https://agsiw.org/emergency-weapons-sales-drag-gulf-arab-countries-deeper-into-u-s-politics/

Gulf countries are getting what they want from the White House, but ties with other parts of the U.S. establishment are fraying.

In an effort to bypass opposition from Democrats and Republican internationalists in Congress, on May 24 the administration of President Donald J. Trump issued a national emergency declaration citing tensions with Iran to complete weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. The declaration covered 22 contracts worth over $8 billion, mostly for the Gulf Arab countries and many connected to the war in Yemen. Lawmakers in both houses and from both parties, although especially Democrats in the House of Representatives, had been seeking to use traditional congressional oversight prerogatives to block these weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, citing the humanitarian crisis caused by the war in Yemen as well as the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and other human rights concerns.

They now say they will seek additional means to block the sales to preserve their institutional powers. These developments are dragging the Gulf Arab countries deeper into U.S. domestic political disputes and threaten to exacerbate strains in relations with core parts of the U.S. political establishment and policy-framing community, despite ongoing strong ties to the Trump administration.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are caught in the crossfire of domestic U.S. disputes along three axes: the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government; efforts by opposition Democrats to attack Trump and the Republicans on foreign as well as domestic policy; and attempts by more traditional, internationalist Republicans to push back against the president’s sometimes mercantilist or neo-isolationist “America First” agenda. On all three fronts, these Gulf Arab countries find themselves vulnerable to being used as a cudgel against Trump by his Democratic antagonists and Republican “constructive critics” alike.

The Yemen intervention was never popular among Democrats, but they were restrained while President Barack Obama was in power, given his tepid support for the Saudi-led effort precluded any confrontation – especially since he allowed a hold to be placed on a large shipment of precision guided munitions to be sold to Saudi Arabia to replenish stockpiles that had been exhausted in Yemen. Trump lifted the hold soon after coming into office and expanded the scope of U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition’s participation in the Yemen conflict.

While critical Democratic voices became louder throughout the first half of the Trump term, it wasn’t until the Khashoggi murder that an influential group of Republican internationalist senators, notably Lindsay Graham and Marco Rubio, became willing to oppose delivery of weapons to Saudi Arabia to express a more generalized alarm about the trajectory of Saudi government behavior. Graham, in particular, turned from being a notable defender to a vociferous critic of the Saudi government, and particularly Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Shortly after the Khashoggi murder, the Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives in the November 2018 midterm elections. Tensions with Congress were further stoked by the detention and reported abuse of women’s rights activists in Saudi Arabia and allegations that Saudi diplomats had helped Saudi nationals abscond from the United States to avoid trials on serious criminal charges. And it became increasingly clear that newly empowered Democrats and increasingly frustrated Republican internationalists were likely to view weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a key form of foreign-policy leverage with the administration.

The partisan division with the Democrats was evident from the beginning of the Trump administration but became actively contentious when Democrats retook the House. Strong ideological and strategic pressure from Republican internationalists in the Senate began after the Khashoggi murder. The institutional, separation-of-powers contest between the White House and Congress centered on these issues came to the fore with Trump’s April 16 veto of the legislative effort to invoke the 1973 War Powers Resolution to mandate the cessation of all U.S. operations related to the Yemen war. With this emergency declaration seeking to bypass the prospect of a legislative rejection of these weapons sales, the White House has doubled down on its effort to sideline Congress.

All of this illustrates the way in which Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and particularly their military intervention in Yemen, have become exposed to three of the most important fault lines in domestic U.S. politics, along partisan, ideological, and institutional axes. Saudis may feel they’ve been here before. Similar emergency declarations were used to sell them weapons over congressional objections by Presidents Ronald Reagan in 1984, George H.W. Bush in 1990, and George W. Bush in 2002. And, they may well reason, the strategic alliance with the United States that began in the 1940s under President Franklin D. Roosevelt has been maintained by all presidents of both parties since and has survived far more extreme tests than any that exist today, such as the 1973 oil embargo, the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

However, the political dynamics of foreign policy in Washington are dramatically shifting away from the post-World War II and post-Cold War contexts that were the basis for this alliance until now. Even if Trump does not restructure U.S. foreign policy in a profound and lasting way, by resurrecting neo-isolationism, for example, it will still not return to what it was during either of those bygone eras. Apart from the strong ties to the Trump administration and family, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are witnessing significant fraying of their support base among Democrats and some influential Republicans. Trump has vetoed the Yemen war resolution and will supply these weapons through the emergency declaration. But both actions, while they get the Gulf Arab countries what they want immediately, reinforce the sense in Congress and among key voices in both parties that this relationship is somehow particular to the Trump administration’s view of international relations. In the long run, that’s unlikely to be a strong position for Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in Washington.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/the-only-winner-to-emerge-from-impeachment-proceedings-would-be-donald-trump-1.866371

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-23/trump-s-palestine-investment-conference-is-a-cynical-farce

U.S. officials are shocked by the news that Palestinian business leaders won’t accept their invitation to trade national rights for cash.

