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The massacre of over 100 protesters in the Syrian city of Hama on Sunday not only shocked the conscience of the world, it has created something of a crisis for American policy toward Syria.
In recent weeks, the Obama administration’s approach to Syria could be summed up in two words: managed transition. The preferred solution to the Syrian crisis was to try to reach out to members of both the opposition and the power structure simultaneously to try to begin a real dialogue about Syria’s future. That now looks increasingly unlikely, and the prospect of what Washington fears most—sectarian civil war—is increasingly possible.
For many months, Washington tossed lifelines to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, calling on him to lead the transition and begin the process of reform. Although most informed observers were convinced from the outset that the regime was, literally, incapable of reform for a myriad of unsavory reasons, the United States had profound and reasonable concerns about chaos and civil conflict in Syria.
In particular, the American concern has been that a raging, and especially sectarian, civil conflict in Syria could spill over into neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, and possibly even be the tipping point for a wider regional conflict. Israel’s and Turkey’s anxieties have also figured prominently in American thinking. A particular concern is Turkey’s apparent inclination, at a minimum, to militarily create a buffer zone in northern Syria, especially in Alawite and above all Kurdish areas, in the event of a civil war or sustained anarchy.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton came under particular criticism after a March 27 statement in which she declared that “[m]any of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent months have said they believe [Assad] is a reformer.” However, as the regime’s brutality escalated, Washington was unable to sustain this tone and imposed limited sanctions in April and May. The administration essentially abandoned the idea that Assad himself could institute reforms, with President Barack Obama bluntly stating that if he could not do so, he should “get out of the way.”
American efforts to try to avoid Syrian civil conflict have been led by the ambassador in Damascus, Robert Ford, whose credibility was greatly enhanced by his controversial July 8 “unauthorized” visit to Hama. Calls to pull the US diplomatic presence in Damascus were rejected on the implicit grounds that Ford was leading the quest for “managed transition” by keeping lines of communication open to figures in both the Syrian opposition and ruling elite.
That strategy, however, appears to have borne little if any fruit so far. Even before the Hama massacre, Ford was recalled to Washington for consultations. American concerns remain the same, but the approach to achieving regime change or transition in Damascus without all-out civil conflict plainly needs considerable and urgent revision.
Hama prompted the strongest words by far from Obama: “al-Assad is ensuring that he and his regime will be left in the past.” Yet American options remain limited, and a Libya-style military intervention is out of the question. Increased sanctions, particularly in the energy sector, are overdue. So is pressure through the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has referred the Syria file to the Security Council.
After last weekend’s massacre, the prospect of a referral of Syrian officials to the International Criminal Court or the creation of a special tribunal on Syria has received renewed attention. Syria is not a party to the Statute of Rome, meaning the Security Council would have to authorize an ICC investigation, as it did in Sudan. However, Russian and Chinese opposition to such a move may not be easily overcome at this stage.
Even though American options are limited, the Obama administration now has no choice but to significantly and publicly increase the pressure on the Assad regime. Concerns about stability are understandable, but it’s impossible not to recognize that the Assad regime itself is now the greatest source of instability. Indeed, it is undoubtedly dragging Syria toward civil war, quite possibly on a sectarian basis, and is most probably doing so deliberately.
This means that the calculation has to change immediately. The United States and its allies might not be able to prevent the Assad regime from forcing a brutal and probably sectarian conflict on its own country, but the best hope for avoiding this is moving away from a policy based on cautiously managed transition to one based on bolder actions aimed at regime change. Such steps can also help ensure that the pitched battle, if it must come, is quicker and more decisive, and that its destabilization of the region is better contained.