https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/despite-trump-s-cries-of-victory-no-one-emerged-a-winner-from-mueller-s-testimony-1.891441

Those hoping for impeachment were let down, while the damning facts about the president were confirmed

The highly anticipated testimony by special counsel Robert Mueller, at two hearings on Wednesday, established no new facts and changed almost no minds about Donald Trump’s conduct. It greatly bolstered the position of the Democratic Party leadership that a drive to impeach Mr Trump now would be a mistake and that the focus should be on the 2020 election.

Mr Trump crowed with victory, but he clearly was not a winner. Mr Mueller confirmed a litany of damning facts, most notably that Russia systematically interfered with the 2016 election on behalf of Mr Trump, and that he welcomed this intervention, then lied about it, including under oath. And he dismissed Mr Trump’s claims of “complete exoneration, suggesting he could be prosecuted after leaving office.

Anyone backing impeachment was obviously a big loser. Inexplicably, some hoped for a blockbuster “made-for-TV” moment that would suddenly and powerfully dramatise the president’s misdeeds for the public.

They were never going to get that.

Mr Mueller practically begged Congress not to make him testify, insisting that he would not go further than confirming what was in his report. True to his word, he refused to offer anything that might contribute to a partisan agenda on either side, generally restricted himself to yes or no answers, and simply reiterated that everything in his report was accurate.

This was widely viewed as a bumbling and incompetent performance. But, whatever its flaws, it was true to his stated intention to remain an impartial and thoroughly professional prosecutor. He did not breathe life into his report as many had hoped. But Mr Mueller had made it clear long in advance that he did not consider that his role, and he refused to change his mind.

The big winner clearly was House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who has been restraining her overzealous colleagues, including Judiciary Committee chairman Jerry Nadler, from launching formal impeachment hearings against Mr Trump.

Even if a more effusive performance by Mr Mueller would not have convinced much of the public or any Republican lawmakers to back such an inquiry, it might have intensified pressure on Democratic leaders to charge in this quixotic direction.

In the event, Ms Pelosi, Intelligence Committee chairman Adam Schiff and other key Democrats claimed vindication for caution about impeachment and focusing on the upcoming election.

Moreover, impeachment proponents are simply running out of time before the next election.

Ms Pelosi and her allies generally rely on two arguments against an immediate impeachment inquiry: that most of the public, including most Democrats, don’t yet support it, and that there is no Republican support either, meaning that any impeachment would result in an acquittal in the Republican-controlled Senate.

These are good arguments, but the idea that there is insufficient public support could be countered by noting that, without an impeachment inquiry, the public will not have heard the facts yet. There was little public support for the impeachment inquiry regarding Richard Nixon until that brought out the details of his corruption.

The strongest case, though, against impeachment is only whispered, and centres on the fact that no one can be confident Mr Trump will not be re-elected next year.

Imagine Mr Trump impeached, acquitted and then re-elected. The only real obstacle before him at that point would be a four-year term limit. Other than that, it might be a terrifying new version of Mr Trump, thoroughly unrestrained.

It’s not a coincidence that both of the serious impeachment efforts In the past century, against Nixon and Bill Clinton, occurred in their second terms.

If Mr Trump is re-elected, and there is still a Democratic majority in the House, which appears likely, then a thoroughgoing set of impeachment-related hearings might make sense.

Even if there is a Republican Senate, if the facts uncovered are grave enough, it could shift opinion, as happened with Nixon.

However, until then it would be madness to squander the potential for an impeachment push when it is likely to fail and when Mr Trump could well be defeated at the polls.

Far wiser to keep that powder dry for a second, and far more ominous, Trump term.

Now, centrist Democrats will have to prevent their party’s most left-wing members from dragging the presidential nominee too far in their political direction on two key issues that Mr. Trump hopes to exploit for re-election.

He wants to campaign on race, and is using immigration as a proxy for white communal interests. Most Americans still favour immigration and are appalled by his brutal tactics, such as separating children from their parents. They want humane and fair border security.

But some Democrats are overreacting by threatening to abolish immigration agencies and giving the impression that they favour open borders. The party as a whole certainly doesn’t, and has just approved almost $5 billion more for border security.

It is essential that the Democratic candidate does not appear to be an extremist polar opposite of Mr Trump on immigration. Balance is vital.

Similarly, the push for universal healthcare coverage is crucial, but proposing that all private insurance policies will be eliminated by a comprehensive single-payer system will not play well.

By adopting moderate positions on immigration and healthcare, and abandoning immediate impeachment, Democrats will be well positioned for 2020.

