https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/hariri-s-return-pulls-lebanon-back-from-the-brink-1.677982

The real battlegrounds against Iranian hegemony are Syria and Iraq

It’s no surprise that, now that he is back in Beirut, Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri has placed his resignation on hold pending negotiations with President Michel Aoun and other allies of Hizbollah. This represents a vital opportunity to pull Lebanon back from the brink of crisis, given that all Lebanese parties and the country would suffer if the delicate political balance that had allowed Mr Hariri to cohabitate politically with Hizbollah, which stands accused of assassinating his father Rafiq in 2005.

All major Lebanese actors are beholden to foreign patrons, in Mr Hariri’s case Saudi Arabia and with Hizbollah serving Iran’s interests. Riyadh almost certainly approved both Mr Hariri’s resignation, which was made by video from Saudi Arabia, and now his return to Beirut and offer of negotiations with his rivals.

Riyadh has been a major formal and informal source of vital support and foreign exchange to the Lebanese state and economy. But Hizbollah’s destabilising regional role has continuously expanded, especially after the fall of Aleppo in January of this year. It now includes not only a crucial role in supporting Iran and Bashar Al Assad in Syria, but also Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia appears to have decided that it is no longer willing to continue to fund and underwrite the base that Hizbollah uses to extend its tentacles across the region on behalf of a growing Iranian hegemony.

Matters reached a crisis three weeks ago when Houthi rebels in Yemen fired a missile – allegedly supplied by Iran and probably overseen by Hizbollah – at Riyadh’s international airport, and pro-Iran forces seized control of crucial areas along the Syrian-Iraqi border that make an Iranian “land bridge” to Beirut and the Mediterranean Sea an emerging reality rather than an aspiration.

Some commenters argue that Riyadh overreached in Lebanon and elsewhere in response, but the Saudi message has effectively communicated to all the Lebanese. Even Hizbollah seemed deeply rattled, as evinced by an uncharacteristically conciliatory speech by its leader Hassan Nasrallah in response to Mr Hariri’s resignation announcement.

Riyadh has yet to deploy its biggest weapons in Lebanon: withdrawing at least US$860 million (Dh3.16 billion) in deposits with the Lebanese central bank and blocking vital remittances from hundreds of thousands of Lebanese expats working in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Such moves would devastate Lebanon’s economy, currency and political equilibrium, and the whole country has been warned.

Yet how much can be accomplished by pressuring other Lebanese to reign in Hizbollah is questionable, given their relative weakness. The real battlegrounds against Iranian hegemony are Syria and Iraq, where it will take much more than this to shift Hizbollah, not Lebanon and Yemen.

Mr Hariri might convince Hizbollah to stop aiding the Houthis, a major imperative for Riyadh. But rolling back Iran in Iraq and, especially, Syria will require coordination between Arab countries, the United States, Russia, Turkey, and even Israel. Beirut simply can’t and won’t be a key factor in reshaping the regional landscape, despite the key role Hizbollah is playing in Iran’s expanding imperial project.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/israel-s-claims-of-an-alliance-with-arab-countries-to-deal-with-iran-is-overblown-1.676668

More overt ties between moderate Arab countries and Israel will require significant progress on Palestinian issues

Israel has been noticeably stepping up its courtship of Saudi Arabia in recent days, playing up the possibility of (and need for) strategic co-operation against Iran, extreme Islamist groups, and other mutual threats. There is definitely the potential for building on shared threat perceptions between Israel and Gulf Arab countries to try to develop greater dialogue, enhanced co-operation and even, ultimately, a new strategic environment and architecture in the region. But there is ample reason to doubt the willingness or ability of prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet to make the kind of serious moves on the Palestinian issue that would be required to facilitate a meaningful strategic and diplomatic breakthrough.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/iran-s-long-cherished-tehran-to-beirut-land-bridge-moves-closer-to-reality-1.674875

The map of the Middle East is being redrawn and that should provide serious cause for concern

In recent weeks, the strategic map of the Middle East has been redrawn with potentially momentous consequences. Yet these dramatic events have been largely ignored by most commentators and policymakers.

The strategic breakthroughs by Iran and several of its key Arab clients and proxies in northern and western Iraq, as well as eastern Syria, will be nothing short of regionally transformative if consolidated over the coming months and years.

