https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/fetishizing_nationalism

For those in the grip of its authority, a clearheaded understanding of how nationalist ideology actually operates seems extremely difficult.

All contemporary nationalisms are based on constructed and imagined narratives about history, geography, culture, ethnicity and religion.

Such narratives invariably involve a great deal of what can only be described as fiction. In particular, reading the past—whether real or imagined—as a justification for present-day political projects is, by definition, intellectually treacherous territory.

Last week I wrote about a new book tracing the history of Palestinian traditional dress in which I ruminated on the development of contemporary Palestinian national identity. Only a lingering degree of naïveté can account for my genuine surprise at the outpouring of outrage the column produced. I haven’t written anything this controversial in years, though all I did was assert that a new book helps demonstrate that Palestinian nationalism—while a contemporary, 20th-century phenomenon—is deeply rooted in broader Arab and ancient traditions and civilizations, and has its own distinctive cultural styles.

I had not taken into account the existential need some nationalists have to deny every aspect of a rival’s authenticity. The pro-Israel voices objecting to these virtually self-evident observations seem unconcerned with defending the Israeli national identity, but obsessed with attacking the invocation of any heritage or tradition on which Palestinian nationalism can draw.

The impulse to negate the other seems overwhelming. It appears much more powerful than any imperative to define, defend or interrogate one’s own nationalist identity, which is taken for granted.

These critics assume all aspects of Jewish and biblical Hebrew mythology, traditions and history automatically legitimize the Israeli national project. However, such claims were highly controversial among the Jews of the world for many decades, and are again being subjected to significant interrogation.

The traditional Zionist narrative holds that only the present-day Jews of the world are the genetic, religious and cultural heirs of the biblical Hebrews and ancient peoples of the “holy land.” Everyone else is a Johnny-come-lately at best, with the Palestinians usually ascribed no deeper origins than the arrival of Islam in the area (a mere 1,200 years ago)—and in many cases much less than that. The idea that they too, and perhaps even more than Jewish Europeans, might have genetic, ethnic and cultural ties to the ancient and biblical peoples of the land—including the ancient Hebrews—has been rarely considered.

In the decades immediately preceding 1948, the word “Israeli” was totally unknown and meant nothing, and the word “Palestinian” meant many things, but certainly not what it means today. Both of these national identities—the Jewish Israeli and the Arab Palestinian—are contemporary constructs born of recent history. They are largely grounded in their encounter with each other. They also embody deep cultural memories, traditions, myths, legends and tendentious narratives that at least to some extent retrofit the past to privilege their own national projects.

But all of this is entirely beside the point. Neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli national identity is more or less “authentic” or “legitimate” than the other because both are self-defined nationalisms adhered to by millions of people. The extent to which they are based on imaginary constructs—as all modern national ideologies ultimately prove largely to be—is meaningless in practice. Objecting to these mythologies is the political equivalent of complaining about the rain.

Systematized discrimination or exclusion is, of course, unacceptable for any decent society. But modernity dictates a healthy respect for both the human rights of individuals inherent to their status as human beings and the rights of self-defining national collectivities to self-determination. Contemporary political and national identities, including the Israeli and Palestinian, are invariably based on a confused mélange of myth, legend and history. But that is politically irrelevant. They are what they are, say what we will.

The deployment of myth, legend, history and tradition in the service of contemporary and modern national projects is, at least at a certain register, intellectually and philosophically invalid. Yet nationalist agendas can help people secure their individual and collective rights, achieve self-determination, overthrow colonial domination and serve other useful purposes.

Indeed, no sizable group of people can function successfully in the world of modernity without participating in some national structure.

Hence the urgent need to end the virtually unique statelessness of the Palestinians, who are not citizens of Israel or any other country.

The analytical challenge is to recognize that while not all nationalist claims are necessarily equally valid (they may speak on behalf of very few people, for example, and not really have the constituency they claim), in some important senses they are, however, all equally invalid. Championing one’s own nationalism as self-evidently “authentic” at the expense of a well-established, deeply-rooted and much-cherished rival identity is a particularly lowly form of self-delusion, chauvinism and fetishism.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68028/hussein-ibish/penniless-palestine?page=show

The financial crisis currently facing the Palestinian Authority is not
just economic; it is also a symptom of the deep political problems
facing the leadership in Ramallah. The PA has based its appeal to the
Palestinian public on a strategy that combines working with Gulf Arab
states, Israel, and the West to produce improvements in the quality of
life for Palestinians under occupation, while at the same time
pursuing independence through international diplomacy. Now a lack of
funding has limited the PA’s ability to meet its payroll, undermining
the credibility and authority of its approach and its leaders.

The situation became especially perilous in late July, when promised
donations failed to materialize, including $330 million that Gulf Arab
states had pledged to provide every six months. This shortfall was
caused by a combination of donor fatigue, impatience with the lack of
progress on Fatah-Hamas unity, and a long-standing tradition of Arab
states not meeting their pledges to the PA. Previously, in May, Israel
also temporarily failed to deliver the Palestinian tax revenues it
controls. As a result of the shortfall, the PA was forced to announce
that government salaries — on which more than a million Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza are dependent — would be cut in half for
August.

The PA’s financial woes undermine the achievements made by the state-
and institution-building program initiated by Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad in August 2009. Public anger at the proposed wage cuts was
palpable: civil servants, doctors, and teachers threatened a mass
strike. The government, meanwhile, mandated a reduction in the price
of bread, the staple food for most Palestinians — a further
reflection of the financial hardships that the crisis is causing to
ordinary people.

Undelivered pledges from Arab states are at the core of the immediate
crisis. (Fayyad has refused to publicly identify which states reneged,
but the group certainly includes Saudi Arabia.) This has been a
perennial problem for many years, since Arab states have often tied
the delivery of their donations to political demands and have at times
raised legitimate questions about the corruption that used to be
endemic in Palestinian financial management.

The uncertain status of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement has
further undermined donor confidence, because governments prefer to
know who precisely will be in charge of the money they are providing.
By signing a vague “national reconciliation agreement“ in Cairo in
April, the PLO and Hamas agreed, in effect, to agree. But since then,
they have not achieved a specific agreement on any issue. The tense
and frequently hostile relationship between the parties remains
unchanged, meaning that Palestinian society, polity, and leadership
remain not only divided but in a de facto cold war.

