What a Joe Biden Presidency Might Mean for Gulf Arab Countries

Gulf states may find plenty to work with to strengthen ties with Washington in a Biden presidency.

As former vice president, Joseph R. Biden Jr. has emerged as the uncontested Democratic Party nominee for president to face incumbent Donald J. Trump in November, Gulf countries are increasingly analyzing what a Biden policy toward the Middle East might involve. This task is necessarily speculative. The situation facing both the United States and the Middle East, including the Gulf region, will look very different in November, not to mention January 2021, when the next presidential term formally begins.

Numerous factors shape U.S. policy, which most agree is in a period of transition. Nonetheless, as Trump has arguably discovered, there are some persistent consensus views and perceptions of the national interest that push back against a rapid and radical change of course. And the personal views of the president are likely to be a major factor, particularly one with a deep well of experience, which certainly would be true of Biden, should he be elected.

When examining evidence of where candidates’ inclinations, experience, past positions, and recent policy statements – as well as the broader atmosphere within their party and the country as a whole – may lead them, it is essential to keep in mind some obvious caveats. Past positions were adopted at a different time and with a different set of calculations in mind. Direct personal responsibility for the conduct and consequences of foreign policy, and above all, the use of force, is a unique burden that cannot be easily simulated or imagined.

Even positions Biden espoused as vice president were produced under different circumstances and without the direct personal responsibility of the presidency. The primary goal of most politicians is, naturally, to get elected. It is only after the candidate has won the White House and been inaugurated that the full brunt of the president’s responsibilities become clear.

Therefore, it is reasonable to look at the candidates’ current and past positions and their senior advisors for some guidance as to what they might do. In doing so, however, it is essential to emphasize the apparent limitations of such analysis. It can help in hypothesizing about what might be coming, but nothing more than that. Nonetheless, Biden has a long track record and numerous recent statements worth consulting for an indication of what his foreign policy might look like.

It’s tempting to assume he would try to simply turn the clock back four years and resume where he and, in particular, former President Barack Obama left off, and Trump took over. But even if Biden wanted to do that, assuming he wins, it’s not possible. Too much has changed in the interim. He is not Obama, and making that clear via policy differences will be both necessary and important to Biden, should he be elected. For that and numerous other reasons, the wholesale reinstatement of Obama-era policies would be both impossible and undesirable.

While it may seem like an eternity in domestic politics, January is not far off in the context of international relations. So, here’s a quick evaluation of what Middle East and Gulf policies under a potential Biden administration might look like on several issues that are likely to remain central nine months from now.

Iran and the JCPOA

The standard line during the Democratic primaries from almost all candidates was pledging to return to the Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which Trump abandoned in 2018. In August 2019, Biden told the Council on Foreign Relations that, “If Iran moves back into compliance with its nuclear obligations, I would reenter the JCPOA” and use that as a starting point to address “Tehran’s other malign behavior in the region.” That’s probably what most Democratic voters, viewing the JCPOA as Obama’s signature foreign policy achievement, and deeply resenting Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement, wanted to hear. But while the JCPOA functions on paper, in reality it is a dead letter. Between the U.S. “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign and Iran’s own abandonment of its commitments under the deal, any effort to revive it would, in effect, require a wholesale renegotiation of it. So even if Biden and his team were to announce a “return to the JCPOA,” what they would really seek is a new understanding based on that model.

One of Biden’s chief foreign policy advisers, Jake Sullivan, who was also one of the key architects of the nuclear deal, seems keenly aware of the need for an approach that goes beyond maximum pressure and an effort to turn back the clock. While he admits he did not think sanctions would be effective without international consensus and cooperation, he acknowledges that Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign has had a major impact: “Actually, those sanctions have been very effective in the narrow sense of causing deep economic pain on Iran.” At the same time, he observes these effective sanctions were not a “magic bullet” and have not resolved U.S. differences with Iran.

This is a strong indication that the Biden camp is moving beyond campaign rhetoric about “reentering the JCPOA” and is evaluating the present situation. It would include analyzing the leverage that sanctions have given U.S. policymakers in dealing with Iran, as well as the shortcomings of a policy that may have lacked the necessary diplomatic and political components to translate such leverage into strategic gains. Sullivan said the next step would be “to establish something along the lines of the [JCPOA], but immediately begin the process of negotiating a follow-on agreement.” In other words, a Biden policy would seek to reengage on the nuclear deal, mainly to look past it to a stronger agreement with expanded timelines that would address what Sullivan calls the “other elements that we learned subsequently could be strengthened.”

There is no indication yet how a Biden administration would seek to counter Iran’s malign regional behavior, particularly its support of armed sectarian militias in neighboring countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria – although that issue has become more pressing and deadly since the last election. It’s also unclear whether, or under what terms, Biden would be willing to consent to recognizing Iran’s right to enrich uranium, which many observers credit as the breakthrough U.S. concession that made the nuclear agreement possible.

Iraq

Biden has been frequently criticized for supposedly suggesting the partition of Iraq into Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish states, but that is an exaggeration and even a distortion of what he actually called for. In a 2006 New York Times commentary and a 2007 Washington Post op-ed, both coauthored with the journalist and commentator Leslie H. Gelb, Biden recommended the “soft partition” of Iraq – effectively along Bosnian lines – loosely held together by a weak central government in Baghdad. This concept was vilified and ridiculed at the time, but while the word partition remains anathema, the essential concept has subsequently gained adherents in Iraq and the region. Arguably, this is the federalist direction in which the country has been heading anyway, particularly in Kurdish and Shia areas that are effectively self-ruling while being nominally part of a broader, but decentralized, Iraqi state.

The larger question to be discussed during the campaign and determined by the next administration will be the scope and presence of the U.S. military in Iraq. Both Biden and Trump will undoubtedly continue to vow to bring the “forever wars” to an end, and both will probably try to repudiate their on-the-record support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (for Biden a vote in the Senate, for Trump comments on the Howard Stern radio show). But although Trump has frequently advocated for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Middle East and other parts of the world, he has generally not pursued that policy. In contrast, Biden has said he does not support the wholesale withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Middle East, and presumably would be even less inclined to draw down the U.S. military presence in Iraq to zero or anything close to that.

