Monthly Archives: December 2017

Are we witnessing a broad reorientation of US politics in the Trump era?

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/are-we-witnessing-a-broad-reorientation-of-us-politics-in-the-trump-era-1.691522

Almost a year into the Donald Trump presidency, it is a good time to reflect on what it has, and has not, meant over the long run for American politics and foreign policy. In the short term, as I have frequently argued, it seems clear it has involved a degree of almost calculated and willful American decline in international influence and authority. But, in the longer term, are we witnessing the beginning of a broad reorientation, or is the Trump era essentially a speed bump in a broader trajectory that will remain essentially linear?

In these pages last February I speculated on how, if he played his cards right, Mr Trump might be able to preside over a redrawing of the American political landscape that could persist for at least a generation. Is that happening?

Largely, and probably mercifully, it’s not. In order to accomplish the potential restructuring I anticipated, Mr Trump would have to initiate a genuinely populist, pro-labour, economic policy of essentially Keynesian stimulus through the kind of gigantic infrastructure programme on which he campaigned.

If he could get Congress to authorise at least $1 trillion in new government spending on badly needed infrastructural repairs and improvements, and thereby create a huge wave of new and well-paid working-class jobs, Mr Trump could probably win over labour leaders as well as many of their constituents and reorient the Republicans away from traditional conservatism.

However, there is no sign of any such programme. On the contrary, the Republican Congress has just approved, to Mr Trump’s evident delight, a $1.5 trillion tax cut that will massively transfer wealth from the middle and working classes to the rich, explode the national deficit and debt, and therefore serve as the basis for large spending cuts on everything except the military.

It’s almost impossible to imagine the Congress that just passed this gigantic tax reduction approving a massive new spending programme. So the sine qua non of the total ideological realignment I imagined seems now unattainable.

However, other aspects of the changes I envisaged are developing. In particular, the process whereby an entire generation of neoconservatives and other foreign policy hawks begin to migrate from the Republican to the Democratic Party.

As with the process in the 1970s when hawkish liberals slowly morphed into neoconservatives and bolted the Democratic Party for the Republicans, the current counter-migration is fitful, fraught, unpleasant and non-linear. Yet, it is clearly gaining steam.

In some cases, the ideological transformation appears complete. The noted neoconservative intellectual Max Boot, one of the most vehement “never-Trumpers,” has recently written about how, as a good conservative and Republican, he used to scoff at the complaints of blacks and other ethnic minorities, women and others and dismiss the idea of white privilege. “If the Trump era teaches us anything,” he writes, “ it is how far we still have to go to realise the ‘unalienable rights’ of all Americans to enjoy ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,’ regardless of gender, sexuality, religion or skin colour.” His article might as well have been called “How Trump Made Me a Liberal,” and, inevitably over time, a Democrat.

Former Republican congressman turned journalist Joe Scarborough, once a follower of key Trump supporter Newt Gingrich, has been inching to the left for many years. But his recent scathing attack in the Washington Post on the Republican tax bill as a plundering of working-class pocketbooks by rich plutocrats might have been written by not merely a Democrat, but a Bernie Sanders ultraliberal. Mr Scarborough’s journey from right to left, while largely under chronicled and seldom analysed, is one of the most dramatic in contemporary American politics.

But, one need not become a full-blown liberal to have left the now-Trumpian Republicans, as George Will, who has boundless contempt for Mr Trump and all his works, has demonstrated. He has formally left the Republican Party but remains a committed conservative. Unlike most of the others, it’s hard to imagine Mr Will voting for Democrats, or at least admitting to it, on a regular basis. But, in the long run, where can he go?

Mr Will, and others such as Bill Kristol, son of one of the founding neoconservatives, Irving Kristol, have hinted at the creation of a new, center-right third party. They must know this is structurally impossible in the American system. Such sentiments are invariably an unhappy way station in the often dismal journey from one affiliation to the other.

Many conservative Republicans, who now rightly feel adrift and without a party, have no such illusions. Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin, among others, has been blunt about the need for all right-thinking people to hold Republicans accountable for their backing of Mr Trump at the polls, particularly in the upcoming midterm elections.

There are countless other commentators and columnists who have spent a political lifetime on the right and as committed Republicans but who are now identifiably somewhere on the road to permanently realigning as Democrats. At the very least, this one part of the grand reorientation I imagined back in February is actually happening.

Trump said he didn’t care about the Jerusalem fallout. Turns out he cares a great deal

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/trump-said-he-didn-t-care-about-the-jerusalem-fallout-turns-out-he-cares-a-great-deal-1.689962

The US president thought he was shoring up his evangelical base with the announcement – but the move backfired worse than he could have imagined

I am not in the outrage business. Years ago I trafficked in plenty of professional Arab-American pique. But around 2004, I deliberately abandoned the bluster, the community representation that required it, and the farcical television “debates” I then specialised in. Sober, constructive analysis intended to promote preferable outcomes seemed so much more valuable and interesting.

Time and again, though, Donald Trump is painfully forcing me back into indignation mode – most recently on Jerusalem. On this most sensitive of disputes, involving war and peace and therefore people’s lives, my instincts and values instruct me to craft frank and thoughtful but purposeful interventions that, hopefully, might help prevent matters from getting worse and perhaps even promote improvement. Words do matter.

Alas, Mr Trump is giving those of us searching for the least negative interpretation of his recent actions on Jerusalem nothing to work with.

Just before his announcement earlier this month pledging to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, I incurred the blustering wrath of a noted Palestinian activist on an Arab TV show. I suggested that Mr Trump was largely motivated by domestic political considerations and that there existed a wide range of possible statements he might make with varying diplomatic implications and, therefore, also an array of potentially wise Arab and Palestinian responses. The simple suggestion that political realities are complex sent him into paroxysms of outrage, peppered with ludicrous accusations.

