The US government’s immigration policies are rooted in a refusal to accept demographic change and loss of power

Last week immigration and border security issues roiled US politics more than ever. No one doubts the intensity of the argument, but few realise that the very future of American democracy may be at stake.

Everyone agrees that there is a crisis on the southern US border, with an extraordinary number of people seeking asylum for humanitarian reasons.

However, Americans have no common narrative.

Therein may lie the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. That is certainly Donald Trump’s calculation.

Mr Trump successfully sought the Republican nomination, and then the presidency, by claiming that there was an immigration crisis involving an invasion of Mexican rapists, criminals and gang members.

It was entirely fictional and cynical.

However, partly because of his own policies, a genuine border crisis has now developed.

Ostensibly, this is about a clash of American values.

Republicans claim to be protecting US laws and territorial integrity. Their rhetoric effectively no longer recognises that asylum seekers exist at all – all undocumented border-crossers are assumed to be economic and illegal migrants.

Although the appalling treatment of migrant children by the authorities is part of a harsh strategy of deterrence, the infrastructure is overwhelmed by an unexpected flow of people from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

Some Democrats are so horrified by the outrageous conditions under which these families, and children, are held at the border that they oppose any additional funds for these agencies.

The Democratic Party was badly split last week between a majority that wanted to provide funding, with clear basic treatment conditions, to care for these people, and a left-wing minority that wanted to deny all funding to support what they see as the unjustifiable detention of families and children, especially without clearly stipulated minimal care conditions.

Funding was ultimately approved by Congress when Vice President Mike Pence privately assured House Speaker Nancy Pelosi that the Trump administration would abide by many of the proposed care conditions that were dropped from the funding bill.

The immigration controversy, however, is a symptom, and a subset of the far larger issue of the increasing demographic and cultural transformation of the United States, away from a white, Christian majority to a far more diverse society that no longer resembles the traditional, normative American ethnic and cultural self-perception.

This is a traumatic moment for many white Americans, and echoes other dangerous and disruptive transitions in US history.

Mr Trump accurately believes he was elected primarily on the basis of a racial and ethnic appeal. He is determined to run for re-election on the same implicit ethnonationalist platform.

He has therefore purged the immigration services of relatively moderate managers and installed hyper-aggressive administrators with absolutist views on immigration and asylum similar to his own.

On Twitter, he darkly warns of a national sweep to deport thousands, if not millions, of undocumented families.

Beneath all this lies the fundamental question of whether much of the non-urban white, Christian American population is prepared to accept calmly that it will soon no longer be the majority US community, and that the country is on an inexorable path towards being far more diverse and cosmopolitan than in the past.

Urban white, Christian populations appear ready to accept this, but many non-urban ones may not be.

This is, therefore, a historic and extremely dangerous turning point in American history.

It has at least two clear precedents, in which hyper-empowered constituencies have sought an alternative to fully realised democracy when its outcomes did not suit them.

The Civil War was the result of the refusal of an enraged, slave-owning minority of once-dominant southern states to accept the election of Abraham Lincoln. It riled them so much that they eventually tried to undo his election by seceding from the United States, despite no provision for that in the Constitution.

During the 1930s, indignant sections of the middle and working classes, having been atrociously impoverished by the Great Depression, seemed on the brink of overthrowing both democracy and capitalism. Only the radical reformist New Deal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and the subsequent massive stimulus of the Second World War, salvaged American capitalism and democracy from potential revolutionary overthrow.

How large the constituency for revolutionary socialism might have become as the Great Depression dragged on is not knowable, though it was clearly huge. What is vital is that, again, a significant section of the US public was apparently prepared to place specific, urgent interests over the democratic political system.

As with the Civil War, they were ultimately brought to heel. But in both cases, it was a close call.

The United States seems to be again entering a historically transformative period, in which a large section of the population will have to ask itself whether it prefers the basic structures of democracy over its own narrow, communal and sectarian interests.

That’s what the immigration debate – and arguments about partisan gerrymandering, a citizenship question in the census, and many other current controversies – are really about.

Are non-urban white, Christian Americans willing to accept a significant degree of narrow, communal disempowerment to preserve democratic processes and values? Or, are they prepared to jettison democracy, in whole or part, if it threatens their identitarian interests?

