http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/11/20/jerusalems-undying-ethnic-strife-deepens-urban-divide/8514/

Worldfocus: How would you characterize the current situation in Jerusalem?

Hussein Ibish: Jerusalem is the most divided city in the world. Israelis in West Jerusalem and the Jewish quarter feel like normal citizens of the Israeli state living under Israeli law. For them, life is very normal.

But East Jerusalem is more than 80 percent Arab. The situation is similar to that in the rest of the occupied territory, but it’s starker in Jerusalem because they’re living in such proximity. Insofar as an analogy to “apartheid” applies, this is more stark in Jerusalem than anywhere else, where separate and unequal is almost universal.

Most Jerusalem Arabs are not in effect subjects of Israeli law but practically live under martial law. In many cases, they’re technically residents of Israel — but not citizens. They can’t vote in national elections. And they generally don’t vote in municipal elections. Jerusalem is the flash point for the conflict.

Worldfocus: Why can’t the leaders on both sides reach a rational agreement about sharing the city?

Hussein Ibish: The cultural, religious and political importance of the holy places means that Jerusalem is central to both populations. Both sides are becoming increasingly influenced by right-wing religious rhetoric. The conflict is transforming from an ethnic struggle over land and power in a small area — into a religious struggle between bearded fanatics on both sides about the will of God and holy places.

The Old City of Jerusalem requires a creative solution and the unique formula like the Vatican City. It can’t be the exclusive preserve of any of the religious or ethnic groups. A unique formula has to be found. But it’s not beyond the wit of man to come up with a solution for this, because the national interests of all parties require it.

Worldfocus: Are there certain deal-breakers on the issue of Jerusalem?

Hussein Ibish: For the Israeli side, the “right of return” (for Palestinian refugees) is a deal-breaker just like the claim that Jerusalem is the undivided and eternal Israeli capital is for the Palestinians. This kind of rhetoric acts as a political narcotic: it makes people feel good, but it’s extremely damaging.

But when you get into the final status agreement, these are all issues that can be negotiated successfully. Both parties have a stake in making it work. That could keep Jerusalem united and parts of the city jointly administered — although with separate sovereignty. All it takes is political will and some creativity. I’ve thought about it a lot, and I’m a skeptical person, but it seems possible to me. It’ll be an unusual arrangement reflecting the unique character of the place.

There are reciprocal bitter pills on the right of return and Jerusalem both sides must swallow in their own existential national interests.

The only serious player really resistant to this idea [to create two capitals in Jerusalem] is the Israeli government, which is trying to prevent Jerusalem from being a topic of discussion in any the final status talks. But Obama made it very clear that the terms of reference need to be clear and precise — and involve security for both parties, borders, refugees and Jerusalem. The U.S. position on Jerusalem is closer to the Palestinian view than to the Israeli one. There is implicit understanding in the U.S. that most of East Jerusalem needs to be the Palestinian capital.

There will also clearly have to be a land swaps. The Palestinian people accept that, and the leadership accepts it. Not every settlement in and around Jerusalem must be evacuate. I don’t mean that the Palestinians will be unwilling to have Israelis [in Palestinian-controlled East Jerusalem] or elsewhere in the Palestinian state. But the Israel government would probably not want to face the crisis of some incident involving Israeli citizens living in newly sovereign Palestinian state, and I think it will be they who push for
evacuation in the event of an agreement.

Both sides should be creative and flexible and Israel should be willing to evacuate settlements that make Palestinian statehood impossible. It’s politically problematic but not impossible. These are painful concessions for both but they are obviously necessary. It’s all about a series of complicated quid pro quos. This is not a menu where you can go through and choose what you want based on your tastes, its a delicate pattern of concessions. It’s also a kaleidoscope. Every time you move the image a little, the whole pattern shifts.

Worldfocus: Do you envision that Jewish Israelis will be able to stay on in the areas that become Palestine in East Jerusalem and the West Bank?

Hussein Ibish: Palestinian citizenship or dual citizenship for them is possible, but I don’t think the Israeli government will allow it in the West Bank, though they might find a way to make it work in East Jerusalem.

An agreement is in the core existential national interest of both parties. Settlements will be evacuated according to a variety of formulae. At least 75,000 [Jewish settlers] will need to be removed. That means perhaps up to 200,000- 300,000 will be staying where they are in the small parts of West Bank such as Ma’ale Adumim that will become part of Israel.

The bottom line is that the Palestinians cannot be denied 22% of Mandatory Palestine — the equivalent of East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank. I think they need and deserve that.

Worldfocus: What role will Palestinian Gaza play if it continues to be a separate entity from the Palestinian West Bank?

Hussein Ibish: Gaza has no independent future from the rest of Palestine. The idea of a political status that is separate is completely wrong. Very few people in the Gaza Strip want that. Israel is strategically trying to emphasize these divisions, but it’s not something that will take.

I don’t think we’re looking at a scenario yet where Hamas can really succeed in replacing the PLO. They’re quite far away from that. All they hope to do so is for negotiations to break down. Hamas are weak and isolated — only able to maintain control in Gaza through brute force and oppression. Hamas thrives on chaos, stalemate [in talks] and a rhetoric of confrontation and violence. Their core constituency — at most 13-15 percent of the Palestinian population — believes in the Muslim Brotherhood model. But that’s not really a major political force unless there is no hope for peace.

Worldfocus: How about fresh alternatives to the Fatah-Hamas split?

