especially Yiddish names in favor of Hebrew ones.
 
(It's probably worth mentioning that Benzion X is not a run-of-the-mill Zionist, but one of the most extreme in the history of the movement. He has many times expressed the view that Arabs are by nature and by definition virtually subhuman, and can and should only be dealt with through extreme forms of force. He also adheres to a greater Israel movement which holds the present borders, including occupied territories, to be entirely unsatisfactory. He was unable to establish a viable political career in Israel because his views were considered beyond the limits of respectability even by the extreme right. So, the specific version of the nationalist political agenda actually being expressed in that act of changing the name Mileikowsky to Netanyahu isn't a normal form of nationalism or a normal form of Zionism, but a program of institutionalized racism and regional aggression of a particularly vicious variety. But, of course, the son is not the father.)
 
So, Netanyahu's father adopted this name as a political act but it has no traceable connection to his family history which as far as can be historically determined seems to be entirely an Eastern European one. While there can be no doubting the deep attachment present day Israelis and Jews from around the world feel towards the land, I'd like to call attention to the series of diversionary gestures in this process designed to not only legitimate Israeli nationalism and Zionism, but to privilege it.
 
In the first stage, we are presented with the seal bearing the name Netanyahu, from 2000 years ago which confirms what no one denies: there was an ancient Hebrew culture, among many other communities, in this land. But it implicitly foregrounds and privileges that historical moment and that particular culture and community as opposed to all others that existed before, during and after that time.
 
In the second stage, it is pointed out that this name “Netanyahu” uncannily links some ancient official with the current prime minister. But the prime minister only bears that name because his father adopted it as a 20th-century political act based on 20th-century ideology and nationalism in what can only be described as an appropriation of the past. One could hardly posit a direct connection between a Mr. Mileikowsky of Warsaw and an ancient official called “Netanyahu” based on those two names.
 
Prime Minister Netanyahu may feel that he is demonstrating some profound historical evidence of the continuity between contemporary Israeli nationalism and ancient history, but in fact what he's doing is demonstrating the extent to which an ancient history in another place and time was consciously and politically appropriated by Jewish Europeans to legitimize their political agenda of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. To those who know his family history, this ring actually calls attention not to the authentic, natural and unbroken continuity between ancient history and contemporary Zionism but rather the usually underappreciated artificiality, or at very least consciously constructed nature, of that connection.
 
Here we have two synecdoches — parts that stand in for the whole — that are designed to tell a tale about the political legitimacy of the Israeli state based on two separate sleights-of-hand that are combined to create the total effect. First, this ancient seal is meant to stand in for the entirety of the ancient history of the land, and posit a dominant, unified, coherent Jewish culture and civilization which alone has contemporary political relevance. All other aspects of the history of the region are implicitly elided, downplayed or at very least certainly not accorded equal stature as this seal and all it supposedly implies. Every aspect of this implicit narrative, like all contemporary political appropriations of ancient history, is extremely dubious at best and misleading at worst.
 
The second synecdoche is the fact that the current Israeli Prime Minister's last name is the same as the one on the seal. The seal stands in for all the (at least politically relevant) history of the area between the river and sea, and the Prime Minister for all of the Jewish Israelis. The apparent organic connection between the two is hence presented as proof positive of the great authenticity and legitimacy of the Israeli national project and implicitly the primacy of its claims over all others. It also implicitly posits that contemporary Jews are the sole and only legitimate heirs of the biblical Hebrews, and that Palestinians and others cannot claim any portion of this heritage. It privileges biblical Hebrew history over all others in the land, and privileges the Israeli claim to being the sole heir of that privileged history. Both of these claims, of course, are exceptionally dubious.
 
Even if the Prime Minister's last name in terms of his family history actually were Netanyahu rather than Mileikowsky, it still wouldn't demonstrate any direct connection between ancient history and contemporary politics (which are almost always strained to the breaking point). But of course it isn't. Neither of these synecdoches work on their own except as reductive and crude generalizations, of the history of the land and of the nature of contemporary Jewish Israeli society and other groups. When put together, they demonstrate perfectly how nationalist discourses that deploy ancient history, myths and traditions are almost invariably engaged in a kind of intellectual shell game: the pea which actually connects ancient cultures and civilizations with contemporary nationalist agendas can never be found, because it does not exist. But of course the shells are impressive, and even more so is the mesmerizing motion of the huckster spinning them around the board so fast almost everyone loses track of the original, core claim.
 
I cite this example to try, for one final time, to demonstrate to my Jewish readers how this process works, but not to suggest that this is in any sense unique or particular to Jewish nationalism or Israeli identity. On the contrary, it is a universal characteristic of all nationalisms that try to root their present-day claims in appeals to ancient history. Saddam Hussein tried to do just this with Babylon. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been trying to do so as well with pre-Islamic Persian history, Cyrus the Great and so forth, in his losing battle with the Iranian power structure that prefers to cast Iran as an “Islamic” state with the natural leadership of a huge portion of the world rather than simply a “Persian” national project. Palestinians deploy ancient history all the time as well, with equal desperation and fatuousness as everyone else.
 
I'd say if you want to find the most extraordinary version of this tendency outside the Middle East, the first stop would probably be the Indian subcontinent, where ancient history, traditions, myths and legends are fought over passionately and sometimes to the point of madness. Who were the peoples of the Indus Valley civilization? Was there really an Aryan invasion? What's the relationship between Sanskritic and Dravidian languages and culture, and are they related to that deep past? Where does the caste system fit into it? How should the prolonged periods of Muslim rule in large parts of India be regarded historically, in terms of India's relationship with Pakistan and with regard to India's important Muslim minority? To call these disputes the tip of the iceberg would be an understatement.
 
What I'm not trying to do here, and what I'm not doing, is questioning the deep religious and emotional attachment of the Jewish people to the land, or the legitimacy of the Israeli national project. But I am trying to demonstrate why, should I wish to do so, Zionism is certainly not one of the better examples that would spring to mind were I to try to assert some kind of continuity between ancient history and a contemporary national project. In any event, the effort would prove futile, as this will always involve tendentious narratives, privileging of certain historical events, times and places over others, and carefully avoiding inconvenient facts that demonstrate the inherent instability of these narratives.
 
But unlike a great many academics in recent decades who have understood and demonstrated how this process works, I don't dismiss or condemn nationalism as purely a menace or a dangerous illusion. Achieving political effects requires developing constituencies, which are always going to be based on reductive identity groups drawn together by philosophically and intellectually invalid claims. There is a deep conundrum built into the relationship between a healthy understanding of the illusory nature of all reductive identity groupings and their constituting narratives on the one hand and the need to form constituencies to achieve anything on the other hand.
 
Nationalism has been the source of much suffering, conflict, abuse and repression. But it is also built into modernity at its core level. No large, self-defining people can function in the world today — which is made up of states and citizens of those states — without being part of some national structure. Indeed, no individual can function in the modern world outside national structures. Try traveling without a passport, for example. Hence the particular plight of the Palestinians, by far the largest group of stateless people in the world. They find themselves outside the whale, not second-class citizens or citizens of oppressive states — both of which can plausibly fight for their individual or collective rights within the structures of those states — but noncitizens, citizens of no state whatsoever.
 
Nationalism is indispensable as a political reality because the nation-state has not been transcended as the dominant political structure in the world today in which people have to function. This is the reality that escaped or confounded a great many of the postcolonial critics who championed nationalism as the only effective weapon against colonial rule in the Third World (that much is too obvious to deny), but who critiqued and rejected the nationalisms of developing societies, usually by definition. There wasn't any other option in seeking independence from colonial rule, and there isn't any other option for functioning in the contemporary global society either. This doesn't mean that separatism, ethnic nationalism or Balkanization is a good idea. On the contrary, it's almost always preferable to keep larger societies together and to avoid partition when people can possibly find a way to live together. History demonstrates that, when it has proven possible, remaining in large, multi-cultural or quite heterogeneous societies is beneficial to all parties.
 
When this is impossible, obviously a good divorce is better than a bad marriage. Here again nationalism presents itself as much as a solution as part of the problem. Often it's both, simultaneously. Will the people of the new Republic of South Sudan form a relatively harmonious union in spite of their extreme heterogeneity? That very much remains to be seen. But they were virtually unanimous on one thing: they wanted no more to do with the rest of Sudan, especially Khartoum. This new nationalism, such as it is, at very least gives the people of South Sudan a fighting chance at building a better next half century than the last one.
 
So what I'm offering here is a qualified, contingent and very reluctant defense of nationalism as not so much a necessary evil as simply a reality of the modern world, while at the same time pointing out that its narratives are particularly dubious. This is especially the case when nationalist rhetoric tries to deploy ancient history, myths and traditions, including religious ones, to legitimate its agenda and ideology. As I have been trying to suggest, the only reasonable conclusion is that nationalism needs to be respected as a legitimate and authentic expression of the will or needs of millions of people (assuming it has a real constituency), but not confused with an intellectually legitimate or historically authentic logical continuation of ancient realities.
 
No doubt there will be Israelis and their friends who will continue to write to me about ancient bowls and glyphs and so forth. And most people will continue to buy into whatever mythologies they are raised with, especially when it comes to their core national, ethnic and religious identities. The threat of this kind of “delegitimization,” of discovering that there never is a pea underneath that nationalist shell, is probably too threatening for a great many people. All I can offer them, beyond this simple example of how such rhetoric performs its ideological legerdemain, is the assurance that there is something deeply liberating in this insight.

Transcript of my interview with Press TV on Israel’s announced new settlement housing units in Har Homa

The following is the transcript of my Press TV (Iranian English-laguage station) interview about the new Israeli announcement of 900 new settlement housing units in the area called Har Homa. The transcript was re-edited by me for greater accuracy. The original video and a not fully-accurate transcript can be seen here.

Press TV: Could it be that these housing crisis protests turn into a bad thing for Palestinians, and any prospects of peace? 

Ibish: I don't think the protests themselves have any particular ramifications on the peace process, it is an internal Israeli matter but it is being used as an excuse by [Israeli] Interior Minister Eli Yishai for the 900 housing units in Jebel Abu Ghneim, the settlement which the Israelis call Har Homa. You have to understand that it is not exactly in Jerusalem as such. It is in the extreme south-west corner of what Israel redefined in 1967 as municipal Jerusalem. I mean, Jerusalem under the Ottomans, the British and the Jordanians was really the city but Israel made the first of its major land grab by extending the boundaries of municipal Jerusalem deep into the West Bank what. 

What we are talking about here is a Jewish settlement that is right on the border of Bethlehem, deep into the West Bank and what is significant about this new housing project is that it will create a new ridge in this Har Homa settlement which, which, if it is finished, will cut the Bethlehem off from East Jerusalem which will make it much more difficult to ever have a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem alongside an Israeli state, which is the only peace agreement. 

So it's a very dramatic, significant thing and I expect it will meet with significant international opposition. The US has been deeply opposed to this and the whole international community has been deeply opposed to it so this is an announcement that is made in the context of the housing crisis, with the Israeli right saying, well, we just have to make more settlements as if the cost of living bubble, the housing market bubble were connected to some kind of housing shortage and as if the only land available to build houses in Israel was Palestinian occupied land; it is all ridiculous but it is the argument that is being made by people who are determined to entrench the occupation and never allow the Palestinian their freedom. 

Press TV: Israel's largely claimed that settlements are approved years in advance. Is it possible that trust it at this juncture, especially, as mentioned, in Netanyahu's reputation, due to these protests isn't doing well? 

Ibish: I think that is right, he is in bad shape and I don't think this is particularly going to help him out, the protesters in the tent city and the middle class, who have their cost of living rising, are not going to be impressed that the settlement movement is using their housing price and cost of living protest to advance the settlement project. 

In fact I think there are a lot of people in Israel who are wondering about the financial cost of occupation, this is not a cheap thing, taking people's lands away, taking these settlers there, giving them generous subsides, because many Israelis have moved to settlement in and around Jerusalem because they have to been subsidized to do so, becuase it is a good deal for them and the settlers get all kinds of benefits that ordinary Israelis, like the ones who are protesting, do not 

I don't think this is going to help [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu domestically and I think he is in a lot of trouble over this; increasingly the settlement activity is not going to get him out of it. 

What it will probably get him into is another argument with the US. It is true the veto the US has cast at the end of the last year at Security Council on the settlement resolution kind of killed the issue and I think it was a miscalculation on the Palestinian part to push forward knowing the US was going to veto a resolution that used the word “illegal” even though the US agrees it is illegal. They would have been willing to have said “illegitimate.” 

The Palestinians pushed the issue for many different reasons, both because it is true and for the domestic political reasons, but they paid a heavy price because from then until now the settlements have been gone forward without any comments. I think this may be different, I think really you might see some pushback from the US, from the Europeans, etc, on this because if it is completed, it would really cut Bethlehem and other parts of the West Bank off from East Jerusalem and make the eventual border much more difficult to draw. 

You are right about these announcements, the Israelis announced them and they always say these decisions were made previously and then they are going to be completed sometime in advance and this project has been one that has been discussed since 2000 and it has not been completed because it is so sensitive. 

I think there is a very good chance, especially if there is an appropriate amount of international pressure, that there will be another of these announcements that doesn't eventually get completed. This is an extremely crucial area, this is not another annex to another settlement like Maale Admumim that probably will be part of a land swap. It's a dagger aimed at the heart of a peace agreement.

Press TV: With the building of settlements pretty much the status quo at this point, where does this leave a two-state solution, the Palestinian-statehood-bid at the UN, etc.? 

Ibish: It is in grave jeopardy, it really is, and nothing could threaten it more than a settlement project like Har Homa. There are plenty of settlement blocks which if the Israelis build more buildings in them wouldn't really change the strategic equation, it will still be a violation of international law and it would be bad and increase the number of people who don't want to make a deal. But this is very strategic, this totally changes the strategic landscape so this really undermines the very the prospect of a two-state solution, which is really the only solution that would actually work. 

The Palestinian statehood initiative at the UN, if it happens and depending on the form it happens, is not really going to be connected to this except in so far as it is an expression of how stuck diplomacy is and how desperate the Palestinian people are, people who are living under occupation and who cannot afford to wait and let these things sort themselves out and come back to this in a year or half or two years time, they don't have that luxury. 

I really don't think a confrontation at the UN is a great idea from anyone's point of view and I think there needs to be very urgent work here to figure out a compromise that can avert any kind of explosion on the ground or a major diplomatic fight that would harm everybody and particularly the weakest party always ends up losing the most and in this case it unfortunately is, again the Palestinian people again.

The Trouble with Jeffrey

In Alfred Hitchcock's 1955 black comedy, The Trouble with Harry, in an idyllic small town nobody knows what to do with an inconvenient person (in that case, the trouble with Harry is that he's a corpse and everyone is convinced they were somehow involved in his death and don't know how to dispose of the body). Washington and the broader political world, especially online, can be like that too. There is a powerful inclination to rhetorically do away with inconvenient people, and tremendous anger from the enforcers of various versions of ethnic and ideological correctness against the heretics, schismatics and apostates who, it is assumed, should naturally belong to the ranks of the faithful. When someone from “the other side” is taking an objectionable position, that's fine because it only reinforces reassuring binaries, clichéd narratives and the certainty of the converted that the received wisdom is indeed the One True Faith. This is even more intense when it comes to ethnic (let's face it, tribal) expectations. And the intensity reaches its crescendo when it comes to anything remotely related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic magazine is a fascinating case in point. He's an influential columnist and blogger with a strong ethnic Jewish perspective and a deep attachment to Israel. This makes him anathema to many Arab and Muslim Americans (I've been vilified for agreeing to be interviewed by, and later — horror of horrors — coauthoring an article with, him), and to many on the extreme left, including some ultraleft Jewish Americans. But he's also a strong critic of the occupation; the settlements (he has written sympathetically about settlement boycotts); Islamophobia (I'd note that his initial speculation that Islamists might have been involved in the Norway terrorist attacks was hardly out of bounds and bore no resemblance to the disgraceful ravings of Jennifer Rubin or John Podhoretz); paranoid TSA pseudo-security practices (about which he has written hilariously); and bigotry in general. This provokes the ire of a great deal of the extreme right, including the Jewish far-right. So the extremes on all sides dislike him a great deal, and they are disliking him more with every passing day.

The trouble with Jeffrey is that he thinks independently. He doesn't fit neatly into any simple category. As far as I can tell he is basically a liberal, but with some hawkish views (especially on some Israeli wars and Iran, that I strongly disagree with), and other ideas that don't fit well with a kind of dumbed-down knee-jerk liberalism. So conservatives don't like him because he's basically a liberal and liberals don't like him because he thinks critically enough to take plenty of "deviant" positions. He's keenly aware of and writes frequently about his Jewish identity and all matters Jewish-American. But he resists knee-jerk thinking here too, particularly on matters regarding settlements and the occupation, and is a powerful voice against Islamophobia. So anti-Semites don't like him because he's proudly Jewish, and Jewish absolutists don't like him because he strays from the reservation when he thinks it's important, either pragmatically or on principle, to do so.