Both Fayyad’s reputation and that of the entire PA leadership have
suffered as a result of the financial crisis. Some leaders in Fatah
and Hamas have tried to make Fayyad the issue by claiming that
disagreement over whether he should remain in office was the primary
obstacle to reunification. But Fayyad is a convenient red herring. In
reality, there is near-total disagreement between the two sides.
Focusing attention on a manufactured dispute about Fayyad, who is a
member of neither party, has been a means to distract from Fatah and
Hamas’ inability to agree on any substantive issue.

Hamas is the primary beneficiary of the PA’s financial woes and their
political consequences. Indeed, although Hamas is suffering something
of a financial crisis of its own due to tensions with Egypt — and,
especially, Syria — it remains the recipient of significant cash
transfers from other patrons, primarily Iran. Still, the consequences
of Hamas’s financial crisis are greatly mitigated by the fact that its
rival, the PA, continues to pay most public employees in Gaza — even
though Hamas still rules there.

The real core of the PA’s long-term challenge is the ongoing Israeli
occupation, which prevents the Palestinians from having control over
key sectors of their economy and restricts almost every form of
economic development. In April, Mariam Sherman, the World Bank’s
country director for the West Bank and Gaza, said, “While we commend
the solid performance of Palestinian institutions, we are concerned
about the prospect for continued economic growth.” Israel’s ”closure
regime,“ she continued, represents ”the most substantial obstacle to
Palestinian economic viability.” A World Bank report issued at the
same time noted that strong private sector growth is unlikely “while
Israeli restrictions on access to natural resources and markets remain
in place, and as long as investors are deterred by the increased cost
of business associated with the closure regime.”

Such findings echo those of every major multilateral institution,
which emphasize that Israeli restrictions on access and mobility are
the gravest threat to long-term development and financial stability.
Genuine financial viability will ultimately require the creation of an
independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

However, even under occupation, the PA has achieved a great deal in
recent years. According to the World Bank, real economic growth in the
West Bank in 2010 exceeded 9 percent of GDP, which surpassed the PA’s
budget projection estimate of 8 percent. Moreover, under Fayyad, the
PA has overcome a legacy of corruption and patronage to establish a
transparent public finance system that has greatly reassured foreign
donors.

Nevertheless, corruption in other sectors remains an issue. The PA’s
improved image is threatened by an ongoing investigation into alleged
malfeasance by some officials, including four ministers, among them
Minister of the Economy Hassan Abu-Libdah. There are also charges and
countercharges of corruption between Fatah and an ousted former PLO
official, Mohammed Dahlan.

Other obstacles to economic well-being also remain. A June UN report
showed rising unemployment among Palestinians in the West Bank and
East Jerusalem — from 21.7 percent to 25 percent during the last
year. Moreover, what economic growth has occurred has been based on an
increase in construction and retail businesses, not manufacturing or
long-term, self-sustaining enterprises.

The PA’s state- and institution-building program has shown great
promise, but it requires sustained international financial and
political support to continue and expand. Crucially, if it is to
remain politically viable, it must also be seen by the Palestinian
public as part of a broader program to establish an independent state.
There is no Palestinian constituency for a program to create better
living conditions in small autonomous zones within a permanent or
semi-permanent Israeli occupation.

Although the PA’s potential plan to push for UN recognition of
Palestinian statehood is not directly related to the present crisis,
it does contribute to the overall uncertainty about the direction in
which Palestinian politics and national strategy are headed. A UN move
could create additional significant financial problems, including a
withdrawal or reduction in U.S. aid and possible withholding of
Palestinian tax revenues by Israel. At the same time, reported plans
for mass civil disobedience among Palestinians in coordination with a
UN initiative in September further contribute to uncertainty among
donors and investors, and raise additional tensions with the United
States and Israel.

The bottom line is that the PA’s financial crisis threatens the
achievements and potential of the state-building program, which has
been the basis of significant but limited economic growth in the West
Bank in recent years, as well as the credibility of the moderate
leaders who have created and led it. The success of the program in
terms of economic development must be linked to a viable political
path to national independence — not symbolic gestures at the UN that
have no effect on realities on the ground — or even its creators and
leaders will abandon it. Fayyad and other PA officials conceptualized
their project as a bottom-up supplement to top-down diplomacy, not as
an alternative to it.

The mainstream Palestinian leadership in Ramallah has staked its
entire political future on this policy of independence through a
combination of state-building efforts at home and diplomacy abroad. If
the Palestinian public sees this strategy as having permanently and
irrevocably failed, particularly if there are ongoing or regular
financial and economic crises, they will look to an alternative
leadership and program. The alternatives are either chaos or Hamas,
with inevitably dire consequences for the Palestinian national
movement and for U.S. and Israeli interests as well.

Those parties who do not want the Palestinians to go ahead with a UN
initiative — such as the United States, some European countries, and
Israel — should make every effort to ease the financial crisis. The
Palestinian leadership needs a clear and reasonable incentive to avoid
a confrontation at the UN in September, which would probably be very
damaging to Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. interests in the broader
Middle East. Otherwise, the Palestinians might feel they have no other
diplomatic options and an overwhelming domestic political necessity to
go forward with plans that carry significant risks.

Meanwhile, those parties, including some Arab states, who are
encouraging Palestinians to go forward with a UN initiative in spite
of the risks have an obligation to protect them from the political,
diplomatic, and financial consequences. But so far, the opposite has
occurred: the pattern of unmet pledges undermines the ability of
Palestinian leaders to make constructive decisions, places them at the
mercy of domestic political calculations and public anger, and weakens
their ability to lead. It is pushing them toward a confrontation with
the United States (and for that matter, much of the West) and with
Israel that they can ill afford, leaving them alone and exposed.

There is, however, the potential for compromise. Fears of a
Palestinian failure at the UN producing a backlash in the West Bank
are justifiably widespread. Yet a perceived success at the UN, met
with an initial wave of euphoria but followed by disenchantment as
living conditions remain unchanged or worsen because of Israeli or
U.S. retaliation, could produce an equal backlash. Instead, a
compromise strategy could produce a limited but real Palestinian
achievement in New York. Such a strategy would involve an upgrade of
the PLO observer mission at the UN, a reiteration of the Obama
principles (negotiations based on 1967 lines with agreed-upon land
swaps) , and a UN declaration clarifying that the international
community will not accept any outcome other than a two-state solution.