Hussein Ibish: Salam Fayyad a very serious actor on the scene, yet he’s not a politician. Fatah is a dysfunctional political party but commands major support. The PA could use Fatah’s political authority to facilitate Fayyad’s state-building agenda and technocratic prowess. This is crucial because Fayyad’s plan provides another avenue for progress, change and momentum towards ending both the occupation and the conflict. If 1/20 of Fayyad’s plan could be implemented, there would be a serious transformation of the strategic environment, greatly enhancing Palestinian interests and the prospects for peace.

I think his plan could serve as a crucial augmentation of diplomacy and a parallel track that is constructive, serious and transformational. The biggest threat to it at the moment is the idea of dissolving the PA and going back functioning strictly through the PLO as a diplomatic but not a governing entity. With international financial support and political protection, it would be very difficult for Israel to block this institution-building plan. In short order, this could really change the Palestinian political scene and the strategic environment for the better.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-levin-jd/fort-hood-tragedy-is-bein_b_355712.html

In the aftermath of the appalling attack at Fort Hood, one of the most important questions is how this rampage by a twisted fanatic has affected relations between Muslims and other Americans of different faiths. For some, Hasan’s obvious fanaticism is not simply a starting point for thoughtful analysis about the harmful effects that splinter extremism poses in general, or specifically on an alienated, unstable individual. An aggressive and vocal group of Islamophobes are seeking to exploit the tragedy as a siren call to bigotry, a springboard to legitimize the marginalization of not merely extremists, but rather Muslims as a whole from meaningful participation in society, starting with military service.

These bigots should listen to the words of the daughters of murdered Fort Hood physician assistant Michael Cahill. Kerry Cahill told CBS’ Early Show, “You can’t blanket a whole group of people. There’s extremists in every religion, and there’s extremists all over the world…when this man was obviously ill, I think.” Another daughter, Keely Vanacker said, “The death of our father or any of these victims shouldn’t be an excuse or a reason to begin to hate an entire group of people.”

For a slew of odious bigots, the massacre was simply too big of an opportunity to pass up. To them, it is not Hasan, or even the twisted minority of extremists who inspired him, but either Islam as a whole or all Muslims that must be incapacitated.

Lt. Col. Ralph Peters shared his forthright analysis of what threatens American society on Fox News’ O’Reilly Factor Tuesday evening: “Its clear that the problem is Islam.”

His new novel, The War After Armageddon, recounts how a revitalized Christianized United States government dispatches a reorganized National Guard called the “Military Order of the Brothers in Christ” to crusade against Muslims who have attacked the United States and destroyed Israel and Europe.

Pat Robertson, who once blamed secularists like abortion doctors, gays, and People for the American Way for fomenting the 9/11 attacks, has narrowed his broad bush to mostly focus on Muslims for the Fort Hood attack on the November 9 broadcast of the 700 Club on CBN:

“If we don’t stop covering up what Islam is, Islam is a violent, I was going to say religion, but it’s not a religion. It’s a political system, it’s a violent political system, bent on the overthrow of the governments of the world and world domination. That is the ultimate aim and they talk about infidels and all this but the truth is that’s what the game is. So you’re dealing with a, not with a religion, you’re dealing with a political system and I think we should treat it as such. And treat its adherents as such as we would members of the Communist Party or members of some fascist group.”

Dave Gaubatz, a leader of an organization that has called for illegalizing Islam in the United States, overtly called for what he described as “professional and legal backlash against the Muslim community and their leaders,” and some of his supporters in Congress, including Rep. Sue Myrick (R-NC), have declined to condemn or even distanced themselves from his appeal to hate and discrimination.

American Family Association’s Bryan Fischer said, “We should not allow Muslims to serve in the US military and we have got to raise questions about whether we can afford to allow Muslims to immigrate into the United States at all.” Not surprising since his overall perspective is “While Christianity is a religion of peace, founded by the Prince of Peace, Islam is a religion of war and violence, founded by a man who routinely chopped the heads off his enemies, had sex with nine-year old girls, and made his wealth plundering merchant caravans.”

That Hasan was born in the United States and serving as an Army psychiatrist only exacerbates the potential for this incident to spread unjustifiable fear of Muslim Americans in general. It may exacerbate irrational anxieties that the Muslim community is threatening because it is supposedly very difficult to distinguish between extremists and mainstream Muslim Americans.

Obviously, the alleged killer’s ethnicity, religious affiliation, name and other signs identifying him as both an Arab and Muslim American are all the explanation needed for some. However, if we truly wish to prevent this tragedy from repeating itself, it is crucial to examine the totality of the personality of the offender, including not only his sick ideology, but the role that personal dislocations and fears may have played in his eventual spiral toward violence.

These include fear and conflict over an impending first deployment, unresolved distress over the loss of his mother, difficulties with his colleagues and in finding a mate, a cross-country move, and repeated exposure to traumatized soldiers. After two of the main support systems that he knew all his life, namely job and family grew distant, extremism apparently filled the void. A comprehensive analysis of Maj. Hasan suggests a religious and political fanatic, motivated partly by idiosyncratic madness and partly by these extreme beliefs.

In America mayhem caused by deranged violent individuals intoxicated by a twisted ideology is nothing new and certainly nothing particular to the Muslim American community, let alone being typical of it. Obvious, examples include the Branch Davidians at Waco, an offshoot of Seventh Day Adventist Christians; accused abortion doctor killer Scott Roeder; and the Klan bombers of Birmingham’s 16th Street Church who killed four young girls. Another obvious and well-known example would be Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, an angry, isolated and politically extreme former serviceman motivated to a significant degree by the infamous Turner Diaries that inspires a great deal of the ultra-right wing “militia movement.”