Biden’s international worldview is much closer to the traditional post-Cold War internationalism that Trump generally rejects. So, while he frequently argued against the use of force during the Obama administration (opposing the intervention in Libya, arguing against any major involvement in Syria, and even urging caution regarding the raid that killed Osama bin Laden), and might be very hesitant to be drawn into any military conflict, Biden might be more open than Trump to recognizing the broader strategic benefits in retaining the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

Indeed, Biden has stated plainly he would leave U.S. forces in the Middle East, in particular to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which suggests a continued presence in Iraq. Indeed, Biden’s emphasis on continuing to combat ISIL has even led him to cite the “imperative to remain engaged” in Syria, possibly more than either Obama or Trump would have contemplated. Recent remarks by Antony Blinken, one of Biden’s top foreign policy advisers, strongly suggested the continued presence of U.S. forces on the ground would be essential to retaining leverage and hinted at regret that the Obama administration did not do more to help shape the outcome in Syria.

Military and Other Commitments to Gulf Countries

One of the clearest rhetorical differences between Biden and Trump has been their stated attitudes toward weapon sales to U.S. Gulf Arab partners. Trump appears to view Gulf Arab countries primarily as customers for U.S. military goods and services and, therefore, a source of profit for U.S. corporations and employment for workers. But, for a variety of reasons, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE, has emerged as a significant partisan fault line between Democrats and Republicans. Support for Saudi Arabia has even become a contentious issue between some internationalist Senate Republicans, such as Lindsey Graham and Marco Rubio, who are normally supportive of Trump and the White House. The war in Yemen, in particular – exacerbated by the kiling of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, growing concerns about the treatment of dissidents in Saudi Arabia, and other sources of tension – turned Washington’s relationship with Riyadh into one of the most controversial aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the Trump era.

Biden, along with many Democrats, has become increasingly outspoken about the war in Yemen and limiting arms sales to Saudi Arabia while it continues. Biden told the Council on Foreign Relations, “I would end U.S. support for the disastrous Saudi-led war in Yemen and order a reassessment of our relationship with Saudi Arabia.” During a Democratic primary debate, Biden even referred to Saudi leaders as “pariahs” and said there was “very little social redeeming value in the present government in Saudi Arabia.” Still, to the Council on Foreign Relations he outlined the need for a continued, if altered, relationship with Riyadh, emphasizing that “I would want to hear how Saudi Arabia intends to change its approach to work with a more responsible U.S. administration.” This formulation, and much of the Democratic rhetoric about Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and similar issues during the Trump presidency, ultimately circles back to opposition to the current occupant of the White House. As with these comments, the implication is that a different president and U.S. foreign policy is the key to producing a “corrected” relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab partners.

Nonetheless, some Gulf Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE, have become political footballs in the United States between partisan Republicans and Democrats and, more recently, between internationalist and “America first” Republicans. They have considerable work to do to rebuild ties to Democrats and internationalist Republicans, and this task would become more urgent in the context of a Biden presidency. But the threats of international terrorism, Iranian hegemony, and other shared concerns provide a solid basis for a revived, if recalibrated, partnership under Biden.

Israel and the Palestinians

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a central plank of U.S. foreign policy for domestic political reasons and is of deep concern to Gulf Arab countries, most of which are potentially open to developing closer ties to Israel. Of the Gulf states, only Kuwait has not demonstrated in recent years a clear interest in exploring the potential for a better relationship with Israel. While the reasons for this interest vary, significant improvements in bilateral relations with Israel are contingent on progress between Israel and the Palestinians on a two-state solution or, at the very least, easing the burden of occupation on the Palestinian people. Therefore, the Trump administration’s promotion of Israeli annexation of occupied territories and its systematic denigration of Palestinian aspirations and claims have been problematic for most of the Gulf Arab countries.

The looming prospect of additional large-scale Israeli annexations in the West Bank, as suggested by the Trump proposal issued in January, makes additional progress far more difficult. Gulf countries that have an interest in better relations with Israel, for whatever reason, must be extremely concerned about U.S. policies that promote Israeli conduct that would make such improved ties far more difficult, if not impossible, to secure. The Trump proposal suggested that Israel could annex most of the settlements, official or unofficial, in vast swaths of the West Bank, as well as the strategically crucial Jordan Valley.

Having effectively invited Israel to indulge in such annexation, the Trump administration has apparently sought to restrain Israel from acting immediately. However, the rise of Biden in the polls and the political difficulties Trump is facing as a result of the coronavirus pandemic and concomitant economic crisis appears to have prompted some in the Israeli government to view the coming months, particularly before November’s election, as an opportunity to act quickly to grab as much of the West Bank as possible before a Biden administration steps in to restrain them. The Trump administration has not publicly encouraged such a move, however, and there are hints of potential private reservations.

Biden, however, has made it clear he is opposed to annexation and remains committed to a two-state solution. Moreover, he has said that, if elected president, he will not be bound by whatever Trump recognizes in the coming months and may well reverse any such moves. Despite its strong basis of domestic support in both parties, Israel, too, is increasingly becoming a contentious issue between Republicans and Democrats and within both parties. Strong supporters of Palestinian rights are dismayed by Biden’s historic commitment to Israeli security and the “special relationship” between the two countries. But the specter of a Biden presidency is at least as much of a deterrent for a major Israeli land-grab in the Palestinian territories as it is a reason for the Israeli government to act quickly.

Prognosis

Most of the Gulf Arab countries had grave doubts about the Obama administration and welcomed the victory of Donald Trump almost four years ago. On that basis and because of some of the concerns outlined above, many of them may continue to fret about the potential of a Biden presidency. The primary lesson may be that it was a mistake to become excessively identified with the Republican Party and the Trump administration when the partnership they value is with the United States, in general. History has firmly established a cyclical pattern for the transfer of power in the United States. While some outside players, most notably Israel, can rely on solid bases of domestic political support, most, including all of the Gulf Arab countries, lack that assurance.

Besides, the general trend toward an attenuation of global U.S. leadership and military engagement, and broad conflict fatigue – especially in the Middle East – which is shared by the political classes, the armed forces, and the public at large, will be a key factor, no matter who wins in November. Even though several Gulf countries are happier with the “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions against Iran under Trump than they were with the JCPOA under Obama, the new policy has not resulted in the easing of tensions or any improvement in Iran’s behavior. A generalized sense of disappointment with the United States that has been building for over 15 years persisted under Trump and was augmented by a disturbing sense of unpredictability. And, while some Democrats advocate greater U.S. disengagement, there are signs from Biden and his advisers that his administration would treat the Middle East as a region of continued importance for the United States and could seek a new U.S. diplomatic push to lower tensions and enhance stability across the board. So, there’s potentially much to work with in a Biden administration despite some of the potential sources of tension. There is no reason that Gulf countries wouldn’t find themselves as well, or better, aligned with a Biden presidency than a Trump second term.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/palestine-s-mahmoud-abbas-is-threatening-the-nuclear-option-1.1024046

Faced with the threat of illegal annexation, the Palestinian Authority is signaling that it is running out of options.

