A reader of the Ibishblog asks me, ?Don?t you think that your opinions are severely disconnected from those of Middle Easterners living in the Middle East?? I think this is the most interesting and complex question anyone has yet to ask me since I started blogging a few weeks ago.

First of all, I think it?s important to note that opinions in the Middle East vary widely. I?m sure that a very large number of people in the Middle East don?t agree with a lot of what I have to say, but given my strong connections to the Middle East, my upbringing in Beirut, my wide range of experiences, etc., I don?t think one can describe them as ?severely disconnected.? To be sure, there is a kind of received wisdom in the region, especially regarding questions about Palestine, that is not only dominant but hegemonic, and might be described as ?The Narrative.? A lot of what I say challenges and deviates from ?The Narrative,? but any form of political discourse that amounts to a regurgitation, in whatever form, of the essential elements of ?The Narrative? might constitute an opinion, but it does not constitute thinking. The reality is that both internally within their own societies, and externally with regard to regional and international dynamics, Arabs generally speaking don?t have a great deal of power, and tend to cling tenaciously to ?The Narrative? in many cases as an alternative to the admittedly painful process of considering what our real situation and our actual options in fact are. However, strict adherence to a rigid and received narrative is the very antithesis of thinking, as it necessitates a kind of fidelity to certain constructs that may be imaginary, anachronistic, no longer relevant or simply mythological. This is a perfect example of the veritable ?box? the hoary cliché urges one to think outside of.

There are, of course, many brave and important voices in the Middle East itself that do deviate from ?The Narrative,? but many more who, in spite of knowing better and speaking sense privately, have exercised self-censorship because of the hegemonic power it wields, and an even larger number who prefer the comfort it provides to the pain of confronting some fairly harsh elements of existing realities. However, since any hegemonic narrative constitutes an insuperable obstacle to clearheaded and imaginative strategic thinking, I believe confronting ?The Narrative,? insofar as its serves to impede rather than enhance Arab national interests and social and economic development, is an overriding and paramount imperative. Obviously, this has already and will continue to annoy a great many people. However, there are many others who are greatly appreciative of the willingness of some of us to begin to think outside the confines of the received wisdom of the contemporary Arab national narrative.

What is fascinating is that there sometimes seems to be more of an appetite for this kind of sincere reconsideration of where the Arabs are, where they are going and what they need, in the Arab world than in the Arab diaspora. Diaspora communities tend to cling more tenaciously to received wisdoms and hegemonic narratives imported in a derivative manner from their countries of origin during the time of their migration. These ideas often get fixed and clung to with an emotional intensity that isn?t necessarily found within the societies of origin themselves. In the Arab world, governments can be relied upon to enforce ?The Narrative,? whereas in the diaspora, social pressure and self-censorship seem to be even more powerful than any mukhabarat. My colleagues and I at the American Task Force on Palestine, for example, have been gratified that the organization is generally very well-regarded and very well-received in Palestine, where the need for a serious Palestinian-American policy organization in Washington that tries to work within the system to advance Palestinian as well as American national interests, is readily understood. It is my very strong impression that there is a great deal more skepticism in the Palestinian and Arab diaspora in the United States about such a project, and considerable hostility in certain quarters to the very idea of working with and within the foreign-policy establishment of our own country to promote both Palestinian and American interests.

Most of my career has been geared towards securing an end to the occupation, the creation of a Palestinian state, improved relations between the US and the Arab world, and challenging and debunking Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism in the West, and I certainly think that the vast majority of Arabs would strongly support these goals. There may be some misunderstanding on the part of some people, whether living in the Middle East or as Arabs in the United States, about how these aims can best be pursued in the United States by Arab Americans. There is no question that I am part of a fairly small group of people within our community that is deliberately and methodically pursuing a new approach to advancing these goals, based on new strategies, new language, and new attitudes. I think it would be quite unreasonable for anyone in the Middle East to suggest that Arab Americans are not well positioned to develop effective strategies for pursuing these common goals that may not be immediately obvious, or even easy to understand, from a strictly Middle Eastern point of view (even one currently residing somewhere in the United States). The point is that we cannot proceed any longer on the basis of a derivative discourse. Arab Americans need their own approach, based on a commitment to the American national interest and to working within the system, to promote these essential goals. Arab Americans who remain strictly committed to various iterations of ?The Narrative,? and who retain an essentially oppositional and hostile attitude towards the American government and political system have guaranteed their own irrelevancy and failure.

On the other hand, when it comes to my own personal deep commitment to secularism and agnosticism, there may indeed be a profound disconnect from generalized attitudes in the Arab world. I believe that Arabs at almost every level of society have tended, over the past 30 years or so, to erroneously and potentially catastrophically conflate the registers of the religious and the political. It is here, I think, that a strong disconnect may actually exist not only in terms of goals and interests, but rather at the level of fundamental beliefs and values. When I was a boy in Beirut in the 1960s and 70s, secularism ? by which I mean the strict neutrality of the state on matters concerning religion ? was certainly not a universal value by any means, but was a highly respected and legitimate position adopted by a great deal of the intelligentsia, political elite and ordinary people. Since the Iranian revolution and the rise of Islamism, a generalized deterioration in the appreciation of the distinction between the political and the religious registers of individual and social life has been positively disastrous. It threatens, if it goes any further, to become absolutely catastrophic, and I will have more to say about this in one of my very next postings.

Sadiq al-Azm and other leading intellectuals continue to bemoan this cultural degeneration, which has promoted a religiosity shorn of spirituality and universal human values, and is instead obsessed with regulating daily activities and restricting the range of choices available to people in a most preposterous, irrational and abusive manner. This has been accompanied by an intellectual deterioration, a lack of sophisticated engagement with much of what is most useful in the intellectual development of the rest of the world (and not just the West by any means), and an intensification of a closing down of what might be called Arab discourse in general. In other words, the Arab world has generally speaking been degenerating rather than progressing over the past few decades. Obviously, there are important exceptions to this, and I wouldn?t want to engage in any reductive stereotyping or fail to acknowledge the (sadly limited) pockets of genuine intellectual, political and artistic dynamism that continue to thrive in spite of a generalized cultural degeneration. There are plenty of inspirational people, groups and institutions in the Arab world, and no reason to be simplistically pessimistic. However, the general trends and the basic realities are, for the most part, getting worse and not better.

If this sounds harsh, that?s because it is. Between the hegemonic political straitjacket of ?The Narrative? and the resurgence of a new, obscurantist and reactionary form of Islam, the Arab world has entered into a period of unprecedented malaise. If many people in the Middle East find all of this somehow comforting or positive, here we certainly disagree. I suppose it?s possible that in this sense, some of my opinions are indeed severely disconnected from those of some Middle Easterners living in the Middle East. Like James Joyce?s Stephen Dedalus ? and with exactly the same spirit and multivalent range of meanings, refuting both teleological fantasies regarding the will of God, and the deterministic and hegemonic primacy of ?The Narrative? ? I wish to tell our own Arab Garrett Abu-Deasys: ?History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.?

Several people have been urging me to do a posting on the Ibishblog on question of why the Arab publics, who live under a collection of despotic regimes, one-party states, failed and semi-failed states, absolute monarchies, military juntas and family/tribal fiefdoms haven’t ever (or at least in living memory) publicly revolted in the same way that so many Iranians have taken to the streets in defense of their rights and for more open, transparent government. Obviously, this is an extremely complex and over-determined question, but I think it might be worth pointing out some of the more obvious factors that have inhibited rebellion of the Iranian variety in the Arab world.