To their credit, Muslim and Arab American organizations were almost instantaneous and absolutely unanimous in their condemnation of the act, forming relief funds for victims and their relatives, and sparing little effort to express their outrage. With the exception of a small group of vocal and dangerous extremists — some already wanted by the United States on criminal charges — Muslims in the Middle East also reacted with horror and loud condemnation.

Proponents of profiling — systematic discrimination and heightened scrutiny against Muslim Americans simply on the basis of their identity– have seized on this incident to press their case. What these people of ill will fail to consider is the warning signs about Maj. Hasan’s instability and extremism were known to the government, but wrongly ignored. Obviously, methods of evaluating extremist behavior, of whatever variety, that might lead to violence in the Armed Forces and other institutions need to be seriously reviewed.

However, the notion that this tragedy justifies discrimination in the military or elsewhere must be categorically rejected by all persons possessing common sense and decency. Targeting people on the basis of warning signs of obvious political or religious extremism makes complete sense, but targeting them based on their identity obviously does not. Credible national security analysts reject crude systems of profiling based merely on ethnicity or religious affiliation as both unworkable and counterproductive.

Moreover, the requisite mechanisms in the United States simply do not exist, and would probably be unconstitutional. In the United States we generally do not officially classify individuals by religious affiliation, except in certain limited cases and then on the basis of self-identification. Enforcement could not exist without instituting a system of government categorization of people based on religious sectarian identity. Moreover, the Census Bureau categorizes all persons of Middle East origin as “white,” so there is no mechanism for identifying Arab-Americans (a majority of whom, by the way, are Christians).

As an extremist, Maj. Hasan was as much of an oddball among Arab and Muslim Americans as he was in the military. The proper and reasonable basis for identifying him as a potential danger was his behavior and extremism, not his identity.

While there is certainly now a small but dangerous extremist subculture among Muslims, that’s also been true for a small number on the Christian right, as well as Jewish extremists like those in the Jewish Defense League, among other violent fanatics. Law enforcement activities and national security policy must be focused on these extremist subcultures, wherever they may be, and not broadly on mainstream people of faith or entire communities.

It is pointless and incorrect to deny that Maj. Hasan’s actions were, in part, prompted by a violent extremist ideology existing among a small subculture of Muslims throughout the world. The Muslim mainstream here and overseas must spare no effort in marginalizing and denouncing this fanatical, hateful worldview.

But, as the McVeigh case and so many others demonstrate, it is hardly the only dangerous ideology that exists on the fringes of various parts of American society that can erupt into atrocious acts of inexcusable violence.

Our law enforcement and national security policies need to deal with all of these extremist perspectives vigorously and vigilantly, but there is no justification for a “backlash” of any kind against Arab or Muslim Americans in general. To do so would abandon our long cherished American values set forth by none other than George Washington, who in 1790 described the ideals of a government that gives religious “bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance.”

http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2009/11/palestinian_despair_for_peace.html

It is almost impossible to adequately convey the present degree of Palestinian despair, but the recent announcement that President Mahmoud Abbas might resign and that the rest of the Palestinian Authority leadership may follow — in effect dissolving the PA — should provide some indication.

This seems to many to be the only real weapon the Palestinian leadership has left, albeit something of a doomsday scenario. President Abbas and the others clearly feel all their other options have been systematically foreclosed. They embraced the roadmap and — at considerable political cost — fulfilled their responsibilities on security to the best of their abilities, as acknowledged by both the United States and Israel. When the Obama administration began its peace initiative, Palestinians were given every reason to expect that Israel would be compelled to fulfill its own roadmap responsibilities and end settlement activity.

From the Palestinian perspective, all of their substantive efforts have been met with stonewalling and disingenuous rhetoric from Israel’s new prime minister, and deeply damaging ineffectiveness on the part of the Obama administration.

All of this was compounded by the PLO’s own mishandling of the Goldstone report, as it was unable to balance demands from international powers to back off with domestic political sentiments to push forward. The Palestinian leadership was therefore always going to pay either a domestic political or international dramatic price over the Goldstone question, but managed to end up paying both, almost in full.

It would appear that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s comments in Israel that appeared to imply a certain American satisfaction with the Israeli position were the final straw.

The Palestinian leadership is ready to give up because it feels it has done everything possible to accommodate the peace process established by the international community, and has gotten nowhere. Denied the slightest political accomplishment to which it can point as a measure of the success of its policies, it clearly came to feel that only the most drastic measures might communicate its political desperation to the outside world.

The attitude among many ordinary Palestinians is, if anything, even more grim.

For them, the 16-year era of peace talks has meant 16 years of further occupation, settlement building and land confiscation, bitter disappointment and denial of basic human and national rights. In addition to Israel and the international community, ordinary Palestinians also blame their own leaderships — both Fatah and Hamas — for not reuniting after the violent split in 2007, and blame all parties for the ongoing human catastrophe caused by the siege of Gaza.

Under such circumstances, it should be readily understandable that the concept of a viable peace process now seems like a sick joke to so many Palestinians.

This is the political context in which the Palestinian leadership has to operate: an exceedingly skeptical public and international actors that don’t seem to comprehend the limitations of Palestinian patience.

At last, it seems, even the most die-hard adherents of negotiations have concluded that either the dynamic must be changed or abandoned.

