https://www.publicators.com/app/dms.asp?ms_id=26617

The dramatic August 13 announcement that the UAE and Israel would begin the process of fully normalizing all of their relations is both a significant blow and a sudden lifeline to a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. That sounds paradoxical, but how the agreement impacts chances for a two-state solution will be entirely determined by the broader context in which it plays out in the coming years. To understand this paradox, let’s begin with why the two sides made the agreement, and why they did it now.

The immediate context was the looming threat of a large-scale Israeli annexation in the occupied West Bank. The Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” proposal issued in January contemplated Israel annexing up to 30% of the occupied West Bank beyond the already de facto annexed East Jerusalem, including almost all Israeli settlements and the strategically crucial Jordan Valley. Any such move would permanently foreclose the prospect of a viable two-state solution because it would render any potential Palestinian state politically and economically nonviable and entirely surrounded by a greater Israeli state. There is no prospect of any Palestinian leadership accepting such an arrangement under almost any circumstances.

But even a more modest de facto annexation, such as the extension of Israel’s civil law (as was done in East Jerusalem) into major settlement blocs such as Ma’ale Adumim, Gush Etzion and even Ariel, would have effectively rendered Palestinian statehood territorially and politically unacceptable from a Palestinian point of view. And it would have established annexation, presumably with US support, as the new Israeli approach to the occupied territories, unilaterally and dramatically abrogating and indeed nullifying the basic Oslo agreements, particularly the 1993 Declaration of Principles which establishes the agreed-upon framework for negotiations and enumerates the final status issues.

Having vowed to immediately begin the process of annexation on July 1, as permitted under this coalition agreement with Benny Gantz, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seemed poised to act quickly this summer. However, a number of factors, including the coronavirus pandemic and quiet calls for delay and restraint from Washington, left him looking for a way out. The UAE – which had long contemplated a closer partnership with Israel to counter Iran and Turkey and to partner on technology and commerce – saw an opportunity. Having urged the Israeli public, directly, respectfully and in Hebrew in Israeli newspapers, UAE officials began an intensive dialogue with Israel in June, ostensibly brokered by the Trump administration.

The aspect of the agreement that provides an unexpected lifeline to prospects for a two-state solution is Israel’s agreement to hold off on any possible annexation. Netanyahu assured the Israeli right that he had only agreed to a temporary pause, but both the UAE and Donald Trump have strongly indicated that annexation is, in fact, “off the table” for the foreseeable future. Israel would clearly be potentially placing the agreement at risk if it moves forward with annexation anytime soon, and most Israelis seem to prefer the deal over annexation. And, why wouldn’t they? The agreement with the UAE arguably only formalizes an existing reality, but so would annexation. Annexation wouldn’t gain Israel anything it doesn’t already have in effect, and it would come at a considerable cost. Normalization with the UAE, on the other hand, has potentially very significant strategic and commercial benefits for both sides in the coming years given that only limited forms of cooperation can be effectively conducted behind the scenes. Now, the sky’s the limit for the two most technologically sophisticated and ambitious Middle Eastern countries.

If annexation really would have been the ultimate, almost irreversible final blow to a two-state solution, placing what increasingly looks like a semi-permanent freeze (especially if Joe Biden wins US election in November) on the process logically must have salvaged the potential for such an eventual agreement, no matter how remote it may seem at the moment.

On the other hand, Palestinian outrage is certainly understandable. The UAE has just shattered the main leverage they believed they still had with Israel: the Arab consensus that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) defined the basis for any additional Arab diplomatic outreach to Israel. The API proposes full normalization between Israel and the entire Arab world, and, given its later adoption by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, virtually the entire Islamic world as well, in the event of a two-state Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Over time, the API was amended to include the possibility of mutually-agreed land swaps. In recent years, the understanding even grew that these could be implemented over time, with significant Israeli moves towards ending the occupation or ameliorating conditions for Palestinians on the ground met with limited Arab diplomatic outreach to Israel that set the stage for eventual normalization.

However, the UAE’s agreement to move forward with normalization not only in the absence of any progress towards ending the occupation but, rather, to forestall annexation the Palestinians regard as outright theft – a move Israel not only had not taken but was moving away from – appears to the Palestinians to remove their last significant nonviolent leverage over Israel other than the mere fact of their continued existence. Given that the API had increasingly come to be the bedrock of the Palestinian’s own diplomatic position, the extent of the disaster for the Palestine Liberation Organization is hard to overstate.

But there’s another way of looking at it. Because so much activity was going on between Israel and several Gulf Arab countries, including not only the UAE but also Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and even Saudi Arabia, arguably the API was simply a comforting illusion for Palestinians. If the commitment to the agreement by Gulf countries and others, such as Sudan and, perhaps, Morocco, was a convenient fiction, perhaps it’s better to dispense with deception and self-deception. Moreover, history suggests that the two Arab countries (the complex case of Mauritania excluded) which have diplomatic relations with Israel, Egypt and Jordan, have been far better able to cure specific Palestinian interests on the ground, including in Gaza, than Arab states that keep Israel at arm’s distance.

Some other Arab countries are likely to follow suit, most notably Bahrain and Oman, probably Sudan and possibly Morocco. The big prize, Saudi Arabia, will probably not even consider such a step as long as King Salman, who is committed to the API and the imperative of Palestinian statehood, remains on the throne. When and if his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, ascends to the throne, a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement might be imaginable, particularly given a shift in generational thinking and much of the Arab world regarding Israel, depending on a wide variety of regional circumstances. Saudi Arabia has a far broader set of strategic considerations and political and diplomatic vulnerabilities than any of these other countries, and the strategic equation for Riyadh may or may not make sense when the time comes.

The UAE-Israel normalization process may lead some other Arab countries to follow suit, but not very many for now. It seems to pull the rug out from under the Palestinian’s diplomatic and strategic calculations, but it seemingly preserves the potential for a two-state solution into the foreseeable future. And, if it’s so inclined, the UAE is now much better positioned to negotiate on behalf of policy and interests with Israel than it was before. Whether this is a net plus or minus for peace between Israel and the Palestinians must therefore be considered an entirely open question.

After the UAE, Who Will and Won’t Be Next to Normalize With Israel?

A number of countries are expected to follow suit, each for its own distinct reasons.

The United Arab Emirates’ decision to begin full normalization of relations with Israel is a breakthrough in diplomatic and, potentially, strategic relations in the Middle East. While it merely formalizes a relationship that has been steadily growing, especially behind the scenes, it has the potential to accelerate and broaden Emirati-Israeli cooperation. For the UAE, it is a bold and possibly risky move that shatters the preexisting Arab consensus – based on the Saudi-crafted Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the Arab League in 2002 – that diplomatic relations with Israel are contingent on the development of a two-state solution between Israel and an independent Palestinian state. In recent years, while that consensus held in theory, and even became the centerpiece of Palestinian policy toward Israel, the initiative was amended to allow for mutually agreed land swaps. Over time, the idea was widely accepted that steps toward achieving a two-state solution could be met by concomitant steps toward building Arab relations with Israel. By moving forward now on the basis of a suspension of wide-scale territorial annexation in the West Bank by the Israeli government, the UAE effectively abandoned the Arab Peace Initiative framework. It claims its action has preserved the option of a two-state solution, although it has offered normalization of relations in exchange for Israel refraining from actions it had not, and in the short run, probably was not going to take.

