https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/moderation-and-caution-should-be-the-watchwords-in-a-kurdish-crisis-that-could-spiral-out-of-control-1.669009

It is time for everyone to pull back from the lines of confrontation and take a deep breath

Kurdistan regional government chief Masoud Barzani had briefly basked in the afterglow of an Iraqi Kurdish independence referendum, which he insisted on and pushed through despite the warnings of all outside parties. And then, this week, the roof fell in all around him.

Mr Barzani could not have misplayed his hand more disastrously if he had tried. His supporters say that, for everyone other than the Kurds, there will never be a “convenient” time for a push towards Kurdish independence. That doesn’t relieve Kurdish leaders from the responsibility of sensible national leadership that will advance, not severely harm, the cause of eventual de factoindependence.

Hostile forces, including the Iraqi army, its counterterrorism units, popular mobilisation forces and Iranian Quds forces descended on a series of disputed territories in and around Kirkuk and have seized possession of about 80 per cent of Erbil’s oil resources.

The key factor has been Kurdish disunity in the face of Iranian determination. Mr. Barzani’s rivals in the PUK, along with various other movements and even some of his own factions, essentially stepped aside for an Iranian-led offensive that the divided Kurds were unable to resist.

This was telegraphed by a statement by Bafel Talabani who presented the PUK stance as a responsible refusal to get involved in disputes that could start another war inside Iraq. However, of course, it was just as much an effort to turn Mr Barzani’s mind-boggling miscalculations against him in domestic Kurdish politics.

General Qassem Suleimani, a leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and head of the Iran’s regional expeditionary vanguard, visited Kirkuk earlier this week and PUK leaders and other important Kurdish figures were read the riot act. The Iranians and their allies made it very clear resistance would not be tolerated and that Tehran and Baghdad would combine, with the tacit support of Ankara and Washington, their forces to crush Kurdish units trying to keep hold of Kirkuk and disputed oilfields.

This was obviously very bad news for the Kurds, but it did allow the PUK to begin to turn the screws on Mr Barzani and turn the development at least to their political advantage in their rivalry with him and his party.

Therefore when the Iraqis and the Iranians moved on the disputed territories, the PUK and the other groups essentially stepped aside. Apparently the Kurds are consolidating their forces to protect their last major oilfield; this is a very important goal. It’s not in anybody’s interest for the KRG to be totally bankrupt and non-functional.

Meanwhile, making matters worse, Mr Barzani appears to have disappeared. The situation is so disastrous and anger against his miscalculations is running so deep, that he is, it would seem, effectively in hiding against a potential assassination. This is certainly what it looks like and if he is not trying to communicate that message, it’s another terrible miscalculation.

But the situation has become so delicate and fraught that almost anything within the realm of possibility could now happen.

The Kurds are clearly reeling, still trying to comprehend the scope, swiftness and magnitude of their losses, and the fact that their own disunity was the key factor contributing to that.

Mr Barzani and his supporters note that Baghdad and Tehran have long coveted the recapture of Kirkuk, and that they are using the referendum as a cynical excuse for acting on that long-standing territorial ambition. That’s probably true, but what Mr Barzani and company need to explain is why they decided to help them in that endeavour so thoroughly.

The way that the referendum was carried out, despite serious and even dire warnings from all parties, including Washington, strongly indicated that in the aftermath of the vote, not only would nothing change on the ground, but also if Iran or its proxies moved to take advantage of the situation, the Kurds could expect no support from Ankara and Washington, let alone Baghdad. They left themselves with no friends whatsoever and nobody interested in protecting them from this kind of devastating defeat.

In the event, the reaction by Iran and its Iraqi proxies was far more furious and overwhelming than anyone had anticipated. And now everyone has made their points. The Kurds have held a referendum that they should have postponed and conducted in a different way at a different time. But it’s over. Baghdad and Tehran have seized control of large amounts of territory and pitted the PUK against the KDP in a very dramatic way.