Since Donald Trump became US President, the walls have been rapidly closing in on Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian President, and his commitment to negotiating a two-state agreement with Israel.

In January, Mr Trump issued a “peace proposal” that virtually invites Israel to annex about 30 per cent of the occupied West Bank, including the strategically crucial Jordan Valley. Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, successfully campaigned to remain in office on a promise to do exactly that in the coming months.

The Trump administration has asked Tel Aviv to wait until a joint Israeli-US mapping committee determines which chunks of Palestinian territory Washington will allow Israel to devour. Palestinians have not been included in any of these conversations whatsoever. Naturally, they are desperate to assert their agency, make themselves relevant, and press the international community to act fast to save the possibility of a two-state peace agreement.

On Tuesday, Mr Abbas voiced this anguish, declaring: “The Palestine Liberation Organization [of which he is the chairman] and the State of Palestine are no longer committed to all signed agreements and understandings with the Israeli government and the American government, including security commitments.”

It’s not clear what this announcement will mean in practical terms for the Palestinian Authority government in Ramallah and its considerable administrative and governance role in the lives of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. But by adding that Israel would now have to “uphold responsibilities before the international community as the occupying power” he was clearly hinting at the PLO’s long-standing “nuclear option” of dismantling the quasi-independent Palestinian administration that has been developed within the occupation’s broader context since 1993.

Dismantling it would certainly create innumerable headaches for Israel. If the PA completely closes its institutions, Israel would theoretically have to step in and directly rule Palestinian towns as well as provide for the basic needs of the population.

That’s not something many Israelis want to do, but it’s not impossible either.

The greatest brunt, especially at first, would be felt by ordinary Palestinians, who would lose a wide range of administrative and social services and, in many cases, jobs; the PA and its subordinate agencies are the biggest employers in the West Bank and Gaza.

Completely renouncing the Oslo Accords and refusing to deal with Israel would also mean giving up most of the PA’s operating budget, which is funded by Palestinian taxes that under the accords are collected by Israel and transferred to the Authority.

But apart from repeated declarations that the Palestinians have ended all security and intelligence co-operation with Israel and the US, there is no sign that the PA has changed its functional modus operandi. No one seems to have resigned from, let alone closed, any office, though Palestinian security forces have reportedly been withdrawing from certain areas.

The bottom line is that Palestinians have not developed any practicable alternative national strategy to seeking a political agreement with the Israelis. If negotiating with Israel now seems a complete dead-end, armed struggle has an even worse track record. And no one in their right mind really believes Israel is going to be brought to heel by the UN or to its knees by grassroots international boycotts.

So, this threat is probably an empty one, at least until a new leadership with an alternative vision emerges – although the dire situation certainly demonstrates the urgent need for both.

It is difficult to understand what Mr Abbas hoped to gain by this speech under the current circumstances. Some Palestinians whisper that the plan was for him to emphasize that this is what the PA and PLO had always intended to do in the event of a major Israeli annexation. That makes more sense, given that should Israel grab all that land such a response would probably be inevitable and arguably justifiable.

But it hasn’t happened yet. And it may not. Publicly, the Trump administration is not urging Israelis to avoid annexation for the rest of the year, but it isn’t encouraging them either. It’s hard to imagine that Mr Trump would be disappointed if the Israelis decide to wait and see what happens.

With the looming threat of a Joe Biden presidency, Tel Aviv may feel some urgency to act now. But Mr Biden has pointedly repeated his commitment to a two-state solution, and insists he won’t be bound by any new commitments Mr Trump makes that would render it impossible, and is even prepared to reverse them. Is that a fight Israel really wants to have with Washington in 2021 and beyond?

Since it’s unclear what the Israelis will do, why would Palestinians want to appear to be abrogating the very agreements, particularly the Oslo Accords’ Declaration of Principles, that explicitly disallow annexation?

No doubt Mr Abbas is trying to remain relevant and to communicate the level of Palestinian desperation and despair to an apparently apathetic international community. But the price for such defiant-but-empty bluster – reminiscent of the “you’re leaving because I want you to go” genre of torch song – is potentially quite high. Much wiser to let Israel administer the rhetorical as well as practical coup de grace to the Oslo process.

The Palestinian leadership has said this kind of thing before, although not quite so categorically, and then decided, in the cold light of day, that cancelling co-operation, let alone dismantling fledgling Palestinian national institutions, doesn’t make much sense. It is, we keep discovering, easy and even habitual for both parties’ rash actions to hurt Palestinians and Israelis simultaneously.

Fortunately, Israel and the US are essentially ignoring the speech. Unfortunately, there may come a time when such drastic declarations and steps become unavoidable. But last week wasn’t it. The immediate goal for all responsible actors must be avoiding such a calamitous, but closer than ever, point of no return.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/will-the-us-supreme-court-stop-donald-trump-in-his-tracks-1.1020581

The outcome pending cases will effectively determine the ability of Congress and state prosecutors to check a president.

American democracy has been in big trouble for a long time, and it is rapidly deteriorating. Donald Trump, with his authoritarian tendencies, is certainly part of the problem. But he is even more a symptom of deeper weaknesses. Structural distortions ensured that although his opponent, Hillary Clinton, got almost three million more votes in the 2016 elections, he became the President. He could well be re-elected in November but has almost no path to winning the most votes this time either.

And there are more serious problems than the presidency going to the losing candidate. Accountability, rule of law and constitutional checks and balances are atrophying alarmingly. Several pending court rulings will strongly indicate how deep the rot now runs.

Let us start with the electoral college. Americans do not directly vote for the president but for a committee of electors who meet three weeks after the popular vote and formally elect the president. States try to control these electors’ votes, usually to enforce support for whichever candidate won a majority in that state.

Losing candidates like Mr Trump in 2016 can nonetheless become president because most states adopt a winner-take-all approach whereby whoever gets the most votes in a state wins all the electoral college votes of that state (which are apportioned according to population) regardless of how narrow that victory was. This formula meant that Mrs Clinton’s national three million-vote victory at the polls translated into a clear defeat in the electoral college.

