http://www.agsiw.org/can-moscow-effective-mideast-mediator/

Moscow increasingly aspires to play the role of mediator in the Middle East, but how seriously should we take this? Russia, along with Turkey and Iran, has been attempting to mediate between the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and some of its opponents in negotiations in the Kazakh capital, Astana, and in Geneva. There have also been reports that Moscow has not only offered to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but that it has even hosted some discussions between them. In addition, Moscow has offered to mediate between Israelis and Palestinians, and between warring factions in Yemen. There have been suggestions that Russia could mediate between opposing factions in Libya as well.

Moscow, it seems, wants to present itself as the solution to every problem in the region, or at least the go-to interlocutor with a unique ability to address the concerns of all responsible parties. The argument that Moscow puts forward in touting itself as the most suitable Middle East mediator is that Russia talks to all sides (except, of course, the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant and al-Qaeda) in any given Middle East conflict. The United States, by contrast, either does not talk with some Middle Eastern actors (such as the Syrian regime or Hizballah), or does not talk to them very effectively (such as Iran or the Palestine Liberation Organization).

In evaluating Soviet Middle East diplomacy in times past, Russian observers now believe that Moscow made a mistake in breaking diplomatic relations with Israel at the time of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. This was because when Arab governments decided they needed to reach a negotiated settlement with Israel, they turned to the United States, which had close ties to Israel, and not to the Soviet Union, which did not. And even when Moscow played an official role in convening various Middle East peace negotiations, the United States’ greater ability to work with Israel led to Moscow being sidelined in them. The apex of this process was U.S. diplomacy during and after the 1973 war, managed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in which the United States ensured that Israel was victorious but chastened, the Arabs defeated but not humiliated, the Russians engaged but as a supporting actor, and Washington positioned to communicate seriously with all parties offering to help them realize their post-conflict goals. Borrowing a phrase from his Watergate-embattled president, Richard Nixon, Kissinger called this positioning “the catbird seat.”

These days, as Moscow sees it, the situation is reversed. It is Moscow that can talk to all sides (except the jihadists) in several conflicts while it is Washington that cannot or will not. This is especially true when it comes to Iran. Although the Obama administration did talk to Tehran about the Iranian nuclear accord, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared that the Islamic Republic would not talk to Washington about anything else. The Trump administration has made clear that it is not interested in negotiating with Iran anyway. Because it can and does interact regularly and often positively with Iran, Moscow is (by Russian logic) in a much better position to help others, too, mediate their differences with Iran.

Being able to talk to all sides (or even just the main ones) in a conflict, though, is not by itself enough to allow Russia to play the role of Mideast mediator effectively. A mediator may also need to be in a position to incentivize opposing sides in a conflict to reach an agreement. The 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, for example, were facilitated by the Carter administration committing the United States to provide billions of dollars of assistance annually to both Egypt and Israel – something the United States has done ever since then. Even when Washington was not central to the negotiating breakthrough – as in the secret Israel-PLO talks in Oslo that did not directly involve the United States – U.S. good offices, assurances, and financial and other inducements were invaluable in translating the basic Israeli-Palestinian understandings into a series of complex agreements that, however imperfect, remain in effect to this day.

Russia is highly unlikely to be willing or able to provide enough assistance, much less anything even approaching what the United States has been providing Egypt and Israel, or even the Palestinian Authority, to induce warring Middle Eastern actors to stop fighting. Indeed, Russia is seeking to persuade the West and Gulf Arabs to deliver the assistance that Moscow can’t or won’t provide with arguments such as “Peace in Syria is a global public good.” But, it is unlikely that others are going to be willing to pay the costs of making Russian mediation, and hence foreign policy, work, as demonstrated by the negative reaction to these arguments from Western and Gulf Arab participants at the Valdai Discussion Club conference on the Middle East in Moscow in February.