Haider Al Abadi, Iraq’s prime minister, has played his hand quite well, although he does appear more dependent on Iran than ever. But with an eye to the election next year, he seems to be in a pretty strong position to win, if not to govern more independently.

It is time for everyone to pull back from the lines of confrontation and take a deep breath. More conflict, more punitive measures against the KRG, and more bitterness among the Kurds themselves, and between them and other Iraqis, will help nothing and no one.

This can all easily spiral out of control, harming everyone. It is an urgent time for moderation and caution now, on all sides.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-white-house-is-talking-a-great-game-over-the-iran-nuclear-deal-but-will-it-lead-to-a-workable-plan-of-action-1.667055

After the announcement of Donald Trump’s “new Iran strategy” everyone, both those panicked and elated, need to take a deep breath. For all the drama and bluster of the Trump speech and the White House’s companion Iran strategy summary document, very little has changed thus far. And there’s little indication of when, how, or into what, US policy will change.

Mr Trump did not assert that Tehran is not in compliance with the nuclear deal. That is because it is. However, Washington is also still fully in compliance with the deal. And there’s no clear reason to expect that either side will really walk away from it now.

What Mr Trump did was assert a subjective judgement he has held for years: the nuclear deal isn’t in the American national interest and therefore he won’t certify it is. Almost all of the reasons for this are what is not in the deal, not what Iran is failing to do within the context of the agreement. He doesn’t like it and never did.

Mr Trump and others point out that many of the agreement’s terms will expire in 10 to 15 years. Arms control agreements are, by their very nature, temporary, and Iran would still be bound by the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Moreover, Mr Trump focused on Iranian misbehaviour that the deal doesn’t – and couldn’t have – addressed. Missile testing and development, sponsorship of terrorist groups and militias around the Middle East, and the unjust detention of Americans and others were all elements of a lengthy and accurate bill of particulars against Tehran.

But the scope and passion with which Mr Trump denounced the agreement, and his anger against Iran for its real transgressions, is wholly inconsistent with the remedies he announced, especially regarding the nuclear agreement.

Mr Trump is asking US Congress to legislate a new set of conditions in which sanctions would be automatically re-imposed against Iran. This is very odd indeed. Mr Trump does not need it to legislate any new sanctions. He could re-impose them himself. Moreover, he doesn’t need Congress to legislate new sanction triggers. He could simply announce them himself.

One of the biggest mysteries – and there are several – is why any president would ask Congress to take a series of actions that are well within the prerogative of the executive? It is highly unusual for any president to defer to it on foreign policy, even when the legislature has a plausible claim on authority. In this case, it seems inexplicable.

Alas, one possible answer is that Mr Trump wants to make a big show over the issue, but actually force the real decisions onto someone else. He has done that many times since taking office, though this seems the most striking example yet.

At any rate, for all his bluster, Mr Trump has thus far done exactly nothing practical to end US participation in, and compliance with, the nuclear agreement. He has merely invited others to consider mapping a possible path to potentially doing so.

So, fans of the nuclear deal can relax a little.

But those who are excited about the new White House strategy to counter Iran – which has been officially praised by the governments of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Israel – should probably attenuate their expectations.

True, the White House is talking a great game. Both the strategy summary and Trump speech invoked an ambitious, but very vague, agenda to counter Tehran, with the strengthening partnerships with Washington’s regional allies repeatedly highlighted.

Mr Trump pledged to stop Tehran’s “destabilising activity and support for terrorist proxies in the region.” He also promised “additional sanctions on the regime to block their financing of terror,” and measures to counter the “proliferation of missiles and weapons that threaten its neighbours, global trade and freedom of navigation.”

All that certainly sounds good. But there may well be a lot less here than meets the eye. For example, Mr Trump announced a range of new treasury department sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for its support of terrorism. But there have already been two previous treasury sanctions executive orders against the IRGC, with little impact.

Had the White House wanted to really impress Tehran, they could have added the IRGC as an entity to the state department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations, a far more meaningful threat.