The Mueller hearings have been extremely helpful in focusing them on their real task.

https://agsiw.org/conflict-or-compromise-u-s-and-iran-on-a-knifes-edge/

Whatever the path out of the current crisis, Gulf Arab states seeking an end to Iranian interference in regional affairs are likely to be disappointed.

The simmering confrontation between the United States and Iran is delicately poised on a knife’s edge between an emerging bargain and steadily mounting potential for direct armed conflict. The ongoing de facto war of attrition with a “maximum pressure” sanctions regime being countered by “maximum resistance” low-intensity military provocations could grind on for months, assuming commanders in the field do not overstep or make a mistake that ignites an open conflict. But eventually a fork in the road will be reached. The logic of confrontation, if continued indefinitely, leads sooner rather than later to a military clash. Since neither side wants even a limited war, however, the potential for an agreement is clearly emerging. Almost all elements are in place for both scenarios, with conflict and accommodation appearing almost equally plausible and imaginable – a most unusual circumstance in international relations. Yet the key reality for the Gulf Arab countries, especially those most antagonistic toward Iran – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain – is that neither scenario is likely to deal with their greatest concern: the growth of Iranian hegemony in the Arab world and Iran’s use of nonstate proxies and clients to destabilize its neighbors and spread its influence throughout the region.

The Logic of Confrontation
Since President Donald J. Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or nuclear agreement, the confrontation between the United States and Iran has gradually escalated. Washington has waged an aggressive campaign of “maximum pressure,” mainly in the form of sanctions and financial warfare, against Iran. Tehran, finding itself increasingly boxed in by an ever-constricting economic vice, has responded with a carefully calibrated program of “maximum resistance,” especially in the form of low-intensity and sometimes deniable attacks on commercial and military assets in the Gulf region.

While it is widely assumed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has coordinated or conducted these attacks, it has been careful not to cross any redline that would necessitate a military response. Tankers have been sabotaged with limpet mines but only above the waterline and none have been sunk. A British-owned tanker was seized but Iranian officials said this was in retaliation for Britain’s seizure of an Iranian shipment of oil off the coast of Gibraltar allegedly destined for Syria in violation of European Union sanctions. Iran has suggested an exchange of the ships to resolve the issue. Iran shot down a U.S. drone, which it claims was in Iranian airspace, but both Iranian and U.S. officials noted that Tehran did not attempt to down any U.S. aircraft with personnel aboard.

Lacking any leverage with Washington of its own, but unable to sustain the intense economic damage being wrought by sanctions, Iran’s aim has been to try to force U.S. allies and trade partners to intercede with Washington and loosen the financial stranglehold. Iran has pressured these countries with threats to maritime security in the Gulf region and potential disruptions to the free flow of Gulf energy exports. With European signatories committed to trying to preserve the JCPOA, Iran has used the confrontation as a rationale for abandoning its own commitments, first by increasing stockpiles of low-enriched uranium and then by increasing the enrichmentprogram itself. It is threatening a full “hard exit” from the deal and even hinting at abandoning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the first step toward the open development of a nuclear weapon.

Iran’s actions to date make it likely that Gulf Arab countries would be prime targets in any tit-for-tat exchange of military attacks. In particular, attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure gave the most direct hint of what might be expected in the context of a full-blown military conflict. And while the Gulf Arab countries welcomed the “maximum pressure” campaign, none of their governments want a military conflict, hoping the aggressive U.S. strategy toward Iran will achieve the desired change of behavior. At a minimum, sanctions have started to deprive Iran of resourcesto feed to its network of nonstate clients, militias, and extremist groups throughout the region. Short of that, many of the Gulf Arab countries were hoping that “maximum pressure” would at least yield a policy of containment, limiting Iran’s ability to continue to spread its hegemony and opening space for rolling back some of the strategic gains it has accumulated over the past 15 years.

Thus far, Iran’s strategy to counter this pressure has not worked. The United States’ European and Arab allies have not strongly lobbied Washington to ease the sanctions, and international energy markets have remained relatively calm in the face of Iran’s threats to international shipping in the Gulf and Red Sea. Trump has not been baited into an overreaction to Iranian provocations, particularly a military response that the international community would regard as disproportionate and reckless. He has even dismissed Iran’s suspected sabotage of commercial tankers as “very minor.” And he made a big production of ordering and then dramatically calling off at the last minute a missile strike aimed at Iranian targets in retaliation for the drone attack.