First, it’s worth pointing out that with a couple of exceptions, most notably Lebanon which has a very weird, deeply flawed and sectarian but nonetheless democratic system, people in the Arab world generally know perfectly well that they don’t have any meaningful political or civil rights. Hamid Dabashi has been one of the most forceful commentators in describing, I think perfectly accurately, the uprising in Iran against the ruling elite as being essentially a "civil rights movement." In other words, what has driven Iranians into the streets in defiance of government oppression is a sense that rights that they believed that they had have suddenly and blatantly been taken from them in the most crude and indeed brutal manner. Until the recent election fraud/military coup, or however one wants to characterize the grotesque usurpation from within the system that has taken place within Iran, most Iranians did believe that they possessed a set of limited but reliable civil and political rights within the rubric of the "Islamic Republic." In other words, they believed that they were free to choose in elections between approved candidates willing to operate within the essential framework of the Iranian political system (one commentator aptly describe the range of choices available as analogous to an American conservative gamut running roughly from figures approximating Bob Dole-style moderate conservatism all the way to the David Duke-KKK extreme right).

Following the crude and blatant election fraud, the Iranian public has essentially been told, "April fool, your votes don’t count." Following the crackdown on demonstrations after the first few days of tolerated dissent, they’ve similarly been informed that the right to protest, freely assemble, and express grievances towards their government were also illusory and have been, in effect, canceled. The same applies to other forms of civil rights, such as free speech within certain limits, freedom of conscience and other elements of post-revolution Iran that were supposed to give meaning to the republican part of the "Islamic Republic." Mousavi has said that the present crisis is a test of whether "Islamic republicanism" is actually a possibility, or is an oxymoron. Unsurprisingly, the latter is increasingly proving to be obviously the case, as theocracy and not only democracy, but also pluralism and civil rights, simply do not go together. The situation has been made worse by the fact that the entire fiasco is being driven by an internal takeover within the regime by a military/intelligence clique dependent on, and appointed and led by Ayatollah Khamenei, usurping the authority of a more traditional clerical and revolutionary elite within the Iranian ruling circles. The people in the streets are outraged that their votes don’t count, they’re not allowed to protest, and their supposed right to free speech and assembly have been canceled (if they ever really existed in practice at all). Clerics in Qom and other religious establishment figures are appalled to find that a bureaucratic national security state clique has usurped power entirely and marginalized the old guard of the "Islamic Republic." When people feel that their rights have been suddenly taken away from them, or that a new and unaccountable clique has seized power, outrage is the inevitable response.

None of this applies in the Arab world. The sad fact is that the Arabs know full well that they don’t have meaningful political or civil rights, with a very limited exception of Lebanon (and, in some odd and also very limited ways, in the West Bank and Iraq too, but under conditions of internal strife and occupation). The sad truth is that in almost all cases, Arabs know that their votes don’t count, that they don’t have freedom of speech, assembly or conscience, and that they live under strictly authoritarian or totalitarian systems. In some cases these are enforced with sheer brutality, and in other cases with financial rewards for quiescence as an additional inducement to passivity. In all cases, the sticks are well-known and frequently used, in other cases (mainly the oil-exporting Gulf countries) the carrots are also very enticing. The combination seems to have been extremely effective, at least for now.

A second factor, which may be even more important, are extremely legitimate fears of the consequences of open rebellion in the Arab world. The two likely consequences of such rebellion in many cases, at least in the minds of many people, are even more unpalatable than the dysfunctional and heavy-handed states currently in place. In every Arab country, the principal opposition is the Islamist ultra-right. They have very strong support, but it certainly limited in almost every country to a distinct minority, in few cases exceeding 20-25% of public opinion at most. The rest of society is deeply disturbed at the prospect of theocratic rule by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood or analogous organizations. I think there is a very real, and extremely realistic and accurate, sense that replacing existing regimes with Islamist revolutionary governments would be anything but an improvement on the present situation for most people. It could well be argued that the Arab regimes have promoted exactly this situation by systematically cracking down on all liberal and left-of-center opposition groups while allowing religious extremists a degree of political space in which to operate and organize. All of this, of course, was with the enthusiastic support of the West which always preferred, especially during the Cold War, religious conservatives to anything smacking of socialism.

Obviously, it is socially more difficult to interfere with organizations that hide behind religious structures in order to operate, but it’s also politically useful for governments to have unreasonable and extremist opponents who will fail to appeal to a majority of sensible people. The details vary from country to country, but in almost every case the center and the left has been persecuted, marginalized and crushed (or discredited by being co-opted by the regimes), while the religious right has been allowed a certain degree of space to operate within mosques and Islamic institutions, and for certain complex historical reasons has risen in every single Arab country to constitute the main, and in many cases the only, properly organized opposition. I think a very large number of Arabs prefer to continue to deal with the devil they know to be highly problematic in their own governments, as opposed to a devil they know to be even worse in the Islamist opposition groups. It is almost certain that, given the paucity of centrist and leftist organizations that are organized and effective, any public uprising that effectively destabilized existing governments would open the door almost inevitably to the rise of extreme Islamist parties to power. The Iranian case may have emboldened Arab Islamists, but it has certainly spooked the general Arab public in the same way.

The other alternative, obviously, is open-ended civil conflict and failed-state status. Lebanon and Iraq are already at the very least semi-failed states. Somalia is absolutely a failed state. It isn’t very difficult to imagine that widespread civil unrest, if it didn’t result quickly in the seizure of power by Islamist extremists which would be more oppressive, brutal and obscurantist than existing governments, would give way to open-ended chaos and failed-state status. These alternatives certainly explain the otherwise confounding ability of the Ba’athist regime in Syria to continue to survive in spite of all of its myriad failings, inadequacies and unacceptability. Assad survives in an authoritarian, unpopular and sectarian minority-dominated Alawite regime because the two alternatives are deemed by most Syrians and regional actors as absolutely unacceptable: Muslim Brotherhood takeover or Iraq-style chaos. Indeed, not only does this prevent (along with shameless repression by the regime itself) the Syrian public from taking to the streets as the Iranians have done, but also prompted Syria’s main regional rivals and opponents — Saudi Arabia and Israel — to intervene with the Bush administration to argue strongly against a campaign of regime change during the era of neoconservative intoxication in Washington between 2002-2004.

The Arab center and left finds itself in the unpalatable position of having to choose between working within the systems that provide an unacceptably limited space for civil society and political pluralism versus adopting positions and strategies that would, under the present circumstances, only serve to usher in a period of either theocratic dictatorship or generalized chaos. Some, especially on the far left, seem to have convinced themselves that the best way to move towards the center and the left in the Arab world is to charge headlong towards the extreme right. This seems absolutely irrational, and the prospects of progressive change under Islamist rule strike me very strongly as much more implausible than gradual reform within the admittedly unacceptable existing political structures in most Arab states. You could call it a Hobson’s choice, or a devil’s bargain, or anything you like, but in the real political world one must seriously consider the practical consequences of the real choices that have to be made. Obviously what is required is for the Arab center and left to work diligently, patiently and boldly to create more space for political pluralism and civil society within existing structures and to use whatever limited reforms are currently underway or being contemplated, and always push for ever greater reforms, and to rebuild a progressive Arab political narrative and agenda that can serve as an alternative to both abusive authoritarian regimes and the obviously far worse option of theocratic dictatorship.