Of course, aiding various opposing sides by itself may not be enough to resolve a conflict between them anyway. Saudi-Iranian rivalry, for example, does not seem amenable to being resolved in this way – even if Russia (either alone or with others) were in a position to offer Saudi Arabia and Iran assistance. What might be required in that case instead is the ability to help Riyadh and Tehran agree to delineate and respect each other’s spheres of influence in the Middle East region. But unless these two parties are willing to contemplate such an arrangement which, in effect, would cede areas of hegemony to the other side while accepting restrictions on their own interests or ambitions, no external mediator – including Russia – is likely to succeed in coaxing or cajoling them to do so.

Another problem for Moscow is that even if a party to an ongoing conflict has reasonably good relations with Russia, it might not want it as a mediator. During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s most recent meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he reportedly argued that Moscow was in a strong position to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians due to Russia’s close ties to the PLO – effectively adopting a mirror image of Washington’s claim that its “special relationship” with Israel positions the United States as the optimal broker – and offered to step in. Seemingly unimpressed, Netanyahu apparently turned down Putin’s offer. In this case, not only does Russia have insufficient resources to incentivize Israel to compromise with the Palestinians, but Moscow is not in any position to persuade or coerce Netanyahu to pursue an agreement if he does not want to.

Yet another problem Moscow faces in being an effective Middle East mediator is that it may face competition for this role – and not just from Washington. China, for example, has reportedly offered to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. If Riyadh and Tehran really were willing to have their differences mediated, China might be a far more attractive third party for both of them than Russia. Beijing, after all, can offer far more in terms of trade and investment than Moscow. But even if Riyadh and Tehran do not take up Beijing’s mediation offer, that China made it suggests not only that Beijing does not think Moscow can play this role effectively, but also that Beijing is not particularly concerned about any sensitivity Moscow may have about China offering to play the role of mediator to which Russia aspires.

Beijing does not have the historical baggage that Moscow, with its long engagement and controversial legacy in the Middle East, has accumulated. This deep history can complicate Russia’s regional agenda. For example, deep-seated narratives about 19th century Russian imperialism have made it exceedingly difficult politically for the Iranian regime to allow Moscow to deploy air force bombers at Iran’s Hamadan base for use in the joint intervention in Syria. In August 2016, Iran reversed such permissions after only a week. Despite the clear strategic benefits to both sides, the idea was, as one expert aptly put it, “just too much for Iranian domestic politics to bear.” Russian media reports claim that the use of the base has quietly resumed, but this illustrates that not just Washington, but Moscow as well, inspires suspicions, and even hostility, among erstwhile allies and interlocutors in the Middle East.

While Russia is benefiting, at least for now, from positioning itself as an “alternative” to the United States on a range of issues and roles, sooner rather than later it will have to take full responsibility for its own policies and actions. Should Moscow make a concerted effort to “own” diplomacy on conflict resolution in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and other regional battlegrounds – especially where it is perceived to be more of a belligerent than a well-intentioned bystander – this could quickly extract more costs than benefits, especially if negotiations are unsuccessful and, worse, seen as part of a calculated and self-interested Russian strategy. China is in a far better position – lacking both the historical baggage and present-day direct engagement in Middle East conflicts that can undermine U.S. and Russian diplomatic initiatives – to convincingly lay claim to an “honest broker” title, should Beijing really want such a role.

Being able to talk with all sides in a conflict may be a necessary condition for being an effective mediator. But it is not a sufficient one. For a host of reasons, then, Moscow does not appear to be as suited to the role of Mideast mediator, in as many conflict situations, and as effectively, as the Kremlin would have us believe.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/unreliable-america-is-now-unpredictable-too

The chaos in Washington is now far beyond the mere political “disruption” promised by Donald Trump. He has, in amazingly short order, so compromised key norms and institutions of American governance that much of the system has been cast into open-ended disarray. Any further deterioration could have serious consequences for American allies, including in the Gulf.

Last weekend, Mr Trump made by far the most incendiary charge ever leveled by any American president against a predecessor, accusing Barack Obama of illegally wiretapping his communications for political purposes during the presidential campaign and calling him a “bad (or sick) guy”.