Almost 15 years ago, King Abdullah II of Jordan, alarmed by evident Iranian meddling in Iraq’s first post-Saddam election, warned of the emergence of a “Shiite crescent”, dominated by Tehran and arching across the northern Middle East. Ever since, this prospect has haunted the nightmares of many Arab states and Israel, as well as insightful and well-informed Turks and Americans.

The essential precondition for the development of such an Iranian-dominated mini-empire in the Middle East is the creation of a long-cherished “land bridge” linking Tehran to Beirut and the Mediterranean. This is a prize of such enormity that even the great Persian empires of the past have scarcely dreamt of it.

It would give Iran direct and full control of a military corridor to its key Arab proxy, Hizbollah, and to Lebanon, the epicentre and locus of its influence in the Arab world dating back to the early 1980s.

Yet this ambition has been fanciful and speculative … until now.

In recent weeks, Iran and several of its proxies, including Hizbollah, various Iraqi militias, including Iraq’s own version of Hizbollah and the so-called “Popular Mobilisation Forces” – as well as elements of Baghdad’s military and the army of Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad – have seized control of key areas in northern and western Iraq and eastern Syria. This makes the establishment, at least for now, of an Iranian-controlled land bridge to Lebanon a virtual fait accompli.

In the aftermath of the ill-fated Kurdish independence referendum, Iraqi government forces and various Iranian-backed militias seized control of key areas from Kurdish troops. These not only included the disputed city of Kirkuk – and oilfields that had provided the bulk of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s income – but also strategically crucial areas leading to and along the border with Syria. They also took advantage of the last stages of the battle against the ISIL “caliphate” to gain control of similar areas along the Syrian border.

And in Syria, following the fall of Raqqa, not only has the Syrian military seized control of analogous territories on the Iraqi border, pro-Iranian Iraqi militias crossed over into Syria to assist the effort.

With the capture by Syrian government forces and Iraqi militias of Al Bokamal – which abuts the Iraqi town of Al Qaim and its key border crossing – and other strategic areas of Deir Ezzor province, the territory separating pro-Iranian forces is now negligible. The only thing preventing the complete control and linkage of these territories is ISIL remnants, which are bound to disintegrate quickly.

This means that pro-Iranian forces have captured, or very shortly and inevitably will control, the final pieces of a land bridge leading from Tehran to Beirut. It’s particularly ironic that despite Donald Trump’s constant vows to confront Iran, Washington has done nothing to try to prevent, reverse or even acknowledge this transformative development.

Israel has been loudly complaining about growing Iranian and Hizbollah power in Syria, but also hasn’t acted to reverse it. And Saudi Arabia, which was incapable of stopping these developments, is primarily retaliating by squeezing Hizbollah politically in Lebanon, the efficacy of which very much remains to be determined.

If this massive Iranian strategic triumph is consolidated, then Tehran will be close to achieving its status of becoming the region’s superpower rather than simply being a large and formidable Middle Eastern country with many allies and heft. Indeed, it is the key to the possible eventual emergence of an actual “Shiite crescent” dominated by Iran.

This Iranian accomplishment is tenuous and fragile and could be broken in half a dozen places and a dozen ways. Achieving that is essential if countries sceptical of Tehran’s intentions want to prevent Tehran emerging as the dominant regional power.

Russian air power played a key role in linking Al Bokamal and Al Qaim and, therefore, realising Iran’s emergent land bridge to Beirut and the Mediterranean. Moscow must be given good reasons to re-assess its interests in Iran becoming this powerful, not only in Syria, but possibly through an arc curving across the northern Middle East.

The Syrian Democratic Forces remain a potential serious counterforce if empowered and encouraged. Alternatively, other effective forces could be created. The restoration of the KRG and formation of a Sunni federal area in western Iraq are other possible solutions. And the Iraqi government in Baghdad could be separated from Tehran based on Iraqi national identity and interests.

There are many potential effective responses. But the depth of the crisis needs to be acknowledged and all opposed to an imperial Iran need to co-ordinate a response that denies Tehran the land bridge it is securing and the crescent of control to which that may lead.

http://www.agsiw.org/hariri-resignation-signals-intensified-saudi-iranian-rivalry-lebanon/

The resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri almost certainly signals the determination of Saudi Arabia and its allies to intensify their regional confrontation with Iran and its clients in Lebanon and beyond. It’s not just that Hariri is a long-standing and loyal ally of Saudi Arabia, and, indeed, a dual citizen of the two countries. In case there was any doubt about its regional meaning, his resignation was made on video from Saudi Arabia, which he was and still is visiting, and amounted to a tirade against Iranian interference in Lebanese and Arab affairs.