That, at its core, is the question now facing the United States.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/trump-launches-his-2020-re-election-show-but-now-voters-know-what-they-re-tuning-in-to-1.878460

Since his inauguration, the US president has attacked institutions and attempted to shield himself from any form of oversight

Last Tuesday, US President Donald Trump launched his campaign for re-election in November 2020. Given that Mr Trump’s candidacy was largely built on his stint as the star of The Apprentice, many commentators could not resist comparing his angry, grievance-emphasising launch rally in Florida with his reality TV appearances.

His rundown of greatest hits included attacks on familiar enemies, such as “the fake news media”, “un-American elites”, “radical and unhinged” Democrats, and, of course, Hillary Clinton – his followers dutifully chanting “lock her up” at every mention of her name, despite her near invisibility of late.

The relentless nostalgia of the rally strongly suggested that the Trump presidency has been a lot less exciting than his 2016 campaign. He seems to be mainly appealing for re-election on the grounds that he won against the odds last time.

Mr Trump is by far the most unpopular president in modern US history, having never surpassed 50 per cent approval in any representative group of polls over a sustained period. His party also took a serious drubbing in the midterm elections.

Yet he could well be re-elected. He won last time, to the surprise of almost everyone, apparently even himself. He also has several new advantages, including a strong economy, relative peace and the considerable power of incumbency.

He has also completely conquered the Republican Party, which now resembles a personality cult in which criticism of him is intolerable heresy.

However, if Democrats can unify and energise their own base, there is also a good chance he could be defeated.

Many of the independents and swing voters who decided, at the last minute, to vote for Mr Trump rather than Mrs Clinton in 2016 may be more tired of his now very familiar routine than his diehard fans.

What is most remarkable about the Trump presidency, and has yet to be tested at the polls, is the accelerating process of deinstitutionalisation he has unleashed since his inauguration.

At every step, Mr Trump has undermined, discredited, disempowered and even dissolved core American democratic, political and civic institutions in a manner that reflects deeply authoritarian yearnings.

This has intensified significantly in recent months.

“He has attacked the courts, the military, the intelligence services, all Democrats, and anyone else who might get in his way.”

He began with a war against the “fake news” media, bluntly telling reporters that he was intent on discrediting the press, in case they reported anything embarrassing about him.

As soon as the investigation of Russian interference in the last elections by the FBI and the Justice Department was revealed, he began to decry the FBI as “treasonous” and “crooked.”

With Attorney General William Barr now leading the way, Mr Trump’s administration has begun investigating the investigations, and the conduct of his own staff and associates, suggesting it was all a treasonous plot or “coup” by “crooked cops.”

His supporters in Congress are even vowing to send FBI officials to prison for simply doing their jobs.

Mr Barr has repeatedly referred to what seem to be well-founded investigations into apparent foreign espionage as “spying”, suggesting nefarious abuses of power without any evidence.

The atmosphere of vengeance, intimidation and coercion against federal law enforcement has become intense.

Mr Trump has also repeatedly attacked the courts, the military, the intelligence services, his own bureaucracy, all Democrats, any Republicans who don’t agree with him, and anyone else who might get in his way.

Now that Democrats have taken control of congressional committees and pursued their constitutional oversight role by investigating administration conduct, Mr Trump is also trying to strip Congress of its essential powers.

He has instructed all his current and former aides to refuse to co-operate with congressional investigations, or to answer any questions about their activities in the administration, or even in the transition team before he was inaugurated.

Mr Trump’s lawyers called their blanket claim of executive privilege on everything his staff has ever done in his service “absolute immunity”. It is an original and chilling perspective that would eliminate congressional oversight almost completely.

Worse, his attorneys have been insisting in court that Congress has no authority to investigate lawbreaking under any circumstances, including by the president or the administration, except perhaps in the context of an impeachment inquiry.

It’s an absurd idea, but it has been made at least twice by administration lawyers in recent court cases, and probably will be again.

If sustained, that would mean Congress would have essentially no investigative authority, and that the entire executive branch of the government could only be investigated by itself.

The president and administration would, in effect, therefore be above the law and immune from any investigation of lawbreaking unless it initiates it itself. And no one at all could investigate lawbreaking by a president.

This ridiculous claim is very unlikely to prevail. But, in its own quiet way, it is probably the most authoritarian attack on American constitutional democracy by any administration in more than 100 years.

Incumbency cuts two ways for Mr Trump. He can and does exploit the gravitas of the office, but everyone now knows exactly who and what they are voting for and against.

Democratic campaign slogans may well suggest that it is “Time to change the channel”.