From the point of view of the Palestinian national project, the most serious threat posed by the present crisis is obviously to the Palestinian state and institution building program proposed by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. The plan could enact a dynamic, unilateral, nonviolent and constructive resistance to the occupation, creating the necessary framework for Palestinian independence, and constituting a dramatic transformation of the strategic environment in favor of both Palestinian interests and the prospects for peace.

Obviously, for this plan to succeed, it would require not only the financial and technical support of the international community, and most especially the United States, but also direct and vigorous political protection as well. It would be very difficult for Israel to block the project were it under international political protection, and almost impossible to interfere with specific projects that were being jointly pursued with American and European cooperation and involvement.

However the present crisis plays itself out, it is essential that this state building enterprise continue. It is the only thing on the horizon that offers a serious path forward towards ending both the occupation and the conflict, and can create hope in the midst of despair.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/09/abbas-speech-palestinian-elections?

The recent announcement by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas that he would not seek a second term in office or run in elections has prompted considerable speculation, even confusion, around the world. His decisions contains much ambiguity while conveying different messages to different parties at the same time.

It is almost certainly true that Abbas would prefer to no longer continue as president. He clearly feels let down and betrayed by most if not all his allies, including the Arab states and the Obama administration, and seems genuinely fed up with being put in impossible political situations over issues such as the elusive Israeli settlement freeze agreement and the Goldstone report into the Gaza war.

Unlike most politicians, Abbas did not really crave the presidency and never seemed fully comfortable or effective in the job. Given his experiences, any sentiment on his part to move on is understandable.

However, his statement was not a resignation speech at all, but a layered message and the most important layer was addressed to his American allies, in whom he is clearly extremely disappointed. Left out on a limb once too often, Abbas is now asking Washington to seriously consider the alternatives. It’s a not particularly subtle reminder that they are unlikely to find a more amenable peace partner any time in the foreseeable future, and that without Palestinian co-operation, no progress is possible.

One of the most powerful points Abbas made in his speech was his complaint that, in spite of the fact that the Palestinian position on permanent-status peace seems much closer to the American view than Israel’s, the US persistently sides with the government it disagrees with. This is because in the US matters regarding Israel are primarily driven by domestic political interests, with foreign policy considerations as secondary.

Abbas is saying that as long as the US finds itself essentially incapable of putting genuine pressure on Israel, or finding a way to prove it holds meaningful political support for its Palestinian partners, it is going to be almost impossible for Palestinian leaders to bridge the gap between diplomatic necessities internationally and political credibility domestically.

A similar message is being directed at Israel – aimed at the entire society, not just the present government. Abbas is urging it too to consider the probable relationship with a different Palestinian leadership from among the presently existing alternatives.

The most worrisome of these alternatives to many would be Hamas, another clear target of Abbas’s mixed messages. The president’s announcement was entirely framed around the question of elections, which Hamas has been opposing at every stage almost certainly because of a sustained collapse in its popularity and credibility over the past six months. Even the fiasco over the PLO’s mishandling of the Goldstone report has apparently not rescued its fortunes.

Fatah can seriously claim to have gone the extra mile in pursuit of elections: first it signed an Egyptian reconciliation plan that better served Hamas interests and called for elections in June, but Hamas refused. Then, Abbas called for elections in January, as required by Palestinian law – again, Hamas angrily refused. Now he has raised the stakes by saying he will not run for office again.

Abbas is almost daring Hamas to change its mind. Of course, if it does change its mind, he may change his. The lack of any obvious successor, the clear factional disunity within Fatah, his position as unchallenged party leader and his position as chairman of the PLO all make it very hard to imagine him being able to continue to demur in the event of actual elections. Because Palestinian law does not provide a practical alternative to elections for the replacement of the president, it’s going to be difficult for anyone to credibly complain about Abbas continuing in office.

As things stand, he can claim: “I really don’t want this job and I’ve made that pretty clear, but there isn’t any practical alternative so I’m going to have to continue in office. It’s everybody else’s fault but mine.”

http://www.juancole.com/2009/11/ibish-against-one-state-solution.html

Last Thursday on Informed Comment, Juan Cole uttered a powerful cris de coeur about prospects for a two-state agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, echoing warnings by chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat that if Israeli colonization continues, Palestinians may switch to demanding equal rights in a single state. Such pessimism is not only justified, it is requisite given the difficulties facing the prospects for peace, and can only be intensified by a similarly despairing announcement by Pres. Abbas that, because of Israel’s refusal move seriously towards peace, he would not seek another term in office.

Erekat’s statement, while unusual, is hardly unprecedented from senior Palestinian and PLO figures. Similar “threats” to abandon the quest to end the occupation in favor of a single-state agenda have been issued several times in the past as I describe in my new book, What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda? In 2008, former Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei and other leading Palestinians, including the “Palestine Strategy Study Group,” expressed similar views.

In contrast with the one-state rhetoric among pro-Palestinian activists in the West, which generally holds Palestinian independence to be both unachievable and undesirable, Palestinians in the occupied territories who raise this specter generally do so as a tactic designed to compel greater seriousness by Israel on negotiations and warn about the consequences of a failure to achieve a two-state agreement. Erekat’s comments clearly reflected this. In his speech Abbas declared that he was personally fed up but that everything in his experience indicated that a two-state agreement is possible.

These two versions of one-state rhetoric may one day merge into a unified agenda, but for now they remain distinct phenomena, most clearly divided by their ultimate goal: Palestinian leaders still seek independence and an end to the occupation, aims that are angrily rejected as insufficient and even outrageous by many diasporic one-state advocates.