But this angry rejection of analysis and indignant championing of un-thought illustrated that opportunists and demagogues were being handed a potentially potent rhetorical weapon that would be highly resistant to the simplest applications of reason.

I pointed out, for example, that some vital policy implications of Mr Trump’s announcement would hinge on quotidian but meaningful bureaucratic questions, such as whether American diplomatic documents would continue to refer simply to “Jerusalem” or would now read “Jerusalem, Israel”. Apparently there are no plans to refer to “Jerusalem, Israel”, which is clearly quite significant.

Beyond such details, however, both the announcement and several subsequent administration moves almost willfully block any broader reading that mitigates the enormous harm they have done to prospects for peace and broader US interests in the Middle East.

True, in his statement Mr Trump did claim: “We are not taking a position on any final status issues, including the specific boundaries of the Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, or the resolution of contested borders.”

But that is obviously false. Merely stating that “Jerusalem is Israel’s capital” unquestionably takes a strong new position on a core final status issue. It severely prejudices and might effectively remove Jerusalem from negotiations. This isolated, vague and factually incorrect sentence did virtually nothing to offset his echoing mantra that “Jerusalem is Israel’s capital”.

Since then, all serious people have been waiting, again in vain, for White House clarification that Mr Trump was talking about West Jerusalem and not occupied East Jerusalem.

Astoundingly, administration officials were unable to even identify what country they believed Mr Trump was in when he visited the Western Wall. Another senior official further muddied the waters by stating: “We cannot envision any situation under which the Western Wall would not be part of Israel.”

But please remember, they are “not taking any position on final status issues”.

Then came the US veto at the UN Security Council on Monday, whose other members voted unanimously in favour of repudiating and invalidating Mr Trump’s statement, followed by his offensive and insulting threats to link US aid to countries’ votes on a similar resolution that was passed overwhelmingly by the General Assembly.

Those of us looking for ways forward have been utterly thwarted. What can we honestly say? That Mr Trump was referring to West Jerusalem but not East Jerusalem? That he hasn’t prejudiced a core final status issue or trashed the very basis of the Oslo agreements and the peace process which Washington is supposed to guarantee? That we even understand what, precisely, US policy is now on Jerusalem?

Clearly, Mr Trump did this to shore up his evangelical base given mounting political pressure he faces from the Robert Mueller investigation and his dwindling public support. But it is also evident that this inexperienced administration thought they didn’t care about the international fallout, because they badly underestimated it. It turns out they care very much indeed, with anger and recriminations aimed even at close allies.

Mr Trump probably thought he was ticking a domestic political box and wouldn’t have to hear anything more about Jerusalem during his presidency. In reality, he’ll never hear the end of it.

The worst actors are having a cynical field day. Israel’s long-standing ally, Turkey, is now absurdly posing as the champion of Palestine and Al Quds to promote its pro-Islamist, pro-Hamas agenda. Ankara’s main competition comes from Hizbollah and Iran.

Mr Trump’s Jerusalem statement was reckless, miscalculated and deeply harmful. Instead of salvaging matters with simple but crucial clarifications, his administration is now repeatedly doubling-down on the damage. Someone should inform them Palestinians and other Arabs have domestic politics too.

My raison d’etre as a commentator will remain crafting constructive arguments. But Mr Trump’s Jerusalem fiasco is a reminder that sometimes it’s just impossible.

How Trump’s National Security Strategy Will be Read in the Gulf

http://www.agsiw.org/how-trumps-national-security-will-be-read-gulf/

When Donald J. Trump was elected president of the United States just over a year ago, Washington’s Gulf Arab allies were generally optimistic. They were so alienated by President Barack Obama’s second term that almost any change would have been welcome. They expected to hear fewer complaints about democracy, and human and women’s rights, from a Trump administration than from a traditional Republican or Democratic White House. And, especially, they were buoyed by Trump’s strong campaign rhetoric against Iran.

Thus far, they have not been disappointed. And they will, in general, welcome the contents of the administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released December 18, outlining the focus of U.S. foreign policy under Trump. The three main goals for the Middle East – combating “jihadist terrorists,” preventing the domination of “any power hostile to the United States,” and ensuring “a stable global energy market” – are fully consistent with the national interests of all of the Gulf Arab countries.

What the Gulf Countries Will Read into the NSS

The Gulf Arab countries will pay little attention to the ideological and often sharp domestic political content in the NSS. And they will be less perturbed than some other states, particularly in Europe, by apparent contradictions between passages reiterating a traditional values and rules-based U.S. approach and new elements reflecting a Trumpian “America First” agenda. Gulf Arab interests are quite specific, and therefore they will generally focus on those aspects of the NSS that appear to most directly address their relatively narrow concerns.

Above all, as with many U.S. partners around the world, they will strongly welcome the clear commitment in the new NSS to valuing, respecting, and prioritizing U.S. partnerships around the world and, especially, to Washington’s global leadership role. “America First” is plainly not being interpreted by the administration as a kind of neo-isolationism, as some of Trump’s supporters advocated and many others feared, and as might have been implied by the deep history of the phrase itself. Instead, the NSS unequivocally commits Washington to maintain, and in some cases even expand, its global and regional commitments.

If there appears to be a contradiction throughout the document – evident in the first paragraph of its introduction – between “a strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology,” that is somehow also simultaneously “grounded in the realization that American principles are a lasting force for good in the world,” this will not raise many eyebrows in the Gulf region. Indeed, Washington’s Gulf Arab allies are likely to welcome the repeated assertions that “the American way of life cannot be imposed upon others,” and that values will not be a defining feature of Washington’s partnerships around the world, whereas shared interests and desired outcomes will be. In particular, they will welcome the assertion that “We are not going to impose our values on others. Our alliances, partnerships, and coalitions are built on free will and shared interests.”