Gulf Arab States Don’t Want a U.S.-Iranian War, and Could Help Avoid One

Caught in the crossfire already, Gulf Arab countries have an important opportunity to help shape the off-ramp from confrontation.

On June 20, Iran and the United States came perilously close to a direct armed conflict, with President Donald J. Trump reportedly ordering and then canceling retaliatory strikes against Tehran after the downing of a high-tech U.S. drone near the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf Arab countries find themselves already caught in the crossfire between the two parties, repeatedly targeted by low-intensity and deniable attacks by Iran or its allies in recent weeks. There is virtually no scenario whereby Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, would not be prime targets for additional Iranian attacks should the confrontation intensify. 

Iran says the drone was shot down in its own airspace, but the United States insists it was well off the coast of Iran. Iranian officials also claim Trump sent them a warning through Omani officials of an imminent attack and demanded negotiations. Administration officials have repeatedly said that one clear redline for a robust military response would be the death of any U.S. service personnel. U.S. forces in the Gulf region, including warships that serve as key cruise missile launching vessels, are reportedly on a 72-hour standby.  

Trump is caught between several competing impulses, including a desire to restore U.S.deterrence by striking back, a disinclination to be drawn into the kind of Middle East conflict he campaigned against in 2016, and due caution about being baited into an overreaction by Iran. Tehran seems to be attempting to escalate a regional crisis while avoiding a full-blown war with the United States, to convince U.S. allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia to pressure Washington to ease the crippling sanctions that have brought the Iranian economy to its knees.  

The Gulf countries may be experiencing a degree of analogous ambivalence, pleased by Iran’s predicament while deeply anxious about the consequences of further armed confrontation. Most of the incidents thus far in Iran’s low-intensity escalation campaign have involved attacks on Gulf Arab interests, which are in many ways Tehran’s most vulnerable potential targets. As always, the interests, reactions, and engagement by Gulf Arab countries vary greatly given their different perspectives. However, there is one area of generalized agreement: The Gulf region and Middle East do not need or want a U.S.-Iranian conflict. The Gulf Arab countries can, and would much prefer to, secure their interests without a dangerous and unpredictable conflagration. This solid regional opposition to a rush into conflict is one of several restraining factors that could help to de-escalate the current tensions and create an opening for new dialogues to avoid conflict and stabilize the region. 

A Trajectory of Intensifying Tensions 

U.S.-Iranian relations reached their high point with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015 but began to notably deteriorate by 2016 during the final months of the Obama administration. President Barack Obama had hoped that the nuclear deal and international engagement would moderate other aspects of Iran’s behavior, including support for destabilizing militia activity in the region, development of its missile program, and human rights abuses inside Iran. Not only did that not happen, but Iran if anything intensified its interference in the Arab world and refused to negotiate moderating its behavior with the United States beyond the nuclear agreement. 

Trump campaigned against the JCPOA and in May 2018 announced the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement. The administration began applying “maximum pressure” against Tehran, mainly in the form of economic sanctions to reduce or eliminate Iran’s international oil sales. Washington’s actions were rejected not only by Iran but by the other JCPOA signatories, including Russia, China, and even key U.S. European allies the United Kingdom, France,and Germany. Indeed, the Europeans proposed setting up a special purpose vehicle, the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges or Instex, to facilitate payments to Iran in currencies other than the U.S. dollar to continue providing Iran with sanctions relief benefits from the agreement. 

However, this effort proved ineffective, and Instex has remained essentially unused. Iran’s economy entered freefall, with more than 4 percent negative growth, surging inflation and unemployment, and a plummeting currency. Not only was Iran’s economy profoundly wounded, its ability to financially underwrite its regional proxies, including core allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias in Iraq, was significantly reduced. The final straw for the Iranian regime appears to have been an effort to extend new sanctions to cover Iranian petrochemical productsas well as oil sales. Between the effectiveness of the existing sanctions and the threat of an even more comprehensive sanctions regime, including the very kind of petrochemical products sanctions that drove the Iranians to enter into the negotiations with European countries that ultimately led to the JCPOA, Iranian leaders concluded that the situation was intolerable. 