If Tehran was counting on Trump to overreact, it must be gravely disappointed. Washington has made clear that the killing of any American would cross a redline requiring a direct kinetic response, but Tehran was already taking great pains to avoid any action that would likely appear to the international community to justify a U.S. military response. Still, “maximum resistance” has not yet produced any breathing space for Iran or its economy. Therefore, the logic of confrontation, if it continues to unfold, dictates not only continued Iranian provocations but gradually intensified ones. If Iran’s actions thus far have been insufficient to prompt a U.S. overreaction or an intervention by Washington’s allies to force Trump to ease the pressure on Iran, more of the same is unlikely to suffice. Yet continued intensification could well lead, sooner rather than later, to a direct clash that neither side wants.

The Logic of Accommodation
As a consequence, the potential for an accommodation that reduces the likelihood of direct military conflict has been developing despite the bellicosity. From the outset, Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and other administration officials have insisted that their goal has been the negotiation of a “better deal” with Iran. The Iranian leadership initially reacted to mounting U.S. pressure with outrage and ruled out any new negotiations on nuclear and other issues with Washington and especially with Trump himself. Yet as pressure has mounted and “maximum resistance” has failed to yield any results, Iran’s position has been notably softening.

Tehran has clearly abandoned its insistence that any dialogue must begin with the United States rejoining the JCPOA. Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, has repeatedly said that Iran is willing to have a dialogue with the United States as long as Tehran is treated “with respect,” and Iran’s president has made the same offer if sanctions are lifted. Washington also appears to have tacitly acknowledged that the expansive list of 12 demands on Tehran presented by Pompeo in May 2018 were a wish list and opening bargaining position. In recent weeks, Trump has said he is not interested in regime change in Tehran, only in curbing its nuclear agenda, and Pompeo repeatedly has said Washington is willing to negotiate with Iran without preconditions.

On July 18, Washington and Tehran took the first tentative steps toward direct dialogue when Zarif met in New York with Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, a key Trump ally in Congress and a leading neo-isolationist. From this tentative beginning, the outlines of a potential agreement are becoming dimly visible. In effect, such an agreement would mimic several of the trade deals Trump has secured, such as the pending renegotiated NAFTA agreement with Canada and Mexico. In this template, existing accords, which Trump passionately denounces as “the worst ever,” of which the JCPOA and NAFTA are key examples, are effectively tweaked, updated, renamed, and then pronounced “the best ever.” This model suggests Trump might be open to a kind of JCPOA 2.0, a renegotiated version of the nuclear agreement that deals with several of the flaws its critics identified from the beginning, such as relatively short sunsets, but is still largely restricted to the nuclear issue.

Zarif publicly suggested that Iran might be open to precisely such a renegotiated JCPOA-plus, telling reporters that Iran could speed up its formal ratification of the deal’s “Additional Protocol,” that allows for international nuclear inspectors to have extensive access in Iran. Since Iran already abides by the protocol, though its Parliament has not ratified it, critics have dismissed this offer as insubstantial. The additional protocol offer, however, is a hint of what might be possible under the right circumstances and shows a willingness to barter concessions, at least in theory.

Assuming both sides resolve to craft a revised agreement, the biggest obstacles are likely to be the vexed question of Iran’s “right to enrich” uranium and its missile program. The turning point that led to the achievement of the JCPOA was the acknowledgment by the administration of President Barack Obama that any agreement would need to recognize Iran’s right to enrich, as the agreement did under limited and highly controlled circumstances. The Trump administration has not opined in detail on this issue, but it has certainly given the impression that it wishes to eliminate such a supposed right. However, if the 10 to 15-year sunsets in the JCPOA on limitations on Iranian enrichment and processing were extended or made permanent in any new agreement, the Trump administration could well agree to some enrichment in practice. Such a reversal has been seen in negotiations with North Korea: The administration began by insisting on a “complete, verifiable, irreversible” nuclear disarmament by Pyongyang, rejecting North Korea’s preference for a phased process, and now appears to accept that this is the only way to make progress.

Tehran presumably does not want any new understanding to address the missile issue. Even though Trump, Pompeo, and others have lambasted the JCPOA for not restricting Iran’s missile development and testing, they could still argue that as long as any new accord effectively eliminates the potential for Iran developing a nuclear warhead any time in the foreseeable future, conventionally armed missile development by Tehran can be adequately countered with missile defense systems and by deterrence from U.S., Arab, and Israeli missile arsenals and other means of counterattack. So, although Washington is likely to try to put the missile issue on the table in any substantial talks with Iran, failure to achieve that may not prove a deal breaker.