It’s hard to imagine a more pointless exercise than a Palestinian investment conference without Palestinians. Talk about staging Hamlet without the prince! But that’s exactly what the Trump administration is cooking up, to be held June 25-26 in Bahrain. And it’s emblematic of the predetermined, intentional failure of its approach to brokering Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The “Peace to Prosperity” workshop on investing mainly in Palestinian areas under Israeli occupation is meant to unveil the economic component of the U.S. peace plan, leaving political issues for later. U.S. officials say they hope for up to $68 billion in pledges.

The trouble is, both the Palestine Liberation Organization, universally recognized as the diplomatic representative of the Palestinian people, and the Palestinian Authority government in Ramallah say they weren’t invited or consulted.

Apparently, Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and chief Middle East peace official, and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who is the official host of the conference, had thought it would be smart to invite Palestinian businessmen, but not political leaders.

Kushner keeps trying to bypass Palestinian leaders and speak directly to the Palestinian people in the deluded belief that they will be more receptive to his minimalist peace project, which emphasizes improving living conditions without addressing political aims such as independence, statehood and citizenship.

Numerous Palestinian business figures have reported receiving invitations and are unanimous in derisively and categorically rejecting them, with one predictable exception.

The administration’s negotiator, Jason Greenblatt, said he finds these refusals “difficult to understand.” That just means he doesn’t grasp basic Palestinian experiences and perceptions.

In fact, it’s almost impossible to imagine any self-respecting Palestinian attending under current conditions.

Palestinians desperately need economic support, so under almost any other circumstances, they’d be enthusiastic participants.

But the Trump administration has signaled that the political portion of its plan won’t involve Palestinian statehood or provide Palestinians with freedom, independence or citizenship but rather some form of local collective autonomy within an expanded Israel.

Kushner has therefore left Palestinians no choice but to conclude that the Bahrain meeting could, if they participated, effectively amount to selling off their human and national rights.

Yet Kushner and Greenblatt appear genuinely surprised that Palestinians won’t go along.

The administration is celebrating the participation of numerous Arab countries as if their presence signals approval of the Trump-Kushner approach. It doesn’t. For the Arab states, it’s an easy way to curry favor with Washington, since they know that the structures for implementing any investments they pledge will never emerge as the initiative collapses.

Why would the U.S. stage such a ridiculous kabuki show? Unfortunately, the intention is obvious.

If the administration were interested in resolving the conflict, it would put together a serious plan that addressed the existential concerns of both sides and then add economic inducements, not the other way around.

The idea, instead, is to offer a phony “economic incentive package” to the Palestinians and then express incredulity when their generosity is spurned.

Trump and Kushner want to be able to say that they went the extra mile to offer Palestinians a chance to transform their living conditions that any sensible people would embrace.

When that doesn’t happen, as it certainly won’t, it’ll be that much easier to repeal and replace the two-state solution that has been the basis for negotiations since the Oslo Accords of 1993.

Israel and the Trump administration will claim that Palestinian intransigence gives them no choice but to create new realities without Palestinian involvement, featuring more Israeli annexations. That’s one way to cut off all that irritating talk about occupation.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-21/jason-greenblatt-trump-envoy-poisons-israel-palestine-peace

Twitter insults will make it harder to say yes to a soon-to-be-delivered White House proposal. It’s a blame game.

The most significant social media account in the U.S. presidential administration belongs to the tweeter-in-chief, Donald Trump. But the Twitter feed of Jason Greenblatt, Trump’s negotiator on Israel-Palestinian issues, is a close second.

Greenblatt’s tweets sound frivolous and naive, but they’re clearly calculated to poison the atmosphere before the publication of the administration’s promised peace proposal.

He’s emerged as a troll against a bewildering array of Palestinian individuals and institutions, not just key interlocutors like negotiator Saeb Erekat.

Greenblatt has browbeaten the entire spectrum of Palestinian political and civic life, from senior officials to random journalists, school districts and even the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Nothing is too ordinary to escape his badgering.

His tone is self-righteous and arrogant. He speaks to Palestinians as if he were dealing with wayward children or hopeless maniacs.

He occasionally criticizes Israelis, such as a settler rabbi who called Hitler “the most correct person there ever was.” But his embrace of the settlers’ perspective appears total, and he evinces no understanding of any aspect of the Palestinian experience.

In his telling, Israel is under attack by fanatical Arabs brainwashed with hatred. He has never acknowledged the impact of the Israeli occupation or Palestinian dispossession, disenfranchisement and exile. He often sounds most like a spokesperson for the Settlers’ Council, whose propaganda he routinely cites.

Greenblatt’s tone-deafness on the occupation was recently demonstrated by his celebration of a Ramadan dinner held in Hebron by Israeli settlers and a few local Palestinians.

It was an astounding choice because Hebron is the epicenter of some of the worst abuses meted out by settlers and the Israeli authorities, which often go beyond segregation and repression.

Greenblatt’s sanctimonious tweets are oblivious to the essential feature of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the occupied territories, especially places like Hebron, which is the methodical subjugation of millions of people by an army that is systematically taking land from one group and giving it to another.