And it gets worse. This year, the Supreme Court will rule on states’ legal authority over “faithless electors” who vote for whoever they like regardless of the popular vote.

The trouble is that the Supreme Court’s conservative majority all claim to be either “originalists” or “textualists”, supposedly guided by a law’s “original” meaning. Faithless electors are a perfect test of such supposed principles since no reading of constitutional history or texts leave any doubt that the founders of the US Constitution intended electors to vote according to their own judgments.

The Supreme Court majority may, and should, rule against “faithless electors”, but when they do they will yet again reveal that their “originalist” rhetoric is a disingenuous proxy for a Republican Party-driven political agenda. An actual originalist ruling would force the country to reform these antiquated systems, which is the last thing Republicans would want.

That partisan stance will be even more clearly tested in several crucial cases that will do much to define the astounding immunity and impunity of the presidency that Mr Trump is brazenly claiming.

Several test the total immunity that Mr Trump is demanding for all of his subordinates from constitutional subpoenas. Former White House counsel Don McGahn has been subpoenaed by the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives but refuses to testify. The White House claims all executive branch staff, past and present, are entitled to ignore such subpoenas and effectively quash congressional fact-finding.

They concede that the House can impeach a president. But this would render that function meaningless by making most oversight practically impossible. Congress will not be able to discover whether impeachment is warranted or not.

The Supreme Court has returned this case to a lower court, but they will ultimately decide it one way or another, even by inaction.

And the Supreme Court is directly examining a second new privilege Mr Trump is claiming as President that is even more expansive and terrifying. New York state prosecutors are seeking, as part of a grand jury proceeding, to secure financial records involving Mr Trump, his associates and relatives, and his New York-based businesses from the accountants Mazars USA.

It is a fairly straightforward request, but Mr Trump asserts that, because the Justice Department argues that a sitting president cannot be charged with a crime while he is in office (although this has never been decided by a court), he therefore also cannot be investigated by any law enforcement officials either.

Such “absolute immunity” would apparently extend to a president’s past and present associates and businesses. They would all be beyond the reach of the most basic kind of legal investigation, including – as White House lawyers insisted in court – if a president were seen murdering someone in public.

In both of these cases, the Republican-appointed Supreme Court majority will instinctively want to protect Mr Trump. But they will have to also be concerned about the near-total impunity they would be handing any future president, free from all congressional and law enforcement investigation, inclusive of associates and former businesses.

Chief Justice John Roberts claims to be an “institutionalist” interested in the court’s reputation, as well as an “originalist”. These two cases will be the greatest test of those pretensions in his career thus far.

The court may try to split the difference by ruling against the Congress on subpoenas but against the President regarding his financial records.

In doing so, they would be gutting Congress’ ability to check and balance a president through oversight, and delivering yet another hammer blow to basic structures of democracy.

But rulings from the administrations of Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton seem to clearly establish that presidents are indeed subject to some forms of investigation and litigation. If the court does not uphold the right of New York officials to access the financial information from Mazars, then the presidency will truly be above the law – and entirely and absolutely monarchical.

That is probably a step too far even for this court, at least for now.

The cynicism of such a ruling would be almost overwhelming, because should it be guided entirely by partisan politics and not constitutional law, these same justices would certainly be prepared to casually but completely reverse themselves if a Democratic president tried to assert any such ridiculously expansive privileges.

The Roberts court could rise above partisan politics by rejecting both of Mr Trump’s outrageous claims. Sadly, a more likely scenario is that the court’s conservative majority will hypocritically (but correctly) rule against “faithless electors”, and defend the White House from congressional oversight while reiterating that a sitting president is not totally above the law.

Such a cynical compromise between creeping authoritarianism and lingering accountability would leave American democracy even more badly, but perhaps not yet mortally, wounded. Alas that is probably the best we can hope for at the moment.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-05-13/the-world-won-t-endorse-israel-s-annexation-of-the-west-bank?sref=tp95wk9l

Approval from the Trump administration won’t spare Israel from international opprobrium for its West Bank land-grab.

It’s looking more and more likely that the new Israel’s government agreed between Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and Benny Gantz’s Blue and White coalition will proceed with a plan to annex large parts of the West Bank. In Israel and the U.S., much discussion has focused on when exactly the land-grab might occur, and how the Trump administration would react to it.

President Trump, remember, has already blessed the idea of annexation. But, as I have suggested before, he may not want it to happen before presidential election in November. Netanyahu and Gantz will undoubtedly be expecting some guidance from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo when he arrives in Jerusalem today.

Little attention is being paid, however, to how annexation will be perceived by other actors. In much of the world, there is already growing unease over the future Israel will be imposing on the Palestinians. If the five million Palestinians living in the territories occupied in 1967 are deprived of more land without even the basic rights of citizenship, it may become impossible for Israel to escape the stigma of an apartheid state.

Nor will the international community fail to notice that the Israelis are unilaterally abrogating solemn treaty commitments. In the 1993 Declaration of Principles  it agreed with the Palestinian Liberation Organization—under the sponsorship of the U.S. and Russia—Israel promised not to annex occupied territories. Breaking that word, even with American approval, will cause serious and lasting diplomatic damage.

How would the world react to annexation? Among the major powers, Russia and China will likely issue formal expressions of regret, but do little else: Moscow and Beijing will not risk their strong ties to Israel over this issue. Europe is another matter, however.

More than likely, European governments will regard the newly-annexed areas illegitimate, as they do many other Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Although there is little they can do to actually prevent the annexation, they can impose an economic cost on Israel. Members of the European Union are already considering punitive measures, ranging from restrictions on trade agreements and the denial of grants.

Many European countries have laws distinguishing between goods and services produced in illegitimate settlements—which are labeled to show their origin or excluded from advantageous trade terms—and those produced in Israel proper. Israelis setting up businesses in annexed land could struggle for access to European markets.

There will be a political price, as well. Over time, Europeans will increasingly view a greater Israeli state as fundamentally illegitimate because it has been rendered indistinguishable from settlements. This view will inform the policies European governments adopt toward Israel.

Most emerging countries will likewise take a dim view of annexation: they have a stake in an international system that prohibits land-grabs by war. India could conceivably regard it as vindication of its own policies in Kashmir, but will at least express pro-forma disapproval. South Africa, Brazil, Mexico and others will be more forceful in their criticism—especially in the United Nations and other multilateral bodies—and will resist the normalization of an expanded Israel.