“Malign Activities” and “Regime Change”
The painful truth for the Gulf Arab countries is that neither of these scenarios is likely to adequately address their main concern regarding Iran: its “malign activities” in the Middle East, particularly destabilizing its neighbors by funding and arming nonstate militias. This has been a key feature of U.S. and Israeli criticism of Iran as well and is prominently represented in critiques of the JCPOA and in Pompeo’s 12-point agenda. However, when Trump declared that he is not interested in regime change in Tehran, that may have implied a recognition that forcing Iran to abandon such conduct completely probably is not achievable through “maximum pressure,” a view that National Security Advisor John Bolton does not share. The Trump administration may be confronting the reality the Obama administration accepted in the run-up to the nuclear deal – that while an accommodation with Tehran on nuclear issues is possible there is virtually no chance that the Islamic Republic will abandon policies that are both the core of its national security agenda and a key part of its foundational raison d’etre.

Iran’s support for armed nonstate groups such as Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, and the Houthis, among others, are the centerpiece of Iran’s regional and national security policy. Such groups are the primary means through which Iran spreads its influence, weakens its local adversaries, and acquires strategic depth. It allows Iran to engage in armed conflicts with its antagonists entirely outside of its own borders and largely without using its own citizens and personnel (with the partial exception of the intervention in Syria). This also supplies it with a degree of deniability and the rationalization that it is only supporting groups fighting to defend themselves and secure their legitimate rights within their own country. Despite its deep cynicism, it has the patina of a moral agenda for certain audiences. Moreover, many of these groups are deeply motivated by sectarian and religious passions, which Iran exploits to secure zealousness in combat and, in many cases, a highly regimented obedience to Iran’s leadership and, therefore, foreign policy agenda.

Iran is playing a very effective game that Tehran’s regional adversaries generally seek to avoid, and therefore have great difficulty countering. This is amplified in that Iran’s goals in most cases involve disrupting the status quo and destabilizing neighboring states and societies. Therefore, even when nonstate allies such as the Houthis fail to fully implement Iran’s suggestions, their activities are still almost always a net benefit to Iran because they contribute to the overall promotion of disruption and disorder.

By leading this effort since the founding of the Islamic Republic, the IRGC has risen to a place of remarkable prominence. Particularly in the past 15 years, the IRGC, especially the Quds force that oversees these proxy militias and Iranian expeditions abroad, has been at the forefront of Iran’s transformation from an isolated and contained pariah during the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent era of dual containment into a budding regional hegemon. Iran now has tremendous influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and beyond. As a consequence of this centrality to Iran’s growing power, the IRGC has concomitantly developed into a major economic and political force within Iran.

All of this has emerged against the backdrop of the revolutionary ideology that underpins the Islamic Republic, and the founding imperative of exporting the revolution and establishing Iran’s supposedly rightful place as the leader of the entire Islamic world and a major global force on behalf of the downtrodden. The policy therefore has the triple protection of being a foundational ideological commitment, the main and highly effective tool of national security and foreign policy, and the institutional bedrock for one of the most powerful factions within the state and society.

That’s why demands for Iran to abandon these policies are regarded as tantamount to calls for regime change. Any Iranian regime that did not pursue such a policy, even if it were still packaged under the brand of the Islamic Republic, would be, in effect, a new regime. The Obama administration recognized that and eventually secured its nuclear-only agreement with Tehran.

Even if a new agreement moves forward, then, the core Gulf Arab concerns regarding Iran are not going to be practically resolved, even if there is a fig leaf of pledges to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Iran’s neighbors. “Malign activities” will almost certainly continue, at least in an attenuated fashion, and could be ramped up at any moment. Similarly, in the event of a conflict, unless it somehow leads to the collapse of the Iranian regime or the full-scale invasion of Iran by the United States (both of which are exceedingly unlikely), that is likely to intensify Iran’s use of and reliance on nonstate militias. They would be a key weapon in Iran’s counterattacks against U.S. interests in the region, the Gulf Arab countries themselves, and conceivably even Israel.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and others are therefore probably going to have to look beyond the current confrontation for a long-term solution to the problem of Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Arab world. Neither plausible scenario, a conflict or an accommodation, is likely to resolve their fundamental concerns about Iran’s regional role over the long run. The best-case scenario from their point of view would be a continuation of the current situation – a slowly developing process of containment of Iran. But for that to really address Tehran’s “malign activities” it would require a level of U.S. regional military engagement, particularly in countries like Iraq and Syria, that appears unlikely. Worse, the current situation may not prove sustainable for much longer. Whether a clash or a deal ultimately develops, Gulf Arab countries may find themselves still facing a hostile Iranian regime that is ready, willing, and able to use armed nonstate groups, terrorism, and a campaign of widespread destabilization in the Arab world to try to advance its interests.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/trump-s-go-home-comments-present-republicans-with-a-stark-choice-1.888786

Members of the GOP must now must adopt or accommodate the US president’s racial attitudes – or leave

Donald Trump is determined to make 2020 the “send her back” election. That ugly taunt is shaping up to be the defining slogan of his campaign.