Greenblatt should study an important new book, “Freedom and Despair,” by the Israeli peace activist David Shulman, who has been trying to help Palestinians resist cruelty, abuse and land theft by settlers and the military in the South Hebron hills for decades.

Shulman’s powerful moral interrogation of himself and others stands in stark contrast to Greenblatt’s self-satisfied certainties.

Astonishingly, Greenblatt’s tweets also frequently engage with marginal Palestinian figures such as random Hamas members, not senior leaders, and fringe terrorist groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

He doesn’t seem to realize that being directly addressed on Twitter by the chief U.S. negotiator is a major achievement for such extremists. He’s doing them an enormous favor. They must love him.

So why is the chief U.S. negotiator wasting his time hectoring random Palestinians, disseminating settler narratives and promoting extremists?

Greenblatt’s campaign is part of a calculated effort by the Trump administration to ensure that relations are so bad that there’s no chance Palestinian leaders can possibly engage with any new U.S. proposal.

The administration is instead counting on them to say “no” and then accuse them of recalcitrance.

The most recent example of other actions with the same purpose is the refusal of the State Department to grant a U.S. visa to Hanan Ashrawi, a Palestinian leader who has an unblemished, decades-old track record of advocating nonviolence.

Along with recognizing Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, cutting off all U.S. aid, shutting the Palestinian embassy in Washington and the U.S. consulate in East Jerusalem, Greenblatt’s Twitter feed is obviously intended to deny Palestinian leaders political wiggle-room.

Palestinians shouldn’t oblige him by just saying “no,” and they need to formulate a sophisticated response.

But Greenblatt is doing an excellent job of making any constructive reply as difficult as possible. His Twitter feed has been a key tool in that insidious project.

Gulf Arabs Caught between U.S. “Fire and Fury” and Iranian “Strategic Recklessness”

Saudi Arabia moves to consolidate Arab and Muslim support, anticipating intensified confrontation or diplomacy.

U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s rhetoric toward Tehran reached the “fire and fury” stage with a tweet on May 19 warning of “the official end of Iran” in the case of a conflict. Meanwhile, low-intensity attacks on U.S. and allied interests by Iranian-backed militias proliferated. These developments have increased fears of a looming, possibly inadvertent, drift toward all-out conflict. Yet, at the same time, a flurry of diplomatic activity, much of it involving Gulf Arab countries, seems aimed at forestalling such a development even as tensions mount.

Iran’s Low-Intensity “Proxy War” Heats Up

A telling aspect of the intensification of confrontation is the growing list of attacks conducted by Iranian-linked armed groups against U.S. interests and those of U.S. allies in the Arab world. Warnings in recent weeks of the potential for such proxy assaults and evacuations of, and warnings to, U.S. personnel in countries including Iraq and Lebanon increasingly appear to be validated. On May 12, there were sabotage attacks reported on oil tankers off the coast of the United Arab Emirates followed by a drone strike on two Saudi oil pumping stations on May 14. Recent major developments include a rocket attack on the Green Zone near the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and Saudi Arabia reported it intercepted two missiles over Mecca province it said were launched by Iranian-back Houthi rebels in Yemen.

While no group has claimed responsibility for the Baghdad rocket attack, and several notable pro-Iranian militia groups in Iraq denounced it, the strike appears consistent with previous conduct by such groups. Iraqi government sources said the attack was conducted by the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia. Last week U.S. officials said they had intercepted increased communications between the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and various Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and other Arab countries about potential attacks on U.S. troops and diplomats, as well as commercial shipping and other targets. Alarm was further stoked by reports from U.S. officials of aerial photographs of fully assembled missiles on small boats in the Gulf off the coasts of Iraq and Iran.

It has been widely reported that about a month ago IRGC Major General Qassim Suleimani assembled the leaders of pro-Iranian militia groups in Iraq and told them to “prepare for proxy war” against the United States and its allies. The IRGC was recently labeled a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department, the first official part of another government to be so designated. The recent spate of asymmetrical attacks on U.S. and allied interests by pro-Iranian militia groups seems to correspond to the beginning of a “proxy war” and to confirm the validity of intelligence warnings about the potential for such attacks.

Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, but seems to want to demonstrate it has less drastic but still effective options. Norwegian shipping insurers reportedly concluded that the IGRC was “highly likely” responsible for the attacks on the tankers off the UAE coast. According to the report, the attacks were “highly likely intended to send a message to the United States and its allies that Iran did not need to block the Strait to disrupt freedom of navigation in the region” and it suggested more such attacks are likely.

Trump Seems Sure Tehran Will Fold

The drift toward a potential conflict seems to be driven by the perceptions on both sides that they are operating from positions of relative strength. The Trump administration is buoyed by the effectiveness of the “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against Tehran, which was recently compared by Iranian leaders to the devastating Iran-Iraq War. The administration says it wants Iran to negotiate a “better deal” than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear pact from which the United States withdrew in 2018, and apparently feels that Tehran will soon buckle under the strain. On May 15, Trump tweeted that he is “sure that Iran will want to talk soon.” And, if nothing else, administration sources say that Iran now has much less money to lavish on its regional proxies, and this appears to be confirmed by the deep financial woes of Hezbollah in Lebanon. So the United States appears set to continue to ratchet up the pressure on Iran, for instance by imposing additional sanctions, while, as officials put it, waiting “by the phone.”