Their initial strategy of attempting to keep the JCPOA functional, work with Europeans and others to find ways around U.S. sanctions, and essentially wait the Trump administration out in hopes of a less hostile U.S. administration after the 2020 elections, proved unsuccessful. Iran repeated threats to close the Strait of Hormuz or otherwise disrupt shipping in Gulf waters in the face of U.S. pressure, even declaring that if Iran could not sell its oil, no one else could export their oil through the Gulf either. Meanwhile, Iran indicated that it would soon begin to violate restrictionson its stockpiles of low-enriched uranium, effectively abrogating the JCPOA. Senior Iranian leaders have even hinted Iran might withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as North Korea did in 2003, which would be a clear prelude to the development of a nuclear weapon. 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General Qassim Suleimani, chief of Iran’s Quds Force that manages its nonstate proxies in the Arab world, reportedly summoned the leaders of Iranian-aligned Iraqi militias to urge them to prepare for a “proxy war” against the United States. U.S. and other intelligence services issued warnings, met with widespread skepticism, that Iranian-backed groups were preparing attacks on U.S. interests in the region. In response, the United Statesdispatched additional naval and other military forces to the region. 

Those Iranian attacks have seemingly begun, but in a calibrated, low–intensity manner and with considerable deniability. On May 12, four oil tankers were attacked off the coast of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates and on May 14, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen attacked Saudi oilinstallations. This was followed by an additional attack on June 13 on two additional oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman near the Iranian coast. There have also been a number of rocket attacks against U.S.-related targets in Iraq, allegedly conducted by Iranian-backed militia groups. In response, the United States has shifted more military personnel and resources to the region, committed to protecting oil tankers in Gulf waters, and explicitly warned Iran that the death of any U.S. service personnel at the hands of Tehran or any of its allies would result in a military response.  

A Game of Chicken 

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA returned the United States and Iran to a path of confrontation from which the agreement appeared to offer at least temporary respite. Neither side seems to want war, but both appear unwilling to engage in the compromises needed to move away from acollision course. Washington and Tehran, rather, have been pursuing measured confrontation and both seem to believe they are operating from positions of relative strength. Yet both may be underestimating the difficulties they face and are potentially misreading the signals and intentions of the other side. 

While the United States is much the stronger party, its options are limited by self-imposed restraints stemming from war fatigue and skepticism due to long military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan and from a lack of international support. There seems to be little appetite in Congress and among the public for any major armed confrontation with Iran and Trump insists he does notwant a war. Key U.S. allies are even less enthusiastic. But the ultimate goals of the Trump administration are not clear. The administration has said that it seeks a new agreement with Iran that deals with issues not covered by the JCPOA. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a more far-reaching 12-point agenda for change in Iranian behavior that ruling circles in Tehran regard as tantamount to regime change. At the same time, Trump has said that simply, “We don’t want them to have nuclear weapons – not much to ask.” So, the core U.S. demand of Iran is not completely clear, inviting critics to conclude that the administration cannot agree on or prioritize specific changes in Iranian behavior, or that “maximum pressure” is an end in itself. Worse, if the administration does want to avoid a major armed conflict, it is running out of plausible nonmilitary options. 

Iran clearly feels cornered. Its carefully calibrated campaign of violence and sabotage seemsdesigned to send a message of defiance, inflict some pain on regional and international actors, but avoid forcing Trump to take military action that he has made clear he would prefer to avoid.  

While Iran’s calibrated strategy has not provoked a conflict, it also has not succeeded in panicking global oil markets, international shippers, U.S. Gulf Arab allies, or Washington. Trump dismissed the latest attacks on shipping as “very minor” and stated that the United States no longer needed Gulf oil, indicating that he was not going to be baited into an ill-advised overreaction or allow Tehran to dictate the agenda. The deeper message to Tehran is that the United States and its allies, as well as global oil markets, can easily shrug off Iran’s attacks on its neighbors’ infrastructure. Iran attempted to call Trump’s bluff regarding the use of force. But Trump appears, in turn, to be calling Tehran’s bluff regarding low–intensity, deniable attacks. 

The game of chicken in the Gulf is now fully engaged. What is needed to avoid additional conflict is an off-ramp from the path of confrontation in which “maximum pressure,” for the most part crippling economic sanctions, is being met by “maximum resistance,” mainly low–intensity anddeniable sabotage and terrorist attacks. Tehran may conclude that it must increase the pressure in order to bait Trump more effectively. The rocket attacks in Iraq and the downing of the U.S.Navy drone may indicate just such a further escalation. 