Gulf Arab countries are likely to give more weight to those passages that emphasize the transactional character of Washington’s partnerships rather than more familiar recitations of the need to spread human rights, democracy, and other traditional American values. Yet even the passages that emphasize such values, particularly on women’s rights, will be even less problematic than statements made in the past, particularly in Saudi Arabia, given the significant reforms on gender discrimination currently underway in the kingdom.

Moreover, most Gulf countries will strongly welcome the assertion in the NSS that “The United States has learned that neither aspirations for democratic transformation nor disengagement can insulate us from the region’s problems.” This passage strongly implies that Washington has drawn what Gulf countries would regard as the correct lessons from the Arab Spring upheavals, yet understands that a continued strong U.S. role in the Middle East and the Gulf is indispensable. That is precisely what most of these governments (with the possible exception of Qatar, because of its support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other Arab republics) would wish to hear. The additional observation that “We must be realistic about our expectations for the region,” will likely be viewed as further reinforcement of the dominant narrative in most Gulf countries, which champions carefully calibrated and managed, top-down, social and political transformations as opposed to uncontrolled revolutionary tumult. To emphasize this point, the NSS confirms “Whenever possible, we will encourage gradual reforms.”

The Fundamentals of Partnership

There is much in the NSS to reassure Washington’s Gulf Arab allies about the value the Trump administration places on alliances with traditional Middle East partners. Indeed, Trump’s introductory note boasts that “We have renewed our friendships in the Middle East,” which is precisely what Gulf Arab countries were hoping for following years of alienation from the Obama administration. They will especially welcome the commitment that “We will retain the necessary American military presence in the region to protect the United States and our allies from terrorist attacks and preserve a favorable regional balance of power.” There is no reference to a major U.S. “pivot to Asia” – an Obama-era concept that prompted considerable anxiety in the Gulf.

The unusual focus of this NSS on U.S. prosperity and economic security should work to the advantage of Gulf countries. Most of them have excellent trade balances with the United States, and serve as major markets for U.S. exports in general and in defense-related goods and services in particular. Insofar as the Trump administration judges its international relations based on a mercantile balance of payments, the Gulf countries are well-positioned to argue their case for being exemplary partners. Moreover, repeated calls for greater “burden sharing” by U.S. partners around the world and admonitions to “modernize, acquire necessary capabilities, improve readiness, [and] expand the size of their forces” will help bolster their case for more technology transfer and cutting-edge weapons sales. The United Arab Emirates, for example, is angling to purchase fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets and Saudi Arabia is seeking the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system. Burden sharing rhetoric also bolsters the case for the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, which is increasingly being characterized in Washington discourse as a military quagmire and a breathtaking humanitarian crisis. Yet, if burden sharing is to be taken seriously, the Yemen campaign, whatever its drawbacks and failings, must in part be seen as a meaningful response to such a demand.

Gulf Arab countries might be expected to dislike passages in the NSS identifying “energy dominance” as a new U.S. national security goal. In fact, this is very unlikely to cause any concern, let alone friction. The text defines the rather grandiose term “energy dominance” in a surprisingly modest, practical manner: “America’s central position in the global energy system as a leading producer, consumer, and innovator.” This is neither new nor problematic for Gulf Arab countries. Moreover, the United States has long since ceased to be a major export market for most Gulf energy products, whereas their markets in South and East Asia do not appear to be threatened. The technological and other changes that have resulted in a global energy glut were unavoidable, and because most energy products and money are fungible, U.S. “energy dominance” as defined in this way poses no economic or security threat to Gulf Arab energy exporters. Indeed, pledges in the NSS to “work with allies and partners to protect global energy infrastructure from cyber and physical threats,” and “encourage other countries to develop their own” strategic petroleum stocks will be fundamentally reassuring.

Iran

The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, all close partners of the United States, have numerous differences, perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the ongoing boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. But they essentially agree that Iran poses the most serious strategic threat to their interests and to the region. There is much in the NSS to reinforce their belief that the Trump administration is taking a tougher line toward Tehran and its proxies, at least rhetorically. Iran and North Korea are repeatedly identified as “rogue regimes,” a phrase that had been jettisoned during the entire eight years of the Obama administration. Iran stands directly accused of sponsoring “terrorism around the world,” “developing more capable ballistic missiles,” and potentially resuming its nuclear weapons research and development. Gulf Arab countries will certainly welcome repeated pledges to combat “Iranian-backed groups such as Lebanese Hizballah.”

Despite the strong language about Iran in the NSS, the document does not suggest any actionable strategy for confronting Iran and its proxies or rolling back their influence. It does not seriously consider Iran’s role in Syria or Iraq, or acknowledge the recent acquisition by Tehran and its proxies of key areas along the Iraqi-Syrian border, which, if consolidated, could create a long-sought land bridge between Iran and the Mediterranean Sea. The NSS complains that “Iran, the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, has taken advantage of instability to expand its influence through partners and proxies, weapons proliferation, and funding.” But this and several similar passages are essentially descriptive rather than prescriptive, and do not indicate in any meaningful way what, beyond strengthening regional partnerships and maintaining its military presence, Washington intends to do to disrupt or reverse this expansion.

The GCC

The NSS repeats Washington’s commitment to “a strong and integrated Gulf Cooperation Council,” which, in context, appears to be a subtle and implicit encouragement to resolve the dispute with Qatar. While National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster has been accusing Turkey and Qatar – implicitly in coordination – of becoming the new primary sponsors and funders of groups promoting violent Islamic extremism, there is nothing in the NSS reflecting this perspective. It affirms that “Some of our partners are working together to reject radical ideologies,” which certainly refers to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but may or may not be intended to include Qatar and others. It again suggests that Washington’s “partners procure interoperable missile defense” capabilities, a long-standing U.S. goal for the GCC, which shows no signs of being advanced in practice in any serious way.