Goldberg's willingness to take on Israeli orthodoxy over settlements and the occupation was recently played out on Twitter in an extraordinary exchange he had with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon. Goldberg harassed Ayalon remorselessly about an absurd YouTube video Ayalon produced and has been promoting. It is a remake of a settler video and essentially argues there is no occupation, so there are no settlements, and strongly implies the occupied territories belong to Israel anyway. On his blog, Goldberg correctly noted that the video "argues, in essence, the following: The West Bank belongs to Israel now and forever, so fuck off." On Twitter, Goldberg (@Goldberg3000) bluntly told Ayalon (@DannyAyalon), “Your entire project is designed to legitimize Israel’s hold over the territories forever.” When Ayalon accused him of engaging in “1984” tactics by drawing logically unavoidable conclusions about the deputy foreign minister's intentions from his own statements, Goldberg devastatingly replied, “You, of all people, invoking '1984'? Your government supported a bill that punishes free speech! Talk about Orwellian." Part of the exchange was catalogued and analyzed by Tablet.

For this blasphemy, Goldberg was subject to a mandatory ritual lapidation by the self-appointed Beth Din at Commentary magazine, delivered with tremendous wrath and furious anger by none other than the high priest himself, Jonathan Tobin. For Goldberg, he wrote "the mere mention of Jewish rights… is wrong." In Tobin's worldview, Goldberg is a heretic because, “To speak of the West Bank as disputed territory rather than 'occupied Arab land' is beyond the pale, because it hurts the feelings of the Palestinians and puts the two claims on a level playing field." Both Tobin and Ayalon are, of course, perfectly aware of the small mountain of UN Security Council resolutions, all voted for by the United States one might add, that clearly hold that East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights are occupied territories and Israel is the occupying power. But what are the small matters of international law and requirements of peace, or for that matter the rights of millions of Palestinians, when it comes to the metaphysical, transhistorical, divinely-ordained and indisputable Jewish “right” to all of “The Land of Israel”?

As I noted in a recent episode of Al Jazeera English's The Stream program that was largely based around the Ayalon video, anybody is entitled to their opinion about the occupied territories, but because the Security Council is the legal and political arbiter of such matters in the international community, we can state as a legal and political fact that these territories are occupied by Israel, end of story. In other words, you can have an opinion that the sky is green if you like. None of the rest of us are bound to take that remotely seriously, and we are perfectly entitled to laugh in your face when you say so or, as in this case, detect something more sinister in the deception. Tobin accuses Goldberg, in effect, of lying about supposed “Jewish rights” in the occupied territories in order to sustain, "the mainstream Jewish liberal conventional wisdom to which he subscribes." Presumably this is a reference to the outrageous heresy of belief in peace with the Palestinians.

The attacks on Goldberg from the far-right do not, of course, begin or end there. On his blog he reports recently receiving the following love letter: “Pamela Geller is right, you want to see America and Israel destroyed. Why do you love Muslims so much? Are you a secret Muslim?” In this case the motivation was not his opposition to the outrageous Ayalon video but his strong stance against Islamophobia (he was one of the strongest supporters of the rights of the backers of the Park 51 planned lower Manhattan Islamic Center, a.k.a. “the Ground Zero mosque”). And Goldberg has been one of the most persistent critics in the mainstream American media of Geller, Robert Spencer and other professional Islamophobes.

Much of the far-left also has a profound distaste for Goldberg, including the Jewish ultra-left. Max Blumenthal rather hilariously described him as the "Chief Rabbi of a one man island," although this metaphor makes no sense whatsoever. Neither does attacking someone one thinks is completely irrelevant, or as the analogy implies, has no audience at all. Some left wing critics acknowledge that he's not exactly without any audience, such as Joseph Dana, who recently referred to Goldberg as “the dark lord of American Zionist hasbara.” Well, if all of this is the work of Netanyahu's American “dark lord of propaganda,” the Israeli government's public diplomacy is in much worse shape than even I thought it was. Goldberg is also, needless to say, a favorite target of the oddball Mondoweiss website (as am I). The intellectual and moral character of that site can be simply gauged by the fact that its proprietors, Philip Weiss and Adam Horowitz, have seen fit to publish articles questioning the right of anyone to sit in judgment of Palestinians who commit drive-by shootings against random settlers, including pregnant women, implicitly defending, therefore, a fairly cold-blooded variety of murder.

Indeed, these attacks from fringes only makes sense, and only really occur, when there is a belief that the intended target has an audience and is genuinely influential. They are an acknowledgment that one is having an effect and an impact. And for the Guardians of Purity, those who think for themselves are especially dangerous. There is a vast amount, especially about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that Goldberg and I disagree about passionately. But one thing is for sure: I never know exactly what to expect from him. And I doubt any of my readers know exactly what to expect from me either. Key perspectives become obvious over time, but people who think for themselves are likely to throw out curveballs on a regular basis, and this is the thing that the Guardians of Purity hate more than anything else: not inconsistency, but consistent independence of thinking.

In some cases it is the influence alone that I think accounts for the objections. I have several friends who are staunch liberals but not ultraleft, who are not Arabs or Jews, and who are not that heavily invested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or anything around it, yet who have expressed a strong distaste for Goldberg which they have been unable to fully explain to me. As best I can understand it, there is a strong objection because they perceive him to be a kind of arbiter of Jewish liberal opinion in some sort of an unhealthy, hegemonic manner. It almost sounds something like the resentment Booker T. Washington used to face from those who thought all “respectable” African-American public opinion and major funding for community organizations needed to be approved by “the Wizard of Tuskegee.” I'm afraid I don't understand this. Maybe I'm just not close enough to the inner workings of the Jewish American community, but it seems to me a very heterogeneous bunch, and honestly I can't see that the Emperor Goldberg has a particularly vast dominion or endless brigades of lockstep followers. That he is influential is without question; all the more reason to be glad when he takes on Israeli extremists, including the deputy foreign minister, or Islamophobes, or what have you. But the unquestioned arbiter of a mass body of important opinion? Really? I have detected this resentment factor, but I haven't fully comprehended it.

It should be obvious that in spite of our many disagreements, I identify with Goldberg in this one respect: being the subject of campaigns of ideological and ethnic purity from the high priests of the True Faith on both extremes of the spectrum simultaneously. An amazing amount of balderdash was spewed out last week in a press release by the Zionist Organization of America about the American Task Force on Palestine in general and me personally, and it's only the most recent and noteworthy example of attacks on ATFP and/or me from the Jewish far-right. By the way, the vice-chairman of the ZOA recently wrote in the Jerusalem Post that Israel should annex all of the West Bank but provide neither votes nor citizenship to the millions of Palestinians living there, which tells you pretty much exactly where they're coming from. And of course there are the daily love letters to me from the Arab extreme left, including more than one website largely devoted to praising my every statement and two twitter "parody" feeds that are, sadly, underwhelmingly unfunny. Not a week goes by that I'm not described online by somebody as a “terrorist,” a “jihadist,” or a “radical Islamist” on the one hand and a “traitor,” a “collaborator,” and an “Arab Zionist” on the other hand. It goes with the territory. Such are the perils of life in the political center, the rejection of dogma in favor of independent thinking, refusal to adhere to prefabricated formulae, resistance to the dictates of stage-managed rituals of ethnic solidarity, and the willingness to say what one actually thinks knowing full well these are the inevitable consequences.

As with all sustained and coordinated vitriolic attacks, I suppose one must take these things as a compliment, because they are certainly an acknowledgment that one is having a major impact, or at least is considered, by the self-appointed enforcers of ethnic and/or ideological purity, profoundly threatening. These communal comisars are, of course, stultifyingly predictable in their own thinking. Indeed, they are frozen in non-thought. The thing that alarms them the most is an independent thinker willing to take nuanced, balanced and, worst of all, unpredictable positions based on reason and principle rather than ethnic affiliation or prefabricated ideologies. So in the end, the trouble with Jeffrey (and the trouble with Hussein for that matter) is strongly analogous to the Trouble with Harry: what to do with an inconvenient, disconcerting, unsettling, and, ultimately, terrifying presence that disrupts the otherwise idyllic space of the pristine ideological imagination?

The costs and benefits of Palestinian UN options

Talk delivered at the 65th Middle East Policy Council Capitol Hill Conference, "Arab and Israeli Peace Initiatives: A Late Chance for Negotiations?", July 25, 2011. For video of the event and a full transcript, click here.

 
 
I’m going to look at what looms ahead potentially at the United Nations in September, because that seems to be the most immediate diplomatic and political context, from a Palestinian perspective anyway, and has huge repercussions.
 
First of all, I’d like to put this whole conversation in its context, at least the way that as I understand it, and also the way the Palestinian leadership and a lot of Palestinians who are talking about some kind of U.N. initiative in September, understand it.
 
The first point is that while it’s certainly true that there are a lot of Israelis and Americans and Europeans and others who are frustrated at the lack of progress diplomatically, the lack of viable, working peace process or any negotiations, Palestinians live under occupation. And they uniquely find the status quo not only untenable but unbearable, intolerable. And that has very profound implications for Palestinian leaders and the Palestinian political scene, because while it is frequently alleged on the Israeli right and on the Arab left that the leadership in Ramallah of the PLO and the PA is content with the status quo because their rule in Area A of the West Bank is fairly stable and relatively unchallenged, this is, I think, completely wrong.
 
Over the medium and long term, they’re not content at all, because they understand that if their policy and their program of achieving Palestinian statehood and independence through – primarily through diplomacy and negotiations, augmented by state-building and other measures is seen by the public as having permanently failed, they will be finished in Palestinian society, that they don’t have a future beyond that approach. And when that approach is shelved, people will look elsewhere. And who they’d look to is not mysterious. A lot of people posit the emergence of a third force – that could happen – but right now, the alternative to the PLO and the PA is sitting there in Gaza. We know exactly who it is, what they say, what their agenda is. And I think we can speculate about the consequences to the Palestinian national movement of an Islamist takeover of that cause.
 
So the status quo, in fact, is totally unacceptable to the Palestinian leadership in spite of whatever stability they have in the areas that they control in the West Bank and despite of these accusations. The breakdown in diplomacy after the direct talks failed and particularly after the United States was unable to get Israel to agree to a three-month extension of its partial temporary settlement freeze moratorium, in spite of a very attractive and generous package of inducements, led, I think, the Palestinian leadership to conclude that the process as it’s structured now is simply dysfunctional, it’s simply not working for them; and if they continued to rely primarily on – for their long-term goals on a process that is dependent on Israeli enthusiasm for making an agreement and American determination, that really they were surrendering themselves too much to a process that they couldn’t control and in which they didn’t have sufficient initiative or agency.
 
So there was this tremendous desire to find an alternative formula, an alternative path forward diplomatically, while at the same time continuing to stand strongly against violence and these other principles that they are committed to. And I think also there’s a kind of subtext here that’s important to appreciate, which is that this frustration over the past couple of years with Prime Minister Netanyahu, with his cabinet and with the American role – not with the Obama administration particularly but with the American role generally – has led many Palestinian leaders to want to find a way of demonstrating to these two parties that it has actually viable and maybe even powerful alternatives, that in other words, it’s not completely dependent, that it has other options and second-best scenarios, so to speak. So this is another impulse, I think, that’s very important.
 
Now, the other really crucial thing to understand, to contextualize these ideas, is that the official position and, I think, the real position of the PLO leadership, as continuously emphasized by President Abbas, is that they prefer negotiations to any kind of U.N. initiative, and it’s understandable, as I’ll explain, because virtually every idea about approaching the U.N. carries with it significant dangers and cost. So it’s completely understandable that from a Palestinian point of view, this is perceived as a kind of leverage to get negotiations restarted if they possibly can. In fact, today, Abbas’ quote is this is: negotiations is our first, second and third choice. This is literally what he said. So he’s really trying to emphasize how much they would like to negotiate.
 
And what they’re asking for, looking for, are clear terms of reference, which have not been forthcoming, and a framework for the negotiations, which also has not been forthcoming. They’re interested in President Obama’s speech and the framework that was suggested by it: talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon land swaps and focusing – although this makes both parties uncomfortable – on borders and security first. They’re potentially open to that.
 
There were two extras, two little fillips thrown in by the president for both parties:  one, for the Israelis, that the Palestinians ought to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, whatever that means, which I think is the right answer to that request – well, what does that mean? Please provide a definition. And I think that ought to at least make the request a little clearer. And for the Palestinians, a full and phased withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the territories that will become a Palestinian state. That’s fairly new. That’s a new formulation anyway, from the United States. And it was important.
 
But nothing has been achieved to create terms of reference or a negotiating framework out of that vision. And as a matter of fact, the Quartet at its last meeting was unable to reach any consensus on this. It was apparently three to one over this Jewish state question and maybe some other divisions. And the European Union is also rather badly divided, with its last meeting issuing a rather anodyne statement.
 
So not only has the West not produced a clear, working framework or set of terms of reference or anything like that; I think it’s fair to say that Western policy is extremely divided, unusually divided, on this subject. Really, the role of the Quartet until now has been to give international backing to American-led initiatives. And that’s failed to be produced. I don’t think it’s ever happened since the founding of the Quartet, frankly. So you have on top of everything else a kind of breakdown in the coherence of the Western approach to the specifics of negotiations, which are essential to restarting them. And that only pushes the Palestinians further toward the United Nations. However, none of the options, as I say, is cost-free to say the least. And I just want to look at each of the three main ones that have been considered or discussed publicly.
 
When they first started talking about this in public and people started speculating about it in public, the terminology that was usually used was that the Palestinians would look for recognition from the U.N. in September, which is meaningless, because the U.N. doesn’t recognize states. States recognize each other. The U.N. has member states. So it was assumed that what Palestinians would do – and it’s still widely assumed what Palestinians would do is submit an application to the secretary-general to be referred to the Security Council, which is required for a recommendation to the General Assembly and a two-thirds vote by the General Assembly, which would make a potential state, a member state, of the United Nations.
 
I don’t think there’s much doubt the Palestinians could get the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, but there’s also no doubt that the United States will veto this in the Security Council, and so it won’t happen. And there is a significant potential cost to a confrontation with the United States over the question of statehood in the Security Council, which I think is putting it rather mildly. I’ll illustrate it only by reminding you of the veto cast last year on the question of settlements, which effectively killed that issue, because ever since then, Israel has had in effect a kind of a free hand on settlements. It announces settlements all the time, and there’s virtually no international response. The last thing I heard was Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief saying she was "disappointed" by some very provocative announcement – which is the mildest possible language – and even muted Palestinian responses.
 
So for the time being, that sort of shelved the issue. Now, I really think it behooves everyone to think very carefully about repeating that potentially on the issue of statehood. I mean, the issue of settlements is bad enough. So a confrontation with the United States in the Security Council over the question of statehood carries with it simply enormous political and diplomatic costs for the Palestinians, which is why I think it’s less likely than likely, in spite of the political pressure to do it.
 
The second thing that was talked about quite a lot was some kind of a resolution in the General Assembly under General Assembly Resolution 337, the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution from 1950, that was designed to get around vetoes by a Security Council member. It was prompted by American frustration with continuous USSR vetoes in the late ‘40s on the question of Korea. And this particularly animated the Israeli press because it permits member states to take various coercive actions to meet breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and whatnot. But its practical implications seem very, very nebulous because there already are states that have been practicing sanctions and boycotts against each other in all kinds of conflicts without any 337 Resolution, and that includes the Middle East Conflict. And it doesn’t go to the question of statehood or the question of membership. It seems entirely off point, frankly, and without practicality. So we haven’t really heard much about that since people looked at it carefully.
 
The idea that’s dominating the conversation now, at least in public, is the idea of a Palestinian application, either instead of a move in the Security Council to request full U.N. membership recommendation to the General Assembly or after it, would be a request directly to the General Assembly for non-member state status. Right now, the Palestinian representation in the U.N. is the PLO observer mission, which is not a non-member state.  It’s a political entity, observer mission. And there are a number of those, in particular the EU and the Holy See.
 
And that would require, as I understand it, 50 percent plus one, which the Palestinians would certainly get. And this is appealing in some ways and also not appealing in some other ways and carries very significant costs if it’s pursued. The first thing that it wouldn’t do, of course, is it wouldn’t establish an independent state of Palestine. This just would be kind of a declaration by the U.N., by the General Assembly – that's all.
 