Allegations in Hizballah-controlled and sympathetic media that Hariri is a prisoner or “hostage” of the Saudis seem highly exaggerated. He has traveled to the United Arab Emirates and there’s no reason or evidence that Saudi Arabia would want to detain him, though the Saudis may be encouraging him to stay in the Gulf region for the time being. In fact, all prominent Lebanese political actors serve both a domestic constituency and, simultaneously and incongruously, foreign patrons to whom they are beholden. In Hariri’s case, he is a client of Riyadh, while Hizballah serves the interests of Tehran. Therefore, what’s really significant is that his resignation had “Made in Saudi Arabia” stamped all over it and is a function, primarily, of Saudi foreign policy.

The proximate cause for this development is not directly connected to the other dramatic events involving Riyadh in recent days, including the mass arrests on corruption charges of numerous prominent Saudis or the Houthi missile launched at the Riyadh international airport. Instead it is almost certainly inspired by extremely dramatic and underappreciated developments in northern and western Iraq and eastern Syria in recent weeks. In the aftermath of the ill-fated Kurdish independence referendum and the last phases of the battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, pro-Iranian forces in these areas, especially along the Syrian-Iraqi border, have made major gains that could prove a strategic game changer in the Middle East.

In the past month, Iraqi forces – including government troops, pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces and other militias aligned with or controlled by Tehran, and Iranian Quds Brigade expeditionary troops themselves – have gained control of key areas in north and western Iraq formerly held by Kurdish peshmerga forces or ISIL fighters. Simultaneously, forces aligned with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Hizballah have taken significant advantage of the dislocation of ISIL forces in eastern Syria since the fall of Raqqa and have seized control of Deir al-Zour and the border regions. Indeed, a recent video convincingly purports to show the comradely meeting of what are, in effect, Iraqi Hizballah forces with pro-Assad and Lebanese Hizballah forces in the no-man’s land along the Iraqi-Syrian border.

This means that Iran and its clients in the Arab world are on the brink of establishing a land bridgebetween Tehran and Beirut on the Mediterranean coast. This, in turn, could signal the emergence of the Iranian-dominated “Shia crescent,” the prospect of which has, for so long, haunted much of the Sunni-majority Arab world. This has, in short, all the makings of a disaster for Saudi Arabia and its allies and is a colossal triumph for Iran and Hizballah, and their partners. Yet, particularly with the United States essentially standing aside and not opposing these strategically vital, and potentially transformational, Iranian gains, there was little, if anything, Riyadh could do to prevent them from occurring.

The Hariri resignation is, in effect, the first phase of the Saudi response to these momentous events in remote areas far from the Saudis’ influence. They would not, after all, partner with al-Qaeda, let alone ISIL, to prevent these major strategic victories for Tehran, and Washington did nothing practical to prevent them either. Riyadh, therefore, is responding where it can, and preparing what seems set to be an all-out political campaign to challenge Iran where it is strongest, and where it first began to exercise its influence in the Arab world: Lebanon. Saudi Arabia will now seek to undermine Hizballah’s control of the Lebanese state by political means, as a military challenge against Hizballah is beyond the kingdom’s means or those of its allies.

However, isolating, sanctioning, and otherwise pressuring and destabilizing the Lebanese state is certainly possible. This requires the absence of Hariri or a similarly credible Lebanese Sunni leader so that the Lebanese state is firmly identified with Hizballah and its allies alone. All that is a project Saudi Arabia and its allies could successfully undertake and appear to be preparing. This would certainly bedevil not only Hizballah but also its Iranian patrons. The removal of Hariri is, in effect, a kind of trap for Hizballah, daring it to fully reveal its power and dominance in Lebanon and take complete responsibility for the Lebanese state which, from a Saudi perspective, it effectively controls anyway. The next step would be for Hizballah and Lebanon itself to suffer the consequences of being completely identified with what is widely considered to be an international terrorist organization.

The resignation of Hariri in effect removes the fig leaf from Hizballah’s de facto control of the Lebanese government. How far Riyadh can succeed in pressuring Hizballah – and by extension, Iran – will depend on many factors beyond Saudi control, including the U.S. and European reaction to such a campaign, as well as the position various other Arab countries take. Perhaps one of the biggest wildcards, however, is the response of Israel. The Israelis are extremely uncomfortable with how powerful, experienced, connected, and battle hardened Hizballah has become as a result of its involvement in the Syrian war.