Yet it seems clear that Trump wants to avoid a war with Iran if he can, and apparently has been passing messages and “phone numbers” to Tehran through Swiss intermediaries, according to White House officials. Iranian officials appear to believe that this creates a potential opening for them, and that their best option is carefully calculated brinksmanship. This explains the recent spate of attacks and also why, as many experts have noted, they appear to be carefully calibratedto avoid provoking a massive U.S. retaliation. Iran seems to be testing U.S. resolve and willingness to use force, as Trump has reportedly told his advisors he doesn’t want an all-out conflict and even suspects some of them may be “getting ahead of themselves” and thereby “annoying” him.

Tehran’s Policy of “Strategic Recklessness”

Therefore, several key analysts argue that Iran has calculated that its best bet under the circumstances is to force the United States to confront the limitations of a maximum pressure policy that does not include a large-scale conflict option. The veteran Arab analyst and journalist Raghida Dergham has written two articles for the UAE newspaper The National arguing that Iran is pursuing a policy of “strategic recklessness” by pressing the confrontation and testing the United States’ will.

The Iranian-American analyst Trita Parsi, who is generally sympathetic to the government in Tehran, has reached the same conclusions, writing that “Tehran’s plan appears to be to accelerate matters toward the point at which Trump will have to decide whether he is truly willing to go to war with Iran.” More ominously, he warns that “having planned to thwart a U.S. military attack on Iran ever since the mid-1990s, Tehran also appears ready for this plan not to work” and Iran is prepared for its brinksmanship policy to fail and to end up actually provoking a major U.S. attack.

Additionally, the sudden fluctuations in Trump’s messaging toward Iran have had the, possibly intentional, effect of befuddling and disorienting friend and foe alike. The atmosphere of uncertainly generated by this brinksmanship could increase the risks of misinterpretation or miscalculation and raise the prospects of an armed clash.

Gulf Arab Countries Brace for Conflict or Diplomacy

All this adds up to an increasingly dangerous situation for the Gulf Arab countries, which would inevitably be caught in the middle of any Iranian-U.S. conflict and have already been the site of several of the low-intensity Iranian provocations in recent weeks. This largely accounts for the caution with which Gulf Arab governments are proceeding, and a growing flurry of Gulf and Arab diplomatic activity. The UAE, for example, has been careful not to directly blame Iran or its proxies for the attacks on commercial shipping off its coast and instead has referred the matter to the United Nations. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly said it does not want war, while emphasizing its determination to defend itself.

However, mixed messages have been emerging from Saudi Arabia on the conflict. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir stressed that “We don’t want a war in any way” and that “We want peace and stability.” And Saudi academic Abdulaziz Sager co-authored an article in the New York Times with former Iranian official Hossein Mousavian calling for urgent dialogue between the two countries. On the other hand, the state-owned Arab News urged a U.S. (but not Saudi) “calculated surgical strike” against Iran and columnist Hassan al-Said of Okaz dismissed any possibility of reconciling with Iran or trusting it to adhere to any commitments it makes. But there is hardly an outpouring of calls for action or conflict in the Saudi media and rather a pervasive sense of alarm about the threats of both Iranian policy and the prospect of a war.

Oman may be at the center of Arab efforts to create a channel of communication to Tehran, possibly also on behalf of the United States. Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi visited Iran on May 20, after U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called Oman’s Sultan Qaboos bin Said on May 15 and, according to the State Department, discussed “Iranian threats to the Gulf region,” among other things. It’s almost certain that the Omanis will be carrying messages from both Gulf Arabs and Americans directly to Iran and could, yet again, serve as a crucial back channel of communication if the parties are willing to seriously de-escalate.

As things stand, however, the situation remains volatile and extremely dangerous for the Gulf Arab countries. This helps to explain the caution of many Gulf governments and the Saudi moves to consolidate support. Riyadh has organized “emergency” Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council summits before the next scheduled Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting on May 31 in Mecca. Saudi Arabia appears to be leading an effort to circle the wagons in much of the Arab and Sunni-majority Muslim worlds to prepare for either intensified diplomacy or confrontation, depending on which direction Washington and Tehran decide to go in the coming weeks. The Arab world may, as it has in the past, find itself in a largely reactive mode as others take the key steps that will shape the immediate future of their region.

https://amp.thenational.ae/opinion/editorial/despite-the-redactions-the-truth-of-the-mueller-report-is-coming-to-light-1.862910?__twitter_impression=true

The document raises a number of important questions that have clearly shaken President Donald Trump.

While global attention was understandably focused on Iran, the US-China trade talks, Venezuela and other dramatic developments last week, more information is seeping out about what happened surrounding the 2016 presidential election – and the news isn’t good for the White House.

