https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2021/11/29/inflation-isnt-bidens-biggest-problem-right-now/

His administration has done a good job on COVID and the economy, yet it is failing to sell this to the public.

US President Joe Biden remains mired in alarmingly low poll numbers, with the latest figures showing about 43 percent approval of his performance compared to 52 percent disapproval. In addition to the cyclical, historical patterns of US politics that I recently outlined in these pages and which are obviously a major factor, most observers on all sides point to two primary, and closely related, issues at play: the economy and the pandemic.

For many Democrats, this unpopularity makes little sense. On the economy, they argue that the media is fixated on negative stories involving inflation while ignoring the roaring comeback on many other fronts. They have a powerful case.

More than 5.5 million jobs were created in the past 10 months, leading to the lowest unemployment figures in 52 years. And while gross domestic product growth sagged a bit this summer, it’s now anticipated to run between 5-7 percent in the last quarter of 2021.

Stock market values have soared. And while there is a tight labour market, that has resulted in a significant strengthening of bargaining power for many workers, whether individually or collectively.

Yet, ongoing inflation carries a powerful negative political punch. The October rate of 6.2 percent was among the highest in recent memory and slightly exceeded already gloomy forecasts. Whenever inflation is outpacing growth in spending power and wage increases, there is bound to be political blowback.

The Democrats offer both a sophisticated and a ridiculous response to such criticism.

The serious response, which tends to be made more quietly and aimed at better-informed audiences, holds that by allowing the economy to, in effect, overheat somewhat in favour of greatly revived consumer demand, the administration and the Federal Reserve Board have erred in favour of job creation and economic growth at the expense of higher inflation.

The core argument is that both the economy and ordinary people would be far worse off with an unemployment crisis than rising but manageable inflation and a labour shortfall. That’s probably true, but it doesn’t play well, or even really register, on main streets.

The second argument, usually spouted on television, is that corporate greed is responsible. This is ludicrous, though it may appeal to the anti-big business sentiment of many Democrats and even some populist Republicans.

Corporate profits are up, they say, therefore there must be gouging. But when demand for many goods and services cratered during the lowest points of the pandemic, most corporate profits similarly tanked. Now that demand is back up, predictably so too are profits.

This resurgent demand is helping to fuel inflation, as ongoing supply-chain bottlenecks continue to make many high-tech goods, especially those requiring computer chips, scarce and pricey. Higher wages due to the extremely tight labour market add additional inflationary pressure.

Across the economy generally, demand is overwhelming supply, and therefore, inevitably, prices are going up.

Not only is this not Mr Biden’s fault, his relative success in managing the pandemic has actually contributed to a strong recovery that made significant inflation virtually inevitable.

In their quest to shift blame, Democrats are especially targeting the oil and gas industry, because rising petrol prices are the most obvious signs of inflation that Americans see in giant numbers on huge signs everywhere, every day.

The administration is reduced to investigating the oil industry for supposed malfeasance and collusion, despite the emergence of a global energy crunch based on the very same dynamic of resurgent demand confronting reduced supplies.

Mr Biden is even releasing 50 million barrels of crude oil from the strategic petroleum reserve, which will account for one day’s supply in the global market, and therefore probably won’t even dent prices at the pump. But, hey, we tried.

Thus far, the administration and the Fed are resisting calls to raise interest rates to keep the roaring recovery going and prioritise jobs and growth over inflation. Depending on coming trends, they may have to revisit this judgment, possibly quickly.

Harping on inflation is good politics for Republicans, and apparently has an inordinate appeal to much of the media. But there’s definitely a good news story Democrats could tell if they decided to get serious and disciplined about messaging.

The other major Republican attack on Mr Biden is truly topsy-turvy. Their main talking point in recent days is that he campaigned as the man who would, single-handedly, defeat the coronavirus (though he never said anything like that) but since it continues to plague much of the country, he failed, which accounts for his low approval ratings.

In fact, from ubiquitous new vaccines to new treatments, and effective wide-ranging mandates, the Biden administration has performed well.

One of the primary reasons the pandemic continues to rage in much of the country is that many Republicans have systematically discouraged Americans from getting vaccinated or masking and other mitigation, blocked or banned mandates, and much of the party has spread wild disinformation about this deadly disease.

Yet, Mr Biden’s significant, if badly hampered, successes on containing the pandemic have come at the price of a virtually inevitable surge in inflation given renewed demand and have fuelled paranoid Republican culture war talking points.