I think it’s hard to imagine it accomplishing the goal that President Abbas and others keep sort of suggesting it might. I mean, they don’t really put it in the context of non-member state status, but this is how I take it anyway, of getting on a more equal footing with Israel in the diplomatic register. And particularly, there’s an emphasis on wanting to negotiate about the future of the territory of another state, not the territory of an undefined area under military occupation. I am not sure that such a vote in the General Assembly would actually accomplish that in practice.
 
Let me tell you, however, about what it might achieve. What it might do is first, as at least some people are hoping, is possibly give the Palestinians access to the International Criminal Court.  It’s, I guess, conceivable, since I can’t see anything that absolutely precludes a Palestinian entity that is a non-member state in the general assembly at least trying to accede to the Statute of Rome and become a part of the assembly of parties at the International Criminal Court. It’s theoretically possible.
 
But there are a couple of problems with that. And first of all, would this status actually be taken as real state status, especially when it comes to the question of territory? And the question of territory is very important for the ICC, because Israel is not a party to the Statute of Rome, which means that Israeli citizens cannot be prosecuted based on actions they take within Israel or because of their status as Israeli nationals.
 
What the PA tried to initiate in January of 2009 with a letter to the ICC was an authorization to the court to have jurisdiction or request that the court exercise jurisdiction in the territories nominally or supposedly under the control of the PA, including Gaza – this really was kind of a reference to the Gaza War – because if the PA or Palestine were regarded as a state by the ICC, Israel could be liable for actions committed within the territory that is assumed or recognized to be under the control of that state, if any.  So you see the importance of territory here. So this non-member state might not be understood to actually control territory in any kind of sovereign way, so it might become extremely complicated.
 
However, I do think this has been one of the guiding concerns of Israel about all of this, because the Statute of Rome has several elements that might be seen as very threatening and alarming to the Israelis, should they ever fall under it. All belligerent parties are potentially liable to war crimes such as, you know, unlawful use of force against civilians or property or whatnot. But there are two things, two passages that might apply – that might particularly apply to the Israelis.
 
One is that the Statute of Rome specifically lists settlement activity and the transfer of population into an area under military occupation as a war crime. This must be alarming to the Israelis because there’s no doubt – the Security Council has reaffirmed many times that this is an area – the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights for that matter, are under Israeli occupation and that Israel is the occupying power. So this is a concern.
 
There’s also a crime called crime of apartheid, which is described roughly as a system of discrimination favoring one ethnic group over another, with the intention of perpetuating that system. That last part might be the out there, but I think if you looked at any sort of political system or social system anywhere in the world, probably the system that Israel operates under the occupation falls closest to meeting that definition than any other. It’s obviously a vulnerability.
 
As I say, it’s not at all certain or even likely that such a recognition, or such status accorded, by the General Assembly would actually give Palestinians direct access to the ICC or give the ICC, in its own mind, jurisdiction over the territories it claims.  But that’s one possibility that’s been discussed. The ICC, when they received the letter in ’09, made no determination. They received it without prejudice, and they never came to any conclusion about it. Whether this would help them do that – although statehood was obviously an issue, territory was obviously another issue for them – whether that would resolve this issue or not is very much in question.
 
The other thing that appeals, I think, to Palestinians about this idea is that there have been 16 non-member states in the history of the U.N., not including the Vatican, the Holy See, which is currently the only non-member state. And if you allow for states that have united – Vietnam and Germany – all 16 of those are now member states of the United Nations. And this history must be, at least in an aspirational sense, very appealing to the Palestinians.  If a state of Palestine can become a state observer – and the Vatican has never wanted to become a member state – and became the latest state that intends ultimately to become a member, it might be, they would hope, difficult to prevent that in the future.
 
There are costs. I’ll try to explain these significant costs. First is Israeli unilateral retaliation, which they’ve threatened. They’re currently talking about revoking or abrogating the Oslo Agreements, whatever that might mean – possible annexation, who knows. There’s American retaliation. Congress has threatened the cutoff of aid.  And the U.S. is the single biggest donor annually to the PA, not if you include all the EU, but alone. That’s a significant amount of money that’s at stake here, plus general relations with the United States, which is very important.
 
Finally, the Israelis have the idea of countering any Palestinian majority in the General Assembly with a group of 30 states that would be small in number but represent the most powerful, influential countries: most of the West plus Japan. And they would present this, in effect, or maybe even overtly as the camp of the so-called “civilized world,” and claim that all these countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America might be with the Palestinians, but, you know, the important countries, the “civilized world” or something like that, they’re with us. And this might be another kind of victory for Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
 
So, all these options carry with them very serious costs. And all parties, including the Palestinians, have a very serious day-after problem; what do they do the day after? And particularly, from a Palestinian point of view, if any of these measures is seen as a diplomatic “success,” but nothing changes on the ground for Palestinians and because of Israeli retaliation the loss of U.S. aid or other measures, things actually get worse as a consequence for people’s daily lives, plus the frustration, there is a potential for an outbreak of popular anger.
 
Now, people look at the nonviolent movement in the West Bank and the nonviolent nature of a lot of the Arab uprisings and hope – and I hope so too – that if there is another explosion of anger, that it would take a nonviolent form. But the occupation is the system of control and discipline. I do not think the Israelis have many options of dealing with a sustained campaign of nonviolence other than the use of force eventually. And there are many Palestinian factions who are totally committed to armed struggle and violence and would certainly take advantage of that kind of situation. So how long it could stay nonviolence, even if it started in a nonviolent way, is extremely questionable and would be a headache for the Israelis and the PA as well.
 
So there are very powerful incentives, which is the subject of this panel, to resume negotiations, for everyone, but such talks might be indirect. Even providing a framework, even providing a road map or especially providing terms of reference that is seen to be meaningful might be enough to stave off any kind of train wreck or confrontation.
 
And the most obvious way out is for everyone to agree that Palestinians would seek a mission upgrade, not a change of status exactly, to keep the PLO observer mission as the Palestinian presence in the U.N. but with upgraded rights and privileges, sort of EU-minus, since they probably can’t aspire to have all the privileges of the EU without provoking some kind of politically damaging, diplomatically damaging confrontation, but they could get more rights and responsibilities and privileges than they have now. That would be a kind of diplomatic victory.
 
I think the bottom line is that the Palestinian leadership politically and diplomatically needs an incentive not to do this. They need a political reason not to do this. They certainly need something they can turn to their public and say: This is why we decided not to. If they’re left with absolutely nothing, they’re going to be in an extremely difficult political situation and also diplomatic one. And that might precipitate something that would harm – a confrontation that would harm all parties and that would be best avoided.

The evolution of Syrian policy towards Palestine and the Palestinians

Talk delivered at the ATFP/Carnegie Endowment briefing, "Owning a Piece of Palestine: Syria’s Assad Regime and the Palestinian Question," July 27, 2011. For an audio recording and full transcript of the event, click here.

 
The policies of the Hafez and Bashar Al-Assad regimes in Syria have systematically undermined independent Palestinian national leadership and asserted control over the Palestinian cause and movement. These policies did not arise in a vacuum, but rather are a continuation and intensification of traditional Syrian approaches to the question of Palestine. These Syrian efforts to “own a piece of Palestine" — if not the whole thing, at least as an issue — are not unique among the Arab states. Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and others have also been involved in efforts to deploy this issue in the service of their own foreign policies. None, however, has been as adamant about its right to define and control the Palestinian issue, the subordination of that issue to a broader Arab agenda which it also defines, and to consistently oppose and undercut the independent Palestinian leadership by supporting opposition movements first from the far left and more recently the religious right under the Orwellian rubric of “independent opposition.”
 
As the Ottoman Empire was being dismantled following World War I, most Syrians, Palestinians and other Arabs regarded Palestine as “Southern Syria,” and particularly during the era of Prince Faisal's rule in Damascus, agitated for the “reunification” of a greater Syria as opposed to the creation of several independent states. Faisal was seen as the one leader who might unite a broad alliance of Arabs to both unify a "greater Syria" and, from a Palestinian point of view, be the vanguard of a broad-based Levantine opposition to Zionist ambitions. Over time, however, the Palestinian national movement gained an increasing sense of independence in several stages. First, after the downfall of Faisal, there was a need to focus on defending Palestine from Zionist plans to establish a Jewish state rather than reunification with the rest of "greater Syria." Second, before, during and immediately after the establishment of Israel, several Arab states, particularly Syria, Egypt and Jordan were maneuvering to try to both mitigate the damage it caused to them and to foreclose each other's ambitions.
 
After the collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961, and particularly the crushing defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, Palestinians were confronted by the unavoidable necessity of creating independent national institutions and decision-making. Several Arab states sought to control this process, but Palestinians proved adept in playing one off against the other to gain as much space as possible. Syrian governments initially supported Fatah as an insurgent challenge to the first incarnation of the PLO, but rapidly turned against the organization, at least at the ideological level. From the 60s through the 90s, Palestinians were divided between three main perspectives: 1) independent nationalists led by Fatah; 2) Arab nationalists led by the PFLP; 3) Marxist-Leninists led by the PDFLP. Syrian regimes strongly preferred the second two groupings, but even more their own self-created "Palestinian" institutions, particularly the PFLP-GC and As-Sa'iqa, as well as Syrian dominated elements of the Palestine Liberation Army. All three of these forces came to blows with the mainstream national leadership throughout the decades.
 
This pattern was intensified following the establishment of the Baathist regime by Hafez Al-Assad in the early 1970s. As a Baathist, Assad was by definition part of the absolutist Arab nationalist camp, however within the Baath party he was leader of a pragmatic and Syria-first camp. From these twin and often seemingly contradictory ideological positions he continuously harassed the PLO for decades, frequently accusing its leadership of treason and betrayal of the Arab and Palestinian causes, while at the same time unabashedly asserting particular Syrian national interests and imperatives, including occasionally bluntly resurrecting the assertion that Palestine remains, in essence, “southern Syria.” This ideological oscillation between maximalist, absolutist forms of Arab nationalism and strident assertions of Syrian particularism and primacy gave the Assad regime a unique ability to harass independent Palestinian national leadership on multiple fronts simultaneously.
 
The main Syrian ideological position, or the one repeated most consistently, was that the Palestinian cause was subordinate to a broader Arab revolution, and that Palestinians should be a vanguard of transformation in the entire Arab world first, before their own cause was attended to. The PLO, particularly under Yasser Arafat, essentially took the contradictory stance that while Arab states and societies had a responsibility to assist the Palestinian cause by whatever means possible, the Palestinians nonetheless had a completely free hand in decision-making. In early decades, this PLO expectation included launching attacks against Israel from the territory of those states, with or without permission. Plainly neither of these stances is, on its face, politically functional or defensible, and reflects not only strongly opposing but also fundamentally unreasonable positions.
 
The Assad regime also repeatedly confronted the Palestinian national leadership with force, including numerous assassinations, proxy conflicts and occasionally direct armed conflict. This was most dramatically expressed in Lebanon, where in the 1970s the Syrians consistently sided with anti-PLO elements and militarily intervened on behalf of forces confronting the Palestinians and their allies. It was even more starkly revealed by strong Syrian backing for Lebanese Shiite forces, as well as direct military intervention by their own forces, in the “war of the camps” when the PLO tried to reassert its presence in Lebanon following the 1982 Israeli invasion. However, despite decades of relentless effort, the Syrians were never able to gain control of the Palestinian movement or place its subordinates in leadership positions.
 
In the late 1980s and early 90s — following the Gulf War, the first intifada and the collapse of the Soviet Union — both Syrian and Palestinian calculations shifted. The PLO completed the process of moving away from a program of armed struggle to one based on negotiations and eventually entered the Oslo Accords with Israel. Syria, on the other hand, became the leading Arab state opponent of this approach and rhetorical champion of Arab rejectionism. However, it shifted its support from left and nationalist opposition groups, which had lost support and momentum after the collapse of the USSR, to right-wing Islamists, particularly Hamas.
 
While the PLO had carefully avoided numerous efforts to get it to locate or relocate its headquarters in Damascus, understanding the implications of such a decision, for the bulk of its existence Hamas' Politburo and much of its military command has been based in the Syrian capital. By shifting its attention from left and nationalist Palestinian opposition to that based on the extreme religious right, in spite of the ideological incoherence of this position, the regime of Bashar Al-Assad has continued the tradition established by his father of confronting and co-opting the Palestinian national independent leadership and agenda by whatever means possible.
 
Events since the Syrian uprising began illustrate the cynicism of this approach. The manipulation of border regions on this year's Nakba and especially Naksa days; the killing of at least 11 Palestinians by the pro-Assad PFLP-GC at the Yarmouk refugee camp; the virtual split with Hamas because of its inability to side openly with the regime against the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood; and the recent move to recognize independent Palestinian statehood in contradiction to all past ideological pronouncements and almost a century of Syrian policy that has opposed such independence, all demonstrate that for this regime, as with the last one, the Palestinian issue is a card to be played in foreign policy, regional affairs and, at long last, in a bid to clinging to power by any means necessary. In fairness it should be noted that other Arab states have also tried to manipulate the Palestinian issue to similar ends, although none with the same intensity and harm caused by that of Syria. It's also worth noting that almost none of the Arab states have had any comment on the brutal suppression of the Syrian uprising by the regime, and that includes the Palestinian national leadership.
 
Were the regime to survive its present extreme difficulties, it is almost certain that the rhetorical recognition of an independent Palestine would prove as cosmetic as Syria's recognition of Lebanese independence. In neither case have the regime and its supporters truly accepted that these are independent societies and states, and in both cases efforts to exercise Syrian hegemony, at an absolute minimum, over their leaderships and decision-making is virtually guaranteed. And so is a determination to continue to "valiantly fight" against Israel… at least until the last child in Gaza and southern Lebanon, that is.

Male hysteria in the bell tower: Buñuel’s El as the primary source for Hitchcock’s Vertigo

Alfred Hitchcock's 1958 masterpiece Vertigo has been the subject of so much commentary and analysis — especially since its re-release in 1983 after it had been removed from circulation for 10 years along with four other Hitchcock classics — that it is extremely difficult to write or even think anything new about the film. Some would say that it's been done to death (“oh God, not another Vertigo essay,” etc.). However, I'm about to undertake that quixotic mission not once, but twice, on the Ibishblog (hopefully in rapid succession), and this is my first offering on the subject.

What I'm suggesting here, in a nutshell, is that the (as far as I can tell) completely overlooked primary source outside of Hitchcock's own work for Vertigo is Luis Buñuel's 1953 classic El, one of the earlier of his quasi-surrealistic Mexican melodramas that have received far too little attention in critical circles. I don't think there's any doubt that Hitchcock and Buñuel were keen observers and admirers of each other's work, and the parallels between the two films are extremely profound. Both deal with male hysteria about women and loss of identity as a primary theme and have crucial sequences involving jealous, controlling men throwing, or threatening to throw, the women they seek to possess from colonial Spanish-style bell towers. Of course one can't, and I don't intend by any means, to simply let that observation stand as a case on its own, but it surely qualifies as exceptionally powerful prima facie evidence of a deep connection between the two films.

El and Vertigo share a common theme, one that is a major feature of art throughout the ages, and deeply connected to cinema in particular: male hysteria. In most cinema, the possessing, devouring (and often murderous) gaze is implicitly male, its fixation the fetishized, objectified female form. Male hysteria, in this case, refers not simply to neurotic symptoms, but to those directly connected to male anxiety about women: control and possession of women, the psychic and social implications of such control, and its powerful role in the construction and maintenance of an illusory sense of male identity and ego. It reflects, of course, not only the loss of identity but also the threat of emasculation. Historically hysteria was considered entirely a feminine phenomenon, for many centuries beginning with the ancient Greeks, linked to the bizarre notion that the womb itself as an organ (hystera in ancient Greek) could actually physically relocate itself for various reasons, creating physical and behavioral symptoms. Before Charcot and especially Freud, these notions persisted although there was a brief period of recognition of male hysteria in the 18th century, especially in Britain, when it was described as “the English Malady.”

In spite of the resistance from general culture and medical thought to embrace the concept of male hysteria until the 20th century, it's been a consistent theme of art since ancient times. In his invaluable book Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness (Harvard University Press, 2009), Mark S. Micale listed writers such as Burton, Shakespeare, Mandeville, Hume, Cheyne (author of The English Malady), Johnson, Wordsworth, Mill, and Flaubert as notable investigators of male hysteria and its various symptoms. I'd argue the list is actually far longer, and includes most of the canonical writers of Western classical literature, the Renaissance and all stages of modernity and postmodernity. In other words, in my view, the theme is virtually ubiquitous.