A number of Arab countries have been developing their views on a relationship with Israel to the point that additional normalization initiatives become readily imaginable. But the UAE arguably had more reasons than most others, which is presumably why Abu Dhabi was willing to risk crossing this well-established Arab “redline.” The UAE and Israel share a distrust of Iran with many other Middle Eastern countries, but they have a particular antipathy toward Turkey and its emerging Sunni Islamist-oriented coalition. Abu Dhabi was also keen on solidifying ties with the Trump administration while simultaneously performing damage control with Democratic Party leaders, both of which strongly support their decision.

The UAE also says it secured the Trump administration’s agreement to bypass objections based on preserving Israel’s “qualitative military edge” to purchase fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets and advanced military drones. The UAE maintains it also had Netanyahu’s agreement for this, but after a wave of criticism in Israel, he expressed opposition to the F-35 sale. The UAE reportedly has responded by cancelling a meeting between the two parties to signal that these military sales are a key aspect of the deal from its perspective. Assuming it gets back on track, the rapprochement with Israel also supports the UAE’s intention to emerge as a cutting-edge technological hub in the region, a goal for which Israel is the obvious partner.

But what might prompt other countries to follow suit? Israeli officials have repeatedly said they expect several other Arab countries to also engage in a formalized normalization process in the coming “weeks or months.” Secretary of State Mike Mike Pompeo, followed by a team led by Senior Presidential Advisor Jared Kushner, is visiting a number of Arab countries in the coming days to promote precisely such steps. Potential candidates include Bahrain and Oman, as well as Sudan and Morocco. Until the UAE breakthrough, the zenith of Israel’s diplomatic relations with Gulf Arab countries was its official trade mission that operated in the mid-1990s in Qatar. Based on that history, Qatar probably would be interested in such ties, but its strong partnership with Turkey and close relations and dependence on Iran almost certainly exclude that option in the medium term.

Probably Not Saudi Arabia
The UAE joins Egypt and Jordan, which have formal peace treaties with Israel, and Mauritania, which recognized Israel in 1999 but froze relations in 2009 as a result of Israeli attacks on Gaza. But the most significant Arab country not to be on the list of potential candidates is, of course, Saudi Arabia. Given the sharp decline in regional influence by traditional Arab centers of power such as Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, it has emerged as the de facto Arab regional leader and a major force in the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia also carries the gravitas of its history as the birthplace of Islam and the site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Securing diplomatic relations with Riyadh would be the biggest diplomatic breakthrough for Israel since the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, a historic, transformational event.

Yet it is highly doubtful that Riyadh would take such a step while King Salman bin Abdulaziz remains on the throne. Saudi Arabia was the author and principal sponsor of the Arab Peace Initiative, and its statements articulate a strong continued commitment to that framework. Moreover, the king has quietly intervened in recent years to reassert Saudi commitment to the Palestinian national cause when public and private comments attributed to his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, appeared to signal its weakening.

Like the UAE and the other candidates for a potential normalization process, Saudi Arabia has obvious strategic reasons to contemplate such a move. Primary among them is the perception that Iran and its network of regional non-state proxies pose an existential threat to Saudi Arabia and its allies. But given its sizable and diverse population, Saudi Arabia must be far more concerned about domestic political blowback as well as regional reaction and damage to its standing as an Arab and Islamic leader. It would sacrifice its commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative, and invite rhetorical, and possibly even physical, attack from its enemies, from both inside and outside the kingdom. However, it is possible that if and when Mohammed bin Salman ascends to the throne, he could take Riyadh in a different direction and open such a process with Israel. That would reflect, among other things, the generational shift in Arab and Gulf thinking toward Israel as well as the bold, decisive, and at times even reckless, approach to policy that has been his hallmark as a leader.

Bahrain
Bahrain is an obvious candidate to follow the UAE into the normalization process. Bahrain has a history of tolerance and inclusion toward its small but prominent Jewish community. More important, Bahrain’s anxiety about Iran is singularly intense. Both under the shah and, at times, the Islamic Republic, Iran has claimed sovereignty over Bahrain. While Bahrain has a Sunni ruling family and governing elite, it has a Shia majority that feels disenfranchised, marginalized, and dissatisfied. This has led to unrest in the country repeatedly since at least the 1950s. Some of the more extreme figures in the Shia community have ties to Iran, and Tehran has made no secret of its efforts to promote destabilization in Bahrain. The Bahraini government has every reason to fear Iran’s long-term intentions.

That alone is enough to explain why the Bahraini royal family and government would be interested in diplomatic and strategic relations with Iran’s most dangerous military enemy in the Middle East: Israel. But, in recent years, Bahrain has largely deferred to Riyadh on matters of defense and foreign policy. Manama, therefore, sometimes serves as a test case for potential Saudi diplomatic or political moves. If Saudi Arabia were interested in the possibility of normalization but disinclined to take such a step, Bahrain could act as a kind of proxy for Saudi Arabia at the diplomatic level. In addition, Bahrain always looks for opportunities to strengthen its relationship with the United States, which bases its Fifth Fleet in its territory.

The close relations with Saudi Arabia and strong bond with the United States – Bahrain is formally designated as a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States, provide the country with its basic defense posture, particularly regarding Iran.

Adding Israel to this mix as another militarily powerful partner would strengthen Bahrain’s strategic position. Since 2015, Bahrain has improved its relations with pro-Israel Jewish-Americans and permitted its citizens to visit Israel. In 2018, it recognized Israel’s right to defend itself, and therefore, to exist. In 2019 it hosted a conference on the economic component of the Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” proposal for Israel and the Palestinians and welcomed a number of Israeli officials and the chief rabbi of Jerusalem. It is, therefore, well-positioned to make the transition to an open and formalized normalization process.

Oman 
Oman has traditionally sought to position itself as a mediator in a tense and challenging region and, to that end, has attempted to maintain warm relations with as many players as possible. It has excellent relations with Iran and the United States, is a core member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and was the host of several crucial meetings that eventually led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal. From Oman’s perspective, not having diplomatic relations with Israel only hampers its ability to mediate and, when necessary for security purposes, triangulate between more powerful regional players. So, the imperative to normalize relations with Israel is virtually axiomatic for Muscat.