Israel and Jerusalem

The latest irritant between Washington and its Gulf Arab partners is the recent announcement by Trump that the United States recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The administration has been pursuing the prospect of an “outside-in” approach to Middle East peace by bringing Gulf Arab countries, among others, into the peace process and creating an expanded dialogue with Israel about resolving the Palestinian issue and confronting Iran. This has been greatly complicated by the Jerusalem announcement. The NSS does not reference this issue directly, but states that while “the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has been understood as the prime irritant preventing peace and prosperity in the region,” now “the threats from jihadist terrorist organizations and the threat from Iran are creating the realization that Israel is not the cause of the region’s problems.” This passage implies that Washington still intends to promote an outside-in agenda based on the mutual threats from terrorism and Iran, and does not believe that Israel’s occupation, even in Jerusalem, is a major issue over the long run for many Arab countries, especially in the Gulf. Such expectations may underestimate the continued political, religious, and diplomatic significance of Palestinian issues, and particularly Jerusalem, in the Arab and Islamic worlds, including in the Gulf.

The Gulf Will Want Deeds to Follow Words

Overall, the NSS will be strongly welcomed in the Gulf, despite the lack of specifics regarding what the United States intends to do, practically, to combat the spread of Iranian influence in the region. But the repeated assurances that traditional alliances are vital, not predicated on the spread of American values, centered around transactional and instrumental outcomes, and based on shared interests rather than ideologies will be most welcome. Jarring notes such as the passage asserting that “jihadist terrorists attempt to force those under their influence to submit to Sharia law” will be dismissed, probably correctly, as nods to domestic constituencies that respond to such inapposite buzzwords. Because most of its content is so closely aligned with their own interests, Washington’s Gulf Arab allies will be hoping that the key themes of the NSS prove not to be limited to rhetoric and aspiration, but are translated into practical, effective policies.

A national security strategy should provide clarity, but the Trump foreign policy doctrine is laced with contradiction

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/a-national-security-strategy-should-provide-clarity-but-the-trump-foreign-policy-doctrine-is-laced-with-contradiction-1.684825

Since Donald Trump took office almost a year ago, one of the most vexing questions has been: what will an “America first” foreign policy mean? With the administration torn between multiple competing power centres, unusually large gaps between rhetoric and reality and the inherent challenges of interpreting an essentially novel framework for US foreign policy, friend and foe alike have been left scratching their heads. Monday’s release of the new US national security strategy document, the first since 2015, should, in theory, do much to clarify what a Trumpian foreign policy doctrine involves.

It will be scrutinised at home and abroad on three main criteria: how much it diverges from traditional US foreign policy; how interoperable and logically consistent its component parts seem and how well these ideas comport with the administration’s practical actions and stated goals thus far.

While the 70-page text has been fairly closely-guarded, the outlines have become clear. The drafting has been led by Nadia Schadlow, senior director for strategy at the National Security Council, who is widely respected as an establishment conservative figure well-versed in traditional US and Republican Party foreign policy thinking. Therefore, it’s not terribly surprising that much of the text frequently doesn’t deviate dramatically from strategies issued by the George W Bush and Barack Obama administrations.

While the continuities will be marked, there will also be some significant distinctions. Perhaps most notably, and unsurprisingly, the Trump strategy will downplay, although not eliminate, several traditional pillars of US foreign policy, particularly the role of values and human rights and the importance of multilateral institutions, alliances and treaties.

Even more strikingly, the virtues of nationalism, and indeed parochialism, will be stressed at the expense of Washington’s traditional championing of a rules-based international order that promises win-win scenarios. Instead, much of this strategy will implicitly assume an anarchical international competition of all against all, with clear winners and losers fighting over limited and diminishing, rather than expanding, global prizes and resources.

Critics will protest a surrendering of principles while supporters defend clear-headed realism.

But passages reflecting this binary and narrow vision will coexist uneasily with much more familiar articulations of how American principles inform both US foreign policy conduct and goals. There is likely to be a considerable degree of dissonance throughout between the Trumpian “America first” impulse and more normative iterations of “Americanism” in foreign policy.

“America first” has not translated into neo-isolationism, either in theory or in practice. Indeed, “expanding American influence” is among four central pillars of the new strategy. But it has involved a retreat of American global authority – whether by ceding new space for Chinese leadership on trade and technological innovation, expanding Russian influence in Syria and the rest of the Middle East, or favouring narrow bilateral arrangements over more advantageous but far-reaching multilateral institutions and agreements.

Mr Trump’s political base may actually welcome this calculated international retreat, viewing it as an essential prelude to emphasising domestic priorities. What otherwise appears to be foreign policy self-mutilation is thereby perceived as a practical expression of “America first”.

But will the strategy help resolve some of the profound contradictions that have plagued Mr Trump’s foreign policies thus far?

Mr Trump has emphasised the need to enforce undefined limits on North Korea’s nuclear programme. Indeed, his ally Sen Lindsey Graham says there is a 30 per cent chance of a war over this, rising to 70 per cent if Pyongyang conducts another nuclear test. Yet Mr Trump has almost started a trade war with South Korea for reasons that remain essentially mysterious. The priorities appear muddied at best.

Similarly, in the Middle East, Mr Trump has cited defeating terrorism and confronting Iran as key goals, as will likely be reflected in the strategy. Yet Washington has all but labeled Syria – which is plainly the epicentre of the threats of ISIL and, especially, Al Qaeda, and the focus of Tehran’s expanding power and potential land-bridge to Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea – to be essentially Russia’s “problem” and therefore Russia’s prerogative as well. Again, policy means and ends don’t seem to match up at all.