Indeed, in the post-Aleppo environment, Hizballah has emerged as a regional military vanguard of the pro-Iranian militia and substate actors’ network throughout the Middle East; it is no longer primarily a Lebanese organization, but a transnational entity. It is not only active in Syria, but also Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, and beyond. It is arguably the most militarily capable nonstate actor in history. As such, Hizballah now poses a new kind of threat not, only to the Sunni Arab states that are at odds with their Iranian patrons, but also potentially to Israel.

Israel is capable of direct military action against Hizballah in a manner that Saudi Arabia and its allies are not. However, as Hizballah’s leaders keep stressing, the cost to Israel could be much higher than in previous conflicts. Given its recent gains in Syria and Iraq, however, Hizballah would be loath to be dragged into unavoidable conflict with Israel under the current circumstances. Hizballah’s energies, and those of its allies, will be primarily centered on consolidating the tenuous and fragile control of these key areas of northern and western Iraq and eastern Syria that make the land bridge suddenly a potential reality.

Therefore, Hizballah is likely to be willing to absorb some substantial Israeli hits with bluster and rage but without retaliating or doing anything to facilitate the escalation of a conflict that could draw it away from that project of consolidation and potentially lead to a bruising battle with Israel that ultimately degrades its capabilities. Alternatively, the Israelis could unleash a barrage of aerial attacks against Hizballah assets and forces in Syria, rather than Lebanon, and try to cut the organization down to size in that manner. This would allow Hizballah leaders to retaliate nominally, or even not at all, if they wish to preserve their remaining strength for other battles.

All of this is, however, beyond the ability of Riyadh to dictate, or even significantly influence. Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly proceed with the campaign to politically undermine Hizballah no matter what Israel decides to do. Riyadh will also continue to push back against Iranian influence in Iraq, increasing outreach to both Sunni and Shia Iraqi Arab leaders, including Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, Muqtada al-Sadr, and many others.

For now, Riyadh’s approach to Lebanon appears to be relying almost entirely on sticks. In Iraq, Saudi Arabia will have to deploy mainly incentivizing carrots to promote its agenda, including support, aid, and patronage for old and new allies and partners. It can also continue to try to promote Iraqi nationalism – and the fact that even Iraqi Shias with strong links to Iran are Iraqis and not Iranians, and Arabs rather than Persians – to encourage Baghdad to develop and maintain a degree of strategic and diplomatic equidistance between Riyadh and Tehran. How far this can go remains to be seen, however, and much of the heavy lifting will probably have to wait until after the Iraqi elections in 2018.

However, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is only intensifying, and, along with other battlegrounds like Yemen and Bahrain, this rivalry is most likely to play out in coming years in Lebanon and Iraq. The Hariri resignation suggests it is now “game on” in Lebanon.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/virginia-election-a-bellwether-for-the-new-republican-model-1.672914

Contentious down-ballot races next week could predicate next year’s House of Representatives elections

Next week’s election in Virginia has national and international significance that is largely unrecognised, especially outside the United States. But the gubernatorial vote could indicate the future of the Republican Party – and therefore, the trajectory of US policy – in coming years.

And the down-ballot races for the House of Delegates might be a bellwether for the all-important election next year for the national House of Representatives, indicating the prospect of an upheaval of the revived Democratic majority in that chamber.

From the outset of the Donald Trump era, one of the key questions has been whether the president is simply the focus of a personality cult that only applies to him or if he represents a powerful new political trend that can be successfully replicated by very different Republican personalities around the country.

Ed Gillespie, the Republican candidate for the position of Virginia governor, is pioneering a model that, if successful, will likely prove the new template for most future Republican candidates. Mr Gillespie is a veteran and once-centrist Republican who long championed moderation, diversity and an outreach to minorities. But in the Trump era, he has swung sharply to the populist extreme right.

His recent ads equated immigrants with gang members, condemned “sanctuary cities” – of which there are none in Virginia – supported Confederate monuments and blew every possible dog whistle of intolerance and racial bias. In short, Mr Gillespie is experimenting with a blend of traditional and moderate establishment Republicanism injected with enough Trump-infused rhetoric to appeal to a base that seems imbued with cultural and ethnic rage.