The same goes for the Islamic nations, even distant ones like Indonesia and Nigeria. In the Middle East, annexation will deepen hostility toward Israel from a wide range of actors, from Iran and Turkey to Islamist groups. And if Hezbollah and Hamas step up attacks on Israeli targets, they will have a ready-made justification that many Muslims around the world will find persuasive.

Annexation would virtually rule out diplomatic recognition of Israel by other Arab countries, even those that have recently been cultivating closer strategic relations, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It would even threaten relations with Arab states that do recognize Israel: Egypt and Jordan.

In the longer term, the reactions of Arab and other Muslim states will be governed by what the Palestinians do. The annexation plan leaves them marooned an autonomous area in the West Bank, entirely surrounded by the expanded Israel. Netanyahu, who calls this a “state-minus,” is calculating that Palestinians will have no option but to take whatever they can get.

This is wishful thinking. Palestinians will not surrender their historic claims and national aspirations in exchange for a West Bank enclave with limited self-rule within a greater Israel. A violent new uprising may be inevitable, requiring a military response from the Israeli Defense Forces—in turn risking more international opprobrium.

Even without a conflagration, Israel will essentially be suppressing the basic human rights of millions of people—and there won’t even be a pretense of this being a temporary situation, pending an eventual peace agreement. No amount of support from the Trump administration can erase that stain.

Why U.S.-Saudi Relations are Facing an Unprecedented Crisis

Although there are many reasons to believe the U.S.-Saudi partnership can endure, the need for both parties to repair trust has rarely been more urgent.

An April 2 call between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman left no doubt about the state of U.S.-Saudi relations. Trump reportedly told the crown prince that if Saudi Arabia didn’t immediately move to resolve the oil price war with Russia and drastically cut production – which would salvage what was left of the devastated U.S. shale oil industry – Washington would withdraw its military forces from the kingdom. Those troops had been bolstered in 2019 amid increasing tension with Iran including attacks on Saudi oil fields, so the gravity of this threat was unmistakable. The Saudis hurriedly moved to convene the OPEC+ oil producers group, and after several days of intensive wrangling, secured an agreement with Moscow – which was also suffering significant economic woes due to the price war – and others to stabilize the market. But how did it come to this?  

As Trump’s intervention demonstrates, Saudi Arabia and the United States may be experiencing one of the worst rifts in a long history of cooperation, with pockets of support for Riyadh in Washington dwindling over a complex series of disputes. The Pentagon now says it is removing Patriot missile batteries from Saudi Arabia and may also withdraw some of the extra U.S. troops deployed in the military buildup over the past year, with the rationale that the Iranian threat is receding. It is hard not to read this in part as a message to Riyadh, especially given the timing of the announcement. Although there are many reasons to believe the partnership can endure, the need for both parties, particularly Saudi Arabia, to repair the bilateral relationship has rarely been more urgent. 

The current strains are a historical anomaly, even though the strategic affiliation between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which dates to the 1940s, has endured numerous strains in the past. Among the worst of these were the 1973 oil embargo and the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 al–Qaeda attacks. But in those instances, a bedrock of official support for the relationship on both sides – informed by urgent geostrategic imperatives such as the Cold War or, later, the struggle to combat terrorism and Iranian hegemony – helped overcome the divisions. Over the past 18 months, however, it has become increasingly difficult to identify consistent pockets of goodwill in Washington toward Riyadh amid myriad signs of mounting unease.  

Tensions in the Second Obama Term 

Disquiet between Saudi Arabia and much of the Democratic Party surfaced during the second term of Barack Obama. The then president frequently advocated a U.S. strategic “pivot to [East] Asia” and implicitly away from the Middle East. He expressed the view that the Middle East and its strategic energy reserves were no longer as important to bolstering the U.S. global position as they had been in earlier decades. He also referred to Saudi Arabia and other U.S. Middle East partners as “free riders,” who were not doing their fair share in their own defense. And, finally, he criticized Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries on human rights and women’s rights, critiques he did not apply to their principal regional antagonist, Iran. 

It was on Iran that the deepest divisions emerged. Saudi Arabia, along with its Gulf allies and Israel, left no doubt it was deeply concerned over the U.S.-led international nuclear negotiations with Iran. Riyadh was concerned the agreement, which emerged in the form of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, unduly advantaged Tehran and could be the first step in a broader rapprochement between the United States and Iran without any fundamental restructuring of Iran’s regional policies. Saudi Arabia and its allies eventually endorsed both the negotiations and the subsequent nuclear agreement but remained concerned by the potential outcomes.  

As it was, none of that played out. Under Obama, Washington was never able to pivot away from the Middle East, toward Asia or anywhere else, and maintained its robust regional military and commercial presence. Iran proved unreceptive to additional outreach and was disinclined to alter its destabilizing regional conduct, particularly support for armed sectarian militias in neighboring Arab states.  

The Trump Era Intensifies the Partisan Divide 

Yet the experience left a bitter taste in the mouths of both sides. Many Saudis and their allies were relieved there was no “pivot to Asia” or broader understanding with Iran but continued to doubt the intentions of those who provoked those fears in the first place. And many Democrats persisted in seeing Saudi Arabia in the often negative terms Obama had defined. All of this was greatly exacerbated when Trump became president. He quickly embraced Saudi Arabia as a key ally and consumer of U.S. military goods and services. With great fanfare, his first trip abroad as president began with an extended stay in Riyadh, and he touted numerous contracts he claimed had brought unprecedented profits to U.S. companies and employment to U.S. workers. 

Throughout the Trump administration’s first term, the existing tensions between Democrats and Saudi Arabia rapidly deteriorated, partly because Washington and Riyadh went to such lengths to emphasize their strategic alignment. Democrats were looking for a foreign policy issue to focus their attacks against the administration and for a variety of reasons that focus fell on Saudi Arabia. In particular, objections to the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen became a rallying cry against administration policy on Capitol Hill as the humanitarian situation in the country deteriorated, and the war increasingly became a quagmire for Riyadh and its allies.  

Ill will intensified when Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and instituted a campaign of “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran. Democrats were dismayed at this all-out assault on what most considered Obama’s signature foreign policy accomplishment. And many of them blamed the governments of Saudi Arabia and Israel for encouraging and enabling this radical policy shift. Israel, however, is largely protected by its deep reservoir of bipartisan political support in the United States. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies can call on no such domestic political support to secure their interests and defend their positions. 