One of the most intriguing questions is whether the strategy will reflect the assessment being advanced by national security adviser HR McMaster that Turkey and Qatar have emerged – implicitly in coordination – as the primary funders and supporters of groups promoting radical, violent Islamist ideologies.

This is a welcome recognition of a real threat. But it’s also at odds with Washington’s increasingly “even-handed” approach to the boycott of Qatar, its continued embrace of Turkey, and, especially, Mr Trump’s endless praise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

In all three cases, and many others, it’s hard to see how the broader goals can be achieved if more limited bilateral issues with Seoul, Moscow, Doha or Ankara, or a reticence to make hard choices, keep dominating the practical agenda.

A national security strategy should provide guidance and clarity. That has rarely been more needed. But the danger is that confusion will proliferate if the document seems internally inconsistent, reflects major dissonance between goals and policies, and sounds more like Mr Bush or Mr Obama than Mr Trump.

Why did Trump make his Jerusalem decision? The answer is rooted in US domestic politics

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/why-did-trump-make-his-jerusalem-decision-the-answer-is-rooted-in-us-domestic-politics-1.682870

The US president is hovering at a dangerous approval rating of around 35 per cent. It makes sense for him to shore up his most loyal supporters immediately and at all costs

Donald Trump’s announcement that Washington recognises Jerusalem as Israel’s capital served neither any US national security imperative whatsoever, nor his broader goals in the region. It undermines them all. Why, then, did he do it?

Mr Trump has said he wants to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace. This will make that virtually impossible. He wants to foster a new opening between Israel and Arab states. This pretty much forecloses that too.

He says his priorities are combating terrorism and confronting Iran. Yet plainly the biggest beneficiaries of this in the Middle East, apart from the Israeli right, are precisely terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIL, and, even more, Iran and Hizbollah.

Some argue Mr Trump is just fulfilling a campaign promise. But he has discarded a huge number of campaign promises, even by the standards of ordinary politicians. Indeed, the entire populist spirit of his campaign is about to be permanently jettisoned for a tax bill that amounts to a massive transfer of wealth from the poor and the middle class to the wealthy, and particularly the wealthiest, Americans.

Indeed, Mr Trump ignored this very campaign promise six months ago when he, like all his predecessors, signed a national security waiver not to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He’s still signing the waiver, but pledges to put the process, which will take at least four years, if not much longer, into motion immediately, and made the symbolic declaration and policy change unequivocally.

He might have avoided the worst harm to US national interests by clearly distinguishing between West Jerusalem and occupied East Jerusalem, and recognising only the first as Israel’s capital. Russia did precisely that in April, and met with virtually no opposition.

The United States plays a different role in the peace process and the Middle East, so any major change of American policy on Jerusalem would have provoked some indignation. But had he made such a distinction, and clearly stated that the United States was not in any sense recognising Israel’s presence in, or annexation of, occupied East Jerusalem, the fallout probably would have been manageable.

He didn’t do that. Why not? And what has changed in the past six months to provoke such a drastic U-turn?

Let’s begin with what this isn’t. It’s not an expression of Mr Trump’s views or foreign policy. In fact, it runs entirely counter to all of their identifiable features.

Second, it has almost nothing to do with Jewish American power, although Mr Trump has a small interest in placating the few wealthy right-wing Jewish Americans, like gambling tycoon Sheldon Adelson, who have amply donated to him.

Instead, the answer does plainly lie in domestic politics, but with a different constituency. The real targets are right-wing Evangelical Christians, who are devoted to not just Israel but its occupation and, especially, Jerusalem, because of their violent fantasies – which are, ironically, largely anti-Semitic – about the Apocalypse and the second coming. Mike Pence, the vice-president, is the main broker of this unmitigated fiasco, not Jared Kushner.

But why would Mr Trump be scrambling to recklessly trash his own foreign policy to throw red meat at his key Evangelical Christian supporters, the most steadfast element of his political base?

Because Robert Mueller’s investigation is inching ever closer to the Oval Office. Former national security advisor Michael Flynn has turned state’s evidence, and nobody knows what information he will be sharing to protect himself and his son from serious legal jeopardy.

It’s barely conceivable that Mr Trump is defensive enough to be acting as guiltily as he has been, and appearing to engage in a huge cover-up, without any underlying criminal activity or real legal exposure. But it’s highly unlikely and implausible. The most recent evidence against this was his bizarre Twitter tirade last week against the FBI, his own federal police, which he denounced as corrupt, tainted and incompetent.

Why would any president denounce his own police force in such derisive terms? It’s difficult, if not impossible, not to conclude that he’s terrified of what they may one day confront him with and wishes to lay the groundwork for a broad public claim that they are pursuing a vendetta against him, either because they are already politically tainted or they object to him pointing out their failings in public.

Mr Trump is hovering at a dangerous approval rating of around 35 per cent. Given the impending and extremely unpopular Republican tax bill, that’s not likely to improve. If he really does face significant legal and political exposure, it makes sense for him to shore up his most loyal supporters immediately and at all costs.

If trashing every articulated element of his own Middle East policy goals, abandoning the logic of six months ago, dispensing with the UN charter and the bedrock legal principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and upending 70 years of US policy and international consensus helps, then fine.

This is what circling the wagons in a panic looks like. It will cause incalculable harm. But, until the roof falls in completely, it may prove effective.

Trump’s Jerusalem Statement May Foreclose any “Outside-In” Initiative with Gulf Arab Countries

http://www.agsiw.org/trumps-jerusalem-statement-may-foreclose-any-outside-in-initiative-with-gulf-arab-countries/

Whatever domestic calculations prompted President Donald J. Trump to announce on December 6 that the United States recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and will move its embassy there from Tel Aviv, the international consequences are likely to be far-reaching and almost entirely negative. This announcement puts Palestinian leaders, notably Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, in an utterly impossible situation. It will also make it extremely difficult for Gulf Arab countries, specifically Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to explore the possibility of a greater dialogue with Israel based on shared concerns about the growth of Iranian power in the Middle East.