The US president has moved dramatically to solidify his position as the champion of white Christian Americans. Moreover, he is forcing many apprehensive Republicans to go beyond coded dogwhistles and embrace his openly strident white nationalism.

Mr Trump has looking for a target to replace his 2016 opponent, Hillary Clinton.

Last week, he found them in a squabble between House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and four newly elected Democratic congresswomen, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Rashida Tlaib and Ayanna Pressley.

Ms Pelosi dismissed challenges to her authority and the Democratic Party leadership by these young left-wing lawmakers. They in turn accused her of marginalising women of colour.

Mr Trump immediately smelled blood.

Despite being no fan of Ms Pelosi, Mr Trump insisted that she is not a racist, even though the young Democrats never directly accused her of that. He even seemed to be using her as a proxy for himself.

The four women are ideal targets for his politics of rage: they are stridently left wing, young, female, non-white, and, best of all for his purposes, in the cases of Ms Omar and Ms Tlaib, Muslim.

That places them far outside the normative American identity Mr Trump believes to be under attack. They typify the diverse new society he hates and fears.

He unleashed a series of largely false Twitter attacks against them, even demanding they “go back” to “the countries” they came from, though only Ms Omar is an immigrant.

The age-old taunt of “go back” to “where you came from” is the quintessence of US intolerance.

Mr Trump’s own Equal Opportunity Employment Commission identifies this as an exemplary form of unlawful harassment based on national origin.

In the private sector, anyone saying this would be immediately sacked. It has been unacceptable for decades.

“Mr Trump is determined to bitterly divide the country. His eventual opponent’s best bet is uniting it.”

At a North Carolina rally on Thursday, the president denounced the congresswomen as “anti-American,” despite his own extraordinary history of denouncing other presidents, the FBI, CIA, Congress, courts, the press and many other core national institutions – not to mention his fawning over such hostile dictators as Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un.

When he targeted Ms Omar, the crowd erupted in chants of “send her back,” echoing the campaign mantra “lock her up” which was used against Mrs Clinton. The president beamed.

Mr Trump and his base evidently believe that only they are “real Americans,” entitled to howl about everything they dislike, while people of colour are citizens only under the sufferance of white Christian Americans and cannot assert contrary views without being treasonous.

Congressional Republicans publicly defended the president but privately expressed alarm at the depth of the racism beginning to characterise his re-election campaign. They are used to Mr Trump’s antics, but were taken aback to see them taken up by large crowds and redefining the party ethos.

They convinced Mr Trump to claim he did not like the chant and that he moved quickly to stop it, although video evidence refutes that.

This limited retreat lasted less than 24 hours.

By Friday, Mr Trump was back to extolling the “tremendous patriotism” of the crowd and retweeting comments by a notorious british anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim extremist praising the chant.

This clarifies several things.

Mr Trump and the Republican Party are running the next election mainly on race, championing white Christian Americans against others.

The uneasy coexistence of the traditional, conservative Republican Party and Mr Trump’s essentially white nationalist movement is over. Republicans now must adopt or accommodate his racial attitudes or, like the Palestinian-American congressman Justin Amash, leave the party on principle.

Most Republican officials want Mr Trump to run his campaign on the current strength of the US economy. But the truth is that he inherited sustained growth from Barack Obama, and it could slow, or even tank, in coming months. Besides, Mr Trump is clearly determined to double down on the racial politics that secured his 2016 victory.

This is the game he wants to play and, at this stage, the genie probably cannot be put back in the bottle. Expect to hear regular chants of “send her back” from now on.

Some Democrats, like the young congresswomen, may also welcome an identity-based fight. Unlike Ms Pelosi, who is fixated on defeating Mr Trump in 2020, Ms Ocasio-Cortez, Ms Omar, Ms Tlaib and Ms Pressley have a much longer-term agenda to push their party to the left and secure control of it. For them, 2020 is just the start.

But to defeat Mr Trump, Democrats should avoid fighting on his terms. Far better to focus on the interests of all middle and working-class voters, for example regarding healthcare and income.

