American allies and Moscow’s friends all have good reasons to avoid taking sides in the Ukraine war. But neutrality has its risks, too.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put Middle Eastern friends of Washington and Moscow in difficult positions. Russia’s allies, Syria and Iran, are backing it, but with trepidation. And U.S. allies in Israel and the Arab world haven’t been willing to clearly take Washington’s side.
The unfortunate truth from the perspective of both global powers is that no Middle Eastern country stands to gain from the confrontation.
Israel and the Gulf countries are walking the same tightrope. Over the past decade they’ve concluded that Washington was no longer fully reliable, and have sought to diversify their strategic options. All reached out to Russia, China and one another. They’ve all developed military relations with Russia and are counting on Moscow to be a repository for prohibited Iranian nuclear material if an agreement to halt Tehran’s nuclear weapons development can be secured. Israel also relies on military coordination with Russia to contain chaos in Syria.
The U.S. has the most leverage with Israel. Persistent Israeli attempts to avoid taking sides came under such heavy American pressure that the government changed positions several times to become more critical of Russia.
Israel, along with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, supported a second United Nations resolution condemning the invasion on Wednesday after dodging one at the Security Council on Feb. 25. But the impulse to sidestep commitments to either Washington or Moscow is unmistakable and understandable.
Saudi Arabia has also come under heavy American pressure for trying to say nothing. Riyadh hopes to avoid being forced to increase oil production to stabilize the price of petroleum, now rising fast as a result of the war. It’s trying to protect a hard-fought production agreement with Russia and its own development plans, all of which would be complicated by a production surge.
The UAE has been most openly friendly to Russia despite the invasion. It has continued diplomatic outreach to Moscow, employing terms like “friendship” and “partnership.” It has expressed no unhappiness with Russia except in the UN vote. The government even canceled free visas for Ukrainians on Tuesday, despite the rising refugee flow.
In addition to trying to maintain links with Russia, the UAE has to worry about a global campaign to sanction the hidden offshore assets of Russian oligarchs, because Dubai is a major global stash house for pilfered Russian wealth. So is Israel (along with London and Florida).
Prominent Emiratis have been more forthright than their Israeli and Saudi colleagues in explaining the thinking they all effectively share: They have no stake in the fight, and since the U.S. is no longer the single global superpower, strategic diversification, even with Russia, is ultimately more important than the partnership with Washington.
It’s no coincidence that the two pro-American countries with the most developed ties to Russia are the same pair that went furthest in reaching out to each other in the 2020 Abraham Accords: the UAE and Israel.
Russia’s friends have their own doubts. The Bashar Assad regime in Syria effusively praised the invasion, but it had no choice. Moscow saved the Syrian dictatorship with a brutal military intervention in 2015. Russia remains Assad’s preferred patron because Moscow makes much less onerous demands on Syrian sovereign prerogatives than its other key ally, Iran.
Tehran is torn. The thought of Russian President Vladimir Putin striking a mortal blow against the U.S.-led international order appeals to a country that doesn’t like Washington or the global system. ButIranian leaders are watching anxiously as most of the world rallies together, under American leadership, to support Ukraine and sanction Russia, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization appears reunified and revitalized.
That kind of reunification is a terrible development for Iran, especially since, like Syria, it gains nothing from Russian aggression in Europe.
Iran is further threatened by the prospect that the West could perfect a system of sanctions against Russia that could be turned against Iran as well. Syria, too, fears that sanctions against Russia will impoverish and weaken its main patron and damage its own economy.
But it’s not necessarily all losses in the Middle East. Iran’s oil could be part of a pricing stabilization, increasing the incentive to lift sanctions. And while Gulf Arab countries don’t want to increase production, it would at least mean additional revenue if they do.
The Gulf states and Israel would be wise to remember that the international order they seem resigned to moving beyond was a big advantage for them. Such a rules-based system serves the interests of small and vulnerable states far better than a chaotic transition to a more predatory, might-makes-right order dominated by Beijing and Moscow.
It was precisely their interest in preserving the international and regional status quo that aligned these countries with the U.S. in the first place. The alliance of Western powers and Asian democracies, and the international order it has defended, was useful to them in the 20th century. Its revitalization ought to be just as attractive in the 21st.