Though there is ongoing bad news on both, Mr Biden doesn’t really have either an inflationary or economic crisis or an out-of-control pandemic at present. But he plainly has a serious messaging crisis.

Far too many Americans do not realise or register how much improvement has occurred in 2021, despite the wide-open Thanksgiving holiday last week in stark contrast to last year’s lockdown non-feast.

Yet, by dismissing inflation, first as imaginary and more recently as the function of “corporate greed”, the administration and the Democrats more broadly are doing themselves no favours. They need to be much more honest with the public about real inflationary pressures and the defensible, logical choices they’ve made.

They should certainly take a cue from former president Donald Trump, whose hyperbolic grandiosity was as effective as it was repulsive. Though they need not replicate his pathological dishonesty, they could learn a thing or two about politically useful boasting about their actual successes from the man Mr Biden derisively dismisses as “The Former Guy”.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-11-26/saudis-and-uae-are-caught-in-the-middle-of-the-u-s-china-cold-war?srnd=opinion&sref=tp95wk9l

Washington provides protection. Beijing is the top customer. What’s a petrostate to do? Preventing a potential U.S.-China Cold War has emerged as a top foreign policy priority for Gulf Arab countries, especially Washington’s key partners: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. But, as illustrated by the recent controversy over a secret Chinese port being built in the UAE, balancing relations between the established superpower and the rising one is getting harder for smaller states. Construction of the Chinese facility, near the Emirati capital of Abu Dhabi, was halted due to protests from Washington. The UAE insists it was merely a shipping port. Still, it’s understandable that U.S. officials suspect China may be trying to establish a military foothold in the Gulf. For the Gulf states, fears about being forced to choose between their key strategic partner, the U.S., and their biggest energy customer, China, now rank alongside the threats from Iran and Islamist groups ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-Qaeda. These anxieties reveal much about the uncertain realities of power in the epicenter of global energy. Even as U.S. attention has shifted to rivalry with China, the Gulf has remained a big part of the geopolitical conversation. When President Barack Obama was advocating a “pivot to Asia” to combat China’s rise, he was implicitly suggesting a shift of resources away from Europe and the Middle East. That aspiration has persisted under Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Yet no major drawdown of U.S. military resources in the Gulf has taken place. This is because a pivot of U.S. attention to East Asia would pull the Gulf and its energy resources along in tow. Most of the dynamic economies of East and South Asia, including China, remain dependent on the energy exported from the Gulf. The two regions are inextricably intertwined. Still, Washington’s Gulf Arab partners have every reason to worry about a weakening of the U.S. commitment to their security. When Iran attacked key Saudi Aramco oil facilities in September 2019, the Trump administration took no action on the grounds that no Americans were killed. But the attack knocked Saudi production off course for weeks, and significantly affected global energy markets. Moreover, it demonstrated an alarming degree of Iranian proficiency in precision guidance and accuracy. This was an inflection point, but not the beginning, of Gulf Arab doubts about Washington’s dependability. So, as part of a wide pattern of strategic diversification, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are solidifying relations with Russia and China, de-escalating with rivals including Iran and Turkey, and reaching out to a potential new partner, Israel. For now, these countries need outside security support, and only the U.S. can effectively provide it. So they remain committed to keeping Washington as their main strategic partner. But there are other imperatives. The Gulf states need to cultivate China as a rising local presence and a crucial customer. They also need to ensure that Iran, which is solidifying a partnership with Beijing, does not develop an exclusive relationship with the Chinese into the future. Saudi Arabia and the UAE cannot afford to allow the only Gulf voices in Beijing to be Iranian. They need to hedge against China’s mighty global and regional future. As the kerfuffle over the reported Chinese port construction demonstrates, it’s going to be extremely difficult to balance a close strategic partnership with Washington alongside warm and friendly ties, going beyond mere commerce, with Beijing. Recent cooperation between the UAE and China has included defense industries, Covid vaccine production, global investment and development, green energy and other significant non-oil trade. At the same time, the U.S. has been pressing the UAE to drop the Chinese communications company Huawei Technologies Co. from its telecommunications network, saying it is an obstacle to a planned $23 billion sale of Lockheed Martin F-35 aircraft and drones. This demonstrates why Gulf leaders are openly fretting about the potential for a full-blown U.S.-China Cold War, in which they would be forced to throw full support behind one or the other. A leading UAE government foreign-policy strategist, Anwar Gargash, explains, “We are all worried very much by a looming cold war … because the idea of choosing is problematic.” That’s a diplomatic understatement.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2021/11/24/why-biden-isnt-the-republican-partys-biggest-challenge-in-2024/

His party may well lose the midterms, but the US President could win reelection if he completes his legislative agenda.