Gulf Arab Countries in the Crossfire 

While they frequently express support for the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign, there is little evidence that any of the Gulf Arab countries relish the prospect of a military confrontation. They would be among the first targets of Iranian military action. Indeed, apart from the attacks in Iraq and, allegedly, Afghanistan, Iranian maritime actions have been largely aimed at Saudi and UAE exports of oil and petrochemical products and their infrastructure to demonstrate a realinternational cost to the U.S. strategy. Whether Houthi missile attacks aimed at Saudi Arabia are specifically instigated, or merely supported, by Iran is beside the point: Gulf Arabs know that they can be, and are already being, attacked where they live. The prospect that this could get much worse is obvious. 

Saudi Arabia has been clear in expressing outrage and maintaining its right of self-defense, but it has also insisted that it does not want a conflict in its neighborhood. The UAE has declined to explicitly blame Iran for the May maritime attacks and referred the matter to the United Nations. None of that suggests an effort to fan the flames of conflict. 

Bahrain is exceptionally anxious about Iran’s intentions and generally defers to Riyadh on matters of defense and national security. The other three Gulf Cooperation Council countries are even more unnerved by the U.S.-Iranian standoff. Oman and Kuwait maintain the most cordial relations with Tehran in the Gulf and can only lose from any confrontation. Oman hosted the conversations through which the United States joined the European-Iranian conversation that ultimately led to the nuclear agreement, and Kuwait in the past has been the channel of some Gulf Arab-Tehran messaging.  

The Qatari position is particularly delicate in the confrontation between Washington and Tehran. Doha must maintain reasonable relations with Iran because most of its income comes from the natural gas field the two countries share. The boycott that began in 2017 by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt forced Qatar to seek stronger relations with Iran to secure several key interests, including civilian aviation overflight routes. Yet Qatar is a close ally of the United States and hosts the forward operating headquarters of U.S. Central Command and one of the most significant U.S. military bases in the region. Therefore, any major alteration in the status quo between the United States and Iran threatens to undo the delicate balance Qatar has created in its relations with both. 

A Gulf Role in an Off-Ramp? 

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain joined the other Gulf Arab countries in reluctantly endorsing the nuclear negotiations with Iran and, after it was signed, the JCPOA. Although initially they advised the United States to stick with the agreement and use it as leverage with Tehran to modify its behavior, they ultimately expressed satisfaction with the U.S. withdrawal. That said, for months key Gulf Arab foreign policy leaders have been counseling Washington to translate the leverage generated by the new sanctions into a political path for gaining concessions from Iran. There is at most a small constituency in Gulf Arab countries for “maximum pressure” as an aim in itself.  

Given that “maximum pressure” sanctions have probably achieved what they can, the quiet Gulf Arab call for a political or diplomatic path with Iran may now begin to resonate. U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook seemed to speak to this point during a press conference in Riyadh June 21 following a meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, when he said: “Iran needs to meet our diplomacy with diplomacy and not military force. It’s important we do everything we can do to de-escalate.” 

Oman and Kuwait are potential mediators, and, despite widespread misapprehensions, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely keen to see a more modulated U.S. policy. Dialogue among the Arab and Iranian parties could begin with more concrete steps by all sides to de-escalate the war in Yemen, possibly expanding to discussions of maritime security.  

Internationally, this sequence could be reversed, beginning with a U.S.-Iranian agreement that some sanctions relief would be met with concomitant Iranian concessions in Syria and possiblywestern Iraq – concessions that would undercut the IRGC’s regional agenda but lead to economic benefits for Iranians and provide the Iranian government with incentives to help it curb the IRGC’sdestabilizing activities. And as Suzanne Maloney notes, “Iran’s political establishment has quietlyspeculated for months about the possibilities for devising a diplomatic pathway out of the country’s current predicament, and there has been a flurry of Iranian engagement with would-be intermediaries.” 

The Trump administration should prioritize its fundamental demands on Iran and make them consistent and clear. An Iranian capitulation or regime change seems highly unlikely but the “maximum pressure” campaign, and even the current impasse, could yield compromises by Tehran if the United States – especially in coordination with its European, Gulf Arab, and Israeli allies – presents well-defined, stable, and reasonable terms for sanctions relief. Iran could then rationally decide whether to explore a compromise or insist on continued conflict. And the United States‘ Gulf Arab allies could formulate policies best designed to help Washington achieve their shared goals without a devastating conflict that everybody wishes to avoid. 