At some point, the dam will burst and there will be significant, perhaps even radical change in the Arab Middle East. If the Arab regimes do not begin to seriously move to create more space for civil society, political pluralism and the ability of the center and the left to begin to rebuild their organizations, narratives and agendas, then the flood will be an Islamist one. This is in the interests neither of the present governments nor of the general publics of the Arab world, and must be avoided at all costs. Both the regimes and the center and left opposition groups must also, in order to avoid such a catastrophe, move beyond the monomaniacal obsession with the conflict with Israel, and begin to pay serious attention to domestic social, economic and political development in the Arab world. This doesn’t mean abandoning the cause of Palestine, by any means. It means augmenting concern and support for the Palestinians with a healthy understanding that the Arab world has a panoply problems with which it must deal, and that governments must not hide behind the conflict to resist reform, while the center and the left must not give way to abandoning its broader social, political and economic agenda in order to simply support anything and everything (at present, usually Islamist) that presents itself as the vanguard of "the resistance." The day may come, and soon, when the Arab public demands and achieves major change in their societies, and even revolt against their governments, but it must never be the case that the Arabs are, so to speak, "revolting."

Gilad Atzmon is an Israeli jazz musician, proponent of a single Israeli-Palestinian state, and political charlatan. His article, recently published on multiple websites, "Thinking Outside of the Secular Box," represents the very worst in neo-Orientalist and frankly racist objectification of Arabs, Muslims and especially Palestinians, and is one of the weakest defenses for supporting the Islamist ultra-right yet produced from the Western left. It embodies, I think, almost everything that is worst about the way some Western leftists approach questions involving the Muslim world generally and Palestine in particular. The entire article is worth carefully reading as an index of how not to approach solidarity with Palestinians and other Arab or Muslim peoples and causes.

Atzmon begins by making a categorical assertion that Westerners and Muslims are simply fundamentally different categories of people, since, “Our human conditions are imposed on us; we are a product of our culture.” It is unrealistic and unfair, he suggests, for Westerners or any other liberals, leftists or progressives to hold Palestinians or other Muslims to any universal standards of human rights, particularly the social and political pluralism inherent in secularism, since “secularism is in itself a natural outcome of Christian culture.” Atzmon apparently believes that only Christian societies can have governments that are neutral on matters of religion. “Islam and Judaism, unlike Christianity," he argues, "are tribally orientated belief systems.” I won’t pass any judgment on questions involving Judaism, although this doesn’t correspond with the Judaism I have experienced from most Jews I have met and dealt with in my life. However, the notion that Islam is essentially a "tribally-oriented belief system" is simply preposterous. Islam is a universalist faith that, at least theologically, is categorically and unequivocally opposed to ethno-centrism, racism, tribalism or anything of the kind. It’s certainly true that in much of the postcolonial world in Asia and Africa in which the majority of Muslims live, tribal systems dominate cultural and political structures, but this is extraneous to the logic and systems of thought built-in to most forms of Islamic theology. The two phenomena are parallel and co-exist, but are in many ways more contradictory than complementary.

Not only are Muslims incapable of being secularists and are inherently tribalist, not only culturally but in terms of the essence of the theology of their religion, “Like in the case of Rabbinical Judaism, that is totally foreign to the spirit of Enlightenment, Islam is largely estranged to those values of Eurocentric Modernism and rationality.” I have to admit to feeling personally insulted by this absolutely disgusting regurgitation of blatant racism by Atzmon. I think it’s perfectly true that religious faith and superstition have a complex and often contentious relationship with Enlightenment rationalism and modernity in general, but this is certainly not unique to Judaism or Islam, and it is readily to be found in Christian societies, and most certainly here in the United States. There is no question that the entire postcolonial world is struggling to come to grips with a modernity that is largely the product of Western history over the past 600 years, and has spread through different means, largely colonial, throughout the world. However, the idea that Islam and the Muslims are therefore incapable of becoming fully-interpolated modern subjects imbued with both of the essence of their traditional faith and the reality of their full and equal participation in a modern, rational post-Enlightenment global society is simply insulting as well as positively idiotic.

Atzmon then extrapolates this ridiculous line of thinking to the question of Palestine writing, "I have recently accused a genuine Leftist and good activist of being an Islamophobe for blaming Hamas for being ‘reactionary’.” If it is “Islamophobic” to call the fundamentalist religious ultra-right “reactionary,” then neither term has any meaning whatsoever. Atzmon tries to justify his opposition to recognizing the political nature of Hamas’ ideology by arguing that, “in Islam there is no real separation between the spiritual and the political. The notion of political Islam (Islamism) may as well be a Western delusional reading of Islam. I pointed out that Political Islam, and even the rare implementation of ‘armed jihad’, are merely Islam in practice.” To call this extremely simplistic would be far too generous. In fact, it’s a caricature, and an Orientalist (in the worst sense of the term) and indeed a racist one. In fact, without going into the details, throughout almost all of Islamic history there has been a clear distinction between political and clerical authority, and while this distinction has taken on very different forms than those in the West, it is completely false to suggest that Muslims have not and cannot embrace a separation between the political and the religious registers of social life. It is to suggest, among other things, that all Muslims are naturally Islamists, that Arab and Muslim secularists are frauds and phonies, and that all the progressive movements in the Middle East over the past hundred years and more are fundamentally inauthentic and illegitimate.

Atzmon asserts that Hamas is not only the actual leadership of the Palestinian people, and the authentic, genuine and popular expression of Palestinian social and political sentiment, but that any questioning of this idea is simply racist Western liberals imposing their own narrow values on the Palestinian people: “Rather than loving ourselves through the Palestinians and at their expense, we need to accept Palestinians for what they are and support them for who they are regardless of our own views on things. This is the only real form of solidarity.” Atzmon might put down his saxophone long enough to start to understand that most Palestinians, while certainly a conservative people and fairly religious, are, have been and remain essentially secular in their political orientation. The majority of Palestinians have never been Islamist in their essential political outlook, and it remains so to this day, with the PLO remaining significantly more popular than Hamas in most opinion polls over the past 15 years. The parliamentary election victory by Hamas in 2006, with 44% of the votes cast for candidates running under their auspices, hardly represents a decisive victory for Islamism or against secularism, rationalism and Enlightenment values among Palestinians. The result was the product of a series of deeply overdetermined factors, including frustration with lack of progress on peace and independence, disgust with corruption and mismanagement by Fatah, local political concerns, and many other factors. It also occurred at a moment of Hamas’ maximum organizational power and popularity, and an internal implosion within Fatah. At any rate, the idea that Palestinians, like all other Arabs and Muslims, are basically at heart reactionary Islamists permanently and inevitably alienated from secularism, rationalism and all aspects of the Enlightenment is a familiar theme of Western racist discourse, and it isn’t any less repulsive coming from a Jewish Israeli leftist than it would be from a mustachioed British colonial colonel.