US politics seems to be following an extremely familiar script these days.

At the end of his first year, a new president is both achieving a great deal – indeed far more than his recent predecessors – yet is struggling at the polls with his party set for a potentially significant midterm congressional defeat. If Americans follow their well-established pattern, the Democrats will sustain significant losses next November, but two years later Joe Biden, health permitting, will be reelected.

Yet, patterns are just templates, and outcomes frequently deviate from them. Donald Trump, Mr Biden’s predecessor, crashed to a significant defeat last year. And both parties are currently beset by conflicting impulses of optimism and pessimism that are equally easy to justify and critique.

According to most current polls, the Republican advantage in the upcoming congressional races looks overwhelming.

Americans are currently expressing an unprecedented preference for generic Republicans over generic Democrats, with 46 per cent preferring Republican control of the House of Representatives versus 41 per cent favouring the Democrats. And several key states have been gerrymandered to the point that Democrats would require impossible super majorities to prevail.

Yet, this bleak picture for Democrats, both in terms of historical patterns and present trends, could be misleading.

The midterm election is still 12 months away, and a great deal will change. Many Democrats are consoling themselves it’s in November 2022, not 2021.

Many believe that the polling has yet to reflect the recent $1 trillion infrastructure bill breakthrough. And optimism is growing that some version of the $2tn “Build Back Better” social spending bill that just passed the House will ultimately be agreed upon by Senate Democrats as well.

If that happens, they will go into the midterms with undoubtedly the strongest package of governance achievements in more than 50 years. Although even that hardly guarantees them success, it gives them the best possible opportunity to buck the historical trend and retain control of one or both houses of Congress.

But Republicans face a much bigger problem than a potential resurgence of popularity for Mr Biden and the Democrats: Mr Trump.

The former president remains wildly popular among the Republican base, but it is becoming increasingly obvious that much of the party leadership regards him as the greatest potential obstacle for success at the polls.

The biggest concern is that he persists in endlessly relitigating the 2020 election, insisting it was the biggest fraud in US history without any evidence. Very few, if any, Republican leaders believe this and they are aware most of the public does not either.

Yet, Mr Trump with his iron grip on the party base has insisted on making fealty to his “big lie” about rampant election fraud a litmus test for Republican politicians. The fear is that if the party and its candidates generally run on claims that US democracy is a fraud and that the 2020 election was stolen, that will spell disaster in most swing states.

Even many voters who have unfounded questions about the integrity of the last election, largely because they keep hearing baseless claims to that effect, nonetheless understand the country must move on. There are no provisions in US law for reversing any of the outcome. Yet, Mr Trump is fixated on convincing everyone that he did not lose because he does not lose anything ever. This only plays well among the most devoted followers.

The tension among Republican leaders between confidence in their chances and fears of Mr Trump’s potential to ruin everything have been greatly reinforced by the victory of Republican Governor Glenn Youngkin in Virginia, a state Mr Biden carried by 10 points in last year’s presidential election.

Mr Youngkin echoed many of Mr Trump’s culture wars talking points, but he almost never mentioned the former president and pretended, in effect, that he didn’t exist. His veteran Democratic opponent, Terry McAuliffe, based his whole campaign on bashing Mr Trump, but because Mr Youngkin successfully distanced himself from him and his claims about 2020, it was ineffective.

But there are increasing signs that Mr Trump, although he did not interfere in Virginia, is increasingly asserting his role as a kingmaker and arbiter among Republican candidates. His criteria largely centre around loyalty to him, his groundless claims of 2020 election fraud, and, most recently, ousting any Republicans who dared to vote for the infrastructure bill.

He is increasingly harassing Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell, consistently deriding him as an “old crow”, and attacking and trying to unseat the governors of Republican states he lost, such as Doug Ducey of Arizona and Brian Kemp of Georgia.

The party leadership, of course, wants to reelect strong incumbent governors and members of Congress. This is the clearest clash of interests between Mr Trump and his nominal party (he spent most of his life as a relatively liberal Democrat) since the Republican primaries of 2016.

