https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/too_early_to_judge_the_arab_revolts

A year into the Arab uprisings, it’s far too early to come to any definitive conclusions about where the upheavals will lead. But it is helpful to try to keep terms and categories straight in order to follow what has happened and what may happen into the future.

Some commentators are trying to characterize in broad-brushstrokes what is taking place in Arab political culture. Some are identifying the main feature as a liberationist imperative that has gripped the Arab political imagination. Others warn that popular uprisings without clear aims will inevitably lead to the “victory” of Islamists. Others say we have entered into a period of protracted chaos that will be characterized by increasing violence and conflict within states and regionally.

All these views are premature. Elements of each and of all can be found in the events of the past year. But, a clear, overriding narrative that sums up the essence of what is taking place in the Arab world is beyond anyone’s reach.

The convulsions are so multifaceted, with so many variables and so much that remains to be determined, that we must content ourselves simply with accepting that we are witnessing historic and transformative events. However, there have also been definite dynamics characterizing the uprisings in various countries. So we can be precise about what exactly has and has not been taking place.

I was on a television panel last week with the insightful Egyptian commentator Mamoun Fandy, for a year-end round up of the uprisings. Fandy observed that “there has not been one Egyptian revolution, there have been two.” I pointed out that there had been no revolutions at all in Egypt. What took place with the fall of President Hosni Mubarak was regime decapitation, not regime change. Faced with growing popular pressure, the military and other parts of the power structure removed the president and certain other key high-level figures in order to preserve as much of their power as possible.

Egypt is now the scene of a contest for power within and between previously existing institutions – principally the military and the only political party that is truly effective, the Muslim Brotherhood. This hardly qualifies as a “revolution.”

The Tunisian case is somewhat different. There, analogous regime decapitation did not lead to military rule; it led to what we could call a “pacted transition” to an emergent constitutional system, one that has been brokered but not dominated by the military.

So far, the only Arab country to have seen a real “revolution” is Libya, the product of a fully-fledged civil war and limited external military intervention. But the new order in Libya lacks institutions and is dominated by rival armed militias and a growing rivalry between the east and west of the country that has yet to be resolved.

In Syria, popular protests have not turned into a revolution yet, but armed resistance to the regime is growing, in spite of the misgivings of much of the political opposition. Syria seems well into an insurgency phase, and may be headed toward outright civil war. However, that will require the defection of mechanized units of the army or heavy weapons being provided to rebels from the outside.

In Yemen, popular protests have also not turned into a revolution. Rather, they have been more or less hijacked by various members of the political elite in a complex power struggle that is slowly dragging the country into ever-greater levels of disintegration.

In Bahrain, popular protests not only did not lead to a revolution, protestors probably did not seek a revolution (at least at first). The uprising thus far appears to have been contained by the royal family and its Gulf allies. However, the status quo is unsustainable and the potential for a campaign of urban terrorism by opposition or Shia extremists remains potentially a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Algerian government appears particularly concerned about the potential for an uprising. Morocco and Jordan have relatively popular monarchs, and some Gulf states are protected by wealth. But even if uprisings were to spread to these countries, it is impossible to predict what form they would take. Meanwhile, Iraq and Lebanon are heavily driven by sectarian forces and are especially sensitive to regional developments.

The best anyone can really do – apart from describing in immediate terms what has been happening in specific Arab states and in the broader region – is not to try to characterize the Arab uprisings in sweeping terms. It is preferable to use precise terms rather than resort to frequently emotional rhetoric about “revolutions.”

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=348411

A year into the Arab uprisings, it’s far too early to come to any definitive conclusions about where the upheavals will lead. But it is helpful to try to keep terms and categories straight in order to follow what has happened and what may happen into the future.

Some commentators are trying to characterize in broad-brushstrokes what is taking place in Arab political culture. Some are identifying the main feature as a liberationist imperative that has gripped the Arab political imagination. Others warn that popular uprisings without clear aims will inevitably lead to the “victory” of Islamists. Others say we have entered into a period of protracted chaos that will be characterized by increasing violence and conflict within states and regionally.

All these views are premature. Elements of each and of all can be found in the events of the past year. But, a clear, overriding narrative that sums up the essence of what is taking place in the Arab world is beyond anyone’s reach.

The convulsions are so multifaceted, with so many variables and so much that remains to be determined, that we must content ourselves simply with accepting that we are witnessing historic and transformative events. However, there have also been definite dynamics characterizing the uprisings in various countries. So we can be precise about what exactly has and has not been taking place.

I was on a television panel last week with the insightful Egyptian commentator Mamoun Fandy, for a year-end round up of the uprisings. Fandy observed that “there has not been one Egyptian revolution, there have been two.” I pointed out that there had been no revolutions at all in Egypt. What took place with the fall of President Hosni Mubarak was regime decapitation, not regime change. Faced with growing popular pressure, the military and other parts of the power structure removed the president and certain other key high-level figures in order to preserve as much of their power as possible.