His approach is, sadly, paying off. After months of trailing his Democratic rival, Ralph Northam, Mr Gillespie has now pulled within the margin of error and has a real shot at winning. If he does, his victory will be credited largely to his Trumpian turn and Republican candidates all over the US will tack sharply to the ethno-nationalist right to win elections. In the process, Mr Trump’s conquest of the Republican Party will be consolidated and its dominant narratives transformed for at least a generation.

If Mr Gillespie fails, then the war within the GOP, being led by former Trump chief strategist Steve Bannon, to destroy the existing Republican Party and replace it with a “populist” and essentially white nationalist movement, will intensify and be played out over a longer and more painful period.

If Mr Northam wins, Democrats will feel heartened that Mr Trump’s unpopularity with most Americans has proven a real drag on Republican prospects. But their attention may be even more greatly focused on the Delegates’ election.

These little-known seats in the lower house of the Virginia legislature are miniature versions of the elections that will dominate next year’s national mid-terms. Democrats are hoping to win six new seats. If they can gain 10 or more, it will be the sharpest sign that Democrats might indeed be gaining the momentum in smaller elections in swing districts to have a real shot at regaining a majority in the House of Representatives. Democrats are in no position to gain a majority in the Virginia House of Delegates, which has a Republican majority of more than 30, bolstered by many safely conservative seats and gerrymandered districts. But major gains would indicate they are in a strong position for next year’s national house elections.

If Democrats do regain control over the House of Representatives next year, they would have a total veto over legislation they cannot accept. Perhaps even more significantly, they would acquire the control over house committees and investigative powers to seriously probe an endless array of possible misdeeds by Mr Trump and his associates, ranging from accepting foreign emoluments to collusion with Russia and financial maleficence and self-dealing. They could even impeach Mr Trump for cause, although conviction and removal from office would still be in the hands of a Senate that is likely to remain Republican.

The outcome of the Virginia governor’s race will do much to indicate the trajectory and character of the Republican Party in coming years. And there is no better measure of where next year’s house election is headed than the Virginia Delegates race.

These outcomes have national and international significance. Mr Trump’s effectiveness, such as it has been, is tied to Republican control of Congress. He is already embroiled in the Russia investigation led by Robert Mueller and many other damaging controversies. A Democratic house could effectively paralyse his administration, including on foreign policy, through a series of investigations and hearings into the numerous allegations of dubious activities surrounding Mr Trump and his administration.

Should Mr Gillespie prevail, Mr Trump will have clearly stamped his mark on the party and its traditional, and formerly moderate, leaders. A Trump-inflected ideological era in American politics will be decisively at hand and the old Republican Party gone. The world would then be dealing not only with a very different president, but also a very different America.

http://www.agsiw.org/bahrain-leading-gulf-arab-outreach-israel/

Over the past year, there has been a great deal of speculation about the potential for improved relations between Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf region, and Israel, largely based on a shared perception of the threat from Iran and the need for a more stable regional status quo. Yet, the ongoing occupation of Palestinian territories and decades of Arab-Israeli enmity remain potent obstacles to be overcome. In recent weeks, though, the Kingdom of Bahrain has emerged as the Gulf Arab country most actively pursuing better relations with Israel, both for particular reasons of its own and, presumably, with the blessing of its principal benefactor, Saudi Arabia.

While Bahrain has traditionally been relatively open to contacts with Israel and Israeli officials, until recently its position strongly adhered to the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly the occupation that began in 1967, would have to be resolved before better formal diplomatic or trade relations could be developed. Still, quiet contacts have been maintained since at least 1994. In September, however, at a multinational event at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, American rabbis Marvin Hier and Abraham Cooper said that Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa had expressed opposition to the ongoing Arab League economic boycott of Israel and had said that citizens of Bahrain and Israel should feel free to visit each other’s countries without restrictions. Prince Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa attended the same conference and toured the overtly pro-Israel Museum of Tolerance, which is closely associated with the Wiesenthal Center, in Los Angeles. Some Western officials have even speculated that there could be the establishment of some formal diplomatic or trade ties between the two countries sometime in 2018.