Massive international investment in state- and institution-building
could ensure a major upgrade in the quality of life for Palestinians
in the West Bank and could defuse the impact of any disappointment.
Whatever happens in New York in September, the day after needs to look
better, not worse, for Palestinians on the ground. Ultimately, the
Palestinian national aspiration for independence must be met. But
institution-building, investment, and financial support for a
leadership that is opposed to violence and committed to peace with
Israel can buy time and patience — probably for years, but certainly
not for decades.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=299083

 

What can a book about traditional folkloric costumes tell us about contemporary politics? Quite a lot as it happens.

Hanan Karaman Munayyer’s beautiful new volume, “Traditional Palestinian Costume: Origins and Evolution” (Interlink, 2011) combines superb photography of the renowned Munayyer collection of traditional Palestinian dress with an analysis of their origins, evolution and variations. Since the 1980s, Munayyer and her husband Farah have been assembling these costumes and other artifacts of Palestinian traditional life in their Palestinian Heritage Foundation.

Between the two of them and their foundation, they are among the most important documentarians and preservationists of this history and heritage, not just in the United States, but in the world. Their collection, which dates from the 1850s to the present, has been exhibited at the Kennedy Center in Washington and in museums and galleries across the globe.

Munayyer’s important new book demonstrates a number of very salient points with serious implications about the present and future for the Palestinian people. First, it shows that traditional and folkloric Palestinian costumes are distinctive from other Levantine ones. Within Palestinian society, in various areas and villages, the costumes have their own particular features, handed down largely from mother to daughter, over decades and indeed centuries. But there is still a distinctive Palestinian style, strongly connected to other Levantine traditional dress, with forms and patterns all their own.

Second, this rich history yet again demonstrates—and unfortunately this point continuously needs to be reaffirmed against pro-Israel propaganda that attacks the idea relentlessly—that an ancient and unbroken Palestinian history and culture really does exist. Like Walid Khalidi’s invaluable volumes “Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History Of The Palestinians 1876-1948” (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984) and “All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948” (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), Hanan Karaman Munayyer’s book stands as a stark refutation of the negation of Palestinian identity, history and culture.

The days are long gone when Golda Meir’s infamous remark about the Palestinians is still taken seriously in the West. The onetime Israeli prime minister stated that “[t]here is no such thing as a Palestinian people… It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their country. They didn’t exist.” Yet there remains a hard-core contingent among Israelis and pro-Israel Westerners who persist in denying Palestinians their identity, history and heritage.

Therefore, documenting that history and those traditions is not only a vital project of collective memory and an important academic task in itself, it is also a quintessentially political act. It is, above all, an act of passionate, dedicated and deeply meaningful resistance to the continued efforts at the negation of Palestinian identity and history.

This is Palestinian sumud, or steadfastness, at its finest. Beyond bluster, slogans and canned rhetoric, Munayyer’s volume has something deeply serious and meaningful to say about both the origins and the future of Palestinian national identity. That it is an important reference work in its own right and a stunning contribution to art history is an added bonus.

Beyond Palestinian particularism, the book also sheds important light on the relationship between different Arab cultures over the centuries and their relationship with ancient, pre-Arab traditions and civilizations. Perhaps even more importantly, it also examines the cross-pollination between Western and Middle Eastern cultures in the field of textile arts. Like so much of the rest of this fertile exchange, its most important moments were the confrontational interactions of civilizations during the Crusades and the colonial era.

Understanding the continuous interaction between the art and culture of the West and the Middle East undermines any notions of binary oppositional relationships between these societies and the dangerous concept of a “clash of civilizations.”

The West and the Arabs have been learning from each other for more than 1,000 years, and they continue to do so. Even a history as specific as that of traditional Palestinian costume demonstrates that contemporary cultures are rooted in an ancient past, an evolutionary process of cross-cultural exchange and influences, and, at its best, a healthy respect for each other’s contributions and traditions.

The book also helps to show that while Palestinian identity is distinctive and draws on particular cultural styles, it is also deeply rooted in the broader Arab Levantine tradition. This identity has been shaped more by its 20th century political encounter with Zionism and Israel than any pre-existing distinctive nationalist identity.

By focusing in great detail on a very narrow aspect of Palestinian life, Munayyer’s book has much to teach us not only about the past and future of the Palestinian people, but also about how culture in general functions in daily life and in shaping present-day political identities. Such flashes of insight help us understand the origins of our contemporary national identities, but also their broader ancient and regional roots, and their deep connection to a never-ending process of human cultural interaction across vast swaths of time and space.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/08/facts_on_the_ground?page=full

With negotiations hopelessly stalled and the deadline for a potential confrontation at the United Nations in September rapidly approaching, the Israeli government apparently decided that now would be the appropriate time to announce a major expansion of one of its most provocative settlements. Interior Minister Eli Yishai said last week that final approval has been given for 900 new units in the Jerusalem “Har Homa” settlement, an area known to Palestinians as Jabal Abu Ghneim.

With breath-taking cynicism, Yishai claimed that the cost-of-living crisis and housing bubble, which has spurred escalating protests and sit-ins across Israel, caused Israel to go ahead with this particularly controversial project. In announcing the decision, he said that “the real estate crisis is serious and we shall not halt projects” and that the move is merely part of “an effort to enable all Israeli citizens to purchase an apartment.” But given that the economic crisis is about the prices of housing, student fees, and cottage cheese, and not about the number of houses as such — and given that there is plenty of space in Israel where the government could build houses — nobody is buying this argument, above all because there is no more sensitive or strategically significant area anywhere under Israeli control, except the Old City of Jerusalem itself.

The expansion in Har Homa is not only highly damaging to prospects for peace, but it also taps into the deepest Palestinian fears of relentless and carefully choreographed settlement activity designed to permanently foreclose the possibility of their meaningful independence. The bitterest experience for Palestinians in their dealings with Israel since negotiations began in 1993 was the doubling of the number of settlers in the occupied territories from 200,000 to 400,000 during the 1990s, when they believed they were negotiating an end to the occupation. Not only did the occupation not end and no Palestinian state get created, but the number of settlements and settlers greatly increased throughout the entire era of the “peace process.” Including East Jerusalem, they now number more than half a million.

Har Homa, which didn’t exist before 1993, as Jerusalem expert Daniel Seidemann correctly points out, “is viewed by the Palestinians as the quintessential post-Camp David unilateral act.” It will be difficult for any Israeli government to agree to cede control of it, but almost impossible for Palestinian leaders not to insist on that very point, especially because the area is crucial to connecting Jerusalem with the rest of the West Bank. It has been a sticking point whenever raised in border negotiations. For Palestinians, an economic crisis in Israel being used to justify the most damaging of land grabs only reinforces their sense of powerlessness and the urgent need to find some means of confronting an unacceptable status quo.