Egypt is now the scene of a contest for power within and between previously existing institutions – principally the military and the only political party that is truly effective, the Muslim Brotherhood. This hardly qualifies as a “revolution.”

The Tunisian case is somewhat different. There, analogous regime decapitation did not lead to military rule; it led to what we could call a “pacted transition” to an emergent constitutional system, one that has been brokered but not dominated by the military.

So far, the only Arab country to have seen a real “revolution” is Libya, the product of a fully-fledged civil war and limited external military intervention. But the new order in Libya lacks institutions and is dominated by rival armed militias and a growing rivalry between the east and west of the country that has yet to be resolved.

In Syria, popular protests have not turned into a revolution yet, but armed resistance to the regime is growing, in spite of the misgivings of much of the political opposition. Syria seems well into an insurgency phase, and may be headed toward outright civil war. However, that will require the defection of mechanized units of the army or heavy weapons being provided to rebels from the outside.

In Yemen, popular protests have also not turned into a revolution. Rather, they have been more or less hijacked by various members of the political elite in a complex power struggle that is slowly dragging the country into ever-greater levels of disintegration.

In Bahrain, popular protests not only did not lead to a revolution, protestors probably did not seek a revolution (at least at first). The uprising thus far appears to have been contained by the royal family and its Gulf allies. However, the status quo is unsustainable and the potential for a campaign of urban terrorism by opposition or Shia extremists remains potentially a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Algerian government appears particularly concerned about the potential for an uprising. Morocco and Jordan have relatively popular monarchs, and some Gulf states are protected by wealth. But even if uprisings were to spread to these countries, it is impossible to predict what form they would take. Meanwhile, Iraq and Lebanon are heavily driven by sectarian forces and are especially sensitive to regional developments.

The best anyone can really do – apart from describing in immediate terms what has been happening in specific Arab states and in the broader region – is not to try to characterize the Arab uprisings in sweeping terms. It is preferable to use precise terms rather than resort to frequently emotional rhetoric about “revolutions.”

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=344594&MID=0&PID=0

Hamas is on the move, both literally and figuratively, but how far it
can and will go very much remains to be determined.

Hamas is in an impossible position, given the regional realignments
following from the Arab uprisings, and is frantically trying to adjust
without paying too high a price.

For more than a decade, Hamas’ strategy was based on being
simultaneously allied with both the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood network
and the, essentially, Shiite, Iranian-led alliance. This incongruous
ideological contortion was made possible by a narrative embraced by
both of these broader anti-status quo alignments: that the Middle East
was the site of a trans-historic battle between a “culture of
resistance” and a “culture of accommodation.”

This narrative has collapsed completely, and is rapidly being replaced
by a new sectarian order pitting Sunni actors, including both Arab
governments and Islamists, as well as Turkey, against what is now
perceived as the non- or even anti-Sunni alliance led by Iran. This
realignment has been most starkly illustrated in Syria, whose
pro-Iranian government is now supported entirely by non-Sunni forces
in the Middle East and opposed by virtually all Sunni ones.

Hamas can no longer have a foot in each of these camps when they are
increasingly at odds, often in existential ways. The movement’s
political bureau cannot long remain based in Damascus since the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood is a core part of the uprising trying to overthrow
the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The break with Assad also means a break
with Tehran.

Hamas needs not only a new home but also new sponsors and a new
regional profile, since the strategic landscape in which it operates
has shifted so dramatically.

Literally on the move, its de facto “prime minister” in Gaza, Ismail
Haniyyeh, is planning a tour of Arab states, beginning with Qatar and
possibly including Turkey. Khaled Meshaal, who heads Hamas’ political
bureau, meanwhile, has been trying to engineer a reconciliation with
Jordan, and has been planning a trip there that has yet to happen.
Both sides insist this has not been canceled.

Figuratively on the move, Meshaal, according to Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas, has agreed that resistance to occupation must be
nonviolent and must seek to create a Palestinian state based on the
1967 borders. A spokesman for Hamas leaders in Gaza appeared to
confirm these commitments, but reiterated that Hamas would not
recognize Israel.

This apparently difficult readjustment has exposed latent tensions
within Hamas. The organization is divided along multiple axes, but the
most obvious is the division between many in the leadership in Gaza,
which is entrenched in power and only stands to lose from any changes,
and the external leadership, which has no choice but to urgently find
new headquarters and patrons.

This squabble has been most publicly expressed in an ongoing feud
between Meshaal  and a Hamas hardliner in Gaza, Mahmoud Zahhar. In
May, Zahhar was harshly critical of Meshaal for recognizing the
authority of Abbas and the Palestine Liberation Organization to
negotiate with Israel. Worse still, he questioned the authority of the
political bureau itself, claiming, “the leadership is here [in Gaza],
and the part that is abroad is just a part of that.”