The redacted version of the Robert Mueller report released to Congress and the public was clear that it could not establish any unlawful conspiracy between the Trump campaign and Russian intelligence during the election.

But it specifically refused to clear the president of obstruction of justice, largely on the grounds that the Justice Department, somewhat controversially, believes that no serving president can be criminally charged; only impeached by Congress. The report said if it could have cleared the president, it would have, but it could not.

That has left unanswered what potentially criminal acts of obstruction was the Mueller report referring to, though 10 incidents were cited as problematic, and, more importantly, what such obstruction was intended to hide.

We may be inching closer to the truth.

Several key incidents on both counts involve President Donald Trump’s first national security adviser, the retired General Michael Flynn.

It has been long established that, before Mr Trump was inaugurated, Mr Flynn had highly questionable conversations with the Russian ambassador, in which he encouraged Moscow to ignore new sanctions imposed by the still-serving administration of Barack Obama, and promised a new relationship with the incoming Trump administration.

Two key questions remain unanswered, at least in the public realm.

First, why did Mr Flynn make such an offer at all, especially when he was still a private citizen, and particularly given its obvious impropriety and dubious legality?

Second, why did he subsequently lie about these discussions to the FBI, which is a crime, and to others, when, as a former senior intelligence official, he knew full well that the US government was undoubtedly tracking the Russian ambassador’s phone calls?

And, last but hardly least, why does most of this information appear to have been redacted from the Mueller Report by Attorney General William Barr?

On Thursday, a federal judge ordered that the transcripts of Mr Flynn’s conversations with the Russian ambassador be made public.

He also mandated the release of a voicemail message from Mr Trump’s personal attorney emphasising the president’s continued affection for the fired Mr Flynn, even as he was preparing to co-operate with prosecutors.

The Mueller Report declined to make any judgment about Mr Trump’s criminal culpability on obstruction of justice, except to emphasise that it could not exonerate the president. Yet within hours of receiving the report, Mr Barr did precisely that.

The new information emerging calls that snap judgment into even greater question.

In a memorandum written when he was still a private citizen last year, Mr Barr suggested that a president cannot commit obstruction of justice while conducting otherwise normal functions of the executive branch, because criminal intent would be almost impossible to prove. But, he did admit that a president could commit obstruction by “sabotaging a proceeding’s truth finding function” if he “knowingly destroys or alters evidence, suborned perjury, or induces a witness to change testimony” and so on.

The problem for both Mr Trump and Mr Barr is that, apparently, Mr Flynn told prosecutorsabout several episodes in which “he or his attorneys received communications from persons connected to the Administration or Congress that could have affected both his willingness to co-operate and the completeness of that co-operation”.

In other words, precisely the exceptionally high standard the current attorney general has already set for presidential obstruction.

It also raises the question of who in Congress is involved in this possible obstruction. And why did Mr Flynn encourage an outspoken anti-Mueller congressman while he was supposedly co-operating with prosecutors?

All of this, obviously, also puts Mr Barr’s extensive redactions of the Mueller report in a new light. Speculation that he may have been concealing evidence of obstruction of justice now rests on much more solid ground.

Anyone who doesn’t wonder why any president would be trying so hard to keep his former associates from co-operating with law enforcement and prosecutors simply isn’t thinking.

Meanwhile, it is obvious that the president is extremely concerned.

On Friday, he tweeted: “It now seems the General Flynn was under investigation long before was common knowledge. It would have been impossible for me to know this but, if that was the case, and with me being one of two people who would become president, why was I not told so that I could make a change?”

But, of course, he was warned, multiple times, about Mr Flynn, by Mr Obama, then-Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates, then-New Jersey governor Chris Christie, Representative Elijah Cummings, and, not least, then-FBI director James Comey.

Why would Mr Trump seek Mr Flynn’s silence long after his resignation and agreement to co-operate with prosecutors? It is hard not to assume he was trying to contain a potential crisis.

The attorney general’s conclusion that there was no presidential obstruction of justice, even by his own extraordinarily narrow standards, is looking increasingly shaky. And Mr Trump seems to know it.

https://agsiw.org/amid-saber-rattling-in-the-gulf-crisis-voices-of-caution-emerge/

While some urge confrontation, powerful voices of reason emerge.

Mounting tensions between Washington and Tehran have recently reached a boiling point, leading many observers to wonder if key factions in each government are quietly hoping for a military confrontation, or if miscalculation, misperception, and miscommunication could lead to the unintentional ignition of a conflict that no one wants.

These frictions have been steadily mounting for several years, following the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal and the refusal of Iran’s senior-most leaders to discuss any additional non-nuclear concerns. Any hopes the deal would moderate Iran’s aggressive regional policies were dashed. Tensions intensified with the election of Donald J. Trump as U.S. president, who campaigned denouncing both Iran and the JCPOA. Shortly after Trump’s inauguration, his first national security advisor, retired General Michael Flynn, put Iran “on notice” that a new era of U.S. pressure and skepticism was at hand. That culminated with the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the initiation of a campaign of “maximum pressure” against Tehran, mainly in the form of far-reaching new U.S. economic sanctions.