The Har Homa announcement is particularly ironic because Palestinians are being lectured ad nauseam by Israel and the United States about their supposedly “unilateral” initiatives at the United Nations in September involving some sort of acknowledgment of Palestinian statehood. Of course, Israel settlement activity is without question unilateral — as well as a violation of the Geneva Conventions, the Roadmap of the Quartet, and many other crucial obligations. Palestinian U.N. initiatives may be outside the context of negotiations, but are not in fact unilateral, because the United Nations is a multilateral body.

In an effort to stave off a damaging confrontation at the United Nations — and to fend off the threat of shifting the issue to a multilateral forum beyond its control — the United States has been trying to find a way to revive the bilateral negotiating process it has overseen since 1993. In May, U.S. President Barack Obama proposed a generalized vision for new talks, based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed land swaps and focusing on borders and security first. Palestinians cautiouslywelcomed the idea but asked for clear terms of reference. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, categorically, and even angrily, rejected the formula.

With September approaching, however, Palestinian leaders are making it clear that they intend to go forward with some U.N. initiative — though precisely what is not yet known — unless they are offered a clear reason not to do so. They have understandably said that though their first choice is to resume negotiations, they find the present impasse intolerable and are determined to find some path forward.

Everyone faces a substantial “day after” problem in September. Any U.N. initiative, whether or not it is regarded by the Palestinians as a diplomatic success, will not change realities on the ground. Whatever happens in New York, if life for Palestinians under occupation doesn’t change or — because of American or Israeli retaliation — actually gets worse, an outpouring of widespread public anger is a real possibility. Some Palestinian officials have been encouraging mass nonviolent demonstrations coordinated with a U.N. initiative. But Israeli troops facing large Palestinian crowds, even nonviolent ones, are likely to resort to the use of force. And there are numerous Palestinian groups committed to armed struggle that would undoubtedly quickly move to take advantage of a chaotic or confrontational environment.

Leaks from the Israeli prime minister’s office have suggested that Netanyahu may now be willing to agree to talks based on the 1967 borders as long as the Palestinians recognize Israel as a “Jewish state,” whatever that might mean. The Obama administration has not confirmed the existence of such an agreement, and nothing remotely resembling a framework for negotiations or terms of reference has been made public. The reported proposal is a non-starter, though, because Netanyahu would basically be asking the Palestinians to agree to a very significant concession on an issue that was never raised until 2007 in exchange for a reaffirmation of what has been understood by all parties as the basis of negotiations since 1993. It’s a perfect example of asking for something very substantial in return for nothing whatsoever.

Some formula may yet be found, however, because almost all Palestinian options at the United Nations would constitute symbolic victories at most, but incur substantial costs and risks. A U.S. veto in the Security Council — or even a General Assembly vote pitting a large bloc of developing states against most of the West and Japan (which Israel is likely to claim as a coalition of the “civilized world” in its camp) — would do little to advance the cause and could actually damage chances for achieving Palestinian independence.

A losing confrontation with the United States over the issue of statehood in the Security Council would be particularly dangerous to the Palestinian national interest. The U.S. veto in February of a resolution on settlement activity effectively left Israel with a free hand to build with barely any protests, at least until now.

The Har Homa announcement, however, may be a step too far. Every U.S. administration has been strongly opposed to settlement activity in this area because it prejudices the outcome of negotiations on Jerusalem and greatly damages the prospects for an agreement. In 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accurately described Har Homa as “a settlement the United States has opposed from the very beginning.” It is imperative that the Obama administration, no matter how allergic it may have become to the settlement issue, also takes a firm stance on this latest plan.

Expanding the settlement at Har Homa is unlikely to help the Israeli government mollify the huge cost-of-living protests. But it will certainly give the Palestinians yet another reason to regard the present situation as not only intolerable but desperate, and to press forward with a U.N. initiative in spite of the substantial risks. The United States and others wishing the Palestinians to refrain from any ambitious U.N. initiative in September need to provide their leaders with a politically plausible and diplomatically meaningful reason to do so. With its new announcement about Har Homa, the Israeli government could not have given Palestinians a greater incentive to despair about where both present realities and the moribund American-led peace process are taking them, and, in spite of the considerable costs at stake, go ahead and roll the dice at the U.N. casino in New York.

http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/294651

The United States has just entered its extended presidential and
congressional election season with the Republican battle over their
party’s nomination well underway and President Barack Obama having
formally launched his reelection campaign. This regular feature of the
American political system has important implications for US foreign
policy and vital lessons for the Arab world.

As always, the election context has a direct influence on both the
conduct of, and the debate over, US foreign policy. For example, while
the Obama administration clearly regards progress on peace between
Israel and Palestinians as essential and not optional for US
interests, no major peace initiative can be expected during the
campaign season. These built-in restrictions are an integral part of
the cautious American approach to pushing Obama’s outline of renewed
talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon land swaps
and a focus on borders and security first. They also help explain why
so little progress has been made in translating them into clearly
defined negotiating terms of reference rather than generalized
principles.

The election season has also helped produce a hardening of attitudes
in Congress towards the Palestinians, with administration officials
having to defend continued aid to the Palestinian Authority against
vehement criticism. And it prompted grandstanding by Republican
lawmakers who threatened to defund the mission in Libya. It is
unthinkable that Republicans would have threatened to defund a
military effort by a Republican president, and they would have
questioned the patriotism of anyone who tried to do so.

Electioneering unquestionably distorts foreign policy, as it brings
politics into conflict with policy, which is always a problem, even
more than usual. But it helps clarify the mechanics through which US
foreign policy is determined and the US national interest is defined.

Many Arabs, and even Arab-Americans, tend to think of US policies as
predetermined or subject to the machinations of small and shadowy
groups of powerful players. To the contrary, as election seasons
demonstrate most dramatically, the levers through which Americans
define their interests and develop a policy consensus are, in fact,
largely open, transparent and played out in public.

The two main sources of leverage in American politics, including on
foreign policy, are votes and money. These, more than any other
factors, determine exactly who gets elected, and on what platforms.
Media coverage, publicity and policy advocacy, especially when
connected to broad national or influential elite sentiments, are also
an important factor.

These levers are available to all Americans, and there are no laws or
mechanisms restricting who can apply them if they have the means and
the will. History demonstrates that a sustained application of such
resources eventually has a powerful impact on shaping how the country
defines its national interests and what its policies will be.

