http://m.thenational.ae/
When Donald Trump tweeted unmistakably strong support for the Arab
coalition confronting Qatar, the final window of hope slammed shut on
Doha. Qatar’s only practical way out of the crisis was hope that
Washington would mediate the crisis in a spirit of strict neutrality
and press all sides to return to the status quo ante. That’s clearly
not happening
Some voices in Washington did suggest such an approach, arguing that
the United States should avoid any involvement in a “spat” between
allies and that US military interests in Qatar overrule all other
considerations. This perspective – which is informed mainly by narrow
or ill-informed understandings and fails to appreciate the effect of
Qatar’s conduct on regional affairs – has not prevailed. A more
cautious and circumspect approach rather than blustering,
self-congratulatory presidential tweets would certainly have been
preferable. But the US clearly understands it has a major stake in the
outcome.
Secretary of state Rex Tillerson struck a more subtle tone. He
demanded that Qatar “must do more and … more quickly” to end support
and financing of terrorism, while calling on Arab states to “ease the
blockade against Qatar”.
Note that this apparently even-handed approach actually asks Qatar to
change its behaviour while urging the others to move back to towards
business as usual. Therefore, whether phrased bluntly or more subtly,
the American position is clearly siding firmly with the Arab bloc and
against Qatar.
Even more ominously for Doha, the Trump administration has asked Saudi
Arabia for a list of specific demands on Qatar to restore former
relations.
This confirms that Washington wants to resolve the dispute but
realises that this cannot involve a repetition of the 2014 rupture
wherein Qatar promised to change its behaviour but, after a period of
relative caution, backslid and resumed its support of political and
religious radicals and double-dealing on Iran.
Qatar is defiant and putting on a brave face. But the reality is that
it is surrounded by outraged neighbours, partners and nominal allies.
The travel, trade and communications embargoes that have been imposed,
especially by Saudi Arabia, which effectively controls Qatar’s only
land border, will be increasingly crippling. Moreover, sanctions are
widening and intensifying, and more Arab countries are joining the
camp that is downgrading relations with Qatar until it mends its ways.
Turkey is giving Qatar considerable diplomatic and rhetorical support,
and speeding up some limited and hardly game-changing military
cooperation. But the reality is that Ankara is not able to provide
Qatar with the breadth and depth of support the tiny country needs,
especially over the long run.
Nor can Turkey project enough power at such distances to become the
new Qatari patron and guarantor of its prerogatives over the vehement
objections and opposition of its immediate Arab neighbours.
Much as both Ankara and Doha might want this, the idea of Qatar
becoming a client of Turkey is neither realistic nor viable.
Iran, too, is offering a wide range of support to Qatar. Tehran is
clearly relishing the discord in the Arab camp and fanning the flames
as energetically as possible. Unlike Turkey’s offers, though, Qatar is
largely rebuffing Iran, at least in public. But more quietly Doha
certainly seems to be moving ever closer to Tehran, both confirming
some of the main charges against it and deepening the rift with Arab
countries and Washington.
Iran’s support is theoretically more realistic than Turkey’s, given
its geographical proximity to Qatar, but politically it is far more
non-viable. Indeed, any overt or substantive steps by Doha to
decisively align with Tehran would be a catastrophic error. It could
lead to suspension or expulsion from the Gulf Cooperation Council,
American moves to shift its military presence in Qatar to a
neighbouring country, and might even destabilise the Qatari regime
itself.
Doha knows all this full well and therefore must keep Iran at arm’s
length in public even if it moves closer to it in quieter ways during
the crisis. And it’s almost certain that Qatar will have to reverse
any moves towards Tehran – and then shift further away from it than it
has been in the past decade or more – if it wants to find a way out of
the crisis it has created for itself.
Not only does Qatar lack any viable options, especially now that
Washington has plainly sided against it, the crisis for Doha is just
beginning. If this drags on for months, the country’s economy will be
severely damaged, its regional role all but eliminated, and many of
its plans – possibly including hosting the World Cup – either
disrupted or rendered impossible.
Qatar may drag this out to share the pain, but it knows it is going to
have to capitulate eventually. And just as it is openly working with
Turkey and quietly with Iran to maximise its options and minimise the
damage it sustains during the confrontation, it is simultaneously now
taking steps to reach out and seek a resolution.
Qatar also knows that it cannot end the crisis without agreeing to a
series of measures the Arab bloc is demanding, especially insofar as
they are also insisted on by Washington. Doha is therefore visibly
moving towards negotiating the terms of its coming inevitable climb
down, and limiting the price it must pay. Doha cannot endure current
circumstances, let alone an additional significant escalation. Qatar
has no choice.