He’ll find that the country’s political factions are less resistant to change.
After a tumultuous year, Lebanese politics seems firmly rooted in the proverbial square one . Last October, Prime Minister Saad Hariri was brought down by a series of widespread street protests against the entire ruling elite. Now Hariri looks likely to return, possibly as soon as this week.
At first glance, this might bode ill for the prospects of real reforms in Lebanon. But much has changed in the year since Hariri’s resignation. The worsening economy and the catastrophic August 4 explosion in Beirut have helped to soften political resistance to change. If Hariri plays his cards right, it is just conceivable that he could oversee a meaningful shift — however modest — in the Lebanese power structure.
That would require him to persuade Hezbollah, along with its local partners and Syrian and Iranian patrons, to accept changes in the way the Lebanese state is governed and its resources managed. Some reports suggest the two sides have reached an informal understanding. Harder still, Hariri will have to win over the people who forced him from office a year ago.
Their desire for change is undiminished. Lebanese have made their disgust with the political system, with its sectarian quotas and networks of patronage, abundantly clear. They hold their leaders responsible for destroying their economy and currency, ruining their lives and livelihoods—and for the explosion that shattered their capital. All political factions are under enormous pressure to respond to the growing anger.
Pressure for change is also coming from abroad. Lebanon’s economy needs a multi-billion-dollar bailout from the International Monetary Fund; international investors would be loath to sink money into the country until it has a new IMF-approved framework. But a bailout would come with significant economic and political conditions.
For Lebanese with power and privilege, that means the terrifying prospect of opening the Pandora’s Box of reform. Any IMF-imposed moves toward transparency and accountability in economic management will inevitably impinge on the political elite’s ability to appropriate national resources.
But there are signs that the political class is beginning to accept that without reforms Lebanon would face total social collapse. Even Hezbollah has dropped its formerly adamant opposition to any deal with the IMF. It now seems willing to go along with French President Emmanuel Macron’s plan, which requires the formation of a government of technocrats, and committing to an agreement with the IMF. Other, less powerful leaders like Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt recognize they can’t block or veto such a deal and are maneuvering to join the new government.
Most of the political factions regard Hariri as a useful interlocutor with the IMF. This, taken together with regional and international support, will lend credibility to his claim to speak for the Lebanese power structure in making real concessions.
Even Hezbollah, long his opponents, will welcome Hariri’s return. His departure, and the political paralysis that it precipitated, left the pro-Iranian militia responsible for the Lebanese government, a very uncomfortable position, particularly in such hard times.
Hezbollah much prefers the old arrangement that allowed it to assert its primacy on the issues it considers vital, such as maintaining the independence of its fighters and military infrastructure, while leaving the messy work of governing to others. Hariri’s return will allow it to once again wield power without responsibility. In exchange, he might be able to extract concessions on debt restructuring and public sector reforms that he can take to the IMF.
Hariri says he will follow Macron’s plan. An early signal of his seriousness would be the independence and credibility of key members of his cabinet—and especially the minister of finance, a position Hezbollah would be loath to fully relinquish. Announcing a truly independent, credible cabinet might win Hariri some leeway from ordinary Lebanese, who would otherwise regard his return with suspicion.
There is much that could go wrong. Hezbollah might yet balk at serious reform, and the protesters who brought Hariri down last October might not be inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt.
But these are desperate times, and what was once unthinkable is now possible. Consider the maritime border negotiations with Israel, which under almost any other circumstances would have provoked outrage among Lebanese. Now, not even Hezbollah can summon any serious opposition to haggling with the old enemy.
Lebanese desperation might — just might — help Saad Hariri to finally move his country beyond square one.