Therefore, while the accusations about Iran’s malfeasance may sound reassuring, no one should expect that much serious action after the kabuki show over decertifying the nuclear deal and the third-rate sanctions gesture.

A final reason not to get too enthusiastic about Mr Trump’s new Iran approach is that nothing in his speech or policy summary statement actually suggests there’s a coherent or comprehensive strategy in place or underway.

If it seems emotional, melodramatic, rhetorical and, above all, political, that’s because it probably is.

One should always hope for the best. After all, Washington is still fully in compliance with the nuclear deal. So is Tehran. And the United States says it wants to seriously counter Iran’s nonnuclear misdeeds.

http://www.agsiw.org/regional-winners-losers-hamas-fatah-deal/

On October 12, rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas agreed to a national reconciliation pact that began to sketch out a new political arrangement that could lead to far-reaching changes in Gaza with broad, regional implications. Since the decisive break between the two factions in 2007 – each ruling their respective territories in the West Bank and Gaza, which were therefore also sundered – Palestinians have reached many such accords. All of them have failed. However, the new arrangement goes much farther than any of its predecessors and seems to enjoy a wide range of regional backing, including from some key Gulf countries, and the prospect of real benefits for almost all parties. Therefore, there is a very good chance that this new arrangement will actually be implemented in Gaza, at least for a time.

The deal, reportedly brokered by Egypt with the strong support of the United Arab Emirates, was signed by Hamas and Fatah negotiators at the headquarters of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service. While the text of the agreement has not been made public, the deal apparently involves a commitment by Hamas to turn over control of Gaza’s borders and crossings to the Palestinian Authority. This could lead to a rapid opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, the main lifeline in and out of Gaza for its nearly 2 million residents, most of whom are refugees. Hamas has also promised to relinquish day-to-day governance and administration in Gaza to a PA-controlled authority, including PA security forces from the West Bank that have developed a strong track record of coordination with Israel. Hamas apparently intends to incorporate its own bureaucrats into the new governance system.

Yet many of the most difficult issues dividing the nationalist Fatah and Islamist Hamas factions remain unresolved. Hamas continues to insist that it will not disarm its paramilitary Qassam Brigades or compromise on the right of armed struggle against Israel. PA and Fatah leaders are openly fretting about the prospect that Hamas may seek to retain a powerful independent militia, while handing the burden of governance to their rivals.

The idea is to implement a system that gives each Palestinian party something it wants, but without addressing the key issues that divide them. Hamas gets relief from overwhelming pressure, including from the Gaza public and the burden of governance. Fatah pockets significant concessions from its rivals and, therefore, a major political victory, and returns in some kind of triumph to Gaza. And the millions of Gaza residents are likely to get a good measure of relief from the unconscionable privation and isolation they have suffered since 2006 at the hands of Israel, Egypt, Hamas, and the PA.

Yet the core differences dividing the Palestinians remain totally unresolved. This includes trying to fit the square peg of Hamas’s ideological commitment to armed struggle until “victory” against Israel into the Palestine Liberation Organization’s round hole of seeking a negotiated agreement for a two-state solution. Nonetheless, it’s likely that the benefits to all sides mean that some kind of effective unity government in Gaza will actually be formed – at least until the underlying differences become unmanageable and the powder keg once again explodes.

The winners and losers among the outside parties are fairly clear cut. Egypt has demonstrated its ongoing regional relevance, in particular its unique ability to broker an effective Palestinian negotiating process (in contrast to other aspirants to this role such as Turkey and Qatar). In addition, Egypt may have found a formula to stabilize Gaza, which has been a bleeding wound on its northern border, and cut off support and sanctuary for Egyptian extremist groups in Sinai. Cairo has also delivered another crushing blow to the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE has played a crucial supporting role, working closely with the Egyptians and promising to fund the construction of a new power plant that would provide desperately needed electricity to Gazans and a fund for families of fighters killed in intra-Palestinian violence, particularly in 2007 when Hamas expelled Fatah from Gaza.