Abbas will now find dealing constructively with Washington and engaging in peace talks with Israel virtually impossible from a domestic political perspective – unless there is clarification from the White House that the United States is recognizing West Jerusalem, and not occupied East Jerusalem, as Israel’s capital. After all, the future of Jerusalem has been a bedrock final status issue since the Oslo agreements and the entire peace process framework were developed in 1993. Even if Trump does clarify that he was only referring to West Jerusalem –  which seems unlikely since that would have been easy to stipulate in his December 6 statement – he would still be prejudicing what has been heretofore universally recognized as a core final status issue.

However, by creating the impression that the United States now recognizes all of Jerusalem, including occupied East Jerusalem, as Israel’s capital, the betrayal of not only Palestinian expectations but also U.S. and Israeli treaty obligations toward the Palestinians, as well as previous U.S. policies and U.N. Security Council resolutions, is almost absolute.

Because of the occupation, Palestinians have no choice but to deal with the Israelis on day-to-day management of their unavoidable relationship. They do not, however, need

to keep negotiating with them when the terms are being unilaterally and radically altered by the very guarantor of the process, the United States. That is not true of the Gulf Arab countries. Openness to a new dialogue with Israel based on common threat perceptions regarding Iranian hegemony is an option rather than requirement for them. No doubt there is a clear strategic imperative to explore the potential for such an opening and new relations. But there are also massive political obstacles to doing so, and those have just been greatly exacerbated.

Since the earliest days of the Trump administration, it was widely reported that the White House had developed a keen interest in exploring an “outside-in” approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace, in which fostering greater dialogue between Israel and Arab states, especially in the Gulf, would form a new basis for progress between Israelis and Palestinians. The Israeli-Palestinian file was entrusted to Trump’s senior advisor and son-in-law, Jared Kushner, which is widely seen as an indication of the seriousness with which the administration regarded the issue. Kushner has also been a key envoy to Riyadh, and reportedly has developed a strong rapport with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, suggesting a possible overlap between strengthening Saudi-U.S. relations and the potential for a new Gulf opening to Israel.

Over the past year, few international issues have been subject to more speculation, rumors, and unfounded assumptions than prospects for an opening between Israel and Gulf Arab countries. This is understandable because such a development, should it ever occur, would be truly momentous, politically transformative, and strategically significant. However, despite much conjecture and gossip, there is no clear evidence that a genuinely new and significant relationship between Israel and Gulf Arab countries has actually developed.

To be sure, shared perceptions of the Iranian threat – particularly after the fall of Aleppo and the recent expansion of Iranian control of key areas of the Iraqi-Syrian border following the Kurdish independence referendum and the collapse of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – provide a rational basis for a potential strategic opening. Yet the two sides have drastically contrasting narratives about how much has been accomplished. Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, frequently claim that there is a radical transformation in Arab attitudes toward Israel and a new strategic partnership against Iran is virtually realized. This appears to be deeply hyperbolic, and may be an effort to get the public on both sides used to the idea and foster the impression of a fait accompli in order to create what amounts to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

However, a recent interview by the Israeli military chief of staff, General Gadi Eizenkot, with the London-based Saudi publication Elaph, may have more clearly indicated how little has been achieved thus far. True, interviewing a serving Israel Defense Forces chief was a first for a Saudi publication, and his assessment of the Iranian threat would have resonated strongly in much of the Gulf. However, his offer to share intelligence with “moderate Arab states” should probably be interpreted as meaning that very little is being exchanged at the moment, which would be a minimal form of cooperation when facing down a common dire threat. Or, at least, that there is much more that could be done.

The Saudi and broader Arab position toward improved relations with Israel has been predicated on the Arab Peace Initiative, first proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and subsequently adopted by the Arab League and then the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. That hasn’t changed, although over the past year or so there were indications that some Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, might have been willing to consider altering the structure whereby it is implemented. Originally, the Arab Peace Initiative offered full diplomatic and trade normalization for Israel with the Arab and Muslim countries at the end of the peace process, after a final status agreement with the Palestinians. The potential for a different approach, based on a model of concurrent, limited mutual steps to build confidence and develop relations, has been emerging. It would allow for Gulf countries to take steps toward Israel in regard to civil aviation, commerce, or limited diplomatic contacts in recognition of Israeli measures on Palestinian issues such as limiting settlement activity or easing the blockade of Gaza.

Any move to add such an “outside-in” dynamic to Israeli-Palestinian peace can only begin with such limited concurrent measures, in hopes of building a virtuous cycle that not only develops Arab-Israeli relations but helps the peace process as well. But the official Saudi position is the mirror image of Israel’s. Riyadh insists nothing has changed and the Arab Peace Initiative remains the only basis for moving forward. The truth may well lie somewhere between the contrasting Israeli and Saudi narratives. Clearly Israeli leaders are engaging in at least some calculated hyperbole. Yet there may really be some greater communication, and perhaps some limited forms of very quiet cooperation, developing behind the scenes. However, covert ties cannot be the basis of a new relationship, let alone a strategic partnership, even against Iran.

All the talk, largely driven by the Trump administration and the Israeli government, of a flourishing “outside-in” agenda has fostered a widespread mistaken impression, particularly in the Middle East, that there is an Israeli-Arab partnership to counter Iran. It has also fueled deep anxieties among Palestinians, especially at the prospect of an exchange of concurrent limited measures between Israel and Gulf Arab countries. This is because the Palestinian national movement has secured only two major indisputable assets since the late 1960s: the international diplomatic status of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Palestinian control of their own decision-making process, particularly regarding Israel, free of undue influence from Arab governments.