With the political situation so unsettled, historical patterns are probably still the best guide

Back then, the party leadership did not want Mr Trump as its nominee, but he was able to force himself upon them by overwhelmingly winning most primaries. It must be a major case of deja vu for party bigwigs.

They sense a huge opportunity, but not only do they have to worry about a possible Democratic recovery, their de facto leader appears to be preparing to sabotage many of their key candidates and pull their party even further to the radical right. And few of them believe he could regain the White House in 2024 by harping on the election in 2020.

With the political situation so unsettled, historical patterns are probably still the best guide. Republicans may not score the overwhelming victories they anticipate in Congress next year, but tradition suggests they will at least retake the House.

But if Mr Biden can add the $2tn social spending bill to the already passed $1.9tn pandemic relief measure and $1tn infrastructure bill, he will have accumulated more than enough to justify reelection in 2024, as the same historical patterns would suggest he probably will.

So, Democrats are aware that they probably have less than a year to secure whatever they can in additional spending and, just possibly, protecting elections and voting rights. After that, two years of gridlock apparently awaits. But if this pattern holds, their redemption comes in 2024, not next November. Though they may face a painful setback, that’s a pretty good scenario for Mr Biden and his party.

https://agsiw.org/why-the-gulf-states-turned-on-lebanon/

Saudi Arabia and its allies are pressuring Lebanon to gain leverage in Syria and Yemen.

In recent weeks, many of the Gulf Cooperation Council states have ostracized Lebanon, initiating what may even be a developing boycott. In early November, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador from Beirut and ordered the Lebanese ambassador to leave Riyadh. Saudi companies were ordered to halt all dealings with Lebanese firms, and Lebanese imports are now banned in the kingdom. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait followed suit by withdrawing and expelling diplomats. The most severe measures – holds on remittances from Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf, total travel bans, and a thoroughgoing disinvestment from the Lebanese economy – have yet to be imposed. However, it is clear that most of the Gulf states are not only unwilling to help revive the cash-strapped and foundering Lebanese state and economy, they are taking an unprecedented stance to isolate Lebanon, which is likely to exacerbate its woes.

The ostensible reason has been a series of provocative and hostile remarks by various Lebanese officials and prominent figures aimed at Gulf states and their policies. Yet these provocations are better understood as a final straw than the actual proximate cause for the isolation campaign. Had relations been better, or had Gulf countries perceived continued opportunities through engagement with Lebanon, specific individuals or groups could have been targeted for sanctions rather than the entire country, or the entire affair could have been waved away or answered rhetorically. Instead, the reaction appears disproportionate because it is not primarily motivated by the insults themselves but rather by the underlying conditions they may have highlighted.

The Underlying Causes

The de facto abandonment of Lebanon by most of the Gulf states has been developing for at least a decade. These countries have long been uneasy with the decisive political power in Lebanon of the pro-Iranian Shia group Hezbollah. Those concerns have been steadily mounting along with the rise of Iran’s regional influence and reach following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the successful intervention by Russia, Hezbollah, and Iran in the Syrian civil war beginning in 2015 in support of the Damascus regime. Since the main part of the Syrian conflict has ended with the fall of Aleppo to pro-regime forces, Hezbollah has come to occupy a regional role far beyond its function as a Lebanese political party and militia. It effectively serves as the vanguard of Iran’s extensive network of allied militia groups in Arab countries such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and beyond with a presence and effective role far beyond Lebanon’s borders.

After many years of pressure and efforts to find ways of maneuvering within Lebanon to offset or constrain Hezbollah’s activities and ability, many of the Gulf states have seemingly come to the conclusion that working inside Lebanon under current circumstances is a lost cause. The first clear sign that Gulf countries were prepared to walk away from Lebanon came in 2016, when Saudi Arabia cut billions of dollars in aid to the country, discouraged Saudi tourism to Lebanon, and, along with the full Arab League, formally designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Eventually some aid was resumed, but the level of support Riyadh was providing to its Lebanese allies, notably Sunni Muslim constituents around former Prime Minister Saad Hariri but also some Christian and Druze groups, remains drastically curtailed. After that, considerable aid to and trade with Lebanon had resumed until recently, but Gulf countries were no closer to garnering the influence to prevent the state and society they were underwriting from being used against their interests throughout the region.