Yemen and the Killing of Khashoggi Alienate Key Republicans 

By the summer of 2018, Saudi relations with Democrats, who were months away from regaining control of the House of Representatives, had deteriorated severely. However, Riyadh maintained strong ties with the White House and, for the most part, with internationalist Republicans, especially in the Senate, despite growing unease over Yemen. However, the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a U.S. permanent resident and columnist for The Washington Post, at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018 proved a hammer blow to Saudi relations with congressional Republicans. The killing, which the Saudi government asserts was carried out by its agents acting without authorization, is believed by many to have been ordered by the crown prince, fueling congressional outrage.  

Many prominent and influential Senate Republicans who had stuck with Riyadh despite growing unease over the military stalemate and humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen – including Lindsay Graham and Marco Rubio – lost their patience with Saudi Arabia’s constantly evolving and unconvincing explanations for Khashoggi’s killing. The slaying dovetailed with a growing bipartisan desire to assert Congress’ role in U.S. military actions overseas and led to the unprecedented assertion in April 2019 of the War Powers Resolution over U.S. involvement in the Yemen campaign by majorities in both houses of Congress. Trump vetoed this effort to legislatively prohibit continued U.S. participation in the Yemen war, via arms sales and logistical support for the Saudi-led coalition, but it was a rare instance in which the president had to push back against Republicans as well as Democrats. 

For the past year, therefore, the Saudi government was left almost entirely dependent on Trump and the White House for continued support in Washington. Bipartisan pressure to end U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen continued to grow. Democratic politicians’ resentment over the continued maximum pressure campaign against Iran and reciprocal military attacks intensified. Concerns mounted over a continued political crackdown in Saudi Arabia, particularly the jailing and abuse of women’s rights and other human rights activists, some connected to the United States. There were ongoing accusations that Saudi officials were helping their nationals flee criminal prosecutions in the United States. And a shooting spree in December 2019 by a Saudi military trainee at a U.S. naval base in Pensacola, Florida that killed three U.S. citizens and wounded eight others added to the sense of unease and mistrust.

The Oil Price War Pushes Relations Close to a Breaking Point 

Throughout it all, the Trump administration appeared to stick with Riyadh. But that all changed with the oil price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia in which U.S. shale-oil producers were among the most damaged parties. From a Saudi point of view, the confrontation with Moscow was provoked by Russia walking out of an OPEC+ meeting that was intended to create market stabilization and its refusal to continue with an existing production cut agreement.  

The Saudis were pushing for burden sharing to control the price of oil, and they got it. In the process, they demonstrated their importance in managing global oil markets. However, that came at a huge cost to its relations with the United States. The Trump administration holds fossil fuels in high regard and has been committed to a program of U.S. global “energy dominance.” The rise of U.S. fracking and shale oil production was a major pillar of this claimed policy success. Now, instead, the centrality of Saudi Arabia to global oil markets has been clearly reaffirmed.  

The confrontation came at a particularly disastrous time for the U.S. economy, given the massive contraction associated with the coronavirus pandemic and the maturing debts of the U.S. shale oil industry. It infuriated not only Trump, but 13 key senators from oil-producing states, including Ted Cruz, the Republican from Texas, who on March 18 penned a letter urging Riyadh to resolve the dispute with Moscow and increase the price of oil. “If you want to behave like our enemy, we’ll treat you like our enemy,” said Cruz, traditionally a congressional ally of Saudi Arabia. The president’s threat to withdraw all U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia appeared to pick up on Cruz’s theme, suggesting that Washington would no longer feel bound in any way to protect Saudi Arabia’s national security and even its territorial integrity. It was essentially a threat to end the relationship. 

Relations are Salvaged But Much Work Remains 

Saudi Arabia moved quickly to respond to these threats, and particularly to Trump. In doing so, Riyadh has probably salvaged its relationship with the White House and possibly some Republican senators. However, ongoing tensions over Yemen, Khashoggi, and other issues suggest there is much work to be done with traditional Republican allies on Capitol Hill. As for Democrats, there is little doubt that Saudi Arabia remains a convenient and preferred target, not only on the far left but also within the mainstream. With Democrats well positioned for the November elections, Riyadh may be increasingly aware of the urgent political repair work required. 

However, the Saudis still have added value. No matter how infuriating the oil price war was to many U.S. citizens, Riyadh managed to demonstrate two key points that may have needed reinforcing: first, the continued centrality of its oil to U.S. economic and strategic interests, and second, the unique role it inevitably plays in stabilizing and managing global energy markets. In other words, for all the anger it generated, Riyadh demonstrated it’s an ally worth having and keeping. 

Additionally, if Democrats win the presidential election in November, the discussion within the establishment about rejoining the JCPOA and returning to the strategic approach of the second Obama term will not survive. Practically speaking, the JCPOA no longer exists. And everything else relevant to this question has changed since 2016. So even a Democratic White House would have to look at the challenges facing Washington in the Gulf region in 2021 to calculate its position. A strong alliance with Saudi Arabia will almost certainly count as an existing and valuable asset once real policy planning begins. That means the Saudis will have an opportunity to reset relations. But to succeed, they will have to move quickly, while recognizing the extent and urgency of the challenge they face in repairing ties in Washington. 

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/for-trump-it-s-public-health-vs-the-economy-1.1017451

With 80,000 dead already and massive unemployment, the American people will pay mightily if he fumbles again.

For the second time, US President Donald Trump is about to make a huge bet against the power of the coronavirus. Earlier this year, as his officials fretted, he gambled that “everything will work out fine.”

Now, he appears determined to push the US into quickly reviving normal life.

In January, he received nearly daily warnings that the virus was spreading with potentially disastrous consequences. Always focused on the economy, and with the Dow Jones industrial average approaching the coveted 30,000 benchmark, Mr Trump assured Americans, investors, and himself that there was nothing to worry about.

When the pandemic struck in March, the resulting lack of preparation and planning helped ensure the impact of the pandemic reached almost unimaginable proportions.

Despite a thoroughgoing campaign of social distancing, closure of public places and other mitigation efforts, the US has among the world’s highest Covid-19 toll, in both absolute and per capita terms. Americans, constituting a mere 5 per cent of the world’s population, account for a whopping 33 per cent of confirmed cases. Almost 80,000 have died, at a daily rate six times higher than the global average. And with the exception of the New York City metropolitan area, the spread of the virus appears to be accelerating, not slowing.

The US performed spectacularly badly because of the lack of a coordinated national response. Mr Trump insisted that states alone are responsible for all major decisions and key tasks, including testing, securing supplies and equipment such as ventilators.