Like Qatar, Oman established a process of normalization of relations with Israel in the mid-1990s, at the height of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. In 1994, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited Muscat where he was received by Sultan Qaboos bin Said. The following year, Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi visited Jerusalem and was received by Shimon Peres who was serving as acting Prime Minister because of Rabin’s assassination a few days earlier. Between 1994 and 2000, the two countries operated open trade relations, and in 1996, signed an agreement committing to the reciprocal opening of trade offices. As with Qatar, Israel’s progress with Oman was halted by the outbreak of the second intifada in the fall of 2000.

However, contacts did continue, including a meeting between foreign ministers in Qatar in 2008. In October 2018, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Muscat and was welcomed by Sultan Qaboos, although the trip was not publicized until it was over. Immediately afterward, then-Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi declared Israel “an accepted Middle East state.” There have been several suggestions since then by Omani officials pointing to a readiness to normalize relations. Oman may therefore be even further along the path of normalization with Israel than Bahrain.

Sudan and Morocco
Beyond the Gulf, Sudan and Morocco have clear but very different reasons for strongly considering developing formal ties with Israel. Following the February 2019 ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir, who is now awaiting trial on numerous charges, the new Sudanese government led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan moved firmly into the regional orbit of Egypt, the UAE, and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia, and has made repeated overtures to the United States.

The dialogue between Sudanese and Israeli officials was already fairly advanced, having begun at the latest in 2016 under the former regime. In February, Netanyahu and al-Burhan met in Uganda and reportedly agreed to start preparing to normalize relations. In addition to solidifying its partnership with Egypt and the UAE, Khartoum would undoubtedly be hoping to finally be removed from the U.S. Department of State’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and be relieved of the concomitant sanctions. Like Egypt, the UAE, and Israel, the new government of Sudan is hostile to Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and is already effectively serving as another member of this de facto anti-Islamist coalition.

Morocco’s immediate interests probably center most around the occupied territory of the Western Sahara. While Morocco’s claims over this territory have been historically rejected by the United Nations, the Trump administration’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem and the Golan Heights has opened a new era in which Washington appears ready to overlook the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by war and recognize the sovereignty of occupying powers in such territories. Israel has reportedly been urging the United States to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, thus far without success. But such a prize could be potentially sufficient, along with other forms of aid and support from parts of the Gulf, the West, and Israel, for Rabat to also undertake a normalization process with Israel.

Morocco has a prominent Jewish population and many Israelis have their origins in that community. Dialogue between the two has been quietly proceeding since at least the 1960s. Moreover, Morocco probably has little to fear from such a move in comparison with many other Arab countries. The Western Saharan Polisario rebels are now left primarily with the Algerian government as supporters given the overthrow of the former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. However, the prospect of restoring relations with Mauritania would be complicated by the process, given that Nouakchott is likely to be angered by formal recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the Western Sahara.

Conclusion
While there are other Gulf and Arab candidates for following the UAE in normalizing relations with Israel, Abu Dhabi’s bold step is unlikely to lead to a flood of sudden Arab diplomatic recognition of Israel. Each country has specific reasons, aims, and strategic calculi for being willing to consider such a step. Some face far greater costs than others, in particular, Saudi Arabia, which would face one of the most challenging and complex strategic decisions of any Arab country. But as both history and recent experience confirm, diplomatic and political change can happen suddenly and dramatically. And recognition, even when extended, can be withdrawn.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/does-trump-honestly-believe-in-qanon-conspiracies-1.1067238

No-longer fringe wings of the Republican Party are trying to untether US voters from reality.

Last week’s virtual Democratic National Convention, in which former vice president Joe Biden was formally nominated to run against the incumbent Republican President Donald Trump, was carefully calibrated to refute the incessant Republican charge that the Democrats are a “radical left-wing” party with an extreme socialist agenda. Democrats adopted a strikingly moderate tone that could appeal to disaffected Republicans, and gave several of them speaking time.

Obviously, the Democrats have a growing left-wing faction. But the party’s mainstream remains staunchly centrist. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the Republican Party under Mr Trump. Indeed, the GOP is in danger of heading down a rabbit hole of conspiratorial madness and angry racism.

For much of the 20th century, party affiliation did not automatically communicate ideological orientation. There were lots of conservative Democrats, especially from the South, and liberal Republicans from the Northeast and Midwest.

Although in recent decades ideological conformity has become the norm, until the Trump era there was still a strong tether across the parties to basic rationality. The centerpiece of the Democratic Party’s electoral strategy is to show that, for them, that is still true.

But it is getting harder to say the same about Republicans, beginning with Donald Trump’s idiosyncratic conspiracy theories, fabrications, contempt for expertise and affinity for crackpots. Although many Republican leaders cited exactly these peculiarities in a vain effort to convince their voters not to back Mr Trump in the 2016 primaries, such thinking has now infected the party discourse deeply.

Having given paranoid fantasies and racist resentment the White House imprimatur, Mr Trump opened the door for, and is enthusiastically promoting, a raft of fresh Republican candidates who are spearheading a dramatically deteriorated level of conspiratorial mania and bigotry.

One racist agitator, Laura Loomer, who was elected as the Republican candidate for a seat representing Florida in Congress, earned no less than five congratulatory tweets from Mr Trump. She calls herself “a proud Islamophobe” and has been permanently banned from Twitter for relentless hate-speech. Fortunately, she has little chance of winning.

Not so for Marjorie Taylor Greene, who, again with Mr Trump’s ardent support, will be running in Georgia for a safely Republican seat and is very likely headed to Congress next year. In addition to belligerently racist views, she is among 11 Republican congressional nominees this year who are adherents of one of the most widespread, bizarre and disturbing conspiracy theories in US history: QAnon.

QAnon, an entirely baseless, paranoid fantasy developed in internet forums, posits that many leading Democrats, Hollywood actors, government officials and other prominent citizens are devil worshippers who, in a highly organised international criminal conspiracy, engage in systematic paedophilia and even child cannibalism.

This twisted delusion posits that Mr Trump, in league with the former special counsel who investigated him, Robert Mueller, is planning to expose, crush and arrest this gigantic global cabal of ogres.

The narrative began as a series of anonymous posts on the online forum 4chan, and was a follow-up to the earlier “Pizzagate” delusion that emerged from the same website. The author, identified as “Q”, claims access to highest-level secrets. Why such a person would post cryptic messages about such information on the internet is, of course, never addressed, because simply to ask the question is to destroy the fantasy. “Q” posts have made countless predictions of momentous events, not one of which has ever come true despite the law of averages.

As with many conspiracies, demonstrable proof of its nonsensical nature is no obstacle to continued and expanding credibility among the gullible. In part, QAnon is popular because it is a particularly extreme version of what Columbia University professor Richard Hofstadter referred to in the 1960s as “the paranoid style in American politics”. But, more importantly, it functions as a kind of game or “fan fiction”. By engaging its audience to create imaginative and creative interpretations of the “clues” dropped by “Q”, the great bulk of the narrative gets drawn collaboratively by the adherents themselves. It’s a grand mystery where you, too, get to play detective. What fun!