This exasperation, coupled with the recent flurry of insults, is what has primarily motivated the ostracism of Lebanon. However, the broader regional context also plays a crucial role. The shift for at least the past 18 months throughout the Middle East by regional players away from direct or indirect confrontations to a reliance on diplomacy, politics, and commerce to pursue their interests helps to explain Gulf strategic thinking regarding Lebanon. In effect, closing the petrodollar ATM to the Lebanese, particularly at their moment of most extreme self-inflicted economic privation, is the diplomatic and commercial stick that is available when conflict and confrontation is no longer regarded as attractive.

Sticks as Well as Carrots in Regional Maneuvering

Most of the elements of maneuver, in this period of “consolidation, retrenchment, and maneuver” by regional actors, have taken the form of diplomatic and commercial outreach. New dialogues, rapprochements, and trade arrangements have proliferated in the Middle East, often to the surprise of many analysts who assumed intractable animosity between antagonists. Regional players have been generally trading in the exchange of carrots to entice each other into de-escalation and sometimes even various forms of cooperation. However, as the isolation of Lebanon demonstrates, diplomatic, political, and commercial maneuver also can involve sticks; Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait have given up on securing anything positive from direct engagement with Lebanon under current circumstances and sense that squeezing the Lebanese in this manner could provide leverage and new openings.

At the very least, they are convinced that this is no loss for them if none of it works out. The traditional Arab and Gulf affection for Lebanon as a cultural, educational, and commercial center, largely based on memories from the 1960s and ‘70s, has long faded. The rising generation of Gulf Arab leaders and citizens have little of the nostalgia for the heyday of Beirut that their parents and grandparents often cherished. To this younger cohort, Lebanon seems like a sinkhole of endless, wasted aid, and investment, likely in the tens of billions in the past decade, and a prime source of regional instability and Iranian mischief-making.

Moreover, compared to Syria and Iraq, Lebanon appears to be of secondary strategic importance at best. It is not coincidental that Lebanon is being cut adrift just as Gulf countries, led by the UAE, begin to reengage in Syria, looking for opportunities to work with Russia, Turkey, the United States, and even, potentially, the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to sideline Iran’s and Hezbollah’s sway in Syria. To these Gulf countries, Lebanon is strategically important mainly as a geographic and political appendage of Syria. It also until recently served as a sanctions-busting financial hub for the Syrian regime and a base for rampant smuggling. The long-standing Sunni Arab nightmare has been of an Iranian-controlled military corridor or “crescent” leading from Iran through Iraq and Syria down into Lebanon and the Mediterranean coast. Many Arab governments believe developing such a secure passage between Iran and the Mediterranean is a primary geostrategic goal for Tehran. And although it has yet to be achieved, since 2003 it has gone from a far-fetched fantasy to a viable goal.

Syria, Lebanon, and Iran

Therefore, Syria, a far larger and, in the current view of most Gulf countries, a far more strategically and politically important Arab country, is the real subject of maneuver at present, along with Iraq. They see progress in Lebanon as more aptly attained through a long-term engagement in Syria. The ultimate aim is not just to marginalize the influence of Iran and Hezbollah inside Syria, it is to encourage the Syrian regime to move independently of Tehran to reestablish its own hegemony inside Lebanon, thereby curtailing Hezbollah’s control of the country. This may seem far-fetched under current circumstances. But given the history of Syrian sway in Lebanon, the wide-ranging network of allies and ties that Damascus has throughout the country, and its subdued but detectable yearning for restoration of its former powers (independent of Iranian domination) all suggest this might be a possibility.

In mid-September, Hezbollah insisted that its Maronite Christian allies in President Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement finally agree to the formation of a government, even though it didn’t meet the Free Patriotic Movement’s long-standing demands for a veto level of representation in the Cabinet. Hezbollah’s demand was driven in large part by the fear that Lebanon’s freefall was creating opportunities for other Arab countries, notably Syria, to begin to meddle again in Lebanon on the cheap and behind its back. Squeezing Lebanon therefore, for these Gulf countries, is a means of directly pressuring Hezbollah and, through it, Iran. Moreover, it could help, over the long run, to ease the path for Syria to become a competing (Arab), external force inside Lebanon. Again, if this does not pan out, current Gulf thinking suggests that at the very least nothing significant will have been lost.