But this is not only an accusation against Mr Obama. Any such surveillance would have been conducted by the FBI, which also would have broken the law, as well as its own strict policies.

FBI director James Comey and Mr Obama have reportedly vehemently denied the accusations. And no one in the Trump administration can offer any evidence to support the claim, or is even willing to say they believe it’s true.

However, it seems that a computer server in Trump Tower and some of Mr Trump’s associates may have been incidentally caught up in lawful and court-authorised foreign intelligence surveillance of two Russian banks. Beyond that, additional intelligence or criminal warrants may exist.

If that’s what Mr Trump was referring to, he inexplicably decided to implicate himself in an actual criminal or intelligence investigation.

Lindsey Graham, a Republican senator, has called this an unprecedented scandal and, in a letter co-authored with another senator, demanded copies of any relevant criminal court orders or warrants. Mr Graham notes that either Mr Obama illegally tapped Mr Trump’s communications or he obtained legal warrants to do so based on demonstrable evidence of foreign intelligence or criminal activity.

But what is, perhaps, even more disturbing and clearly implicit in Mr Graham’s carefully worded formula, is a third scenario: that Mr Trump was making groundless, and indeed libellous, accusations against Mr Obama and the FBI because he is a stranger, equally, to both reason and reality, and because issuing these tweets simply made him feel good.

Americans and their allies are thus now confronted with one of only three possibilities. Either Mr Obama is a heinous villain. Or Mr Trump is a suspected criminal, or agent of a foreign power, based on credible evidence. Or Mr Trump is pathologically unstable.

There is no plausible fourth explanation of the facts, despite efforts by some Trump supporters to posit interpretations wherein both his accusations and the unanimous official denials can somehow both be correct. They can’t.

And no matter which of these three scenarios proves true, Washington is in desperate trouble.

Meanwhile, an almost daily drip of revelations involving ties between the Trump camp and Russia is exacerbating profound suspicions of improper collusion.

The publication Politico has even issued seven flowcharts illustrating these mind-bogglingly elaborate ties. They all might amount to nothing, except that so many have been falsely denied – not least by Mr Trump, who now insists “I have nothing to do with Russia,” while for years he boasted about his deep Russian connections.

Too many lies. Too much smoke.

Several investigations are under way, and the truth will be out. But, for now, the Trump administration is greatly distracted and badly damaged.

For the Gulf Arab countries, this is very bad news.

They had much to legitimately hope for from Mr Trump and several of his senior appointees, as illustrated by the state department’s recent decision to unblock the sale of precision munitions to Saudi Arabia.

But the downside of the Trump presidency has been the destabilising uncertainty it has produced over US international attention and intentions.

Admittedly, Mr Trump’s caprices are an even bigger headache for Americans, above all his own national security professionals, who can’t guess what bizarre bombshell is coming next from a profoundly impulsive president who clearly regards them as an enemy within.

Vertiginous disorientation now transcends mere policy doubts, undermining the stability, credibility and future of the administration itself.

The Gulf countries were unhappy with Mr Obama because he generated doubts about Washington’s reliability, mainly through his words, but also, sometimes, his risk-averse deeds such as the Syria “red line” reversal.

Mr Trump has added extreme unpredictability to apparent unreliability, greatly complicating, rather than resolving, these concerns. Gulf countries should therefore hope for a quick resolution, either way, to the governance crisis in Washington.

Should Mr Trump somehow stabilise his parlous political condition, some of their hopes regarding US policies may be realised.

But if he continues to spiral into chaos and paralysing dysfunction, Gulf countries would be clear beneficiaries of a rapid and smooth transition of power.