Mr Trump is determined to bitterly divide the country. His eventual opponent’s best bet is uniting it with a programme to improve the lives of ordinary people and counter tribal chauvinism with genuine, inclusive patriotism.

Naturally, Mr Trump wants to run against these women as a proxy for all the social and demographic changes he and his supporters so fear. And until the Democrats have a nominee, he can pretend that he is.

Eventually he will face a real adversary who cannot be told to “go back to the country you came from”. And with the right approach, that person should be able to send him back to Manhattan.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/trump-s-social-media-summit-reveals-a-new-and-darkly-authoritarian-post-truth-information-order-1.886032

The first Twitter President still feels persecuted by the very online platforms he exploits.

Donald Trump is obviously the first Twitter president in US history. As Franklin D Roosevelt perfected the use of radio and John F Kennedy television as instruments of governance, Mr Trump has made social media the tool of a new style of outreach to the public.

Yet he has a love-hate relationship with the social media he relies on, because he and his supporters have made an art form of playing fast and loose with the truth, norms and even rules.

They’re right to feel vulnerable about being able to sustain such conduct. Some of the most extreme, like Alex Jones of Infowars, are finally being banned from various online platforms for consistent racism, incitement to violence and libelous conspiracy theories.

Mr Trump’s political mentor, Roy Cohn, preached a doctrine of denial, evasion and constant attack, and his best student unwaveringly follows his playbook.

So, now that his far-right supporters are finally faced with red lines on hate speech by social media companies, Mr Trump decided to counterattack.

On Thursday, in the most outlandish circus ever held at the White House and its stately Rose Garden, the president convened a menagerie of 200 internet provocateurs at a “social media summit”. Social media companies themselves were, naturally, not invited.

The worst of the worst were not present, but the guest list was largely composed of conspiracy theorists, hate-mongers and slime-throwers, there to simultaneously celebrate and castigate the social media in which they thrive.

Mr Trump was in his element, having risen to political prominence as the loudest proponent of the conspiracy theory that Barack Obama was not born in the United States, and therefore was an illegitimate president.

Mr Trump set the tone, celebrating his mastery of Twitter, marveling at its power, and boasting about the ease with which he uses it to dominate news cycles. He even boasted about the effectiveness of his Tweets, falsely accusing Mr Obama of having wiretapped Trump Tower during the 2016 election campaign.

Like his guests, Mr Trump values social media, particularly Twitter, precisely because it lends itself so readily to the propagation of such falsehoods – stories that would never be lent credibility by the mainstream news media. Mr Trump and his coterie were clear that they view social media as a corrective to the “fake news” of actual fact-based reportage.

“The crap you think of is unbelievable,” Mr Trump told the assembled provocateurs, obviously intending a compliment.

Since the Roy Cohn playbook holds that attack is the best form of defense, although they rely on Twitter and Facebook, Mr Trump and his far-right minions have been increasingly complaining that these companies have an anti-conservative bias.

Not only is there no evidence of that, it is both obvious and empirically verified that conservatives have been much more effective in going viral on these platforms than liberals.

The point of these groundless complaints is to stave off any additional efforts to curtail hate speech, conspiracy theories and the deliberate spreading of libelous falsehoods.

Twitter even recently decreed that, owing to public interest in their pronouncements, world leaders such as Mr Trump could break their rules without risking suspension, although offending tweets might be labelled as such.

There is also a struggle in the courts over whether politicians such as Mr Trump can block other users based on their political views. A judge recently ruled that, because the president uses Twitter as a public forum for governance, he can’t.

Now, Mr Trump waxes furious at the idea that, even though he governs by Tweet, he is not allowed to block people who disagree with him, while simultaneously denouncing social media companies for supposedly discriminating against his allies because of their own political beliefs.

Mr Trump directly threatened legal protections for fact-based reportage, saying: “Free speech is not when you see something good and then you purposefully write bad. To me, that’s very dangerous speech and you become angry at it. But that’s not free speech.”

He also vowed to “explore all regulatory and legislative solutions” to control social media.

The president insisted he would have been elected without Twitter, but that cannot be known. He is the Twitter president, using social media with unprecedented effectiveness while castigating it as biased against him.

Sure, these are mutually exclusive thoughts, but that’s the beauty of narratives that can reach the public directly at an emotional level, without any effective fact checking by actual journalists.

Mr Trump was partly trying to distract attention from his final surrender on the issue of adding a citizenship question to the upcoming census.