Gulf Arab countries were nervous about President Barack Obama’s nuclear negotiations with Iran, in large part because they did not attempt to address Iran’s regional conduct and hegemonic ambitions. However, these countries did not initially urge the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA, which they hoped would be used as leverage to change Iran’s regional policies. And, there is no evidence that any of the Gulf Arab governments have been promoting a military conflict between Washington and Tehran.

The Gulf Arab states appear to understand the limits of what Washington might be willing to do, unless attacked, regarding Iran. They seem fully aware that a U.S. invasion and occupation of Iran, akin to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is not in the cards. They seem to realize that a series of inconclusive military engagements such as airstrikes or skirmishes could leave them worse off than they already are. And they apparently understand, perhaps better than some U.S. officials, that regime change cannot be imposed on a large and well-organized country from the outside, particularly through mere financial pressure and political machinations.

Therefore, what the Gulf Arab countries undoubtedly seek is what they in fact say they want: not regime change as such but rather a significant change to Iran’s regional and foreign policies, particularly an end to Iran’s meddling in the Arab world, destabilizing of neighboring Arab states through nonstate militias and sectarian armed groups, and efforts to export its revolutionary agenda to the region. And while they welcome a wide range of U.S. and other pressures on Iran to achieve that goal, they do not appear to be pressing Washington toward an all-out military conflict.

As always, there is a range of views within and between the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain are strongest in categorically opposing Iran’s regional agenda. Qatar has always had to moderate its policies toward Iran because of their shared natural gas field that provides Doha with almost all its income, and, since a Saudi- and Emirati-led boycott against it began in June 2017, Iranian-provided civil aviation routes and other benefits. Oman has long maintained good relations with Iran, and Kuwait has established itself as the Gulf Arab mediator with the Iranians.

Some Gulf Arab leaders have welcomed U.S. sanctions and “maximum pressure” against Iran, which, in the short run, have led to diminished resources for Tehran to fund its armed proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Arab world. But privately there is a real concern among key Gulf Arab leaders that the gains of this campaign could be squandered without a political mechanism for translating them into agreements that involve changes in Iran’s behavior. They have always viewed the endgame as the establishment of a new, and less threatening, arrangement with Tehran about the limits of Iran’s ambitions and the threat it poses to regional stability.

These countries will almost certainly welcome statements by senior U.S. and Iranian leaders that neither country wants or expects a war, even if they wonder whether smaller factions in both might welcome a limited military confrontation for domestic political or ideological purposes. Yet U.S. and Iranian officials continue to accuse each other of trying to provoke a full-scale confrontation and tensions have risen to the point where a miscalculation or misinterpretation could lead to an unintended conflict.

In recent days, Saudi Arabia and its closest allies appear increasingly leery of the prospect of a military conflict. Perhaps the strongest signal of this was the New York Times commentary co-authored by Saudi analyst Abdulaziz Sager and Iranian former diplomat Hossein Mousavian, each of whom is known to be close to – and therefore unlikely to break ranks with – key leaders in their respective countries.

Sager and Mousavian wrote that “now is the time to explore a new foundation for a lasting peace in our region … because the situations in the historic conflict zones are ripe for diplomacy.” Their op-ed points the way forward to renewed dialogue between Tehran and Washington, and signals that Saudi Arabia, at least, felt it necessary to announce that it is open to such a process with Iran, implying Washington should be as well. It’s also a clear sign that Riyadh does not want to be seen as working in tandem with Israel, which has a very different set of concerns and priorities, in pushing the Trump administration into war.

It’s especially noteworthy that this comes at a time of increased Gulf Arab anger and anxiety given recent sabotage attacks against international oil tankers off the UAE coast and Houthi drone attacks against Saudi oil pumping stations. But even as such attacks prompt outrage, they also serve as useful reminders of the cost of conflict.

The Sager-Mousavian commentary not only indicates an appreciation of those costs, but virtually confirms the existence of a rumored high-level “Track II” or diplomatic backchannel between influential Gulf Arabs and Iranians. That suggests both parties are potentially ready for negotiations as brinksmanship begins to play itself out and the limits of what is achievable under the current circumstances are reached. Trump, too, campaigned against large-scale foreign commitments such as the Iraq and Afghan wars, and is unlikely to view an avoidable conflict with Iran as politically acceptable. Yet it’s possible that hard-liners in his administration such as National Security Advisor John Bolton and others, as well as extremists in Iran and elsewhere, could push the situation to a tipping point.

In the past, Oman has played a crucial role in providing a venue for U.S.-Iranian negotiations, and if the parties are looking for an offramp before they reach a broader conflagration neither wants nor needs, that could happen again. Europeans, too, could play a useful role in developing a new understanding with Iran based on economic and trade carrots and sticks that maintains Iranian compliance with its JCPOA commitments. This could then be expanded to include the two remaining key concerns of the Trump administration and its Middle East allies: Iran’s regional conduct and missile development. In the past, that United States’ European allies have served as the initial interlocutors with Tehran, sketching out the essential framework of agreements later involving Washington, and they could again play that role. Alternatively, Russia, which has good relations with both Iran and Gulf Arab countries, as well as Trump personally, could be a useful bridge away from a looming confrontation.

