https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/kavanaugh-s-confirmation-is-just-the-start-of-this-sorry-story-1.777956

The Senate may have voted in the favour of President Donald Trump’s nominee, but the Democrats still have options to explore

This weekend the US Senate confirmed Judge Brett Kavanaugh, 53, to a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court. But this story won’t end there.

His will be the decisive fifth vote in a new conservative court majority that could be dominant for decades. Conservatives have been trying for more than 30 years to control the court, and now they will.

But liberals won’t simply accept that.

On both procedural and substantive grounds, a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives – poised to emerge following the November midterms – can launch a real inquiry.

Questions regarding Judge Kavanaugh’s conduct, truthfulness and temperament have steadily grown.

The FBI’s “investigation” was a pitiful charade. Neither the judge nor his primary sexual assault accuser, Dr Christine Blasey Ford, were interviewed. Scores of people are on the record saying they have relevant information for the authorities, but were ignored.

The FBI was restricted to questioning a tiny handful of approved persons to seek implausible corroborative eyewitness testimony to two alleged incidents, and nothing more.

There’s obviously a mountain of relevant information, but the White House didn’t let the FBI go near it, since White House counsel Don McGann, Mr Kavanaugh’s primary booster, controlled their activities.

The New York Times reports that he warned President Donald Trump that a broad inquiry “would be potentially disastrous for Judge Kavanaugh’s chances.”

That dovetails with a disturbing pattern.

Ms Ford and the Democrats pressed for a serious FBI investigation, while Mr Kavanaugh and the Republicans resisted it. Senate Republicans fast-tracked the nomination, demonstrating an appreciation that time was not on their side and the less people knew, the better.

Ms Ford’s Senate testimony was straightforward, clear, and manifestly honest. Mr Kavanaugh’s was emotional, elusive, misleading and even downright dishonest. Her testimony bore all the hallmarks of truthfulness, whereas his, for all its passion, betrayed evasion and deception.

There are also troubling indications that he and his supporters knew about or anticipated accusations before they were made and prepared advance defences in a highly suspect manner.

The FBI report, which remains hidden, hasn’t answered any questions, because it wasn’t designed to. It was obviously just intended to give Republicans a fig leaf for confirming the nominee.

Most of the story may still be unknown, but a great deal is probably discoverable, and bad for Judge Kavanaugh.

So there are ample factual grounds for Democrats to reopen the case, as well as powerful political and procedural reasons.

The Kavanaugh nomination followed the scandal of Mr Trump’s first Supreme Court appointment, Neil Gorsuch. Senate Republicans refused to consider then-President Barack Obama’s candidate, Merrick Garland, for almost a year until after the next presidential election.

This unprecedented manipulation of majority power to essentially steal a Supreme Court seat is part of a larger picture.

Mr Trump lost the popular vote by almost three million to Hillary Clinton, while the Republican Senate majority represents a shrinking minority of Americans, heavily concentrated in smaller and rural states.

Republicans disproportionately benefit from a range of deviations in the American system from “one man, one vote” democracy, including heaps of “dark money” from unidentified donors, voter suppression, partisan gerrymandering and similar undemocratic distortions.

Republican control of the White House and Senate, if not the House of Representatives, represents the growth of what amounts to minority rule in the United States: the predominance of a right-wing government in what is increasingly becoming a majority centre-left country.

The House of Representatives is the least susceptible to such distortions, and appears to be about to fall back into Democratic hands. Both the Senate and the White House could easily follow. US politics isn’t just cyclical. It’s pendular, and Democrats will eventually come back to power.

But the conservative movement has secured the Supreme Court majority that has been its primary focus for decades. One can easily imagine that, soon enough, Democrats, perhaps with some liberal Republicans, will lead a progressive government while the emerging right-wing Supreme Court majority, largely shaped by Mr Trump, tries to block its every move.

Since this is what both sides are also imagining, Democrats will explore every option to prevent it. There’s never been a successful impeachment of a Supreme Court justice. But there’s always a first time, especially since the new Supreme Court majority will be widely and plausibly regarded as tainted and illegitimate.

Whether or not they can remove Judge Kavanaugh, a new Democratic-controlled government is also likely to try expanding the Supreme Court by several new members. Expect that, too.

The bottom line is, Republicans don’t have a defensible narrative. They are either saying, in effect, that Ms Ford is a crazy person who has been manipulated into spreading outlandish lies. Or they are saying that even if she’s telling the truth, with all that implies, they don’t care.