Having pronounced Palestinians to be irretrievably reactionary, Islamist and alienated from rationalism, the Enlightenment and modernity, Atzmon urges his readers to embrace this imaginary and deliciously exotic Arab pet, since, "If we claim to be compassionate about people we better learn to love them for what they are rather than what we expect them to be." Of course, Atzmon is in love with the Palestinians who behave as he expects them to, that is to say the reactionary fundamentalist ultra-right of Hamas and its core Islamist supporters. As for the rest of the Palestinians, he just doesn’t recognize their authenticity or legitimacy.

All of this is painfully reminiscent of Arundhati Roy’s outrageous refusal to draw any distinctions between elements of the Iraqi resistance to the American occupation she was willing to support even during the time of Zarqawi’s campaign the mass murder of Iraqis and snuff videos on the Internet among other mind boggling abuses and atrocities (all in the name of the most vicious reactionary agenda imaginable). Roy said simply, "the Iraqi resistance is fighting on the frontlines of the battle against Empire. And therefore that battle is our battle," without drawing any distinctions or making any effort to distinguish between groups operating in Iraq with a radically different goals and methods, including Zarqawi’s forces of pure, unmitigated evil. She rationalized this irredeemably unprincipled position by arguing, "if we were to only support pristine movements, then no resistance will be worthy of our purity,” which is an absolutely ridiculous formulation that suggests there can be no space between what may be difficult to stomach versus what is absolutely unacceptable under any circumstances, and which completely ignores the question of what the ultimate agenda behind such actions in fact is.

Atzmon’s racism is simply breathtaking. He actually wants the Palestinians and the other Muslims to be anti-rational, anti-modern, anti-Enlightenment and supporters of ultra-right-wing, reactionary religious fundamentalist parties. Why he wants this, only he can say. But if he has the courage of his convictions, Atzmon should convert to an ultraconservative version of Islam, leave his hip London jazz scene and move to Gaza or better yet southern Afghanistan, become an armed member of a salafist-jihadist gang, and possibly start wearing a burqa.

Yesterday I commented on the outrageous demagoguery of Prime Minister Netanyahu who told the German foreign minister that, "Judea and Samaria [official Israeli jargon for the occupied West Bank] cannot be Judenrein," a term that invokes the genocidal anti-Semitic policies of the Nazi regime. Now the ultra-right wing Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has gone one better. Reuters reports that, “Lieberman told Israeli ambassadors to circulate the 1941 shot in Berlin of the Nazi leader seated next to Haj Amin al-Husseini, the late mufti or top Muslim religious leader in Jerusalem. One official said Lieberman, an ultranationalist, hoped the photo would ‘embarrass’ Western countries into ceasing to demand that Israel halt the project on land owned by the mufti’s family in a predominantly Arab neighborhood in East Jerusalem.”

For many years, right-wing Zionists and others have tried to use the Hitler-Husseini association as a tool to justify the most outrageous Israeli behavior, and to suggest that Palestinian identity itself and the Palestinian national movement is nothing more or less than a creation and form of Nazism. This message has been a central feature of the Islamophobic campaign in the United States post-9/11, and was the main thrust of the film, “Obsession: Radical Islam’s War against the West,” whose original principal marketer and de facto producer is the quasi-official propaganda organization honestreporting.com, closely linked to Israel’s Foreign Ministry.

The argument that the Palestinian cause is in essence a Nazi plot has developed a considerable following on the Israeli and pro-Israeli far-right in the years since the second intifada began in September, 2000. The film “Obsession” promoted this balderdash shamelessly and to a wide audience, and Lieberman is invoking the same idea. In this rhetoric, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is totally decontextualized and the occupation simply unmentioned as a factor. The entire blame for tensions is placed on Palestinian television, textbooks, media, etc., as if the occupation itself were not the ultimate form of incitement. The whole point is to change the subject from the occupation as the obvious proximate cause of the conflict and indict Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims as such by attacking their beliefs and culture, particularly as a derivation and form of Nazism, and implicitly justify the occupation and settlements.

During the 2008 presidential campaign, at least 28 million DVD copies of “Obsession” were suddenly distributed free of charge via mail and newspaper inserts to huge numbers of unsuspecting American voters. The context of this distribution barrage was unmistakable. The candidacy of US Senator Barack Obama, a Christian whose Kenyan father was of Muslim origin, was the target of numerous attacks claiming that he was secretly a Muslim, in league with Muslims or disloyal because of his family’s partly Muslim heritage. The sudden reintroduction of the film and its free distribution to millions of voters, primarily in swing states, was plainly intended to serve a dual purpose: first, to reinforce its message of Islamophobic and anti-Arab hatred, and second, to encourage bigoted anxieties about Obama’s heritage and connections to the Muslim world.

The organization behind the distribution campaign during the election was a shadowy group called the Clarion Fund, which appears to be an offshoot of the right wing Aish HaTorah organization in Israel. According to the Jewish Week newspaper, “the ties between Aish HaTorah and the production of the films appear to date back to the launch of the media watchdog group Honest Reporting by the founder and former executive director of the Jerusalem Fund of Aish HaTorah, Irwin Katsof, in 2001.” Rabbi Raphael Shore serves as the executive directory of The Clarion Fund and is also a full-time employee of Aish HaTorah. In addition, the spokesperson of the Clarion Fund, Gregory Ross, was listed as an Aish HaTorah international fundraiser on a June 2007 federal election contribution form.

“Obsession” and similar propaganda discuss Nazi efforts to reach out to Arabs and Muslims in the 30s and 40s, as if similar efforts were not made with regard to the other colonized peoples in the British and French empires. These policies are not presented as predictable attempts to cause problems for global rivals — which is what they were — but as demonstrating some kind of special affinity between Arabs and Nazis, which is preposterous. The alliance between Amin al-Husseini and Hitler is not presented as one between political figures brought together by mutual British enemies, but as an inevitable linking of kindred spirits.

The farcical implications this kind of rhetoric are clear – Muslims, above all Palestinians, were Nazis during the Second World War and clamoring to serve Hitler’s agenda, and continue on that path to this very day. In our contemporary western discourse, almost no mention is ever made of the tens of thousands of Muslims who served, and thousands who died, in the allied armies and played a significant role in the defeat of Germany and its allies. No one ever mentions, to take only one instance, the almost half a million Muslims who are estimated to have been serving in the British Army during World War II, more than 300,000 who joined during the war itself. The numerous stories of Albanian Muslims sheltering Jewish refugees have only recently been told in English in “Besa: Muslims Who Saved Jews in World War II” by Norman H. Gershman (Syracuse University Press, 2008). Equally ignored are similar heroic efforts by the Turkish diplomats Selahattin Ulkummen, Necdet Kent, and Namik Kemal Yolga. And the efforts by numerous Arabs in Vichy-France occupied Morocco and Algeria to protect Jews has been outlined for the first and only time in the West in Robert Satloff’s “Among the Righteous” (PublicAffairs, 2007). But all of this is generally ignored in favor of the myth of the Arabs and Palestinians as rabid junior Nazis who deserve everything they get.

This is a crude and obvious effort to make Amin al-Husseini stand in for all Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims, whose actions are supposed to create a collective guilt that then justifies the worst abuses the Israeli occupation can dish out to innocent Palestinian civilians. Lieberman actually wants his hapless diplomats (who I actually feel a little sorry for in this instance) to go to European officials and say, “Yes, we are building illegal settlements in occupied territory in violation of international law and our own Roadmap commitments, but its ok: the Palestinians are all just a bunch of Nazis, and we have a photo from 1941 to prove it.”