Egypt and the UAE have also probably succeeded in getting PA President Mahmoud Abbas to make a concession of his own, although all the formal ones came entirely from Hamas. Both countries have been angling to promote the return of former Fatah security chief Mohammed Dahlan to Gaza, where he retains popularity with Fatah members and has strong personal relations with some of the new generation of Hamas leaders. Yet he continues to be largely unpopular in the West Bank, and Abbas and Dahlan despise each other. Yet, if the agreement is going to be implemented, someone is going to have to lead the new Fatah-dominated administration and security structure in Gaza, and it is very likely to be Dahlan, who has been living in Abu Dhabi since 2011 and reportedly has close relations to UAE leaders.

It may be that, under the circumstances, the other benefits to Abbas were so attractive that he is finally ready to swallow the bitter pill of Dahlan returning to power in Gaza under the rubric of both Fatah and the PA. Indeed, for months Dahlan has been engaged in friendly talks with senior Hamas figures such as Yehya Sinwar and contributing money raised in the UAE. And he has been at the center of laying the groundwork for much of the new reconciliation deal.

Israel and the United States are both maintaining an arms-length distance from the agreement, but neither moved to stop the agreement. According to U.S. and Arab sources, the administration of U.S. President Donald J. Trump approves of the deal. And while Israel has been insisting publicly that Hamas must meet a long list of requirements that it is unlikely to agree to, Israeli officials were reportedly in Cairo on October 10 to confer with the Egyptian negotiators who brokered the agreement that was formally signed two days later. Therefore, it appears that although the United States and Israel are not publicly celebrating the accord, both are quietly pleased that control of Gaza borders may soon be in the hands of relatively trusted forces from Egypt and the PA.

The biggest loser, regionally and internationally, is almost certainly Qatar. Doha has long sought to be a major player in Gaza, and has viewed the Hamas government there as a key part of its regional network, along with other Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups and Turkey. However, as the confrontation between Qatar and the quartet of countries opposing Doha’s policies has festered, the campaign to squeeze Hamas in Gaza gained steam: The PA cut a range of support and services, Israel withheld electricity due to nonpayment, and pressure came from Egypt and elsewhere. Indeed, pressure from Cairo, which controls the Rafah crossing, had already pushed Hamas in May to renounce ties to the transnational Muslim Brotherhood movement.

Moreover, Cairo and the UAE made it clear that serious benefits were on offer, but with certain conditions, in particular, breaking the strong alliance with Doha. The first clear indication that such a choice was being made came with the October 2 visit to Gaza by PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah, a move that presaged the formal agreement between Hamas and Fatah. If Hamas is willing to take a backseat in the administration of Gaza, it therefore seems to have chosen, for now, to embrace Egypt and the UAE, and distance itself from Turkey and, much more importantly, Qatar.

It appears likely that this latest agreement, with its strong international support and regional backing and financing, will produce a new governance arrangement in Gaza. However, given continuing profound disagreements on the major national questions that persist among the Palestinian groups, the long-term prognosis for national reunification – and even the stability of the new administration in Gaza – are very questionable. Meanwhile, however, these developments can only be seen as a significant blow to the regional fortunes of Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood, and their allies, and a very significant victory for Egypt and the UAE, and their partners.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/what-the-tillerson-trump-tensions-mean-for-the-middle-east-1.664893

Rumours of tensions between Donald Trump and US secretary of state Rex Tillerson were confirmed, rather than dispelled, by the latter’s extraordinary press conference last week in which he denied that he’s considering resigning.

Mr Trump, in turn, expressed “total confidence” in his top diplomat. Mr Tillerson didn’t deny calling Mr Trump a “moron”, though his spokesperson insists he “does not use that type of language”. That leaves only the precise wording still unknown.

Many commentators have concluded Mr Tillerson won’t stay much longer. If personal and political differences were the decisive factors, as in any normal government, that would be correct, but Mr Trump’s administration doesn’t obey the laws of either classical or quantum political mechanics.