Under the present circumstances it seems most probable that if the strategy of the secular-nationalist forces in Palestine were to collapse or be abandoned, the main beneficiaries would not be one-state advocates. The real political contest among Palestinians is between the nationalists and the Islamists, and the declining fortunes of either almost axiomatically advances the interests of the other.

Even if Palestinians were somehow to abandon their long-standing national aim of independence, avoid their national movement becoming entirely dominated by Islamists, and adopt the goal of equal rights in a post-nationalist state, it is very hard to imagine that this would leave them in an improved strategic position.

A noted one-state advocate has accused me of suggesting an interview with the Atlantic website that “the one-state solution is bad because Jews don’t want it.” This is to misread not only my analysis but the fundamental political reality, which is extremely simple: a one-state solution will be impossible as long as an overwhelming or even a solid majority of Jewish Israelis don’t want it. The added irony is that most one-state advocates have not only done nothing to try to create a message that can appeal to mainstream Israelis, they have crafted one that encourages the greatest possible fear and suspicion.

In reality, it’s almost impossible to imagine a one-state “solution,” although it’s certainly possible to envisage a one-state outcome. The distinction is crucial: the second formulation recognizes the incredible amount of brutality, violence and mutual exhaustion that would be required for both parties to surrender their cherished national agendas to some formula for post-nationalist power-sharing in relatively equal numbers. Consider the violence of the past 60 years, without any real dent in the nationalist fervor of either party, and then try to imagine what would be required to actually get them to abandon these ideals.

One should be under no illusions that the final abandonment of a two-state agenda will give way to a campaign of nonviolent resistance, boycotts and sanctions that will somehow succeed in bringing Israel to its knees. The alternative to an agenda of negotiations is crystal clear: increasing conflict, violence and occupation that is increasingly dominated by religious fanatics on both sides. The religious right is well-positioned in both societies, ready to lead a battle to the death between bearded fanatics over holy places and the will of God.

We face a simple choice: either a slow, gradual and, yes, painful, inching towards a two-state agreement, or war, conflict and occupation into the foreseeable future, very possibly leading to a catastrophe. Despairing, giving up and walking away is too irresponsible for anyone with the best interests of Palestinians, Israelis and Americans at heart. This is an existentialist crisis we are facing, like Beckett’s suicidal unnnamable: we can’t go on, we’ll go on.

Cries of despair are intellectually and morally justified and, perhaps, necessary, but the only rational policy for all responsible parties is to avoid calamity and continue to somehow try to find a way to make the only plausible peaceful solution work.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/palestinian-statehood-institution-building?

In an article last week, Ahmad Samhi Khalidi derisively dismissed the plan of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to build the infrastructural, administrative and economic framework of a Palestinian state in spite of the occupation.

His arguments essentially made Israel’s case for it: that the Palestinians are not capable of building state institutions, lack the legal authority to do so, and can only create structures that do not challenge the occupation. One can only marvel at expatriate Palestinian intellectuals making Israel’s case against a dynamic, proactive Palestinian plan to transform realities on the ground and attack the very essence of the occupation.

The PA plan provides a mechanism that complements diplomatic efforts to end the occupation and frees Palestinians from being entirely dependent upon discussions with others. It enables them to shape their own future. Khalidi, however, argues that no such state-building project is possible because “every PA action is determined by the Israeli occupation”. This is only true to the extent that the Palestinians submissively accept it and refuse to embark on what Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad describes as “positive unilateralism“. While Israel might be theoretically capable of blocking such moves, its ability to do so in practice may prove quite limited.

What the PA is proposing is consistent with stated Palestinian, American and Israeli intentions and, in effect, calls Israel’s bluff. Moreover, the PA plan could and should be provided with powerful diplomatic and political support by the US, Europe and other international players that have considerable sway with Israel.

Even Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu has stated that the ultimate goal of negotiations is the creation of a Palestinian state. Under such circumstances, it would be politically costly, and hard to explain, if any attempt were made to block measures that peacefully move in that direction and pose no threat to legitimate Israeli interests. It would be doubly difficult if specific projects are conducted in practical co-operation with American, European and international institutions, whose financial and technical support will undoubtedly be required for the success of much of the programme.

Even if the PA plan does succeed, Khalidi argues that the result will be “a partial, ersatz entity”, insufficient in every respect for the realisation of Palestinian national aims. Khalidi is completely wrong to suggest that institution-building negates or substitutes for the kind of robust diplomacy that insists on a genuinely independent Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem. Nothing whatsoever in the plan either suggests or promotes any other outcome.

The worst misapprehension Khalidi harbours is the idea that the programme is essentially “apolitical” and plays into Netanyahu’s ridiculous idea of “economic peace”. In fact, building Palestinian institutions is one of the most radical and effective acts of resistance to occupation imaginable. It will demonstrate the Palestinians are effectively governing themselves, and building the practical framework for a state supported by an overwhelming international consensus.

Khalidi understands that it is essential to continue to strive politically and diplomatically for such a state, but for some reason seems bitterly opposed to any efforts to prepare for it to be well-functioning, stable and effective.

So what do he and the other detractors actually propose? That Palestinians continue to demand statehood, but not prepare for it in a meaningful way? That, because of the occupation, they pay no attention to improving their society, administration and infrastructure? That they have no responsibilities beyond political rhetoric? That they have no agency beyond simple demands for statehood? That they remain entirely dependent on the peace process without trying to alter conditions on the ground to improve not only their society but also their strategic position vis-à-vis Israel?