However, there is a particular affinity between the cinematic medium and the theme of male hysteria, particularly because of the centrality of the power of the gaze. In the outstanding essay, Male Hysteria and Early Cinema, Lynne Kirby examines the way in which Hale's Tours in the first few years of the 20th century used early cinematic train images to provoke fear and fascination with the new medium in the audiences. Both cinema and train travel, when first introduced, created widespread anxiety and even panic. The combination was irresistible. The shock of cinema was invoked to re-create the shock of train travel, often to devastating effect. Kirby argues that the train-related hysteria experienced by late 19th-century males was a key factor in permanently demolishing the idea that hysteria was exclusively a female phenomenon, and that the obsession of early cinema with the train as an instrument of trauma links film directly to that realization.

She appropriately quotes Walter Benjamin as noting that, “film is the art form that is in keeping with the increased threat to his life that modern man has to face. Man's need to expose himself to shock effects is his adjustment to the dangers threatening him. The film corresponds to profound changes in the apperceptive apparatus – changes that are experienced on the individual level by the man in the street in big-city traffic, on the historical scale by every present-day citizen.” Kirby suggests that cinema itself, at its earliest stages, produced de-gendered subjectivities in audiences: passive, traumatized, “feminized” male viewers and “masculinized” women. The intimate connection between the medium and this cultural crisis of patriarchy is fully played out in both El and Vertigo.

Hitchcock was an obsessive watcher of other people's films. He had a miniature cinema in his own home and, by all accounts, watched a new movie almost every night. His debt to Eisenstein is completely obvious and he acknowledged that on many occasions. There are other instances of direct influence that are quite obvious, and I think Luis Buñuel is a rather obvious case in point. In the 40s, Hitchcock composed a dream sequence in Spellbound with Buñuel's early collaborator and friend Salvador Dalí, which is in many ways interesting but also profoundly disappointing. The two were not a great fit artistically, for obvious reasons. Hitchcock was not a surrealist, while Dalí was only a surrealist, even in his “paranoid” period of paintings that can exhibit at least two distinct images depending on how they are viewed. Buñuel was not particularly well-known or admired in the United States during his period of exile from fascist Spain in Mexico during the 1950s, in which he made primarily surrealist-tinged melodramas. Without going into any details beyond the comparison I'm making here, I think it's obvious that a great exception was Hitchcock, who obviously admired his fellow master filmmaker.

El investigates a somewhat different version of male hysteria from Vertigo. El is about jealousy and paranoia that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: an easily accomplished union destroyed by almost deliberate self-sabotage. Vertigo is about fantasy and longing for an unattainable object, an object that is a construct of the mind of the delusional Scottie Ferguson and that he inevitably destroys. In El the destruction is aimed at the self and the relationship; in Vertigo it is aimed equally at the object and the self, in a total obliteration of any form of rational coherence. Yet both films are about the inability of a male protagonist to control a female object of desire. In both films, neurotic symptoms give way to deeper, underlying delusions and, ultimately, outright psychosis (that, at the end, we understand was there from the beginning). Their subject matters are therefore not precisely the same, but rather parallel and complementary.

However, there are strong indications that El served very directly as the primary antecedent for Vertigo. A great deal of work has been done in cataloging the influences on and sources for Vertigo, but if anyone has included Buñuel's 1953 classic, I'm not aware of it. For example Ken Mogg's essay The Fragments of the Mirror: Vertigo and its Sources exhaustively looks at potential influences on Hitchcock's masterpiece, but makes no mention of El. This is remarkable because on one obvious point, there is no mistaking the connection.

No image is more closely associated with Vertigo than that of the bell tower at the Mission San Juan Batista, a set constructed by Henry Bumstead, Hitchcock's brilliant art director on the film (and several others). Both Madeline and Judy die by falling from the bell tower. Indeed, it's impossible to think of Vertigo without immediately thinking of various images inside and outside of the bell tower, in particular the shattering final shot of Scotty standing, arms outstretched in limp defeat, as he looks down on the consequences of his crazed, careening set of maniacal actions.

El opens with credits that are entirely shot over the image of a bell in a bell tower. This is not any old bell tower, this is one in Mexico, as the Mission San Juan Bautista would essentially have been during the “old California days” before the territory became part of the United States. Madeline tells Scotty when she first describes the scene that it is a “village in Spain.” Indeed not. It is a village in Mexico. Not only do the two films share this iconic image as a defining motif, Buñuel gives us a template for the deaths of both Judy and Madeline. And it's impossible not to note that in both films, religion is associated with obsession, sexuality, danger and death. The bell tower, after all, is the highest point, the extremity, of a church, and source of the call to the faithful to attend prayers, but in these films it is also the scene murder, mayhem and symbolic rape. The suggestion, of course, is that taken to its extreme, like all obsessions, religion is a powerfully destructive force.

The opening sequence of El, which is an elaborate set piece during a high mass in a grand Catholic church (likely to appeal to Hitchcock's deeply Catholic sensibilities), is, in spite of the ambient noise of the service, essentially an exercise in what Hitchcock called “pure cinema.” It relies entirely on framing, montage and camera movement to tell the story, rather brilliantly, and there is no way that the artist responsible for the "pure cinema" of, for example, Marnie's deft escape from the Rutland office in spite of the cleaners would not have admired this. Buñuel was probably as much of a devotee of “pure cinema” as Hitchcock, and both of them have significant passages in almost all their films of it.

The scene depicts the sexually fetishistic and indeed masochistic ritual washing of the feet of pretty young altar boys by the priest, Padre Velasco, all officiated by rather pompous lay helpers including our protagonist. The scene is not only fetishistic, but ritualistic and extremely theatrical, with numerous shots of huge crowds in the cathedral straining to look at the priest's abjection before the novices whose feet he is worshiping. The most fetishistic image of all is the symmetrical row of bare novice feet waiting to be washed and kissed. The foot fetish theme, observed and aided by Francisco, who is one of the deacons whose job is to pour the water into the basins with which each quasi-catamite foot is cleansed and adored, is then repeated by him as he turns and casts his gaze across the row of feet among the worshipers. The shot pans over an analogous, echoing, row of them, only to return (in a classic Buñuel camera movement) quickly to a pretty pair of young, elegantly clad extremities. A similar “pure cinema” gesture is repeated in Buñuel's much later masterpiece Belle du Jour, as the unnamed title character's feet are shown drawn to, recoiling from, and then drawn back to the fetishistic brothel in which she eventually prostitutes herself.

At this point in El, the camera pans up, revealing an elegant, demure young woman who apparently immediately captures Francisco's imagination. At his possessive gaze, which she does not return or seem to acknowledge at first, she looks down, demurely, as if embarrassed by his sudden attention. Her gaze slowly rises to meet his intense stare. An obsession has begun. In an important contextualizing shot, the camera pulls back through the crowd in the cathedral, leaving the scene of fetishistic sexual/religious ritual and the instant attraction it seems to have engendered between the to-be couple, re-emphasizing the social gaze and the religious context of permissible fixation in which the drama is taking place.

The differences between Francisco's obsession with Gloria and Scottie's obsession with Madeline are obvious. In El, it is religiously and culturally inflected if not determined, whereas in Vertigo it is, to some extent at least, constructed by a deliberate criminal conspiracy. But there are some crucial similarities. One of the most important of these parallel themes is the tendency of both Francisco and Scotty to view Gloria and Madeline/Judy as disembodied objects, focusing on discrete aspects of their physiology or attire as their essential attributes. Francisco has a foot fetish. Scotty has a hair fetish. Scotty is fascinated by Madeleine's spiral hairdo, and it is the final flourish in his remaking of Judy into Madeleine: he cannot have her hair done in any other way. Elster calls his attention to it as well. There's also the repeated fetishistic focus on Carlotta's necklace, and, in the eeriest scene of all in Vertigo, the close-up shots of the lips, nails and hair of Judy as she is being re-transformed into Madeleine on the obsessive, hysterical instructions of Scotty.

The two characters have a marked tendency to obsess about the discrete parts of the female objects of their desire, as opposed to the person as a whole who seems irrelevant, uninteresting, unfinished or unsatisfactory. Everything must be right, but the discrete elements are individually greater than the sum of those parts. An anti-Gestalt is in effect. Even when Judy is finally and apparently satisfactorily recreated as Madeline — and a whole greater than the sum of its parts seems at last to have been achieved for Scotty — Carlotta's necklace — the ultimate fetishistic object in Vertigo — asserts its primacy and shatters the cumulative effect of the summation of the parts. Leaping off of the mirror in his gaze, coming to life from his dream, this fragmentary object single-handedly destroys his illusion and undoes the campaign to reimagine Judy as Madeline. There is much more to be said about this moment and this object in another essay, but what is important to note here is that in both of these films the synecdoches are invariably much more important than the totality of the desired other.

Francisco sees Gloria from afar in formal settings, many of them religious or reverential. She appears aloof, demure and inaccessible, but also caught up in the semi-spontaneous and un-staged impromptu moment in a theatrical environment supposedly not designed to produce this effect. She refuses his initial advance, registering a degree of shock at his boldness in a holy place, as he extends his hand to her and she walks off with an older woman, presumably her mother. Madeline, on the other hand, seems uncannily unaware of Scotty's rather unmistakable and barely disguised presence as he follows her around San Francisco on her merry dance, spiraling downward into himself. As he leaves the church in an effort to follow the two women, Francisco is briefly waylaid by Velasco and two other priests. When he tells them he must go do something “important,” Velasco admonishes him that, “if it's important, it's not good for Christians!” He has been warned.

Francisco lives in a bizarre house that is one third gothic, one third Art Nouveau and one third Antonio Gaudi. It doesn't have any analogues in Vertigo, certainly not Scottie's apartment, unless it is the sheer weirdness of Scotty's own mind. But it does call to mind, to some extent, Manderley in Hitchcock's first American movie Rebecca, and its “Alice in Wonderland” disproportionality between various figures, especially the young wife, and the exaggerated physical dimensions of the dwelling itself. In this case the strangeness of the flowing fixtures are another element. They certainly represent the odd amalgam of incongruous, warped ideas at war in Francisco's brain.

In Vertigo, these are expressed more directly in Scotty's actions, visions and delusions. In El, they are manifested in the physical structure itself, although perhaps it could be argued that the weird, spiraling, undulating landscape of San Francisco itself is Hitchcock's larger analogous framework to Francisco's house (in this sense, Scotty's home is not Francisco's, but San Francisco). This is, of course, emphasized by the idiotic priest Velasco's declaration that the house's architect, apparently guided by “sentiment, emotion and instinct… not reason,” must have been the opposite of Francisco who is so “normal and levelheaded.” This echoes Elster's disingenuous description of Scotty as the “hardheaded Scot,” when, of course, he is the ultimate romantic, and indeed delusional, ultimately, psychotically so. Both of these men have cultivated a manifest appearance of normalcy, levelheadedness and rationality, but both of them are in the grip of profoundly irrational, neurotic and indeed psychotic impulses.

Between the protagonists in El and Vertigo, there is a marked class difference. Francisco is fantastically wealthy, much closer to Gavin Elster, whom he somewhat resembles physically. Scotty is a man of “fairly independent means,” meaning he can freely retire from the police force and offer to support Judy, but he lives modestly, drives a middle-class car and shows no evidence of extravagance. Francisco is obsessed with his supposedly lost land in Guanajuato, and this drives his manifest neurosis, behind which lurks a more malevolent, misogynistic and psychotic streak. Scotty's neurotic symptom is acrophobia, the fear of heights, his vertigo, which is the screen behind which his own misogyny and psychosis lurks from the very beginning. So while their manifest symptoms and psychopathologies are very different, Francisco and Scotty share some deep-seated latent pathological tendencies that link the two films' images and concerns. Francisco's obsession, like Scotty's, is deeply rooted in the early 19th century, in this case his alleged ownership of large areas of Guanajuato, and in Vertigo the urban legend/historical legacy of the mad Carlotta and her unnamed lover/abuser. Both men are obsessed by the past of old Mexico and California, a Spanish colonial legacy and familial past that haunts them in their hysterical male fantasies of possession and desire.

Francisco is a control and neat freak about everything. Scotty is fastidious and careful, and obsessively controlling with Madeline and above all Judy, but mess and clutter don't seem to bother him. Scotty also seems to be satisfied with vague accounts of the urban legend of Carlotta, while Francisco is insistent on the details of documents so old (his lawyer tells him they are, after all, early 19th-century deeds) that they are no longer legally enforceable. Yet the need to control the narratives swirling around and haunting them, and through which they define their identities, is a powerful analog between the two characters. Both are repeatedly advised to leave well enough alone. Neither is capable of doing so, and take great offense at their allies who suggest it.

When Francisco enters the church for the second time, in a repetition compulsion looking for Gloria, he enters a very similar space in a very similar way as Scotty does in his entrance to the old chapel at the Mission Dolores while following Madeleine into the cemetery garden. The shot is extremely similar, even eerily so, and both are accompanied by haunting organ music. He stares at her from behind, with her hair done up in a bun, reminiscent of Scotty looking at Madeleine at the Palace of the Legion of Honor. But in this case, rather than being icily and preposterously indifferent to his presence, Gloria feels his gaze immediately, and becomes perceptibly excited and/or uncomfortable by it. She deliberately leans back to hear what it is he has to say to her. This is not the undead, aloof, ghostly ice queen Madeline. This is a warm-blooded woman who responds to male approaches, whatever the outcome might be.

Francisco confesses he's been coming to the church on a daily and nightly basis (though his role in the opening scene suggests he might be doing that anyway), on the grounds that he's been waiting for her to return. Repetition compulsion is in the air. She turns with her hand on her heart, apparently affected, and looks at him with wild-eyed amazement. She leaves quickly, but he follows her out and makes his pitch. She says she can't see him anymore, and the chase is on. His car follows hers, as Scottie follows Madeleine. In another instance of Hitchcockian or, Buñuel-esque, “pure cinema” Francisco observes Gloria meeting in a restaurant with her fiancé from outside the window. Her back is to him, just as Madeleine's is to Scottie in his first sighting of her at Ernie's restaurant. The affect is similar: jealousy, plotting, and a desire for possession.

Francisco knows and goes to visit the fiancé, who is an engineer at a construction company, and like Gavin he builds things (he calls the damn he's working on, “a hopelessly complicated job,” as Francisco's project also proves to be), although in this case it is Francisco who is constructing something. In Vertigo, Elster's shipbuilding construction is a metaphorical invocation of his elaborate murder plot, subtly in motion in the background of his first conversation with Scotty in his office. Francisco invites them both, and her mother, to come to a dinner party at his surrealistic mansion. Gloria is taken aback by Francisco's appearance as the host. As part of his pitch over dinner to Gloria, Francisco launches into a soliloquy about love at first sight, or more properly, the "amour fou" that was so beloved of the original Surrealists, including Buñuel. He insists that love cannot be built over time, but is immediate; that it emerges between people in an instant, and is instinctive, irrational, and, implicitly, self-destructive. Naturally he says this looking directly at Gloria. Another of the guests describes this as “a poisoned arrow.”

This also, apparently, is Scotty's view. His rational choice would have been Midge, or anybody else. Yet he is drawn instinctively to a woman who doesn't exist, seems to be insane and suicidal, is certainly at least completely disturbed, and who he believes is already married to an old school chum. His infatuation couldn't be more absurd or false, but it appears utterly irresistible and instantaneous. So obviously, Francisco and Scotty have similar perspectives on the matter of romance. Francisco thinks the love for a woman is “nurtured from infancy, and that a man walks past 1,000 women then suddenly meets one… that instinctive one! She fulfills a dream, answers the longing, this is a man's lifetime wish.” This might have been Scottie speaking at Ernie's.

As the party continues, Gloria is aware of Francisco's devouring, ravenous gaze and is both excited and alarmed by it. At the moment of her discomfort, the scene is disrupted by a commotion and explosion of dust from a storage room as Francisco's butler is trying to uncover a bridge table. This cluttered, dirty, profane interior space recalls the storage room behind the flower shop which is the first place Madeline leads Scotty — and also the outer portion of the fruit cellar in Psycho — a physical manifestation of the sudden, unexpected and unwelcome uncovering of a long-forgotten, polluted and filthy psychic interior – the return of the repressed indeed. As Francisco orders the butler out and the clouds of dust begin to settle, the piles of junk in the room appropriately collapse in ruins.