They would, after all, still be dealing with a post-Obama Republican White House and Congress. Just without this unsustainable, unmanageable volatility.

http://www.agsiw.org/china-leg-key-success-king-salmans-asia-tour/

The administration of President Donald J. Trump has suggested that one of its foreign policy goals may be to attempt to persuade Russia to distance itself from Iran and even cooperate with the United States against Tehran. The benefits for Moscow seem clear to those in Washington who think the United States and Russia have important common interests in the Middle East: Russia’s relations with the West and the Gulf Arabs would markedly improve, and, as the P5+1 nuclear deal demonstrates, the United States and Russia working together have greater prospects for ensuring that Iran does not break out of its commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons (which is just as much of a threat to Russia). Further, sidelining Tehran would enable Moscow and Washington to cooperate on resolving the conflict in Syria and pursue the mutual aim of eliminating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other extremist groups.

But, while this logic may appear compelling to its advocates in Washington, it is not likely to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin, for whom it poses two problems: First, siding with Washington against Tehran involves serious risks for Moscow; second, Putin cannot be confident that the costs he incurs from a poorer Russian-Iranian relationship will be compensated by benefits from a potential improved Russian-U.S. relationship.

For Moscow to side with Washington against Tehran means that Russian-Iranian relations are bound to deteriorate, and Moscow has reasons to fear this. As many Russian observers have pointed out, the Kremlin has benefited significantly from the improvement in Moscow-Tehran ties that occurred at the end of the Cold War. Tehran worked with Moscow to resolve the 1992-97 Tajik Civil War on terms favorable to Tajikistan’s pro-Russian government. Moscow and Tehran both supported the Taliban’s adversaries that prevented the group from taking over Afghanistan before the U.S.-led intervention after 9/11. And most important, the Iranian government (unlike the governments of some Arab states) expressed support for Russian efforts to prevent secessionist efforts by Muslim rebels in Chechnya.

Maintaining good relations with Iran, then, has been seen as important for Moscow in maintaining its influence in Central Asia as well as control of the North Caucasus inside Russia. If Russian-Iranian ties deteriorate in response to Putin responding to Trump’s invitation to side with the United States against Iran, all this could be put at risk. A hostile Iran could do much to support anti-Russian forces in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Tehran may not be able to bring these groups to power, but it could greatly increase the costs Russia must pay to suppress them.

Perhaps the most contentious issue between Russia and Iran is the future of Syria, where, despite many tactical and short-term commonalities, the longer-term interests of the two partners appear to diverge. But even in this case, Moscow is in no position to break with Tehran, at least under current circumstances, and lacks any clear motivation to do so. The coordinated Russian-Iranian intervention in Syria that began in fall 2015 (supplementing an ongoing Iranian intervention with Hizballah and Iraqi Shia militias that had been failing) was a dramatic military, diplomatic, and political success for both countries. Iran was able to secure its interests, and that of its paramount international asset, the Lebanese Shia Hizballah militia, and forestall a potentially disastrous defeat through the downfall of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia was able to reassert its influence in the Middle East and claim to be a resurgent power on the international stage, not just along its borders or within the territory of the former Soviet Union.

However, their broader interests in Syria, while overlapping and complementary, are not, and never have been, identical. In addition to asserting a regional and global role, Russia is assuring access to its only major military bases outside of the territory of the former Soviet Union, in Tartus and Hmeimim. Russia also has major financial assets and investments in Syria, and a significant number of expatriates living in the country. The stakes for Iran are much more existential. Tehran regards its presence in Syria as essential to securing and maintaining its all-important “land bridge” to Hizballah in Lebanon. It also regards the maintenance of a friendly, and in many ways subordinate, regime in Damascus as essential to the defense of the Shia-dominated (and Iran friendly) Iraqi government, which might be destabilized by a hostile Sunni regime in Syria. The Iranian right wing even raises fears that a hostile Sunni regime in Damascus could threaten Tehran’s hold over Iran’s predominantly Arab Khuzestan region. The emergence of an antagonistic, or even ambivalent, government in Damascus, then, would be an enormous setback to Iran and its entire regional project.

In the immediate term, Moscow and Tehran are both getting their way in Syria, though their interests might diverge. Any party seeking a stable end to the conflict in Syria will have to accept that the Assad regime, particularly without a change of leadership at the top, cannot preside over a sustainable new national order, however decentralized. Assad himself is simply too tainted with the brutality and bloodshed of the conflict to be seen by much of the population as minimally legitimate.