The prospect of concurrence, which is the only way “outside-in” could be advanced, appears deeply threatening on this last point. If Arab states did agree on limited mutual measures with Israel, that would not, precisely, be dictating anything to the Palestinians. However, many Palestinians would surely regard it as foreclosing their options and making concessions, in effect, on their behalf, without their acquiescence and with uncertain benefit to their cause. That Palestinians have engaged in numerous concurrent confidence building exchanges with Israel – arguably even including the Oslo agreements – goes largely unrecognized. And it seems beside the point because those were still Palestinian decisions.

Such fears were greatly exacerbated by a poorly sourced and highly dubious report in The New York Times that suggested that, during a recent visit to Riyadh, Abbas was presented with “an American plan” for peace by Mohammed bin Salman that would be extremely disadvantageous to Palestinians, and was browbeaten about agreeing to it. There is no credible indication that such a plan has been finalized, that it was the subject of Abbas’ conversations in Riyadh, or that Saudi Arabia embraces it, let alone is trying to foist it on Palestinians. Yet no matter how weak and uncorroborated this reporting seems, it circulated widely and amplified concerns among Palestinians that an anti-Iranian convergence between Arab countries, the United States, and Israel would be primarily at their expense.

If such a three-way convergence has been at the heart of the Trump administration’s vision for countering Iran and promoting Middle East peace, the Jerusalem announcement has all but doomed serious prospects for its realization. Washington’s key Arab allies – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan – all strongly cautioned Trump not to make any such generalized announcement, and expressed strongly worded subsequent dismay. Indeed, the White House seemed to push back against this robust criticism, particularly from Saudi Arabia, when Trump issued his own blunt and unprecedented statement calling on “the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to … completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it.”

An opening to Israel, however cautious and strategically valuable, even if carried out under the rubric of the Arab Peace Initiative, was always going to be politically difficult for Gulf Arab countries. Trump’s Jerusalem announcement has exponentially increased those complications. If there is a silver lining for Abbas and the Palestinians, it is that pressure on them from the Arab countries regarding the peace process will almost certainly now be greatly attenuated.

Jerusalem is (or was) not merely a final status issue, and a key aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is also a powerful political symbol throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds and a strong religious concern for Muslims. Trump tried to ease religious alarm by calling on all parties “to maintain the status quo at Jerusalem’s holy sites, including the Temple Mount, also known as Haram al-Sharif.” But that, and his vague remark that “We are not taking a position of any final status issues, including the specific boundaries of the Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, or the resolution of contested borders,” will do little to offset the diplomatic and political backlash in the Arab world.

Unless the White House moves quickly to clarify that U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital applies only to West Jerusalem (as an April 6 Russian statement, which drew very little protest, appeared to do), prospects for progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace will be severely curtailed. Additionally, the potential for an “outside-in” initiative, and, more broadly, the development of new openings between Israel and Gulf Arab states will be, at best, greatly complicated, and quite possibly foreclosed for the foreseeable future.

Trump’s Jerusalem Announcement Means the U.S. Can Kiss Its Remaining Moral Authority Goodbye

https://www.thedailybeast.com/trumps-jerusalem-announcement-means-the-us-can-kiss-its-remaining-moral-authority-goodbye

In what is almost certainly the low point of his administration’s foreign policy performance thus far, President Donald Trump announced today that the United States recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and will begin the process of moving the embassy from Tel Aviv. This is almost certainly a mortal blow to any peace plan Jared Kushner and his team have been working on for the past 10 months, and, in all likelihood, a massive setback in efforts to develop fledgling new relationships between Israel and Gulf Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Palestinians, in particular, will be outraged, and for good reason. This is a colossal betrayal by the guarantor of the peace process, the Oslo agreements and all of the understandings and treaties that have been entered into since 1993. All of them, without exception, hold that the future of Jerusalem is a final status issue to be negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.

The United States has just removed, in effect, that issue, even though Trump insists it has not. Unless he somehow clarifies that he was really referring only to West Jerusalem and not occupied East Jerusalem, and the administration makes it clear that it has not prejudiced the future of occupied East Jerusalem, which it sure sounds like it has, then it has totally betrayed all assurances Palestinians have been operating under since 1993.

Moreover, for the past decade Palestinians have been lectured ad nauseam by Israel and United States about not taking “unilateral measures” at the UN, just by upgrading their status in the international community and building their diplomatic relations and presence as Israel continuously does. This was held to be a violation of the agreements. Yet somehow, this infinitely more severe end-run around one of the most basic and essential premises of the Oslo framework, by its guarantor no less, is okay. That’s never going to wash.

Official Palestinian responses over time will depend a great deal on the reaction of Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan. But all those countries strongly warned the Trump administration against taking this step, and Trump really gave not just the Palestinians but even the Gulf Arab countries little mitigation upon which they could really rationalize moving forward with an “outside-in” engagement with Israel based on concurrent measures designed to build confidence. Any of that has become an even greater longshot than it already was.

Meanwhile, every bad actor and extremist in the region is certainly celebrating. Any remnants of ISIS hanging on in eastern Syria were smiling into their battered smart phones. Al Qaeda must be delighted. But, above all, Trump’s supposedly main regional targets, Iran and Hezbollah, will be cracking open case after case of sparkling apple juice, or whatever it is they substitute for champagne. This is the gift that will keep on giving for terrorists and extremists of every stripe.

Neither the president nor his administration even tried to make the case for why to do this now. What he said was, in effect, “We must do something different. This is different. Therefore, we must do this.” This is a logical fallacy known as a syllogism, and every well-trained high school student will cringe.