But he was also certainly trying to protect the strong advantage he and his troll army gain from social media by condemning it in advance of any pushback.

This adds up to a clear vision of a darkly authoritarian, post-truth new American information order that may never be born, but is clearly gestating in the right-wing womb.

So is the idea, which Mr Trump keeps “joking” about – on Twitter, naturally – that he will be president long after constitutional term limits, if not for life.

Neither are likely, but anyone who thinks the president and his allies are just kidding about any of this is being pathetically naive

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-12/qatar-juggles-alliances-with-iran-turkey-and-the-u-s

How a tiny Middle East emirate preserves its alliances with Iran, Turkey and the U.S., even as those powers tear at each others’ throats.

This week’s visit to Washington by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, including an appointment with President Donald Trump at the White House, is the latest performance of the most delicate high-wire act in international politics.

Isolated by its neighbors, Qatar is improbably balancing friendships with the three contesting powers in the Middle East: the U.S., Turkey and Iran. In a Venn diagram of Middle Eastern strategic relationships, Qatar would account for most of the heavily shaded areas.

It’s being boycotted by Egypt and three of its Gulf Arab neighbors — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain — which accuse the tiny emirate of sponsoring extremist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

The boycott hasn’t changed Qatar’s policies, but it has made it rely more on the support of regional powers. And while the U.S., Turkey and Iran all offer crucial forms of support, Qatar is also striving to offer up crucial benefits in return.

The key relationship for Qatar’s security is with Washington. That partnership is centered on the al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which hosts 10,000 U.S. troops and the forward operating headquarters of U.S. Central Command.

Al-Udeid has the only regional runways capable of handling B-52 bombers, which means there aren’t any obvious alternatives nearby. Moreover, the Qataris were so keen on bringing the U.S. military into their country for their own security that they not only financed and constructed the base, they essentially gave the U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction over it, allowing it to function almost as sovereign U.S. territory.

The U.A.E. has encouraged the U.S. to relocate its Central Command headquarters there, but there’s no chance the Emiratis would agree to such extraordinary terms.

Since the boycott began in the summer of 2017, Qatar has been agreeing to virtually everything Washington has asked of it, ranging from agreements on curbing terrorism financing to capitulating on a civil aviation dispute, agreeing to massive new contracts for U.S. military and commercial goods and services and upgrading and expanding the air base.

Moreover, Qatar has been trying to frame its good relations with radical groups as an asset for the U.S., even as other Gulf states complain about them. With Israel’s encouragement, it has been providing Hamas with cash payments on a quarterly basis to meet payroll in Gaza. And it recently hosted what might prove to be a breakthrough negotiation between the Taliban and members of the Afghan government.

During his Washington trip, the Qatari leader reportedly offered to be a go-between with Iran but said the U.S. didn’t appear interested since it wants to apply further sanctions on a country it regards as a rogue state.

Since the boycott began, Qatar has failed to get the U.S. to intervene on its behalf, but has successfully consolidated its relationship with Washington.

This has occurred despite a spike in tensions between the U.S. and Qatar’s other major partner, Turkey. Turkey’s efforts to purchase Russian S-400 missiles are only a symptom of a deeper rift with the U.S. as Turkey begins to try to assert itself as a major Middle Eastern power.

The irony is that Qatar is Turkey’s main partner in this effort, since the two countries are the founding members of a coalition that primarily backs Sunni Islamist groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus far, the U.S. has preferred to ignore this aspect of Qatar’s regional agenda, but if Turkey continues its regional ascent, that might not continue.

The contradiction is even stronger with the third major Middle East power, Iran, with which Qatar must maintain good relations. Almost all its income comes from a natural gas field it shares with Iran. And since the boycott, it has depended on Iranian airspace overflight rights to keep its airline viable and itself widely internationally accessible.

Despite the boycott, Qatar was included in Gulf, Arab League and Islamic “emergency meetings” that Saudi Arabia organized on May 30 as the confrontation with Iran boiled over. The Qataris seemed to go along with a joint statement criticizing Iran’s regional policies, which suggested potential progress in healing the Gulf Arab rift.

But the next day, Doha stepped away from many of the criticisms of Iran, underscoring the divisions with its neighbors. But it certainly must have mollified Tehran.

So while Qatar works hard to provide its American and Turkish partners and Iranian friends with what they need, and has been able to balance these delicate relationships, there isn’t much of a net under the tightrope. If any two of Doha’s three senior partners ever come to blows, Qatar may experience a long, hard fall.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/trump-s-go-home-comments-present-republicans-with-a-stark-choice-1.888786

At best, it seeks an end-of-conflict agreement involving large-scale Israeli annexation of occupied Palestinian territory and no sovereign Palestinian state

If there is an underlying, guiding principle behind the Trump administration’s agenda for Israel, it is surely that Palestinians are not to be treated as normal human beings.