A reader of the Ibishblog writes, “It appears that the PA and its supporters believe that Jews may not live in a future Palestinian state. Why is it necessary to make Palestine Jew free?” Thank you very much for that question, but I am happy to report that this is not, in fact, the case. Much has been made recently of these claims by many supporters of Israel, apparently including Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. It is reported that, in defending his insistence that Israel settlement activities continue apace in spite of American and international demands that Israel adhere to its commitment to a settlement freeze, Netanyahu told the German foreign minister that, "Judea and Samaria [official Israeli jargon for the occupied West Bank] cannot be Judenrein," a term hearkening back to the genocidal anti-Semitic policies of the Nazi regime. This theme that a stop to settlement activity is some kind of Nazism, anti-Semitism, or even “ethnic cleansing” (a despicable piece of sophistry recently proposed by the typically ludicrous annual Frank Luntz public relations/hasbara manual tediously regurgitated by the Israel Project) is ridiculous on multiple levels, and simply designed to obfuscate the fact that Israel has no right either legally or politically to continue with settlement activities.

However, the idea that all Jews and Israelis would have to leave a future Palestinian state is not a demand made by the Palestinian Authority or its supporters. To the contrary, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad said at the Aspen Institute recently that, "Jews, to the extent they choose to stay and live in the state of Palestine, will enjoy those rights and certainly will not enjoy any less rights than Israeli Arabs enjoy now in the state of Israel." Numerous other Palestinian officials have made similar comments in the past, and I personally said the same thing in my colloquy with the Israeli Council General in Los Angeles in a radio program a few months ago. I think there are very few, if any, Palestinians who have a desire to see zero Jews living in a Palestinian state.

However, the situation is obviously a complicated one. There are almost 500,000 Israeli settlers living in the occupied territories at the present time. Their physical presence is the single greatest complicating factor in drawing a mutually acceptable border between Israel and a Palestinian state. However, the principle of a land swap in which parts of the occupied territories that have been heavily settled by Jewish colonists might be exchanged for unpopulated or sparsely populated territories in Israel adjacent to the West Bank has been accepted in principle by both sides for quite some time. It is estimated that between 70-80% of the Israeli settlers reside in between 3-4% of the occupied territories, especially in and around occupied East Jerusalem. In theory, a large majority of Israeli settlers in some of the major settlement blocs, with some adjustments, could become Israeli citizens living within parts of the occupied territories ceded to Israel as part of a land swap agreement. The negotiation of the details would obviously be fairly complex, but I think there is every indication that such an arrangement is achievable.

However, that leaves the question of a significant group of settlers who would then be left residing in the rest of East Jerusalem and the West Bank that becomes the territory of the Palestinian state. Palestinians have already expressed a willingness to have Jews remain in Palestine either as Israeli citizens residing in territories under Palestinian sovereignty or some other formula such as dual citizenship. However, there are two additional complications. First, many of the settlers, especially in outlying settlements that will almost certainly not be part of any land swap and will have to be integral elements of a Palestinian state, are living on land that has been unlawfully expropriated from Palestinian public or private ownership. It is estimated that almost 40% of the West Bank has been expropriated in one form or another of the state of Israel, and there is no way that this “arrangement” can survive the transfer of authority to a Palestinian state. Therefore, the question of land ownership in settlements that will become part of a Palestinian state in which Jewish residents will wish to continue to reside is an issue that will have to be resolved in negotiations by the national leaderships with sensitivity and a sense of realism. Again, I do not think this should be in any way insurmountable if the will for a permanent status agreement is strong on both sides. However, it is unlikely that the Palestinian state would permit the current Jewish-only policies for residency in these Jewish West Bank settlements to continue following independence, and settlers who remain in Palestine will not only find themselves living in a Palestinian state, but living with and among Palestinians as equals. This will be a new experience for many of them, but if their intention is to live on the land and not to conquer and rule it, it shouldn’t be impossible to accept.

The biggest obstacle to the continuation of Jewish residency in a future Palestinian state is unlikely to be the Palestinians themselves, or even the Jewish settlers willing to abide by the laws of Palestine. Rather, opposition is most likely to come from the government of Israel itself. It is difficult to imagine the Israeli state feeling that it can allow large numbers (or even modest numbers) of Jewish Israeli citizens to continue living in the territory that becomes a fully independent and sovereign Palestinian state under the protection of the Palestinian, and not the Israeli, authorities. In every society, especially where there are ethnic tensions, and even within ethnic groups, there are always incidents of violence, unrest and grievances. It is likely that most Palestinians would not have a problem with the continued presence of Jewish Israelis in a Palestinian state who were willing to submit to Palestinian law and live as equals rather than as colonizers and rulers. However, there is no guarantee that tensions and confrontations may not occur — in fact, it’s almost impossible to imagine any society in which such things do not happen. I think it would be very politically and socially problematic for any Israeli government to essentially say to former Jewish settlers, now residents of Palestine, in effect, you are on your own, good luck, and if you have any problems, contact our embassy in East Jerusalem. I imagine this might look like a nightmare to any Israeli political leader and the public outcry might be intolerable. Therefore, I actually think that the party with the strongest interest in ensuring that there is the smallest possible presence of Jewish Israelis remaining as permanent residents, citizens or dual citizens of a future Palestinian state is actually the government of Israel, and not either the settlers or the Palestinians.

To return briefly to Netanyahu’s outrageous comments invoking the ghastly concept of “Judenrein” when referring to holding Israel to its Roadmap commitments and international legal responsibilities to cease colonizing occupied territories, there are two final points worth making. First, the Israeli state is in no position to lecture anybody else, anywhere in the world, about ethnic cleansing, ethnic discrimination, and attempting to rid a land of its people. Such outrageous hypocrisy, particularly coming from a politician with the ideology of Netanyahu and his even more extreme coalition partners, is the very definition of chutzpah. Second, the reason why international law, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 49), as I’ve pointed out many times in the past, prohibits settlement activity in occupied territories is that it is, by definition and inevitably, a human rights violation against the people living under occupation. Therefore, in Netanyahu’s twisted "through the looking glass" world, ceasing to violate the human rights of Palestinians living under occupation and obeying the Geneva Convention, international law, the roadmap and everything else, becomes, in effect, a capitulation to Nazism. If we have ever seen a more cynical huckster at work, it’s been a while.

A regular reader of the Ibishblog asks me, “Why is it that you continue to propose that Israel be enriched for doing what every particle of international law suggests it is obliged to do? If a burglar is caught and offers to return the stolen property if he is treated to an Armani suit and a better apartment, we would rightly laugh hysterically as we cart him off to prison. But when Israel makes an equally preposterous demand for simply conforming to its legal responsibilities, folks like you urge us to leap at the chance to mollify the aggressor. I’m sure you justify your position with reference to some variant of ‘political realism,’ but I believe this is an enormous mistake. If I understand you correctly, you seem to think that confronting a cornered animal will only get you into trouble. I understand, but I think it more unwise to toss the beast a filet or two while it regains its strength and plans its escape."