On this key point, Moscow and Tehran will not necessarily see eye to eye in the long run. For Russia, it is easy to imagine maintaining its interests in Syria following a regime change, as long as those interests are respected by all parties. However, neither Iran nor Hizballah can secure their core interests in Syria beyond the present ruling elite, and probably not beyond Assad himself. There is simply no other plausible regime in Syria that would acquiesce to placing the basic interests of the state at the service of Iran and its Lebanese proxy group. Moreover, Russia could seek to parlay its influence in Syria; its ability to work with Turkey to forge a functional cease-fire, and possibly even a viable endgame in the country; and its vital cooperation in the battle against ISIL, for potential Western concessions regarding Crimea and parts of Ukraine.

However, none of these divisions has been exploited by the West, Turkey, or the Arab states in a manner that incentivizes Moscow to distance itself from Tehran. To the contrary, as things stand both Russia and Iran need each other to secure their fundamental interests in Syria. Russia has provided the air cover, intelligence, weapon systems, and key diplomatic and political support for the Iranian/Hizballah project in Syria. Iran, Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, and the Syrian forces under Iran and Hizballah’s sway have provided the key ground troops that have driven rebel fighters out of Aleppo and many other areas of what both Moscow and Tehran regard as “necessary Syria” for their own purposes. Without Russian support, Iran and Hizballah wouldn’t have been able to engineer the regime’s remarkable turnaround and inflict the strategic losses suffered by the Syrian rebels. But without Iranian-allied forces, Russia wouldn’t have been able to outflank the United States, Turkey, and the Gulf Arab countries in engineering the survival and limited victory of the regime.

Therefore, neither Moscow nor Tehran has any incentive to break their alliance on Syria. As things stand, they are both pleased, albeit for very different reasons, by the dramatic resuscitation of the Assad regime and the relative collapse of more moderate rebel groups in key strategic areas. And given that nothing has been done to exploit the ways in which they differ, Moscow has every reason to stick with the Iranians and their allies in a partnership that has produced strikingly effective mutual benefits.

Moreover, Iran and its allies on the ground in Syria have the ability to greatly complicate the Russian position in the country should Moscow attempt to undermine and thwart them, particularly in concert with other powers. Therefore, whatever Russia’s differences with Iran over the long-term future of Syria might be, for now the partnership between the two seems rock-solid, and highly unlikely to be threatened without major efforts to change Russia’s calculations and incentive structures. There is, moreover, scant basis for anticipating any such developments in the near future.

Besides, what would Putin gain from Trump in return for running the risks he would incur for distancing Russia from Iran? There was great hope in Russia when Trump was elected president that Washington would ease the sanctions regime on Russia as well as accommodate Russia on Crimea, Ukraine, and NATO (which candidate Trump had described as obsolete). So far, though, none of the benefits Moscow expected have materialized. Further, despite his positive statements about Russia, some of Trump’s top foreign policy, intelligence, and defense appointments have expressed a much more negative view toward the country. Finally, rising concerns about the Trump campaign’s ties to Russia have now made it very difficult for Trump to do much of anything favoring Russia. Indeed, Trump’s statements about increasing the U.S. nuclear arsenal after he became president may have led Putin to wonder whether Trump ever really intended to oversee an improvement in Russian-U.S. relations.

For Putin to side with Trump on Tehran, then, could risk serious costs for Moscow from Iranian retaliation while yielding few, if any, benefits from the United States in recompense. While the logic of why Russia should cooperate with the United States against Iran might seem persuasive in Washington, the logic of why Russia should not remains highly compelling in Moscow.

Mark N. Katz is a visiting scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Hussein Ibish is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/republicans-start-to-look-to-mike-pence-for-comfort

Vice-president Mike Pence is starting to cast a very long shadow indeed in Washington. Events are brewing that, just possibly, might make him the most consequential second fiddle, though perhaps not for long, in recent American history.