The problem is, it purports to be about real people, life, politics and society, and therefore has very real consequences. QAnon is qualitatively different from previous widespread American conspiracy theories – such as the idea that American leaders like President Dwight Eisenhower were knowing agents of the Soviet Union – because it doesn’t merely take a paranoid view of existing reality but rather posits a completely fictional, alternative one.

It is extremely destructive because it promotes so much hatred and even violence. The FBI has recently identified QAnon as a threatening source of domestic terrorism because of a series of violent incidents connected to QAnon and its Pizzagate predecessor.

Mr Trump, though, apparently cannot help being delighted, because in this gruesome delusion, he is the hero.

When asked about it recently he used his usual elliptical style to claim he didn’t know much about the belief system but appreciates that its followers like him. When told that the theory holds he is waging a war against Satanic paedophiles and cannibals, he responded, “Is that supposed to be a bad thing? If I can help save the world from problems, I’m willing to do it.”

Wink, wink.

Not only did the president say nothing to challenge or critize this lunacy, he all but endorsed its most twisted claims.

But why not? He rose to political prominence as a champion of the ridiculous “birther” conspiracy theory that then-President Barack Obama was secretly born in Kenya and hence ineligible. And ever since he has been peddling conspiracy theories almost daily, many involving Mr Obama or other African-Americans.

Mr Trump is stuck with conspiratorial theorizing. And the Republican Party is stuck with him. So, Americans get Ms Loomer, Ms Greene and a whole raft of other racist and conspiratorial candidates – or at least, candidates who cynically play to that thinking. It’s clearly a significant trend.

House Republican leaders say that if Ms Greene wins, as expected, she will be welcomed as a normal member with committee assignments and all other prerogatives. No problem.

Joe Biden and the other Democratic leaders are certainly liberals. But they are hardly “radical left-wing socialists”. Sadly, with Mr Trump as their unchallenged leader welcoming Ms Greene as “a future Republican star”, radical and extreme seem insufficient to describe where the GOP could be heading.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-19/un-tribunal-on-the-hariri-killing-has-endorsed-lebanese-impunity?sref=tp95wk9l

But Hezbollah can’t afford to celebrate for too long.

Lebanon is a land of impunity. The bigger the crime and the worse the culprit, the less chance there is of meaningful accountability. Witness the convoluted and inconclusive verdict of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon investigating the 2005 murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

Hariri was killed in a massive bomb blast in Beirut, shortly after he had decided to join demands for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from his country. Many Lebanese, despairing of a clean investigation and fair trial in their own law-enforcement and judicial systems, hoped that the United Nations tribunal based in the Netherlands would replace the incapacities of the Lebanese state with international legitimacy and authority.

Fifteen years later—and after the expense of almost $1 billion, much of it paid by Lebanon itself—the tribunal has issued what amounts to a split decision. It had initially indicted five Hezbollah operatives, but dropped charges against the most senior of them after he was killed in Syria in 2016. Of the four remaining, three were acquitted due to lack of evidence. One, Salim Ayyash, was convicted of helping to plan the attack. While the tribunal noted this was an act of political terrorism and that Syria and Hezbollah had obvious motivations, it said their direct guilt could not be established.

The ruling will be a Rorschach test, with every side in the Lebanese political arena seeing what it wants.

Hezbollah and its allies will point to the verdict as proof of their innocence. Their critics will point out that Ayyash had neither the personal motive nor the means to engineer a massive and precise attack, one that required enormous logistical support and significant organizational capacity, and bespoke a confidence of impunity. But the tribunal did not have the ability to make a U.S.-style racketeering case, indicting an entire organization for a crime of its operatives. It could not investigate states or groups, but only those individuals directly involved.

The UN’s efforts to secure truth and justice, where the Lebanese state obviously couldn’t, began well: the initial investigation established an enormous body of credible facts. They clearly established that the killing was indeed the work of a complex and military-style conspiracy, closely linked to Hariri’s growing opposition to Syria. There were details about the means and motives Assad and his Hezbollah allies had in orchestrating the killing. The tribunal, led by German judge Detlev Mehlis, appeared headed towards real revelations and high-level indictments.

But after a few months, Mehlis faced credible threats of assassination himself. In January 2006, he stepped down and was replaced by a Belgian judge, Serge Brammertz—who, for some reason, did not inspire similar threats. The investigation bogged down and never recovered.

By 2008 at the latest, it was clear that the tribunal was not interested in identifying the true authors of the murder; ever since, careful observers have expected something like Tuesday’s diplomatically convenient verdict.

All four indicted Hezbollah members are in hiding, including Ayyash. Hezbollah swore never to give them up. Even if Ayyash were somehow captured, he’d have to be tried again.

French President Emmanuel Macron, who is taking a leading international role in Lebanon these days, will be gratified by the verdict. It affords him maximum room for maneuver in his complicated dealings with Hezbollah, and by extension its patron, Iran. He can use the conviction of Ayyash to pressure Hezbollah, even while justifying his continued engagement with it on the grounds no evidence was found to prove its direct responsibility.

In isolation, the tribunal’s verdict looks like yet another victory for impunity in Lebanon, the more egregious because it bears an international imprimatur.

But for Hezbollah, the bigger picture remains grim. The verdict will not long overshadow other trends that challenge its authority in Lebanon—the protest movement, the economic meltdown, the coronavirus pandemic and, of course, the massive explosion that destroyed much of Beirut.

To its deep discomfort, Hezbollah can no longer operate behind the façade of the state. The Lebanese government most directly responsible for the port explosion was entirely made up of Hezbollah allies. Its militia defends the corrupt political and economic system that has hollowed out the country.

The verdict may be legally and diplomatically equivocal on Hezbollah’s responsibility for Hariri’s killing. But the intense pressures that have accumulated over the past year will not ease.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-19/how-an-agreement-with-israel-fits-into-the-uae-doctrine?sref=tp95wk9l

Normalization of relations is key to the Emirati view of regional security and its own economic future.

The agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates to normalize relations didn’t come out of the clear blue sky: since the mid-1990s, many Gulf Arab countries have been slowly and quietly building their relationships with Israel, without breaking the long-standing taboo against formal recognition without any significant progress on Palestinian rights. The UAE’s decision to take the plunge reflects a willingness to cross that line in pursuit of the ambitious role it has set for itself in the Middle East.

Despite its small size, the UAE aspires to be one of the region’s leaders, promoting an Emirati vision for the social, political and economic future in the Arab world. This view emphasizes religious tolerance, ethnic diversity, social and cultural openness, and confident Arab cultural and economic engagement with the outside world. But it has little use for democracy, instead championing a strict security state that closely regulates political speech and activity.