Arabs and Arab-Americans seem remarkably resistant to either
understanding how the system works or, at least, deciding to
participate in it enthusiastically. We have generally opted out of the
process altogether, leaving an open playing field for others on many
of our most cherished issues.

Arab-Americans have failed to create strong, effective national
institutions. Every single national Arab or Muslim American
organization is smaller or in some way less effective than it was on
September 10, 2011, which is a shocking indictment of the lack of
interest of the community in defending itself or promoting its
concerns. I’m not aware of a single registered lobbyist working for an
Arab-American organization with Congress on Capitol Hill. The
consequences of such woeful inaction are evident across the board.

While direct political participation is reserved for American citizens
only, Arab societies and governments have also demonstrated a
bewildering disinclination to understand the importance of encouraging
and supporting the development of Arab-American organizations. What
Arab societies need in the United States are not clients but friends;
allies, not employees. There has to be room for significant
disagreement as well as agreement. But influential Arabs have shown a
consistent preference for working with non-Arab-American organizations
and companies that do not understand or really care about broader Arab
concerns, and wasted huge amounts of money on this dead end.

Both the Arabs and the Arab-Americans have the means, talent and
resources to have a significant impact on the American policy
conversation through the established political system, which is open
to them in different capacities as citizens or noncitizens. The
negative consequences of their persistent non-engagement or
wrongheaded engagement is always evident, but becomes even more clear
as elections approach.

If we want Americans to sympathize with our positions, for example by
adopting a more evenhanded policy towards Palestine, we must give them
a reason to do so. Serious, sustained and meaningful engagement with
the American political system, and creating and supporting relevant
institutions, is the only way to accomplish this. Not doing so
guarantees continued failure.

http://www.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/294651

The United States has just entered its extended presidential and
congressional election season with the Republican battle over their
party’s nomination well underway and President Barack Obama having
formally launched his reelection campaign. This regular feature of the
American political system has important implications for US foreign
policy and vital lessons for the Arab world.

As always, the election context has a direct influence on both the
conduct of, and the debate over, US foreign policy. For example, while
the Obama administration clearly regards progress on peace between
Israel and Palestinians as essential and not optional for US
interests, no major peace initiative can be expected during the
campaign season. These built-in restrictions are an integral part of
the cautious American approach to pushing Obama’s outline of renewed
talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon land swaps
and a focus on borders and security first. They also help explain why
so little progress has been made in translating them into clearly
defined negotiating terms of reference rather than generalized
principles.

The election season has also helped produce a hardening of attitudes
in Congress towards the Palestinians, with administration officials
having to defend continued aid to the Palestinian Authority against
vehement criticism. And it prompted grandstanding by Republican
lawmakers who threatened to defund the mission in Libya. It is
unthinkable that Republicans would have threatened to defund a
military effort by a Republican president, and they would have
questioned the patriotism of anyone who tried to do so.

Electioneering unquestionably distorts foreign policy, as it brings
politics into conflict with policy, which is always a problem, even
more than usual. But it helps clarify the mechanics through which US
foreign policy is determined and the US national interest is defined.

Many Arabs, and even Arab-Americans, tend to think of US policies as
predetermined or subject to the machinations of small and shadowy
groups of powerful players. To the contrary, as election seasons
demonstrate most dramatically, the levers through which Americans
define their interests and develop a policy consensus are, in fact,
largely open, transparent and played out in public.

The two main sources of leverage in American politics, including on
foreign policy, are votes and money. These, more than any other
factors, determine exactly who gets elected, and on what platforms.
Media coverage, publicity and policy advocacy, especially when
connected to broad national or influential elite sentiments, are also
an important factor.

These levers are available to all Americans, and there are no laws or
mechanisms restricting who can apply them if they have the means and
the will. History demonstrates that a sustained application of such
resources eventually has a powerful impact on shaping how the country
defines its national interests and what its policies will be.

Arabs and Arab-Americans seem remarkably resistant to either
understanding how the system works or, at least, deciding to
participate in it enthusiastically. We have generally opted out of the
process altogether, leaving an open playing field for others on many
of our most cherished issues.

Arab-Americans have failed to create strong, effective national
institutions. Every single national Arab or Muslim American
organization is smaller or in some way less effective than it was on
September 10, 2011, which is a shocking indictment of the lack of
interest of the community in defending itself or promoting its
concerns. I’m not aware of a single registered lobbyist working for an
Arab-American organization with Congress on Capitol Hill. The
consequences of such woeful inaction are evident across the board.

While direct political participation is reserved for American citizens
only, Arab societies and governments have also demonstrated a
bewildering disinclination to understand the importance of encouraging
and supporting the development of Arab-American organizations. What
Arab societies need in the United States are not clients but friends;
allies, not employees. There has to be room for significant
disagreement as well as agreement. But influential Arabs have shown a
consistent preference for working with non-Arab-American organizations
and companies that do not understand or really care about broader Arab
concerns, and wasted huge amounts of money on this dead end.

Both the Arabs and the Arab-Americans have the means, talent and
resources to have a significant impact on the American policy
conversation through the established political system, which is open
to them in different capacities as citizens or noncitizens. The
negative consequences of their persistent non-engagement or
wrongheaded engagement is always evident, but becomes even more clear
as elections approach.

If we want Americans to sympathize with our positions, for example by
adopting a more evenhanded policy towards Palestine, we must give them
a reason to do so. Serious, sustained and meaningful engagement with
the American political system, and creating and supporting relevant
institutions, is the only way to accomplish this. Not doing so
guarantees continued failure.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=296779

The massacre of over 100 protesters in the Syrian city of Hama on Sunday not only shocked the conscience of the world, it has created something of a crisis for American policy toward Syria.

In recent weeks, the Obama administration’s approach to Syria could be summed up in two words: managed transition. The preferred solution to the Syrian crisis was to try to reach out to members of both the opposition and the power structure simultaneously to try to begin a real dialogue about Syria’s future. That now looks increasingly unlikely, and the prospect of what Washington fears most—sectarian civil war—is increasingly possible.

For many months, Washington tossed lifelines to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, calling on him to lead the transition and begin the process of reform. Although most informed observers were convinced from the outset that the regime was, literally, incapable of reform for a myriad of unsavory reasons, the United States had profound and reasonable concerns about chaos and civil conflict in Syria.