Either the noose is really beginning to tighten around the Donald Trump administration regarding connections between his campaign and Russian intelligence, or one of the most ridiculous comedies of error in American memory has been playing out in recent weeks.

While it might all be a massive farce rather than a tragedy, it’s not too early to speculate about what, if things start to completely unravel for Mr Trump, the endgame might look like.

His first national security adviser, Michael Flynn, was fired after he lied to Mr Pence and the FBI about phone calls with the Russian ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak, in which they discussed sanctions imposed by the outgoing Obama administration.

Now, attorney general Jeff Sessions has been caught in an equally blatant lie about contacts with this same senior Russian diplomat and, almost certainly, key intelligence official.

Mr Sessions told the Senate, verbally and in writing, that he had had no contact whatsoever with Russian officials during the campaign. But, in fact, he met the ambassador twice. He is now thoroughly tainted and has recused himself from the Russia investigations.

Why, like Mr Flynn, did Mr Sessions tell a stupid and reckless lie that was bound to be discovered and exposed? What is the Trump team hiding about their connections to Russia?

Could this be a cover-up without any underlying scandal? Does that ever happen? Is it all just rank stupidity, and Mr Trump’s inexplicable infatuation with Vladimir Putin just a coincidence?

It’s always possible, but looking increasingly less plausible. Whenever, as now, a White House is pressuring the FBI not to investigate something, every alarm bell shrieks.

Very few facts are known, but a pattern is emerging: for whatever reason this administration is engaged in a Nixonian stonewalling and denial effort, increasingly reminiscent of Watergate, no less. If any underlying scandal is indeed connected to efforts to influence the election by a hostile foreign power, it will be an even bigger earthquake.

Richard Nixon was somewhat immunised by his clownish, fuming vice president, Spiro Agnew. Anyone considering removing Nixon had to take seriously the prospect and consequences of facilitating the emergence of a President Agnew. It gave them pause.

Agnew’s guilty plea on corruption charges was a significant blow to Nixon. So was Agnew’s replacement by Gerald Ford, who was widely considered plausible, though hardly ideal, presidential material.

Just as the spectre of Agnew bought Nixon some precious political space and time, now the looming shadow of Mr Pence may start to haunt Mr Trump.

The conventional wisdom is that Mr Trump is protected from any effective oversight by the Republican-dominated Congress because he seems willing to sign much of their legislation, nominate judges they like and cooperate on some things.

However, many congressional Republicans still harbour private doubts.

The only major tenet of traditional American conservatism Mr Trump truly embraces is deregulation. Regarding almost all other once-core Republican principles, such as small government, budget hawkishness and entitlement rollbacks, social conservatism, and robust international leadership, he either isn’t interested or is actively hostile. Mr Trump’s recent address to Congress reflected none of these ideas.

Mr Pence, by contrast, is a traditional conservative Republican. His politics reflect the Reagan legacy, not the populist “nationalism” of Breitbart.com.

Moreover, as unsettling as Mr Trump has been as president, Mr Pence has proven reassuring, and, perhaps surprisingly, statesmanlike, as vice president. Despite his doctrinaire Republican background, he has been among the more calming features of the administration, a welcome vestige of American political normality, however conservative, in profoundly abnormal circumstances.

Republicans, particularly in Congress, have made little real progress in ensuring that Mr Trump embraces their governing agenda rather than his wildly divergent campaign pledges.

If the Trump-Russia imbroglio continues to develop, as seems likely, and significantly undermines Mr Trump’s credibility and legitimacy as president, congressional Republicans will be faced with a very difficult choice.

Getting rid of a president from their own party would certainly be painful and difficult.

However, when the alternative is a familiar, trusted figure Mr Pence, who could be counted on to return the party, government and agenda to a more familiar conservative approach, rather than Mr Trump’s wild-eyed nativism, that very bitter pill may have a sugary coating.

