Sectarian political structures will undermine the secular demands raised in mass demonstrations.
Lebanon and Iraq are the Arab countries most disfigured by highly sectarian politics, and not coincidentally, dominated by Iran. So it is reassuring, even inspiring, that the mass protests rocking both countries are entirely secular in character.
Alas, they are probably doomed to fail. The protesters, lacking both organization and a programmatic agenda, have little chance of altering the political structures in both countries, which are entirely sectarian. To protect Iran’s influence, its proxies in both countries are reacting with threats and violence. In the recent history of rebellions in the neighborhood are any guide, the sectarian establishment will ride out the demonstrations, and hijack any concessions the protesters secure from the power-centers in Beirut and Baghdad.
Structural change needs a broad-based, organized and focused political movement that pursues not just better living standards but inclusive and tolerant national unity, as opposed to communal and transnational identities that outsiders easily exploit. It needs an identifiable and accountable political leadership that represents its base, negotiates with other groups and can engage in electoral politics. This is not what is happening in Lebanon and Iraq.
In Lebanon, the protesters have come from every religious community and walk of life, voicing unanimous rage against years of mismanagement, the lack of basic services and a looming economic catastrophe. They have aimed their wrath at their own confessional leaders, with Shiites denouncing Hezbollah, Christians railing against President Michel Aoun, and Sunnis blaming Prime Minister Saad Hariri for the sorry mess.
In Iraq, the protests were largely restricted to Shiite-majority cities like Baghdad and Basra. They have not spread to the Sunni-majority areas in the west, or to the Kurdish provinces in the north, both of which have different priorities. The Sunnis are still recovering from the depredations of the Islamic State, and the Kurds are preoccupied with building their own quasi-independent enclave.
But where the Shiite-led Iraqi government rules most directly, it now faces the anger of the majority sect, especially from unemployed youths. Shiites have not only condemned their political leadership, they have specifically linked their grievances—rampant corruption, poor services, unemployment—to Iranian meddling.
The reaction of Tehran’s local clients has been predictable. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has issued dire threats, sought to cow politicians and deployed mobs of counter-demonstrators to intimidate the protesters. To their credit, the Lebanese army has beaten back the motorcycle-riding thugs—for now. In Iraq, the reaction has been far more violent. Over 150 protesters have been killed, many by snipers; even the government admits that its security forces and pro-Iranian militias used excessive force.
Iraq remains tense, even though the protests have died down somewhat. In Lebanon, the demonstrations continue unabated.
But the spontaneity and momentum of these uprisings protests cannot mask their basic weakness: the protesters have no clear political goals, only socioeconomic demands. Most likely, they will eventually tire and be placated by promises of reform—of the kind announced by Hariri’s government—that will either go entirely unfulfilled, or be coopted by the usual process of patronage and corruption by existing elites.
That’s exactly what happened in the countries that experienced the Arab Spring protests. With the exception of Tunisia, they all failed to produce the democratic reforms demanded. Instead, they degenerated into tussles of power between the existing elites and Muslim Brotherhood parties. Eventually, the Islamists proved too unpopular to defeat what amounted to the old regimes posing in new garb.
That same dynamic is likely to thwart the aspirations of the Lebanese and Iraqi protesters. Because their protests are not an organized revolution, but rather a popular rebellion, their secular sentiments, no matter how widespread, are unlikely to prevail over entrenched sectarian power structures.
In both countries, sectarianism is hardwired into the underlying political structures—and in Lebanon, into the constitutional order. Lebanese politics are almost entirely confessional, with top jobs such as the presidency, premiership, and military and central-bank leadership reserved for particular sects, and almost all parliamentary seats allocated on ethnic or religious lines. In Iraq, an ethno-sectarian quota system similarly reserves key jobs for Shiites, Sunnis, Turkmen and Kurds respectively, and an informal communal patronage system takes care of the rest.
The protesters may be unhappy with this state of affairs, but they have not defined what they would like to see in its stead, much less demonstrated the ability to force a change.
In Lebanon, no one has envisioned a practical alternative to the prevailing confessional system, so the most that will be accomplished politically is a warning to Hezbollah of its growing unpopularity. Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s leader, must know now that he can no longer escape blame for the failure of the state. In Iraq, Shiite sectarian leaders are on notice that they must perform better. But there’s no real pressure on them to be more inclusive.
Some concessions on socioeconomic issues are likely—such as telecommunication privatization and tax reform in Lebanon, and jobs programs and unemployment stipends in Iraq. But eventually any benefits accruing from reforms will almost certainly be folded into the existing systems of patronage controlled by the corrupt, self-serving and sectarian powers.
Because there is no other system in these societies, the sectarian blob will eventually swallow everything it encounters.
And as long as Iran dominates Lebanon and Iraq, its proxies will vigorously—and if need be, violently—defend sectarian identity politics, ensuring that communal disharmony trumps the impulse for national unity among the Lebanese and Iraqi peoples.