Yemen and Iran

But above all, the explanation for the timing of the isolation of Lebanon may lie in the war in far-off Yemen, as well as the Saudi dialogues with the Houthis in Oman and Iranians in Iraq. For years, Saudi Arabia has been looking for a way to extricate itself from the quagmire in Yemen. Riyadh’s Yemeni allies associated with the United Nations-recognized government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi have proved remarkably ineffective, and the final major holdout to a thoroughgoing Houthi victory in northern Yemen is the country’s key economic center in Marib, which is currently under constant attack and appears liable to fall to the rebels.

Unlike the regional actors, all of which have turned away from conflict, many local Yemeni actors continue to search for battlefield victories to advance their domestic strategic positions. While Saudi Arabia seeks to extricate itself, the Houthis – anticipating continued military gains – see ongoing conflict as beneficial to their political, strategic, and negotiating positions. Hence the talks in Oman have been fruitless from a Saudi point of view.

Yet Riyadh lacks leverage over the Houthis and is seeking to use its dialogue with Iran in Iraq to try to aid its quest for an exit. For the Saudis, the Baghdad talks have been equally frustrating, as they seek to discuss Yemen while their Iranian counterparts focus entirely on the restoration of diplomatic ties. The talks continue not because of any shared agenda but because of a mutual desire for de-escalation.

Undoubtedly one of Riyadh’s primary calculations is that pressuring Tehran through Lebanon and Hezbollah suggests a quid pro quo, not only in terms of diplomatic relations in exchange for the easing of Iranian support for the Houthis, but also as a kind of Lebanon-Yemen exchange. The implicit subtext of the current situation is that, if Iran eases pressure on Saudi Arabia by curtailing support for the Houthis, Saudi Arabia and its allies could ease or at least not intensify their own pressure on Lebanon and hence on Hezbollah and ultimately Iran. The linkage is greatly underscored by the strong evidence of extensive Hezbollah support on the ground for the Houthis on the battlefield and in terms of technical, communication, and political expertise.

What If This Fails Again?

Ironically, then, Lebanon’s best hope for extrication from this sudden and painful Gulf pressure could be dependent on not only talks in Oman and Baghdad, to which it is not party, but even battlefield outcomes in distant Marib. If, however, in the medium term, this Gulf pressure campaign on Lebanon fails to yield any benefits with regard to Lebanon, Syria, Iran, or Yemen, it may have to be rethought. And the calculations that Lebanon is of little strategic importance and that the potential reintroduction of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon could benefit the Arab world both rely on numerous debatable assumptions. In the current era of maneuver and search for leverage, this move, however brutal to Lebanon, does have its identifiable logic for the Gulf countries. But it may well prove as fruitless as similar efforts in the past.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2021/11/13/the-complicated-legacy-of-fw-de-klerk/

After enforcing apartheid for years, the departed South African leader was remarkably brave and astute to end it.

We typically expect good, and perhaps even great, things to be done by good and great leaders. Yet, sometimes good and great things are done by people who cannot honestly be considered great or even good.

The world has just bid farewell to a key example. FW de Klerk, the last leader of apartheid-era South Africa, died on Thursday at the age of 85. He leaves a complex, troubled and often ugly legacy, but the historical greatness and boldness of his most significant act – dismantling apartheid – is habitually underestimated.

There are many reasons for this, but failing to recognise the importance, and indeed the bravery, of what De Klerk did by giving up power, not only for himself but his entire community, is a huge mistake.

It’s difficult to get past De Klerk’s extensive role for decades as an enthusiastic proponent and enforcer of apartheid, an exceptionally evil system. And, indeed, he should not be exonerated for the unfairness and brutality he helped to perpetuate, particularly as the primary ally of his predecessor as president, PW Botha.

It’s not much of a mitigation to say he was born into that system and role, even though it’s essentially true. He was the scion of one of the leading Afrikaner families that constructed the apartheid regime, son of a leading pro-apartheid politician and cabinet member, and nephew of a prime minister. Obviously, he had far better moral choices than to follow in their footsteps for so many decades.

He need not have gone as far as Joe Slovo, the white South African communist leader who became one of the founders of the African National Congress (ANC) paramilitary group, Umkhonto we Sizwe. More moderate means were available, as demonstrated by numerous white anti-apartheid activists such as Helen Suzman, Helen Zille, Uys Krige, Sailor Malan, Harry Schwarz, and many writers, artists and journalists.

Instead, and to his eternal discredit, De Klerk embraced the agenda of white supremacy. It is exceptionally hard to get past that. But it’s necessary.