However, Meshaal reportedly retains the support of key Hamas leaders,
including Ahmed Jabari, the head of its paramilitary Ezzedine
al-Qassam brigades. The group reportedly imposed “severe disciplinary
measures” against Zahhar in response to his challenge to the authority
of Meshaal and the political bureau.

The big question is whether Hamas’ need to adjust to the changing Arab
political order will compel the movement to moderate its positions.
Probably not if Hamas can help it, for it remains locked in a
long-term power struggle with Fatah over leadership of the Palestinian
national movement. Yet its ability to remain a viable contender for
such leadership cannot be based on Islamist social conservatism alone.
If it cannot outbid the PLO when it comes to the struggle with Israel,
it’s hard to see what its broad appeal will be.

Hamas is hoping that the Arab uprisings will strengthen its hand by
bringing its Muslim Brotherhood allies to power in numerous Arab
states. It has reportedly recently formally joined an international
umbrella group of the Brotherhood movement. But as it has to abandon
the Iranian-Syrian alliance and explore deeper relations with Qatar,
Egypt and even Jordan, Hamas will be dealing with states that, at
least for now, will not be willing to take responsibility for the
movement’s traditional policies and actions.

The outcome of the Arab uprisings and realignment writ large will
probably determine the future of Hamas. Fatah, too, will have to
adjust to the emerging strategic and political environment. These new
regional realities will probably affect the future of both
organizations more than anything the Palestinian groups decide
independently or between themselves.

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2011/12/the_thrill_of_watching_christopher_hitchens_come_to_my_defense.html

Because Christopher Hitchens was so politically confrontational and
devastating to his opponents, the public is largely unaware of his
intense personal generosity and kindness. Time and again, he went far
beyond the normal duties of friendship. As our mutual friend Michael
Weiss aptly puts it, “Friendship was his ideology.”
I instantly bonded with Hitch in 1998 when I tagged along to an
interview he did with a friend of mine over lunch. The friend left
after an hour, but we stayed at the restaurant talking about politics,
literature, and history. Lunch turned into dinner, and finally his
wife, Carol, summoned him home on the grounds that 10 hours straight
of talking to anyone was more than enough for one sitting. This set
the stage for an abiding friendship based on such marathon
conversations.
His loyalty never ceased to amaze me. In March 2002, David Horowitz
published an article outrageously suggesting that I had secretly
celebrated the 9/11 attacks before publicly condemning them on
television. Christopher immediately sent him a blistering email
insisting that this allegation was not only untrue but “something that
could not be true.” (Emphasis in the original.) Indeed, he put his
relationship with Horowitz on the line, writing, “I’m willing to be a
mutual friend if you will accept my pledged word that you have (and I
wish I could say inadvertently) grossly wronged a decent man.”
Horowitz immediately issued a full retraction and apology.
On a more recent occasion, when he was at the start of his last book
tour, just before falling ill, I had a personal crisis. He was in
Chicago when I phoned him. His instant response was “Right, I’m
canceling tomorrow’s events, and coming back to D.C. for a day. We
will sit together and talk this through man to man.” And he did.
So as the world eulogizes a great mind and fierce spirit, I’m left
with profoundly moving personal memories of one of the kindest,
sweetest, and most loyal of men.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=342187&MID=0&PID=0

I’ve been appearing on television talk shows for more than 12 years
and I’ve never found them to be an emotional experience, until last
Sunday, that is.

During a routine program on Al-Hurra reviewing recent events in
Tunisia, I was suddenly overwhelmed by an astonishing realization: For
the first time in my life, I was having a conversation about politics
in an Arab state that was entirely normal, modern and healthy.

For the first half-hour or so, I found myself in the middle of an
argument with Al-Nahda MP Abd al-Lateeh al-Makki and another
representative of his party on one side, and Democratic National
Movement MP Tawfic Ayashi on the other. Naturally, they were
quarreling about the new 26-clause temporary constitution passed by
the Constitutional Assembly that now serves as the parliament.

As expected, and as has already been thoroughly played out in the
Tunisian and other Arab media, Ayashi repeated the basic complaint of
the opposition: that the new legislation was cooked up behind the
scenes by the troika coalition of Nahda, the Congress for the
Republic, and Ettakatol, and that the parliamentary procedure had
essentially been a sham.

Al-Makki and his Nahda colleague predictably dismissed these
allegations, insisting that proper procedures had been followed, and
pointing out that 141 out of 217 assembly members had voted for the
new law and that, in any case, the whole thing was temporary.

As I navigated between these positions, both of which have some merit,
I was suddenly struck by the uniqueness of the conversation in terms
of contemporary Arab politics. The argument itself was not only
predictable, but also banal and mundane. But what was really shocking,
indeed overwhelming, to me was what was missing from this bickering
and its context. There was no monarch, no dictatorship, no junta or
oppressive military, no killings, no militias, no riots, and no hint
of civil conflict, foreign interference or invasion.