One of the most important elements of the programme is that it begins to create an administrative and governance structure among the Palestinians that is bureaucratised and institutionalised, and therefore insulated from the untoward dominance of political parties. Fayyad’s second tenure as prime minister has already seen a meaningful distinction develop between party and administration that has been healthy for both. And, far from exceeding his authority in doing this, he is implementing the policies of Palestinian president and PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas.

Either Khalidi does not recognise the importance of this or he doesn’t like it. Independent, effective administrative apparatuses would protect Palestinian governance structures from undue influence by both parties and traditional elites. This is what really informs much of the internal Palestinian opposition to a programme that would empower the Palestinian people, improve their strategic position, and can only bring forward the moment of independence.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/Oct/07/Credit-Barack-Obama-with-resolve-on-a-Palestinian-state.ashx#axzz2axJWowPa

Under the administration of President Barack Obama, the United States has vigorously re-engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and made commitment to Palestinian statehood an American national security and foreign policy priority. Obama has said that it is “absolutely crucial” to US interests to resolve the conflict, and appears determined to persist despite all difficulties and obstacles.

There are several crucial reasons for this intensification. First, while the benefits to American interests of ending the conflict have been clear for many years, the substantial costs to the United States of failing to secure a peace agreement are becoming more widely understood. The conflict in the Middle East has become an exceptionally powerful weapon in the hands of fanatics throughout the region and beyond, fueling anti-American sentiment. The Obama administration has understood that ending Israel’s occupation would be a singularly effective counterattack against those manifestations of extremism.

Second, the Obama administration is taking a more holistic approach to retooling the American relationship with the region, when compared to its predecessors. Rather than viewing each regional relationship and problem independently, and dealing with it on a case-specific and usually bilateral basis, this administration understands that these problems and relations are both independent and interconnected.

Third, it has become increasingly clear to many American friends of Israel, including numerous prominent Jewish Americans, that a peace agreement with the Palestinians and an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab land in general is not only in the United States’ national interest, it is also in Israel’s interest. If it persists with the occupation, Israel can be neither Jewish nor democratic in a meaningful way, and will not know either peace or regional acceptance.

This understanding has allowed many prominent Jewish Democrats, including key members of the US Congress, to support Obama’s push for an Israeli settlement freeze.

Indeed, Obama’s initial strategy for advancing the peace process was to secure Israel’s implementation of its commitment under the “road map” to peace, issued under former President George W. Bush, to freeze settlement activity in the Occupied Territories. Obama was also trying to secure diplomatic gestures from Arab states as a reciprocal move.

The US president met with only partial success on both sides, with Israel reportedly agreeing to a temporary settlement freeze in the West Bank, but not in occupied East Jerusalem. At the tripartite meeting held at the UN headquarters between Israeli, Palestinian and American leaders on September 22, Obama made it clear that he did not accept this proposed compromise on settlements by Israel, but was setting the issue aside for now and moving forward on permanent-status talks.

While previous US administrations would almost certainly have embraced the proposed Israeli compromise, Obama continues to reject the legitimacy of Israeli settlement activity and has left the issue unresolved. At his UN General Assembly speech the following day, Obama laid out a number of stipulations for the negotiations that strongly favor the Palestinian position, pledging to “end the occupation that began in 1967.” The president insisted, above all, that the status of Jerusalem was to be addressed in new talks.

Including Jerusalem in the talks runs directly counter to Israeli positions and strongly reinforces the Palestinian view that the city must be the capital of any future Palestinian state. It is, indeed, a central question that cannot be ignored. Perhaps even more than settlements, the issue will prove extremely challenging for Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu, especially given his coalition partners’ uncompromising stance on the future of Jerusalem.

Ultimately, the main message senior administration officials, including Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, are sending is that the administration is “determined” to achieve a two-state peace agreement.

This determination, a willingness to take political hits and keep on going, was evident in Obama’s words at the UN General Assembly meeting. There, he declared: “[E]ven though there will be setbacks, and false starts and tough days – I will not waiver in my pursuit of peace.” Any party counting on wearing down, waiting out or chasing this administration away from negotiations must now seriously reconsider its strategy.

http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=26406&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0&isNew=1

Washington, DC – Under US President Barack Obama’s Administration, the United States has vigorously re-engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and made commitment to Palestinian statehood a national security and foreign policy priority. Obama has said that it is “absolutely crucial” to American interests to resolve the conflict, and appears determined to persist despite all difficulties and obstacles.

There are several crucial reasons for this intensification.

First, while the benefits to American interests of ending the conflict have been clear for many years, the substantial costs to the United States of failing to secure a peace agreement are becoming more widely understood. The conflict has become an exceptionally powerful weapon in the hands of fanatics throughout the Middle East, fuelling anti-American sentiment throughout the region. The administration has understood that ending Israel’s occupation would be a singularly effective counterattack against extremism.

Second, the Obama Administration is taking a more holistic approach to retooling the American relationship with the region, compared to its predecessors. Rather than viewing each relationship and problem independently, and dealing with them on a case-specific and usually bilateral basis, this administration understands they are both independent and interconnected.

Third, it has become increasingly clear to many American friends of Israel, including numerous prominent Jewish Americans, that a peace agreement with the Palestinians and an end to the occupation is not only in the United States’ national interest, it is also in Israel’s interest. If it persists with the occupation, Israel can be meaningfully neither Jewish nor democratic, and will not know either peace or regional acceptance. This understanding has allowed many prominent Jewish Democrats, including key members of Congress, to support Obama’s push for an Israeli settlement freeze.