Above all, the Emirati doctrine rejects the injection of religion into politics, and vice-versa. This puts the UAE on a collision course not only with Shiite-Islamist Iran, but also with Turkey and its Sunni-Islamist alliance, including Qatar, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tripoli-based government of Libya.

The UAE viewed the “Arab Spring” uprisings as an open doorway to Islamist rule in Arab republics and strongly supported the 2013 ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt by the military under General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi. The Emiratis were never involved in the Syrian war because opposition groups were too Islamist for their liking. In Libya, Tunisia, Sudan and the horn of Africa, the UAE has sought to extend its influence and curtail that of Islamists.

A partnership with Israel fits into the Emirati doctrine. For Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and main author of the doctrine, Iran represents the greatest danger to the region, a view he shares with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Not only are the glittering cities of the UAE sitting ducks for Iranian missiles, the Islamic Republic’s ability (and frequent threats) to choke off the Straits of Hormuz threatens the economies of all the Gulf Arab states.

Historically, the Emiratis relied on the U.S. for protection. But the UAE is no longer confident of Washington’s willingness to help. President Barack Obama’s eagerness to make a nuclear deal with Iran dismayed MBZ, as the prince is known. And although he has cultivated a good relationship with the Trump administration, he knows not to trust the current occupant of the White House.

So, the UAE has taken the lead among Gulf Arab countries in actively diversifying its security relationships, including a strategic partnership with Russia that includes stronger economic ties and a quiet alliance, along with Egypt, in tactical battlefields such as Libya. But the understanding with Russia is of limited use against the Iranian threat: Tehran is building an ever-closer relationship to Moscow. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic is implacably hostile to Israel, which is attacking its proxies in Syria and Lebanon.

The U.S. may be leading the anti-Iranian coalition, but from the Emirati point of view, it is Israel that’s doing most of the kinetic heavy lifting. So, normalization with Israel is crucial to the UAE’s security calculations, for itself and its neighborhood. The clandestine Israeli-Emirati security relationship can now be strengthened in the open. Israeli defense manufacturers expect orders worth billions of dollars from the UAE in the coming months.

American manufacturers, too: The Emiratis will hope to get some exemptions from U.S. defense-export restrictions that ensure Israel has what is known as a “qualitative military edge” over Arab states. More generally, normalization of relations with Israel has already greatly improved the UAE’s standing in Washington, not only with the Trump administration but also with Democratic leaders.

The agreement with Israel will also strengthen the UAE against the Turkish threat, real and perceived, to its interests. This will likely play out in Libya, where the Emiratis are backing the rebel commander Khalifa Haftar against the Tripoli government. There have already been unconfirmed reports of Israeli-made military equipment finding its way into rebel hands. More will undoubtedly follow.

Finally, a deeper relationship with Israel will serve the UAE’s vision of its economic future as a regional hub for science and technology. It has already acted on this ambition, becoming the first Arab country with a major nuclear power program and it recently launched the region’s first interplanetary venture, a mission to Mars. Emirati firms can now openly pursue partnerships with Israeli tech companies. Israel’s Science and Technology Minister Izhar Shay is looking forward to investments from the UAE.

What Motivated the U.S.-Brokered UAE-Israel Agreement?

Palestinians are fuming, but the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel all see clear benefits in the normalization of relations between a key Arab state and Israel.

The August 13 announcement that the administration of President Donald J. Trump had brokered an agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Israel was perhaps not as surprising as it might have appeared at first blush. The agreement wasn’t anticipated at this time, but there has been clear evidence of increasing ties between Israel and a number of Gulf Arab countries – both publicly and behind the scenes.

A key turning point was UAE Ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba’s direct appeal to Israel and Israelis, in both Hebrew and English, not to go forward with planned annexations because the move would severely impair the process of improving relations. Whatever happened diplomatically behind the scenes, the result is this dramatic agreement in which Israel suspends annexation in exchange for a process aimed at full normalization of relations with the UAE. That process will begin with a series of agreements, likely including areas of practical cooperation. The opening of an Emirati embassy in Tel Aviv may be a long way off.

But why now, and what’s in it for all three countries?

The answers are political, diplomatic, and strategic, but it is not difficult to glean why all three felt this was the right moment to do something they wanted to do for their own reasons, and they are using the agreement to avoid decisions they didn’t want to make.

Arguably, the most important aspect of the timing has to do with Trump’s struggling reelection campaign. Both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the UAE government welcomed Trump’s victory in 2016 and have been generally pleased with the course of relations since. Netanyahu is a personal ally of Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, the broker of the deal. The UAE, too, has maintained strong ties to the administration and Kushner, and both were presumably inclined to help Trump claim a significant foreign-policy victory.

For the UAE, there is also the imperative of repairing its somewhat damaged reputation in Washington. The country’s reputation has suffered primarily because of its involvement in the war in Yemen – although its counterterrorism operations in southern Yemen have been uncontroversial and excluded from every major congressional bill restricting U.S. aid for the war itself. In addition, the UAE’s strong identification with the Trump administration and Saudi Arabia – itself a frequent target of congressional criticism – has also led to strained relations with certain quarters in Washington.

The UAE is also certainly thinking of its interests regarding the intersection of technology, security, and commerce. The country is a significant high-tech player in the Middle East and plausibly views Israel as a logical partner in developing those industries and capabilities. In particular, the UAE will be interested in Israeli cybersecurity, surveillance, and military technologies and the potential to partner with Israeli tech companies in developing those systems. Additionally, the agreement is no doubt intended to help the UAE overcome long-standing objections, based on the United States’ commitment to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge, to the sale and transfer of the highest levels of U.S. weaponry, such as Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fifth-generation fighter jet.

Because the UAE’s dramatic decision will benefit the president’s reelection bid, the Emirati government is taking a risk in the context of U.S. domestic politics. However, Joe Biden’s campaign and most of the leading Democratic members of Congress have welcomed the agreement, and that is a strong indication that the Democratic mainstream remains effectively pro-Israel. Moreover, the Biden campaign and Democratic candidates around the country do not need to lose much sleep over voters’ reactions to this agreement, since very few Americans vote on foreign policy issues unless a significant war or major terrorist threat is at hand.

Both the administration and most Democrats will welcome two key U.S. allies in the confrontation with Iran developing closer relations. It has long been an Achilles heel of the anti-Iran coalition that, even though it is much bigger and stronger in theory, its members are scattered and frequently at odds, while Tehran’s coalition, including Syria, Hezbollah, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen, is relatively streamlined, disciplined, and unified.

But what about Israel and the UAE? Netanyahu is contemplating calling Israel’s fourth parliamentary elections in two years and has been doggedly clinging to office despite failing to secure a clear mandate and fending off serious criminal charges. This gives him another argument to Israeli voters that he can deliver both Arabs and Americans alike, playing at a different international and regional level than any of his rivals. He can claim to have been the author of a major breakthrough for Israel.