In particular, the American concern has been that a raging, and especially sectarian, civil conflict in Syria could spill over into neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, and possibly even be the tipping point for a wider regional conflict. Israel’s and Turkey’s anxieties have also figured prominently in American thinking. A particular concern is Turkey’s apparent inclination, at a minimum, to militarily create a buffer zone in northern Syria, especially in Alawite and above all Kurdish areas, in the event of a civil war or sustained anarchy.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton came under particular criticism after a March 27 statement in which she declared that “[m]any of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe [Assad] is a reformer.” However, as the regime’s brutality escalated, Washington was unable to sustain this tone and imposed limited sanctions in April and May. The administration essentially abandoned the idea that Assad himself could institute reforms, with President Barack Obama bluntly stating that if he could not do so, he should “get out of the way.”

American efforts to try to avoid Syrian civil conflict have been led by the ambassador in Damascus, Robert Ford, whose credibility was greatly enhanced by his controversial July 8 “unauthorized” visit to Hama. Calls to pull the US diplomatic presence in Damascus were rejected on the implicit grounds that Ford was leading the quest for “managed transition” by keeping lines of communication open to figures in both the Syrian opposition and ruling elite.

That strategy, however, appears to have borne little if any fruit so far. Even before the Hama massacre, Ford was recalled to Washington for consultations. American concerns remain the same, but the approach to achieving regime change or transition in Damascus without all-out civil conflict plainly needs considerable and urgent revision.

Hama prompted the strongest words by far from Obama: “al-Assad is ensuring that he and his regime will be left in the past.” Yet American options remain limited, and a Libya-style military intervention is out of the question. Increased sanctions, particularly in the energy sector, are overdue. So is pressure through the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has referred the Syria file to the Security Council.

After last weekend’s massacre, the prospect of a referral of Syrian officials to the International Criminal Court or the creation of a special tribunal on Syria has received renewed attention. Syria is not a party to the Statute of Rome, meaning the Security Council would have to authorize an ICC investigation, as it did in Sudan. However, Russian and Chinese opposition to such a move may not be easily overcome at this stage.

Even though American options are limited, the Obama administration now has no choice but to significantly and publicly increase the pressure on the Assad regime. Concerns about stability are understandable, but it’s impossible not to recognize that the Assad regime itself is now the greatest source of instability. Indeed, it is undoubtedly dragging Syria toward civil war, quite possibly on a sectarian basis, and is most probably doing so deliberately.

This means that the calculation has to change immediately. The United States and its allies might not be able to prevent the Assad regime from forcing a brutal and probably sectarian conflict on its own country, but the best hope for avoiding this is moving away from a policy based on cautiously managed transition to one based on bolder actions aimed at regime change. Such steps can also help ensure that the pitched battle, if it must come, is quicker and more decisive, and that its destabilization of the region is better contained.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2011/Jul-29/The-ex-spy-who-stepped-into-the-cold.ashx#axzz1TP2YXQES

In 2007, an organization called Conflicts Forum, which at the time was being funded by the European Union, issued a report intended to promote a “positive assertion of Islamist values and thinking” in the West. It laid out a public relations campaign for rebranding “resistance movements” in the eyes of Westerners in terms of “social justice,” specifically promoting “Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s values, philosophy and wider political and social programmes.”

“We need to clarify and explain that Islamist movements are political and social movements working on social and political justice,” the report explained, “and are leading the resistance to the U.S./Western recolonisation project with its network of client states and so-called ‘moderates.’” The authors also asserted that “the progressive space of social movements [in the West] is empty” and asked “how the West can learn from the values and the notion of society that Hezbollah and Hamas have at the centre of their philosophy.”

Conflicts Forum, which received $708,000 from the EU between 2007 and 2009, is the brainchild of Alastair Crooke, a former long-serving British intelligence agent and adviser to the former EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana. In recent years Crooke has emerged as the leading Western champion of Arab and Muslim extremists and anti-Western regimes. Conflicts Forum, in other words, does not seek to resolve conflicts but rather exacerbates them.

Crooke’s most recent intervention was a commentary in Asia Times in which he argued that the Syrian uprising is almost entirely the work of extremist followers of the late Al-Qaeda terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Crooke also affirmed that a large majority of Syrians back the dictatorship of President Bashar Assad, who they believe shares their desire for radical reforms. In this way he merely parroted the demonstrably false propaganda of the Syrian regime.

In an earlier essay for Foreign Policy, Crooke insisted that Assad was uniquely immune to the “Arab Spring” because of his championing of “resistance” movements – news, no doubt, to the 10,000 detained Syrians and the families of the 1,400 dead, who Crooke now expects us to believe are all followers of Zarqawi.

Crooke is noted for arranging back-channel meetings between Western officials and members of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. But other than the grant from the EU, the rest of his funding remains mysterious, as do his core motivations, about which he is decidedly coy.

Crooke is a strong supporter of the Iranian ruling faction and its ideology, and has maintained “there’s absolutely no evidence the election [of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009] was stolen.” He apparently believes that the radical Shiite Islamism espoused by Iranian hard-liners is the key to the future of the Middle East, as opposed to any form of liberalism or democracy, or the conservative Sunni Islam championed by Gulf Arab monarchies. He cites Hamas as a Sunni group positively influenced by Iranian notions of revolution and resistance.

Most of the publications on the Conflicts Forum website reflect official Iranian ideology and foreign policy, including articles explaining “Iran’s commitment to the Palestinian cause,” attacking the Palestinian Authority, strongly supporting Hamas, celebrating the “principled foreign policy of Ayatollah Khamenei,” and casting the Arab Spring as an Iranian-style “Islamic awakening.”

Conflicts Forum strongly advocates the narrative that the contemporary Arab world is the site of a macro-historical struggle between a “culture of resistance” and a “culture of accommodation,” meaning all moderate, secular and pro-Western forces in the region. Crooke’s attachment to Assad appears to be a function of the Syrian regime’s self-professed role as a supporter of “resistance” and its strong ties to Iran and Hezbollah.

Conflicts Forum’s documents do not reflect Western efforts to understand Islamist movements; rather, they speak in a clearly and unabashedly Islamist voice. Its advisory board includes Azzam Tamimi, a prominent Hamas sympathizer in the United Kingdom who has defended suicide bombings. It also includes Moazzam Begg, who, as London’s The Daily Telegraph recently reported, confessed in a signed statement to the FBI that he learned how to shoot guns and operate explosives at an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan.

Crooke’s and Conflicts Forum’s activities are alarming from a Western point of view, but even more so from the perspective of those interested in the spread of democracy and liberal values in the Arab and Islamic worlds, above all Arabs and Muslims themselves. What such activities champion are in fact ultra-right wing, reactionary and fundamentally totalitarian ideologies hostile to human rights in general, and more specifically to the rights of individuals, women and minorities. Crooke is evidently a spy who gladly stepped into the cold.