Indeed, Obama’s initial strategy for advancing the peace process was to secure Israel’s implementation of its commitment under the roadmap for peace, issued under former US President George W. Bush, to freeze settlement activity in the occupied territories. Obama was also trying to secure diplomatic gestures from Arab states as a reciprocal move.

Obama met with only partial success on both sides, with Israel reportedly agreeing to a temporary settlement freeze in the West Bank, but not in occupied East Jerusalem. At the tripartite UN meeting between Israeli, Palestinian and American leaders on 22 September, Obama made it clear that he did not accept this proposed compromise on settlements by Israel, but was setting the issue aside for now and moving forward on permanent status talks.

While previous administrations would almost certainly have embraced the proposed Israeli compromise, Obama continues to reject the legitimacy of Israeli settlement activity and has left the issue unresolved.

At his UN General Assembly speech the following day, Obama laid out a number of stipulations for the negotiations that strongly favour the Palestinian position, pledging to “end the occupation that began in 1967” and insisted, above all, that the status of Jerusalem is to be addressed by new talks.

Including Jerusalem in the talks runs directly counter to Israeli positions and strongly reinforces the Palestinian view that the city must be the capital of any Palestinian state. It is a central question that cannot be ignored. Perhaps even more than settlements, this issue will prove extremely challenging for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, especially given his coalition partners’ uncompromising stance on Jerusalem.

Ultimately, the main message senior administration officials, including Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, are sending is that the administration is “determined” to achieve a two-state peace agreement.

This determination, a willingness to take political hits and keep on going, was evident in Obama’s words at this week’s UN General Assembly meeting when he declared, “…Even though there will be setbacks, and false starts and tough days–I will not waiver in my pursuit of peace.” Any party counting on wearing down, waiting out or chasing this administration away from negotiations must now seriously reconsider its strategy.

The Daily Star (Beirut)
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=10623…

On college campuses in the United States and the United Kingdom, and increasingly among grassroots activists in the West generally, the cause of ending the Israeli occupation and securing independence for a Palestinian state is being abandoned in favor of a much more far-reaching goal of replacing Israel with a single, democratic state for all Israelis and Palestinians, including all of the refugees. Until now, this rhetoric has been largely unchallenged from a pro-Palestinian perspective, which has probably been a significant factor in its appeal.

My new book, “What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda?”, traces the development of this agenda and interrogates its assumptions and claims.

The outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, which inflicted profound suffering and created deep ill-will on both the sides of the Palestinian-Israeli divide, bolstered stridently nationalist perspectives among Israelis and Palestinians. For many, it prompted a negative re-evaluation of what kind of peace was possible and desirable.

In Israel, this was manifested in the collapse of the “peace camp,” a radical shift to the political right and the election of Ariel Sharon, who became prime minister. Among the Palestinians, Islamists, especially Hamas, gained significant ground. In the Palestinian diaspora, where support for Hamas is limited and, especially in the United States, politically untenable and even legally risky, this same disillusionment and radicalization was largely expressed through the rise of the one-state agenda.

More generally, the one-state agenda reflects the conclusion that Israel will never agree to seriously end the occupation and allow for the creation of a fully sovereign, viable Palestinian state, therefore that negotiations and diplomacy are pointless. At the end of Part One of my book I pose a series of pointed questions that are not usually addressed to, or have been insufficiently answered by, one-state advocates, and that in many cases their sympathizers have not adequately considered. Here are the six of them:

First, if Israel will not agree to end the occupation, what makes anyone think that it will possibly agree to dissolve itself? If Israel cannot be compelled or convinced to surrender 22 percent of the territory it holds, how can it be compelled or convinced to surrender or share 100 percent of it?

Second, what, as a practical matter, does this vision of a single, democratic state offer to Jewish Israelis?

Third, what efforts have Palestinian and pro-Palestinian one-state advocates made in reaching out to mainstream Jews and Israelis and to incorporating their national narrative into this vision?

Fourth, how do one-state advocates propose to supersede or transcend Palestinian national identity and ambitions? Why is it that no significant Palestinian political party or faction has adopted the one-state goal?

Fifth, how, apart from empty slogans about largely nonexistent and highly implausible boycotts, do one-state advocates propose to realize or advance their vision? What practical steps do they imagine and what is their road map for success?

And sixth, since they reject both Palestinian independence and the ongoing agenda of infrastructural and institutional development presently defining the strategy of what they consider the “quisling” Palestinian Authority, what do one-state advocates, as a practical matter, offer those living under occupation other than expressions of solidarity and interminable decades of continued struggle and suffering?

It is striking that the most ardent and tenacious one-state advocates seem to be taking a great deal of their time in even starting to formulate answers to these questions. Assad AbuKhalil, who comments on anything and everything on his blog, has remained strangely silent. Ali Abunimah, who is surely the most ardent and prolific one-state proponent in the United States, and who also runs a well-read blog, also appears at a loss for words. Even the overgrown juvenile delinquents at the Kabobfest blog, who have exhibited signs of suffering from a cybersphere version of Tourette’s syndrome, are also strangely passing up what would seem to be a golden opportunity to repeat their usual accusations about “traitors” and “collaborators.”

