The Arab Spring uprisings exposed chronic shortcomings in Arab republics that remain almost entirely unresolved and reflected a desperate crisis in contemporary Arab political culture, especially at the level of national consciousness. The sources of the rebellions were never mysterious: persistent economic malaise; misrule by patronage-system elites; an absence of accountability, recourse and rule of law; and myriad discontents created by governments that regard their citizenry as problems to be managed.
The Arab Spring was essentially a collective cry for dignity from citizens to their states. Perhaps the reason why the Arab monarchies were largely spared from the unrest – except Bahrain which has experienced numerous uprisings dating back to the 1950s – is that republics promise citizen empowerment in a way subjects of monarchs are not (in addition to the relative wealth of some Arab monarchies).
None of the underlying issues are resolved. Economic malaise and unemployment remain chronic. Except Tunisia, progress towards democratisation has not resulted. Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya are fragment and war-ravaged. Egypt and Syria are more repressive than ever. Meanwhile, transnational religious and/or ideological affiliations and sub-state – local, communal, sectarian or ethnic – identities trump national sentiments. With no shortage of organisations, often backed by regional powers like Iran and Turkey or other Arab countries, offering to champion transnational or sub-national alternatives, these sentiments are all-too easily mobilised to destabilise and undermine Arab states.
Most Arab republics are as hollow and dysfunctional as they were before the rebellions, and many monarchies look brittle. The dignity of Arab citizenship remains elusive. And with traditional power-centers such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq unable to provide regional leadership, the Arab state system is incapable of defending Arab interests in the Middle East. Such leadership now falls to Gulf countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, that are unsuited to, and unenthusiastic about inheriting, this role.
The uprisings were a largely failed experiment, in some cases disastrously so. But the urgent need for Arab reform, growth and change is every bit as desperate as it was ten years ago. And the Saudi experiment in controlled, top-down transformation has yet to prove an effective, let alone transferable, alternative. The peoples of the Arab republics continue to seethe in states that do not meet their basic needs or respect their fundamental rights, and where national consciousness is under effective and sustained attack from sub- and trans-national orientations.
Almost everyone agrees that change must come. But no one has a practicable formula for implementing a such transformation, especially given that it would perforce disempower those who currently control the guns, money, patronage and internal and external support upholding the status quo. Arab political culture seems stuck in deeply engrained patterns of thought that bedevil opposition groups as much as they cripple governments. Yet the unresolved and chronic failures of Arab states and societies almost certainly ensure that if a path to orderly transformation is not discovered, then another set of rebellions is all-but inevitable.
Ten years ago, the marker was set down as a demand for dignity of citizenship and the actual consent of the governed. That demand will not expire. The imperative will resurrect itself, sooner rather than later. Until then the ghosts of the Arab Spring will haunt the Middle East.