Both arguments are utterly indefensible. In this giant swirl of contested claims, that these are the only two positions available to them has been lost. But if tested against the facts and more rational interpretations, they’ll both collapse spectacularly.

So, his confirmation will be just the beginning of the already sordid Kavanaugh saga.

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/how-iran-and-the-gulf-arab-states-can-start-a-dialogue-again

It’s hard to overstate the regional impact of the rivalry between Iran and several Gulf Arab states—most notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—bordering in recent years on enmity.

While these countries haven’t come close to direct warfare, tensions have impacted many regional conflicts in the Middle East including in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, and festering instability in countries like Lebanon, Bahrain, and even among the Palestinians.

More even than the struggle against terrorist groups like al-Qaeda or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Turkish-Kurdish struggles, the confrontation between Iran and Gulf Arab countries has provided an ideological framework that generated proxy conflicts and greatly exacerbated existing ones. As a result, this has caused Iran and Gulf Arab countries to search for every opportunity to bedevil each other, and expand their own influence while limiting the other side.

These contradictions boiled over with the execution of the Saudi Shia dissident and secessionist cleric Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016, and the subsequent mob attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, which led Riyadh to end its ties with Tehran. But tensions have been a constant feature of the relationship since the 1979 Iranian revolution, and particularly following the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq.

From a Gulf Arab perspective, since the ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Iran hasn’t only gone from strength to strength in the Middle East, but has been systematically encroaching into the Arab world through a campaign of destabilizing Arab countries and utilizing proxies and militias to exploit or create chaos in Arab societies in order to expand its influence. Iran sees itself surrounded by enemies and casts its role in Arab countries like Syria and Iraq as combating terrorism in order to enhance stability and security.

Two recent conflicts have brought them closer than ever before. In Syria, Iranian forces and Iran-backed militias engaged in direct combat against Gulf Arab-sponsored rebel groups. And in Yemen, Gulf Arab forces have battled Iran-sponsored Houthi rebel fighters. In each case, one side has been directly confronting clients or proxies of the other.

Conventional wisdom suggests that relations are presently as bad as ever, if not worse. Tehran has blamed the United States and Gulf Arab countries for terrorist attacks inside Iran. Riyadh and Washington blame Iran for a series of missile attacks by Houthi rebels in Yemen against Saudi cities.

Both countries are reacting to a new campaign of maximum pressure against Iran unleashed by the Trump administration following its withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement. The Iranian leadership feels angry and alarmed, particularly since sanctions have helped greatly exacerbate a serious economic crisis in Iran which, in turn, intensified a range of social and political tensions within the country.

Saudi Arabia and its allies, by contrast, feel that Washington is once again fully on their side, which will lead to a reversal of strategic victories for Iran in the Arab world since 2003.

Yet few believe there is a military solution to the tensions between Iran and Gulf Arab countries. Tehran may wish to become a revolutionary regional superpower, but its leaders understand that its appeal is limited to certain, largely majority Shia or Shia-dominated areas.

Therefore, it’s not surprising that Iran has been more open to dialogue in recent years, believing it’s entering any such discourse from a position of strength.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, by contrast, are resistant to a direct dialogue under the current circumstances, believing Iran would be shaking with one hand and sticking the knife in with the other. And, of course, they hope that Washington’s newly aggressive posture towards Iran will lead to strategic setbacks that allow them to negotiate with Tehran on more equitable terms, if not from a position of relative advantage.

So, eventually, dialogue will be necessary. But it’s impossible to imagine a leap from the current estrangement and widespread proxy confrontation to a new norm of cooperation and comity. To put it plainly, any rapprochement will have to be realized in stages, and the creation of a functional dialogue itself would be a major accomplishment.

Efforts by Kuwait and others to engineer that have failed spectacularly. The key may be to develop a sequential process, in which successfully dealing with one issue leads logically to the next, until the most damaging regional problems are dealt with and the basis for greater stability is restored.

Such a framework for progress could form by demonstrating the mutual gains, building confidence, and laying the groundwork for the next constructive step, as well as reducing the chances of additional irritants and sources of tension.

Ending the war in Yemen is an obvious first step in the process, given its centrality to Saudi concerns and Iran’s limited interests in the country. It’s hard to imagine a working dialogue going forward until this conflict is contained and possibly resolved.