It was just plain old squabbling between MPs from different factions
about legislation, procedure, who does or does not have a mandate, and
whether backroom deals or open debate is propelling the new laws and
the formation of the new government.

It was ugly, as politics always is, but it was also stunningly
beautiful. It’s been many decades since any Arab society has found
itself in this position: building a real, genuine democracy. Indeed,
one could easily make the case that this is the first time an Arab
state has ever really done so.

I made this point with some passion, and I had to hold my emotions in
check with difficulty. On the substantive issues, I had to agree with
the opposition that what was happening was largely cooked up by the
coalition, but this is how parliaments tend to operate.

I thought the Nahda MPs were basically right that 141 votes were
sufficient for a temporary constitution, but that it must prove quite
temporary not only because it lacks a broad-based mandate but also
because it is insufficiently detailed and leaves much to be
determined. The permanent constitution cannot be based on 141 votes
out of 217 and will need a stronger mandate than that.

The biggest bone of contention was Article 8 of the new law, which
holds that the president must be, among other more reasonable
qualifications, a Muslim. Host Mohamed Ali Haidari and I both pressed
the Nahda MPs vigorously on the issue and their defenses were
virtually laughable.

At first they tried to say that since this same provision was also in
the constitution of deposed dictator Ben Ali, they hadn’t introduced
anything new. What, I asked, was the point of the revolution if the
dictator’s constitution was to be regarded as a source of legitimacy?

Al-Makki then tried to suggest that I simply didn’t know enough about
Arab or Muslim societies, that this is a universal and
noncontroversial provision in Arab states (which I pointed out is not
true), and that non-Muslim Tunisians don’t feel discriminated against,
so it’s no big deal.

My response was that “I need no instruction on Arab or Muslim culture
from this Islamist,” and that because indeed there’s no real
possibility of a Christian or Jew becoming the president of Tunisia,
“your law is not only ridiculous, it’s superfluous.” “And,” I
concluded, “It has got to go!” Appropriately enough, this proved the
last word of the hour-long conversation.

But I floated out of the studio with a feeling of real elation.
Tunisians have created a fledgling but genuine, working democracy, in
which the arguments are about backroom deals versus parliamentary
procedures, what kind of mandate is sufficient for core legislation,
and the legitimacy of discriminatory laws. Its very banality is its
beauty.
The magnitude of Tunisia’s achievement must not be underestimated.
Assuming they can keep it, this should show what’s possible in the
rest of the Arab world in the long run.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=339875&MID=0&PID=0

The preliminary results of the first round of the elections in Egypt
for the new constituent assembly were both predictable and sobering.

The strong showing of the Muslim Brotherhood was virtually inevitable.
They’ve had at least 30 years’ head start on almost everybody else
since being in effect decriminalized by Anwar Sadat. Their Freedom and
Justice Party is by far the best organized in the country.

Anyone surprised by this result has been sleeping through recent
Egyptian history.

Naturally, the liberal parties fared badly. For the most part they
barely campaigned at all and are fragmented into a dizzying array of
groupings.

Secularists and liberals have not had time to create effective party
organizations that can actually win elections. However, they have a
far more onerous task ahead of them. The challenge facing Arab
liberals is to define an entirely new political orientation: a
contemporary Arab liberalism free from the stigma of supposedly
“secular” oppressive regimes.

This is inevitably going to take a great deal of time, effort and
public education. At present, post-dictatorship Arab liberalism is
largely defined by what it is against—Islamism and the old
regimes—rather than what it is for.

In Tunisia, the secular groups mainly focused their campaign on what
is bad about the Islamists rather than articulating a clear vision for
the future. In Egypt, most of the liberals barely bothered campaigning
at all, and much of their efforts in the immediate run-up to the
campaign focused on protests in Tahrir Square.

Not only did the Muslim Brotherhood consolidate their competitive
advantage during these last weeks by continuing to focus on the
election, they handled the protest movement skillfully.

By refusing to openly join the protesters but at the same time
strongly condemning the crackdown by the military, they projected an
image of being above the fray and more responsible than either the
military or the demonstrators. Meanwhile, they hedged their bets
slightly by not preventing a good deal of their youth from
participating in the protests, though without any official permission.

It’s not that this won them many new friends. On the contrary, some
people felt betrayed by their ambivalent position. But, crucially, it
didn’t make them many new enemies either. Those inclined to be angry
with the protesters, or with the military, or both, were unlikely to
see the Brotherhood as the chief culprits.

What is most troubling is that Salafist parties performed better than
expected, and they represent a religious extremism of an entirely
different order than the Brotherhood. They too have long-standing
networks that have been quickly transformed into ad hoc electoral
machines, which, along with significant foreign funding, especially
from the Gulf, translated into a deeply troubling success.

Unlike in Tunisia, where the electoral system was fairly
straightforward and people knew they were voting for an assembly that
will be in charge of writing the constitution, in Egypt much remains
profoundly murky. It is distinctly possible that Islamists have, in
fact, peaked too early, given that they have attained dominance in an
assembly with extremely limited powers.