If it did, Jeff Sessions wouldn’t still be the attorney general. Instead, it’s all driven by the whims of a leader who can most charitably be described as impulsive and mercurial, and hence fundamentally unreadable.

So, while it’s very hard to know where Mr Trump’s caprices and “instincts” will take him and us all next, there’s no particular reason to think Mr Tillerson is, in fact, going anywhere.

To the contrary, the two seem, at least for now, stuck together. Mr Tillerson can’t go back to Exxon Mobil, and it’s not clear what he’d do after leaving office other than retire. Mr Trump can’t keep hemorrhaging senior officials. And what other plausible figure would accept the position, especially after what Mr Tillerson and the others have been through?

No matter how bad the personal and policy differences between the two might seem, the current arrangement actually suits both.

So, while nothing is ever predictable, let alone logical, in the Trump era, Mr Tillerson probably isn’t packing his bags.

Some in the Gulf have developed a pronounced aversion to Mr Tillerson, but even if he’s forced out or storms off, that won’t necessarily promote better policies. And it would certainly intensify the atmosphere of instability and chaos at the White House.

Dissatisfaction with Mr Tillerson is understandable for many reasons, but the appropriate response isn’t to imprudently ignore him or the state department, or pointlessly hope for his removal. Instead, US allies would be well advised to focus on a broad and institutional approach to gaining influence in Washington.

Even within the executive branch in any administration, it’s not just a matter of dealing with the right people in the White House, including the president. Even there, one deals with endless feuding factions.

But many powerful departments and agencies, beginning with the mighty Pentagon and including numerous others, have their own institutional cultures, imperatives and interests. And, of course, their own infighting cabals. Sometimes a really effective president can successfully overrule his own subordinates, but that’s surprisingly rare.

And then there’s Congress. In theory, the legislature has a limited role in foreign policy. But, in fact, US allies need congressional support to get what they want most of the time.A good example was the recent cut in aid to Egypt. Abdel Fattah El Sisi, Egypt’s president, has a strong personal relationship with Mr Trump, who has lavishly praised him. Cairo and its friends were, therefore, stunned when, in August, the administration cited human rights in cutting US$100 million (Dh368 million) in US support for Egypt and withholding another $195 million pending improvements.

Mr Trump’s personal goodwill towards Mr El Sisi appears sincere, but wasn’t decisive. Elements in his own administration were determined to punish Egypt, particularly regarding a restrictive new NGO law that Washington warned Cairo against. Moreover, the administration sought to forestall a looming and far larger congressional aid cut.

Beyond the executive and legislative branches of government, which includes most of the policy-making apparatus, lies a large and diverse, but highly influential, and in many subtle ways also powerful, policy-framing community.

This includes a wide spectrum of media, think tanks, academic institutions, lobbies, single-issue pressure groups and civil society organisations.

The US government was designed to be lobbied. The first amendment to the constitution prohibits congress from abridging “the right of the people…to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” In practice, that means lobbying and, in every other legal way, trying to influence law and policy.

Small but passionate and empowered minorities can even ensure the continuation of policies, like the Cuba embargo that pointlessly persisted for decades, or the ongoing lack of sensible firearm regulations, that majorities disagree with but don’t prioritise.

Whether Mr Tillerson stays or goes isn’t likely to have much impact on Mr Trump’s foreign policies. And Gulf countries should recognise that no matter how much some people may like Mr Trump or dislike Mr Tillerson, neither man nor any other individual or small group – not even a president – holds the keys to American foreign policy.

Instead, it’s formed over time by a complex web of interconnected inputs, a wide range of institutions and groups that, together, constitute a system which is open, constantly in flux, and beyond anyone’s ability to truly control.

The secret of American foreign policy is that there is no secret.

http://www.agsiw.org/saudis-are-about-to-buy-a-major-russian-missile-system-or-are-they/