Second, both sides can and should agree on the political independence, territorial integrity, and need for stability in Syria and Iraq. This would reflect a generalized understanding of spheres of influence and a balance of power in the region that is mutually acceptable, sustainable and reflective of the actual conditions in the countries in question. In effect, Saudi Arabia and its allies will have to tolerate a more powerful and influential Iran than they would like, but Tehran cannot continue to impose its will by force on parts of the Arab world in which it currently operates as a hegemonic power.

Finally, it’s essential that Hezbollah return to serving its constituency in Lebanon and stop acting as an international revolutionary vanguard supporting a range of militias and proxies throughout the region. Ending Iran’s support for militias and strategy of promoting and exploiting state weakness in much of the Arab world will have to be a central theme, and of any successful process. This third stage would represent, in effect, Iran agreeing to move away from its reliance on proxies to pursue its interests at the expense of its Arab neighbors while others recognize its legitimate regional role and interests.

Such a sequential framework is potentially realistic and practicable, and it’s hard to imagine a more ambitious approach succeeding under the current circumstances. And it may be that such a dialogue cannot be entertained now. However, sooner rather than later the limitations of what all sides can achieve in the era following the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement will become evident. Regime change in Iran is highly unlikely, but Tehran won’t be able to isolate Washington and its allies or keep the nuclear deal afloat for long.

When the dust settles, Iran and Gulf Arab countries—as well as United States—will have to confront the limitations of what can be achieved under these circumstances and once again look for a plausible modus vivendi. Then a constructive dialogue should become possible, particularly if Iran suffers strategic setbacks in the Arab world where it has overreached.

That could help ensure Iran’s negotiating positions are more realistic and that Gulf Arab countries can enter such a dialogue with more confidence and, therefore, realism. That would help set up the long-term compromise described above where both sides get less than they want, but as much as they need, from each other.

Iraq’s New Government: Balancing Allies and Neighbors

With the new government, Iraq could be a major arena for those seeking to roll back Iran’s influence in the region.

The formation of Iraq’s new government under the prime minister-designate, Adel Abdul Mahdi, could represent another small step forward in the incremental process, being led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, of counterbalancing Iran’s hegemonic influence in Iraq and reintegrating that country into its broader Arab milieu. Much depends on the nature of the government Abdul Mahdi will assemble in the coming weeks, and how the division of power plays out as various Iraqi leaders orient themselves in the postelection environment.

Abdul Mahdi is a consensus choice that points to continuity rather than reform and avoids consolidating or institutionalizing the rise in power of the Popular Mobilization Forces pro-Iranian sectarian militia groups that, along with their allies, represent Tehran’s strongest assets in Iraq. As The Washington Post reported, “A pro-Iran bloc of lawmakers, led by [PMF] militia commander Hadi al-Amiri and former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, tried to block Abdul Mahdi’s nomination but eventually dropped their opposition once they realized they did not have enough seats for a parliamentary majority.” Eventually Amiri joined Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the largest bloc in Parliament, in backing Abdul Mahdi, presumably in exchange for key posts in the forthcoming Cabinet.

Abdul Mahdi’s elevation, therefore, is a compromise everyone can live with, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Sadr, Kurdish parties, and even Iran. Indeed, he is a formerly sectarian Shia politician who once had deep ties to Tehran, but has since become much more of a nationalist nonsectarian figure. He therefore represents many of the same tendencies as Sadr – Iraqi nationalism and outreach to Kurds and Sunni Arabs but from an unmistakably Shia communal basis. The days in which the United States and Iran could essentially cooperate in Iraq, for example to maintain the status quo and stability or, especially, to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, are long gone. However, the appointment of Abdul Mahdi as prime minister, with Sadr lurking closely behind him in a position of authoritative kingmaker power doesn’t particularly favor either Washington or Tehran, the two outside powers that have dominated Iraqi politics since the ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003.

However, it could represent a significant step forward for the newest external players in the Iraqi political scene, the Gulf Arab countries – particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, of course, has a long history with Iraq, but essentially walked away from efforts to seriously engage with Iraqi domestic politics during the premiership of Nuri al-Maliki, who pursued an increasingly sectarian and pro-Iranian policy. In the past few years, however, Riyadh has made a major effort to re-engage with Iraq largely through incentives and positive diplomacy, seeking to foster Iraqi policies that are more balanced between Arab and Iranian influences and interests. For instance, Sadr and Saudi Arabia publicly built strong channels of communication in the run-up to the Iraqi election, as the Shia cleric was representing himself as a nationalist alternative to unwaveringly pro-Iranian policies by the PMF groups or Maliki.