De Klerk obviously also suffers mightily from his inevitable comparison with Nelson Mandela, who was his nemesis and, eventually, unlikely and uncomfortable partner in national reconciliation.

Mandela, after all, is one of the towering moral and political figures in modern, and probably all, human history. He was that rarest of combinations: a moral leader, a political visionary and an effective politician. The closest comparison to Mandela is probably Mohandas Gandhi, even though they differed categorically on the question of violence, which Gandhi deplored but Mandela came to embrace but used relatively prudently.

Virtually no one is going to come off well in comparison to such a titanic figure, and, indeed, De Klerk does not. Yet, realistic and mature consideration of political realities, available options and typical human behaviours requires the recognition that, despite everything and at the end of his practical career, De Klerk had the vision, guts and determination to do what was necessary but also exceptionally difficult.

Towards the end of his life, several times he expressed contrition for apartheid and said he had completely changed his racial attitudes. But it’s clear that when he decided the system had to go in favour of black majority rule, he had not yet recognised it as evil so much as unworkable.

That, too, doesn’t detract from the fact that what he did required great strength and pragmatism. He did not dismantle apartheid out of altruism, he did so because it was in the best interests of his community – which got to keep all its accumulated wealth and privileges up to the moment of the end of the system – and even, he hoped, for his own career.

Yet, honesty requires us to acknowledge that very few politicians would have had the gumption to face grim facts as De Klerk did, and swallow the bitter pill. By legalising the ANC and releasing Mandela from prison, he made the end of apartheid inevitable, and he knew it.

To dismiss FW de Klerk’s breakthrough as simply doing what he had to is facile and unrealistic

One way of breaking through the undoubted ugliness of the rest of his career is to pose a simple thought experiment: how many lives, black and white, did De Klerk save by making a reasonable deal with Mandela and the ANC? What might a full-blown racial war in South Africa have looked like?

To dismiss De Klerk’s breakthrough as simply doing what he had to is facile and unrealistic. Most politicians and leaders focus only on tomorrow, next week or next year, at most. De Klerk had other viable options, including doing nothing. But he was clearly seeing 25 or even 50 years into the future, and what he could accurately glimpse was terrifying. So, he took an immensely bold and, within his own constituency, not terribly popular move. And before anyone could stop him, it was too late. He did not do it alone, of course, but he shouldered almost all the responsibility.

It’s imperative, therefore, to look back at De Klerk and not see another story of a supposedly, probably genuinely, remorseful racist. What must be recognised is the historical significance of someone, while not driven by noble motives, but who is honest with themselves and others and chooses what, for his own community at least, is perceived as bad over worse, and that hugely benefited their whole country and the world.

There are other examples in recent history of leaders either consciously or effectively dismantling the odious systems they came to lead. Mikhail Gorbachev’s probably inadvertent oversight of the collapse of the Soviet Union is an obvious example, for which he is reasonably lauded.

However, Mr Gorbachev’s liberalisations that spelled the doom of the USSR seem like child’s play compared to De Klerk’s remarkable decision to dismantle apartheid and transfer power to the South African black majority in exchange for no retribution. De Klerk knew exactly what he was doing and there are ample grounds to believe Mr Gorbachev didn’t. And he and his community were probably taking a far bigger risk than Mr Gorbachev and his comrades.

The former South African president’s legacy conclusively demonstrates that great and good things can indeed be done by people who are not necessarily great or good, but whose achievements demand to be recognised for the triumphs that they are.

https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2021/11/07/divided-america-is-not-noticing-joe-bidens-victories/

Biden is betting enough Americans want deliverables he can prevail but what if all they want is a good show?

The past week saw both the low point and the high point, in rapid succession, of Joe Biden’s still very young presidency. From here on, his fortunes could go either way, but the American leader probably has considerably more going for him than most people think.

It’s been a painful summer for Mr Biden. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan was widely criticised, and he has been plagued by surging inflation and supply chain bottlenecks. Although the pandemic is increasingly under control and the economy seems to be gaining strength despite inflation, many Americans simply don’t feel good about where the country is right now.

Angst is pervasive.

In their daily lives, they still see pandemic-related problems with schools, inflation – especially at the gasoline pump – and difficulties in buying many consumer products as a result of supply chain issues.

Dissatisfaction reached a crescendo last Tuesday when Terry McAuliffe, a veteran Democrat and former Virginia governor, lost the usually reliably Democratic state to a wealthy Republican upstart, Glenn Youngkin. The defeat was long anticipated, but it still was a stinging rebuke, especially coupled with the difficulty the Democrats had in holding onto the governorship of solidly Democratic New Jersey.