Trump is certainly doing that and so is Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the UAE. The UAE is only the fourth Arab country to commit to full normalization of relations with Israel, following Egypt, Jordan, and Mauritania. But Egypt and Jordan had territorial and immediate security interests at stake, and Mauritania is relatively remote.

For Israel, the breakthrough is huge because it shatters the consensus on the Arab Peace Initiative, presented by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and adopted unanimously by the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The initiative promises full normalization of relations with Israel but only after the conclusion of a two-state peace agreement with the Palestinians. Not only has that not happened in this case, to the contrary, Israel was considering annexation, which, as the UAE argued, would permanently invalidate a two-state solution.

Meanwhile, the UAE is strenuously arguing that, by using the promise of diplomatic normalization to leverage Israel to forego annexation, it has saved both the prospect of Palestinian statehood and, therefore, the Arab Peace Initiative. Few Palestinians will accept this argument and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has described the agreement as a “betrayal” and demanded it be rescinded. But the UAE may have a more plausible argument that Palestinians benefit from its agreement to normalize relations with Israel than Egypt did when it concluded the first Arab peace treaty with the Israelis. It arguably saved Palestinians from losing even more, at least for now, a claim that could not have been made by Egypt, Jordan, or Mauritania.

Netanyahu appears to have been looking for an excuse not to go forward with annexation, which he continuously promised his right-wing supporters, because of numerous security concerns and, apparently, pressure from Trump. This agreement provides him with that opportunity. The UAE can plausibly claim that its outreach to Israel, beginning with Otaiba’s appeal, began a conversation that not only gave Netanyahu a way to suspend annexation but also a real incentive not to proceed in the future. But many Palestinians will argue that the cost of breaking the consensus on the Arab Peace Initiative is prohibitive for them.

The most important factor, though, is almost certainly the regional threat perception shared by Israel and the UAE of Iran combined with an emergent challenge posed by Turkey. Israel and the UAE are concerned that Turkey is developing into a budding regional hegemon that is attempting to leverage Sunni Islamism in a manner analogous to the way Iran has deployed Shia Islamism as a unifying ideological principle. While Egypt appears to share this concern, Saudi Arabia and others remain largely focused on Iran.

The United States, the UAE, and Israel have ample reasons to welcome this agreement. Trump gets a foreign policy success in the Middle East, and the United States brings key allies together. Netanyahu scores his own foreign policy success: Israel breaks the consensus on the Arab Peace Initiative, weakens the Palestinian diplomatic hand, and gets out of the annexation conundrum. The UAE gains a crucial new ally against Iran and its proxies, as well as Turkey and its network, and takes a potentially major step toward restoring its reputation in Washington while at the same time helping a beleaguered President Trump. For all three, it feels like a win.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-14/who-wins-who-loses-from-the-israel-uae-agreement?sref=tp95wk9l

Joy in Cairo, relief in Amman, anger in Ankara and alarm in Tehran.

The Israeli-Emirati commitment to normalize relations, brokered by the U.S., obviously stands to benefit all three parties. But what will the agreement mean for Middle Eastern countries whose signatures won’t be on it?

The Palestinians, apparently taken by surprise, have denounced the move as “treason,” and demanded that it be rescinded. For them, it is disastrous that the United Arab Emirates has broken a long-standing consensus that all relations with Israel must be based on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which offered Israel normalization with the entire Arab world after an agreement to create a Palestinian state.

The UAE has violated this Arab red line by joining Egypt, Jordan and Mauritania in committing to normalize relations with Israel, but without any progress on ending the occupation. (Egypt and Jordan made peace treaties well before 2002, in exchange for territories lost in war; Mauritania, a marginal Arab state, normalized relations in 1999, only to freeze them again in 2009.) The Emiratis say they acted to prevent imminent annexation and preserve the possibility of a Palestinian state, and therefore also the viability of the API. But few other Arabs and almost no Palestinians will see it that way.

Avoiding annexation is obviously a very good thing from a Palestinian point of view. But the cost at the breaking of the API consensus, often cited as the basis of Palestinian policy as well, and a two-state future will be viewed as unaffordable.

Saudi Arabia is also likely to be miffed, in part at least because the API was a Saudi initiative. Yet Riyadh has also clearly been interested in strengthening relations with Israel as a counter to Iran, and will pay close attention to how the UAE fares in the coming months.

Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s point-man on the Middle East, has suggested that another Arab country will follow the UAE’s lead. There’s speculation that Bahrain and Oman will make announcements soon. Manama generally defers to Riyadh on defense and foreign policy issues, so any Bahraini normalization with Israel would serve as a trial balloon for Saudi Arabia as well. But such a Saudi move may only come after the end of the rule of King Salman, who seems committed to the API.

Formal diplomatic ties with Israel would embellish Oman’s credentials as a regional mediator and a friend to all. Muscat maintains close relations with Iran, but also welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on an official visit in 2018. Oman has, in typically understated fashion, welcomed the announcement.

All three of these Gulf Arab countries have quietly been increasing relations with Israel anyway, so normalization is merely a matter of formalizing what already exists.

For Egypt, the Israeli-Emirati agreement is welcome news, not least because of their shared antipathy toward Turkey. Cairo is alarmed by Turkish ambitions, in Libya as well as the Eastern Mediterranean, and by Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. And it potentially strengthens the Egyptian-Emirati hand in Libya against Turkish-supported forces for control of the country.

The agreement, like the historical Arab antagonism toward Israel, won’t mean much for the rest of North Africa. But Morocco is near the top of the list of other countries that might consider an opening with Israel.

Outside of the Arab world, the countries that will have the most to say about Thursday’s announcement are Iran and Turkey, which are hostile to both Israel and the UAE. Iran has denounced the deal as “dangerous.” It will use the agreement to score propaganda points against the UAE, portraying the Emiratis as having betrayed the Palestinian cause. But behind Tehran’s bluster will be grave concern that two of its more active and potent adversaries in the region have come together under Trump’s offices. Increased military and intelligence cooperation between the U.S., Israel and the UAE would indeed be dangerous for the Islamic Republic.

Things are more complicated for Turkey, which has condemned the Israeli-Emirati agreement and is threatening the suspension of diplomatic relations with the UAE.  It is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to value his access to Trump. Turkey has trade relations with Israel and the UAE but is at cross purposes with them on most issues. Erdogan routinely lambasts Israel over Palestine, and will not take kindly to recent Israeli moves in the Eastern Mediterranean. He has also taken rhetorical aim at the UAE, for its support of the rebels in Libya (Turkey backs the government in Tripoli), its role in the embargo on Qatar (a close Turkish ally), and its hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The biggest winner outside of the three parties directly involved in the agreement is surely Jordan, because it allows at least the hope of a Palestinian state in the future. That hope would have evaporated if Israel went ahead with Netanyahu’s planned land-grab in the West Bank.