This man, his odious views, and his nefarious organization have had a free pass for far too long. It is time to recognize Conflicts Forum for what it is: a champion not of “resistance and revolution” but of violence, intolerant religious fanaticism and totalitarian ideologies. That should be enough to make Crooke and his organization anathema to anyone even remotely interested in a decent future for Arabs and Muslims.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/defusing-palestinian-statehood-bid-at-the-un/242619/

Palestinian leaders need a reason not to ask the United Nations for recognition in September, which would be risky for everyone involved

Palestinian President Abbas wipes his brow after addressing the UN in September / Reuters

For most of 2011, Palestinian leaders have been privately and publicly speculating about potential statehood initiatives at the UN General Assembly meeting in September. The PLO may present some plan in effect asking the UN to recognize Palestine as an independent state, which wouldn’t make it so, but it would put Israel and the U.S. in a very awkward position. These ideas have been opposed by both Israel and the United States, which have described them as “unilateral,” and met with a mixed response among European states. To date no clear plan or strategy has been put forward but language of a draft resolution could be unveiled as early as Thursday.

In recent months, Palestinians have floated a number of ideas about what they might try to do at the UN meeting and what they hope to achieve. As President Mahmoud Abbas keeps insisting, it seems Palestinians would prefer to resume negotiations with clear terms of reference. With neither negotiations nor clear terms thus far forthcoming, however, and with time quickly running out, a UN initiative of some sort looks increasingly likely. The political and diplomatic results will depend on what, exactly, the Palestinians propose.

Despite persistent claims by both the Israeli right and the Palestinian left, the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah is not content with the status quo, in spite of the fact that its rule in “Area A” of the occupied West Bank is, for now, secure. The Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization leadership likely know that if their long-term strategy of securing Palestinian statehood, mainly through negotiations and diplomacy, is seen as a permanent failure, they will be finished in Palestinian politics. They need only look towards Gaza, where Hamas was elected, to see the alternative national leadership waiting in the wings. An Islamist take-over of the Palestinian national movement, they know, would have dire consequences for the cause of independence.

Many Israelis and Americans are frustrated at the impasse in peace talks. So too are the Palestinian people and leadership, for whom the special conditions of occupation and the ongoing Israeli settlement project make the status quo particularly alarming. Following the rapid breakdown of direct negotiations last year and the Obama administration’s failure to secure even a three-month extension of Israel’s partial and temporary settlement moratorium — even with an astoundingly generous package of inducements — the PLO concluded that they could not continue to rely primarily on a peace process that requires Israeli enthusiasm and American determination.

Palestinians had hoped that a convergence of bottom-up state-building and top-down diplomacy, led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, would be the key to independence. Left on its own, the state-building plan has been little more than a development project under occupation. This has given the leadership a sense of urgency that has impelled its turn towards possible statehood initiatives at the UN.

The most widely discussed option is for Palestinians to apply to the Secretary General for full UN membership, leading to a referral to the Security Council. If the Security Council approved the request, it would be forwarded to the General Assembly where it would require a two-thirds majority, which Palestinians would almost certainly get. But the United States has made it clear that it intends to veto any such resolution in the Security Council, making full UN membership for Palestine impossible at present.

Another option under discussion would be for Palestinians to seek a General Assembly resolution under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution 337 of 1950. This was an American-led initiative to overcome persistent USSR vetoes of Security Council resolutions regarding Korea. However, Uniting for Peace resolutions do not address UN membership, but rather are concerned with a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” They are a way to authorize use of force, sanctions, and other coercive measures by the UN General Assembly in spite of a Security Council veto. It is very difficult to see how such a resolution would advance the cause of Palestinian membership in the UN. Boycotts and sanctions have been in place in many contexts, including the Middle East, without such a resolution, and there is no indication that it would have any practical impact on either Palestinian UN membership or coercive measures aimed at Israel by other member states.

The most recently floated idea is that Palestinians could apply for non-member state observer status, as opposed to the PLO’s present observer status as a non-state mission. Theoretically, this would require a 50 percent-plus-one vote in the General Assembly, a tally Palestinians could likely easily achieve. However, such a change in status would make Palestine neither a member state of the UN nor a state with practical independence. Abbas and others have said the goal is to gain a more even footing with Israel diplomatically and to negotiate over the occupation not of undefined territory, but the territory of another state. Whether such a change of status in the UN would achieve this result is highly questionable.

But there are real reasons to pursue non-member state observer status. In the UN’s history, other than the Vatican,16 states have had held that status, and all 16 eventually became members. It could also provide Palestine with access to the International Criminal Court, possibly allowing it to accede to the Statute of Rome and become a member of the Assembly of State Parties. This is no doubt among the most important of Israel’s concerns about such a move, against which it has threatened unspecified unilateral retaliation.

Like many countries engaged in conflict, Israel is potentially liable for “war crimes” which includes unlawful use of force against civilians and property, most notably with regard to the last war in Gaza. But the Statute also defines a “war crime” as, “The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” which could easily be applied to Israel’s settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Despite Israel’s continuous insistence that these territories are “disputed” rather than occupied, the Security Council holds that the territories captured in 1967 are indeed occupied and Israel is the occupying power. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that such settlement of occupied territories is unlawful and a human rights abuse.

Another potential ICC vulnerability for Israel is “the crime of apartheid,” which the Statute defines as “inhumane acts … committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.”

However, because Palestine would not have the clearly defined borders necessary to join the ICC as a state, and since Israel is not a party to the Statute, Israelis could not be prosecuted by the ICC based on their nationality, or for their actions in areas that are not in the territory of a state that is party to the Statute. In January 2009, following the war in Gaza, the PA formally recognized the jurisdiction of the ICC, implicitly asking for it to exercise its authority in areas the PA considers under its authority, including Gaza. The ICC “accepted the declaration without prejudice” to its applicability, but made no clear determination, apparently because of the nebulous nature of Palestinian statehood. Non-UN-member state status may or may not improve the chances of a clear ICC acceptance of jurisdiction in any territories claimed as part of the Palestinian non-member state.