According to the rules promulgated by the military authorities, which
are very controversial but remain definitive for now, the constitution
will be drafted by a 100-member body, in which the assembly will only
receive 20 seats. The assembly can only choose between candidates from
an array of other organizations for the other 80 seats.

Moreover, while the Brotherhood now insists on the right to form a
government, nothing in Egypt’s presidential system permits them to do
so. Egypt still has a presidency, which is in effect being exercised
by the military, and the Brotherhood is in a logical and political
bind because, by placing such an emphasis on the elections, in effect
it has confirmed the role of the military as the de facto president.

They can hardly, at least in the meantime, dismiss its authority on
other matters having upheld it in this most crucial function.

But the potential seeds of a confrontation with the military over
power have obviously been sown. The Brotherhood and its allies are
likely to strongly push for a shift toward a parliamentary system on
the grounds that they have won a mandate. They have certainly acquired
powerful new leverage, but the military remains enormously potent as
well.

In June, I described a potential power-sharing agreement in Egypt
leaving the military in de facto control of defense and national
security, with a foreign policy-oriented presidency and a parliament
with broad powers in domestic affairs.

Nothing that has transpired since has altered my view that this is the
most likely and, indeed, optimistic scenario for the country.

So, it can only be one cheer for the Egyptian elections. In many ways
they are an important step forward, but the results are deeply
troubling, the legal and constitutional framework highly contentious,
and the path forward still very fraught and murky.

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/bahrain_another_opportunity_squandered

The report by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, which was
published on November 23, and the Cabinet Statement of November 21
acknowledging many of its more embarrassing findings represented the
most significant opportunity for progress in Bahrain in many months.

But it appears that neither the government nor opposition groups are
moving quickly or decisively to take advantage of it and instead are
continuing with the confrontation that has been simmering since the
uprising was crushed last spring. I described this confrontation in
detail in a briefing paper on “The Bahrain Uprising: Towards
Confrontation or Accommodation?” published on the same day as the
commission report.

Particularly disturbing was the use of force against Shia protesters
on November 24, the day after the report was published, which was part
of a now-familiar pattern of controversial deaths and violent clashes
and funerals. It suggested that the modus operandi of security forces
had not been affected by the commission’s findings.

While the cabinet says that at least 20 security officers will face
prosecution for their role in the crackdown, there have been no
high-level resignations and no dramatic reorganization in the security
forces.

On November 28, the king did decree that security forces would now
have to refer cases “requiring arrests” to the Interior Ministry. And
there have been some changes in the top security personnel in Bahrain.
Major-General Adel bin Khalifa bin Hamad Al Fadhel has been appointed
acting National Security Agency chief. He replaced Shaikh Khalifa bin
Abdulla bin Mohammed Al Khalifa who has hardly been demoted, and will
now serve as “Supreme Defense Council secretary-general and advisor to
HM the King for national security affairs with the rank of minister.”

None of this is likely to reassure anyone that a major transformation
is underway.

The primary government response has been the creation of a National
Committee to examine the commission’s recommendations and report back
to the king by February. This sets up a potentially endless cycle of
commissions referring to committees that in turn refer to working
groups and so forth, with a large amount of process and little
substance.

Opposition groups pointed out that the commission had suggested any
follow-up committee should be jointly appointed, not created by royal
decree. Indeed, the charge of unilateralism was among the most serious
complaints leveled by the opposition against the commission from the
start.

Reportedly the largest opposition group, Al Wefaq, has had at least
two members invited to join the new committee but has refused to
participate. This mirrors its stance of boycotting parliamentary
balloting in September and refusing to participate in the legislature
under the current circumstances.

One can readily understand the opposition’s skepticism about the
government’s intentions and this entire process. However, the
commission report was hardly the whitewash that many opposition
figures had predicted. To the contrary, it was surprisingly blunt
about the excessive use of force and other abuses on the part of
security services, even though it did not go as far as many would have
wanted with regard to the systematic nature of abuses.

Without being in the least naïve, it’s important to recognize that for
all its failings, Bahrain’s government has gone further than any other
Arab regime currently facing a popular uprising in what in effect
amounts to self-criticism: sponsoring and welcoming a report that is
frankly critical of the crackdown.

As they have several times since the protest movement began early in
the year, moderates in both the government and the opposition appeared
to be allowing themselves to be outflanked by more hard-line elements.

Rather than taking advantage of whatever opportunity might have been
presented by the commission report, opposition figures can continue to
insist that no real reforms are on the table, and government
supporters can continue to claim the opposition are simply subversives
and continue on the path of confrontation rather than accommodation.

Nothing in the aftermath of the commission report suggests either side
is seriously adapting its approach and both are behaving much as they
did before it was published. Most troublingly, there is still no
working mechanism or venue for meaningful dialogue between the
parties.