I think I’ve already explained my logic for why I think the Obama administration ought to be willing to allow Netanyahu some face-saving measures in order to keep his coalition together while he essentially accepts a settlement freeze. Calling it "temporary," is precisely such a fig leaf. A temporary settlement freeze will in effect be permanent, at least until there is a new president in the White House. Minor adjustments such as fulfilling existing contracts (I believe there are 200 buildings in question or so), or other minor details might allow Netanyahu to capitulate in reality while telling his more extreme coalition partners that he has won some kind of valuable concession from the United States. As I’ve said in the past, I don’t think a confrontation between the White House and Netanyahu that will in effect drain a great deal of political energy and capital towards replacing the Israeli government at the moment would be a useful development. How much political energy and capital would be left for actual progress after such a grueling and draining process is questionable, and it would certainly reinforce the sense among Israeli politicians that the settlement issue is one to be avoided at all costs since it brings down governments and ends political careers.

You are absolutely right, my arguments are in fact based on not a variant of political realism, but political realism itself, insofar as the term refers to what is required to actually get things done rather than sitting back and demanding them in a way that ensures that nothing happens. This has been a typical Arab and Arab-American approach, and I think it’s high time that we try to understand how diplomacy and American politics can actually function in a way that advances the Palestinian interests rather than allows Israeli colonization to proceed apace. We are experts on the what and why of politics, explaining what we think ought to happen and why it is justified. What we tend to miss, ignore, and even become angry at the mere mention of, is the how. How is an exceptionally important question for any goal-oriented political strategy. And, in such a difficult, delicate and politically charged situation, the how requires finesse, strategic intelligence and nuance. The morality and international law of the situation are beyond question. What is challenging is not making the case of what Israel should do and why, but how to get them to actually do it, especially given the most recent election results.

My urging of the Arab states to reciprocate with the Obama administration’s bold and unprecedented moves on pressuring Israel by expressing a willingness to begin to operationalize the Arab Peace Initiative through diplomatic gestures short of recognition and full relations (which must continue to be contingent on a permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians) is a reflection of the understanding that the Obama administration requires political cover and support to maintain its unprecedented stances domestically in the United States and also an understanding that Israel requires political inducements for doing what it must and should, but which any Israeli politician would find exceptionally politically problematic and risky. Like farm animals, individuals and societies can only be moved through a combination of carrots and sticks. All sticks and no carrots is generally ineffective, and standing on principles of morality and international law simply will not work, especially with recalcitrant ideologues like Netanyahu and even more his ultra-right wing coalition partners. No politician is going to take a step that is guaranteed to bring down his government and end his career. No state is going to do something that is politically painful and difficult without being able to show significant benefits for having done that. All I’m asking the Arab states to do is to recognize this reality, and to embrace the logic of their own pronouncements.

Obama and the United States are not going to be able to do this on their own. The United States has unprecedented and unique leverage over Israel, but Israel is a sovereign state and I think we often exaggerate the extent to which the United States is able to enforce its dictates, both as an internal political matter here at home, and much more significantly with regard to another country far away with very specific and limited interests and a powerful and aggressive ideology and national narrative. I do not agree that Israel is a "cornered animal," I think it still possesses a lot of cards and the present tactic appears to be to hunker down and weather the storm. I think the approach you suggest would actually play into their present attitude perfectly, and could actually allow it to succeed. The Obama administration is certainly playing its part, and so is the Palestinian Authority, especially with regard to its security commitments. If the Arab states too were to express a willingness to engage in dpilomatic overtures, as Sec. Clinton said in her Council on Foreign Relations speech "however modest," Israel and the Netanyahu Cabinet would find themselves completely isolated as the sole recalcitrant, uncooperative party. I don’t think this is a tenable or sustainable position for them.

Were the Arab states to continue to insist that the Initiative is an all-or-nothing offer that might then been seen by the West and others as in fact constituting a public relations ploy without substance, this could well be the factor that allows Netanyahu and his allies to wriggle out of the present trap in which they find themselves. I think it would be a tragedy if this were allowed to happen. It is not a question of rewarding criminals. It is a question of achieving tangible, substantial and extremely significant benefits for Palestinian diplomacy and the aim of ending the occupation. A settlement freeze is, and has for a long time been, the sine qua non for progress and for starting Roadmap Phase 4 permanent status talks. The Netanyahu Cabinet understands this perfectly well, which is why they are so adamantly opposed to accepting it. At the moment, it is the name of the game. If the Arabs assist Netanyahu in avoiding this and scuppering the Obama administration’s initiative, it is the Palestinian people and their national cause and rights that will suffer the most. We really don’t have much to gain by simply lecturing or embarrassing Israel. We do have a great deal to gain by helping to force them to accede to a settlement freeze. I think it is the reader’s approach, and not mine, that would help Netanyahu escape a settlement freeze and go ahead with expanding and entrenching the occupation. Political realism is not a pejorative, it is a necessity for effective strategy, effective action, and actual success.

PS– since originally posting this article, I have come across two stories that confirm the grave danger of exactly what I’m talking about. First, Laura Rozen of the outstanding The Cable blog at Foreign Policy magazine reports that Obama’s efforts to get the Arabs to cooperate fell flat during his crucial meeting with the Saudi government during his Middle East trip. An additional article in today’s Haaretz reports that this lack of cooperation is leading to a reassessment of Obama’s approach towards a settlement freeze and towards pushing for the peace process, although thankfully rather than giving up the administration is apparently attempting to find new avenues. But this lack of cooperation from the Arab states is absolutely shameful and entirely destructive.

A simple and fundamental miscalculation in how the hijab has been explained to their non-Muslim compatriots by the emerging Muslim communities in the United States and other Western countries has created what would otherwise have probably been largely avoidable controversies. The most recent iteration of this is a proposed law in the state of Oregon that would ban teachers from wearing "religious attire" in schools, apparently in an effort to prevent proselytizing in classrooms (which is a perfectly reasonable concern for any state legislature). This is, of course, highly reminiscent of ongoing controversies in France and other European countries that have sought to ban students in schools from wearing hijab and similar "religious attire." However, the entire matter might have been avoided, or at least significantly downplayed, had the most vocal spokespersons for these emerging Muslim communities not attempted to present the hijab as a "religious requirement" but rather as a cultural and personal choice to do with standards of modesty to which no one could reasonably object.

There are two reasons why some of the Muslim leadership in the United States and Europe have emphasized the hijab as "religiously mandated," suggesting that it is a form of religious symbolism rather than a personal choice about an individual standard of modesty in public attire. The first, of course, is that many if not most women who wear the hijab consider it a religious duty. The second is that many of these generally conservative and sometimes reactionary leaderships wish to enforce the idea that it is, in fact, a religious duty for women to cover their hair, and pressure women to do so. The Council on American-Islamic Relations has, for example, several times in the past issued e-mails expressing the view that women in public should be fully covered except for the face and hands, that men should not wear silk or gold, and similar constructs. Obviously, everyone is entitled to their opinions about both religion and fashion, no matter how dubious.