Mr Trump did flex his mighty federal government muscles by ordering virus-plagued meat processing facilities to stay open to avoid any threat to the hamburger supply. But there has been no comparable mobilization on the production of tests, personal protective equipment or other goods that lack the overriding national importance of meat.

Now Mr Trump appears ready to spin the wheel again by reopening society without any of the requisite benchmarks met or basic systems in place.

The impulse is understandable. Unless Mr Trump can oversee a quick economic turnaround, he seems unlikely to beat former US vice president Joe Biden in November. The presumptive Democratic nominee, despite being virtually invisible in recent months, is winning handily in most polls, especially in several key swing states. And Mr Trump’s support among senior citizens, disproportionately susceptible to the virus, is collapsing.

True to form, Mr Trump has cultivated an atmosphere of deeply political division in which reopening the country is cast as a conservative and Republican position, whereas caution, data-driven decision-making, and even regard for life, have apparently become liberal and Democratic approaches.

Any sensible person must be deeply concerned about the devastating economic consequences of mitigation as well as the public health catastrophe caused by the pandemic. Unemployment figures are staggering, reaching levels not seen since the Great Depression almost 100 years ago. It may take years, or even decades, to reverse the damage of mere months of lockdown.

Yet Mr Trump is promoting a narrative that seems to pit public health against the economy when instead they are inextricably interdependent.Even if states try to force people back to work by cutting off their unemployment and other benefits, consumer spending will not rebound unless the public feels safe patronizing businesses. People cannot be ordered to be productive and spend confidently.

Meanwhile, epidemiologists warn that loosening restrictions without adequate preparations could result in another round of infections and tens of thousands of additional deaths.

Under current circumstances the move makes little apparent sense. None of the states Mr Trump is encouraging to loosen restrictions meet the standards established by his own coronavirus task force. And the White House last week blocked a more detailed set of reopening guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, reportedly because they demonstrate how unprepared much of the country remains.

There is no national testing program or remotely adequate state-based structure, which would probably mean between three million to 25 million tests a week. There is no national or state contact tracing system. There is not even a plan or structure for creating them.

With a little imagination and initiative, though, the unemployment and contact tracing crises could be addressed simultaneously through a national program to rapidly employ hundreds of thousands of coronavirus fighters. But Republicans are allergic to anything that smacks of an expanded and effective public sector
So, the country will not even be able to tell how well or badly the upcoming re-opening gambit is going until it is too late.

Mr Trump never made any effort to create serious testing and tracing programs and appears to have given up entirely, surrendering that key territory to “the invisible enemy” without so much as a fight.

Instead, Mr Trump is battling to change attitudes by communicating that social distancing and other basic precautions are overrated and the best remedy is a bold return to normalcy. He calls the public “warriors,” prepared to risk their lives to return to work. The essential message is clear: only cowards and traitors want to mitigate. Real Americans, and especially real men, are ready to die for the economy.

This narrative was impeccably enacted when Mr Trump toured a mask factory without wearing a mask and with the song Live and Let Die blaring in the background.

He has started to insist testing “isn’t necessary” and “somewhat overrated.” Still, no one is allowed near him without being immediately tested and he appeared astonished that several White House staff recently tested positive.
He has also taken to suggesting that the death tolls are exaggerated, and has resurrected the mantra that the virus will soon disappear. The White House now often refers to the pandemic in the past tense.

The last time they sounded like this, the coronavirus was spreading uncontrolled, and largely undetected throughout society.

Mr Trump gambled big earlier this year. He lost hugely. 80,000 Americans, so far, have paid the price. He is about to throw the dice again. This time, the stakes for everyone are a lot higher.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-05-05/what-arab-tv-says-about-evolving-attitudes-toward-jews-and-israel?sref=tp95wk9l

In drama and comedy, the trend is toward sympathetic and humanizing portrayals of Jews.

The annual crop of Ramadan TV shows represent one of the most interesting bellwethers of popular culture in the Middle East: watched by an audience of hundreds of millions, they often reflect—and sometimes help to shape—evolving social mores and shifting political moods. Since most of the region’s media outlets, for entertainment as much as for news, are subject to heavy censorship, the content of these shows is assumed to have official sanction.

This year’s batch of dramas and comedies is encouraging an unusual discussion over Arab-Jewish relations. It comes at a time when many Arab countries—especially the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain—are gingerly exploring more cooperative relations with Israel, not least because of shared opposition to Iranian, and Turkish, ambitions in the region.
The dramatic series “Um Haroun” constitutes a significant breakthrough in the Arab popular-culture representations of Jewish-Arab relations in the context of the creation of Israel. Set in an unnamed Gulf country which most closely resembles Kuwait, it tells the story of how ties between Jewish and Arab communities were snapped by the creation of Israel in 1948.

Rather than casting Israel and Jews as malign elements that ought to be extirpated from the Middle East, as TV shows sometimes do, it takes a more nuanced reading of region’s recent history and current realities. It is a humanizing and sympathetic portrait of the Jews of the Arab world, a wistful account of what was lost on all sides when these communities left for Israel.

This tone is set by the opening voice-over monologue in Hebrew from the titular main character – based on a real Barhaini Jewish midwife: “Before our footsteps go missing and our lives fall into memory, we will be lost to time. We are the Gulf Jews who were born in the Gulf lands.” Peaceful coexistence crumbles as a Jewish man is murdered when news of the creation of Israel is broadcast on the radio.

Significantly, “Um Haroun” is a broad-based production: It is being aired on the Saudi-owned MBC network, is co-produced by Kuwaiti and Emirati companies, and features performers from several countries. The show-runners had to navigate past censorship (and cultures of self-censorship) in multiple jurisdictions, meaning a lot of authorities signed off on this.

But the show shouldn’t be dismissed is an officially-approved effort to shift public opinion for purposes of geopolitical expediency. It is a genuine reflection of a generational shift in attitudes: Many young Arabs already sense that Israel and Jewish nationalism are a natural and non-pathological part of a regional environment that contains significant and legitimate non-Arab power centers.

A recent Zogby opinion poll found that majorities in most Arab countries now think normal relations with Israel are developing, and that this is a good thing. And increasing cultural and sporting – and in the case of Oman even political—links between Israel and Arab states are widely accepted, meeting with little pushback.