Therefore, that Tehran, Amiri, and Maliki all have found it advantageous to help Abdul Mahdi secure his position, after initially trying and failing to block him, opens even further precisely the space within Iraqi politics in which Saudi Arabia operates: promoting Iraqi nationalism and reintegration in the Arab world as opposed to the country operating as a colony or satellite of Iran. Saudi Arabia’s room to maneuver in Iraq seems to be growing, especially as the election results and Sadr’s successful campaign suggested that many Iraqis are looking for alternatives to Iranian or U.S. hegemony. This is underscored by offers from Iraq to mediate between Washington and Tehran as tensions rise in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and the administration’s campaign of “maximum pressure” against Iran.

Major political unrest and mounting U.S.-Iranian tensions in strategically and politically crucial parts of Iraq in recent weeks have also created new opportunities for Gulf Arab engagement. In early September, mobs of angry protesters in Basra, chanting “Iran out, Iran out,” torched the Iranian Consulate in the heavily Shia and traditionally pro-Iranian city. At least 15 people died in the unrest, which went on for many days and appeared targeted at both Iran and the local government. Grievances included lack of clean water, an electricity crisis exacerbated (if not created) by Iran, and abuses by pro-Iranian militia groups. As tensions rose, the United States was forced to close its consulate in Basra due to threats from Iranian-backed extremists. The outpouring of popular anger against Iran and its local Iraqi clients in the heartland of Shia Iraq was the most dramatic of many indications in recent years that Iran has overplayed its hand in Iraq and that, even among Iraqi Shias, the constituency for greater distance from Iran is powerful and growing.

Iran helped provoke this crisis through a clumsy and heavy-handed tactic: cutting off electricity supplies to the Basra area in the midst of Iraq’s sweltering summer heat. Iran provides an estimated third of all electricity supplies to Basra, and the resulting crisis focused much attention on Iran’s accumulation of power and economic, political, and military stranglehold on much of Iraqi life. It seems clear that the move, ostensibly based on nonpayment of bills, was actually designed to send a message to Iraqis, and especially the outgoing government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, as well as all those involved in the formation of the new government, that Iran has tremendous power in Iraq and is willing to use it to make a point, even in Basra and at the expense of the Iraqi public. None of these messages went down particularly well. The term “political blackmail” was leveled by more than one official, and that seemed to represent much of public opinion.

Into the breach immediately stepped Gulf Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia agreed to sell electricity, as well as a large solar power plant, to Iraq for heavily discounted prices, and Kuwait, which has long been involved in investments and other major projects in southern Iraq, also moved to help replace Iran’s corner on this market. As Evan Langenhahn has argued, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait “together have the resources to provide Iraq with the electricity it requires, diminishing Iranian control over Iraq’s economy, depriving Iran of hard currency, and bolstering political stability through economic development.” Saudi Arabia’s position in Iraq is also strengthened by the selection of Kurdish leader Barham Salih as Iraq’s new president. Salih has few ties and no history of cooperation with Tehran and favors a strong Kurdistan Regional Government within Iraq but is not a major proponent of Kurdish secession, which dovetails well with Gulf Arab interests. Saudi Arabia is also increasingly looking to the KRGas a vital entry point to the broader Iraqi economy and increased investments in the country.

In order to offset or balance Iran’s influence in Iraq, however, the Gulf Arab countries don’t only need each other. They will also rely on a partnership with Washington, which still has a considerable economic, military, and political presence in Iraq, to complete the assemblage. Tehran has a unique degree of leverage and influence in Iraq, unmatched by any other outside power. But if Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United States coordinate their efforts to undermine Iran’s hegemonic influence, and promote a more independent Iraqi nationalism and Iraq’s reintegration in the Arab world, Tehran would be facing a combined effort that could well match its prowess. The elevation of Abdul Mahdi hardly guarantees this will happen or would succeed. But, along with the Basra unrest and many other recent indicators, it does suggest that the conditions for such an initiative are ripe as ever, and that Iraq can, and should be, a major arena for those seeking to roll back the disproportionate influence Tehran has accumulated in the Arab world over the past 15 years.