There are many reasons why Bahrain now seems to be taking the lead in outreach to Israel. Bahrain’s government and mainstream society have long maintained good relations with its tiny but nonetheless influential Jewish community. The community maintains an active synagogue, the only one in a Gulf Arab country. Houda Ezra Ebrahim Nonoo served as Bahrain’s ambassador to the United States from 2008-13, and was the first Jewish woman to represent an Arab country in a senior diplomatic capacity. Since 2015, the Bahraini government has hosted Hanukkah candle-lightingceremonies to honor the Jewish religious holiday. While this was strongly criticized by the Palestinian militant and Islamist group Hamas, it does not appear to have been particularly controversial in Bahrain.

If shared concerns about Iran’s influence lie at the core of potential improved relations between Gulf Arab countries and Israel, Bahrain has a particular incentive to explore the possibilities. Unlike any of its Gulf Arab neighbors, the entire territory of Bahrain was claimed by Iran several times during the 20th century. And while Tehran does not currently maintain an active claim over Bahrain, it does in effect claim to represent the interests, and even the perspectives, of the Bahraini Shia majority. This is usually an implicit claim, although at times it is more overt. Because of its restive Shia population, some of which has deep historical and cultural ties to Iran, growing evidence of Iranian-inspired subversion in Bahrain, and a history of Iran claiming Bahrain as part of its own territory, Manama perceives a uniquely existential threat emanating from Tehran. Therefore, in addition to its existing strong military relationship with the United States, Bahrain has a particular interest in strengthening the regional bloc confronting Iran, potentially including Israel.

Given the internal political tensions in Bahrain, many constituencies, including those sympathetic to the government as well as parts of the opposition, are likely to be among the most enthusiastic in the Gulf Arab countries regarding the prospects of a more coordinated strategic front against Iran, potentially even including Israel. Strong opposition in Bahrain to exploring the prospects for such a realignment would be found in many quarters, but particularly among Islamists of various stripes. Under the current political circumstances, such objections are unlikely to carry much weight with the government and, if it is being attacked by those critical of the government in general, might actually serve to reinforce the sense that this is a policy worth exploring. At any rate, under current circumstances, opposition in Bahrain to a thaw, with not only international Jewish groups, but also Israel, is likely to be largely either muted or marginalized.

While Bahrain has particular circumstances and concerns that explain why it currently seems to be leading the Gulf Arab effort to explore the potential for improved relations with Israel, Manama is almost certainly not acting strictly alone or merely in its own interests. Since the 2011 Peninsula Shield intervention by Gulf Cooperation Council militaries, particularly Saudi forces, Manama has consistently deferred to Riyadh on most matters of foreign and defense policy. Bahrain’s regional role, therefore, is closely coordinated with Saudi Arabia, which typically defines the parameters within which Manama operates its international relations. Therefore, Bahrain speaks for itself in these matters, but, perhaps, not solely for itself. It is highly unlikely that Manama’s outreach to Israel would be going forward if Riyadh objected to that policy. To the contrary, Bahrain is almost certainly acting on behalf of Saudi Arabia and some of its other GCC allies in taking the lead in exploring the potential for a greater opening to, and dialogue with, Israel.

However, all of the Gulf Arab countries are constrained in their potential dealings with Israel, particularly when it comes to more open and substantive diplomatic, trade, and strategic relations, by Palestinian issues, particularly the occupation. The Arab Peace Initiative, introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and subsequently reaffirmed in 2007 and 2017 by the Arab League, provides a framework for a broad Arab and Muslim normalization with Israel in the context of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. However, where the original conceptualization of the Arab Peace Initiative envisaged regional normalization with Israel as the final stage of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a more flexible approach appears to have emerged for a number of Arab countries, including those in the Gulf. A process of concurrence, in which more modest concessions on the part of Israel are matched by similarly modest or limited diplomatic, trade, or strategic openings by Arab countries, now appears possible, albeit with a conflict-ending peace and full normalization still only available at the end of the process.

Bahrain’s outreach to Israel certainly underscores a continuing, and probably increasing, interest in exploring the prospects for better relations, and even potentially a new strategic relationship, between Israel and the Gulf Arab countries. Nonetheless, without any significant progress on Palestinian issues, particularly movement toward ending the occupation, the political space for such a dialogue, let alone rapprochement, will remain limited. Because of this, Israel cannot simply respond to Bahrain and the other Gulf Arab countries bilaterally without quickly encountering a dead end. To build on the present, and perhaps fleeting, opportunity will require not only proactive outreach by Arab countries, most dramatically illustrated by Bahrain’s recent initiatives, but also a practical Israeli willingness to help resolve the Palestinian issue, which remains a highly destabilizing and volatile factor in the Middle East.