Francisco emerges to find Gloria staring out of one of the warped windows into the garden. He approaches her from behind, and the camera jumps to the other side of the window, looking at their conversation through the glass darkly. They converse animatedly and excitedly, but all we can hear is the distant piano playing from within. Their conversation is withheld, another gesture of “pure cinema,” and reminiscent of numerous scenes in Hitchcock films in which diagetic dialogue is deliberately, tantalizingly withheld from us. The most obvious example of this in the later Hitchcock classics from the 1950s is in the film immediately following Vertigo, North by Northwest, in which a very important dialogue between Thornhill and "The Professor" is suddenly and ostentatiously obscured by the roar of airplane engines. There are aspects of what is going on that we can only understand at most through our gaze, through the camera lens, and not through any dialogue. Words have been transcended, and deliberately withheld. Both Francisco and Gloria seem excited and even transported, though the asymmetrical and warped quality of the window is heavily foregrounded, and each is depicted in a separate, barred space as if in two separate frames, or two separate connected but unbridgeable spaces.

He passes around her from behind and opens the door to the garden. With their emergence into this space, dominated by ominous life-size statues of praying monks, (foreshadowing Francisco's own wretched and self-created fate), the dialogue resumes. He tells Gloria that his grandfather built the house there because he liked to live near the trees, and she says, “something in me loves trees, too.” Madeleine, in contrast, hates the giant redwood trees, because they tell her that she knows she has to die. But in this case, Francisco and Gloria have found one more thing, other than Catholicism and repetition compulsion, they share in common. Little else will emerge as the plot continues. Francisco grabs her and the two kiss passionately, followed by a fade to black. This is immediately succeeded by dramatic images of construction site explosions and giant rising cranes, the kind of "cheap Freudian joke" Hitchcock engaged in frequently and also publicly derided in himself. The most obvious examples are probably the fireworks during the kiss in To Catch a Thief and the inexcusable and notorious final shot in North by Northwest. Neither of these auteurs trafficked greatly in psychoanalytic subtlety.

It becomes clear that while the dam project has run into significant difficulties, so have the fiancée's plans to marry Gloria. He must return to the capital, but he wishes he never has to, and we already know why. Driving through Mexico City, he almost runs over a harried, dilapidated looking woman, who turns out to be Gloria. She seems horrified and afraid to see him, and turns away, but he is delighted and approaches her. As she explains she doesn't feel well, a large sign in the background reads “Bambi,” another not particularly subtle reference (Disney made that film more than ten years earlier, in 1942). On second thought she accepts a ride from him, in spite of her obvious fear, and on the ride she begins a long film noir-style flashback narrative.

She explains that her marriage went wrong on the very first night, as they travelled by train to Guanajuato (the site of his manifest obsession and hysteria) for their honeymoon. In a scene that is the inverse of the dreadful rape scene in Marnie, on the train Francisco immediately accuses her of thinking of other people and, in effect, being unfaithful. He withholds his affections in a cold, cruel and aloof manner. In the classic paranoid style, he takes her denials to be further evidence of his suspicions of her infidelity. Initiating a recurring pattern of hot/cold male hysteria, he awakens in the night to beg her forgiveness. She grants it without question with a passionate kiss, and onrushing train shots represent both the sexual implications repeatedly invoked by train shots in North by Northwest, and the careening, unstoppable nature of his hysteria. It also, of course, reminds us of the link between male hysteria, trains and the cinema established by Kirby.

The sweeping landscape panoramas of Guanajuato during the honeymoon scenes are highly reminiscent of the loving shots of San Francisco in Vertigo, especially when Scotty supposedly emerges from his catatonic melancholia after the inquest into Madeline's death. Yet Francisco remains largely obsessed with what he thinks belongs to his family, determined to possess what he believes is “rightfully” his, in both land and people. His manifest mania is for “justice,” and so is that of the former police detective and would-be chief of police, Scottie Ferguson in Vertigo. Both, of course, are in fact the agents of the most grotesque injustice, to themselves and to all those around them. In Guanajuato, Gloria meets an old acquaintance, and Francisco's suspicions began to run wild instantaneously. Many of the buildings in old Guanajuato are deeply reminiscent of the "old San Francisco" edifices that characterize both Elster's fantasy world created for Scotty and the scenes of his encounters with Madeline. The low-shot framing of the characters against the buildings is extremely similar, as if they were dominated and haunted by constructions of the past.

Francisco tells Gloria that he is most attracted to her “kindness and air of resignation” (whatever the latter might mean), but she tells him that her mother thought “the opposite,” without elaborating. She says, ironically, that she was most attracted by his “self-assurance,” the one quality he least possesses in reality. She does say, when pressed, that she finds him sometimes “unfair,” an accusation already manifestly demonstrated in word and deed. It couldn't be better calculated to offend a man whose manifest obsession is with “justice,” and he insists few men possess as a keen sense of it is he does. He takes the inevitable degree of umbrage, and this is reinforced by the appearance of the acquaintance at another table nearby. Demonstrating her point, he rushes to the conclusion that she may well be being stalked by the other man (who he also thinks is laughing at him, when he shares a joke with the waiter), which not only undermines Francisco's claim to a keen sense of fairness and justice, but also is an expression of his own stalking inclinations (which he shares with Scotty) and his acute paranoia. Other men are trying to steal his lands and his woman. He is characterized almost entirely by an exceptional degree of hysterical jealousy and possessiveness.

Once back in the room, his foot fetishism and obsessive/compulsive disorder reassert themselves when he picks up her shoes from the floor and lovingly puts them in the closet, rearranging them at the last second facing forward just as they were when he first saw her feet in the cathedral. When he discovers the acquaintance has the adjoining room, he becomes enraged and picks a fight with a man, leading to the acquaintance's ignominious expulsion from the hotel. In his rage, Francisco blames Gloria for everything, and she says the rest of the honeymoon was without any happiness. Upon their return, Francisco doesn't let her see anyone, including her own mother.

One day he unexpectedly bursts into her room in a good mood, presenting her a birthday present and ecstatically extolling the virtues of his new lawyer, who he is sure will be able to finally win his quixotic lawsuit. He announces the man is coming to dinner and orders her to be a perfect hostess, paying close attention to the main guest. Again, the framing divides them between windowpanes that are warped and twisted, and with theatrical curtains for effect. At the party, Francisco demands that Gloria pay close attention to the young lawyer, but inevitably becomes extremely jealous as they socialize and dance together. The lawyer tells her that the case is extremely difficult and that Francisco's optimism is ungrounded, totally contradicting what he has been saying all day. However, Padre Velasco does contrast the supposedly salacious way (it doesn't appear so to us) the lawyer is dancing with Gloria, noting that she is a married woman, with the "proper" manner Francisco is dancing with his partner (in whom he has no interest). There does seem to be an attenuated attraction between them, but no real reason for concern… yet.

The two go into the garden, on the same path that Francisco led Gloria when he first wooed her, between the twin statues of the reverent monks, although in this case other people are also present. When the butler tells Francisco they have gone into the garden, his reaction is palpable dismay, even though he virtually ensured and demanded that outcome. That night she is plainly excitedly preparing for a sexual encounter, but again he withholds his affections, going into his room and locking the door behind him. It is evidently a cruel punishment for a vivacious young woman. It is the beginning of a campaign of ignoring her consistently.

The spell is broken by the return of his incessant masochistic foot fetish, when at dinner after continuing to pretend she doesn't exist, he drops something, looks down and sees her feet. He arises with a look of affection and desire, which provokes an immediate positive response in her. The hot tap is on again, and he kisses her passionately, claiming he will “forget everything,” even though, as she professes, she has "done nothing” to forgive. She protests that the dinner table is not the time and place for such passion, and he immediately accuses her of being infatuated with the lawyer.

That night, the household is awakened in the wee hours by the sounds of her screaming and crying. It's evident some sort of sadistic exercise is taking place, although the nature of it is entirely unclear. Whatever is happening, Francisco's male hysteria is wreaking some kind of terrible vengeance on Gloria, much as Scotty's hysteria is unleashed on Judy in the second bell tower scene at the end of Vertigo. The next day, Gloria tries to enlist her mother's help but Francisco has already intercepted the mother, and frames matters in a way which induces her to admonish Gloria to understand his jealousies and “be good to him,” even after Gloria shows her a bruise on her upper arm. She has a similar experience with Padre Velasco.

When she returns from her meeting with the priest, who was also pre-prepared by Francisco, he follows her into her room armed with a gun. He shoots her point blank, but with blanks, just as Eve Kendall does with Roger Thornhill in North by Northwest. The campaign of terror continues, in the vain effort to exercise total control both over another person and over wild, self-fulfilling paranoid fantasies. She tells her ex-fiancé that after the fake shooting, he “seemed like a different man” and the hot tap began to run again. But, she says, the worst happened that morning. The flashback continues with Francisco ranting on the phone with his new lawyer about the case, insisting that something must be done to win the unwinnable suit. She wants to visit her mother, but he says he needs her by his side, and tells her he's going to take her to “a wonderful place.” And here begins the greatest parallel between Vertigo and El.

This marvelous space turns out to be… a bell tower. The first shot of it is the same one that dominates the credits, looking directly up, vertiginously, into the heart of a giant bell. He drags her down, not up, a short flight of stairs, to look at the people far below. He describes them as “worms that could be squashed in an instant,” recalling both the "god's eye" shots from far above the bell tower in Vertigo immediately after Madeline's death in which Scotty appears as a tiny figure exiting the building to the extreme lower right of the frame, and also the image of Roger Thornhill fleeing the UN building after the murder of Lester Townsend. Francisco praises his own egoism and says if he were God, “I would destroy them all.”

She runs away from him to stand immediately under the largest bell, and he goes to her and tells her that since they are alone “no one could stop me from pushing you.” “What if I took you by the neck and I threw you all the way down?” he asks her, leaping upon her in a rape-like action that seems a prelude to an actual murder. In the struggle, he tells her he could be “sending you hurtling down against the sidewalk!” If this isn't the strongest possible and most immediate antecedent in any work of art I have ever encountered to the deaths of both Madeleine and Judy, I can't imagine what would be (the dragging of Judy up the steps has a rape-like quality as well). She struggles away from him and descends the spiral staircase as the bells toll ominously in the background. Francisco collapses, utterly defeated, and, although sitting, in a rather similar stance of utter confusion to that of Scotty in the shattering final shot of Vertigo, also in a bell tower with tolling in the background.

The flashback is ended, and her former fiancé tells her she seems to enjoy suffering, which at this point is fair enough, and consistent with the unrelenting sadomasochistic nature of this narrative. The same might be said of Scotty and Judy, if not all the main characters in Vertigo. The ex-fiancée says she has ample grounds to leave him, but she says she can't but doesn't know why. He promises to help her in any way he can, and she leaves to go back in the house, but we can see that Francisco has observed who has brought her home. The ex-fiancée and Gloria both appear as tiny figures in the distance, exactly the sort of entities that Francisco, were he God, would like to “squash.” He confronts her, she admits that her ex-fiancé brought her home, and Francisco accuses her of being a slut. She declares that this is the final straw, and she only wishes it were true because he deserves it.

In his utter despair, sure she has been unfaithful to him, Francisco is framed in the bars of the railings of the staircase of his house, a very familiar//// image William Rothman brilliantly established as a Hitchcockian motif of being barred, trapped and psychically inaccessible in his masterpiece of cinematic criticism The Murderous Gaze. The most obvious analog in late Hitchcock is Lila Crane, framed behind similar wooden posts at the top of the staircase to the fruit cellar in Psycho hiding from Norman, yet inextricably pulled towards her confrontation with “mother.” Francisco collapses while going up the staircase, pulls out one of the carpet rods and, in a bizarre and infantile display of maniacal repetition compulsion begins beating out an inane repetitive rhythm against the staircase. A very deep shot of the giant room is streaked with night shadows that form a perfect //// pattern. Whatever the nature of his psychosis, it is approaching its very apex. Gloria, hearing the racket, wisely locks her bedroom door.

The next morning, Francisco is in the grip of a neurotic writer's block: he feels a compulsive need to write a letter to the governor demanding “justice” in his lawsuit, but cannot compose it. He induces Gloria to write it on the grounds that she is as familiar with the details of the case as he is. She dutifully begins, but he stops her, saying that it is too humiliating. He tries to do it himself, but again proves impotent. They determine to write it together, but by dinnertime when the butler asks if they want to eat, it appears she is composing it entirely on her own. The hot tap comes on full again, and Francisco begs forgiveness in an abject manner, telling her the letter doesn't matter and that he has been making her miserable. She assures him she doesn't hate him and he begs her not to leave. He tells her he understands that she would confide in her fiancée out of desperation. She says she didn't want to but she had no choice. He becomes utterly enraged, and says this is the one thing he could never forgive, the cold tap now running at full freezing level.

That night, Francisco prepares a most gruesome and classically Buñuelian male hysterical plot. At the stroke of midnight he prepares a palette of grisly instruments: bandages, gauze, alcohol, razors, scissors, twine and a large needle, fastidiously arranged needless to say. Placing these items in the pocket of his dressing gown, he picks up two large strands of heavy rope, each tied into large nooses. His intention is not mysterious, no matter how grisly it might be. This concept, which in the works of the Marquis de Sade (Justine, to be precise) is been described as “stricturing," the sewing up of the vagina, is a recurrent theme in the films of Buñuel, an impulse he plainly felt was the ultimate expression of male hysteria and desire to control women (Buñuel was a great admirer of de Sade, like all the early Surrealists, and especially 120 Days of Sodom). The nooses, though plainly intended as an instrument of restraint, of course also invoke murder and hanging. As he approaches Gloria's bed, the noose fills the screen, emphasizing again the murderous, life-obliterating quality of the intended act. As he attempts to place the noose-restraints around her wrists in preparation for his grisly operation, she awakens with an appropriately terrified response of screaming and fighting back. The servants are roused. Francisco recovers the evidence of his attempted crime, and flees the room but collapses in hysterics on the ground of his own bedroom, sobbing inconsolably and beating the floor like a child.

While this concept is present in a number of Buñuel films, he mercifully never allowed it to actually be enacted, much in the same way he prevented the trapped aristocrats in The Exterminating Angel from actually descending to the point of cannibalism, something he later said he regretted. How far one should go with these gruesome tropes is hard to gauge, but Buñuel's repeated reference to the idea is plenty for me. Indeed, the original French poster for his last masterpiece, That Obscure Object of Desire, features a pair of female facial lips crudely sewn together with twine. It's an arresting image, and probably as much as I'd ever want to see, although I will admit to owning an original copy of the first French poster. If it were not a metaphor, I wouldn't want to see it, let alone own it. So, if Buñuel can be accused of a certain diffidence, cowardice, and even a lack of courage, in this case that's what I appreciate. The suggestion is more than enough, thank you very much. Much the same can be said about all the intimations about necrophilia in Vertigo. The idea is there, but the act is not, and we should all be grateful for that.

Francisco is awakened to the news that his wife has fled, loads his gun, and goes off in pursuit of her about the town. In his quest, Francisco is pursued and preceded by giant shadows of himself, doppelgängers come to life more extravagantly than ever, and imagines that random servants are laughing at him when they clearly are not. The total psychotic break has certainly occurred, or at least reached its apex. He believes he spots her in a car, and in a perfect repetition of his initial pursuit of her by taxi, he jumps in a cab and orders the driver to follow her. The repetition compulsion motif is another very clear linkage between the male hysteria in El and Vertigo. The lost object is to be found by retracing steps and reenacting initial gestures. Scotty also repeatedly mistakes vaguely similar women in familiar spaces for Madeline, though they really do not resemble her at all. Francisco follows what he believes to be Gloria and her ex-fiancé into the same cathedral he first saw her, fondling his gun. He confronts the couple, but it is not her. Like Scotty after the death of Madeline, he has seen the lost object in all kinds of vaguely reminiscent distant images.

Francisco collapses in despair, but when an old man walks by him and coughs, it sets off a chain reaction of him imagining the entire church alternately laughing at him, coughing, and cutting back to normalcy. Many make horned gestures, the signs of the cuckold. This seems to have influenced a culminating scene in Roman Polanski's third installment in his claustrophobic trilogy, The Tenant. It also invokes Shakespeare's most extreme example of male hysteria, Leontes in The Winter's Tale, with his repetitive, thumping, pounding declaration of false cuckolding and horns: "Inch-thick, knee-deep, o'er head andears a fork'd one!" Francisco even believes that Padre Velasco is mocking him, and attacks the priest, turning on everything he supposedly believes in and destroying his carefully crafted public image of piety and respectability.

The dénouement of El features Gloria, a young boy (obviously her son), and a man who is not immediately identifiable approaching a monastery. Cassock-clad monks wander around, like the statues from Francisco's garden suddenly come to life. She is with Raul — her ex-fiancé, and now clearly her husband — and their seven or eight-year-old boy. They receive an exemplary report about the behavior of Francisco from the prior, who is surprised to discover they have named their son Francisco. Interestingly, when the monk asks if it is their son, they avoid the question and leave. He may be named Francisco because he is Francisco's.