A resolution to the Yemen war, or at least some progress toward a negotiated end to the conflict, which once again seems possible given redeployments of Houthi forces from key Red Sea ports, could serve the interests of both Gulf Arab states and Iran and might be a good starting point. Maritime security, as well, has emerged as an obvious mutual imperative that could be cautiously explored between Saudi Arabia and its allies on the one hand and Iran and its allies on the other. This kind of sequential framework for Arab-Iranian dialogue remains a viable option.

An effort to calm frayed nerves seems to be developing as Trump continues to leave the door open to talks with Iran and reports suggest he has strongly pushed back on hawkish advisors, and UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash said his country is “very committed to de-escalation,” and would not to be baited into crisis. If an effective and dynamic Middle Eastern, European, or even Russian track with Iran can be developed, it can serve to further reduce tensions and eventually either expand to include the United States or lay the groundwork for new direct dialogue between Washington and Tehran. As things stand, the parties are dangerously close to a conflict no one wants or needs. But it’s reassuring to see that constructive and well-positioned voices are already seriously looking for a way out.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/the-trump-administration-s-dismantling-of-political-norms-will-have-to-be-fought-at-the-ballot-box-1.860323

It is increasingly clear that the United States has a president who places no importance upon adhering to the rules of the constitutional system.

Since the start of the Trump administration, I have been tracking in these pages a creeping process of American political deinstitutionalisation.

With the explosion of a series of bitter disputes between the White House and the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives this week, this alarming dynamic leapt out of the shadows of US governance and onto centre stage.

How the battle over Congress’s constitutionally mandated – but, for the president, extremely inconvenient – oversight authority proceeds will go far in determining whether the Trump administration succeeds in reshaping core political functions and expectations in the United States.

For more than 200 years, presidents have pushed back against congressional oversight. But all of them also recognised the legitimacy of that authority and the constitutional system of checks and balances, of which it is a cornerstone.

Until now.

This week, Mr Trump made it clear that the United States has a president who simply does not recognise, understand or care about the key balancing mechanisms in of the constitutional system, insofar as they interfere with his own interests.

He has asserted an unprecedented, blanket rejection of Congress’s role as a check on the executive through oversight and investigation. And if his absolute refusal to co-operate or reveal vital information proves effective, the balancing mechanisms of the US political system will be smashed to pieces.

Given that the House is now in the hands of the Democrats and the Robert Mueller report has been released by the Justice Department in a redacted form, this fight is no longer avoidable.

Mr Trump says he will oppose every single lawful subpoena from House committees, without exception.

Attorney General William Barr has refused a House Judiciary Committee order to produce Mueller investigation documents under an almost certainly spurious claim of “executive privilege”. The Committee has voted to hold him in contempt.

Former White House counsel Don McGahn is, on the same sweeping grounds, refusing a subpoena to testify. Donald Trump Jr seems to be preparing to do the same.

Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin has flatly refused to obey a law that clearly requires him to release Mr Trump’s tax returns to the House Ways and Means Committee.

In short, Mr Trump’s administration is asserting the authority to refuse, unilaterally and absolutely, to co-operate with Congressional investigations and requests for information, dismissing them all as “presidential harassment”, no matter what the law and the Constitution, let alone American norms, dictate.

Democratic leaders in Congress have deemed this “a constitutional crisis”. Influential commentators on both the left and the right have argued that, if they really believe this, they should push forward with Congress’s main weapon against a rogue president: impeachment.

But Democrats are clearly reticent to do that, because while impeachment in the House would be easy, a conviction in the Republican-held Senate is virtually impossible. Worse, the whole process would not only fail, it could easily prove a political godsend for Mr Trump, who will use his rhetoric of grievance to present it as another groundless “witch hunt” based on “fake news”.

That would leave Democrats relying on the courts to uphold congressional authority. However, there is a new, highly partisan five-vote Republican majority at the Supreme Court that, many fear, would be just as eager to serve Mr Trump as the Republican Senate is.

Only Chief Justice John Roberts – a lifelong republican but also a self-described defender of the court’s integrity – might defect to preserve traditional checks and balances. But it’s at least as likely that he will prove yet another GOP apparatchik. At this point, counting on a single person’s institutional imperatives and integrity seems desperate and naive.

A meticulously sourced New York Times investigation has demonstrated that Mr Trump’s carefully cultivated public persona, as a dynamic, highly successful, self-made real-estate billionaire in the 1980s and 1990s was an elaborate fiction.

In fact, he lost around $1 billion in less than a decade in terrible business deals, even though he received an equivalent of $413 million in today’s money from his father’s own real estate empire. Much of this cash, the report alleges, came Mr Trump’s way because he helped his father avoid paying taxes.