Bitter recriminations ensued, and the media, yet again, was eager to pronounce Mr Biden’s presidency dead in the water. He has been the recipient of some of the most pessimistic coverage in recent memory, possibly reflecting an effort by the press to balance its undying hostility to his predecessor, Donald Trump.

Yet, Mr Biden and the Democrats did seem to get the message that they had better start delivering, or else.

After months of endless negotiations, which often left the impression that nothing would eventually be accomplished, on Friday the President and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi fashioned a remarkable compromise in which progressive Democrats agreed – against all their vows and instincts – to vote for the $1 trillion hard infrastructure bill without simultaneous action on social spending.

Six of the most hard-left Democrats voted against the measure, though. The leftists fear that by supporting the infrastructure bill, they relinquish all their leverage on the also-pending $1.75tn social spending package.

Nonetheless, it is a significant and historic achievement. A whopping $110 billion is allocated for roads, bridges and other surface infrastructure. Another $66bn goes to rail, $39bn to public transport, $11bn for transportation safety, and $65bn for broadband access and additional funds for upgrading power lines and the energy grid, and providing clean drinking water. Airports get $25bn and ports $17bn.

This is the largest-ever federal spending on transportation infrastructure, and the most significant spending on hard infrastructure since the construction of the interstate highway system in the 1950s. The scale of the achievement is underscored by the fact that Mr Trump continuously promised major infrastructure development but never even proposed, let alone passed, such a bill.

Furthermore, this package delivers on another of Mr Biden’s promises: resurrecting bipartisanship. Both in the House and the Senate, where the bill passed in the summer, he managed to secure significant Republican support despite the tendency of most Republicans to try to block almost all his initiatives.

Securing such significant spending with no majority in the Senate and only three spare votes in the House is remarkable enough. Doing it with Republican support is even more extraordinary.

Now, progressives will justifiably demand that centrists, with pressure from Mr Biden, Ms Pelosi and others, return the favour and vote for the social spending bill. Despite many reservations, that will probably happen in the House. A vote is scheduled for November 15.

The bigger problem will be in the Senate, where two conservative-leaning Democratic holdouts, Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema, may be harder to convince. It will be the biggest test yet of Mr Biden’s persuasive powers. But the progressives deserve the best effort possible.
Theoretically, this bill ought to be a turning point for the Biden administration and the Democrats. Coupled with the $1.9tn pandemic relief bill passed in March, in less than a year they have managed to pass two major pieces of legislation on behalf of the general public.

Moreover, many of the key sources of widespread anxiety and dismay look set to ease in coming months as the pandemic lifts further, with new treatments and vaccines for children, supply chains begin to open, and labour markets regain their balance.

Indeed, inflation appears to be the only major immediate issue to which they may not have an obvious answer.

If Democrats can pass any version of the social spending bill before the midterms, they will have an enormous set of governance achievements, with virtually no majorities and an extremely polarised environment, to set before the public.

There are, however, two major challenges beyond that.

First, Democrats have traditionally been strikingly inept at selling their achievements. Mr Biden, too, has suffered from this phenomenon, with Democrats and the media focusing on conflicts within the party and the difficulties of passing the legislation, not the achievement it means. So, he will have to become a much better salesman, and move attention from the messy sausage-making to the tasty sausages.

A more alarming question runs even deeper. Mr Biden’s broad political strategy is based on the idea that Americans really want effective governance, and for politics to deliver improvements in their daily lives. But is that true of enough Americans to prove a winning strategy?

Counterintuitively, given the polarised times and the deep social fissures, there are reasons to suspect that large segments of the American public aren’t paying as much attention to what government is doing or isn’t doing on practical policies. Many, instead, seem more invested in cultural divides and prefer politics as spectacle – a performative routine based on identity-signalling, trolling, stunts and one-upmanship of the kind Mr Trump has specialised in and which has become the particular stock-in-trade of the Republican Party.

The Democrats may go to the midterms with many significant achievements under their belt but it’s possible key American constituencies simply won’t care. Those Americans may only respond to tribal affirmations that express their grievances.

The more Mr Biden achieves, the more clearly this terrifying possibility will be tested in the 2022 and 2024 elections. So far, governance versus the politics of spectacle is emerging as the biggest contest on those upcoming ballots.