But this pattern cannot continue, since it is inherently unstable and
volatile. The simmering tensions and barely-contained violence of
recent months could boil over at any moment, to the benefit of neither
the government nor the mainstream opposition. The opposition would no
doubt correctly note that the government holds most of the cards, but
they too have agency, responsibilities and a major role in determining
the future of their country.

Neither the government and the Sunni minority on the one hand, nor the
opposition and the Shia majority on the other, can hope for any kind
of decisive “victory” over the other in the long run, even in a
political war of attrition. At some point if Bahrainis of all stripes
are to face a reasonable future, they are going to have to achieve a
political accommodation, undoubtedly involving much greater forms of
constitutionalism and wider social and political enfranchisement than
currently exists.

This means serious-minded, reasonable forces on both sides will have
to move quickly and decisively to take advantage of any opportunity
for significant progress. Unfortunately, precisely such a potential
opportunity has just presented itself and appears to have been
squandered in favor of business as usual.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=335209

The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate, while the brutality of the regime, which has killed over 3,500 people and tortured even children, has escalated. Meanwhile, a motley crew of Western commentators continues to carry water for President Bashar al-Assad.

These commentators cannot be immune from responsibility for their words. Their defense of a brutal dictatorship cannot go unchallenged or unexamined. While they have every right to their opinions, the rest of us have not only a right but a responsibility to draw the conclusion that these individuals, in fact, oppose freedom for the Syrian people by supporting a regime denying Syrians their freedom.

The essentially pro-regime stance of Professor Joshua Landis of the University of Oklahoma is well-established. To mention one small example, last April he praised what he called “the stability that the Assad family has enforced in Syria and… the vision of tolerance and secularism they have promoted.”

But there are a number of other commentators whose support for the Syrian dictatorship deserves more careful scrutiny. Probably the most relentless is Alistair Crooke, a former British intelligence officer who is a strong supporter of official Iranian ideology and foreign policy, as Michael Weiss and I have demonstrated. It is surely Assad’s alliance with Tehran that has prompted Crooke’s enthusiasm for the Syrian leader.

Crooke initially claimed that Assad was immune from any popular uprising because of his opposition to the West and Israel, and his support for “resistance.” In April, he actually predicted, “Assad will emerge with his stature enhanced, and Syria will be… resuming its traditional place at the center of Arab politics.”

In July, Crooke claimed the protests were led by followers of the late al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Moussab al-Zarqawi, applying the most terrifying image possible to the opposition. According to Crooke, the uprising he predicted was impossible was in fact a plot by the West and Qatar to install the most extreme Sunni Islamists in power in order to “weaken Iran.”

Columbia University professor Joseph Massad has also condemned the Syrian and other Arab uprisings as having been engineered or co-opted by an imperialistic “US-British-Saudi-Qatari axis.” He even argued that the United States had engineered the downfall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in order to install “a more pliant dictator,” as if post-Mubarak Egypt is friendlier toward Washington’s foreign policy.

Massad has also condemned NATO’s role in Libya in the harshest possible terms, saying it was all based on lies. Again, he pointed out, the intervention was designed to impose a more “pliant” government in Tripoli. This is the mirror image of the hysterical arguments that al Qaeda now rules in Libya. In truth, Moammar Qaddafi was not posing any problems to the West when the uprising began, happily selling his oil at market rates. There’s no reason to believe that the new government in Tripoli will be “more pliant” then Qaddafi was. In truth, the West has little leverage to ensure how Libyans will behave in the future.

As for Syria, Massad has concluded that the Syrians should abandon their struggle for freedom because it can only lead to a “US-imposed pliant and repressive regime à la Iraq and Libya,” given that the West “has destroyed the possibility of a democratic outcome.” Naturally, he does not explain how this is the case. The bottom line is that Massad is urging Syrians to keep Assad in power, then to go home and shut up.

But perhaps the most surprising Western backer of the Assad regime is Ed Husain of the Council on Foreign Relations. In August he described the prospects of overthrowing Assad as “so small” as to be irrelevant. He also argued that more people would be killed in a civil war than by the crushing of the uprising (a line used by Qaddafi backers as well), before concluding, “At present Mr. Assad remains the least worst option.”

Husain also wrote that “Assad has been good news for Israel’s security and borders,” and he predicted that Islamists would be the inevitable rulers of a post-Assad Syria and more unfriendly to the West. Husain has also come out strongly against the policy of sanctions, arguing, “The West would be mistaken to continue developing policy measures that harm Syria and Syrians.” He suggested that support for the uprising could provoke a “campaign of suicide bomb attacks against the West in our cities.” Husain’sprescription was for the West to do absolutely nothing in response to the brutality of the Assad regime, and “leave Syrians alone to put their complicated, sectarian house in order.”

With varying arguments, Crooke, Massad and Husain have joined the notorious Landis in arguing that the Syrian people should be left to the tender mercies of their regime. The alternatives are worse, they say, and Assad’s leadership isn’t really as bad as people think.

