This article was published by The Globe and Mail on November 29, 2024

One of the most unexpected consequences of the Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon is the sudden resurgence of the Syrian rebels led by Sunni Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Late last week the rebels overran the major city of Aleppo and appear to be advancing. The Syrian war, which appeared to be effectively over when government-backed forces took eastern Aleppo from the rebels at the end of 2016, is back in earnest.
The main factor is the decimation of Hezbollah from devastating blows delivered by Israel this year. The recent ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel leaves the Lebanese Shiite Islamists profoundly weakened.

Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was rescued by an intervention in the fall of 2015 organized by Russia and Iran. Hezbollah was tasked to lead the ground forces in key missions, backed by Russian air power.

Hezbollah’s disarray provided the crucial opening for the rebels to re-emerge as a serious threat, not merely in remote areas but in key parts of the country the government deems “necessary Syria.” Aleppo has always been the most heavily contested key city, and its fall demonstrates the important consequences of Israel’s reshaping of the Middle Eastern balance of power by devastating Hezbollah. And while Iran and Russia are attempting to increase their engagement in Syria now, the Ukraine war and Iran’s confrontation with Israel led both powers to take their eye off the ball in Syria. If they can once again make a decisive difference remains to be seen.
First, Sunni radicals are big winners. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was once closely allied with Al Qaeda, although it broke with the internationalist jihadists in 2017. The two groups came to blows on several occasions. Nonetheless, HTS continues to work closely with several more extreme jihadist factions and retains a good deal of Al Qaeda-like ideology. Their resurgence indicates that this ideology continues to be functional in war-torn parts of the Arab world and remains a serious threat, not just in Syria but regionally and even internationally.

Second, Turkey is another big winner. The revival of the war in Syria also announces that Ankara may be resuming its hegemonic ambitions in neighbouring parts of the Middle East, not merely including Syria but also in Iraq and elsewhere. Turkey officially considers Hayat Tahrir al-Sham a terrorist organization, but the Turkish military and Turkish-backed militias in Syria have a love-hate relationship with the group, sometimes co-operating and sometimes checking each other. The new offensive, however, bears all the hallmarks of Turkish involvement, with Ankara-backed militia groups once again fighting alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Third, the weakening of Hezbollah and, consequently, its patrons in Tehran, does not correlate to a more stable Middle East. The region’s political and strategic landscape functions like a kaleidoscope, with the whole pattern shifting as each piece rearranges itself with every major twist. As one side weakens, another moves to take advantage of the sudden opening. That’s why such developments can be unintended yet logical and even predictable consequences of seemingly unrelated actions.

Fourth, the shifting politics make strange bedfellows. Israel has finally admitted to having armed radical Syrian rebels in the areas surrounding the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, which Israel purports to have annexed. Moreover, former adversaries of Mr. al-Assad, most notably the United Arab Emirates, have rallied to the Syrian dictator, vowing support in his battle against Islamist radicals. The struggle for security and power, and over ideology, can lead to alliances that appear otherwise inexplicable, especially to outsiders.

Fifth, Washington continues to suffer from the lack of a coherent Syria policy. The U.S. still maintains troops in Syria, most notably at a small but crucial base at Al-Tanf. This sits a few kilometres away from the Al-Walid border crossing into Syria from both Iraq and Jordan. Control of this highway and proximity to the crossing allows U.S. forces to prevent either Islamist terrorist groups or Iran and its proxies from controlling the crossing and the highway, and has been the most important barrier to the creation of an Iranian-controlled land route linking Iran through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon with Hezbollah and the Mediterranean Sea at its potential terminus.
Despite maintaining this presence, the U.S. does not appear to have any broader strategic goals in Syria, leaving its forces and the U.S. backed, Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces militia effectively stranded and surrounded by enemies.
The resurgence of the war in Syria and revival of radical Islamist groups there bodes poorly for long-term stability in the Middle East. Most of all, it demonstrates that simply weakening Hezbollah and Iran does not make for a more stable or manageable region. Others, arguably even more dangerous, are always ready to step into any void.