The Palestinian leadership appears divided on these three options, including the prospect of seeking non-UN-member state status. Those with deep reservations are said to include PLO Secretary-General Yasser Abed Rabbo and Fayyad, among others, who are concerned with the potential consequences of such a move, especially a cutoff of American aid, as Congress has threatened. The United States is the single largest donor to the PA, providing at least $400 million per year. A losing confrontation with the United States in the Security Council could be disastrous for for Palestinian prospects. The U.S. veto of last year’s resolution on settlement activity effectively killed the issue for the time being and left Israel with a free hand on settlement ever since. Would Palestinians really want to risk statehood in the same way?

There are other risks. Israeli retaliation could include annexation of parts of the West Bank, for example, or abrogation of the Oslo agreements. A failed UN initiative, or one that “succeeds” without improving the daily lives of Palestinians under occupation, could lead to an explosion of popular anger in the West Bank. Even if this were to begin as a nonviolent movement, because the occupation is a system of control and discipline, Israeli forces are likely to use force even against large crowds of unarmed people, and there are many Palestinian factions committed to violent resistance that would not fail to take advantage of chaos. The situation could rapidly spiral out of anyone’s control.

Israel’s proposed response to these options has been to form a block of about 30 states in the General Assembly opposed to a Palestinian initiative. It would be small but comprised of most of the large western powers and Japan. They would present this as not just a coalition of the major world powers but of the community of “civilized countries.” Even this could prove a de facto victory of sorts for Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, no matter what the rest of the General Assembly decides to do.

Many Palestinians therefore hope that renewed negotiations would make the UN initiative moot. But this prospect is receding quickly, especially since both the Middle East Quartet and the European Union are so internally divided on the issue. These dangers underscore the need to find an alternative compromise that would avert the negative consequences of an initiative at the UN, which would produce largely symbolic value and very harmful practical consequences. One such option would be to try to find a widely acceptable option to upgrade the status of the PLO mission at the UN with additional privileges but without non-member state status. This might be especially appealing if it were combined in some way with a restatement of President Barak Obama’s vision of talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed upon land swaps and an additional statement that the international community is committed to a two-state outcome and will accept no other resolution of the conflict.

All parties have a clear incentive to work quickly to find a way around a confrontation in September that would benefit no one and could lead to unmanageable consequences. Whatever the formula, the Palestinian leadership and people must be provided with a clear incentive not to pursue a UN initiative that is unacceptable to other key players. Otherwise, Palestinian leaders, lacking any other diplomatic steps forward, may feel that their hand is being forced. Simply climbing down from their proposed plans, without a credible explanation for their public, would be politically untenable, in spite of the obvious dangers ahead.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/debating_an_extremist_israeli_settler

Last week I had a fascinating debate with David Ha’ivri, an extremist Israeli settler—an event loosely connected to a conference of the pro-settler Christians United for Israel organization.

I call Ha’ivri an extremist settler for two reasons. First, many settlers are living in the occupied Palestinian territories not for ideological reasons but for practical ones. They have been induced to do so by generous Israeli government subsidies. Second, Ha’ivri’s worldview—that all the occupied territories belong exclusively to the Jewish people and that Palestinians there are not entitled to national or political rights—is by any standards extreme.

His vision involves permanent Jewish rule in all of Palestine, but no citizenship or votes for the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

In our exchange, Ha’ivri opened with a recitation of Jewish theological claims to all of the “land of Israel,” including the occupied territories, interspersed with a tendentious narrative about recent history. He and the audience, mainly of his supporters, probably expected me to counter with a tendentious Arab historical narrative or Muslim theological arguments.

I did neither. I pointed out that those arguments exist, and are as passionately held on the other side, but equally unhelpful. In his opening he never mentioned the word Palestinian, and neither described the problem nor suggested a solution.

I continuously emphasized that there are two peoples of approximately equal numbers in a small area who show no signs of being willing to share power or abandon their national agendas. Therefore, the only way to avoid continuing and intensifying conflict is a solution that involves creating two separate states.

My main point was that this was not so much a debate between an Arab and a Jew, as one between a modern mentality and a medieval one. Modern thinking, I explained, recognizes both the inherent rights of individuals as human beings and the rights of self-defined peoples to national self-determination. Medieval thinking, on the other hand, relies on holy texts and symbols, and conceives of people not as individuals and groups of individuals, but as fixed categories in a divinely ordained hierarchy. Though he was born in New York, Ha’ivri really believes that he possesses many rights in Palestine that Palestinians do not.

When the moderator, a friend of Ha’ivri, suggested there was deep significance in the fact that Jerusalem is frequently referred to in the Bible but not in the Koran, I dismissed this as irrelevant on two counts. First, historically this has not been, and it must not become, primarily a religious conflict that is by definition irresolvable. Second, ancient texts of whatever variety have nothing constructive to tell us about how to solve the real problems we face.

This modern, rational evaluation drew snickers from some of the audience. Most of them were clearly more comfortable with the religious absolutism Ha’ivri was offering, and deeply but erroneously and dangerously believe this is a religious struggle.

Many of them seemed more comfortable with the childish caricature he was offering of a morally pure Israel, relentlessly pursuing justice and friendship that is opposed only by degenerate Arab and Palestinian venality. The realistic evaluation I put forward, in which there were faults on all sides and no clean hands, has little appeal to absolutists. Nonetheless, I invited everyone present to join me in the modern world.

While I recognized the deep Jewish attachment to the land, neither Ha’ivri nor most others in the room showed any signs of acknowledging the deep Palestinian history, attachment and presence in it. His arguments, such as they were, boiled down to this: We have returned; we are not leaving; God is on our side. The organizers were distributing a pamphlet entitled “This Land is My Land,” which says it all.

Yes, I told him, you are there and you are a reality everyone must deal with rationally. But Palestinians are also there in equal and growing numbers, and they have the same rights you do, but you do not factor them into your thinking in any realistic manner. I noted neither he nor anyone in the audience would ever agree to be denied their basic rights, as he was suggesting Palestinians should, and that they would fight to restore them if they were taken away. To this, he offered no answer.

The whole conversation was, not surprisingly, deeply reminiscent of a debate I once had on Iranian TV with a leader in Gaza of Islamic Jihad. Nonetheless, some audience members plainly were listening to me and left with at least some challenging and unfamiliar ideas to grapple with.

Ha’ivri was amiable enough, but his mentality is extremely dangerous to Palestinians and Israelis alike. If mindsets like his guide Israeli policy, it would probably drag both Palestinians and Israelis, much of the region and possibly the world, into an apocalyptic cataclysm. This, sadly, is what some of Ha’ivri’s Evangelical friends, intoxicated with fantasies of a “second coming,” are gleefully anticipating.