Palestinian refugees from the 1947-48 war and their descendants make up a majority of Jordan’s citizens, but they have long adhered to a tacit understanding that they pursue their national ambitions in their former homelands, and not in the Hashemite kingdom. That could change is if a meaningful and viable state became an impossibility anywhere in the territory of historical Palestine.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-12/beirut-tragedy-shows-lebanon-needs-a-new-national-compact?sref=tp95wk9l

The government’s resignation paves the way for the country to negotiate its next political chapter.

The aftermath of last week’s shattering explosions in Beirut shows that Lebanese civil society is not only alive and well, but dynamic and inspiring. It also reaffirms that the Lebanese power structure is broken, perhaps beyond repair. Yet the tragedy could force reforms on an entrenched oligarchy.

Beirut, which was devastated last Tuesday by an explosion of 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate, is beginning the slow process of cleaning up and rebuilding. But government agencies are virtually nowhere to be seen.

Instead, Lebanese civil society has once again risen to the occasion. Thousands of volunteers are hauling away the rubble, assessing the damage and beginning the process of restoring normal life. Some are organized, but many are simply citizens doing what’s necessary because they know their government won’t.

Public anger has become overwhelming. The government clearly knew about the vast stockpile of dangerous explosive chemicals being stored at a warehouse in the middle of the city. An internal government report was provided to President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Hassan Diab in July, laying out this danger and predicting that much of the city would be destroyed in the event of an explosion.

On Monday, Diab and his entire cabinet quit. That’s the second government to fall due to public outrage since massive popular demonstrations for reforms began in the country last October.

Since then, Lebanon’s economic crisis has become a Venezuela-like calamity, with the governing parties unable to adopt a unified stance on a much-needed $20 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund. The coronavirus has continued to spread, and now much of the capital is damaged or destroyed.

The recent resignations won’t fix things. After all, Diab will stay on as a caretaker, and most ministries either function — or, more typically, don’t — no matter who is nominally in charge. But they do pave the way for the country to negotiate its next political chapter.

The international community has been responsive to Lebanon’s plight. A French-organized international aid conference on Sunday pledged $300 million in humanitarian support following the explosion, and the United Nations is sending a large shipment of flour for immediate food needs. The IMF is offering a partial bailout — funds in exchange for economic reforms — but Lebanese ruling circles are reluctant to accept even modest requests.

Citizens are insisting all aid be routed through NGOs so as not to reward the bad actors who dominate state institutions. This is a good short-term approach, since it would strengthen Lebanese civil society and maximize chances that donations actually help the needy.

But in the longer term, state institutions can’t be avoided. No one else can negotiate with the IMF or manage crucial infrastructure such as electricity, sewage and roads.

Skeptics warn, however, that any support for the Lebanese state is de facto support for Hezbollah. Since October, the government, including both Aoun and Diab, has been entirely composed of allies of the Iran-backed militia group that maintains its own private army.

Still, only the Lebanese state provides a viable alternative to Hezbollah’s domination of the whole country. And there is hope for one yet. By sparking popular outrage and commanding international attention, the tragedy has created an opportunity to form a new political system, which can serve and mobilize Lebanese society.

Ultimately that means elections or some other national forum to create a new compact — one that empowers the public rather than the nation’s corrupt leaders, strengthens direct rather than sectarian representation and holds groups such as Hezbollah accountable.

Such a compact could be based on unfulfilled Lebanese pacts such as the Taif Agreement, the Ba’abda Declaration and parts of the Constitution — all of which point to a more accountable, non-sectarian system that does not provide cover for armed gangs and foreign intrigues.

For all its impressive qualities, Lebanese civil society can’t achieve such change on its own, since the status quo serves those with the money and the guns. The global community has to partner with them in forcing the country’s ruling elite to accept the need for reforms.

Donors should condition additional aid on an international investigation into what happened at the port, why the ammonium nitrate was stored in the middle of a highly populated city and what triggered the blast.

The Hezbollah-backed government has refused other countries’ participation in the investigation. The group is known to dominate most of Lebanon’s key access points, including the area of the port where the explosion took place. But for a series of complex reasons, including last week’s blast, it is increasingly vulnerable. That is likely to intensify when verdicts for the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri are issued by an international tribunal on Aug. 18. Four of Hezbollah’s cadres are likely to be convicted.

Between the economic bailout, aid and reconstruction following the explosions, fallout from any guilty verdicts in the Hariri killing, and, most importantly, sustained and widespread Lebanese public anger, it’s clear Lebanon needs a new national compact. Out of these tragedies, it could get one.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/why-donald-trump-wants-to-suspend-the-collection-of-wage-taxes-1.1061832

His announcements won’t amount to much, but still threaten the structure of the American political system.

The American political system may be strongly influenced by a set of White House pronouncements that were issued on Friday. They were widely denounced as unconstitutional.

And if they aren’t unconstitutional, that is because they are So strikingly toothless that they clearly avoid crossing any constitutional lines.

Still, as even some of US President Donald Trump’s senior officials acknowledge, these directives dramatically flout the separation of powers between different branches of government.

They could even prove a watershed in the long-developing, but rapidly accelerating, transformation of the US into a functionally purely presidential system.

The announcements purport to provide additional payments to jobless workers, rhetorical support for extending eviction moratoriums, more student loan interest relief and the temporary suspension of collecting wage taxes. In reality, little or none of that may happen.

In May, Democrats in the House of Representatives passed a $3 trillion additional emergency bill. But Senate Republicans could not form a unified position and negotiations between Mr Trump and Democrats collapsed. So instead he issued these pronouncements, which will hardly meet the national emergency.

Republican senators incongruously proved the main obstacle to additional government efforts to salvage the US economy and living conditions, even though without such measures Mr Trump has little hope of being reelected.

Democrats could have been entirely obstructionist, since the president would be primarily blamed for insufficient action before the November 3 election. But because of their commitment to a large and active government, they supported another huge infusion of public spending into the economy. And of course both sides sought to use the opportunity to achieve long-standing goals, both relevant and extraneous, that are anathema to each other.

There are two obvious explanations for why Senate Republicans would not cooperate.

One is that long-standing hostility to government intervention and spending prevented many Senate Republicans from agreeing to another massive outlay, even if Mr Trump would be the main beneficiary.

But it is also possible they were cynically seeking to force Mr Trump to act unilaterally, which they mainly supported, in order to avoid taking responsibility themselves and compromising with Democratic proposals.

Although both the President and the Democrats wanted a major initiative, some huge sticking points proved insurmountable. Democrats demanded much more support for states and would not accept Mr Trump’s insistence on eliminating the payroll tax, which is the main funding for two crucial programmes – social security retirement payments and Medicare health coverage – on which most older Americans rely.

In what is probably the most meaningful of these declarations, Mr Trump ordered a halt in collecting taxes on the pay of most workers. This is intended to have two effects.