Wandering again in the maze-like church garden, at least somewhat reminiscent of the graveyard at the Mission Dolores in Vertigo, the prior meets Francisco, who asks him if the visitors have left. He says he saw them and asks if it was “the engineer” and his wife, and if that was their son. He is told it was indeed. In a perfect Buñuelian ironic gesture, Francisco claims ultimate vindication: “then I wasn't as mixed up as they claimed. Time has proven my point!” He winds his way down a garden path towards a black hole in an ivy covered wall, veering wildly from side to side, like one of the statues from his garden come to life, totally obliterated in identity and unable to keep anything straight, including his own path.

Gloria and her husband had asked if he was going to be admitted into the order, and were assured by the prior that he was not suitable material. Francisco is no longer Francisco, and not even a Franciscan. He is reduced to nothing. He continues to veer wildly towards oblivion, and the music includes very loud and striking bell tones, much like the final passages in Bernard Herrmann's score of Vertigo. The film fades to black. (Several pieces of music in El echo Herrmann's magnificent score. There is a swirling passage in the otherwise unremarkable opening credits of El with its bell tower backdrop that sounds very reminiscent of a recurring motif in Vertigo. The piano music that is being played towards the end of Francisco's first dinner party in which he tries to win over Gloria as he walks over to the piano near where she is standing is also extremely reminiscent of the Wagnerian Liebestod quotations in the theme for the "love" sequences in Vertigo.)

Much like Scotty at the end of Vertigo, Francisco is staring into oblivion. He has lost his identity. His worst fears, self-created and self-inflicted, have come to life. He can claim vindication, but at what cost? His neuroses were a cover for a much deeper psychosis. His male hysteria, which seemed to be aimed at female targets, emerges as more of a self-directed, self-inflicted self-destruction. There is nothing of the old Francisco left, just as at the end of Vertigo, Scotty looks down from the edge of the bell tower into the abyss, into oblivion. Both films end abruptly with the male hysteric heading towards a black hole of nothingness, having lost their identity, and having consumed themselves in mania.

With a few exceptions, Buñuel's Mexican melodramas during his exile from fascist Spain are greatly underappreciated globally, and especially in the United States. The proto-feminist classic Susanna; his Mexican version of Wuthering Heights, Abismos de pasión, by far the best film adaptation of that novel (not even available on DVD in our own Region One at present, which is a scandal); and, of course, El, among many others are, in effect, forgotten masterpieces. But I think it highly unlikely that as attentive and obsessive a student of cinema as Hitchcock was disinterested in the great films Buñuel was producing in Mexico in the 1950s. While I can't demonstrate with any certainty that Hitchcock watched El before constructing Vertigo I find it almost impossible to believe that he didn't. The parallels are overwhelming, and if it is coincidental, it falls in the category of uncanny synchronistic phenomena, more than anything else.

There's no doubt at all that the differences in the films are more striking than the similarities. In no way could it be argued that Hitchcock “ripped off” Buñuel in Vertigo. Hitchcock's film could not have been more personal, idiosyncratic or unique. And, there is a difference in quality. Vertigo is one of the greatest pieces of 20th century art in any medium. El is in every sense superb and masterful, but it does not rise to that level. What I'm arguing, however, is that the parallels between El and Vertigo are powerful and not coincidental. In particular, it seems almost impossible to me that the bell tower scenes are utterly disconnected. Enormous work has been done in attempting to catalog the antecedents to Vertigo. I think there's little doubt that El surpasses all non-Hitchcock candidates as a direct predecessor, and indeed a direct influence, on that masterpiece.

Moreover, Buñuel's classic, like his entire Mexican quasi-surrealist melodrama ouvre has been grossly underrated, ignored and devalued. Like El, many of these superb films, while posing as potboilers, are cinematic art of the highest order, and had a considerable impact on other directors. It is, after all, implausible to think that Buñuel began as one of the most important pioneers of avant-garde cinema and cinematic art, and surrealism generally, but was simply wasting his time in Mexico (or perhaps producing the occasional noteworthy minor achievement), and then suddenly sprang back to life in Spain and France in the late 60s and early 70s producing the acknowledged masterpieces of the end of his career. In fact, I haven't seen any Buñuel Mexican surrealist melodrama that doesn't qualify as cinema art of the first order, the great bulk of them being masterpieces of the highest rank. And I think I've made my case that it's not really possible to talk about influences on Vertigo outside of Hitchcock's own work without putting El at the very forefront of the conversation.

A brief follow-up on the anti-Arab hate-site Ikhras

One of the first responses to my last Ibishblog posting, which was about the anti-Arab hate-speech website Ikhras, was a tweet by a gentleman who, to put it kindly, is best known for his uncomfortable relationship with words. He seemed intimidated by its (modest) length, and urged me to keep my postings under 8,000 words (it was not over 3,000, in fact). So, for the attention deficit disorder set, I'll repeat my concerns in bullet point fashion:
  • This is an anonymous site, which means it has no credibility or seriousness.
  • Nonetheless, the fact that they have launched vicious an highly personal attacks on an exceptionally broad range of Arab-American groups and targets shows they are opposed to any effort, from any perspective, to purposefully engage with the rest of our society.
  • This range of targets precisely mimics those of most anti-Arab and Islamophobic groups, raising serious questions about the motives of these anonymous bloggers.
  • Everyone has to ask who these people are and what they are hiding.
  • There is the further issue of who, if anyone, pays for this site in any way, even indirectly.
  • No matter how marginal Ikhras no doubt is and will remain, these questions should now be asked, especially given the absurdly wide range of Arab and Muslim American targets of their hate speech.
 
Those are the main points. As a side note, I directly asked my former co-author, Ali Abunimah, who is one of the few people Ikhras openly likes, if he was involved with the site in any way. I have to ask this publically since years ago he cut off all direct communications with me. He tweeted that he has no knowledge of or involvement with Ikhras, though he does not say whether or not any of his writing has ever appeared there. Ikhras issued a similar comment. Without any other verifiable facts, I am happy to take him at his word, and I assume that his comment also implies, though it does not state, that he has never written for Ikhras either. As I pointed out in my posting, the reason I asked outright is that every single person I know who has considered the issue suspected he might well have been involved with it in some way, and that includes both people who like and do not like him. As far as I am concerned, unless further information comes to light, this puts a minor side-issue to rest, and I made that clear on twitter as soon as he made his comment.
 
Of course that leaves us with all major questions totally unanswered. We still have no idea who these people are, who supports them (if anyone), or what their real agenda or motives might be. It's exceptionally revealing that some people took raising the very question of someone's possible involvement with Ikhras to be an "attack." That tells you all you need to know about the site: it's deeply threatening even to ask the question if someone is involved with it or not. No wonder the authors and editors are anonymous if this is the reaction to someone being asked whether or not they are involved with it. Ali's reaction and others clearly shows that it would be a huge embarrassment at the very least to be known to be associated with it, so much so that even the question is apparently some kind of affront. As a former ADC staffer, I am sometimes misidentified as someone who used to work for AAI or CAIR or other Arab or Muslim American groups, but I do not take offense. It is a good barometer of how low this discourse is happy to sink that one of its main defenders on twitter — naturally yet another anonymous writer, quite possibly (if not probably) involved in some way with Ikhras — made disgusting "jokes" about the Arab-American comedian Maysoon Zayid, who has cerebral palsy, being "lame."
 
In addition to pointing out how much this overwrought reaction demonstrates about the nature and role of Ikhras, I would also note that if anyone is annoyed that I ask people if they are involved with it or not, clearly the proper place to lodge complaints about that is not with me, but with Ikhras. Is it not completely obvious that by working so hard to remain anonymous while viciously attacking almost all noted Arab and Muslim American groups and individuals, it is Ikhras itself that not only invites but ensures this kind of speculation? I do not know anyone at all who is aware of Ikhras — whether sympathetic, hostile or neutral (not a lot in the third camp, I grant) — who has not wondered aloud and at some length about the unavoidable question: who are these people and why are they acting like this? If they signed their names to their own ghastly writings like normal human beings, no one would be forced to speculate. But since they will not, that is inevitable. It is yet another consequence of their own cowardly decision to hide behind an elaborate veil of secrecy. If people do not like those inevitable consequences, they should hold them to account for it, not anyone else.
 
The bottom-line is that the scoundrels at Ikhras have done a lot in the past 24 hours to add to the bill of particulars building against them in all sane elements of the Arab and Muslim American communities. They have pledged to continue their malignant activities and I have no doubt that they will. But let me repeat my conclusion from yesterday, only with more reason and force than ever: if and when their identities are revealed or discovered, and they are as they claim Arab Americans, the community should neither forgive nor forget their conduct but hold them, their friends and allies, and patrons (if any), responsible for it.

Who is behind the anti-Arab hate site “Ikhras” and what are they hiding?

Ikhras and its Arab-bashing agenda

The website “Ikhras" (“shut up,” or perhaps more accurately, “muzzle yourself,” in Arabic) claims to be Arab-American, but in fact is one of the most enthusiastically and unremittingly anti-Arab-American websites on the internet. The editors and authors almost always hide behind obviously faked names designed to obscure their real identities. From this hiding place they launch vicious and highly personalized attacks on virtually all prominent Arab and Muslim American organizations including AAI, CAIR, ADC, ATFP, ISNA and other national groups, and active individuals such as Azizah al-Hibri, Raghida Dergham, Jim Zogby, Ziad Asali, Suhail Khan, yours truly, Radwan Ziadeh, Dahlia Mogahed, Omar Baddar, Yahya Basha, Sami Al-Araji, Queen Noor, Eboo Patel, David Ramadan, Mona Eltahawy, Nihad Awad, Asra Nomani, Feisal Abdul Rauf, Ray Hanania, pageant winner Rimah Fakih, and comedian Dean Obeidallah (who, they claim, is nothing less than "the Father of All House Arabs," whatever that may mean). Most recently, they have been harassing another Arab-American comedian, Maysoon Zayid, on Twitter. In effect, therefore, it is nothing other than an anti-Arab hate speech site, the targets and basic content of which can only be a source of constant delight to the anti-Arab racists and Islamophobes who wish to exclude Arab and Muslim Americans from the US social, cultural and political scene and keep them marginalized and disempowered.

The individuals and organizations attacked by Ikhras obviously cover a huge range of political, social, ideological, religious and intellectual orientations. Indeed, they have only one thing in common: in their own way, each of them is trying to engage with the rest of our society, assert their rights as citizens and advance the interests of the Arab and Muslim American communities by becoming more involved in the American political system or cultural scene. These are all individuals or groups that take their status as Americans of Arab or Muslim heritage seriously at least to some extent, rather than pointlessly and self-defeatingly defining themselves as Arabs who happen to be living in the United States. Ikhras does occasionally praise a very small number of Arab Americans, but none at all who are engaged in any national organized efforts or purposeful engagement with American society, only those like Ali Abunimah and Assad AbuKhalil who pollute the blogosphere and social media with similar messages of deliberate self-marginalization and disempowerment and who also attack those who try to achieve anything constructive. It is not only an anti-Arab-American website, it's a proudly and categorically anti-American website. And it calls on all Arab Americans to adopt a vocally anti-American stance, as if we were not citizens of this country or somehow have no stake in its success.

Since its establishment, it has become clear that the conscious and deliberate purpose of Ikhras is to attack, ridicule, denigrate and insult any and every Arab or Muslim American who tries, from whatever perspective or approach, to engage the rest of American society rather than spitting at it, and to advance one version or another of their communities' interests. If Ikhras stands for anything coherent at all, it is the categorical rejection of the very notion of any kind of purposeful engagement with American society, from whatever vantage point and orientation. With astounding shamelessness, while hiding behind pseudonyms they have repeatedly called all or most of their targets "cowards." They also had the gall to dismiss four Egyptian protesters — one of whom, Jawad Nabulsi, was shot and lost an eye during the Cairo street protests — as "not revolutionaries," simply on the grounds that they attended an AAI function.

What are the anonymous writers at Ikhras hiding?

To the writers at Ikhras, I ask a simple and direct question: who are you and what are you hiding? What are you so afraid of? What calamity would occur if you actually signed your names to your own articles? You have gone to truly extravagant lengths to hide your identities not only online, but also by word of mouth, and to conceal your authorship. Why? Everybody else involved in these debates has no problem signing their own statements, yet you launch vicious, highly personalized and often repulsive broadsides, cowering behind the veil of anonymity. That you are cowards, and despicable cowards at that, has been clearly established by the way you have conducted yourselves. But what exactly is it that you are afraid of?

What great secret, or set of secrets, is there that would be so unmanageable if your identities were revealed? What level of hypocrisy, dishonesty, corruption or other indefensible facts would be exposed if you behaved like minimally dignified, decent people and signed your own names to these miserable screeds? By refusing to admit your authorship, you have secured a dishonorable advantage over everybody else in what is, or at least should (and otherwise would) be, a legitimate debate about how the Arabs and Muslims in the United States should (or, rather, from your point of view shouldn't) pursue their interests.

Everybody else takes a public position and has to live with the consequences. You, on the other hand, won't even take responsibility for your own words! It is impossible to have a debate with a stone wall of secrecy. This is certainly a mere side effect of your stance of calculated cowardice, for no doubt there are ugly, sticky secrets that must be whitewashed with this thin veneer of false names, or else you would not use them. But those you attack are, in effect, denied the right to reply since you deny them the right to know whom they are addressing. The right to confront one's accusers in public is not only a crucial legal right, it's also a basic tenet of civilized discourse, a concept with which you are clearly either totally unfamiliar or inimically hostile.

Doesn't this pattern of obsessive secrecy, anonymous and false accusations, and smearing every opponent — all under the cover of a false claim of Arab nationalist pride — remind everyone of the outrageous conduct of autocratic Arab regimes? Isn't this exactly how, for example, the government of Syria, to name only one of the more obvious examples, is presently conducting itself? And of course it is one of the many delicious ironies of the Ikhras website that its writers assert not only their right of free speech, but anonymous free speech that is frequently slanderous, and pose as crusading leftists and liberationists, while openly declaring it is their mission to demand, like faceless despots, other people's silence. There is no pretense here of opening, expanding or enriching a debate; merely a censorious, and indeed totalitarian mentality that only one point of view is legitimate and everybody else, no matter what perspective they are coming from, needs to be silenced by any means necessary.

Who is paying for Ikhras' orgy of Arab-bashing?

Behind the simple secrets, which may be personal, familial, professional or any number of other possibilities, lurks an even more interesting question: who is paying for all of this? There is a great deal of activity on that website, and a considerable amount of work put into creating, hosting and maintaining it. Content, no matter how shoddy, must be created and webpages and databases must be designed and maintained, and this takes considerable time and at least some money. It is extremely unlikely, although remotely possible, that the writers themselves pay for all of this out of pocket, meaning there is no sugar daddy behind Ikhras. It's possible, but highly unlikely. Someone is paying for this in one way or another. Who?

Even the highly implausible "all-volunteer" scenario raises a fascinating question: if by some remote contingency that's what each and every person – including web designers and maintainers – involved in Ikhras actually are, all must then have other work. Do they fear the consequences of the revelation of their identities to their day jobs? Some way or another, the money for this project, which is not cost free, is being found. Where does it come from? If they had any dignity at all, they would admit it. Ideally they would simply do what my colleagues at the American Task Force on Palestine have done, and post signed, independently audited, financial statements for every year of its existence on its own website. But since they hide their own names, telling the truth about who is paying for them to go on this orgy of Arab-bashing may be asking too much, even though their audience has a right and a need to be told.

I wish to pose a direct question on the matter of identity to my former co-author Ali Abunimah. From the start, I have seen what I believe are obvious hallmarks of your writing style, with which, of course, I am intimately familiar, as well as your mentality and values, smeared all over this website. I cannot know for a certainty whether you are involved with it or not, and if so in what capacity. But every single individual I know who has thought about the question at all believes you are involved with Ikhras in some way or other, and this includes both those who like you and those who do not. Ali, everyone is absolutely convinced that you play some kind of significant role in this website. The time has come for you to say openly, frankly and honestly what exactly your relationship with Ikhras is and has been. A straightforward answer is required, and if you maintain a silence on the matter or are coy, it will be the most clear-cut admission possible. To all others, I'd like to suggest that Mr. Abunimah should be asked this simple, straightforward question relentlessly on social media, in media appearances, and at public talks, until he gives a simple, straightforward, and satisfactory answer.

