The diplomacy agreement with Iran announced in Beijing wasn’t a threat to America’s position in the Middle East.
The relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia has been written off countless times since it began just after World War II. We are in another such moment. Last weekend, OPEC+, led by the Saudis, moved to oil lower production and raise global prices again. A few days later, Saudi Arabian and Iranian officials in Beijing announced an agreement to potentially restore diplomatic relations, with Chinese facilitation.
Although many have declared the oil cut an affront to Washington, government officials said the US was informed in advance; behind the scenes, there isn’t so much objection to the new Saudi pricing targets, which are between $80-$90 a barrel. This situation bears no resemblance to last October, when Washington genuinely was surprised by an OPEC+ quota cut and recriminations on both sides ensued.
Still, last year’s kerfuffle was quickly resolved, as Saudi Arabia was proven correct that there wouldn’t be a price surge for Western consumers. And in recent months, Washington and Riyadh quietly ramped up security cooperation, especially regarding a new strategy of containment and deterrence against Iran.
Aha, the doomsayers say, but what about Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic outreach to US rivals and adversaries? Isn’t that obvious evidence of a crisis? Not if you know what to look for.
Saudi Arabia has expanded cooperation with China, highlighted by a visit from President Xi Jinping to Riyadh last December. That event produced scores of agreements for cooperation on a wide range of issues, including artificial intelligence, sustainable energy, joint investments and, especially, infrastructure projects reminiscent of China’s Belt and Road initiative.
This outreach to China is an excellent example of Saudi Arabia playing a long game as it emerges more authoritatively onto the world stage as the leader of the OPEC+ oil cartel and the most influential Arab, and arguably Sunni Muslim, country. The Middle East is entering a multipolar era, and Saudi Arabia is maneuvering to find its place in this new reality.
Washington understands this and, indeed, sees benefits in these evolving arrangements, that it anyway cannot prevent. Despite the huge range of commitments, Saudi Arabia was extremely careful not to agree to anything that violates the fundamental American red line — basically, don’t do anything that gives China an undue strategic foothold in this crucial region.
The US cannot stop China from seeking relations with Gulf countries that go beyond buying and selling energy. And Washington has an interest in its regional partners breaking up the increasingly strong Iran-China relationship.
What about this week’s Chinese-brokered agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia? The Chinese role is actually welcome, because Tehran won’t talk to Washington. The Joe Biden administration has been promoting diplomacy over confrontation, and has welcomed the rapprochement. There is no reason a reduction in regional tensions should be a problem for the US. To the contrary, it could even help prompt badly needed dialogue, however indirect, between Washington and Tehran, as well as an end to the war in Yemen.
Much the same applies to Saudi Arabia’s recent outreach to the dictatorship in Syria. The two countries may restore diplomatic relations soon, and Saudi Arabia might invite Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to the next Arab League summit, this May in Riyadh. The US may not be delighted with this — Assad is a murderous tyrant Washington has long wanted out of power — but there is no other way forward for countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that have security interests in Syria, but (unlike Iran) have no troops or armed proxies there.
Saudi Arabia is spreading its wings, but it’s doing so within a US umbrella. And it’s being very careful not to challenge the fundamental partnership with Washington. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US is increasingly recognizing that security control of the three key waterways around the Middle East (the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf) and the three crucial choke points (the Suez Canal, Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz) is one of the most significant American competitive advantages in great power competition with China.
The US-Saudi partnership has survived the 1973 oil embargo, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and countless disputes over oil pricing and production, most recently in 2013 and, on a smaller scale, last October. That’s because both sides need each other and neither has a plausible alternative.
The specifics of the relationship are being readjusted for a new strategic reality, as they have several times before. Yes, OPEC+ could produce more tensions over oil pricing and production in the coming months. But, for now, the US-Saudi partnership is fundamentally sound and very likely to remain robust.