In response, Mr Trump characterised his suspect tax tactics as “sport”, which dovetails with his campaign pronouncement that not paying taxes merely “makes me smart”.

Yet, in Mr Trump’s hands, business after business has ended up in receivership, while he walks away, only to be salvaged by banks that are so deeply committed to him that they dare not abandon his debts, and so have bailed him out every time.

In his last debate against Hillary Clinton, Mr Trump told Americans he wanted to “run our country the way I’ve run my company”. Sadly, he seems to be doing precisely that.

The ultimate goal of deinstitutionalisation is the replacement of a country’s processes by an individual’s will.

Turkey has just provided yet another excellent example of what that looks like, with the order to rerun the Istanbul municipal vote, simply because the result did not suit President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Faced with these challenges to legislative authority, the Democratic House lacks good options, not to mention crucial allies in the Senate and judiciary.

It seems clear that the last and best chance to stop the Trump administration’s historic challenge to core American democratic institutions will be at the ballot box in 2020.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-06/putin-s-russia-gets-higher-marks-from-young-arabs-than-u-s

Surveys show respect for Putin and his country surpassing longstanding faith in the U.S. It probably won’t last.

Lots of Americans fear that Russia has returned as a major player in the Middle East. Lots of Arabs seem to hope so.

The impression rests on Russia’s successful intervention, along with its allies Iran and Hezbollah, in the Syrian war. Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made more trips to Moscow of late than to Washington, as Israel tries to secure its interests in Syria.

Among U.S. Arab allies, too, Russia’s influence has been growing, and not just with governments.

The last two editions of the Arab Youth Survey, an annual study of attitudes among 18- to 24-year-olds in the Middle East and North Africa, show young Arabs increasingly looking to Russia as an ally and viewing the U.S. as unreliable or worse.

Young Arabs unsurprisingly identified Iran as the main national “enemy” at 64 percent, but the U.S. came in second at 59 percent.

Meanwhile, the U.S. reputation as an ally is in decline. The proportion of young Arabs identifying it that way has gone from 63 percent in 2016 to 35 percent last year before ticking up a little to 41 percent now. Russia, by contrast, continues to get high marks, down slightly from 69 percent last year to 65 percent now.

In the strongly U.S.-aligned Gulf Arab countries, 43 percent of the young people surveyed see Washington as a “stronger ally” than Moscow, but only by a single percentage point, with Russia getting 42 percent.

This is particularly intriguing since the devastation in Syria tends to be Exhibit A in the bill of particulars against Iran and Hezbollah. But Russia appears to get a free pass on being the global godfather of the entire project.

The Soviet Union was largely elbowed out of the region after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and Egypt’s drift into Washington’s orbit. And after the end of the Cold War, Russia struggled to cling to any presence in the Middle East at all. But now it’s widely viewed as the primary outside power.

Its appeal can probably be best understood as a theoretical alternative to the U.S.

Its only role in the Gulf region is as Iran’s key international ally and as an alternative arms supplier for those who don’t get weapons from the U.S. Russia may well be serving as a proxy for an appealing, but hypothetical, multipolar reality in which Arab societies have many options for international support while most, practically speaking, really have just one: the U.S.

It’s unlikely that this apparent surge of sympathy for Russia is based on Moscow’s actual policies, particularly its intervention in Syria and patronage of Iran.

But the Syrian war may be helping the Russian image. When Moscow intervened in 2015, along with Iran and Hezbollah, to save the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, that was arguably the first successful international intervention in the Arab world since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

It gave Moscow the patina of being a powerful partner, a force for stability and sovereignty, and a winner. By contrast, the U.S. under Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump has looked timid and ineffectual despite Trump’s occasional air strikes in Syria and Yemen, and a financial war against Tehran. These seem like no-risk ventures.

Moreover, U.S. Arab allies often use Russia as leverage to get what they want from Washington. When Saudi Arabia tried to buy the anti-missile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, it had to move toward buying the Russian S-400 alternative before making real progress with Washington. The same goes for efforts by the United Arab Emirates to buy a modern U.S. jet fighter. The U.A.E. wants American F-35s, but to get them will probably have to negotiate for a Russian alternative.

It’s also helpful to Russia that it has been relatively absent from the Middle East for decades, leaving the U.S. to be blamed for everything that’s gone wrong since the 1970s or before.

Personalities are also in play. Trump is widely regarded globally as an absurd figure and champion of racists. Russian President Vladimir Putin, by contrast, manages to convey strength, determination, ruthlessness and gravitas. It also doesn’t hurt that Trump seems to be in awe of him.

Thus Putin seems to personify a determined and reliable Russia versus an indecisive and hapless U.S.

The honeymoon, though, is unlikely to last. Sooner rather than later, Russia is going to be held to account for its own conduct. And given the limitations of Russia’s ability to project power around the world, with an economy no larger than Italy’s, it is probably already overstretched in Syria alone.

If Washington ever awakens from its self-defeating retreat from active engagement in the Middle East, the idea that Russia is once again a major regional power could, and probably would, dissipate in a few weeks