However, this emphasis on the idea that the hijab is a religious requirement has led many non-Muslims in the West to misinterpret it as some sort of religious symbol designed to communicate a kind of public devotion and announcement of religious affiliation rather than a standard of modesty. This misunderstanding has characterized the entire debate in France in which the hijab is seen as a challenge to French "secularism," although there is no doubt that racism and cultural chauvinism have permeated a deplorably twisted version of this indispensable principle in France and other parts of Europe. A lead editorial in today’s edition of the Oregonian newspaper makes the same error, suggesting that, "Wearing religious attire, whether it be an Islamic hijab or a Christian cross necklace, is not the same as proselytizing." By presenting the hijab entirely in terms of religious symbolism and requirements, Muslim American organizations may have been consciously trying to link the right to wear it to First Amendment freedom of religion protections, but I would strongly argue they have confused non-Muslim Americans as to the most essential reasons some Muslim women choose to cover their hair. The hijab is not a statement or a means of communicating an opinion, it is an issue of propriety and modesty, which are two completely different things. Asking a hijab-wearing woman to remove her scarf and reveal her hair is not analogous to asking a Christian person to remove a cross necklace. It is much closer to asking a typical American lady to remove her shirt and bra in public or teach a class topless. I think this analogy would have been not only more accurate, but much more easily understood, although it would have failed to reinforce the idea within the community that there is some sort of alleged religious obligation for women to dress in a certain manner in order to please God.

The truth of the matter, of course, is that there is no consensus on the hijab whatsoever in the Muslim community in the United States and the rest of the West, or for that matter in the Middle East either. It may be true that a majority of religious scholars over the centuries have felt that vague Quranic injunctions about modesty are properly interpreted as requiring the covering of hair, but this is not a universal interpretation. My guess is that a large majority of Muslim American women do not wear any hijab, and that while the practice has become much more pervasive in the Middle East over the past 30 years, there are very large numbers of Muslim women of the utmost devotion who do not choose to cover their hair and are not less Muslim for that. On the other end of the spectrum, others go so far as to suggest that women should be placed in burqas or naqabs, that is to say in effect inside a kind of a sack, whenever they appear in public outside the home, and this has been reasonably described by some as a kind of "moving prison." This is not to say that those who choose to don a sack should not have the right to do so (Michael Jackson is reputed to have been a devotee of the practice), but rather that the notion that there is some kind of consensus view about women’s attire that characterizes Islamic practices and beliefs is simply false.

In reality, the hijab is a manifestation of a convergence of three distinct factors: cultural norms, religious opinions and personal choices. In some cases, a political factor can be added, as some women have chosen to wear the hijab as a show of political defiance, both in the Middle East and the United States, although this is not terribly common. Of these, personal choice is the most important, as no one should be dictating to anybody else what they should be wearing (including the governments of France and Oregon). Religious opinions are also at play, and should be protected. But at heart, the hijab generally reflects cultural norms about modesty and propriety in dress and attire. These cultural norms are associated with both social and familial standards, and have more to do with a sense of propriety than a desire to display religious affiliation in an ostentatious way as the wearing of a cross or, for that matter Islamic symbolism such as miniature Qurans. Had the question of modesty been emphasized from the beginning by Western Muslim leaderships in discussing the issue of the hijab, which would have been more honest as well as more effective, the issue of religious symbolism might have been largely avoided. Covering or not covering the hair in this context has about as much significance as choosing long sleeve versus short sleeve shirts or ankle-length skirts versus shorter skirts. No one would bother with questions like that in the United States (or France).

However, because the hijab has been wrongly emphasized as a "religious requirement" and therefore imbued entirely with religious symbolism rather than a standard of modesty, it has been caught up in arguments about proselytizing, secularism and church-state issues in which it need never have been a factor. It goes without saying that under the United States Constitution, Oregon is not permitted to prohibit hijab-wearing women from teaching in its public schools, and that any such ban will never survive legal challenge and will probably not even ever be put into effect. However, although I’m not an attorney, I strongly suspect that any legal challenge, if required, would be better made under the 14th Amendment equal protection standards then under First Amendment free exercise of religion protections. In the past, the federal government has sided with the right to wear the hijab, but under the 14th and not the First Amendment. In other words, I think the federal government has it right: this is an equal protection issue, much more than a free exercise of religion issue.

Had Western Muslim leaderships been more interested in facilitating the free choice of women to wear the hijab or not according to their own judgments, they would have taken a very different approach. Unfortunately, they seem to have been more concerned with applying pressure to women to cover their hair and to reinforce the false idea that there is some sort of consensus on the issue and a stigma attached to not covering the hair. It isn’t any more properly the role of civil rights organizations or groups that are supposed to protect the entire community, much if not most of which does not wear the hijab and should not be pressured or coerced into doing so, than it is the role of the government, to tell anyone how to dress.

I have been saying for some time now that the Arab states will be rapidly finding themselves in a situation in which they have to put up or shut up on Israeli-Palestinian peace. That day has come one step closer with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech at the Council on Foreign Relations this afternoon. The speech as delivered was somewhat softer in its tone towards the Arab states than an earlier draft, but still relatively hard-hitting in terms of ratcheting up the pressure for Arab diplomatic engagement with Israel in exchange for Israeli gestures such as a putative settlement freeze.

An earlier draft of the speech, as prepared, included the following passage: “The Saudi peace proposal, supported by more than twenty nations, was a positive step. But so far, those who embrace it seem unwilling to do anything until the Israelis and Palestinians reach an agreement. This may be understandable, but it is not helpful.” Secretary Clinton’s remarks as delivered were much softer: “The Saudi peace proposal, supported by more than twenty nations, was a positive step. But we believe that more is needed. So we are asking those who embrace the proposal to take meaningful steps now.” Nonetheless, the message is clear: if the administration is going to persist with its firm stance towards Israel regarding settlements, Arab states are going to have to demonstrate that the Arab Peace Initiative really is part of the diplomatic landscape of the Middle East and not simply a public relations ploy.

This is partly an inevitable consequence of Obama and Clinton’s policy of applying pressure towards Israel, and partly linked to a meeting the President had on Monday with leaders of major American Jewish organizations. Obama told the group that peace would require Israel “to engage in serious self-reflection” and held firm on his position regarding an end to settlement activity. By all accounts, most of the Jewish-American organizations either supported this position or declined to offer any vigorous opposition to it. However, it is clear that it is becoming politically difficult for the administration to be perceived as applying pressure on Israel, with its powerful domestic constituencies, and the Palestinians, with their greatly limited options and capacities, but not on the Arab states who have neither the domestic American back-up of Israel nor the understandable constraints of a people living under foreign military occupation. It is vital that Obama keep the pressure on Israel and not relent on settlements, but to do so he is going to require serious and significant Arab support and engagement.

The Arab League position that it is not willing to make diplomatic overtures towards Israel until a permanent status agreement is reached is an unworkable and irresponsible stance. In the real world, if the Arab states genuinely understand how vitally important it is to their national interests for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be brought to an end, they too have to be willing to incur political pain and take political risks. It cannot be only the Palestinians, the Israelis and the Americans who do all the heavy lifting, and the Arabs who reap a significant part of the benefits. Secretary Clinton’s remarks today demonstrate that as political pressure mounts on the administration to ease its position on Israel, the preferred approach by the Obama camp is to refuse to do so, but to balance its approach by demanding similarly difficult steps by Arab states, particularly American allies such as Saudi Arabia.

The United States cannot achieve peace in the Middle East on its own. If they really insist on doing nothing helpful, whether through apathy or cowardice, then the Arab states could well end up shouldering a significant degree of blame for scuppering the most promising initiative towards peace in many decades. Clinton has made it clear that the Arab states will not be given a free pass on this issue. Sharing the booby prize of failure with Netanyahu and his extremist coalition partners, and confirming the familiar accusations that they don’t actually care that much about ending the occupation and the conflict, will be the bitter consequences of such a tragic error.