Perhaps inevitably, “Um Haroun” has been greeted with anger among Palestinians, who are dismayed by what they regard as a too-charitable representation of their antagonists. Hamas called the program a “political and cultural attempt to introduce the Zionist project to Persian Gulf society” and said it promotes “hatred, slow killing and internal destruction.” Displays of sympathy for Jews being evicted from their Arab homelands can seem discordant at a time when many in the West Bank are bracing for large-scale annexations of territory by the new Israeli national unity government.

Significant criticism has also been leveled at a Saudi comedy series, “Makhraj 7,” which lampoons attitudes towards Israel, including a particularly controversial discussion of “normalization” of commercial and political relations—with one character complaining about Palestinian “ingratitude” to Gulf countries.

These are heretical departures from the traditional Arab political culture and public discourse, and although the show also presents some of the more conventional views, it is being accused some Palestinians and other critics of promoting rapproachment with Israel.

But the Palestinian criticism is misplaced. These programs do not present a Jewish or Israeli narrative to an Arab audience, and their ability to transform deep-seated attitudes—let alone affect national policies—should not be overstated. After all, despite improved relations with Israel, the countries where these shows are produced joined the rest of the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation in condemning the annexation plan.

Palestinians can count on unanimous Arab support where it matters most: diplomatically and politically. But Arab narratives about Jews and Israel are growing more complex—and closer to reality.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/how-a-former-donald-trump-aide-has-further-exposed-the-faultlines-in-us-politics-1.1014194

Conflicting narratives over Trump’s former national security adviser shows how irreconcilable Democratic and Republican worldviews have become.

Although most Americans are understandably focused on the coronavirus pandemic and consequent economic crisis, several intensifying controversies demonstrate how bitterly divided national politics remain. Take, for instance, the saga of Gen Michael Flynn who faces criminal charges for lying to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

He grew close to Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential election campaign, and was one of his first appointees when named national security adviser on January 23, 2017. But by February 13, he was gone. Mr Trump said he reluctantly had to dismiss him for lying to Vice President Mike Pence and the FBI about a conversation he had with the then Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak while Barack Obama was still president. Prosecutors say he also lied about lobbying on behalf of Turkey.

Yet, as Gen Flynn has faced criminal charges, Mr Trump has been thoroughly siding with him and strongly criticizing his own prosecutors.

The case illustrates how irreconcilable Democratic and Republican worldviews have become, and how, even after more than three years in power, Mr Trump continues to position himself as a political outsider.

Democrats see an arrogant and lawless enabler of Mr Trump lying to everyone in sight, for reasons that remain suspiciously murky, about his conversations with the Russians. It sums up much of what they dislike and distrust most about Mr Trump, and their continued suspicions about unsavory, and possibly illegal, Russian connections.

Republicans, however, see a patriotic, loyal Trump ally being ruthlessly persecuted by unelected, out-of-control bureaucrats who are ideologically opposed to Mr Trump and his “America First” agenda, and are willing to stop at nothing to bring down his administration. To them, this is just one of many scandalous and continuous “deep state” conspiracies against the President, especially the Robert Mueller investigation into the last election and his impeachment over dealings with Ukraine regarding the upcoming election.

The Democrats’ perspective has been consistently reinforced by Gen Flynn’s criminal prosecution, especially his guilty plea on felony charges of lying to the FBI. However, when prosecutors recommended a six-month sentence, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, implying that the government had promised him more leniency. Sentencing has been indefinitely postponed, while Gen Flynn has been receiving increased support from Mr Trump and Attorney General William Barr.

Last week, his lawyers announced they had uncovered a “smoking gun” confirming their deep state conspiracy theory. A set of FBI documents, including working notes in preparation for their interview with Gen Flynn, were released. They include passages many Republicans insist demonstrate outrageous bias and vindicate his claims to have been framed by the police.

One handwritten note asks: “What is our goal? Truth/admission or to get him to lie, so we can prosecute him or get him fired?” Gen Flynn’s supporters argue that this rhetorical question, which seems phrased in a way that can only be plausibly answered with the initial “truth” option, nonetheless demonstrates that he was “entrapped” by the authorities. But the document ultimately concludes that the FBI should be careful to “protect our institution by not playing games” with him.

An even deeper weakness with the “set up” story is that Gen Flynn was not a clueless naif or confused teenager. He is the former head of US military intelligence. He knew that the government routinely records telephone conversations of the Russian ambassador and that the FBI fully understood he was lying to other officials when he denied that the conversation was mainly about new sanctions by the Obama administration on Moscow – a possible violation of the Logan Act, a seldom-invoked law prohibiting private individuals from interfering with foreign policy.

Gen Flynn says he did not intentionally deceive Mr Pence, the FBI and others because he “forgot” the substance of this quite recent and highly sensitive phone call. But he could have simply said he did not remember, or that he would have to check the records, or even invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Instead, he flatly denied they discussed what was, in fact, their main topic. Why he did that remains an open, and at least to Democrats, highly suggestive question.

The entire right-wing political ecosystem is up in arms over the revelations. Many conservatives, including Mr Trump’s son Donald Jr, have even suggested the FBI agents in question should somehow be the ones facing prison.

Yet, there is no actual evidence that the FBI tried to induce or trick Gen Flynn into lying to them, or any reason to believe they could have done so even if they tried. Calling this “entrapment” may play well with a partisan Republican audience, but it is never going to fly in a court of law in which the issue will remain Gen Flynn’s unlawful deceptions, not these (fundamentally normative rather than unusual) police tactics. One cannot, after all, “frame” a guilty defendant.

But what can happen is a presidential pardon from Mr Trump. In numerous tweets, he has been preparing the public for this, and the Republican response appears aimed at justifying it before the fact.

At a deeper level, this controversy – like increasingly heated arguments about social restrictions regarding the coronavirus – illustrates how Mr Trump tries to be both the head of government and the leader of the opposition simultaneously.

He issued national guidelines for social distancing, yet he has sided with angry and armed protesters who have denounced them. His own Justice Department is prosecuting Gen Flynn, while he indignantly complains about an appalling miscarriage of justice.

Time and again, Mr Trump reveals that he is fundamentally uncomfortable with responsibility and prefers condemning his own government, and even his own stated positions. It is a difficult two-step maneuver and underscores that he relishes campaigning far more than he does governing.

Mr Trump is seeking re-election as a political outsider while Democrats try to return him to the literal, and not just rhetorical, sidelines. At least until November, Mr Trump will continue to incongruously oscillate between the unprecedented “total authority” he often claims as President while simultaneously denouncing not just his opponents but his agencies, his officials and even some of his own policies.