They may not relish the required process, but how many conservative Republicans in Congress wouldn’t, in their heart of hearts, much prefer to work with a president Pence instead of president Trump? It’s a question they may have to ask themselves sooner rather than later. Some of them, very quietly, already are.

https://thebaffler.com/blog/undoing-islamophobia-ibish

The moment is ripe to reverse anti-Muslim narratives

As the Muslim American community is learning, sometimes the worst of times can also be the best of times. The era of Donald Trump presents a series of profoundly difficult, and in many ways unprecedented, challenges to the diverse, dispersed, extremely heterogeneous, and almost entirely politically unorganized Muslim American communities. But, since American Muslims have largely failed to take advantage of earlier opportunities (which, it’s true, were likewise quite well disguised as disasters) to deepen their collective identity and complete the process of mainstreaming their participation in American society and culture, there is a surprisingly compelling argument for greeting the current baptism of fire as a golden opportunity that cannot be squandered.

In some ways, of course, it’s been worse in the past. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a social, cultural, and political earthquake for Muslim Americans. The metaphorical ground shifted under our collective feet suddenly, unexpectedly, and irrevocably. I was then serving as the communications director of what was, at the time, the largest national Arab-American organization, and all of us scrambled to adjust our expectations, rhetoric, and priorities accordingly. Most of the immediate damage was at the level of immigration, and noncitizens bore the brunt of the backlash.

But over the ensuing few years, the steady and inexorable rise of Islamophobic narratives and political attitudes ensured that a climate of cultural hostility only grew, despite the obvious disinclination of Muslim Americans, with extremely rare exceptions, to display any sympathy with terrorist groups, let alone specific acts of violence. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Islam rated just slightly lower than Catholicism in American public opinion. By the middle of the decade, these ratings plummeted, and rampant bigotry was both on the rise and making inroads in the political mainstream, particularly within key elements of the right. Meanwhile, the Muslim-American community had virtually no organized presence at the national level, certainly none that was any better than what had been in place prior to 9/11. This meant, for better and worse, that we were entirely dependent on the goodwill of our fellow citizens.

These Islamophobic narratives eventually broke through into the cultural and political mainstream in the Trump campaign. Indeed, they were instrumental in the victory of a racist demagogue who showed a particular animus against Mexican immigrants and Muslims in general. Worse, President Trump has appointed a number of hateful ideologues to senior administration positions, such as Steve Bannon, Stephen Miller, Michael Anton, and Sebastian Gorka, and they wasted no time in crafting an anti-Muslim travel ban executive order so crude that it met with a series of mass protests at U.S. airports. In short order, it was blocked by the courts, and now awaits re-drafting from the Muslim-baiting Trump White House.

There is no doubt that the cultural and political mainstreaming of Islamophobia in the Trump era is profoundly alarming. But the moment is ripe with genuine possibilities for political organization and wider civic acceptance over the longer term. Muslim Americans now find themselves in roughly the same position as millions of other members of racial and ethnic minorities: targeted by the rhetoric of an intolerant administration and its fan base that derives much of its energy from hatred, scapegoating, and demonization. This means that the American Muslim community now possesses—unwillingly, no doubt—vital new opportunities for coalition building, and creating new modes of cross-racial and religiously plural solidarity. And this means, in turn, that American Muslims can mount new and sturdier grassroots and national cultural efforts to mainstream the community.

Moreover, in contrast to the aftermath of 9/11, while in this case the bigots wielding executive power in the White House have definitely tried to “come first for the Muslims” (or at least travelers from seven Muslim-majority countries—initially including even green card holders—plus all Syrian refugees), the worst excesses of the Trumpian assault on minorities will be clearly visited upon the undocumented, mainly from Mesoamerica. Already the horror stories of roundups, deportations, intentions to recruit a small army of 10,000 new immigration and 5,000 new border enforcement officers, and other dystopian realities are mounting daily.