Yet, despite the incredible damage done to U.S. standing and goals in the Middle East—almost certainly undertaken to secure Trump’s support among his evangelical and Jewish-American supporters as Robert Mueller’s investigation inches closer to the Oval Office—the worst damage is to an essential principle of international law.

Since the adoption of the UN charter following the Second World War, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war has been held inviolable. Every UN Security Council resolution since 1967 invalidating Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and calling for an end to its occupation—every one of them supported by the United States—begins with a reassertion of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.

By saying, simply, that the United States now recognizes Jerusalem, without qualification, apparently including occupied East Jerusalem, as the capital of Israel, Trump has tossed this principle into the dustbin. On what basis will we object to Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine? On what basis did we expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait? On what basis will Washington or its allies object to any future act of aggression, occupation, and annexation?

Any reliance on the UN Charter and the basic principles of international law won’t work after this fiasco, because any international aggressor and miscreant will simply throw this in our faces and we won’t have any answer whatsoever.

Trump’s assertion that he is not prejudicing a final status issue seems absurd in light of the text of his remarks. Unless the administration promptly clarifies that the declaration applies only to West, and not occupied East, Jerusalem, the damage will be very difficult to undo, not just in the Middle East, but in the whole world, and, indeed, to one of the most essential and fundamental principles of the postwar international order.

Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is divided and fragile but evolving in inspiring ways​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/tunisia-s-fledgling-democracy-is-evolving-in-inspiring-ways-1.680649

In a coalition government, Ennahda is demonstrating what acceptable religious conservatism might look like

My visit to Tunisia this week confirmed that while the country is continuing to develop its fledgling democracy in important and inspiring ways, there is no underestimating the potential dangers ahead. Everyone in the country is naturally delighted that the national football team has qualified for next year’s World Cup in Russia and drawn a relatively weak group with England, Belgium and Panama, which raises the possibility of advancement to the second round.

Otherwise, the most striking constant is the extent to which Tunisian perceptions radically differ, not only about where they think their country should go (a universal manifestation of essentially healthy political differences), but also much more significantly and unusually in their assessment of the national condition. Most of those associated with the political organisations that are benefiting from, and essentially thriving under, the new system, including Ennahda and several major secular parties, are generally upbeat and at least cautiously optimistic. That’s because things are going relatively well for them personally and politically.

But many other close observers are far less sanguine. Profound anxiety, sometimes bordering on alarm, characterises the sceptics’ perspectives. Most concerns focus on the economy, which tends to be the first subject that comes up in almost any conversation about the national condition. In recent years Tunisia has suffered a series of devastating economic blows, including a collapse of foreign investment and the devastation of the tourism industry following two major terrorist attacks against foreigners.

These difficulties exacerbated both a drain of talent due to emigration and of foreign exchange reserves, which have now fallen to a mere 92 days of imports. That places Tunisia in the dangerous category of cash reserve insecurity. Economic woes are particularly acute in the more impoverished south and west, where angry demonstrations are frequent. Another major issue is the chronic unemployment among university graduates throughout the country.

Economic insecurity not only fuels discontent and unrest but also undoubtedly contributes strongly to the appeal of terrorist groups who have been disturbingly successful at recruiting Tunisians, especially in marginalised areas. There are profound fears about the potential impact of returning ISIL extremists now that the group has been driven out of Iraq and Syria. Border regions with Algeria and especially Libya remain lawless and volatile.

Yet there are some positive indicators. Flashes of entrepreneurial success demonstrate what can be accomplished by business start-ups. The tourism sector might be poised for a comeback as memories of terrorist violence fade, assuming there aren’t any additional major extremist attacks.

The de facto junior partner in the governing coalition, Ennahda continues its slow and non-linear process of transforming into a post-Islamist party. The long-term success of this transformation is almost as significant for the future of Arab political culture as is Tunisia’s overall experiment with democracy.

Religious conservatives, after all, are not going to disappear from Arab societies or opt out of politics. Therefore, a legitimate vehicle and political instrument for these sentiments, that is acceptable to the rest of society, must be developed. By working to shed the conspiratorial, subversive, authoritarian and, most importantly, transnational aspects of traditional Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamism, Ennahda is demonstrating what that might look like.

The organisation, though, is wrestling with a three-way split. The first is between a majority who support the changes and a substantial minority who don’t. Among those who supported this reincarnation, there is an obvious divide between those who take it seriously on its own terms and those who see it as purely rhetorical and tactical.

The relative strength of the parties in this second division is much harder to gauge. But to remain politically viable within Tunisia’s democracy, Ennahda knows there is no going back to a political approach that amounts to religiously reactionary Islamist Leninism.

The organisation is quietly confident about its chances in upcoming municipal and local elections, which will test its strength against president Beji Caid Essebsi’s Nidaa Tunis party. The two have been in an uneasy governing alliance for the past three years but Mr Essebsi has recently been expressing doubts that Ennahda has genuinely transformed from an Islamic identity group into a bona fide civic party, as it claims.

Ennahda is particularly at odds with prime minister Youssef Chahed, who is spearheading a painful and deeply unpopular austerity programme demanded by the International Monetary Fund that involves raising taxes and laying off public employees. When the alliance finally breaks completely, Ennahda is likely to blame Nidaa in general, which could prove a very effective election tactic.

Nidaa and its allies have been pushing back on one of Ennahda’s biggest weaknesses, which is gender discrimination, by promoting the right of women to marry non-Muslims, combating violence against women, mandating equal inheritance for all siblings and similar measures. It’s another crucial area in which Tunisia is blazing an all-important trail for the rest of the Arab world.

Tunisia needs and deserves the greatest possible international and regional support because everyone who cares about the future of the Arab world has a large stake in all the components of the Tunisian experiment – building democracy, Ennahda’s transformation, defeating terrorism, championing women’s rights and the economic recovery on which all that depends.