The continuing upheaval in Iran has demonstrated an extremely interesting, and somewhat unfortunate, propensity for Arab and Iranian intellectuals to project their own emotional and political agendas on the other society and, consequently, talk past each other. The most interesting case in point has been an exchange between Palestinian activist Azmi Bishara and the Iranian Columbia University Professor Hamid Dabashi. Both men are influential and serious left-wing commentators and analysts, and their mutual misreading is very instructive and symptomatic.

Dabashi has been one of the most insightful and principled commentators in the United States on the election dispute in Iran and the upheaval in its aftermath. Most significantly, he has been among the most persuasive in arguing (as is quite clearly the case) that the Iranian opposition that took to the streets following the election fraud was not simply an elite group of disgruntled, pampered and westernized bourgeoisie, but represented a wide swathe of the Iranian society. This is a crucial point, especially in left circles, since if a class analysis of events in Iran suggested that the ruling forces better represented the popular sentiment, and more importantly the interests, of the agrarian and working classes, then support for the protesters would be invalid. This mistake has been made not only by some of the Western left, but also by some on the Arab left. In a rather convoluted article on the Iranian crisis in al-Ahram, Bishara made precisely this error, which seems to be the decisive issue for him, arguing that the Iranian protesters “are not the majority of young people but rather the majority of young people from a particular class,” and that, "most of the youth from the poor sectors of society support Ahmadinejad." He did not cite any evidence for this, of course. To cap it all off, he demonstrated his contempt for the Iranian protesters by accusing them of demonstrating "an arrogant, classist edge," and of believing that, "that their votes carry more weight qualitatively than the numerically greater votes of the poor."

Dabashi powerfully responded to Bishara in an article of his own in al-Ahram, writing that, “The problem with the false impression about this mysterious ‘middle class’ is not only that it distorts the reality of what we are observing in Iranian cities, but that it also inadvertently fuels the conspiratorial theories among certain segments of the North American and Western European left that take this observation one delusional step further and believe that CIA (on behalf of neoliberal economics) is behind this ‘velvet revolution.’” I’m not so sure it’s as inadvertent as he hopes. Dabashi should consider the possibility that Bishara and others who make this argument are perfectly happy to fuel conspiracy theories that would blame the West for unrest in Iran and provide highly qualified but also extremely pointed and effective support for Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. Bishara’s article presents an Ahmadinejad of the Arab imagination, who is less of a conservative and more of "a rebel," has personal "austerity" and "probity," “distributes oil revenues among the poor,” and has "succeeded in reviving national pride by making Iran a central player in the international arena" by confronting the West. It is this final point, of course, which is really decisive for Arab defenders of Ahmadinejad. Indeed, Bishara describes the removal of the ruling regime as "the Western alternative." Virtually every sentence in Bishara’s article shows the extent to which he views events in Iran primarily through the lens of confrontation with the West. Therefore, the conspiracy theory fostering may not be as inadvertent as Dabashi thinks, since many may think in conspiratorial terms.

Dabashi has been absolutely right to warn everyone to avoid this ridiculous idea that the protesters in Iran are effectively tools of the West or some sort of bourgeois counterrevolution. He has called it a "civil rights" movement, and I think thus far that’s exactly what it has been. But for some Arabs on the far left and right, Ahmadinejad appears a populist figure going forward with a bold and laudable confrontation with the Western imperialists and Zionist colonialists, and therefore his domestic opponents must be dismissed as an effete group of arrogant, classist, corrupted and westernized bourgeois. There is no question that such Arabs are projecting their own emotional/political fantasies onto the Iranian screen, and seeing what they want to see regardless of the fundamental realities.

Sadly, Dabashi seems to fall into precisely the same trap when looking at the Arab world. He speaks of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nassrallah as if he were somehow the bearer of the "Lebanese cause," and seems surprised that Hezbollah would openly align itself with Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. Of course, it is unthinkable for them to do anything else. They are not independent actors as such, and their politics as well as their client-status lead them directly to align themselves with the most reactionary of Iranian right-wingers. His admiration for Hezbollah’s "tolerating the principle of democratic dissent" by accepting the results of the Lebanese election is to misread pragmatism for principle. It is not in Hezbollah’s interests to challenge the recent Lebanese elections in which its faction was defeated, but no one should imagine for a minute that this organization embraces "the principle of democratic dissent" among its core values, any more than their ultra-right Iranian patrons and mentors in the Pasdaran who are the force behind this new wave of repression in Iran.

Dabashi contrasts what he calls "corrupt collaborationists" in the Arab world with the "visionary leadership" he seems to have expected and was disappointed not to find coming from Hezbollah. Everything he writes about the Arab world in his response to Bishara suggests that Dabashi more or less buys into the mythology of a grand struggle between “the martyrs and the traitors” in which the Islamist ultra-right represents popular will and liberation, and Arab governments and the PLO represent treachery and collaboration. A few years ago at the New Left Forum at the Cooper Union in New York City, I gave a talk at a panel on the Arab left in which I first started voicing my concerns about that element which had discarded all other principles in favor of simplistic nationalism and had therefore degenerated into simply serving as handmaidens to the Islamist religious right. Dabashi moderated the panel, and though he was, as always, gracious and polite, he made it clear that he took profound exception to this analysis — indeed he was plainly annoyed by it. Even now, as the crisis in Iran has caused what he rightly calls "an epistemic shift in our received political culture” and seems to have caused an epistemic shift in his own attitudes about Iranian domestic affairs, Dabashi does not seem inclined or able to extrapolate these insights to the Arab world and reconceptualize the Arab Islamist ultra-right as a major political threat to Arab societies and left forces that support the ultra-right as profoundly misguided and deeply confused.

Just as some Arab intellectuals like Bishara look at Ahmadinejad and see a populist friend of the poor and a noble anti-imperialist warrior, Dabashi seems to harbor analogous illusions about the Arab Islamist ultra-right. Arab governments — all of them — deserve and require profound criticism, but that doesn’t mean that anyone should have the least illusions about the nature, ideology and intentions of the Arab Islamist movements, whether Shiite or Sunni. The fundamentalist and reactionary ultra-right is exactly that, and it cannot and will not serve as a vehicle of liberation, social advancement or any other noble causes in the Arab world, Iran or anywhere else. Arab and Iranian intellectuals need to stop projecting their emotional/political fantasies onto each other’s societies and nurturing illusions about each other’s extreme right-wing forces. A much better place to start would be thinking seriously about the actual effects such political forces have on their own societies, and not casting such principled and practical concerns aside in favor of some grand, and often imaginary, regional and international causes.

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In Orange County, two neo-Nazi suspects are at large after robbing and stabbing a Latina custodian at a community center on July 4th. One of the suspects had a swastika tattoo on his left shoulder and reportedly told the woman, “Mexicans do not belong in this country,” after yelling racial slurs. According to hate crime experts, violent attacks by white supremacist extremists are on the rise.

Dan Fritz filed this report. LISTEN NOW

LISTEN NOW to the extended interview with Hussein Ibish, Executive Director of the Foundation for Arab-American Leadership, on the growing number of violent hate crime attacks.