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/russia-s-role-in-syria-s-ongoing-conflict-cannot-and-should-not-be-ignored-1.871894

It is time to judge Moscow on the nature and the impact of its actions and policies in the region

The assault on Idlib province, mainly by Russian and Syrian regime forces, is a vast atrocity unfolding before the eyes of an uncaring world. Compared to their entirely appropriate condemnations of Iran, Hezbollah and the Assad regime, Arab nations have also had less to say about Russia’s actions.

Three million civilians are cowering in Idlib, braced for the worst.

One million – yes, one million – of them are children, many sent there during the course of the war to avoid fighting, or in agreed-upon transfers of civilians to facilitate the withdrawal of rebel forces from insurgent areas that could expect no mercy from Bashar Al Assad’s merciless enforcers.

There are several reasons for the international indifference. Some are rational, but none make any moral sense.

First, the Assad regime has won the war in general, so the ultimate outcome isn’t in doubt and Idlib doesn’t matter to that.

Second, among the rebel groups in Idlib are Al Qaeda affiliates and other extremists. No one wants to support them, obviously.

Third, Turkey’s main concern now seems to be that large numbers of Syrian refugees could spill across the border, in addition to the hundreds of thousands already there. Recent attacks on schools and hospitals – favourite targets of the regime and its backers throughout the war – reinforce such fears.

The rest of the world basically sees this as Turkey’s problem. But, in fact, Turkey’s refusal to accept more Syrian refugees and the closure of its borders means that the humanitarian cost of this assault could, as former United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon warned, be worse than the rest of this horrific conflict.

The slow process of the Arab reintegration of the Assad regime is already under way. And, indeed, there is now no realistic way to secure any interests in Syria other than by dealing with the regime and its main backer, Moscow.

Yet the international silence on the looming catastrophe in Idlib is not justifiable.

The Assad regime is, at least, on notice that the Arab world is outraged, especially given that the regime has not been allowed to represent Syria at the Arab League for years. Even if that changes in the future, the point was made.

Iran and Hezbollah are, of course, held responsible by many Arabs for much of the regional chaos and carnage their policies cause, including in Syria. But, for some reason, Russia has been given a relative pass.

“Having overseen the regime’s victory, Moscow looks like a winner and an up-and-coming power within the region.”

One is hard pressed to recall major Arab statements that confront Moscow with the responsibility for its abuses in Syria. Combined with almost no American efforts to deter Russia from assaults in places such as Idlib, which lies far from areas of US influence, Moscow faces no real consequences for its conduct and appears duly emboldened by this lack of cost or criticism.

It’s understandable that many Arabs want to have close relations with Russia. In many ways, it and China serve as potential alternatives to the United States.

Crucially, Moscow can be deployed as leverage to secure Washington’s co-operation – as when Saudi Arabia got the US to facilitate its efforts to buy the THAAD missile defence system, after years of dawdling, by expressing interest in Russia’s S-400 system.

Besides, having overseen the regime’s victory in Syria, Moscow looks like a winner, a steadfast ally when it chooses to be, and an up-and-coming power within the region, in contrast to the US’s failures, flip-flops and gradual disengagement in the Middle East.

But this is largely, if not entirely illusory. Russia cannot begin to compare with the US in terms of power capability in the region, even if Washington is choosing to ostensibly sit out conflicts such as the one in Syria.

More importantly, it is high time to judge Russia on the nature and the impact of its policies in the region. It is no longer tenable to hold that the Assad regime is appalling and that the Syrian war is Exhibit A or B in the list of Iran’s brutal and destructive meddling in the Arab world while largely ignoring the vital role Russia has played in the Syrian conflict.

There are important efforts to try to woo Mr Assad into some kind of arrangement that could freeze Iran out of much of the post-war advantage in Syria. Hopefully, they will succeed.

For now, though, Moscow and Tehran seem deeply aligned, while the Assad regime prepares for what threatens to be the very worst phase of the war for innocent Syrians. Even if that cannot be stopped, at least let us recognise Russia’s role as an author of these crimes.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/a-critical-window-of-opportunity-could-slam-shut-if-tehran-refuses-to-talk-to-us-1.868811

Iranian leaders have past form when it comes to testing limits, then seeking overtures. That time is now

After tensions between the US and Iran came close to boiling over a few weeks ago, both sides have moved to lower the temperature. Yet they remain on a collision course, even though no one would benefit from another war.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly said he wants to talk, even reportedly providing telephone numbers through Swiss intermediaries.

But will Washington and Tehran be able to talk as long as Mr Trump is in the White House?