Questions for Ikhras readers, if they actually have any

I also have a few observations for the Ikhras readership, whoever it may be. Is it not obvious that an anonymous website that attacks virtually any and every prominent Arab-American without restraint and at a deeply personal level without revealing its true identity or motivation is, by definition, not only non-credible but also malignant? You may enjoy the car-crash spectacle of the reckless and indefensible public smearing of everyone trying to do something useful for the community, but honestly, how do you know this isn't in fact the voice of the Zionist Organization of America, or some offshoot of Pamela Geller's operation? (Old-timers will remember Mark Bruzonsky, the former Washington Representative of The World Jewish Congress, who used to run a website and email list called “Middle East Realities” that specialized in outbidding and denouncing all noted Arab and Muslim American organizations, activists and individuals, exactly as Ikhras does, and in much the same language.)

I'll grant that Ikhras is probably not actually an extreme right-wing Zionist operation, but how do you know? Its relentless Arab-bashing hate speech certainly attacks their main targets and plainly serves their purpose of keeping the Arab and Muslim Americans marginalized and disempowered. Doesn't it leave a bad taste in your mouth to be told all these categorically and unrelentingly nasty (and typically false) things about a vast array of individuals and organizations who are trying to make themselves useful from a huge variety of approaches and perspectives, but not to be told who is making these accusations? Don't you wonder who they actually are and what they have to hide? Don't you wonder what they're afraid of? Don't you reflect on the character of people who would conduct themselves like this? Their postings are the equivalent of anonymous voicemail messages left during election campaigns about the “communist ties,” “sexual deviancy,” or “financial improprieties” of a given candidate left by anonymous supporters of their opponents. It's a perfect example of the classic political “dirty trick.”

Because of this inherent lack of credibility and seriousness, I deeply doubt that Ikhras has much of an audience, or impact on Arab-American thought or debate. For this reason, until now I have completely ignored this ridiculous website, but at this stage I think it has become important for somebody to have the gumption to stand up and ask the simplest, most obvious questions and point out how atrocious the intentions of this project truly are, no matter how marginal it undoubtedly has been and will remain.

It needs to be pointed out that whoever is responsible for the bile at Ikhras is deliberately taking a self-consciously destructive approach, but suggesting absolutely nothing constructive or serious as an alternative. If these individuals really think their views and opinions have any actual value or constituency, why restrict them to an anonymous website? Why not create an open, public organization and try to pursue some of these "ideas" in a proactive, purposeful manner?  Of course that's hard to do when all you stand for is the (almost always unfair) criticism of all others, and when you won't even admit who you are. Give it a shot, and see what kind of constituency and credibility you end up with.

It must be obvious that anyone who isn't willing to sign their names to their own opinions, have the minimal courage of their convictions, take responsibility for their own words, and say what they think in their own goddamn names, should be the very first to ikhras. And when and if their identities are revealed or discovered, and should they indeed prove to be Arab Americans as they claim, the community should neither forgive nor forget this outrageous and cowardly website and its perpetrators. It's obvious that these people don't sign their names to their own writings because they are afraid of the consequences to their public standings and reputations, at the very least. Let's make sure that this fear is fully justified, because no one who engages in this behavior can, once exposed, hope to be regarded as anything other than a coward, a scoundrel and an individual beneath contempt. And they may well prove to be worse besides.

Parsing Netanyahu’s Washington talking points

The Israeli Embassy in Washington helpfully sent their allies in Washington a set of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's talking points in relation to his speech in Congress yesterday and to AIPAC at the weekend, which were published by Ben Smith of Politico. They are the following:

Netanyahu's vision of peace:

1) Mutual Recognition of the Jewish state and the Palestinian State

2) A Palestinian state that is independent and viable

3) A Palestinian state that will be fully demilitarized, with an Israeli military presence along the Jordan River.

4) The settlement blocs and areas of critical strategic and national importance will remain a part of Israel.

5) In any peace agreement, some settlements will end up outside Israel's borders.

6) The solution to the Palestinian refugees will be found outside Israel. 

7) Jerusalem will remain Israel's united sovereign capital.

First of all, it should be noted that, as is obvious and has been pointed out by Zvika Krieger of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, these stances are "Israel's starting offer for negotiations." The same applies to a number of the Palestinian official positions, for example on the right of refugee return. In other words, serious Israelis and Palestinians understand that major compromises will have to be made on these and other positions in any actual agreement. Second, these points and Netanyahu's substantive positions in his speech before Congress were restatements of his May 16 speech at the Knesset in which he laid out these positions and claimed that they were a “consensus” among most Jewish Israelis.

Because there is no ongoing diplomatic process between the two parties, and hasn't been one since late September, and it isn't likely to resume anytime in the near future, the diplomatic implications of these speeches are fairly limited. The speeches are both best seen as more political than diplomatic. Domestically, Netanyahu was seeking, and indeed succeeded, in establishing himself as the unquestioned leader of the Israeli center-right and far-right coalition, fending off challenges from rivals within his Likud Party and others such as Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, head of the largely Russian immigrant Yisrael Beiteinu Party, and Interior Minister Eli Yishai, head of the ultra-Orthodox Shas Party. It's become clear that a combination of factors have driven the Israeli polity seriously to the right over the past decade, and even more over the past five years. This began with the extreme reaction to the second intifada that led to the political resurgence of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and has been further exacerbated in recent years by the growing population and political organization of right-wing oriented Russian immigrant and ultra-Orthodox communities. Sadly, there is little doubt that the current right-wing coalition government in Israel really does represent a combined majority sentiment in Jewish Israeli society that brings together the center-right, the far-right and elements of the extreme-right. The Israeli left, and even the traditional Israeli center, is marginalized to the point of being moribund, at least for now. Representing the current face of the old-school Jabotinskyite ultra-hawkish and maximalist but secular Likud orientation, through his three consistent speeches in the past two weeks at the Knesset, Congress and AIPAC, Netanyahu has strongly consolidated his position as the leader of this uneasy right-wing coalition and fended off the possibility of any serious challenge for the foreseeable future. His position as Israel's prime minister seems more secure than ever, and it's hard to imagine that a new election would leave him in a weaker rather than a stronger position vis-à-vis both his right-wing “frenemies” or any challenge from the traditional center or the left.

The second sense in which these speeches, especially the two in the United States, were political rather than diplomatic was a thinly-veiled effort to bolster the chances of Republicans unseating Pres. Obama in the upcoming 2012 elections. It's no secret that Netanyahu is deeply uncomfortable with Obama, and that the two men have a testy, if not indeed acrimonious, relationship and little regard for each other. Neither can afford an open public confrontation, but Netanyahu's public lecturing of Obama following the President's Middle East policy speech was stunning in its arrogance. Obama did not fail to indirectly communicate his exasperation during his own AIPAC speech. Netanyahu directly accused Obama of not understanding reality, while, more diplomatically, Obama said Israel (read Netanyahu) needed to face certain uncomfortable realities, in effect returning the compliment.

Obama's Middle East policy speech was essentially a recitation of familiar American positions, but he was explicit about a number of items that have usually remained implicit: that negotiations must be based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed land swaps; that the parties should focus on borders and security understandings first; and that there would have to be a “full and phased” Israeli military withdrawal from the areas that will become a Palestinian state. He also failed to rule out dealings with a new Palestinian government arising from the “national reconciliation agreement” recently signed by Fatah and Hamas, although he said there were "profound and legitimate" questions about the deal for which Palestinians would have to provide “a credible answer.” This is clearly a reference to the Quartet conditions and the role Hamas will be playing in any new Palestinian Authority government. But it does stand in contrast to demands by Netanyahu and his American supporters that no dealings with any Palestinian government arising from the agreement are acceptable.

None of this is shocking or dramatic, and Obama's positions were unsurprising, reasonable and consistent with well-established American policies. Netanyahu's extraordinary overreaction was partly the reflection of a genuinely visceral sense that Israel's international isolation on the future of the occupied territories is growing, not only with the international community at large, but with the Obama administration and, indeed, the American foreign policy, intelligence and military establishment in general. The contrast between what Obama, the United States and the international community are envisioning as the essential elements of a two-state agreement and the talking points cited above as reflected in Netanyahu's speeches is quite stark. However, there was also a histrionic and theatrical quality to the enraged response, which I think was clearly intended to give political cover to Republican presidential hopefuls like Tim Pawlenty and Mitt Romney to issue strong denunciations of the President on Israel policy, which they immediately did. Even after Obama's AIPAC speech — in which he shifted tone and emphasized US-Israel cooperation (designed, of course, to please his audience), but did not alter any of his positions and did issue a stark warning to Israel that international (and implicitly American) impatience with the lack of progress on peace negotiations is becoming untenable — some of Netanyahu's Republican supporters like Washington Post blogger Jennifer Rubin continued to issue dark warnings to Jewish Americans that a second term for the President would be a disaster for Israel.

It's long been observed that Netanyahu thinks, acts, and talks more like a right wing American Republican than any version of an Israeli politician. His speech before Congress was masterful as an object lesson in how to speak to an American, and particularly congressional, audience. Given the paucity of talent in the present GOP field, it's even tempting to speculate that were he in a position to do so, Netanyahu would actually have a very good shot at winning the Republican nomination for US president in 2012. As things stand, however, it was merely a secondary goal, but an important one, of his reaction to Obama's speech, and some of the tone of his own in Congress, to help nudge Republicans towards what looks like an unlikely victory in November of next year.

Having established all of that, let's look at the talking points — the so-called “vision of peace” the Israeli Embassy released on Netanyahu's behalf — point by point, bearing in mind that these are opening bargaining positions at best and, in context, actually political positions aimed primarily at a domestic Israeli audience and secondarily at having an impact on US internal politics.

1) Mutual Recognition of the Jewish state and the Palestinian State

The question of mutual diplomatic recognition between Israel and Palestine is largely an onus on the Israeli side, since the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, recognized Israel formally and irrevocably in the Letters of Mutual Recognition in 1993. In return, Israel merely recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Therefore the Palestinians have recognized Israel for almost 20 years, while Israel has never recognized a Palestinian state or allowed one to be created. On the contrary, it has continued building settlements and deepening the occupation in many ways during this period, and the number of settlers since 1993 has increased from 200,000 to more than 500,000.

What this talking point refers to, however, is not mutual recognition between two states, but the new demand that first was raised at the Annapolis Conference in 2007 and has become an obsession with Netanyahu that Palestinians recognize Israel, as he usually puts it, as “the nation-state of the Jewish people.” This is therefore not a political but an ideological demand, essentially asking the Palestinians to embrace the fundamental precepts of a classical and very old-fashioned Zionism rather than agreeing to accept Israel as a neighbor with which they will live in peace and security, and as a legitimate member state of the United Nations that is free to define itself as it wishes. I have written before about how problematic this demand is for Palestinians, how unnecessary it is for peace (which is why it played absolutely no role in diplomacy or negotiations prior to 2007), and how it is an attempt to foreclose or prejudice genuine final status issues such as refugees and, by extension, Jerusalem. I will have a more detailed evaluation of this in a forthcoming article, and I've written extensively about it in the past.

2) A Palestinian state that is independent and viable

This represents a genuine reason to be hopeful and optimistic. Historically, Netanyahu and almost all Likud party leaders have been opposed to Palestinian statehood, but he is now on the record on numerous occasions in support of the concept. It is still debatable what he means exactly by the terms “state,” “independent” and “viable,” but this position is an extremely constructive one on its face. It demonstrates that while, as I noted above, the entire Israeli polity has shifted quite dramatically to the right over the past 10 years, the Israeli right itself has also shifted dramatically in its rhetoric about Palestinian independence. Many leaders and parties that absolutely ruled out Palestinian statehood, including Netanyahu, in the past now accept the concept at least in theory. This can only be regarded as progress. Absent a genuine negotiating process, it will be impossible to test Netanyahu's commitment to this principle or what he precisely means by the words cited in this talking point. It is very deeply in the Palestinian interest to try to find a formula as soon as possible to return to those negotiations so as to test these assertions and discover whether he means what he says and what it is he thinks he is describing. Until then, Netanyahu is free to make this commitment without any fear that he will actually have to participate in its realization or clarify his positions on these terms.

3) A Palestinian state that will be fully demilitarized, with an Israeli military presence along the Jordan River.

The first element here is problematic in some ways but almost certainly achievable. For many years now the Palestinian leadership has made it clear privately and implicitly that it seeks a non-militarized state of its own volition, because it recognizes that wasting money on a small army that will not be able to mount or win wars is completely pointless and that all resources should be focused on developing Palestine's infrastructure and extremely promising human capital. The wisest Palestinians look to something approximating the Costa Rican model in which the state is non-militarized, but with a strong police and border force to ensure security, and remains neutral in armed conflicts. This approach has helped to give Costa Rica a much higher standard of living than its Central American neighbors, and the Costa Ricans have managed to use their neutrality and international support for their position of non-belligerence to avoid being drawn into the many vicious conflicts and civil wars in Central America over the past decades. Palestine can and should attempt to emulate this wise approach, but it is much more politically achievable as a deliberate and independent choice that the Palestinians make in their own interests than as an Israeli demand. The Israeli leaders know that this is a Palestinian intention, and they also know that by making it an Israeli demand they make it more difficult to sell to the Palestinian constituency. It is therefore cynical and unhelpful to harp on this issue, which is best left to the Palestinian leadership that is thought to be committed to the principle on solid political and strategic grounds.

The second principle here, what Netanyahu has repeatedly referred to as a “long-term Israeli military presence along the Jordan River,” is an absolute nonstarter for the Palestinians and can only be regarded as either an opening gambit he knows full well will have to be abandoned or, if he intends to stick to this to the bitter end, as a conscious effort to sabotage a workable agreement. A Palestinian entity that does not control its own borders will not be a “state” in any meaningful sense of the term, but rather a bantustan and vassal of Israel. Palestinians will not, then, have achieved independence, but a deeply modified and attenuated form of ongoing occupation. This demand is completely at odds with Pres. Obama's terms laid out in his Middle East policy speech in which he specifically called for “the full and phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces” from the Palestinian state. Obama said “that negotiations should result in two states, with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine.” Obviously, this is completely inconsistent with Netanyahu's unworkable, unreasonable and unacceptable demand that Israel would continue to control, at least on a long-term basis, the Palestinian border along the Jordan River. The Palestinians have repeatedly said that they would accept the presence, possibly over a long-term, of international peacekeepers on their borders, including Jewish troops and even commanders from other countries, but a continued Israeli military presence in or on the borders of Palestine is totally unacceptable. It is simply contradictory to the most fundamental concept of Palestinian independence, and if Netanyahu intends to insist on this till the bitter end, even as negotiations begin to approach the conclusion of a permanent status agreement, he will be deliberately and willfully sabotaging such an agreement because it will be a clear-cut negation of Palestinian independence.

4) The settlement blocs and areas of critical strategic and national importance will remain a part of Israel.

Everyone agrees on the principle of a land swap. There is no question that there are settlement blocs, Jewish areas of occupied East Jerusalem, and perhaps some other geographically small areas of the occupied territories that would be annexed to Israel in exchange for equivalent territory ceded to the new Palestinian state. So in that sense, this principle is noncontroversial. However, Netanyahu has been deliberately vague about what settlement blocs he has in mind, although he has said that some settlements will be outside the borders of Israel at the end of an agreement. So it is a welcome recognition on his part that Israel does not intend to annex all settlements. However, some large settlements, particularly Ariel, extend deep into the territory of the West Bank, almost bifurcating it. Netanyahu has spoken in terms of being “generous” (an extraordinary term to be applied to territories under foreign military occupation) with the size of the territory of the Palestinian state. At the same time, in his speech at Congress Netanyahu denied that Israel is a “foreign occupier” at all and referred to the occupied territories as “the Jewish Land.” This might be Zionist boilerplate, but it doesn't bode well for what he thinks reasonable land swaps might entail. This is exacerbated by his reference to other “areas of critical strategic and national importance,” whatever they may be. He may be referring to areas of supposed military importance based on an anachronistic model of warfare that has been transcended by new technologies, or more simply to religious and political irredentism regarding areas like Hebron, which are a sine qua non for a genuine Palestinian state. So on the one hand this talking point is noncontroversial and even gives ground for some hope. On the other hand it contains implications that raise the deepest possible suspicions that what Netanyahu is imagining is simply impracticable and unworkable, as well as at odds with not just Palestinian but also international and American expectations and requirements.

5) In any peace agreement, some settlements will end up outside Israel's borders.

This point was covered above. I take it as an important admission, but of course he might be referring to small, largely irrelevant settlements, unauthorized outposts and other areas of limited significance. Again, a real diplomatic process will be required to test what he thinks he means by this and Palestinians should look for every opportunity to obtain such clarification.

6) The solution to the Palestinian refugees will be found outside Israel.