Diversity of opinion is a fine thing, but organizations can and should take responsibility for what they choose to sponsor or permit. The Council on Foreign Relations needs to ask itself some serious questions about its role in promoting Husain, one of the most zealous Western opponents of the quest for freedom in Syria.

All of these individuals claim to respect freedom and human rights, but how can that be squared with their eager defense of the Syrian regime? Crooke’s obvious allegiance to Iran, Massad’s knee-jerk anti-Western attitudes and Husain’s fears of an Islamist takeover have all led them to adopt indefensible, and in some cases dishonest, stances that effectively mean they are backing the most brutal repression taking place in the Arab world today. Nothing can justify the outrageous conduct of the Assad dictatorship and no agenda is sufficient to excuse it.

http://www.ibishblog.com/article/2011/11/16/islamism_and_misogyny

While there is no reason to panic, concern about the rise of Islamists
in post-dictatorship Arab societies is warranted, especially as the
rights of women are particularly and immediately open to attack.

No sooner had the Islamist Al-Nahda party secured its status as the
largest group in Tunisia’s new Constituent Assembly, than we saw a
misogynist agenda rearing its ugly, familiar head. The party’s iconic
spokeswoman, Souad Abderrahim, called single mothers a “disgrace” and
declared that they “do not have the right to exist.”

It is irrelevant that many Arab Christians, or other religious
fanatics of whatever faith, might have agreed with her. And it’s not
reassuring that Al-Nahda leaders, in what was clearly a tactical
measure, rushed to contradict Abderrahim in order to quell the uproar.
What’s important is that Abderrahim’s comments demonstrate where
Al-Nahda, one of the least extreme among Arab Islamist parties, is
coming from on the issue of women’s rights. Abderrahim, of course, had
no comment about the role of men in creating single motherhood.

The head of Libya’s transitional authority, Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, added
to the alarm by proclaiming that Islamic law, or Sharia, would be the
principal source of legislation in post-Qaddafi Libya. He implied that
polygamy, a practice almost entirely suppressed under the deposed
dictator, Moammar Qaddafi, might be reintroduced.

Abdul-Jalil was no doubt seeking to distance himself from the former
regime, demonstrate that he is independent from the West, and placate
Islamist elements in the Transitional National Council. It is
heartening that in recent council meetings, large majorities have
apparently coalesced around secular candidates, as opposed to
Islamists, for key transitional leadership positions.

Several Libyan officials have also denounced Qatari support for
Islamist groups. Rather than dictating the post-revolution agenda,
Libyan Islamists may be feeling sidelined enough to require a nod to
their conservative social agenda from the rest of the Transitional
National Council, in order to keep them on board.

Abdul-Jalil’s comments were so vague as to be practically meaningless.
However, they do reinforce the fact that Islamism generally promotes
misogynist attitudes, since his efforts to placate Islamists implied
restrictions on women’s rights. Indeed, wherever Islamists have seized
power, whether in Iran, northern Nigeria, Afghanistan, parts of
Pakistan, and Gaza, their exercise of power has immediately and
intently focused on restricting women’s rights.

This behavior ranges from the unspeakable, and thankfully rare,
practice of stoning women, largely in rural Iran, to the sexually
paranoid restrictions by Hamas on women smoking water pipes
(cigarettes are fine) or riding on the back of motorcycles. It really
does take a hyperactive pornographic imagination to read impropriety
into those latter acts.

Another serious concern is that some of the Arab world’s deposed
secular dictatorships held up their purported advocacy of women’s
issues as a false sign of progress, thereby tainting the agenda.

In Egypt, for example, the Mubarak regime was associated with efforts
to strongly discourage female genital mutilation. While this practice
has absolutely nothing to do with Islam, and is enforced as
enthusiastically by Egyptian Coptic Christians and some African
animists as by some Muslims, the Muslim Brotherhood was always in
practice opposed to official efforts to suppress it.

The Brotherhood’s official position is that female genital mutilation
is neither “halal” (required) nor “haram” (forbidden). Therefore, it
should be religiously permissible, and, indeed unobjectionable, from
their point of view for a government to outlaw it.

During the Mubarak era, the Muslim Brotherhood objected to the
distribution of leaflets calling female genital mutilation
“un-Islamic.” This suggests that the Brotherhood is more sympathetic
to genital mutilation than it cares to admit, or is more socially
conservative than its theological positions require. Efforts to
suppress this unspeakable atrocity will be difficult to resurrect in
the near future, as opposition to female genital mutilation is now
closely associated with the hated former regime, especially the former
first lady.

Conservatism the world over instinctively holds that tradition
contains wisdom. Even some American neoconservatives who originated on
the left like Irving Kristol eventually came to champion tradition for
its own sake.