As for religious hatred, naturally this cannot be restricted to the bashing of Muslims. Trump was consciously courted and coddled by the “alt-right”—a new euphemism for white nationalists and neo-Nazi racists—during his campaign. In office, the president persists in embracing, often implicitly but sometimes explicitly, these groups and individuals. It’s no surprise, then, that a wave of anti-Semitic hatred, no doubt egged on by what racist groups themselves described as “winking and nodding” from Trump, is sweeping the country. Jewish community centers face waves of bomb threat hoaxes and Jewish cemeteries are being vandalized across the country. But what can we expect when one of the final campaign ads by the new president reproduced the feel of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, illustrated with footage of three prominent Jewish financial figures? No one is naïve enough not to pick up on such crude anti-Semitic stereotyping, or to extrapolate from what it portends for other minorities. And in a continuation of the pattern, Trump has had to be forced, probably by his own daughter, into making the simplest of expressions of concern. This reticence in the face of a morally unconscionable form of bigotry in effect lends encouragement through faint condemnation.

It’s essential for Muslim Americans to express full solidarity with these, and all other, victims of official prejudice during the next four years. Apart from the inherent justice of such a stand, this new mode of outreach born of necessity will permit American Muslims to re-inscribe their place in the mainstream American cultural narrative and normative self image. At the same time, though, far too little was also done to mainstream the community or effectively combat narratives that push Muslims to the margins of society, at least in stereotypical cultural terms. Likewise, nothing effectively dislodged Muslim Americans from the suspicion-laden role of quintessential other in the contemporary American imagination.

That’s very much still the case—and under Trump, probably more than ever for much of the country. It’s hard to not strongly suspect that the two Indian engineers shot by a racist anti-immigrant fanatic at a bar in Kansas were assumed by the gunman to be of Middle Eastern origin, and probably Muslims. Racists frequently mistake South Asians for “Arabs,” while actual Arab Americans often remain largely undetected by racists unless identified by distinctive names. Hollywood, which so often plays a leading role in shaping the cultural logic of ethnic exclusion and assimilation, has a long history of casting South Asian actors as Arab and Muslim terrorist villains—presumably because actual Arabs aren’t quite dark and swarthy enough to meet the stereotype, whereas many Indians are.

Nonetheless, the central place of anti-Muslim hatred in the Trumpian spectrum of indeed deplorably hateful attitudes is why a new mobilization of Muslim Americans represents not only an urgent tool of survival, but also a dramatic moment of political opportunity. Islamophobia is now part and parcel of a broader agenda of intolerance, nativism, and white nationalism aimed at huge portions of the country. And this threat is demanding and receiving massive resistance from the energized center-left axis of tolerance in American civic life. During the few days that the “travel ban” was in force, tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Americans participated in those airport protests and mobilized otherwise to resist. Millions, including many conservatives and Republicans, made their disgust with the scarcely concealed racism behind the ban quite clear. (Just yesterday, in fact, George W. Bush gave an interview to People magazine deploring the racism that the Trump administration echoes and legitimizes in American life.)

And now, in turn, Muslim Americans are mobilizing to help repair desecrated Jewish cemeteries, support undocumented immigrants facing deportation, and join with their fellow Americans in rejecting the entire atrocious package of hate that this new administration has brought through the front door of the White House.

It’s a pretty good start, but it’s not nearly enough. If Muslim Americans are smart, they will ensure three things. First, they will continue to emphasize their solidarity with other targeted communities and all Americans who reject bigotry of all kinds. Second, they will make themselves invaluable participants in the campaign to defend traditional American values of tolerance, openness, liberty and respect for others. And finally, they will collectively seize the opportunity to re-inscribe their place in the American narrative as an integral part of mainstream society and culture. Rejecting extremism and condemning terrorism isn’t enough; what’s more, it’s been done by almost all noted Muslim Americans since 9/11, if not before. What’s essential is to embrace Americanness, and real, traditional American values. This means, among many other things, that Muslim Americans must be at the forefront of the fight to preserve—and increasingly, to restore—them in the face of the most sustained assault they have received in many decades. A concerted effort on all these fronts, both nationally and globally, may well ensure that at the end of this ordeal, Muslim Americans will never be the “other” again.