This is, and has for many years, been commonly understood as the inevitable outcome of negotiations since a wide-scale implementation of the right of return is a nonstarter for almost all Jewish Israelis for obvious reasons. However, the refugee issue is a crucial Palestinian negotiating card and it is right and proper that, as they prepare their people for the necessary concessions, they also protect this vital negotiating leverage and ensure that the most that can be secured for the refugees through a workable agreement is achieved and that this brutal and politically wrenching concession is reciprocated by a similar bitter political pill that Israel must swallow. That brings us directly to Netanyahu's final talking point:

7) Jerusalem will remain Israel's united sovereign capital.

 All Israelis who are serious about peace understand that the Palestinian capital must be based in East Jerusalem, that this is a sine qua non of peace and a red line no Palestinian leadership can or will be willing to cross. In many ways it is the Israeli analogy to the Palestinian right of return issue: the deep, painful, existential concession that must be made because without it, the other side simply will not come to terms. It therefore has been for many years also commonly understood as the inevitable outcome of negotiations that the Palestinian capital will be in East Jerusalem. Now Netanyahu's language appears to be categorical in ruling out serious negotiations on Jerusalem, let alone it serving as a Palestinian as well as an Israeli capital. But parsing the language of this talking point carefully, there does appear to be some potential wiggle room for reconciling the two positions. Most parties on both sides would probably prefer not to see Jerusalem divided in any physical sense, therefore the "united" part is no dealbreaker. That Jerusalem will be Israel's “sovereign capital” does not necessarily rule out that Jerusalem can also be Palestine's “sovereign capital” as well. This sounds counterintuitive and contradictory, and may even sound like an oxymoron, but Jerusalem is a sui generis case for which a sui generis solution undoubtedly will have to be found. I do not think it is inconceivable that a united Jerusalem (that is to say without physical divisions such as roadblocks, checkpoints, customs and immigration stations, etc.) can simultaneously serve as the sovereign capital for both Israel and Palestine. It depends how one defines sovereignty, where and how that sovereignty is exercised, whether there is the possibility of separate sovereignties with joint administration or other formulas that could square this circle.

Because these were political and not diplomatic speeches, I'm sure Netanyahu intended all of his audiences to understand this as ruling out any compromise on Jerusalem, and that's how most people took it. That's certainly how it reads at first glance. But there is evidence that behind the decades of bluster about Jerusalem as the “eternal, undivided capital of the Jewish people” has always lurked a gnawing, grudging sense among serious Israelis that a compromise on the city will be necessary. Israel is often said to have annexed occupied East Jerusalem. That's not exactly correct. What Israel did was not an act of formal annexation, but the extension of Israeli civil law to all of what it defined as “Municipal Jerusalem.” In 1980, the Knesset passed the "Jerusalem Law," that declared: "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel." The law was declared null and void on numerous occasions by the UN Security Council, in resolutions all voted for by the United States, most notably Resolution 476 which reiterated “the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.” Now that El Salvador and Costa Rica have removed their embassies from Jerusalem, all of which is still considered a “corpus separatum" under international law, Israel's international isolation on its maximalist claims regarding Jerusalem is again total.

Statements declaring or implying that Israel will make no concessions on Jerusalem and will not agree that any part of it will serve as the Palestinian capital might make for good politics in Israel or before Congress. But just as when Palestinians insist there will be no compromise on the complete implementation of the right of return for refugees, Israelis who believe in peace at all must be viewing absolutist statements about Jerusalem as vital negotiating leverage which they privately understand will require a genuinely painful but absolutely indispensable concession. It's understandable that neither party wants to undermine this kind of powerful leverage in advance of the resolution of the permanent status issues and the achievement of an end-of-conflict agreement. But it's also clear that both sides need to do more to prepare their respective publics for the compromises that, if they are at all serious about peace, they certainly know will ultimately be unavoidable.

Netanyahu's talking points contain no new ideas, but there are aspects of them that are promising and some that can be worked on in serious negotiations. Insofar as they are, as Krieger suggests, an opening gambit consciously crafted not as final positions but as starting points for a serious process, there is no reason to despair because of them, particularly given that negotiations are not presently ongoing and are unlikely to resume until after the 2012 US presidential elections. Still, Netanyahu has adopted some positions that place him very seriously at odds not just with the Palestinians, international law, and the international community, or even Obama personally. They pit him against a well-established consensus that the American national interest requires as essential and not optional the establishment of what Sec. Clinton called the “inevitable” Palestinian state and an end to the occupation that began in 1967. The apparent contradiction between American goals and interests and the vision for the future suggested by Netanyahu's talking points is going to be an increasing strain not only on the personal and political relations of the two leaders, but, in the long run, an increasing issue between the United States and its national interests on the one hand and Israel and the maximalist ambitions of some of its powerful political factions on the other. Even more ominously for Israel, as two of its most prominent and staunch supporters among the American commentariat, Thomas Friedman of the New York Times and Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic, both pointed out in hard-hitting columns today, Netanyahu's policies and positions that have done nothing to advance the peace process are leading Israel in a clear and disastrous direction: its development into what both bluntly called an "apartheid state" and therefore an international pariah.

 

More on ?Walid Shoebat? and his allies and competitors in the ?reformed terrorists? scam

Several readers have asked for more information on the “reformed terrorist” scam and the conman who sometimes calls himself “Walid Shoebat,” and sometimes doesn’t, and on the entire phenomenon. There are a few more interesting things worth pointing out about these sordid people and their dirty dealings that weren’t touched on in my last blog posting, which was prompted by revelations that yet again the federal government, in this case the Department of Homeland Security, had paid this man $5000 to help “train” security officials. Of course, I was only encouraged by a Tweet by a defender of “Shoebat” who produced this masterpiece: "you just stay out of the truck stop restrooms cause I know who you are and what you do I saw you. Leave Walid be you closet cas." [Sic on all that]. It could hardly have been better calculated to make me want to revisit the subject as soon as possible. The first point is to re-establish how truly dangerous unrestrained, hysterical, hate speech on the order practiced by “Shoebat” can truly be. His sentiments frequently veer towards the genocidal. For instance, he recently stated, “I would wish that the whole Muslim world would listen to Mr. Bakri and fight by the sword literally. This way the nukes will take care of the whole problem once and for all." So now that we’re all back on the same page, here’s some more about “Shoebat” and his partners in robbing credulous churches and ignorant, incompetent government agencies with the nonchalance of the most accomplished burglars.

Thom Cincotta recently authored an extremely revealing report about this hate-speech cottage industry called “Manufacturing the Muslim Menace” for the group Political Research Associates. It begins by documenting “what one official involved in homeland security said was how she understood the underlying theme of a speech by Walid Shoebat at an anti-terrorism training in Las Vegas in October 2010.” The report states, “Our investigator had turned around after Shoebat’s speech and asked the woman seated one row back what she thought was the solution offered by Shoebat. ‘Kill them…including the children…you heard him,’ was the full response.” Of course this doesn’t mean that the official was endorsing this view, but it certainly was her understanding of his message. I’m not sure I could’ve summed it up anymore neatly myself. Since “Shoebat” insists that Islam is not only evil and demonic but is itself “the devil,” such an interpretation of his message seems wholly justifiable. The report reasonably suggests that given how extreme his language tends to be, “Shoebat may be the most outlandish example of the coterie of anti-Islamic bigots and fear mongers who are training law enforcement officials and anti-terrorism agents.” The report also helpfully notes “Shoebat’s financial remuneration for his appearances is obscured in complicated financial arrangements he claims are needed to protect him from terrorism.” In other words, somebody tried to look into this and found it deliberately obscured and not worth getting to the bottom of. Suffice it to say, the man is making a living, and almost certainly a tidy one, from spreading this poison around our society.

“Shoebat” frequently partners with Zak Anani, another purveyor of particularly gigantic tales. In the most extraordinary "coincidence," this self-described “former terrorist” and former mass-murderer, claims to have killed no less than 223 people during the Lebanese civil war, “two-thirds of them by daggers.” (Exactly the same claim, word-for-word, attributed to “Walid Shoebat,” as cited in my last blog posting.)  How and why they claim to have killed exactly the same number of people, in exactly the same way, at around the same time, in two different places, and two separate wars, has never been explained. It would be interesting to know who the ghostwriter or coach behind these laughable fabrications is, since they clearly got it from the same set of fantastical talking points. I will not bother to dwell on how ridiculous these claims are, even considered in isolation from each other, in the first place.

Anani claims to have joined “an Islamist militia” in Lebanon in the early 1970s, at age 13 (naturally he does not specify which militia that was, and it is hard to think of a group that would have fit this description in Lebanon at the time). As usual with “reformed terrorists” and self-styled, for-profit “ex-Muslims,” there is a profound anachronism in his claims to have been raised in a climate of militant jihad in a place and time in the Arab world where such rhetoric was extremely rare if not completely unknown. He claims to have not only killed an astounding number of people, but also to have been subjected to extreme persecution in Lebanon, where he says he was “almost beheaded by an Islamist gang.” He ended up in Canada where “his house and car have been burnt, his family attacked.” Not surprisingly, Canadian police flatly deny these claims.

Canadian authorities and experts have also dismissed Anani’s tall tales of former terrorism, with noted expert Tom Quiggin, formerly of the RMCP, correctly observing that, “Mr. Anani is not an individual who rates the slightest degree of credibility, based on the stories that he has told.The Windsor Star quotes Quiggin as saying that, "Anani has said he's 49 years old, which would mean he was born in 1957 or 1958.  If he joined his first militant group when he was 13, it would have been in 1970 or 1971.  But the fighting in Lebanon did not begin in earnest until 1975.  His story of having made kills shortly after he joined and having made 223 kills overall is preposterous, given the lack of fighting during most of the time period he claims to have been a fighter.  He also states he left Lebanon to go to Al-Azhar University at the age of 18, which would mean he went to Egypt in 1976. In other words, according to himself, he left Lebanon within a year of when the fighting actually started." He added, “It appears to be that Mr. Anani is nothing more than an extremist who is trying to create an imaginative history from a contemporary set of fears and stories.” In other words, just like with “Shoebat,” Anani’s account is a transparent, inane fiction that announces itself as an absurdity on first glance to anyone with the least knowledge of the subject under discussion.

As my friend Omar Baddar pointed out in response to my recent posting, the Jerusalem Post also noted that following the by-now thoroughly debunked imaginary bank bombing that “Shoebat” claims he conducted on behalf of the PLO in the late 1970s, “Asked whether word of the bombing made the news at the time, he said, ‘I don't know. I didn't read the papers because I was in hiding for the next three days.’ (In 2004, he had told Britain's Sunday Telegraph: ‘I was terribly relieved when I heard on the news later that evening that no one had been hurt or killed by my bomb.’)” So, he couldn’t even keep his stories straight about whether he was in hiding and incommunicado for three days after the fictional “attack” that never happened, or whether he was listening to the news that very evening. He recently resorted to describing the author of this damning Jerusalem Post story as the “Holocaust-denial supporter Jorg Luyken” on the basis that the author has criticized laws criminalizing Holocaust denial and urging combating it with historical facts, since “the evidence of the Holocaust is irrefutable,” rather than through laws criminalizing stupid and offensive speech of this kind.

Yet, along with a crew of other shameless frauds, these individuals are making a repulsive career out of telling lies about themselves and spreading fear and hatred against entire communities and identity groups. Naturally, there is no honor among thieves. The falling outs have been vicious and most telling. The most amusing is the apparent war between Brigitte Gabriel, the most successful and ambitious of the Arab professional Islamophobes (who I have dissected in some detail in an earlier Ibishblog post) and “Shoebat,” Anani and another huckster called Kamal Saleem. According to Franklin Lamb, as she felt these three upstarts beginning to encroach on her lucrative territory, Gabriel exploded, "Not only are these creeps Arabs, but two of them are Palestinians!" Chris Hedges — who calls the three “Curly, Larry and Mo” — says that by 2008 “Shoebat,” Anani and Saleem were telling their audiences that “the only way to deal with one-fifth of the world’s population is by converting or eradicating all Muslims.” By trying to outbid Gabriel and everybody else in their degree of Islamophobic hatred, according to Lamb, “Shoebat… recently chortled, ‘let the spoiled brat from South Lebanon top that!’ following an appearance on Tovia Singer's radio show.” But as things have played out, Gabriel has proven to have a longer reach and a wider audience on the political extreme right, by emphasizing pure anti-Arab and Islamophobic hatred and downplaying apocalyptic, dispensationalist evangelical Christianity.

“Shoebat” also had an interesting falling out with a former collaborator called Simon Altaf. According to religion writer Richard Bartholomew, the two co-authored a book called “Islam: Peace? or Beast?” which preposterously claimed that the early text of the Book of Revelation in the Codex Vaticanus reveal the “mark of the beast” not to be the Greek symbols for 666 or 616, but rather the Arabic script for Allah. Bartholomew points out that the original text of the Codex Vaticanus does not include the Book of Revelation at all, and the supplement in question was added more than 1,000 years later than the original text. Moreover, the claim is ludicrous on every possible grounds. The two also cofounded the “Abrahamic Faith” website which, when it was first launched, according to Bartholomew “as well as pushing hardline Christian Zionism, it originally attacked other Christian groups, including Evangelicals and Charismatics, Billy Graham, and the Pope.” Bartholomew also points out that the site contained “an early version of Shoebat’s conversion narrative, in which he describes himself as having been involved in anti-Israel rioting during the Intifada, but which doesn’t mention any PLO membership or bomb-planting.

The split between the two apparently occurred when Altaf was ordained as a Rabbi by the Bnai Yahshua Synagogue in Florida, which apparently believes that “non-Jewish followers of Jesus have physical descent from Ephraim” (trust me, you don’t want to know…). “Shoebat” thundered that “Simon Altaf… turned polygamist and cultist of the first order.” An indication of how demented the whole argument was on both sides can be found here. Altaf shot back that “Shoebat’s real name is ‘Walid Salameh’” and that his “handler,” one Keith Davies, was originally employed by an ardent ex-Nazi. Altaf’s totally unverifiable tirade against “Shoebat” can be read here, on the site they originally cofounded.

The latest target of Shoebat’s avaricious wrath is Mosab Hassan Yousef, a.k.a. “Son of Hamas,” who spied on the Palestinian extremist group for Israel before moving to the United States and converting to Christianity. “Shoebat” originally endorsed Yousef, but has now written a tirade against him accusing him of being “more double agent than turncoat.” Presumably, this racket ain’t big enough for both of us, yet again. In an effort to dissuade American churches from hosting (and therefore paying) Yousef, “Shoebat” insists, “Mosab did not convert to what the West would recognize as Christianity, but to a fiery, Palestinian brand of the faith that is vehemently anti-Israel. According to Mosab, his main goal in coming to the U.S. is to infiltrate the main source of international support for Israel: the American church.” It’s about as subtle as when Shoebat’s most prominent patron and defender, Daniel Pipes, demanded I be banned from television after a series of severe drubbings I delivered him in televised debates (he later complained that he couldn’t get on television anymore because he refused to appear with me and therefore I was on and he wasn’t). Most tellingly, “Shoebat” accuses Yousef of “duping pro-Israel churches for his own personal profit.” Takes one to know one. "We are doing our best to warn the church," Shoebat’s handler, Keith Davis, explained. I’ll bet they are!

Yousef was defended by his Shin Bet handler, one Gonen ben Itzhak, who thinks, “Mr. Shoebat is playing a dirty game,” and that “Unlike Walid Shoebat, Mosab did not commit fictitious crimes against Israel,” and “Mosab served hard time in prison and paid for what he did.” Most pointedly he tells “Shoebat,” that because of his background in intelligence and experience, “I can smell a fraud and recognize a fake hero on the spot.” Yousef has also accused Keith Davis, on behalf of “Shoebat,” of trying “to recruit me [as a speaker] to use my story to raise money”.

Yousef says he didn’t respond to this e-mail and the worst that can be said of his veracity is that he has exaggerated his story — not invented it out of whole cloth like “Shoebat” — and his relationship with Israel and the Palestinian cause are complex to say the least. Whether he can be seen as an opportunist or not, even though he might be threatening to Shoebat’s racket, there isn’t any clear evidence yet that he is trying to mimic it. On the contrary, Yousef’s complex, ambivalent and often hard to reconcile and idiosyncratic stances make him far less appealing a speaker on ideological grounds to credulous pro-Israel fundamentalist churches than Larry, Curly and Moe. But clearly the fact that his story is based in fact and not fiction, and that he actually knows something about the subject he is addressing, makes him a very serious threat to the total frauds peddling complete fictions, absolute certainties and uncompromising hatred. The effort to take him out of the equation is extremely revealing about Shoebat’s motives and methods.