Among contemporary Islamists, this impulse is compounded by the
tendency to privilege anything that has a chronological proximity to
the era of Revelation. This suggests that anything that happened in or
around the time of the Prophet Mohammed is, by definition, closer to
authentic and proper religious and social practice than anything that
emerged later. This, of course, derogates the overwhelming bulk of
Islamic civilization, not to mention much of contemporary Arab
culture.

Religious conservatism invariably focuses on social and sexual
control. Women are the most immediate targets and primary focus of the
authoritarianism of the religious right, wherever they may be. As
Islamists seem to be finally getting their chance at gaining a share
of power in the Arab world, the greatest and most immediate danger
they pose is to women’s rights. That is why it is up to everyone else,
including both secularists and religious moderates, to insist on the
introduction of inviolable constitutional principles protecting the
rights of individuals, women and minorities.

Socially conservative Arab parties have a right to participate in
government, but not to reduce women to second-class citizenship.

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=330203&MID=0&PID=0

The recent preliminary Tunisian election results provide legitimate
causes for concern, but overall the process and even the outcome are
grounds for more optimism than pessimism. There are a number of
crucial positive aspects that cannot be downplayed.

First, the fact that the vote took place and appears to have been free
and fair is a milestone. Tunisia, birthplace of the Arab uprisings, is
also the furthest along in the transition toward genuine
post-dictatorship democracy.

Second, the exceedingly high voter turnout, over 90 percent, and the
large number of participating parties, means the citizenry was
genuinely engaged at a broad level. This can only be a good thing for
genuinely representative government.

Third, the army appears to have taken a genuine decision to retreat
from the political process and allow a popularly-driven system to
shape the outcome of regime change.

Fourth, the election was for a Constituent Assembly that will draw up
a new constitution for the country, meaning that a broad-based process
will be shaping the structure of the new Tunisian system rather than
top-down dictates. The outcome of such a process will almost certainly
have more legitimacy than anything imposed by an elite and will have
greater prospects for long-term stability.

What is less reassuring is the strong performance of the Islamist
Al-Nahda Party, which garnered approximately 40 percent of the vote
and will be by far the largest in the assembly. The party is often
described as a “moderate Islamist” one, and compared to many others in
the Arab world, that might be a plausible relative description.

But in fact, Nahda almost certainly remains quite radical in its
ideology and long-term ambitions, so its prominent role in the new
Tunisian political scene and constitution-crafting process is a
legitimate source of concern.

Two important factors are significant grounds for reassurance, however.

First, collectively secularist parties garnered over 50 percent of the
vote, meaning that Tunisia has not demonstrated an Islamist majority.

Nahda clearly knows that its core Islamist agenda has certainly not
carried the day in any definitive sense. The statements of its leaders
reflect an understanding that its future depends on recognizing that
overreaching would be a kiss of death, and they have done their best
to put the most moderate possible face on their program and
intentions.

Second, Nahda appears set to form a coalition with a much smaller but
influential secular and moderate socialist party, Ettakatol.

Critics complain that the upcoming marriage of convenience between
Ettakatol leader Mustapha Ben Jaâfar and Nahda is a cynical move by
both that makes no ideological sense and is simply about gaining power
for both within the new system.

This is exactly right, but should be seen as a positive development
rather than a negative one. This is what parliamentary democracy looks
like in practice everywhere: Parties make deals across unlikely
ideological lines in order to create majorities, as currently seen in
Britain, Israel and many other countries with strange-bedfellow
coalitions. It means Tunisians are recognizing that compromise is the
essence of this democratic form of politics.

Everyone will be watching the constitution-writing process carefully
to see who is favored by its electoral systems and what limitations
are placed on government powers, especially with regard to the rights
of individuals, women and minorities. But the process of compromise is
already underway.

These are very early days, but the Tunisian election suggests that
post-dictatorship Arab democracy even with the powerful participation
of Islamist parties is indeed possible.

Nahda’s strong performance seems to have been more linked to its
emphasis on social justice and economic issues than its reactionary
religious agenda. Secular parties, by contrast, in spite of their
strong showing overall, remain deeply divided and disorganized, and
wasted most of the campaign maligning Nahda in terms that recalled the
rhetoric of the former dictatorship rather than articulating their own
vision for Tunisia’s future. They especially failed to adequately
address Tunisians’ urgent economic concerns.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has obviously noted this element of
Nahda’s strong performance, moving to ramp up its already robust
social services program and distribute cheap food for the recent Eid
al-Adha festival.

The conclusions from Tunisia’s election are that emergent Arab
democracy seems more plausible than ever, even with robust Islamist
participation. Islamists are better disciplined and organized than
secularists but do not command automatic majorities, and secularists
need to focus on articulating their own vision, organizing themselves
as an alternative, and appealing to people’s social and economic
needs. Western societies that wish to see secularists and modernists
do well should also move more robustly to help them overcome these
deficiencies.

These are tentative baby steps toward the emergence of a real Arab
democracy, but they are indispensable ones. So, in spite of the real
grounds for concern about Nahda’s future role, two cheers for the
Tunisian election.