I have no doubt that sooner or later a response, and hopefully a calm and thoughtful one, will be forthcoming from some of the committed one-state advocates. But the amount of time it is taking for them to offer any sort of answer to these extremely relevant questions suggests, perhaps, that they are proving difficult to formulate and quite possibly were not anticipated.

But there surely must be a considerable burden of proof on those proposing that the Palestinian national movement abandon its long-standing goal of ending the occupation, which is based on a huge body of international law and reflects a regional and international consensus, in favor of a grand experiment in almost entirely uncharted waters that poses significant risks and offers uncertain benefits. One-state proponents have an obligation to explain how exactly they think they can achieve the extraordinary task of compelling or convincing Israel to effectively dissolve itself.

Unless it offers answers to simple, clear and obvious questions such as these, the one-state rhetoric will be an agenda for accomplishing very little if anything. Rather it will merely be a convenient vehicle for rejecting any and all things Israeli and adopting a position of uncompromising confrontation.

This is not an abstract intellectual exercise. Those seeking to liberate the Palestinian people cannot allow themselves to be beguiled by the narcissistic thrill of “winning” an academic debate on campuses while contributing nothing, even doing harm, to the causes of peace and Palestine.

The Daily Star (Lebanon)
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=1033…

For years now, my colleagues and I at the American Task Force on Palestine have argued that advocates of a two-state resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict need to form a real, functioning national coalition in the United States to support this goal. President Barack Obama has put a great deal of his political credibility and capital on the line in pursuit of negotiated resolution, forcefully articulating what all parties must do to build momentum toward this goal. The most interested parties outside of the region, specifically Jewish-American friends of Israel and Arab-American supporters of Palestine, have been alienated by decades of mistrust. However, to fully live up to this historic opportunity, these two communities need to do everything possible to work toward this common objective.

Historically, most American Jews and Arabs have largely seen each other through the distorted lens of a zero-sum perspective, assuming that what is good for Israel is necessarily bad for the Palestinians and vice versa. If this was ever true, it isn’t now. It may seem counterintuitive, but Israelis and Palestinians have the same need: a workable peace agreement based on two states. It follows that their supporters in the US should be able to unite under a common cause in pursuing this goal.

Obama has stated that Palestinians need to improve security measures and combat incitement; that Israel must end settlements and avoid measures that preclude Palestinian statehood; and that the Arab states need to become more involved in the peace process. A commitment to these principles is needed on all sides. Supporters of Israel may reiterate what is required of the Palestinians and the Arabs, but they cannot remain silent about Israel’s commitments. Supporters of Palestine may insist that Israel live up to its obligations under the “road map,” but they cannot ignore Palestinian responsibilities. Those with influence over Arab governments should be pressing them to do everything they can to support Obama’s initiative and seize this historic opportunity.

Jewish and Arab Americans cannot allow their past differences and historical competition to impede what has become a common imperative. Long-standing prejudices and misperceptions must be jettisoned if we are to play the role required of us. No other groups in the US have deeper ties, more connections, or a more sophisticated understanding of the history and perceptions that motivate both parties to the conflict than Jewish- and Arab-Americans. We cannot leave this to the government alone.

The history of rivalry and alienation between Jewish- and Arab-American communities has left deep scars, but must be moved beyond. Sincere, responsible people in both communities can demonstrate their constructive intentions by combating their peers who would continue to advocate rejectionism, violence, occupation and conflict.

Many Jewish-Americans remain suspicious that the support of Arabs and Arab-Americans for a peace agreement based on two states is merely the first step in a “plan of phases,” intended ultimately to lead to Israel’s destruction. Equally there are many Arab-Americans who have yet to be convinced that Israelis and their supporters who say they favor peace negotiations are not simply trying to buy time to build more settlements and consolidate the occupation so that no Palestinian state will ever be possible. Mutual distrust masks that most people in both communities are articulating the same goal. They are certain of their own sincerity, but extremely dubious of the intentions of those on the other side. Rather than assuming at the outset that the other party is playing a game of deception, it would make more sense to test the waters and see if it is not possible that, because Israelis and Palestinians have similar needs, their friends in the US can sincerely work together in that direction.

It is necessary, of course, to gauge each other’s sincerity, but this can only be done through active engagement and a sustained effort to forge a serious alliance based on common interests. But, it is neither necessary nor helpful to try to analyze opposing motivations, or insist that competing narratives become harmonized. It should be understood from the outset that, just as Israelis and Palestinians require the same peace agreement each for their own purpose, their friends and supporters in the US will have very differing motivations for joining a national coalition in support of a two-state agreement. A great virtue of a two-state resolution is that it does not require that Israelis and Palestinians reconcile their narratives. Each can live in its own state, with internal minority groups, and forge its future according to its own understandings and imperatives.

Since Obama called for more concrete measures to achieve peace, we should not only be increasing our efforts at outreach and dialogue. Responsible organizations and individuals should develop joint statements and efforts in pursuit of peace to support the president’s initiatives. It is time for mainstream and politically significant Arab- and Jewish-Americans to think about articulating a formal statement of principles that can give shape to an effective national coalition for a two-state agreement in the Middle East. Religious and other peace-oriented organizations and corporate entities with a stake in Middle East peace should be included in these efforts from the earliest opportunity.

The urgency and intensity of Obama’s political and diplomatic emphasis on building momentum toward peace brings an extraordinary, possibly unique, perhaps even final opportunity for Jewish- and Arab-Americans who both say they want Middle East peace based on a two-state solution to begin seriously working together to achieve this result. The president is doing his part. It is now up to all of us who agree with him to do ours.