No surprise, then, that an overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people do not trust the Trump administration, nor believe in its “peace efforts”. And why would they?

Nine out of 10 Palestinians surveyed by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research said they did not trust the US administration. Three-quarters wanted the Palestinian Authority to reject US President Donald Trump’s yet-to-be-revealed peace proposal.

Despite concerted efforts to appeal to the Palestinian people over the heads of their governing bodies, by the team of Mr Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, peace envoy Jason Greenblatt and ambassador to Israel David Friedman, they have only succeeded in increasing support for the relatively unpopular and certainly passé leadership of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, on the grounds that he is at least standing up to Washington.

Mr Kushner has repeatedly suggested that the Palestinian leadership’s refusal to abandon goals such as freedom, independence and citizenship are outmoded and irrelevant “talking points” from corrupt and rapacious institutions that don’t represent the people.

What he must be starting to discover is that the Palestinian people are, if anything, even more, not less, committed to these goals than the Palestine Liberation Organisation and PA leadership.

If Mr Kushner and his colleagues are sincere in their intentions, then they have wildly misjudged the political equation, as demonstrated by the fiasco of the recent Peace to Prosperity workshop in Bahrain, attended by neither Israeli nor Palestinian officials and positing the absurd idea that Palestinian aspirations could be realised primarily through economic aid and investment.

In fact, as the survey revealed, despite their hardships, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians prioritised independence over economic concerns; only 15 per cent put financial woes first.

Mr Kushner accepts the primacy of politics means all proposed investments are contingent on the Palestinians accepting a forthcoming political plan that apparently will not grant them either independence or citizenship. That has inevitably prompted many Palestinians to feel they are being asked to auction off their human rights.

Meanwhile the Trump administration has recognised Israel’s annexations of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Mr Friedman and Mr Greenblatt have said Israel also has the right to annex more areas in the West Bank.

The US has shuttered both the PLO mission in Washington and the US consulate in East Jerusalem. It has eliminated all aid to Palestinians, both directly and indirectly, including, ironically, many of the programmes and groups touted in Bahrain.

It has refused US visas to moderate, non-violent and pro-American Palestinian politicians like PLO official Hanan Ashrawi.

Indeed, there is really nothing left the US could take from the Palestinians that has not already been snatched from them.

This is the Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure”: you have nothing and get nothing, unless and until you engage with it, on its terms.

“A key goal is to re-orient Washington away from any notion of an outcome involving Palestinian statehood and an end to the occupation, towards one that embraces a greater Israel.”

But the Palestinian people understand, because the Trump administration has made this clear, that these terms do not involve ending the occupation, establishing a Palestinian state, establishing equal or even real citizenship in Israel or any other country, or the basic rights of human beings in the modern world.

Naturally, they have reacted angrily to this, and rightly so. To do otherwise would be to surrender, as a series of articles in major American newspapers by Israeli officials and their friends recently urged them to do.

Significantly, the primary constituency for these Trump administration’s policies are not Jews but evangelical Christians. With the 2020 election looming, the president is consolidating their already ardent support by pursuing policies that many of these evangelicals sincerely believe will lead to the second coming and the Apocalypse.

Most commentary continues to assume that the Trump/Kushner approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues is misguided, idiotic or naive. But it has been obvious for some time that the US policy towards Palestinians is in fact carefully crafted. It is just that the goals are radically different from those advertised and assumed.

At best, it seeks an end-of-conflict agreement involving large-scale Israeli annexation of occupied Palestinian territory and no sovereign Palestinian state.

If that’s not possible, at the very least the existing Oslo-era framework with its two-state logic will be utterly destroyed. This goal appears to have been virtually realised.

And given this is all about US policy, another key goal is to re-orient Washington away from any notion of an outcome involving Palestinian statehood and an end to the occupation, towards one that embraces a greater Israel with US recognition and approval.

The fact that most seasoned western commentators cannot or will not acknowledge this brutal and obvious reality does not mean it is not irrefutably evident. It plainly is.

So, under such circumstances, what are Palestinians supposed to think?

The results of the new opinion poll show that nearly all Palestinians can see that the Trump administration systematically rejects their national aspirations and thinks they don’t deserve to be treated equally to Jewish Israelis, or just about anyone else.