Those with jobs are expected to be delighted that the government is apparently taking less of their money on a weekly basis. But it is also designed to put a potential future Democratic administration in an impossible position.

Since Mr Trump has pledged to try to eliminate the payroll tax altogether if he is reelected, it doesn’t matter to him. But, as he notes, anyone who tries to collect rapidly mounting back taxes, which will still be owed unless there is new legislation, will be courting extreme public anger even if it is needed to fund extremely popular and essential programmes.

This is akin to other instances of sabotage-in-advance against a possible Democratic administration, laying political landmines designed to explode if anyone tries to tinker with them. Looming sanctions snapback against Iran and increasing efforts to gin up a new Cold War atmosphere with China are two obvious foreign policy examples.

Mr Trump cannot eliminate taxes by decree, but he can try to create a mess by refusing to collect them. Yet many businesses may balk, expecting that eventually the government will demand the back taxes. So their workers may see no changes to their take-home pay.

The three other pronouncements are even more dubious and ineffectual.

He says he will seize $44 billion in existing disaster relief funds to extend what had been $600 weekly support for jobless workers. That money will pay for $300 weekly payments, but only if states agree to contribute an additional $100 a week and create entirely new programs to disperse the money, which could take weeks or months. The proposal is difficult at best, if not unworkable.

The last two proclamations waive student loan payments for the rest of the year and urge officials to consider extending an expiring moratorium on evictions.

These announcements show how limited presidential authority still is. Yet they also demonstrate how a president can, by flouting norms and expectations and manipulating existing authority, create faits accomplis and conundrums that marginalize Congressional authority, put opponents in impossible positions, and at least appear to take dramatic presidential actions.

Obviously, this is all taking place as election day hurtles towards Mr Trump with the coronavirus surging, the economy collapsing, his prospects for reelection steadily decreasing, and a growing sense that Republicans could lose control of the Senate.

It is now entirely plausible that a Democratic “blue wave” could turn into a blue tidal wave. But Americans are fully on notice: this president does not understand or care about the bedrock norms or fundamental architecture of their system.

While publicly announcing them, he kept referring to these pronouncements, strikingly inaccurately, as “bills,” which of course only Congress can pass. That is best viewed as a very revealing Freudian slip: he is indeed trying to unilaterally impose his own legislation. Bypassing Congress on spending, taxation and other fundamental measures clearly appeals to him.

Over recent decades, Congress has steadily ceded much of its authority to the presidency.

Presidents of both parties have been grabbing more, too. Former US president George W Bush relied on “signing statements” to redefine the meaning of new laws. Another former president, Barack Obama, issued an unprecedented number of far-reaching executive orders.

Mr Trump, though, goes much further. “When somebody is the president of the United States,” he says, “the authority is total. And that’s the way it’s got to be.”

If a president who is willing to act unilaterally on taxation and spending gets another four years in the White House, despite the glaring inadequacy of these largely cosmetic proclamations, the US Congress may finally become a truly superfluous ornament.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-05/beirut-explosion-hezbollah-will-not-escape-blame-for-blast?srnd=opinion&sref=tp95wk9l

When anger replaces sorrow, much of it will be directed at the Iran-backed militia.

As if the Lebanese haven’t suffered enough. For months, they have been caught between an economic meltdown, crumbling public services, and a surging pandemic. Now they must count the dead and survey the extensive damage to their capital after two giant explosions on Tuesday.

The blasts, especially the second, were so huge they were reportedly heard and felt in Cyprus. At least 100 people are reported to have been killed—that number will almost certainly rise—and thousands injured. A large expanse of the port and its immediate neighborhood lies in smoking ruin; miles away, streets are full of shattered glass.

Prime Minister Hassan Diab’s government says the explosions were caused when careless welding ignited about 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate, a highly combustible material used as fertilizer and for bomb-making. By comparison, Timothy McVeigh used about 2.4 tons of the same chemical in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The 2015 disaster in the Chinese city of Tianjin was caused by the explosion of 800 tons of ammonium nitrate.

The equivalent of 2,000 Oklahoma City-sized bombs could indeed account for the devastation and the reddish mushroom cloud that plumed gaudily over the Beirut port. But it doesn’t mean Lebanese will simply accept that the explosion was an unavoidable, force majeure event.

Assuming the official account holds up, the disaster again exposes the rot that is destroying the country—an especially corrosive mix of corruption, ineptitude and malign intentions.

The ammonium nitrate was apparently seized in 2013 from a Moldovan-flagged ship traveling from Georgia to Mozambique. But someone—who, we don’t yet know—brought it into the Beirut port; instead of returning, auctioning or disposing of it, the port management inexcusably allowed it to be stored there for years.

There are no prizes for guessing who in Lebanon might be interested in keeping such vast quantities of explosive material close at hand. The U.S. Treasury and Israel both believe Hezbollah controls many of Beirut’s port facilities.

Diab, whose government is entirely dependent on political support from Hezbollah and its Maronite Christian allies, has vowed to hold those responsible to account. More than likely, some minor officials will be fingered for permitting improper storage of highly dangerous material.

Iran-backed Hezbollah, with its large and well-armed militia as well as its political hold on the prime minister, has nothing to fear from the state. But it will not escape public opprobrium: Most Lebanese will assume the ammonium nitrate belonged to the militia, for use in Syria and against Israel.

Why the chemicals exploded is another matter, rich with possibilities of conjecture. In the court of public opinion, the usual suspects will be rounded up from the ongoing shadow war between Iran and Hezbollah on one side and Israel on the other. President Donald Trump, who can be relied upon to make everything worse, speculated it was a deliberate attack. This will be picked up and amplified by conspiracy theorists in the Middle East.

But suspicions of Hezbollah’s culpability will intensify on Friday when a United Nations special tribunal for Lebanon that has been looking into the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is expected to issue verdicts in cases against four Hezbollah cadres being tried in absentia. The men are in hiding, and have not been seen in years; even if they are found guilty, no one expects them to be handed over. Hariri, remember, was killed in a massive blast.

A guilty verdict would increase domestic pressure on Hezbollah, its allies and the government. When Lebanese have finished mourning their dead, anger will return—the kind that fueled the massive street demonstrations that brought down Diab’s predecessor last October.

Even without the Beirut blasts, the timing of the verdict would have been awkward for Diab, who is struggling to negotiate an economic bailout with the International Monetary Fund: Among the hurdles is Hezbollah’s resistance to the necessary reforms.  

Hezbollah finds itself uncomfortably positioned as the principal backer of the government presiding over a thoroughgoing collapse of the Lebanese state and society. It will not easily shake off blame for the Beirut blast, or for the Hariri assassination. Even in this country that has suffered so much and for so long, the latest of Lebanon’s tragedies will not soon be forgotten, nor its perpetrators forgiven.